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The Evolution of Citizenship Economic and Institutional Determinants ∗
ABSTRACT We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median voter model of citizenship laws determination. Next we test the implications of the model on a new dataset on citizenship laws across countries of the world. We show that citizenship laws have responded endogenously to economic and institutional determinants. When facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli tradition tend to restrict their legislation, while jus sanguinis countries resist innovation. The welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for jus soli legislation, while demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, while the instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual impact. .Key Words: citizenship laws, international migration, legal origins, democracy, borders. 1
1. Introduction Each country of the world has established a complex system of rules that govern the attribution of citizenship. As a consequence of the increasing pressure of international migration, citizenship laws have moved to center stage on policy agendas, since citizenship laws not only affect the design of immigration policy, but also interact with the workings of labor markets, affect welfare programs, and influence demographic trends. Citizenship is the legal institution that designates full membership in a state and the associated rights and duties. It provides benefits such as the right to vote, better employment opportunities, and the ability to travel without restrictions, legal protection in case of criminal charges, and the possibility to obtain a visa for a relative. There are also costs to citizenship, such as the military draft, renunciation of the original citizenship, and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs that may be required for naturalization and for recognition at the age of majority. Examples are language and culture tests, waiting periods, and a commitment to avoid activities leading to disqualification. There are several ways to acquire citizenship: at birth, by naturalization, by marriage.
The regulation of citizenship at birth, which determines citizenship acquisition by second- generation immigrants, is rooted in the well-defined bodies of common and civil law. The former traditionally applies the jus soli principle, according to which citizenship is attributed by birthplace: this implies that the child of an immigrant is a citizen, as long as he is born in the country of immigration. The latter applies the jus sanguinis principle, which attributes citizenship by descent, so that a child inherits citizenship from his parents, independently of where he is born. Despite being rooted in these principles, during the 20th century - and especially after World War II - in many countries citizenship laws have gone through a process of continuous adaptation, in conjunction with the decolonization phase, the collapse of the socialist system, and the mounting pressure of international migration. In this paper we investigate the determinants and evolution of citizenship laws in the postwar period from a political economy perspective. To pursue this goal, we assemble a new dataset which codifies citizenship laws across the countries of the world, with a specific focus on the provisions that regulate the access to citizenship at birth. The dataset is then used to study the dynamic adaptation of these laws, by relating the observed patterns to a
number of potential determinants, including economic factors as well as other political and cultural factors which have been found relevant in related research on institutions. Modern sociopolitical theories have advanced several hypotheses concerning the determinants of citizenship laws dynamics, on the basis of case studies and nonquantitative cross country comparisons. The legal tradition established in a given country is generally believed to exert a persistent impact on current legislation. The relevance of migration has also been investigated. In particular, pressure from a large stock of migrants is perceived as a factor that shapes a country's attitude toward citizenship policy. On the one hand, it could push toward a legislation that allows automatic citizenship granting for all newborn. On the other, migration could also drive toward restrictions of the same principle in countries where it was originally applied. According to some sociopolitical theories, the combination of these forces tends to induce convergence toward a mix of jus soli and sanguinis provisions for countries coming from different legal traditions (Weil 2001). For the case of Europe, Baubock et al. (2006) instead stress the presence of divergent trends, towards liberalization in some countries and toward restriction of access to citizenship in others. The influence of other economic forces is also recognized. Since citizenship rights determine the ability to enjoy welfare benefits, the shaping of nationality laws has been linked with the nature of the welfare state, with a large government representing a potential obstacle to the retention of jus soli (Joppke 1998). This argument, however, has to be weighted against the potential gain coming from the acquisition of relatively young new citizens for countries with expensive
pension systems and in the midst of a demographic crisis. Political factors have also been found relevant. The presence of a consolidated democracy is expected to lead to the adoption of jus soli, viewed as a more equal treatment of aliens. Stabilization of state borders should reduce the pressure to preserve a national identity through jus sanguinis. Finally, an additional factor that has been the subject of debate is the influence of national character and culture. The theory advanced by Brubaker (1992) focuses on France and Germany as two antagonistic kinds of nationhood, the former more assimilationists, and the latter more ethnocentric, which also differ in their definitions of citizenship. In this paper we formalize the above hypotheses within a simple median voter model which can guide our empirical investigation by generating testable implications and by offering an interpretation of the resulting evidence.
The model is based on the assumption that the laws regulating citizenship acquisition can be viewed as the outcome of the decision problem faced by a native median voter, in a context where citizenship confers the right to vote over policy variables. In making this decision, the native median voter takes into account the associated benefits and costs, which depend on the share of migrants over population and the other factors suggested by the literature. The model indicates that the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous impact on the decision to grant citizenship and voting rights to migrants, since it increases the loss, for the native median voter, of letting migrants vote, but it also increases the cost associated with their exclusion. Moreover, the natives' decision is positively influenced by a relatively high income level of the migrants, a small welfare state, a relatively old native population, a high level of democracy, a stable national border, and an inclusive national culture. We test the above empirical implications and find that in the postwar period citizenship laws have responded endogenously and systematically, through a slow but steady process of adaptation, to economic and institutional factors. Overall, our results suggest that migration pushes national legislations in the direction of jus sanguinis, not jus soli. In particular, when we take into account the legal tradition established in the matter of citizenship, we find that countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. On the other hand, in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration has been negligible. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mixed regime, since migration tends to induce restrictions, but not extensions. Other economic factors also matter. While the welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation, demographic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes.
Turning to institutional factors, we find that a high degree of democracy is significantly associated with a jus soli legislation while border instability, in particular following the decolonization phase, decreases its likelihood. Cultural characteristics captured by religion and ethic fractionalization are not found to play a significant role. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 reviews the historical and legal background for the issues we address. Section 4 presents our model of citizenship laws determination. Section 5 describes our dataset on citizenship laws around the world 4
Section 6 investigates empirically the determinants of current citizenship laws and presents our main results, together with a set of robustness checks. Section 7 develops an alternative empirical strategy that highlights the determinants of change in citizenship laws. Section 8 concludes and indicates directions for future research. The Data Appendix collects information about the data employed. 2. Related Literature Our work is related with several branches of the economic literature. First of all, this paper adds to research on international migration and migration policy. Timmer and Williamson (1998), Hatton and Williamson (2006) and Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) empirically analyze immigration policies enacted at the end of the 19th century during the mass migration era, while O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Mayda (2006) estimate voters' attitudes toward immigration in the postwar period. The political economy of migration has been modeled, among others, by Benhabib (1996), Gradstein and Schiff (2006), and DeVoretz (2006). More specifically, the role of citizenship policy has been discussed by DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2006), who investigate the economic costs and benefits derived from citizenship, by Pritchett (2006), who evaluates citizenship policy within a broader discussion on labor mobility and
Johnson. Since our theory emphasizes that citizenship rights imply the right to vote. (2008) specifically analyze the evolution of an index of formalism of legal procedure. Acemoglu. who evaluate the determinants of the decision to naturalize. However. our work is also related to Razin. Balas et al. with contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). they do not examine the determinants of these alternative regimes. and Swagel (2002) and Dolmas and Huffman (2004). who compare the impact of migration on the welfare state with or without voting rights for the migrants. and by Chiswick and Miller (2008).immigration policies. Bertocchi and Spagat (2001).. but with a focus on the conflict between rich and poor. (1998). This paper also relates to the comparative legal approach initiated by La Porta et al. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) highlight the relevance of wealth inequality and political factors in accounting for how fundamental economic 5 Page 7 institutions developed over time. Sadka. We add to this stream by focusing on the determinants of the dynamic adaptation of nationality rules. our work contributes to the research program which has focused on the historical determinants of institutions. . On the other hand. and Robinson (2001) contribute to the understanding of how institutions evolve by using historical variables as instruments for contemporary measures of the quality of institutions. the issue of franchise extension has recently received considerable attention within the literature. while Bertocchi (2007) concentrates on the conflict between men and women. More broadly. The basic premise of this research line is the recognition that laws in different countries are adopted or transplanted from a few legal traditions and that the resulting legislative bodies reflect both the influence of the legal origin and the subsequent revision specific to individual countries.
. citizenship laws reforms tend to be the outcome of long-term processes of adaptation often involving constitutional amendments. Japan also adopted jus sanguinis in this phase. and thus state borders. the process of nation-state formation and the associated codification effort were completed in Continental Europe. both because country size in this literature is the same as population size and is potentially influenced by migration and by the legal status of immigrants. During the 19th century the jus sanguinis principle was adopted throughout Europe and then transplanted to its colonies. By imitation. The French Revolution broke with this heritage and with the 1804 civil code reintroduced the ancient Roman custom of jus sanguinis. By the end of the 19th century. and also because borders play an important role on the determination of citizenship rules. starting with the United States where it was later encoded in 6 Page 8 the Constitution. 3. is also relevant to our approach. recent work by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) on the optimal determination of the size of nations.Finally. the British preserved their jus soli tradition and spread it through their own colonies. In 18th century Europe jus soli was the dominant criterion. following feudal traditions which linked human beings to the lord who held the land where they were born. that are typically adjusted to the business cycle and to the current government orientation. On the other hand. At the same time. However. Citizenship Laws in Historical Perspective Citizenship policy can be viewed as part of broader migration policy. contrary to other migration policy measures such as quotas and visa requirements. Continental modern citizenship law was subsequently built on these premises.
with the specific purpose to protect the birthrights of black slaves. Consistently with its history as a country of immigrants. had by then already moved toward a mixed regime. Below are some specific cases. drawing mostly from Joppke (1998). and jus sanguinis regulating citizenship law in most civil law countries. and 19th century colonization had extended the process of transplantation of legal tradition to the rest of the world. A relatively young and thin welfare state contributes to the fiscal sustainability of jus soli in this country. 1 In particular. jus soli came under attack in the 1980s regarding its applicability to the children of illegal immigrants. Debate about possible restrictions did arise recently. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2000. 2001) and Brubaker (1992). 2 Australia Current citizenship law in Australia differs considerably from that of the United . ranging from immigration policy to naturalization requirements. the US approach is still remarkably consistent with its original attitude in all its aspects. most countries of the world had established specific provisions regarding citizenship acquisition within a relatively well-developed legal system. the next century witnessed a continuous process of transformation of citizenship laws across the world. with jus soli being the norm in common law countries. by that stage. but never led to actual change. However. civil law Latin America had embraced jus soli early on. The United States Jus soli was encoded in the US Constitution through the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment. with its colonies. despite important exceptions. Therefore.the revolutionary phase was over in those countries that had been the subject of the earlier colonization era. and with a general positive attitude toward economic liberalism. For instance. while civil law France.
Latin America In the face of a civil law tradition which had been transplanted by the European powers. of Venezuela in 1830. is a related.1 In his analysis of Mexican immigration. potentially relevant consideration: in the US. 7 Page 9 States. Jus soli survived until 1986. Huntington (2004) has criticized current nationality regulations on the grounds that they represent a “devaluation of citizenship”. Jus soli is still the prevalent rule in the area. Jus soli was encoded in the Constitution of Brazil in 1824. even if it is no longer attracting immigrants. for instance. Pritchett (2006) discusses the possible advantages of guest-worker programs which do not contemplate citizenship. while afterwards a person born in Australia must have at least one parent who is either an Australian citizen or a permanent resident in order to acquire citizenship. 2 The relative thickness of the concept itself of citizenship. most of Latin America was already a jus soli country before the 19th century immigration waves began. Mexico represents a special case where jus soli was also . in the sense that it confers few additional benefits if compared with residency. the country went through numerous legislative and administrative reforms. At independence. despite the common origin as countries of immigration. most of the incipient states chose jus soli as a way to break with the colonial political order and to prevent the metropoles from making legitimate claims on citizens born in the new countries. In the postwar period. Therefore. of Argentina in 1853. this area has followed a rather peculiar pattern. from the perspective of poor countries. Jus soli had also been introduced in Australia by the colonists. citizenship is relatively thin. if compared to residency.
qualifies for British citizenship only if at least one parents is a British citizen or resident. the concept of nationality in the UK was. as a form of selective immigration policy. in 1889 double jus soli became automatic. only to come back to stay with a Constitutional Amendment in 1937. Redefinitions of national citizenship have been effectively employed. The 1948 Nationality Act created the status of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies for people with a close connection to the UK and its colonies.adopted in the 1814 insurgent Constitution. large-scale immigration. The revolutionary experience was particularly important for France. since all subjects of the British Empire had equal access to British citizenship simply by establishing residence in the UK. Because of its colonial history. K. where jus sanguinis was first introduced with the 1804 Civil Code and maintained 8 Page 10 for the entire course of the 19th century. since the 1980s. but was then abandoned in 1836. up to World War II. Citizenship issues and the rights of immigrants became the object . After World War II. this open-door policy was progressively restricted. The United Kingdom British nationality law has been deeply affected by the imperial experience. making the experience of this country a unique one. Following a postwar wave of colonial immigration. particularly extensive. especially from North Africa. France The emergence of the nation-state in Continental Europe was the main factor that shaped citizenship law in this area. raised concern regarding assimilation. In order to secure immigrants' children born in France to the draft. even though military consideration introduced early on elements of jus soli. The 1984 British Nationality Act restricts jus soli by establishing that a child born in the U. even though special status is still attributed to citizens of the British Commonwealth.
of heated debate in French politics. which had established strong sanguinis ties with German overseas emigrants. Brubaker (2002) has influentially argued that the different path followed by these countries has been shaped by their cultural difference. Germany The single most relevant event in the history of German citizenship law is certainly the fall of the Berlin wall. In 1993 Chirac introduced a restrictive revision to the legislation. which paved the way for the achievement of stable national borders. the original Wilhelminian citizenship law of 1913. nor declined it. With the foundation of the GDR and the consolidation of the Eastern Block. but to no avail. following an intense political struggle. With the Left regaining political power in 1997. mostly from Turkey but also from Southern Europe. that required a formal citizenship request from second-generation immigrants. was finally approved in . these restrictions were considerably revised. Germany found itself in the paradoxical situation of having to live with a large population of disenfranchised foreigners born on its soil at home. Prior to that. and at the same time with millions of ethnic Germans living behind the Iron Curtain. which turned naturalization from the discretionary exception into the rule. the massive guest-worker immigration of the postwar period. A major overhaul of the legislation. with France sticking to its tradition of assimilationist nation. The case of France is frequently compared with Germany. however. with the automatic assignment of citizenship at age 18 to those immigrants' children born in France who had neither requested. A first step in this direction was the new Foreigner Law in 1990. Achieving border stability was a decisive factor in pushing Germany toward the longdelayed adoption of jus soli elements. had started to put under strong pressure. and Germany to its ethnic identity.
Greece and Luxembourg.1999. and not only through the indirect impact on the metropolitan countries we previously examined. in the entire EU. many former British and Portuguese colonies rejected the jus soli tradition and switched to an often strongly ethnically-tinged version of jus sanguinis. access to citizenship by second and third generation is facilitated. On the other hand. which recently adapted their legislation to the globalization of international migration and its increasing impact on Europe. in the vast majority of European countries. In particular. . For instance. with the exceptions of Austria. Jus soli is now the norm in Germany (under the mild requirement that one parent has lived in the country for eight years). In the evaluation of the German experience. As documented by Weil (2001). especially for high-immigration Sweden. but had recently to adapt to the quickly changing conditions. The latter aspect may have played a role in shaping the evolution of citizenship policies in several other European countries and especially the Scandinavian ones. other factors that may have delayed the introduction of jus soli are. and the thick nature of the 9 Page 11 German welfare state. restricted forms of double jus soli are de facto applied. The vast majority of the African colonies that were subject to civil law countries practicing jus sanguinis stuck to this principle after independence. where jus sanguinis was functional to the large past emigration flows. as mentioned in the introduction. Decolonization Postwar decolonization had a major impact on citizenship rules applied around the world. the strong ethnic character of German national identity. by now.
recognized citizenship only for persons whose parents were members of one of the tribes established within the territory by 1908. To these days. there had been considerable migration within. In 1981 Mobutu signed a new law on nationality requiring an ancestral connection to the population residing in the territory as far back as 1885. the associated exclusive notion of ethnic and tribal identity caused enormous problems in countries where colonial rule had left shaky democratic institutions. The 1964 Congolese Constitution. The Soviet Union had occupied Estonia. At the same time. stateless. as for all empires. To these days. In situations where instability was pushed to an extreme degree by the young age and the arbitrary borders of these countries. Marginalization and de facto statelessness of significant strata of the population is the unavoidable outcome of these policies. however. 10 Page 12 The disintegration of the USSR Another major wave of citizenship law codification followed the disintegration of the USSR. and was compounded with deep ethnic division. large Russian-speaking. jus sanguinis tended to prevail as a way to control more easily the formation of national entities. During the following decades millions of Russians were encouraged to settle in Latvia and Estonia (less so in Lithuania) in order to Russify them. in an effort to exclude Rwandan immigrants.Sierra Leone's 1961 Constitution established that citizenship is transmitted only by descent and only to children whose father and a grandfather were Sierra Leoneans of AfricanNegro descent. Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. ethnic conflict lies at the roots of a chronic manipulation of citizenship rules in favor of one ethnic group over others. sizeable minorities . The area had been sealed toward international migration but.
Again. We can view the laws regulating citizenship acquisition as the outcome of the decision problem faced by a median voter. Estonian and Latvian laws were sharply criticized by international organizations on the grounds of human rights. even though small concessions to jus soli have been made. the salient fact in shaping current citizenship policy is the perception that many of its citizens are outside its borders. while Lithuania. the new citizenship laws of these three states reflected this heritage with an emphasis on jus sanguinis as the basis for acquiring citizenship. The Model This section develops a simple theoretical model which formalizes the hypotheses that a widely interdisciplinary literature has advanced with respect to the determinants of citizenship laws. in a context where citizenship confers the right to vote . In the anticipation of EU integration. After independence. these recommendations were indeed fulfilled in the more recent legislation of the Baltics.are still present. spread around the former regions of the USSR. By contrast. and a commitment to democratic values with respect to the rights of minorities. The hostile attitude toward ethnic Russians was especially strong in Latvia. showed a more open approach. which was less affected by Soviet immigration policy. for the case of the Russian Federation. 4. while most other countries of the area still persist with discriminatory policies. The issue for these states was how to balance a need to reconstitute their national identity around an ethnic model. The aim of the model is also to generate testable implications that can guide our interpretation of the empirical evidence. this perception as a country of emigrants pushes toward the persistence of jus sanguinis as the main principle.
namely. therefore the model's predictions can be applied to the laws concerning both citizenship at birth and naturalization. beside the right to vote. Migrants are poorer than natives since they are relatively unskilled. where y N and y M denote average income for natives and migrants. while in practice citizenship acquisition implies a larger set of rights.over policy variables. We consider an economy where a population of mass P consists of natives with mass N and migrants with mass M. our focus on the right to vote as the main benefit of citizenship is easily justified. even if the model concentrates on voting on a specific policy. and 11 Page 13 thus the right to vote. respectively. First. and y = N P y . in our oneperiod framework the distinction between different ways to acquire citizenship becomes irrelevant. where M + N = P and M < N. since political rights can be viewed as an instrument through which migrants could achieve broader political. Finally. y N >y>y M . when considering the decision to grant citizenship. is driven by the benefits and costs associated with this decision. to migrants. A native voter. before we present the model's details. Second. economic and social goals. a redistributive tax scheme which finances a public good. and also implies some duties. A few warnings are in order. namely. the same approach could be extended to consider alternative agenda.
c i . The tax rate is set through a political choice under majority voting. median income is lower than average income both for natives and migrants. such that 0 < τ < 1. g. Assume initially 12 Page 14 . Both natives and migrants derive utility from consumption of a private good. according to u i =c i + λg (1) where λ is a positive preference parameter. namely. We also assume that income distribution is skewed to the right for each group. as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). and a public good. and thus for the economy as a whole. Tax revenues are used by the government to finance the public good according to the following balanced budget constraint: g = τy − τ 2 2 y (2) where the second term captures tax collection costs. Both groups pay taxes. according to a proportional income tax rate τ. Each enfranchised individual casts a vote on the tax rate.N + M P y M is the economy-wide average income.
The expression for the indirect utility function of a native voter with income y N i is given by v N i = (1 − τ)y N i − k + λ(τ − τ 2 2 . This cost increases with the share of migrants over population. according to k=K+h M P (3) where K reflects the degree of cultural inclusiveness and h > 0. for instance.that only natives are citizens and are therefore allowed to vote. Assume also that society bears a cost k for the exclusion of migrants from citizenship. reflecting the possibility that their disenfranchisement can lead to social unrest and even violence. k could enter directly the utility function. The cost enters the individual budget constraint as follows: c i ≤ (1 − τ)y i −k (4) where y i denotes individual income. The cost is also affected by factors that determine the degree of inclusiveness of a country's culture. Equivalently. as captured. by a jus soli tradition.
which implies that the tax rate is going to be positive only if y N∗ y < λ.)y (5) which is single-peaked with respect to the tax rate. since migrants also pay taxes. which is measured by the ratio of native median income over the economywide average income. according to which the equilibrium tax rate is the preferred tax rate of the native median voter with income y N ∗ . which is given by . The native median voter could avoid the cost k by granting citizenship to the migrants and thus accepting the tax rate that would prevail under universal enfranchisement. To be noticed is that under our assumptions about income distribution it is not necessarily the case that y N∗ y < 1. according to τ N ∗ =1− 1 λ y N ∗ y (6) The level of the tax rate increases with the intensity of the preference for public goods and with inequality. We can therefore apply the median voter theorem.
Since y N ∗ >y ∗ . it follows that τ N ∗ <τ ∗ . namely. the latter is certainly positive. It follows that the native median voter decides to grant citizenship to migrants if and only if . The difference between τ N ∗ and τ ∗ increases with the income gap between natives and migrants and with the share of migrants over population. If migrants cannot vote. If migrants vote. the tax rate chosen by the native median voter is lower than the tax that applies under universal suffrage. The native median voter faces a simple set of costs and benefits when considering the decision to grant citizenship. In particular. he has to face the cost k. he has to pay more taxes but k is avoided. given our assumptions on income distribution. but can enjoy a smaller tax.τ ∗ =1− 1 λ y ∗ y (7) 13 Page 15 where y ∗ is the economy-wide median income.
while the cost increases with the degree of inclusiveness K of the country's culture. Even if the model is static. Besides. Both the disenfranchisement cost and the fiscal gain associated with the no-franchise status quo increase in the share of migrants over the population.(1 − τ N ∗ )y N ∗ − k + λ(τ N ∗ − τ N ∗ 2 2 )y ≤ (1 − τ ∗ )y N ∗ + λ(τ ∗ − τ ∗2 2 )y (8) where following (5) we find on the left hand side his indirect utility function when migrants cannot vote and on the right hand side his indirect utility function when migrants can vote. we can think of its dynamic implications in terms of a sequence . the fiscal gain also increases with the income gap between natives and migrants.
Finally. migrants who are already in the country and have thus become citizens are simply to be considered as natives themselves. the median voter will respond taking into considerations all the channels involved and this may result in an adaptation of the regulation. If. since a higher share increases 14 Page 16 both the cost and the fiscal gain of disenfranchisement. it follows that jus sanguinis countries will be more reluctant to change. due to a large inflow. since it is the share of migrants over population that matters. generating a trade off. the effect of an increase in the share of migrants is potentially ambiguous. The net effect will depend on which factor is stronger. When the status quo is a jus soli regulation. they will decide whether or not restricting the current regulation taking into account the incoming waves of immigrants and following the simple logic previously illustrated. If we interpret a jus sanguinis tradition as a low degree of inclusiveness and thus a low cost of exclusion. following a sequence of stationary decisions. While the present formulation of the model is designed to establish conditions for extension of citizenship rights to migrants. . it can also encompass restriction.of repeated decisions. Together with the ethnic natives. To be noticed is that a given stock of migrants has a stronger impact on countries with a relatively small native population. The predictions so far obtained from the model indicate that a decision to extend citizenship and the associated voting rights is facilitated by a smaller income gap between natives and migrants and by a larger degree of inclusiveness of a country's culture. the economy is shocked by an increase of the migrants share. or equivalently a particularly generous naturalization policy.
thus amplifying the tax cost which follows the decision to allow migrants to vote. border instability could be captured in a version of the model where the size of the native population. by increasing the tax differential. demographic aspects could be considered by assuming that the migrants' younger average age implies a larger ability to contribute to the welfare state. as captured by λ. is subject to uncertainty. the impact of the size of government on citizenship laws can be captured by assuming that different countries exhibit different preference parameters toward government. could make an open citizenship policy more costly. Third. This should facilitate the decision to grant them citizenship and implies that countries with a relatively old native population should be particularly sensitive to these considerations and thus display a more open attitude. 15 Page 17 . at any given level of income. the level of democracy can influence the outcome since it implies a constraint on the political rights of the natives themselves. the associated tax rate will be higher than otherwise. First. we should therefore expect a negative impact of the size of government on the degree of inclusiveness of citizenship laws. which is higher for a migrant. The testable implication is that the decision to grant citizenship is positively influenced by the domestic level of democracy.The basic model can be extended to consider several other potentially relevant factors. Second. While our one-period model cannot explicitly reflect these aspects. Fourth. Thus a relatively large government size. and thus the population share of migrants. which can be modelled with an income franchise requirement. If only rich natives are allowed to vote. we can interpret our tax as a life-long contribution. Empirically.
5.Indeed. The Data: Citizenship Laws of the World We compile a dataset of citizenship laws across the countries of the world for the postwar period. We take 1948 as the starting point. when the national border is unstable. and the Department of State. The principal focus of our codification is citizenship acquisition at birth. but we also collect information about naturalization requirements. a high level of democracy. the main problem is to establish who can be considered as a native. The principal source for the information we codify is a directory published by the Investigations Service of the United States Office of Personnel Management in 2001. Under standard risk aversion behavior. for the native median voter. a stable national border. Moreover. of letting migrants vote. the Library of Congress. even though there were nearly no reforms in citizenship laws during the first half of the century. the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2003). Citizenship at Birth We attribute to each country an appropriate code for citizenship laws in 2001.1. a relatively high income level of the migrants. but it also increases the cost associated with their exclusion. and a large native population. a relatively old native population. 1975 and at the beginning of the postwar period. so that . 5. The sources for this directory were Embassies. which provides synopses of the citizenship laws currently practiced in 190 countries. We supplement this information with additional one from the CIA World Factbook (2002). we expect the natives' decision to be positively influenced by an inclusive national culture. since it increases the tax disadvantage. to introduce a random component in the model should affect the voting decision by reducing the tax rate. a small welfare state. the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous impact on the natives' decision to extend citizenship and voting right to migrants. and the survey in Weil (2001). To summarize.
we treat the specific legal provisions regulating access to citizenship in 1948 as predetermined.most of the legislation in place in 1948 had actually been developed much earlier. and countries subject to full jus soli (Group 3). (1998). 1975 and 2001. rather than emigrants. countries that apply a mixed regime (Group 2). For 1948. the subsequent half century did not see further evolution. In our classification we focus on the presence of jus soli elements in a country's legislation. which gained independence from the British and French administration in the 1943-1948 period. A mixed regime includes elements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis. despite the occurrence of major historical events such as World War I. Indeed. we divide the postwar period into two subperiods of equal length. while the 19th century witnessed a first wave of adaptation of citizenship legislation from the civil vs. 3 As in 3 By treating 1948 as the initial year. we divide countries into three groups: countries subject to jus sanguinis without any jus soli element (Group 1). common law tradition. at least relative to the subsequent developments that are the focus of the present investigation. 16 Page 18 the analysis of legal origins in La Porta et al. 4 Our dataset includes those 162 countries for which we were able to collect information on both original . we include the postwar decolonization phase with the exemption of the Middle East. By coding citizenship laws in the intermediate year 1975. This approach is justified by our primary interest in the potential impact of citizenship laws on immigrants.
and current citizenship laws, and for which migration data were available for the postwar period. 5 INSERT TABLE 1 The differential patterns of evolution that citizenship laws generate in 1948, 1975 and 2001 are summarized by the transition matrices in Table 1, which reveals considerable variations both across countries and over time. The table shows that in 1948 jus soli was the rule in about 47% (namely, 76 out of 162) of the countries, while jus sanguinis dominated in 41% (namely, 67 out of 162), and the mixed regime was adopted in the remaining 12% (19 countries). Among the countries that were under jus soli in 1948, we find the United States, Canada, all the Oceanian countries, most of Latin America, within Africa and Asia the British and Portuguese colonies, within Europe the UK, Ireland and Portugal. On the other hand, in 1948 jus sanguinis predominated in most of Europe, including its Eastern part. As explained in Section 3, France was unique in its early choice of a mixed regime. Since we 4 For details on our classification criteria see the Data Appendix, part A. 5 For details on migration data see the Data Appendix, part C. 17
treat colonial territories as subject to the metropolitan countries' regime until independence, the group applying the mixed regime in 1948 includes France and its colonies. By 1975, 31% (namely, 50 out of 162) of the countries had jus soli, 62% (101) jus sanguinis, and 7% (11) a mixed regime. The main event justifying this evolution is decolonization, with many former colonies switching to jus sanguinis, from jus soli when the UK and Portugal
were the metropolitan country, and from the mixed regime in the case of France (see Section 3). As of 2001, 24% (namely, 39 out of 162) of the countries apply jus soli, 54% (88) jus sanguinis, and 22% (35) a mixed regime. It has mostly been the adaptation of the legislation of many European countries, relaxing pure jus sanguinis in favor of a mixed regime, that explains the pattern observed for the second subperiod. Among the countries that still adhere to the jus soli principle in 2001 are the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland (which - however - recently introduced restrictions to jus soli with a June 2004 referendum). The United Kingdom and Australia, on the contrary, no longer adhere to it and now adopt a mixed regime. Overall, jus sanguinis is currently the most common regime, with 69% of the countries in Africa, 83% in Asia, and 41% (down from 88%) in Europe. The growing group where a mix of provisions is applied is particularly well-represented in Europe, with 56% of the European countries including the formerly jus soli United Kingdom. On the other hand, jus soli predominates in the Americas, with 89% of the countries in Latin America, and the entire North America (namely, the U. S. and Canada). Table 1 reveals three different patterns of transitional dynamics: stability, switch, and convergence. Stable countries lie along the diagonal. Looking at the 1948 to 2001 transition, we see that a large fraction (28%, namely, 46 out of 162) have started and ended as jus sanguinis. In other words, it is 69% (namely, 46 out of 67) of the originally jus sanguinis countries that have remained so. By contrast, 22% (36 out of 162) are steadily jus soli countries: this means that only 47% (36 out of 76) of the originally jus soli countries have not changed their policies. Off diagonal, there is a sizeable proportion of countries (19%, or 31 out of 162) that have switched from jus soli to sanguinis, by completely eliminating
birthplace as a criterion: most of them - as mentioned - are former African colonies of the UK and Portugal, which made this radical choice at independence. Looking at the two 18
subperiods, we see most of these switches occur between 1948 and 1975. Finally, there is evidence of a process of convergence to a soli/sanguinis mix, which affects 18% of the countries (29 out of 162, of which 20 converge from jus sanguinis by adding jus soli elements, while 9 converge from jus soli by restricting it) and intensifies between 1975 and 2001. INSERT TABLE 2 In Table 2 we present further information on citizenship laws evolution by reporting changes in citizenship laws, organized by original laws. Over the 1948-2001 period, 74 countries (46%) have gone through a change in the laws. Of these, 51 have changed toward jus sanguinis and 23 toward jus soli, while 45 changes have occurred in the first subperiod and 33 in the second. 6 In particular, in the first subperiod, the majority of the countries that went through a change (29, or 64%) were originally jus soli. As mentioned, this pattern is determined largely by the behavior of former colonies. In the second subperiod, the majority of the countries that went through a change (20, or 61%) were originally jus sanguinis, most of which adopting a more open legislation. The above discussion suggests a relevant role of border stability. To investigate this issue, we introduce a set of dummies capturing a country's history of border changes. In particular, we distinguish across three different causes of border instability: decolonization, Berlin wall, other border changes. 7 If we compare the transitional dynamics of the full sample with those
of the subsample of countries that did not go through a border change, we count for the latter a much smaller proportion of switches from jus soli to jus sanguinis. This pattern confirms the relevance of border changes, especially those due to decolonization. INSERT TABLE 3 Summary statistics for our citizenship laws dataset are reported in Table 3. The correlation between 1948 and 2001 citizenship laws is 0.42, which points to some persistence, as confirmed by the even higher correlation between 1948 and 1975 (0.60) and 1975 and 2001 laws (0.81). 6 A few countries went through more than one change. 7 The Data Appendix, part B describes how the three border change dummies are constructed. 19
5.2. Citizenship by Naturalization and the Citizenship Policy Index Naturalization policies are also relevant to the issues at hand. Indeed, to facilitate naturalization for immigrant parents may represent a substitute mechanism to attribute citizenship to children born in jus sanguinis countries. Besides, the general attitude revealed by a country's regulation of citizenship at birth may be reflected in its naturalization laws, with jus soli countries traditionally making naturalization much easier, at least for resident aliens. Within jus sanguinis countries, naturalization requirements again tend to be correlated with the revisions introduced for citizenship at birth. Basic rules for naturalization may include a period of residence, renunciation of other citizenship, familiarity with the language and customs of the country, and the availability of adequate means of support. We code naturalization only for 2001, on the basis of the available information on 142 of our 162 countries. We classify countries on the basis of the number of years of residence
8 In our dataset 62 countries (namely.required for naturalization. 10 8 We do not consider naturalization by marriage. 4 years or fewer). 10 For European countries only. 20 Page 22 . 5 years. which can be explained by the fact that the correlation between citizenship laws and naturalization is only 0. 9 Table 3 reports summary statistics for naturalization and the citizenship policy index. (2006) collect statistics on acquisition of nationality. since it is heavily dependent on family law. The corrected Cronbach's alpha of the indicator is 0.54. while Baubock et al. We construct an index of citizenship policy defined on the 0-1 interval. 6 to 14 years. To construct the index. Alternative ways to define naturalization classes yielded similar conclusions. while 46% require more time and only 10% are more open. 44%) require five years of residence. we treat citizenship laws in 2001 as an ordinal variable. We then combine the information we collected on citizenship at birth and naturalization within a single measure. even though data on naturalization are only available for the year 2001 and for a subset of countries. by associating jus soli elements with lower number of years of residence required for naturalization.37. but we do not use this variable due to limited information. the British Council has compiled an index of civic citizenship and inclusion (see British Council Brussels 2005). 9 Dual citizenship provisions constitute another potentially relevant aspect of citizenship policy. by constructing four classes (more than 14 years. which can be considered a relatively open attitude.
. we employ measures of migration. we select the following variables. and jus sanguinis with minimal inclusiveness. the size of government. while we cannot gauge the impact of the income gap between natives and migrants due to lack of data. Moreover. and the age structure of the population. Border stability is measured through our border changes dummies. The empirical investigation is performed using a panel sample which includes information on two cross sections of 162 countries: the first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod. an ordering by increasing inclusiveness toward immigrants.6. The Determinants of Citizenship Laws 6. The dependent variable is citizenship laws. in principle those regressors that affect the probability of being a jus soli country may not always have the opposite effect on the probability of being a jus sanguinis country. for example. and 3 if the country has a jus soli regime. Further discussion on this point is postponed to the sub-section on robustness. or else may not have any effect at all (and vice versa). 2 if the country has a mixed regime. in order to investigate the determinants of citizenship laws evolution in the postwar period. In fact. To control for other cultural characteristics. with jus soli being associated with maximal. we also consider religion and ethnic diversity. We also control for countries with a particularly small population size. Among regressors. which is categorical and can take three values: 1 if the country has a jus sanguinis regime. We interpret the presence of a jus soli tradition as an indicator of the degree of inclusiveness of national culture. this choice does not impose any ex ante ordering among the three regimes.1. We use a multinomial logit specification to achieve maximum generality. Empirical Specification In bringing our theoretical model to the data.
a is a constant term. In the full specification we present..the second cross section to the 1976-2000 subperiod.. M it is migration stock as a percentage of the population in country i at the beginning of period t. the multinomial logit model we run has the following form: L it = a + bM it + cS it + dM it S it + eT t +Z 0 it f+ it . L it represents citizenship laws in country i at the end of period t.162 and t = 1.2 (where t = 1 refers to the 1950-1975 period and t = 2 refers 21 Page 23 to the 1976-2000 period)... (9) with i = 1. 11 In specification (9). M it S . S it is a dummy for the presence of jus sanguinis in country i at the beginning of each subperiod.
we will organize our comments in terms of the effects of each of our regressors on the probability of adopting either a mixed or a jus soli regime instead of jus sanguinis.it is the interaction between the previous two variables. Z it is a vector of additional explanatory variables. starting with the variables we consider focal to our analysis. Throughout the following. the share of young in the population. immigration and legal tradition. Within this group we consider the border changes dummies and dummies for Latin American. The second group of explanatory variables includes the size of government as a share of GDP. The Data Appendix collects information on the definitions and sources of all variables we employed. Migration (M . 12 The set of explanatory variables Z it can be divided into two groups. namely. Southern European and small countries. The first group includes dummies capturing the country's geopolitical position. consistent with the model previously outlined. where we take jus sanguinis as the reference category. This follows the specification of our multinomial logit estimates. regarding the potential role of the above mentioned factors. proxies for cultural characteristics such as religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Table 4 presents their summary statistics. INSERT TABLE 4 We can now suggest a number of specific hypotheses. T t is a period dummy. and a measure of democracy. and it is an error term.
L i1 and L i2 are citizenship laws in country i in 1975 and 2001. 14 A positive coefficient . By entering the migrant stock near the beginning of each period. we avoid any potential endogeneity problem of migration with respect to citizenship laws. S i1 = 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in 1948 and S i2 = 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in in 1975. M i1 is migration stock in country i in 1960 and M i2 is migration stock in country i in 1980. T 1 = 0 and T 2 = 1. For the first subperiod. respectively.it ) is measured by the stock of migrants in percent of the population at the beginning of each subperiod. 13 while for the second they refer to the stock in 1980. since it is unlikely that stocks evaluated at the beginning of the period can be affected by subsequent changes in citizenship laws. 22 Page 24 1960. for comparison purposes. the available data refer to the stock in 11 We also run multinomial logit models for two types of more parsimonious specifications. 12 In particular.
thus confirming persistence of the original laws. On the other hand. a positive coefficient for the mixed regime would suggest convergence toward the intermediate group. As explained in Section 3. its coefficients would indicate that those jus sanguinis countries facing high migration tend to add jus soli elements. is the legal tradition in the matter of citizenship. the natives' reaction could be a conservative one. To assess the total impact of migration for jus sanguinis countries we also need to take into account the interaction's coefficients. Turning to our geopolitical dummies. We select this dummy because jus sanguinis is the most persistent of the three regimes. as previously discussed. in the presence of a large stock of migrants. We measure it with a dummy for countries that apply jus sanguinis at the beginning of each subperiod (S it ). as suggested by some of the political theories introduced in Section 1. and similarly for the jus soli regime. A negative value of the dummy's coefficient for a mixed and jus soli regime would imply that jus sanguinis countries are less likely to end up in the mixed and jus soli groups. the coefficients of the interaction could also turn out to be negative since. most of Latin America 13 . A crucial control in our regressions. In particular. if border stability really counts as a prerequisite for the introduction of automatic birthrights for the immigrants. thus suggesting a particularly significant role of this initial legislation. The interaction between the jus sanguinis dummy and migration should reveal additional information: if positive. we should expect negative signs for the coefficients for our border change dummies. We introduce the Latin America dummy to capture the peculiarity of this continent's experience.for the mixed regime would indicated that high migration pushes toward it rather than toward jus sanguinis.
For Southern Europe. we would find that countries with a higher share of young in . If indeed the behavior of Latin America differs significantly from the rest of the sample in being associated with a higher probability of adopting jus soli. with most of the revision to the legislation toward mixed regimes occurring in the past 15 years or so. we should expect a positive coefficient for the mixed regime since these countries have been experiencing quickly increasing migration during the second subperiod. so its current position is not determined by postwar developments and in particular by its postwar migration experience.3. more expensive and more redistributive structure would represent an obstacle to automatic citizenship granting to the children of relatively poor immigrants. 14 Even taking into account the anticipation of future changes of citizenship laws in making migration decisions. On the other hand. see the Data Appendix. part C. if young immigrants could offer a solution to domestic demographic imbalances. the endogeneity of our migration measure is ruled out by the fact that such changes had been extremely rare during the first half of the 20th century. we should expect negative signs for this dummy's coefficients. Finally. with a disproportionately small impact on their legislation. where alternative measures of migration are introduced. The potential endogeneity of migration is further addressed in sub-sub-section 6. since migration data reveal that countries with a small population tend to have large and erratic figures.1.Earlier data are not available. The size of government is meant to proxy for the nature of the welfare state: if a thicker. 23 Page 25 adopted jus soli long before our sample period. it should exhibit a positive coefficient for this kind of legislation. we would found negative coefficients.
The establishment of a consolidated democracy . .36). The share of young in population is positively associated with migration stocks (0. the small country dummy. The dummy reflecting jus sanguinis as the initial law is negatively correlated with decolonization (-0. political rights. Overall.31) and Latin America (-0. we include the share of Catholics in total population and an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.43). Political rights tend to be low in countries with high ethnolinguistic fractionalization (-0. beside legal tradition. and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. the Catholic share.64).total population would be less prone to adopt jus soli elements. is highly correlated with the initial citizenship laws as identified by the jus sanguinis dummy (-0.should exert a positive effect on the probability of a jus soli legislation even though even in a democratic country hostility toward the assimilation of outsiders may persist for a protracted period of time. these stylized facts are in line with previous research and economic intuition. Pairwise correlations between all our independent variables are not reported for brevity and can be summarized as follows.52). Current citizenship laws. Citizenship laws are also significantly 24 Page 26 correlated with migration. INSERT TABLE 5 Pairwise correlations among our dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 5. The Latin America dummy is positively associated with the Catholic share (0.15). thus displaying negative coefficients.measured by the political rights variable . the dependent variable.35). In an effort to capture additional dimensions of cultural differences. while its correlation with the civil law dummy is much lower (-0.
while both coefficients are positive for the period dummy. and that in the second subperiod the probability of applying a mixed or jus soli legislation increases. which includes only the core variables. the results reported in the table indicate the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing either the mixed or the jus soli regimes. which adds to (b) the other potentially relevant economic and institutional regressors. the jus sanguinis origin still exerts a negative impact on the probability of applying a mixed or jus soli regime.2. Finally. multinomial logit (c) is our full specification. 6. The table reports three different specifications. Multinomial logit (a) is the core specification. The period . namely. This means that high migration and a jus sanguinis origin decrease the probability of applying a mixed or a jus soli legislation rather than jus sanguinis. relative to jus sanguinis. we find that the core variables are all significant. migration and jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law. Results The results of our multinomial logits are presented in Table 6. plus the period dummy. Jus sanguinis is the reference category for all the results shown. In specification (b). which adds to (a) the dummies we discussed above. INSERT TABLE 6 Starting with the core specification (a). Hence. In particular. which includes the dummies. migration and jus sanguinis display negative coefficients for both the mixed regime and jus soli.It is also clear that several of our independent variables are closely interrelated and that it may be difficult to disentangle their specific effect on the evolution of citizenship laws. while migration 25 Page 27 only remains significantly negative for the probability of applying a mixed regime. Multinomial logit (b) is an expanded specification.
the strength of this tendency is questioned by the fact that. As expected. while the share of young in the population exerts a negative impact. in the full specification (c). while a high degree of democracy . Latin America has a positive coefficient for jus soli. 15 The interaction term between migration and jus sanguinis origin is significant and positive for both the mixed regime and jus soli. the total effect of migration becomes negligible. while the small country dummy now reveals a negative impact on the probability of applying a mixed regime. confirming that Southern European countries have a higher probability of becoming mixed. South Europe has a positive coefficient for the mixed regime. The size of government has a positive and significant coefficient for the probability of applying a jus soli regime. a jus sanguinis origin and the period dummy are confirmed. The share of Catholics and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are both insignificant. However. The role of the Latin America and Southern Europe dummies is confirmed. Finally. the impact of migration. The small country dummy is not significant in this specification.dummy is significantly positive only for the probability of a mixed regime. In this extended version the coefficient for decolonization loses significance. namely. since these countries have a higher probability of applying this regime. uncovering a tendency for countries with a jus sanguinis origin which are exposed to high migration to add jus soli elements. in support of the hypothesis that countries with a relatively old population are more likely to choose mixed and jus soli regimes. if one evaluates the coefficients of migration and of the interaction together. having gone through a decolonization border change negatively affects the probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime. the decolonization dummy displays two negative coefficients.
5% increase due to direct effect of migration. 16 For the full specification (c). 16 For all three specifications.7%. inspection of the marginal coefficients in Table 7 confirms that migration increases the probability of jus sanguinis and decreases that of a mixed regime and that the interaction between jus sanguinis and migration is negative. and decreases the probability of having a mixed regime by 2. the marginal effect of 15 For both multinomial logit (a) and (b) we obtain the same results using a balanced sample composed by the 224 countries which constitute the reference sample for the estimation of our full specification. In particular. an increase in migration of one percentage point for a jus sanguinis country decreases the probability of being jus sanguinis by about 2. consistently with the positive coefficients for jus soli and a mixed regime in Table 6. 17 Moreover. to be evaluated together with the 2. having gone through a decolonization border change decreases the probability of being jus soli by about 14%. Besides. we verified that our results are not driven by outliers. 17 The estimated marginal effects are calculated by holding all the independent variables at their mean 26 Page 28 decolonization reveals that this regressor retains a significantly negative impact on the probability of jus soli.positively affects the probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime. The marginal effects also allow to quantify the impact of our regressors. .3%.5%. while an increase in migration of one percentage point increases the probability of being a jus sanguinis country by about 2.
Quantitative and qualitative development indicators such as income per capita and inequality could reveal if a richer. . and also with democracy and fractionalization. Moreover. the original laws and our geopolitical dummies exert a significant impact on current citizenship laws. both per capita GDP and the Gini index of inequality tend to be associated with migration. In fact they fail to add any further significance to the previous results. due to the fact that all countries identified by them do not exhibit enough variability with respect to the dependent variable. A dummy for socialist countries could instead work as an alternative to our Berlin wall border change dummy. and that other factors such as government size.48.We also consider additional covariates that have often been found significant in related research on the determinants of institutions. 19 INSERT TABLE 7 Overall. For dichotomous independent variables the marginal effect is the change from 0 to 1 holding all other variables at their means. our results indicate that migration. so they are unlikely to add independent explanatory power to a regression. 18 However. a dummy for oil countries could account for the fact that most of them have been experiencing huge immigration which has had no impact on their still very restrictive legislation (often based on Islamic family law). as well as the Berlin wall and the other border changes dummies. 18 The correlation between Berlin wall and socialist is 0. However. we cannot include in the regressions the socialist and oil dummies. In levels. demographics and democracy also contribute to their determination. more equal country is more prone to adopting jus soli elements.
In addition. On the other hand. even though the process of transplantation can prove discontinuous in the case of former colonies. we show that the legal tradition tends to affect the current legislation persistently. Indeed. this correlation covers a more complex pattern which can be revealed once the interaction between migration and the legal tradition in the matter of citizenship is considered. Therefore.19 For example. However. the legal tradition interacts with the way countries react to migration in a complex way. on balance. not jus soli. Contrary to the model's implications. as predicted by the model. Overall. there is evidence of a tendency toward adding jus soli provisions so that. this could be explained by the fact many of the countries with extended welfare systems may favor immigration because of their demographic crisis. On the one hand. for countries with a jus sanguinis origin which have experienced more immigration. in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration turns out to be negligible. countries affected by Berlin wall have always applied jus sanguinis. However. countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. the evidence does not the hypothesis of convergence toward a mix of provisions suggested by some political theories (see Section 1). our results suggest that migration pushes national legislations in the direction of jus sanguinis. the welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation. demo- . The presence of countervailing forces highlighted by the model is therefore confirmed by our findings. because liberal countries tend to restrict while restrictive countries tend to resist innovation. 27 Page 29 particular.
. we replace our measure of migration with a range of alternative measures. When we replace our migrations stocks with average migration flows (computed with reference to each subperiod). our empirical findings match the theoretical insights coming from the model. 20 the coefficients for migration turns out to be insignificant in all three specifications. the evidence confirms that a higher degree of democracy is associated with more jus soli elements.graphic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes. our migration measure was chosen to minimize a potential endogeneity bias. in particular as far as the impact of migration is concerned.3. First. As outlined above. Moreover. samples and estimation techniques.3. 28 Page 30 6. 21 In the Table Appendix. the impact we observe for the size of government could be explained by the fact that it proxies for European-style. Further tests involve alternative measures of migration stocks. Finally. Alternative Specifications We experiment our multinomial logit specifications with alternative covariates. while cultural traits captured by religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to be irrelevant. and provide a deeper understanding of the forces shaping citizenship laws. This could suggest that migration flows are endogenous with respect to citizenship laws. In sum.1. Robustness In this section we present a number of alternatives to our benchmark regressions to investigate whether they are robust to different specifications. relative open socialdemocracies. 6.
Results from this instrumented specification are similar to those presented in Table 6.1. Some differences emerge in the coefficients for migration and its interaction with jus sanguinis. . 21 Namely. column (1) presents the full specification with the 1960-70 and 1980-90 average migration stock. for the first and the second subperiod we select the years 1970 and 1990.1. the latter turns out to be substantially less significant and reduces the 20 Migration stocks and flows show a correlation of 0. with the latter losing significance. 23 If the coefficients of the two alternative dummies were the same. respectively. one could conclude that our detailed codification of the original citizenship laws does not add much to what we can already learn from a country’s broader legal tradition. column (2)).Table A. and citizenship laws could be viewed as part of migration policy. Since in the postwar period migration has been highly regulated by policy in most receiving countries. respectively.45. To sum up. 24 When we replace the jus sanguinis with the civil law dummy (see Table A. as possible alternatives. 22 We also experiment with a specification entering the migrant stock in 1960 for both subperiods. our beginning-of-period migration stocks prove to be the most adequate measures of the role of migration. respectively. and the 1960-70 and 1980-90 averages. the influence of the legal tradition can also be analyzed through a dummy capturing the presence of a civil law tradition. 22 Since jus sanguinis and jus soli are in principle closely linked to the civil and common systems of laws. the simultaneous determination of citizenship laws and migration does represent a concern when we enter within-the-period data on migration instead of beginning-of-period data.
When we replace the Southern Europe dummy with migration flows. which we assume here to be ordered by increasing inclusiveness. possibly because flows are multicollinear with respect to stocks and endogenous with respect to the dependent variable.35. We also run ordered logit regressions where current citizenship laws are explicitly treated as an ordinal variable. namley. 6. we find that its coefficient is insignificant. 29 Page 31 significance of most other regressors. we assume that jus sanguinis corresponds to minimal and jus soli to maximal inclusiveness. The correlation between civil law and jus sanguinis is 0. 24 The correlation between the two dummies is 0. We also replace our decolonization dummy with a dummy for British or Portuguese colonies (identifying those countries that were characterized by a jus soli legislation during the colonial period). In particular.2. an (unreported) alternative multinomial probit model delivers the same qualitative results.3.2 and A. These results are reported in Table A.3. and with the subSaharan Africa dummy. Our previous conclusions .35. 25 but both alternatives are associated with insignificant coefficients. since it is the quickly increasing second-subperiod immigration which determines the peculiar behavior of this region. suggesting that civil law is a much weaker predictor of current citizenship laws than the original citizenship laws. Alternative Estimation Techniques Alternative estimation techniques broadly confirm the same results from Table 6.23 The dummy is equal to 1 if a country belongs to the civil law tradition and to 0 if a country belongs to common law.
Our multinomial logit specification is hence superior to an ordered logit specification.are confirmed. we run a test for the parallel regression assumption. 1950-1975 and 1976-2000. The test is an approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories. 28 The same applies to alternative variants with a cross section over each subperiod. Alternative Sample Criteria We also run multinomial logit regressions on a cross-sectional sample composed by country averages over the 1950-2000 period.3. For the same cross section. namely. with migration and a jus sanguinis origin exerting a negative impact on the application of jus soli. 27 The results for this cross section reveal a much lower level of significance for several covariates. 26 For all specifications. 30 Page 32 with the initial laws. 26 6.3.30) and for sub-Saharan Africa (0. In all cases. the test provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated. in particular for migration and for its interaction 25 Decolonization shows a significant correlation with the dummies for British or Portuguese colony (0. 27 Here the dependent variable is citizenship laws in 2001. while migration stock refers to 1960 and jus sanguinis in 1948 is the initial law.31). an alternative ordered logit regression also achieves much weaker results than in the panel. 29 while ordinary least squares regressions with our citizenship policy index in 2001 and an indexed version of .
7. An Alternative Approach: The Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws In this section we study citizenship laws evolution using an alternative approach which is able to provide additional insights.1. For our panel. 7. Z it contains all the variables previ- . 0 if no change occurs. Empirical Specification In the alternative specification. we run a multinomial logit model of the following form for its full specification: V it = α + βM it + γT t +Z 0 it δ+η it .4). the dependent variable is categorical and can take three values: -1 if the country changes its laws toward jus sanguinis. and 1 if the country changes its laws toward jus soli.2001 citizenship laws as alternative dependent variables both show an insignificant coefficient for migration (see Table A. we developed an alternative specification which is designed to capture more specifically the determinants of a change in the laws. 30 These results may be due to the fact that a single cross section of countries includes less information than our panel. (10) where α is a constant term and η it is an error term. While specification (9) focuses on current citizenship laws as the dependent variable.
where the reference category is no change. more significantly so for restriction for the case of decolonization. while the opposite holds for Southern Europe. the results reported in the table indicate the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing either restriction toward jus sanguinis (first column) or expansion toward jus soli (second column). Migration has a positive impact on the probability to restrict and a non significant impact on the probability to expand. changes in citizenship laws. 31 Page 33 the independent variables are presented in Table 5.2. and 28 We also experiment with migration stocks in 1970 and 1980. to show that they are not driven by outliers.ously described. 29 We apply to the above results the Cook's distance method. and the Latin America dummy. Hence. showing that migration is again negative correlated with the dependent variable. jus sanguinis as the initial citizenship law. The size of government's negative coefficient . Pairwise correlations among our new dependent variable. with similar results. 30 The same qualitative results arise in an unreported regression with naturalization in 2001 as dependent variable. 7. Decolonization and Southern Europe exert a positive impact on change in both directions. namely. except for those which present zero-cell problems. and with average migration flows. The period dummy indicates that the second subperiod witnesses an increase in the probability to expand. Results Regression results for the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 8. its interaction with migration.
The Gini index once again fails to add any significance. we perform a full set of robustness checks for (10). 31 Moreover. these results are complementary to those of Section 6 since they highlight which . When we replace our decolonization dummy with the dummy for British or Portuguese colonies. Ethnic diversity emerges as a significant factor of change toward jus sanguinis. which is consistent with the fact that. the alternative dummy is again significant. while per capita GDP reveals a significant 31 The estimated marginal effects are calculated as explained in footnote 17. INSERT TABLE 8 Table 9 reports the marginal coefficients for the regressions in Table 8 and confirms the restrictive impact of migration emerging from Table 8. the implications of Table 9 are in line with those of Table 7.for restriction confirms that this factor actually prevents it. INSERT TABLE 9 As for specification (9). Alternative measures of migration confirm an irrelevant impact on change in the laws. due to the removal of the Latin America dummy which comprises several former Portuguese colonies. 32 Page 34 impact on expansion. The subSaharan Africa dummy is not significant when entered instead of decolonization. in Table 9. which reports the marginal effects for the multinomial logit specification. in Table 7 decolonization exerts a significantly negative impact on the probability of having a jus soli legislation. Overall. For instance. it emerges as a factor that facilitates change toward sanguinis. while again a relatively young population provokes resistance to extension. meaning that relatively old countries are more likely to liberalize their legislation.
factors have induced the observed evolution of the legislation. . Therefore. while in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration has been negligible. migration is confirmed as a factor that favors change toward restriction. In bringing the model to the data. as reflected by the original citizenship legislation. we found that indeed citizenship laws have responded endogenously and systematically to a number of economic and institutional factors. for each possible direction of change. Conclusion We studied the theoretical and empirical determinants of the legal institution of citizenship in the postwar period. particularly in connection with the decolonization phase. older population and more extended political rights tend to be associated with more diffused elements of jus soli. on the basis of a new dataset we compiled. the legal tradition has affected the way countries have responded to migration. jus soli countries have reacted to increasing migration through restriction. the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mixed regime that includes both jus soli and jus sanguinis elements. 8. Countries with larger welfare systems. Our investigation reveals that migration has had an overall negative impact on liberalization of the legislation and the adoption of jus soli elements. Border instability emerges as a decisive factor in shaping citizenship laws. Moreover. The model predicts that migration has a potentially ambiguous impact on the legislation and that this impact is also affected by cultural factors including a country's degree of inclusiveness. We developed a simple median voter model where citizenship rights are granted by natives to migrants on the basis of the associated benefits and costs. In particular. reflecting discontinuities for the transplanting process of legal institutions. In particular.
a clear implication of our investigation is that institutions should not be 33 Page 35 presumed to be exogenous. within a legal system. and women's rights. In the application of jus sanguinis. between the public and the private sphere of influence.such as commercial law. labor regulation. but also by other institutions such as the internal system of political rights and the international system of relations as reflected by state borders. since they do adapt both to economic and non-economic factors. citizenship laws can be viewed as a link. Citizenship laws are still changing. Further research will study the future evolution of citizenship policy. Our methodology can be extended to the study of other evolving bodies of the law.More generally. Data Appendix A. By showing that citizenship laws are shaped not only by the broader legal origins. we also establish that different institutions are interrelated. and government activities . by using projections of international migration patterns in combination with the available predictions about the future course of democratization and border changes. and where citizenship is not granted due to birth within the country. The endogeneity of institutions to economic factors represents a challenge for research aimed at demonstrating that institutions are crucial determinants of economic performances. This represents another challenge for further research on the process of formation of legal rules and on the impact of institutions on economic outcomes. The Citizenship-at-birth Classification Group 1 (jus sanguinis countries): We include countries where citizenship is passed on to a child based upon at least one of the parents being a citizen of that country. Many issues that fall within the former . such as family law. regardless of the child's actual country of birth.have already been investigated. countries may differ on some . Finally. rules of inheritance.
For example. and the requirement that parents must be citizens other than by descent. the requirement of citizenship for one or both parents. Another is the ability. for example on the father's vs. Since we focus on the presence of jus soli elements in a country's legislation. Most of these factors depend on the interaction between local family law and citizenship law. automatic citizenship for the children of those immigrants who were also born in the country). that justifies the inclusion of a country within Group 2. Group 2 (countries with a mixed regime): We include those countries where elements of jus soli are recognized. our classification does not emphasize how narrowly 34 Page 36 jus sanguinis can be specifically applied to emigrants. the relevance of the marital status of the parents. Group 3 (jus soli countries): We include those countries where citizenship is automatically granted due to birth within the country. albeit in a restrictive form. the age of maturity) subject to either residence requirements or application. mother's right to transmit citizenship by descent. we interpret as an element of jus soli. and coexist with varying degrees of jus sanguinis. residence requirements for parents. A common exception to the general principle of jus sanguinis is automatic citizenship attribution to children of unknown parents. regardless of the parents' citizenship or status.factors. to acquire citizenship at some later point (for example. Moreover. a frequent provision that limits jus soli is double jus soli (namely. . for a child born in a country were jus sanguinis prevails. Examples of restrictions are generational requirements limiting the principle of citizenship by descent to the first or second generations of individuals born and residing abroad. the existence of a provision that birth in the country matters for naturalization.
The countries affected by State Creation are the most numerous. and Russia in 1992). West Germany in 1945. Berlin Wall. the State Demise of Germany in 1945. State Demise. We . They include the new countries gaining independence . Even if we set 1948 as the initial date for our citizenship laws analysis. there is substantial overlap among the observations recorded in the Polity IV dataset. East Germany in 1945. East Germany in 1990.Normally countries that apply jus soli combine it with jus sanguinis provisions for the children of their citizens born outside of their territory (although limitations to the ability to transmit citizenship acquired in this manner to the next generation usually apply through. Decolonization. the new countries formed in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. B.and therefore state borders . and the USSR in 1991. and Other Border Changes) based on data collected from Polity IV (2002). namely. The Border Change Dummies We construct three border change dummies (namely. the State Transformation of Germany in 1990.in the postwar decolonization phase. Examples of the events contained in the Polity IV 35 Page 37 (2002) dataset are the State Disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. Clearly. for border changes we include a few earlier events occurred in the 1943-1948 period that fit within the phase of post-colonial independence. In particular. State Disintegration. residence requirements). and State Creation. State Transformation. from the Polity IV variable CHANGE we record information on four types of events capable of affecting state borders. plus a few additional observations not linked to these two waves. West Germany in 1990. for example. We refer to Bertocchi and Strozzi (2009) for further detail on the data set on citizenship laws.
was obtained from the CIA (2002). per 1.000 total . occurring again to Germany. and the unification of Vietnam). but also the State Demise of Germany in the same year. Migration stock is the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. Definitions and Sources of Other Covariates Migration stock: International migration stock (% population). On the other hand. occurring to Germany. 1990 and 2000. when necessary. the State Transformation of East and West Germany in 1945. Net migration flows: International net migration rate. including refugees. we treat as another single event. Likewise.adapt these data to our needs by matching them to the 162 countries appearing in our citizenship laws dataset. the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan counts for two events. C. more than the direction of a change in terms of a country's size. because it concerns two countries which are in our sample. Additional information. To be noticed is that the way our variables are coded reflects stability of borders. and other border changes (identifying countries which went through other types of boundary changes. of which examples are the split between Pakistan and Bangladesh. we construct our three border change dummies for each period under consideration: Decolonization (identifying countries which went through a post-colonial redefinition of their borders). Berlin wall (identifying countries which went through a post-1989 Berlin wall border change). For instance. 1980. the State Transformation of Germany in 1990 and the State Demise of East and West Germany in the same year. 1970. The data refer 36 Page 38 to incoming international migrants less outgoing international migrants. we count as a single event. The data are taken from United Nations (2003) and are available for 1960. namely. the absence of border changes. On this basis.
taken from Freedom House (1996). Catholic share: Percentage of Catholics in 1980. Gini index: Gini index of inequality. (1999) introduce a separate class for socialist-law countries. The source is the United Nations (2005). Civil law: The source is the legal origin classification in La Porta et al. taken from Easterly and Levine (1997). Bahrain. taken from Penn World Tables (2002). The source is the Correlates of War 2 Project (2004). Southern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa: Dummies for countries belonging to Latin America. The data are available over five year intervals from 1950. taken from La Porta et al. with projections until 2050. INSERT TABLE APPENDIX References 37 . Southern Europe and subSaharan Africa. we assign them to their own class of common or civil law as it prevailed before the communist period. Political rights: Political rights index. among the French. as in Easterly and Kraay (2000). (1999). (1999). GDP per capita: Logarithm of real GDP per capita at current international prices. without distinguishing. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Composite index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. German. and Scandinavian versions. The classification is from UN (2002). taken from Deininger and Squire (1996). We retain only the two main families of common and civil law. and Brunei). Small country: Dummy for countries with a population size of less than one million over all available years between 1960 and 1995. (1999).population. Socialist: Dummy for socialist countries. Share of young: Share of young between age 15 and 34 (% population). within the broader civil law tradition. Oil: Dummy for oil countries (OPEC countries plus Oman. Qatar. while La Porta et al. British or Portuguese colony: Dummy for countries that were British or Portuguese colonies any time after 1918. The data are taken from United Nations (2005). Latin America. since they do not present any significant difference for the issue of citizenship. taken from Penn World Tables (2002). Information is from La Porta et al. Government consumption: Government share of GDP in current prices. Angola. Moreover.
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ITIZENSHIP L AWS E VOLUTION :T RANSITION M ATRICES Citizenship laws in 2001 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 46 20 1 67 Mixed regime 11 6 2 19 Jus soli regime 31 9 36 76 Total 88 35 39 162 Citizenship laws in 1975 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1948: .
Jus sanguinis regime 63 3 1 67 Mixed regime 10 7 2 19 Jus soli regime 28 1 47 76 Total 101 11 50 162 Citizenship laws in 2001 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1975: Jus sanguinis regime 81 20 0 101 Mixed regime 2 9 0 11 Jus soli regime 5 6 39 50 .
Total 88 35 39 162 Page 45 Table 2 C HANGES IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 2001) No change Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 46 0 21 67 Mixed regime 6 11 2 19 Jus soli regime 36 40 0 76 Total 88 51 23 162 Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 1975) No change .
Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 63 0 4 67 Mixed regime 7 10 2 19 Jus soli regime 47 29 0 76 Total 117 39 6 162 Changes in citizenship laws (1975 to 2001) No change Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1975: Jus sanguinis regime 81 0 20 101 Mixed regime 9 2 0 11 Jus soli regime 39 11 .
0 50 Total 129 13 20 162 Page 46 Table 3 C ITIZENSHIP L AWS D ATA S ET :S UMMARY S TATISTICS Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Citizenship laws in 2001 162 1.685 .698 .835 1 3 Citizenship laws in 1975 162 1.916 1 3 .
laws (1975 to 2001) 162 -.920 1 4 Citizenship policy index in 2001 142 .043 .056 .Citizenship laws in 1948 162 2.173 .458 . laws (1948 to 1975) 162 .299 0 1 Page 47 Table 4 S UMMARY .941 1 3 Changes in cit. laws (1948 to 2001) 162 -.451 -1 1 Changes in cit.488 -1 1 Changes in cit.655 -1 1 Naturalization in 2001 142 2.415 .204 .
011 70.673 . law 324 .691 .S TATISTICS Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Current citizenship laws 324 1.500 0 1 Civil legal origin 324 .519 .080 .875 1 3 Changes in citizenship laws 324 -.116 .646 9.485 -1 1 Jus sanguinis as initial cit.713 .470 0 1 Migration stock 300 5.673 Net migration flows 318 -.
204 0 1 Small country 324 .160 .223 0 1 Other border changes 324 .551 -47.146 0 1 Latin America 324 .250 .173 .368 0 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 324 .379 0 1 Southern Europe 324 .043 .95 63.022 .8.434 0 1 Berlin wall 324 .052 .35 Decolonization 324 .
379 0 1 Oil 324 .281 0 1 Political rights 276 3.040 1 7 Catholic share 324 31.086 ..333 .890 Government consumption .535 35.730 2.265 .572 0 97.472 0 1 Socialist 324 .173 .299 0 .349 .442 0 1 British or Portuguese colony 324 .3 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 272 .
The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod.263 19. The reference period is 19502000.425 9.488 1.36 Page 48 Log GDP per capita 263 7.233 Share of young 324 34.617 11. The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries.495 63.979 10.47 27.966 20. Page 49 Table 5 P AIRWISE C ORRELATIONS A .060 Gini index 155 40.249 4.54 3.492 72.01 53.180 N OTE .342 2. For details about the construction of the variables see the text.
10 + Small country .48** Civil legal origin -.06 Jus sanguinis as initial cit.07 -.64** .02 Latin America .12* . law -.09 -.12* Net migration flows -.11 + -.24** Other border changes -.60** .05 .33** Decolonization -.04 Southern Europe -.MONG D EPENDENT AND I NDEPENDENT V ARIABLES Citizenship laws Changes in citizenship laws Migration stock -.15** .42** Berlin wall -.14* -.08 .12* -.
20** Log GDP per capita . .18** Catholic share .22** -.24** Page 50 N OTE .10 + -.02 -.03 .39** . The reference period is 1950-2000.25** .06 Political rights .14* Oil -.19** British or Portuguese colony .26** Socialist -.20** Government consumption -.06 Share of young -.12* -.05 . The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries.13* -.29** .03 -.Sub-Saharan Africa -.10 + Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -.34** Gini index .
The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod.05.055** .10.051 + -. For details about the construction of the variables see the text.01. * p < . ** p < . + p < . Page 51 Table 6 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT E STIMATES Specification (a) Specification (b) Specification (c) Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock -.
47) (2.887** 1.193** 1.-.81) (-1.41) (-.59** (-4. law -2.054 + -.27) Decolonization -1.385** .409* -.045 (-1.30) (-1.99) (-4. cit.24) (-4.86) (-2.28) (-.55) .28) (3.048** -2.084 -1.43) (-4.712** -6.211** -.87) (-3.02) (2.523 (-1.79) (-1.272 2.044** -6.568** -7.53) Jus sang.167* -.61) (-2.65) (.211 (4.38) Period 1.296 + -2.032 -. as init.90) (-5.09) (-1.117** -4.39) (-5.
88) (.68) .415 -2.804 .153 1.523 (-1.69) (.063** (1. X migration stock .495** (-.084 + (1.70) (3.87) Latin America -.224* -.81) (1.866** -.799 2.234 + 1.621 4.035 .156 + .75) Government consumption .187 (2.64) Jus san.07) (2.Southern Europe 1.23) (.69) (-1.51) (2.14) (1.73) (-.03) (-.566 + .93) Small country -.
024 1.716 11.012 .023 1.01 (1.43) (1.02) Political rights .03) (2.05) (2.43) Page 52 Catholic share .626* -. fractionalization .277 (.165* (-2.397* (-1.46) (.426* (2.75) (-2.353* 3.02) (1.73) (2.09) N 300 300 300 300 .48) (-.70) Ethno.548** .Share of young -.46) Constant -1.092** .84) (2.193 + -.
46 . clustered at country level.68 .224 224 Log likelihood -195. The reference period is 1950-2000.83 Adjusted Count R 2 . .24 Maximum Likelihood R 2 .79 Count R 2 . Jus sanguinis is the reference category.53 .77 -155.44 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .45 .81 .64 N OTE . Robust z statistics in brackets.55 .58 .68 McFadden's R 2 .29 .32 .57 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 .94 -95.4 .32 .71 .
* P < .+ P < .681** (18.10.05. ** P < . Page 53 Table 7 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ARGINAL E FFECTS (M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT .09) (-.875** -.34) Jus sanguinis as initial cit.193* -.001 (2.023* -.025* -. law .01.49) (-2.F ULL S PECIFICATION ) Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock .7) .
170 .611** -.77) Southern Europe -.92) Period -.59) (-3.088 -.805** (-4.123 .75) Small country .(-2.203** .44) Decolonization .034 (-1.85) (5.303 + .56) (-7.86) Jus sanguinis X migration stock -.51) (1.336** -.16) (.86) (-.121 (-1.95) (2.194** .027* .51) Latin America -.139 + (.016 -.80) (.114 (.291 .15) (-2.03) (.13) (-1.
29) (1.14) (.152 (-.069** .15) Catholic share -.50) Ethno.01) Share of young .002 .18) (-2.001 Page 54 (-1.001 .007* (-1.16) (.76) (2.107** ..004 .50) . fractionalization -.018 -.96) Political rights -.043* (2.92) Government consumption -.061** -.124 -.98) (.037 + (-3.021 .36) (1.50) (.65) (-1.56) (-.006 (-2.010* .028 .
The above marginal effects refer to the multinomial logit estimates of our full specification (specification (c) in Table 6). Robust z statistics in brackets. Page 55 Table 8 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C HANGE IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMINAL L OGIT E STIMATES Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Migration stock . + P < .01. * P < . The reference period is 1950-2000.10.039 + .61) (1. clustered at country level.(2.90) N 224 224 224 N OTE . ** P < .05.
898** 2.-.736 + (.2 + 2.02 -.94) (3.001 (.82) (1.90) (.493** (.15) (2.155** (1.05 + .82) Catholic share -.12) Share of young .95) (1.65) (1.68) Southern Europe 2.058 + (2.032 (1.593 (.006 .44) Small country -.12) Period .50) (.60) Government consumption -.006 (1.652 1.70) .341 -.73) Decolonization 2.
771* Page 56 (.96) (2.52) Political rights .04) N 224 224 Log likelihood -107.234 (.508 (2.(.08) Constant -4.84) (1.45 Count R 2 .3 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 .12) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1.981* 2.16 .364 9.23) (1.33 McFadden's R 2 .58 Maximum Likelihood R 2 .15 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .104 .81 Adjusted Count R 2 .
clustered at country level.26) . ** P < .000 (2.01) (-1.10.003* -. * P < . + P < . Robust z statistics in brackets.05.N OTE . The reference period is 1950-2000. Page 57 Table 9 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C HANGE IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ARGINAL E FFECTS (M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT ) Toward jus sanguinis No change Toward jus soli Migration stock .003 -.01. No change in citizenship laws is the reference category.
016** (.19) Period .02) (1.374* -.001 (-2.004* .42) (1.16) Southern Europe .022 .06) Small country -.31) (2.29) .003 .10) (-2.33) (1.015 (-.102 .038 -.116 (1.069 (2.74) (-.27) (1.415* .299 -.(-.442* .003 .65) Government consumption -.53) (.58) (-1.00) (-2.05) Decolonization .28) Share of young .013 -.044 -.058* (.
* P < .223* .007 (.60) (.145* -.000 (-.12) (-2.1 .(1.18) (-2.05.12) N 224 224 224 Page 58 N OTE .75) (-1. clustered at country level.015 .74) Catholic share -.89) Political rights .000 .39) (1. Page 59 Table Appendix Table A. Robust z statistics in brackets.19) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization .71) (. + P < . ** P < .01. The above marginal effects refer to the multinomial logit estimates in Table 8. The reference period is 1950-2000.077 + (2.000 .007 -.10.10) (1.
81) (-.T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT E STIMATES .152* -.344** .36) Average migration stock -.533** -7.013 (-.056 -.62) Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law -4.A LTERNATIVE C OVARIATES Specification (a) Specification (b) Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock -.12) (-1.052 (-2.
834** -.88) Period 2.317** -.12) Civil legal origin .33) (2.046 5.79) (-.54) (1.667 4.68) (.003 (-.509 + -.16) (-1.742 + (1.76) (1.21) (-1.42) Latin America -.595 (1.397** .436** .31) Decolonization -.062 .140 -1.941 -1.09) (-4.84) (-1.01) Southern Europe 1.64) (.908 .260 1.218 1.(-5.649 (2.525 1.22) (.
55) (2.29) Jus san.59) Share of young -.019 -.67) (-1.110 (.402* .65) (1.894 + 1.043 .61) Civil legal origin X migration stock . X average migration stock .128 (-1.560 -1.140 + .063** .03) (3.036 .068** (1.10) Government consumption .503 + .(-.23) (-1.09) (2.89) (1.25) (2.65) (.64) Small country -2.040 Page 60 (1.73) (-.90) (.197 + -.
78) (2.56) Constant 3.03) (1.290 1.247* (-1.567 4.276 (2.029 1.52) (2.16) (-1.98) Catholic share .563* .46) (-1.52) (.81) (1.539** .78) (-2.85) (1.831 11.017 (1.74) Political rights .527 (1.950 + (-.012 .011 .006 .-.58) (1.035 1.11) .75) (.08) (2.096 -.436* .273* -3.38) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -.03) (.
01 Maximum Likelihood R 2 .68 . .64 .78 . * P < . Robust z statistics in brackets. The reference period is 1950-2000.01) N 224 224 224 224 Log likelihood -95.75 Adjusted Count R 2 .(-1.01.74 -132. Jus sanguinis is the reference category.48 N OTE .83 . ** P < .04) (1.28 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .57 .64 Count R 2 . + P < .10. clustered at country level.05.41 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 .44 .55 McFadden's R 2 .
Page 61 .