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The Evolution of Citizenship Economic and Institutional Determinants ∗
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ABSTRACT We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median voter model of citizenship laws determination. Next we test the implications of the model on a new dataset on citizenship laws across countries of the world. We show that citizenship laws have responded endogenously to economic and institutional determinants. When facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli tradition tend to restrict their legislation, while jus sanguinis countries resist innovation. The welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for jus soli legislation, while demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, while the instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual impact. .Key Words: citizenship laws, international migration, legal origins, democracy, borders. 1
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1. Introduction Each country of the world has established a complex system of rules that govern the attribution of citizenship. As a consequence of the increasing pressure of international migration, citizenship laws have moved to center stage on policy agendas, since citizenship laws not only affect the design of immigration policy, but also interact with the workings of labor markets, affect welfare programs, and influence demographic trends. Citizenship is the legal institution that designates full membership in a state and the associated rights and duties. It provides benefits such as the right to vote, better employment opportunities, and the ability to travel without restrictions, legal protection in case of criminal charges, and the possibility to obtain a visa for a relative. There are also costs to citizenship, such as the military draft, renunciation of the original citizenship, and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs that may be required for naturalization and for recognition at the age of majority. Examples are language and culture tests, waiting periods, and a commitment to avoid activities leading to disqualification. There are several ways to acquire citizenship: at birth, by naturalization, by marriage.

The regulation of citizenship at birth, which determines citizenship acquisition by second- generation immigrants, is rooted in the well-defined bodies of common and civil law. The former traditionally applies the jus soli principle, according to which citizenship is attributed by birthplace: this implies that the child of an immigrant is a citizen, as long as he is born in the country of immigration. The latter applies the jus sanguinis principle, which attributes citizenship by descent, so that a child inherits citizenship from his parents, independently of where he is born. Despite being rooted in these principles, during the 20th century - and especially after World War II - in many countries citizenship laws have gone through a process of continuous adaptation, in conjunction with the decolonization phase, the collapse of the socialist system, and the mounting pressure of international migration. In this paper we investigate the determinants and evolution of citizenship laws in the postwar period from a political economy perspective. To pursue this goal, we assemble a new dataset which codifies citizenship laws across the countries of the world, with a specific focus on the provisions that regulate the access to citizenship at birth. The dataset is then used to study the dynamic adaptation of these laws, by relating the observed patterns to a
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number of potential determinants, including economic factors as well as other political and cultural factors which have been found relevant in related research on institutions. Modern sociopolitical theories have advanced several hypotheses concerning the determinants of citizenship laws dynamics, on the basis of case studies and nonquantitative cross country comparisons. The legal tradition established in a given country is generally believed to exert a persistent impact on current legislation. The relevance of migration has also been investigated. In particular, pressure from a large stock of migrants is perceived as a factor that shapes a country's attitude toward citizenship policy. On the one hand, it could push toward a legislation that allows automatic citizenship granting for all newborn. On the other, migration could also drive toward restrictions of the same principle in countries where it was originally applied. According to some sociopolitical theories, the combination of these forces tends to induce convergence toward a mix of jus soli and sanguinis provisions for countries coming from different legal traditions (Weil 2001). For the case of Europe, Baubock et al. (2006) instead stress the presence of divergent trends, towards liberalization in some countries and toward restriction of access to citizenship in others. The influence of other economic forces is also recognized. Since citizenship rights determine the ability to enjoy welfare benefits, the shaping of nationality laws has been linked with the nature of the welfare state, with a large government representing a potential obstacle to the retention of jus soli (Joppke 1998). This argument, however, has to be weighted against the potential gain coming from the acquisition of relatively young new citizens for countries with expensive

pension systems and in the midst of a demographic crisis. Political factors have also been found relevant. The presence of a consolidated democracy is expected to lead to the adoption of jus soli, viewed as a more equal treatment of aliens. Stabilization of state borders should reduce the pressure to preserve a national identity through jus sanguinis. Finally, an additional factor that has been the subject of debate is the influence of national character and culture. The theory advanced by Brubaker (1992) focuses on France and Germany as two antagonistic kinds of nationhood, the former more assimilationists, and the latter more ethnocentric, which also differ in their definitions of citizenship. In this paper we formalize the above hypotheses within a simple median voter model which can guide our empirical investigation by generating testable implications and by offering an interpretation of the resulting evidence.
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The model is based on the assumption that the laws regulating citizenship acquisition can be viewed as the outcome of the decision problem faced by a native median voter, in a context where citizenship confers the right to vote over policy variables. In making this decision, the native median voter takes into account the associated benefits and costs, which depend on the share of migrants over population and the other factors suggested by the literature. The model indicates that the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous impact on the decision to grant citizenship and voting rights to migrants, since it increases the loss, for the native median voter, of letting migrants vote, but it also increases the cost associated with their exclusion. Moreover, the natives' decision is positively influenced by a relatively high income level of the migrants, a small welfare state, a relatively old native population, a high level of democracy, a stable national border, and an inclusive national culture. We test the above empirical implications and find that in the postwar period citizenship laws have responded endogenously and systematically, through a slow but steady process of adaptation, to economic and institutional factors. Overall, our results suggest that migration pushes national legislations in the direction of jus sanguinis, not jus soli. In particular, when we take into account the legal tradition established in the matter of citizenship, we find that countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. On the other hand, in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration has been negligible. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mixed regime, since migration tends to induce restrictions, but not extensions. Other economic factors also matter. While the welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation, demographic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes.

Turning to institutional factors, we find that a high degree of democracy is significantly associated with a jus soli legislation while border instability, in particular following the decolonization phase, decreases its likelihood. Cultural characteristics captured by religion and ethic fractionalization are not found to play a significant role. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 reviews the historical and legal background for the issues we address. Section 4 presents our model of citizenship laws determination. Section 5 describes our dataset on citizenship laws around the world 4

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Section 6 investigates empirically the determinants of current citizenship laws and presents our main results, together with a set of robustness checks. Section 7 develops an alternative empirical strategy that highlights the determinants of change in citizenship laws. Section 8 concludes and indicates directions for future research. The Data Appendix collects information about the data employed. 2. Related Literature Our work is related with several branches of the economic literature. First of all, this paper adds to research on international migration and migration policy. Timmer and Williamson (1998), Hatton and Williamson (2006) and Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) empirically analyze immigration policies enacted at the end of the 19th century during the mass migration era, while O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Mayda (2006) estimate voters' attitudes toward immigration in the postwar period. The political economy of migration has been modeled, among others, by Benhabib (1996), Gradstein and Schiff (2006), and DeVoretz (2006). More specifically, the role of citizenship policy has been discussed by DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2006), who investigate the economic costs and benefits derived from citizenship, by Pritchett (2006), who evaluates citizenship policy within a broader discussion on labor mobility and

(1998). This paper also relates to the comparative legal approach initiated by La Porta et al. More broadly. our work contributes to the research program which has focused on the historical determinants of institutions. Sadka. with contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). and Robinson (2001) contribute to the understanding of how institutions evolve by using historical variables as instruments for contemporary measures of the quality of institutions. they do not examine the determinants of these alternative regimes. and Swagel (2002) and Dolmas and Huffman (2004).immigration policies. Johnson. However. On the other hand. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) highlight the relevance of wealth inequality and political factors in accounting for how fundamental economic 5 Page 7 institutions developed over time. (2008) specifically analyze the evolution of an index of formalism of legal procedure. Since our theory emphasizes that citizenship rights imply the right to vote. while Bertocchi (2007) concentrates on the conflict between men and women. The basic premise of this research line is the recognition that laws in different countries are adopted or transplanted from a few legal traditions and that the resulting legislative bodies reflect both the influence of the legal origin and the subsequent revision specific to individual countries. who evaluate the determinants of the decision to naturalize. Balas et al. We add to this stream by focusing on the determinants of the dynamic adaptation of nationality rules. our work is also related to Razin. Acemoglu. but with a focus on the conflict between rich and poor.. Bertocchi and Spagat (2001). the issue of franchise extension has recently received considerable attention within the literature. . and by Chiswick and Miller (2008). who compare the impact of migration on the welfare state with or without voting rights for the migrants.

Citizenship Laws in Historical Perspective Citizenship policy can be viewed as part of broader migration policy. 3. the process of nation-state formation and the associated codification effort were completed in Continental Europe. However. is also relevant to our approach. following feudal traditions which linked human beings to the lord who held the land where they were born. The French Revolution broke with this heritage and with the 1804 civil code reintroduced the ancient Roman custom of jus sanguinis. and also because borders play an important role on the determination of citizenship rules. and thus state borders. On the other hand. In 18th century Europe jus soli was the dominant criterion. the British preserved their jus soli tradition and spread it through their own colonies. By the end of the 19th century. At the same time. By imitation. citizenship laws reforms tend to be the outcome of long-term processes of adaptation often involving constitutional amendments. contrary to other migration policy measures such as quotas and visa requirements. Japan also adopted jus sanguinis in this phase. During the 19th century the jus sanguinis principle was adopted throughout Europe and then transplanted to its colonies. that are typically adjusted to the business cycle and to the current government orientation. starting with the United States where it was later encoded in 6 Page 8 the Constitution. recent work by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) on the optimal determination of the size of nations. . Continental modern citizenship law was subsequently built on these premises.Finally. both because country size in this literature is the same as population size and is potentially influenced by migration and by the legal status of immigrants.

and jus sanguinis regulating citizenship law in most civil law countries. 1 In particular. with jus soli being the norm in common law countries. with its colonies. the next century witnessed a continuous process of transformation of citizenship laws across the world. 2 Australia Current citizenship law in Australia differs considerably from that of the United . civil law Latin America had embraced jus soli early on. drawing mostly from Joppke (1998). Debate about possible restrictions did arise recently. 2001) and Brubaker (1992). and with a general positive attitude toward economic liberalism. However. jus soli came under attack in the 1980s regarding its applicability to the children of illegal immigrants. by that stage. Therefore.the revolutionary phase was over in those countries that had been the subject of the earlier colonization era. Consistently with its history as a country of immigrants. despite important exceptions. ranging from immigration policy to naturalization requirements. and 19th century colonization had extended the process of transplantation of legal tradition to the rest of the world. A relatively young and thin welfare state contributes to the fiscal sustainability of jus soli in this country. most countries of the world had established specific provisions regarding citizenship acquisition within a relatively well-developed legal system. had by then already moved toward a mixed regime. with the specific purpose to protect the birthrights of black slaves. but never led to actual change. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2000. The United States Jus soli was encoded in the US Constitution through the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment. For instance. while civil law France. Below are some specific cases. the US approach is still remarkably consistent with its original attitude in all its aspects.

of Argentina in 1853. Jus soli survived until 1986. while afterwards a person born in Australia must have at least one parent who is either an Australian citizen or a permanent resident in order to acquire citizenship. the country went through numerous legislative and administrative reforms. from the perspective of poor countries. most of the incipient states chose jus soli as a way to break with the colonial political order and to prevent the metropoles from making legitimate claims on citizens born in the new countries. Pritchett (2006) discusses the possible advantages of guest-worker programs which do not contemplate citizenship. 7 Page 9 States. In the postwar period. this area has followed a rather peculiar pattern. of Venezuela in 1830. Therefore. Jus soli is still the prevalent rule in the area. Huntington (2004) has criticized current nationality regulations on the grounds that they represent a “devaluation of citizenship”.1 In his analysis of Mexican immigration. is a related. At independence. 2 The relative thickness of the concept itself of citizenship. even if it is no longer attracting immigrants. in the sense that it confers few additional benefits if compared with residency. Mexico represents a special case where jus soli was also . despite the common origin as countries of immigration. most of Latin America was already a jus soli country before the 19th century immigration waves began. Latin America In the face of a civil law tradition which had been transplanted by the European powers. if compared to residency. potentially relevant consideration: in the US. citizenship is relatively thin. Jus soli was encoded in the Constitution of Brazil in 1824. for instance. Jus soli had also been introduced in Australia by the colonists.

but was then abandoned in 1836. especially from North Africa. only to come back to stay with a Constitutional Amendment in 1937. particularly extensive. France The emergence of the nation-state in Continental Europe was the main factor that shaped citizenship law in this area. The revolutionary experience was particularly important for France. Following a postwar wave of colonial immigration. Redefinitions of national citizenship have been effectively employed. in 1889 double jus soli became automatic. raised concern regarding assimilation. K. The 1984 British Nationality Act restricts jus soli by establishing that a child born in the U. qualifies for British citizenship only if at least one parents is a British citizen or resident. Citizenship issues and the rights of immigrants became the object . since the 1980s. this open-door policy was progressively restricted. In order to secure immigrants' children born in France to the draft. even though special status is still attributed to citizens of the British Commonwealth. Because of its colonial history. as a form of selective immigration policy. large-scale immigration. even though military consideration introduced early on elements of jus soli. The United Kingdom British nationality law has been deeply affected by the imperial experience. up to World War II. After World War II. making the experience of this country a unique one.adopted in the 1814 insurgent Constitution. where jus sanguinis was first introduced with the 1804 Civil Code and maintained 8 Page 10 for the entire course of the 19th century. the concept of nationality in the UK was. since all subjects of the British Empire had equal access to British citizenship simply by establishing residence in the UK. The 1948 Nationality Act created the status of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies for people with a close connection to the UK and its colonies.

these restrictions were considerably revised. and at the same time with millions of ethnic Germans living behind the Iron Curtain.of heated debate in French politics. with France sticking to its tradition of assimilationist nation. With the foundation of the GDR and the consolidation of the Eastern Block. the massive guest-worker immigration of the postwar period. with the automatic assignment of citizenship at age 18 to those immigrants' children born in France who had neither requested. A first step in this direction was the new Foreigner Law in 1990. but to no avail. the original Wilhelminian citizenship law of 1913. Achieving border stability was a decisive factor in pushing Germany toward the longdelayed adoption of jus soli elements. which paved the way for the achievement of stable national borders. nor declined it. had started to put under strong pressure. however. that required a formal citizenship request from second-generation immigrants. was finally approved in . and Germany to its ethnic identity. The case of France is frequently compared with Germany. Germany The single most relevant event in the history of German citizenship law is certainly the fall of the Berlin wall. which turned naturalization from the discretionary exception into the rule. which had established strong sanguinis ties with German overseas emigrants. Germany found itself in the paradoxical situation of having to live with a large population of disenfranchised foreigners born on its soil at home. With the Left regaining political power in 1997. Brubaker (2002) has influentially argued that the different path followed by these countries has been shaped by their cultural difference. In 1993 Chirac introduced a restrictive revision to the legislation. following an intense political struggle. A major overhaul of the legislation. mostly from Turkey but also from Southern Europe. Prior to that.

with the exceptions of Austria. The latter aspect may have played a role in shaping the evolution of citizenship policies in several other European countries and especially the Scandinavian ones. As documented by Weil (2001). For instance. access to citizenship by second and third generation is facilitated. Decolonization Postwar decolonization had a major impact on citizenship rules applied around the world. as mentioned in the introduction. Jus soli is now the norm in Germany (under the mild requirement that one parent has lived in the country for eight years). restricted forms of double jus soli are de facto applied. Greece and Luxembourg. On the other hand. In the evaluation of the German experience. In particular. by now. in the entire EU. many former British and Portuguese colonies rejected the jus soli tradition and switched to an often strongly ethnically-tinged version of jus sanguinis. the strong ethnic character of German national identity.1999. in the vast majority of European countries. and not only through the indirect impact on the metropolitan countries we previously examined. and the thick nature of the 9 Page 11 German welfare state. where jus sanguinis was functional to the large past emigration flows. . but had recently to adapt to the quickly changing conditions. especially for high-immigration Sweden. which recently adapted their legislation to the globalization of international migration and its increasing impact on Europe. The vast majority of the African colonies that were subject to civil law countries practicing jus sanguinis stuck to this principle after independence. other factors that may have delayed the introduction of jus soli are.

The area had been sealed toward international migration but. sizeable minorities . To these days. ethnic conflict lies at the roots of a chronic manipulation of citizenship rules in favor of one ethnic group over others. large Russian-speaking. as for all empires. jus sanguinis tended to prevail as a way to control more easily the formation of national entities. In situations where instability was pushed to an extreme degree by the young age and the arbitrary borders of these countries. stateless. The Soviet Union had occupied Estonia. During the following decades millions of Russians were encouraged to settle in Latvia and Estonia (less so in Lithuania) in order to Russify them. Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. To these days. recognized citizenship only for persons whose parents were members of one of the tribes established within the territory by 1908. At the same time.Sierra Leone's 1961 Constitution established that citizenship is transmitted only by descent and only to children whose father and a grandfather were Sierra Leoneans of AfricanNegro descent. Marginalization and de facto statelessness of significant strata of the population is the unavoidable outcome of these policies. 10 Page 12 The disintegration of the USSR Another major wave of citizenship law codification followed the disintegration of the USSR. in an effort to exclude Rwandan immigrants. there had been considerable migration within. In 1981 Mobutu signed a new law on nationality requiring an ancestral connection to the population residing in the territory as far back as 1885. however. and was compounded with deep ethnic division. the associated exclusive notion of ethnic and tribal identity caused enormous problems in countries where colonial rule had left shaky democratic institutions. The 1964 Congolese Constitution.

In the anticipation of EU integration. After independence. The hostile attitude toward ethnic Russians was especially strong in Latvia. We can view the laws regulating citizenship acquisition as the outcome of the decision problem faced by a median voter. for the case of the Russian Federation. while most other countries of the area still persist with discriminatory policies. even though small concessions to jus soli have been made. 4. Estonian and Latvian laws were sharply criticized by international organizations on the grounds of human rights. which was less affected by Soviet immigration policy. the new citizenship laws of these three states reflected this heritage with an emphasis on jus sanguinis as the basis for acquiring citizenship. The issue for these states was how to balance a need to reconstitute their national identity around an ethnic model. while Lithuania. this perception as a country of emigrants pushes toward the persistence of jus sanguinis as the main principle. By contrast. in a context where citizenship confers the right to vote . The aim of the model is also to generate testable implications that can guide our interpretation of the empirical evidence. these recommendations were indeed fulfilled in the more recent legislation of the Baltics. spread around the former regions of the USSR. showed a more open approach.are still present. the salient fact in shaping current citizenship policy is the perception that many of its citizens are outside its borders. and a commitment to democratic values with respect to the rights of minorities. Again. The Model This section develops a simple theoretical model which formalizes the hypotheses that a widely interdisciplinary literature has advanced with respect to the determinants of citizenship laws.

our focus on the right to vote as the main benefit of citizenship is easily justified. therefore the model's predictions can be applied to the laws concerning both citizenship at birth and naturalization. where y N and y M denote average income for natives and migrants. y N >y>y M . even if the model concentrates on voting on a specific policy. namely. Second. Migrants are poorer than natives since they are relatively unskilled. and also implies some duties. a redistributive tax scheme which finances a public good. namely. First. where M + N = P and M < N.over policy variables. respectively. in our oneperiod framework the distinction between different ways to acquire citizenship becomes irrelevant. is driven by the benefits and costs associated with this decision. and y = N P y . Finally. We consider an economy where a population of mass P consists of natives with mass N and migrants with mass M. A native voter. economic and social goals. before we present the model's details. the same approach could be extended to consider alternative agenda. while in practice citizenship acquisition implies a larger set of rights. and 11 Page 13 thus the right to vote. A few warnings are in order. when considering the decision to grant citizenship. since political rights can be viewed as an instrument through which migrants could achieve broader political. beside the right to vote. to migrants.

We also assume that income distribution is skewed to the right for each group. namely.N + M P y M is the economy-wide average income. g. Assume initially 12 Page 14 . Each enfranchised individual casts a vote on the tax rate. such that 0 < τ < 1. c i . as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). The tax rate is set through a political choice under majority voting. Tax revenues are used by the government to finance the public good according to the following balanced budget constraint: g = τy − τ 2 2 y (2) where the second term captures tax collection costs. and a public good. and thus for the economy as a whole. median income is lower than average income both for natives and migrants. according to u i =c i + λg (1) where λ is a positive preference parameter. Both groups pay taxes. Both natives and migrants derive utility from consumption of a private good. according to a proportional income tax rate τ.

Assume also that society bears a cost k for the exclusion of migrants from citizenship. Equivalently. as captured. according to k=K+h M P (3) where K reflects the degree of cultural inclusiveness and h > 0. The expression for the indirect utility function of a native voter with income y N i is given by v N i = (1 − τ)y N i − k + λ(τ − τ 2 2 . reflecting the possibility that their disenfranchisement can lead to social unrest and even violence. This cost increases with the share of migrants over population. k could enter directly the utility function. The cost enters the individual budget constraint as follows: c i ≤ (1 − τ)y i −k (4) where y i denotes individual income. The cost is also affected by factors that determine the degree of inclusiveness of a country's culture. by a jus soli tradition.that only natives are citizens and are therefore allowed to vote. for instance.

which is given by . according to which the equilibrium tax rate is the preferred tax rate of the native median voter with income y N ∗ .)y (5) which is single-peaked with respect to the tax rate. according to τ N ∗ =1− 1 λ y N ∗ y (6) The level of the tax rate increases with the intensity of the preference for public goods and with inequality. To be noticed is that under our assumptions about income distribution it is not necessarily the case that y N∗ y < 1. which is measured by the ratio of native median income over the economywide average income. since migrants also pay taxes. The native median voter could avoid the cost k by granting citizenship to the migrants and thus accepting the tax rate that would prevail under universal enfranchisement. We can therefore apply the median voter theorem.which implies that the tax rate is going to be positive only if y N∗ y < λ.

τ ∗ =1− 1 λ y ∗ y (7) 13 Page 15 where y ∗ is the economy-wide median income. the latter is certainly positive. If migrants vote. it follows that τ N ∗ <τ ∗ . but can enjoy a smaller tax. Since y N ∗ >y ∗ . he has to face the cost k. namely. The native median voter faces a simple set of costs and benefits when considering the decision to grant citizenship. If migrants cannot vote. given our assumptions on income distribution. In particular. The difference between τ N ∗ and τ ∗ increases with the income gap between natives and migrants and with the share of migrants over population. he has to pay more taxes but k is avoided. the tax rate chosen by the native median voter is lower than the tax that applies under universal suffrage. It follows that the native median voter decides to grant citizenship to migrants if and only if .

Besides. Both the disenfranchisement cost and the fiscal gain associated with the no-franchise status quo increase in the share of migrants over the population. Even if the model is static. the fiscal gain also increases with the income gap between natives and migrants. while the cost increases with the degree of inclusiveness K of the country's culture.(1 − τ N ∗ )y N ∗ − k + λ(τ N ∗ − τ N ∗ 2 2 )y ≤ (1 − τ ∗ )y N ∗ + λ(τ ∗ − τ ∗2 2 )y (8) where following (5) we find on the left hand side his indirect utility function when migrants cannot vote and on the right hand side his indirect utility function when migrants can vote. we can think of its dynamic implications in terms of a sequence .

the economy is shocked by an increase of the migrants share. since a higher share increases 14 Page 16 both the cost and the fiscal gain of disenfranchisement. the median voter will respond taking into considerations all the channels involved and this may result in an adaptation of the regulation. Finally. . To be noticed is that a given stock of migrants has a stronger impact on countries with a relatively small native population. following a sequence of stationary decisions. they will decide whether or not restricting the current regulation taking into account the incoming waves of immigrants and following the simple logic previously illustrated. due to a large inflow. Together with the ethnic natives. the effect of an increase in the share of migrants is potentially ambiguous. While the present formulation of the model is designed to establish conditions for extension of citizenship rights to migrants. since it is the share of migrants over population that matters. When the status quo is a jus soli regulation. migrants who are already in the country and have thus become citizens are simply to be considered as natives themselves.of repeated decisions. If. generating a trade off. If we interpret a jus sanguinis tradition as a low degree of inclusiveness and thus a low cost of exclusion. The predictions so far obtained from the model indicate that a decision to extend citizenship and the associated voting rights is facilitated by a smaller income gap between natives and migrants and by a larger degree of inclusiveness of a country's culture. it can also encompass restriction. The net effect will depend on which factor is stronger. or equivalently a particularly generous naturalization policy. it follows that jus sanguinis countries will be more reluctant to change.

The testable implication is that the decision to grant citizenship is positively influenced by the domestic level of democracy. as captured by λ. we should therefore expect a negative impact of the size of government on the degree of inclusiveness of citizenship laws. the impact of the size of government on citizenship laws can be captured by assuming that different countries exhibit different preference parameters toward government. at any given level of income. Fourth. If only rich natives are allowed to vote. Thus a relatively large government size. This should facilitate the decision to grant them citizenship and implies that countries with a relatively old native population should be particularly sensitive to these considerations and thus display a more open attitude. border instability could be captured in a version of the model where the size of the native population. the level of democracy can influence the outcome since it implies a constraint on the political rights of the natives themselves. which can be modelled with an income franchise requirement. Third. by increasing the tax differential. we can interpret our tax as a life-long contribution. Empirically. could make an open citizenship policy more costly. is subject to uncertainty. demographic aspects could be considered by assuming that the migrants' younger average age implies a larger ability to contribute to the welfare state. which is higher for a migrant. the associated tax rate will be higher than otherwise.The basic model can be extended to consider several other potentially relevant factors. and thus the population share of migrants. Second. While our one-period model cannot explicitly reflect these aspects. First. 15 Page 17 . thus amplifying the tax cost which follows the decision to allow migrants to vote.

a relatively old native population. Citizenship at Birth We attribute to each country an appropriate code for citizenship laws in 2001. but it also increases the cost associated with their exclusion. since it increases the tax disadvantage. a relatively high income level of the migrants. the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous impact on the natives' decision to extend citizenship and voting right to migrants. of letting migrants vote. we expect the natives' decision to be positively influenced by an inclusive national culture. We take 1948 as the starting point. and the survey in Weil (2001). The Data: Citizenship Laws of the World We compile a dataset of citizenship laws across the countries of the world for the postwar period. The sources for this directory were Embassies. To summarize. a high level of democracy. the main problem is to establish who can be considered as a native. 5. the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2003). 5. when the national border is unstable.Indeed. to introduce a random component in the model should affect the voting decision by reducing the tax rate.1. a stable national border. and a large native population. Under standard risk aversion behavior. a small welfare state. and the Department of State. 1975 and at the beginning of the postwar period. The principal source for the information we codify is a directory published by the Investigations Service of the United States Office of Personnel Management in 2001. We supplement this information with additional one from the CIA World Factbook (2002). even though there were nearly no reforms in citizenship laws during the first half of the century. but we also collect information about naturalization requirements. which provides synopses of the citizenship laws currently practiced in 190 countries. Moreover. so that . The principal focus of our codification is citizenship acquisition at birth. for the native median voter. the Library of Congress.

and countries subject to full jus soli (Group 3). we divide the postwar period into two subperiods of equal length. the subsequent half century did not see further evolution. For 1948. at least relative to the subsequent developments that are the focus of the present investigation. This approach is justified by our primary interest in the potential impact of citizenship laws on immigrants. 1975 and 2001.most of the legislation in place in 1948 had actually been developed much earlier. In our classification we focus on the presence of jus soli elements in a country's legislation. 16 Page 18 the analysis of legal origins in La Porta et al. we include the postwar decolonization phase with the exemption of the Middle East. countries that apply a mixed regime (Group 2). common law tradition. we treat the specific legal provisions regulating access to citizenship in 1948 as predetermined. A mixed regime includes elements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis. Indeed. 4 Our dataset includes those 162 countries for which we were able to collect information on both original . despite the occurrence of major historical events such as World War I. 3 As in 3 By treating 1948 as the initial year. (1998). By coding citizenship laws in the intermediate year 1975. which gained independence from the British and French administration in the 1943-1948 period. rather than emigrants. we divide countries into three groups: countries subject to jus sanguinis without any jus soli element (Group 1). while the 19th century witnessed a first wave of adaptation of citizenship legislation from the civil vs.

and current citizenship laws, and for which migration data were available for the postwar period. 5 INSERT TABLE 1 The differential patterns of evolution that citizenship laws generate in 1948, 1975 and 2001 are summarized by the transition matrices in Table 1, which reveals considerable variations both across countries and over time. The table shows that in 1948 jus soli was the rule in about 47% (namely, 76 out of 162) of the countries, while jus sanguinis dominated in 41% (namely, 67 out of 162), and the mixed regime was adopted in the remaining 12% (19 countries). Among the countries that were under jus soli in 1948, we find the United States, Canada, all the Oceanian countries, most of Latin America, within Africa and Asia the British and Portuguese colonies, within Europe the UK, Ireland and Portugal. On the other hand, in 1948 jus sanguinis predominated in most of Europe, including its Eastern part. As explained in Section 3, France was unique in its early choice of a mixed regime. Since we 4 For details on our classification criteria see the Data Appendix, part A. 5 For details on migration data see the Data Appendix, part C. 17
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treat colonial territories as subject to the metropolitan countries' regime until independence, the group applying the mixed regime in 1948 includes France and its colonies. By 1975, 31% (namely, 50 out of 162) of the countries had jus soli, 62% (101) jus sanguinis, and 7% (11) a mixed regime. The main event justifying this evolution is decolonization, with many former colonies switching to jus sanguinis, from jus soli when the UK and Portugal

were the metropolitan country, and from the mixed regime in the case of France (see Section 3). As of 2001, 24% (namely, 39 out of 162) of the countries apply jus soli, 54% (88) jus sanguinis, and 22% (35) a mixed regime. It has mostly been the adaptation of the legislation of many European countries, relaxing pure jus sanguinis in favor of a mixed regime, that explains the pattern observed for the second subperiod. Among the countries that still adhere to the jus soli principle in 2001 are the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland (which - however - recently introduced restrictions to jus soli with a June 2004 referendum). The United Kingdom and Australia, on the contrary, no longer adhere to it and now adopt a mixed regime. Overall, jus sanguinis is currently the most common regime, with 69% of the countries in Africa, 83% in Asia, and 41% (down from 88%) in Europe. The growing group where a mix of provisions is applied is particularly well-represented in Europe, with 56% of the European countries including the formerly jus soli United Kingdom. On the other hand, jus soli predominates in the Americas, with 89% of the countries in Latin America, and the entire North America (namely, the U. S. and Canada). Table 1 reveals three different patterns of transitional dynamics: stability, switch, and convergence. Stable countries lie along the diagonal. Looking at the 1948 to 2001 transition, we see that a large fraction (28%, namely, 46 out of 162) have started and ended as jus sanguinis. In other words, it is 69% (namely, 46 out of 67) of the originally jus sanguinis countries that have remained so. By contrast, 22% (36 out of 162) are steadily jus soli countries: this means that only 47% (36 out of 76) of the originally jus soli countries have not changed their policies. Off diagonal, there is a sizeable proportion of countries (19%, or 31 out of 162) that have switched from jus soli to sanguinis, by completely eliminating

birthplace as a criterion: most of them - as mentioned - are former African colonies of the UK and Portugal, which made this radical choice at independence. Looking at the two 18
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subperiods, we see most of these switches occur between 1948 and 1975. Finally, there is evidence of a process of convergence to a soli/sanguinis mix, which affects 18% of the countries (29 out of 162, of which 20 converge from jus sanguinis by adding jus soli elements, while 9 converge from jus soli by restricting it) and intensifies between 1975 and 2001. INSERT TABLE 2 In Table 2 we present further information on citizenship laws evolution by reporting changes in citizenship laws, organized by original laws. Over the 1948-2001 period, 74 countries (46%) have gone through a change in the laws. Of these, 51 have changed toward jus sanguinis and 23 toward jus soli, while 45 changes have occurred in the first subperiod and 33 in the second. 6 In particular, in the first subperiod, the majority of the countries that went through a change (29, or 64%) were originally jus soli. As mentioned, this pattern is determined largely by the behavior of former colonies. In the second subperiod, the majority of the countries that went through a change (20, or 61%) were originally jus sanguinis, most of which adopting a more open legislation. The above discussion suggests a relevant role of border stability. To investigate this issue, we introduce a set of dummies capturing a country's history of border changes. In particular, we distinguish across three different causes of border instability: decolonization, Berlin wall, other border changes. 7 If we compare the transitional dynamics of the full sample with those

of the subsample of countries that did not go through a border change, we count for the latter a much smaller proportion of switches from jus soli to jus sanguinis. This pattern confirms the relevance of border changes, especially those due to decolonization. INSERT TABLE 3 Summary statistics for our citizenship laws dataset are reported in Table 3. The correlation between 1948 and 2001 citizenship laws is 0.42, which points to some persistence, as confirmed by the even higher correlation between 1948 and 1975 (0.60) and 1975 and 2001 laws (0.81). 6 A few countries went through more than one change. 7 The Data Appendix, part B describes how the three border change dummies are constructed. 19
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5.2. Citizenship by Naturalization and the Citizenship Policy Index Naturalization policies are also relevant to the issues at hand. Indeed, to facilitate naturalization for immigrant parents may represent a substitute mechanism to attribute citizenship to children born in jus sanguinis countries. Besides, the general attitude revealed by a country's regulation of citizenship at birth may be reflected in its naturalization laws, with jus soli countries traditionally making naturalization much easier, at least for resident aliens. Within jus sanguinis countries, naturalization requirements again tend to be correlated with the revisions introduced for citizenship at birth. Basic rules for naturalization may include a period of residence, renunciation of other citizenship, familiarity with the language and customs of the country, and the availability of adequate means of support. We code naturalization only for 2001, on the basis of the available information on 142 of our 162 countries. We classify countries on the basis of the number of years of residence

We then combine the information we collected on citizenship at birth and naturalization within a single measure. 20 Page 22 . while 46% require more time and only 10% are more open. 44%) require five years of residence. even though data on naturalization are only available for the year 2001 and for a subset of countries. since it is heavily dependent on family law.required for naturalization. To construct the index. 8 In our dataset 62 countries (namely. which can be explained by the fact that the correlation between citizenship laws and naturalization is only 0. 5 years. (2006) collect statistics on acquisition of nationality. by constructing four classes (more than 14 years. 9 Dual citizenship provisions constitute another potentially relevant aspect of citizenship policy. We construct an index of citizenship policy defined on the 0-1 interval. we treat citizenship laws in 2001 as an ordinal variable. Alternative ways to define naturalization classes yielded similar conclusions. which can be considered a relatively open attitude. 10 For European countries only.54. 6 to 14 years. 10 8 We do not consider naturalization by marriage. while Baubock et al. but we do not use this variable due to limited information. 4 years or fewer).37. the British Council has compiled an index of civic citizenship and inclusion (see British Council Brussels 2005). The corrected Cronbach's alpha of the indicator is 0. by associating jus soli elements with lower number of years of residence required for naturalization. 9 Table 3 reports summary statistics for naturalization and the citizenship policy index.

2 if the country has a mixed regime. we also consider religion and ethnic diversity.1. for example. Further discussion on this point is postponed to the sub-section on robustness. The dependent variable is citizenship laws. an ordering by increasing inclusiveness toward immigrants. To control for other cultural characteristics. and 3 if the country has a jus soli regime. Among regressors. . and jus sanguinis with minimal inclusiveness. which is categorical and can take three values: 1 if the country has a jus sanguinis regime. we select the following variables. In fact. We use a multinomial logit specification to achieve maximum generality. while we cannot gauge the impact of the income gap between natives and migrants due to lack of data. or else may not have any effect at all (and vice versa). We interpret the presence of a jus soli tradition as an indicator of the degree of inclusiveness of national culture. the size of government. in order to investigate the determinants of citizenship laws evolution in the postwar period. Empirical Specification In bringing our theoretical model to the data. in principle those regressors that affect the probability of being a jus soli country may not always have the opposite effect on the probability of being a jus sanguinis country. with jus soli being associated with maximal.6. The empirical investigation is performed using a panel sample which includes information on two cross sections of 162 countries: the first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod. this choice does not impose any ex ante ordering among the three regimes. Moreover. The Determinants of Citizenship Laws 6. and the age structure of the population. We also control for countries with a particularly small population size. we employ measures of migration. Border stability is measured through our border changes dummies.

.162 and t = 1.. L it represents citizenship laws in country i at the end of period t. 11 In specification (9). M it is migration stock as a percentage of the population in country i at the beginning of period t. (9) with i = 1. the multinomial logit model we run has the following form: L it = a + bM it + cS it + dM it S it + eT t +Z 0 it f+ it . In the full specification we present.2 (where t = 1 refers to the 1950-1975 period and t = 2 refers 21 Page 23 to the 1976-2000 period). S it is a dummy for the presence of jus sanguinis in country i at the beginning of each subperiod. M it S ..the second cross section to the 1976-2000 subperiod. a is a constant term..

Table 4 presents their summary statistics. regarding the potential role of the above mentioned factors. proxies for cultural characteristics such as religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. INSERT TABLE 4 We can now suggest a number of specific hypotheses. Z it is a vector of additional explanatory variables. This follows the specification of our multinomial logit estimates. 12 The set of explanatory variables Z it can be divided into two groups. starting with the variables we consider focal to our analysis. consistent with the model previously outlined. Within this group we consider the border changes dummies and dummies for Latin American. Throughout the following. the share of young in the population. namely. Migration (M . and it is an error term. Southern European and small is the interaction between the previous two variables. The Data Appendix collects information on the definitions and sources of all variables we employed. where we take jus sanguinis as the reference category. we will organize our comments in terms of the effects of each of our regressors on the probability of adopting either a mixed or a jus soli regime instead of jus sanguinis. The second group of explanatory variables includes the size of government as a share of GDP. immigration and legal tradition. T t is a period dummy. The first group includes dummies capturing the country's geopolitical position. and a measure of democracy.

22 Page 24 1960. T 1 = 0 and T 2 = 1. since it is unlikely that stocks evaluated at the beginning of the period can be affected by subsequent changes in citizenship laws. 12 In particular. ) is measured by the stock of migrants in percent of the population at the beginning of each subperiod. for comparison purposes. L i1 and L i2 are citizenship laws in country i in 1975 and 2001. 13 while for the second they refer to the stock in 1980. S i1 = 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in 1948 and S i2 = 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in in 1975. By entering the migrant stock near the beginning of each period. the available data refer to the stock in 11 We also run multinomial logit models for two types of more parsimonious specifications. we avoid any potential endogeneity problem of migration with respect to citizenship laws. For the first subperiod. M i1 is migration stock in country i in 1960 and M i2 is migration stock in country i in 1980. 14 A positive coefficient .

as suggested by some of the political theories introduced in Section 1. we should expect negative signs for the coefficients for our border change dummies. In particular. Turning to our geopolitical dummies. thus suggesting a particularly significant role of this initial legislation. A negative value of the dummy's coefficient for a mixed and jus soli regime would imply that jus sanguinis countries are less likely to end up in the mixed and jus soli groups. On the other hand. the coefficients of the interaction could also turn out to be negative since. To assess the total impact of migration for jus sanguinis countries we also need to take into account the interaction's coefficients. As explained in Section 3. most of Latin America 13 . The interaction between the jus sanguinis dummy and migration should reveal additional information: if positive.for the mixed regime would indicated that high migration pushes toward it rather than toward jus sanguinis. if border stability really counts as a prerequisite for the introduction of automatic birthrights for the immigrants. We measure it with a dummy for countries that apply jus sanguinis at the beginning of each subperiod (S it ). a positive coefficient for the mixed regime would suggest convergence toward the intermediate group. We introduce the Latin America dummy to capture the peculiarity of this continent's experience. in the presence of a large stock of migrants. and similarly for the jus soli regime. its coefficients would indicate that those jus sanguinis countries facing high migration tend to add jus soli elements. the natives' reaction could be a conservative one. A crucial control in our regressions. is the legal tradition in the matter of citizenship. thus confirming persistence of the original laws. as previously discussed. We select this dummy because jus sanguinis is the most persistent of the three regimes.

If indeed the behavior of Latin America differs significantly from the rest of the sample in being associated with a higher probability of adopting jus soli. Finally. 23 Page 25 adopted jus soli long before our sample period. we would found negative coefficients. On the other hand. since migration data reveal that countries with a small population tend to have large and erratic figures. with most of the revision to the legislation toward mixed regimes occurring in the past 15 years or so.1. see the Data Appendix. so its current position is not determined by postwar developments and in particular by its postwar migration experience. For Southern Europe. we should expect negative signs for this dummy's coefficients. if young immigrants could offer a solution to domestic demographic imbalances. where alternative measures of migration are introduced.3. The potential endogeneity of migration is further addressed in sub-sub-section 6. The size of government is meant to proxy for the nature of the welfare state: if a thicker. part C. we would find that countries with a higher share of young in . it should exhibit a positive coefficient for this kind of legislation.Earlier data are not available. the endogeneity of our migration measure is ruled out by the fact that such changes had been extremely rare during the first half of the 20th century. with a disproportionately small impact on their legislation. 14 Even taking into account the anticipation of future changes of citizenship laws in making migration decisions. we should expect a positive coefficient for the mixed regime since these countries have been experiencing quickly increasing migration during the second subperiod. more expensive and more redistributive structure would represent an obstacle to automatic citizenship granting to the children of relatively poor immigrants.

these stylized facts are in line with previous research and economic population would be less prone to adopt jus soli elements. the small country dummy. The dummy reflecting jus sanguinis as the initial law is negatively correlated with decolonization (-0. Political rights tend to be low in countries with high ethnolinguistic fractionalization (-0.64). The Latin America dummy is positively associated with the Catholic share (0. we include the share of Catholics in total population and an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. political rights. is highly correlated with the initial citizenship laws as identified by the jus sanguinis dummy (-0.should exert a positive effect on the probability of a jus soli legislation even though even in a democratic country hostility toward the assimilation of outsiders may persist for a protracted period of time.35). . while its correlation with the civil law dummy is much lower (-0.15). The share of young in population is positively associated with migration stocks (0. Pairwise correlations between all our independent variables are not reported for brevity and can be summarized as follows.31) and Latin America (-0.43).52).measured by the political rights variable . thus displaying negative coefficients. Overall.36). In an effort to capture additional dimensions of cultural differences. the dependent variable. INSERT TABLE 5 Pairwise correlations among our dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 5. Citizenship laws are also significantly 24 Page 26 correlated with migration. beside legal tradition. Current citizenship laws. and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The establishment of a consolidated democracy . the Catholic share.

migration and jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law. Multinomial logit (b) is an expanded specification. The table reports three different specifications.It is also clear that several of our independent variables are closely interrelated and that it may be difficult to disentangle their specific effect on the evolution of citizenship laws. which includes only the core variables. while migration 25 Page 27 only remains significantly negative for the probability of applying a mixed regime. namely.2. the jus sanguinis origin still exerts a negative impact on the probability of applying a mixed or jus soli regime. 6. while both coefficients are positive for the period dummy. plus the period dummy. which includes the dummies. The period . we find that the core variables are all significant. Multinomial logit (a) is the core specification. and that in the second subperiod the probability of applying a mixed or jus soli legislation increases. Hence. which adds to (a) the dummies we discussed above. the results reported in the table indicate the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing either the mixed or the jus soli regimes. INSERT TABLE 6 Starting with the core specification (a). Finally. Results The results of our multinomial logits are presented in Table 6. Jus sanguinis is the reference category for all the results shown. In specification (b). migration and jus sanguinis display negative coefficients for both the mixed regime and jus soli. In particular. This means that high migration and a jus sanguinis origin decrease the probability of applying a mixed or a jus soli legislation rather than jus sanguinis. relative to jus sanguinis. which adds to (b) the other potentially relevant economic and institutional regressors. multinomial logit (c) is our full specification.

The role of the Latin America and Southern Europe dummies is confirmed. In this extended version the coefficient for decolonization loses significance. The small country dummy is not significant in this specification. while a high degree of democracy . a jus sanguinis origin and the period dummy are confirmed. if one evaluates the coefficients of migration and of the interaction together. since these countries have a higher probability of applying this regime. the total effect of migration becomes negligible. South Europe has a positive coefficient for the mixed regime. Latin America has a positive coefficient for jus soli. the impact of migration. while the small country dummy now reveals a negative impact on the probability of applying a mixed regime. the decolonization dummy displays two negative coefficients. in support of the hypothesis that countries with a relatively old population are more likely to choose mixed and jus soli regimes. However. Finally. confirming that Southern European countries have a higher probability of becoming mixed. while the share of young in the population exerts a negative impact. having gone through a decolonization border change negatively affects the probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime. in the full specification (c). The size of government has a positive and significant coefficient for the probability of applying a jus soli regime. As expected. the strength of this tendency is questioned by the fact that. 15 The interaction term between migration and jus sanguinis origin is significant and positive for both the mixed regime and jus soli.dummy is significantly positive only for the probability of a mixed regime. uncovering a tendency for countries with a jus sanguinis origin which are exposed to high migration to add jus soli elements. namely. The share of Catholics and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are both insignificant.

Besides. we verified that our results are not driven by outliers.7%. In particular. an increase in migration of one percentage point for a jus sanguinis country decreases the probability of being jus sanguinis by about 2. . having gone through a decolonization border change decreases the probability of being jus soli by about 14%.positively affects the probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime. 17 The estimated marginal effects are calculated by holding all the independent variables at their mean 26 Page 28 decolonization reveals that this regressor retains a significantly negative impact on the probability of jus soli. 17 Moreover. 16 For all three specifications. consistently with the positive coefficients for jus soli and a mixed regime in Table 6. the marginal effect of 15 For both multinomial logit (a) and (b) we obtain the same results using a balanced sample composed by the 224 countries which constitute the reference sample for the estimation of our full specification. 16 For the full specification (c). The marginal effects also allow to quantify the impact of our regressors. while an increase in migration of one percentage point increases the probability of being a jus sanguinis country by about 2.5%. to be evaluated together with the 2. and decreases the probability of having a mixed regime by 2.5% increase due to direct effect of migration. inspection of the marginal coefficients in Table 7 confirms that migration increases the probability of jus sanguinis and decreases that of a mixed regime and that the interaction between jus sanguinis and migration is negative.3%.

we cannot include in the regressions the socialist and oil dummies. However. both per capita GDP and the Gini index of inequality tend to be associated with migration. Quantitative and qualitative development indicators such as income per capita and inequality could reveal if a richer. as well as the Berlin wall and the other border changes dummies. 18 The correlation between Berlin wall and socialist is 0. In levels. and also with democracy and fractionalization. 18 However. A dummy for socialist countries could instead work as an alternative to our Berlin wall border change dummy. 19 INSERT TABLE 7 Overall. the original laws and our geopolitical dummies exert a significant impact on current citizenship laws. so they are unlikely to add independent explanatory power to a regression. our results indicate that migration. . Moreover.We also consider additional covariates that have often been found significant in related research on the determinants of institutions. due to the fact that all countries identified by them do not exhibit enough variability with respect to the dependent variable. and that other factors such as government size. For dichotomous independent variables the marginal effect is the change from 0 to 1 holding all other variables at their means.48. demographics and democracy also contribute to their determination. more equal country is more prone to adopting jus soli elements. In fact they fail to add any further significance to the previous results. a dummy for oil countries could account for the fact that most of them have been experiencing huge immigration which has had no impact on their still very restrictive legislation (often based on Islamic family law).

as predicted by the model. even though the process of transplantation can prove discontinuous in the case of former colonies. Contrary to the model's implications. 27 Page 29 particular. Therefore. However. the welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation. for countries with a jus sanguinis origin which have experienced more immigration. our results suggest that migration pushes national legislations in the direction of jus sanguinis. In addition. countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. On the one hand. However.19 For example. not jus soli. there is evidence of a tendency toward adding jus soli provisions so that. Overall. because liberal countries tend to restrict while restrictive countries tend to resist innovation. The presence of countervailing forces highlighted by the model is therefore confirmed by our findings. Indeed. demo- . the legal tradition interacts with the way countries react to migration in a complex way. this correlation covers a more complex pattern which can be revealed once the interaction between migration and the legal tradition in the matter of citizenship is considered. this could be explained by the fact many of the countries with extended welfare systems may favor immigration because of their demographic crisis. in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration turns out to be negligible. on balance. the evidence does not the hypothesis of convergence toward a mix of provisions suggested by some political theories (see Section 1). we show that the legal tradition tends to affect the current legislation persistently. countries affected by Berlin wall have always applied jus sanguinis. On the other hand.

6. our migration measure was chosen to minimize a potential endogeneity bias.3.graphic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes. When we replace our migrations stocks with average migration flows (computed with reference to each subperiod). while cultural traits captured by religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to be irrelevant. samples and estimation techniques. in particular as far as the impact of migration is concerned. 21 In the Table Appendix. In sum. First.3. the impact we observe for the size of government could be explained by the fact that it proxies for European-style. Robustness In this section we present a number of alternatives to our benchmark regressions to investigate whether they are robust to different specifications. This could suggest that migration flows are endogenous with respect to citizenship laws. we replace our measure of migration with a range of alternative measures. Finally. Alternative Specifications We experiment our multinomial logit specifications with alternative covariates. As outlined above. the evidence confirms that a higher degree of democracy is associated with more jus soli elements.1. . our empirical findings match the theoretical insights coming from the model. and provide a deeper understanding of the forces shaping citizenship laws. Further tests involve alternative measures of migration stocks. 28 Page 30 6. 20 the coefficients for migration turns out to be insignificant in all three specifications. relative open socialdemocracies. Moreover.

respectively. column (2)).45. Results from this instrumented specification are similar to those presented in Table 6. for the first and the second subperiod we select the years 1970 and 1990. To sum up. . 23 If the coefficients of the two alternative dummies were the same. one could conclude that our detailed codification of the original citizenship laws does not add much to what we can already learn from a country’s broader legal tradition. and the 1960-70 and 1980-90 averages. 21 Namely. as possible alternatives. with the latter losing significance. the latter turns out to be substantially less significant and reduces the 20 Migration stocks and flows show a correlation of 0. the simultaneous determination of citizenship laws and migration does represent a concern when we enter within-the-period data on migration instead of beginning-of-period data. our beginning-of-period migration stocks prove to be the most adequate measures of the role of migration. respectively. 22 Since jus sanguinis and jus soli are in principle closely linked to the civil and common systems of laws. Some differences emerge in the coefficients for migration and its interaction with jus sanguinis. 22 We also experiment with a specification entering the migrant stock in 1960 for both subperiods. respectively.Table A.1. 24 When we replace the jus sanguinis with the civil law dummy (see Table A. and citizenship laws could be viewed as part of migration policy. column (1) presents the full specification with the 1960-70 and 1980-90 average migration stock. the influence of the legal tradition can also be analyzed through a dummy capturing the presence of a civil law tradition. Since in the postwar period migration has been highly regulated by policy in most receiving countries.1.

25 but both alternatives are associated with insignificant coefficients. we find that its coefficient is insignificant. The correlation between civil law and jus sanguinis is 0. namley. We also replace our decolonization dummy with a dummy for British or Portuguese colonies (identifying those countries that were characterized by a jus soli legislation during the colonial period).3.3. We also run ordered logit regressions where current citizenship laws are explicitly treated as an ordinal variable.2. since it is the quickly increasing second-subperiod immigration which determines the peculiar behavior of this region. 29 Page 31 significance of most other regressors. which we assume here to be ordered by increasing inclusiveness.35.2 and A. and with the subSaharan Africa dummy. possibly because flows are multicollinear with respect to stocks and endogenous with respect to the dependent variable. we assume that jus sanguinis corresponds to minimal and jus soli to maximal inclusiveness. an (unreported) alternative multinomial probit model delivers the same qualitative results. These results are reported in Table A. Alternative Estimation Techniques Alternative estimation techniques broadly confirm the same results from Table 6. suggesting that civil law is a much weaker predictor of current citizenship laws than the original citizenship laws. 6. When we replace the Southern Europe dummy with migration flows.23 The dummy is equal to 1 if a country belongs to the civil law tradition and to 0 if a country belongs to common law. In particular. Our previous conclusions . 24 The correlation between the two dummies is 0.35.

we run a test for the parallel regression assumption. an alternative ordered logit regression also achieves much weaker results than in the panel. For the same cross section. 26 6. In all cases. while migration stock refers to 1960 and jus sanguinis in 1948 is the initial law.31).3. the test provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated. in particular for migration and for its interaction 25 Decolonization shows a significant correlation with the dummies for British or Portuguese colony (0.30) and for sub-Saharan Africa (0. 27 Here the dependent variable is citizenship laws in 2001. The test is an approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories.3. Alternative Sample Criteria We also run multinomial logit regressions on a cross-sectional sample composed by country averages over the 1950-2000 period. 30 Page 32 with the initial laws. Our multinomial logit specification is hence superior to an ordered logit specification. 27 The results for this cross section reveal a much lower level of significance for several covariates. 29 while ordinary least squares regressions with our citizenship policy index in 2001 and an indexed version of . 28 The same applies to alternative variants with a cross section over each subperiod. 1950-1975 and 1976-2000. namely. with migration and a jus sanguinis origin exerting a negative impact on the application of jus soli. 26 For all specifications.are confirmed.

1. and 1 if the country changes its laws toward jus soli. the dependent variable is categorical and can take three values: -1 if the country changes its laws toward jus sanguinis. Z it contains all the variables previ- . (10) where α is a constant term and η it is an error term. 7.2001 citizenship laws as alternative dependent variables both show an insignificant coefficient for migration (see Table A. An Alternative Approach: The Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws In this section we study citizenship laws evolution using an alternative approach which is able to provide additional insights. we run a multinomial logit model of the following form for its full specification: V it = α + βM it + γT t +Z 0 it δ+η it . 30 These results may be due to the fact that a single cross section of countries includes less information than our panel. 0 if no change occurs. For our panel. While specification (9) focuses on current citizenship laws as the dependent variable. Empirical Specification In the alternative specification. 7.4). we developed an alternative specification which is designed to capture more specifically the determinants of a change in the laws.

changes in citizenship laws. Hence. while the opposite holds for Southern Europe.2. namely. Pairwise correlations among our new dependent variable. Decolonization and Southern Europe exert a positive impact on change in both directions. to show that they are not driven by outliers. the results reported in the table indicate the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing either restriction toward jus sanguinis (first column) or expansion toward jus soli (second column). its interaction with migration. showing that migration is again negative correlated with the dependent variable. more significantly so for restriction for the case of decolonization. and the Latin America dummy. and 28 We also experiment with migration stocks in 1970 and 1980. The size of government's negative coefficient . 30 The same qualitative results arise in an unreported regression with naturalization in 2001 as dependent variable. jus sanguinis as the initial citizenship law. Results Regression results for the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 8. 29 We apply to the above results the Cook's distance method.ously described. with similar results. The period dummy indicates that the second subperiod witnesses an increase in the probability to expand. and with average migration flows. 7. 31 Page 33 the independent variables are presented in Table 5. Migration has a positive impact on the probability to restrict and a non significant impact on the probability to expand. except for those which present zero-cell problems. where the reference category is no change.

meaning that relatively old countries are more likely to liberalize their legislation. which is consistent with the fact that. the implications of Table 9 are in line with those of Table 7. The Gini index once again fails to add any significance. these results are complementary to those of Section 6 since they highlight which . it emerges as a factor that facilitates change toward sanguinis. INSERT TABLE 9 As for specification (9). while again a relatively young population provokes resistance to extension.for restriction confirms that this factor actually prevents it. while per capita GDP reveals a significant 31 The estimated marginal effects are calculated as explained in footnote 17. due to the removal of the Latin America dummy which comprises several former Portuguese colonies. The subSaharan Africa dummy is not significant when entered instead of decolonization. Overall. the alternative dummy is again significant. in Table 9. 32 Page 34 impact on expansion. in Table 7 decolonization exerts a significantly negative impact on the probability of having a jus soli legislation. which reports the marginal effects for the multinomial logit specification. we perform a full set of robustness checks for (10). 31 Moreover. When we replace our decolonization dummy with the dummy for British or Portuguese colonies. For instance. Alternative measures of migration confirm an irrelevant impact on change in the laws. Ethnic diversity emerges as a significant factor of change toward jus sanguinis. INSERT TABLE 8 Table 9 reports the marginal coefficients for the regressions in Table 8 and confirms the restrictive impact of migration emerging from Table 8.

the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mixed regime that includes both jus soli and jus sanguinis elements. the legal tradition has affected the way countries have responded to migration. particularly in connection with the decolonization phase. on the basis of a new dataset we compiled. Conclusion We studied the theoretical and empirical determinants of the legal institution of citizenship in the postwar period. In particular. 8. while in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration has been negligible. Moreover. Our investigation reveals that migration has had an overall negative impact on liberalization of the legislation and the adoption of jus soli elements. Countries with larger welfare systems. Border instability emerges as a decisive factor in shaping citizenship laws. . migration is confirmed as a factor that favors change toward restriction. older population and more extended political rights tend to be associated with more diffused elements of jus soli. In particular. reflecting discontinuities for the transplanting process of legal institutions. Therefore. jus soli countries have reacted to increasing migration through restriction. In bringing the model to the data. We developed a simple median voter model where citizenship rights are granted by natives to migrants on the basis of the associated benefits and costs. for each possible direction of change. The model predicts that migration has a potentially ambiguous impact on the legislation and that this impact is also affected by cultural factors including a country's degree of inclusiveness.factors have induced the observed evolution of the legislation. as reflected by the original citizenship legislation. we found that indeed citizenship laws have responded endogenously and systematically to a number of economic and institutional factors.

and women's rights. between the public and the private sphere of influence. This represents another challenge for further research on the process of formation of legal rules and on the impact of institutions on economic outcomes.have already been investigated. rules of inheritance. Many issues that fall within the former . labor regulation. citizenship laws can be viewed as a link. The Citizenship-at-birth Classification Group 1 (jus sanguinis countries): We include countries where citizenship is passed on to a child based upon at least one of the parents being a citizen of that country. but also by other institutions such as the internal system of political rights and the international system of relations as reflected by state borders. and where citizenship is not granted due to birth within the country. Finally. since they do adapt both to economic and non-economic factors. countries may differ on some . we also establish that different institutions are interrelated. By showing that citizenship laws are shaped not only by the broader legal origins. and government activities . Further research will study the future evolution of citizenship policy.such as commercial law. In the application of jus sanguinis. Citizenship laws are still changing. a clear implication of our investigation is that institutions should not be 33 Page 35 presumed to be exogenous. Our methodology can be extended to the study of other evolving bodies of the law. by using projections of international migration patterns in combination with the available predictions about the future course of democratization and border changes.More generally. regardless of the child's actual country of birth. within a legal system. Data Appendix A. such as family law. The endogeneity of institutions to economic factors represents a challenge for research aimed at demonstrating that institutions are crucial determinants of economic performances.

Another is the ability. albeit in a restrictive form. we interpret as an element of jus soli. the existence of a provision that birth in the country matters for naturalization. mother's right to transmit citizenship by descent. for a child born in a country were jus sanguinis prevails. to acquire citizenship at some later point (for example. regardless of the parents' citizenship or status. Moreover. for example on the father's vs.factors. Group 2 (countries with a mixed regime): We include those countries where elements of jus soli are recognized. the relevance of the marital status of the parents. and the requirement that parents must be citizens other than by descent. Since we focus on the presence of jus soli elements in a country's legislation. A common exception to the general principle of jus sanguinis is automatic citizenship attribution to children of unknown parents. . Group 3 (jus soli countries): We include those countries where citizenship is automatically granted due to birth within the country. our classification does not emphasize how narrowly 34 Page 36 jus sanguinis can be specifically applied to emigrants. and coexist with varying degrees of jus sanguinis. that justifies the inclusion of a country within Group 2. the requirement of citizenship for one or both parents. automatic citizenship for the children of those immigrants who were also born in the country). the age of maturity) subject to either residence requirements or application. For example. a frequent provision that limits jus soli is double jus soli (namely. Examples of restrictions are generational requirements limiting the principle of citizenship by descent to the first or second generations of individuals born and residing abroad. residence requirements for parents. Most of these factors depend on the interaction between local family law and citizenship law.

Normally countries that apply jus soli combine it with jus sanguinis provisions for the children of their citizens born outside of their territory (although limitations to the ability to transmit citizenship acquired in this manner to the next generation usually apply through. East Germany in 1990. namely. East Germany in 1945. the new countries formed in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. the State Transformation of Germany in 1990. Decolonization. and Russia in 1992). State Transformation. State Demise. plus a few additional observations not linked to these two waves. We refer to Bertocchi and Strozzi (2009) for further detail on the data set on citizenship laws. and the USSR in 1991. State Disintegration. the State Demise of Germany in 1945. Even if we set 1948 as the initial date for our citizenship laws analysis. In particular. West Germany in 1945. The Border Change Dummies We construct three border change dummies (namely. and State Creation. and Other Border Changes) based on data collected from Polity IV (2002). West Germany in 1990. for border changes we include a few earlier events occurred in the 1943-1948 period that fit within the phase of post-colonial independence. They include the new countries gaining independence . residence requirements).and therefore state borders .in the postwar decolonization phase. there is substantial overlap among the observations recorded in the Polity IV dataset. Examples of the events contained in the Polity IV 35 Page 37 (2002) dataset are the State Disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. from the Polity IV variable CHANGE we record information on four types of events capable of affecting state borders. for example. Berlin Wall. The countries affected by State Creation are the most numerous. We . B. Clearly.

Migration stock is the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. On this basis. per 1. we count as a single event. Definitions and Sources of Other Covariates Migration stock: International migration stock (% population). because it concerns two countries which are in our sample. of which examples are the split between Pakistan and Bangladesh. and other border changes (identifying countries which went through other types of boundary changes. The data refer 36 Page 38 to incoming international migrants less outgoing international migrants. we construct our three border change dummies for each period under consideration: Decolonization (identifying countries which went through a post-colonial redefinition of their borders). Likewise. including refugees. namely. Net migration flows: International net migration rate. the State Transformation of East and West Germany in 1945. was obtained from the CIA (2002).adapt these data to our needs by matching them to the 162 countries appearing in our citizenship laws dataset. but also the State Demise of Germany in the same year. 1990 and 2000. To be noticed is that the way our variables are coded reflects stability of borders. the absence of border changes. occurring to Germany. C. 1980. we treat as another single event. more than the direction of a change in terms of a country's size. the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan counts for two events. On the other hand. occurring again to Germany. Berlin wall (identifying countries which went through a post-1989 Berlin wall border change). The data are taken from United Nations (2003) and are available for 1960. 1970. the State Transformation of Germany in 1990 and the State Demise of East and West Germany in the same year. Additional information.000 total . For instance. and the unification of Vietnam). when necessary.

we assign them to their own class of common or civil law as it prevailed before the communist period. The classification is from UN (2002). taken from Easterly and Levine (1997). British or Portuguese colony: Dummy for countries that were British or Portuguese colonies any time after 1918. taken from Penn World Tables (2002). Political rights: Political rights index. The source is the United Nations (2005). Southern Europe and subSaharan Africa. GDP per capita: Logarithm of real GDP per capita at current international prices. The data are taken from United Nations (2005). Socialist: Dummy for socialist countries. Oil: Dummy for oil countries (OPEC countries plus Oman. since they do not present any significant difference for the issue of citizenship. Angola. Moreover. Latin America. Southern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa: Dummies for countries belonging to Latin America. Gini index: Gini index of inequality. taken from Penn World Tables (2002). We retain only the two main families of common and civil law. taken from Deininger and Squire (1996). (1999). Bahrain. taken from La Porta et al. Information is from La Porta et al. with projections until 2050. Civil law: The source is the legal origin classification in La Porta et al. taken from Freedom House (1996). and Scandinavian versions. Government consumption: Government share of GDP in current prices. Qatar. Small country: Dummy for countries with a population size of less than one million over all available years between 1960 and 1995. without distinguishing. (1999). within the broader civil law tradition. while La Porta et al. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Composite index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The source is the Correlates of War 2 Project (2004). (1999).population. The data are available over five year intervals from 1950. Share of young: Share of young between age 15 and 34 (% population). and Brunei). German. as in Easterly and Kraay (2000). (1999) introduce a separate class for socialist-law countries. among the French. Catholic share: Percentage of Catholics in 1980. INSERT TABLE APPENDIX References 37 .

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ITIZENSHIP L AWS E VOLUTION :T RANSITION M ATRICES Citizenship laws in 2001 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 46 20 1 67 Mixed regime 11 6 2 19 Jus soli regime 31 9 36 76 Total 88 35 39 162 Citizenship laws in 1975 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1948: .

Jus sanguinis regime 63 3 1 67 Mixed regime 10 7 2 19 Jus soli regime 28 1 47 76 Total 101 11 50 162 Citizenship laws in 2001 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1975: Jus sanguinis regime 81 20 0 101 Mixed regime 2 9 0 11 Jus soli regime 5 6 39 50 .

Total 88 35 39 162 Page 45 Table 2 C HANGES IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 2001) No change Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 46 0 21 67 Mixed regime 6 11 2 19 Jus soli regime 36 40 0 76 Total 88 51 23 162 Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 1975) No change .

Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 63 0 4 67 Mixed regime 7 10 2 19 Jus soli regime 47 29 0 76 Total 117 39 6 162 Changes in citizenship laws (1975 to 2001) No change Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1975: Jus sanguinis regime 81 0 20 101 Mixed regime 9 2 0 11 Jus soli regime 39 11 .

698 .0 50 Total 129 13 20 162 Page 46 Table 3 C ITIZENSHIP L AWS D ATA S ET :S UMMARY S TATISTICS Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Citizenship laws in 2001 162 1.835 1 3 Citizenship laws in 1975 162 1.685 .916 1 3 .

Citizenship laws in 1948 162 2.488 -1 1 Changes in cit.043 .920 1 4 Citizenship policy index in 2001 142 .415 . laws (1948 to 2001) 162 -.458 . laws (1975 to 2001) 162 -.056 .655 -1 1 Naturalization in 2001 142 2.299 0 1 Page 47 Table 4 S UMMARY . laws (1948 to 1975) 162 .451 -1 1 Changes in cit.941 1 3 Changes in cit.204 .173 .

080 .116 .646 9.673 .500 0 1 Civil legal origin 324 .011 70.519 . law 324 .470 0 1 Migration stock 300 5.673 Net migration flows 318 -.691 .S TATISTICS Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Current citizenship laws 324 1.713 .875 1 3 Changes in citizenship laws 324 -.485 -1 1 Jus sanguinis as initial cit.

173 .379 0 1 Southern Europe 324 .204 0 1 Small country 324 .551 -47.250 .368 0 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 324 .022 .8.35 Decolonization 324 .052 .223 0 1 Other border changes 324 .434 0 1 Berlin wall 324 .146 0 1 Latin America 324 .043 .160 .95 63.

.572 0 97.442 0 1 British or Portuguese colony 324 .281 0 1 Political rights 276 3.535 35.333 .265 .730 2.379 0 1 Oil 324 .349 .086 .890 Government consumption .299 0 .173 .472 0 1 Socialist 324 .3 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 272 .040 1 7 Catholic share 324 31.

The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries.36 Page 48 Log GDP per capita 263 7.54 3. The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod.263 19.01 53.249 4.47 27. Page 49 Table 5 P AIRWISE C ORRELATIONS A .966 20.492 72.425 9.233 Share of young 324 34.617 11.180 N OTE .495 63.488 1. The reference period is 19502000.342 2.979 10.060 Gini index 155 40. For details about the construction of the variables see the text.

64** .48** Civil legal origin -.08 . law -.12* Net migration flows -.24** Other border changes -.04 Southern Europe -.05 .10 + Small country .11 + -.02 Latin America .14* -.15** .42** Berlin wall -.60** .09 -.12* -.06 Jus sanguinis as initial cit.33** Decolonization -.12* .07 -.MONG D EPENDENT AND I NDEPENDENT V ARIABLES Citizenship laws Changes in citizenship laws Migration stock -.

10 + -. The reference period is 1950-2000.02 -. The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries.24** Page 50 N OTE .05 .39** .03 -.22** -.19** British or Portuguese colony . .13* -.06 Political rights .18** Catholic share .14* Oil -.12* -.10 + Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -.26** Socialist -.06 Share of young -.03 .20** Log GDP per capita .20** Government consumption -.29** .34** Gini index .Sub-Saharan Africa -.25** .

For details about the construction of the variables see the text. ** p < .055** .01.051 + -.05. * p < . + p < .10.The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod. Page 51 Table 6 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT E STIMATES Specification (a) Specification (b) Specification (c) Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock -.

523 (-1. as init.117** -4.385** .55) .712** -6.87) (-3.30) (-1.43) (-4. law -2.27) Decolonization -1.-.568** -7.86) (-2.032 -.048** -2.045 (-1.28) (3.084 -1.59** (-4.39) (-5.167* -.81) (-1.99) (-4.296 + -2.211** -.054 + -.24) (-4.887** 1.65) (.79) (-1.90) (-5.53) Jus sang.41) (-.38) Period 1.09) (-1. cit.61) (-2.193** 1.02) (2.272 2.28) (-.044** -6.409* -.47) (2.211 (4.

14) (1.495** (-.224* -.084 + (1.07) (2.156 + .75) Government consumption .187 (2.03) (-.523 (-1.23) (.64) Jus san.81) (1.68) .866** -.87) Latin America -. X migration stock .621 4.73) (-.153 1.88) (.035 .70) (3.566 + .93) Small country -.415 -2.804 .69) (-1.69) (.51) (2.234 + 1.Southern Europe 1.799 2.063** (1.

73) (2.024 1.165* (-2.43) Page 52 Catholic share .277 (.43) (1.48) (-.023 1.09) N 300 300 300 300 .397* (-1.05) (2.548** .02) Political rights .Share of young -.092** .75) (-2.626* -.426* (2.46) Constant -1.716 11.012 .84) (2.46) (.03) (2.70) Ethno.193 + -.353* 3.02) (1.01 (1. fractionalization .

32 .71 .29 .46 .77 -155.55 . . Robust z statistics in brackets.24 Maximum Likelihood R 2 . The reference period is 1950-2000.224 224 Log likelihood -195.83 Adjusted Count R 2 .45 .94 -95. Jus sanguinis is the reference category.81 .32 .44 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .58 .68 .79 Count R 2 .53 .68 McFadden's R 2 .64 N OTE .57 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 . clustered at country level.4 .

001 (2.F ULL S PECIFICATION ) Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock .7) .10.+ P < .875** -.01. Page 53 Table 7 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ARGINAL E FFECTS (M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT .193* -.681** (18.34) Jus sanguinis as initial cit. ** P < .023* -.49) (-2.025* -. * P < .05.09) (-. law .

303 + .114 (.(-2.85) (5.13) (-1.86) Jus sanguinis X migration stock -.088 -.121 (-1.03) (.15) (-2.56) (-7.80) (.194** .027* .336** -.44) Decolonization .016 -.77) Southern Europe -.75) Small country .291 .123 .170 .95) (2.51) Latin America -.51) (1.139 + (.611** -.59) (-3.86) (-.805** (-4.034 (-1.203** .16) (.92) Period -.

76) (2.021 .061** -.56) (-.037 + (-3.65) (-1.29) (1.006 (-2.069** .010* .36) (1.152 (-.50) Ethno.018 -.96) Political rights -.002 . fractionalization -.50) .98) (.107** .16) (.50) (.004 .043* (2.028 .15) Catholic share -.007* (-1.92) Government consumption -.001 Page 54 (-1.18) (-2.14) (.001 .01) Share of young ..124 -.

* P < .61) (1. clustered at country level. ** P < . The reference period is 1950-2000. The above marginal effects refer to the multinomial logit estimates of our full specification (specification (c) in Table 6). Robust z statistics in brackets. Page 55 Table 8 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C HANGE IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMINAL L OGIT E STIMATES Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Migration stock .90) N 224 224 224 N OTE .10.(2.05.039 + . + P < .01.

493** (.70) .50) (.05 + .-.12) Share of young .73) Decolonization 2.12) Period .652 1.60) Government consumption -.95) (1.02 -.006 (1.15) (2.736 + (.001 (.898** 2.90) (.032 (1.593 (.82) Catholic share -.341 -.68) Southern Europe 2.94) (3.2 + 2.155** (1.44) Small country -.82) (1.006 .65) (1.058 + (2.

15 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .33 McFadden's R 2 .23) (1.04) N 224 224 Log likelihood -107.234 (.981* 2.52) Political rights .104 .(.96) (2.08) Constant -4.58 Maximum Likelihood R 2 .81 Adjusted Count R 2 .16 .12) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1.3 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 .364 9.84) (1.45 Count R 2 .771* Page 56 (.508 (2.

Robust z statistics in brackets.N OTE .10.000 (2. + P < . * P < .003* -. The reference period is 1950-2000. ** P < .01) (-1. Page 57 Table 9 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C HANGE IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ARGINAL E FFECTS (M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT ) Toward jus sanguinis No change Toward jus soli Migration stock .05.26) . No change in citizenship laws is the reference category. clustered at country level.01.003 -.

044 -.05) Decolonization .10) (-2.415* .00) (-2.022 .003 .058* (.29) .06) Small country -.069 (2.102 .65) Government consumption -.001 (-2.116 (1.42) (1.038 -.442* .53) (.004* .299 -.16) Southern Europe .58) (-1.003 .013 -.19) Period .27) (1.31) (2.015 (-.28) Share of young .374* -.02) (1.(-.016** (.33) (1.74) (-.

60) (.89) Political rights .000 (-.(1.75) (-1. Robust z statistics in brackets.05.12) N 224 224 224 Page 58 N OTE .000 .10) (1.19) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization . The reference period is 1950-2000.145* -.007 (.18) (-2.223* .10.015 .39) (1.000 .74) Catholic share -. + P < . clustered at country level. * P < .007 -. The above marginal effects refer to the multinomial logit estimates in Table 8.1 .12) (-2.01.71) (. Page 59 Table Appendix Table A. ** P < .077 + (2.

A LTERNATIVE C OVARIATES Specification (a) Specification (b) Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock -.056 -.12) (-1.T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT E STIMATES .36) Average migration stock -.533** -7.013 (-.344** .152* -.81) (-.052 (-2.62) Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law -4.

317** -.834** -.595 (1.003 (-.062 .01) Southern Europe 1.046 5.140 -1.525 1.260 1.21) (-1.54) (1.742 + (1.68) (.09) (-4.908 .22) (.12) Civil legal origin .16) (-1.33) (2.649 (2.509 + -.667 4.941 -1.436** .31) Decolonization -.(-5.79) (-.64) (.88) Period 2.76) (1.42) Latin America -.397** .218 1.84) (-1.

(-.063** .036 .29) Jus san.019 -.197 + -.110 (.128 (-1.068** (1.040 Page 60 (1.894 + 1.140 + .402* .89) (1.10) Government consumption .55) (2.043 .90) (.73) (-.25) (2.65) (1.61) Civil legal origin X migration stock . X average migration stock .03) (3.67) (-1.23) (-1.503 + .64) Small country -2.09) (2.59) Share of young -.560 -1.65) (.

03) (.539** .527 (1.012 .58) (1.276 (2.436* .029 1.11) .035 1.46) (-1.78) (2.011 .290 1.98) Catholic share .38) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -.247* (-1.273* -3.03) (1.85) (1.563* .81) (1.950 + (-.567 4.16) (-1.78) (-2.-.56) Constant 3.74) Political rights .006 .75) (.096 -.831 11.08) (2.017 (1.52) (.52) (2.

+ P < .(-1. Jus sanguinis is the reference category.74 -132.44 .57 .41 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 .83 . . ** P < .01) N 224 224 224 224 Log likelihood -95.01 Maximum Likelihood R 2 .04) (1.78 .10.68 .55 McFadden's R 2 . clustered at country level.05.01.64 .64 Count R 2 . The reference period is 1950-2000.75 Adjusted Count R 2 .28 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .48 N OTE . * P < . Robust z statistics in brackets.

Page 61 .