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The Evolution of Citizenship Economic and Institutional Determinants ∗
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ABSTRACT We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median voter model of citizenship laws determination. Next we test the implications of the model on a new dataset on citizenship laws across countries of the world. We show that citizenship laws have responded endogenously to economic and institutional determinants. When facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli tradition tend to restrict their legislation, while jus sanguinis countries resist innovation. The welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for jus soli legislation, while demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, while the instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual impact. .Key Words: citizenship laws, international migration, legal origins, democracy, borders. 1
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1. Introduction Each country of the world has established a complex system of rules that govern the attribution of citizenship. As a consequence of the increasing pressure of international migration, citizenship laws have moved to center stage on policy agendas, since citizenship laws not only affect the design of immigration policy, but also interact with the workings of labor markets, affect welfare programs, and influence demographic trends. Citizenship is the legal institution that designates full membership in a state and the associated rights and duties. It provides benefits such as the right to vote, better employment opportunities, and the ability to travel without restrictions, legal protection in case of criminal charges, and the possibility to obtain a visa for a relative. There are also costs to citizenship, such as the military draft, renunciation of the original citizenship, and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs that may be required for naturalization and for recognition at the age of majority. Examples are language and culture tests, waiting periods, and a commitment to avoid activities leading to disqualification. There are several ways to acquire citizenship: at birth, by naturalization, by marriage.

The regulation of citizenship at birth, which determines citizenship acquisition by second- generation immigrants, is rooted in the well-defined bodies of common and civil law. The former traditionally applies the jus soli principle, according to which citizenship is attributed by birthplace: this implies that the child of an immigrant is a citizen, as long as he is born in the country of immigration. The latter applies the jus sanguinis principle, which attributes citizenship by descent, so that a child inherits citizenship from his parents, independently of where he is born. Despite being rooted in these principles, during the 20th century - and especially after World War II - in many countries citizenship laws have gone through a process of continuous adaptation, in conjunction with the decolonization phase, the collapse of the socialist system, and the mounting pressure of international migration. In this paper we investigate the determinants and evolution of citizenship laws in the postwar period from a political economy perspective. To pursue this goal, we assemble a new dataset which codifies citizenship laws across the countries of the world, with a specific focus on the provisions that regulate the access to citizenship at birth. The dataset is then used to study the dynamic adaptation of these laws, by relating the observed patterns to a
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number of potential determinants, including economic factors as well as other political and cultural factors which have been found relevant in related research on institutions. Modern sociopolitical theories have advanced several hypotheses concerning the determinants of citizenship laws dynamics, on the basis of case studies and nonquantitative cross country comparisons. The legal tradition established in a given country is generally believed to exert a persistent impact on current legislation. The relevance of migration has also been investigated. In particular, pressure from a large stock of migrants is perceived as a factor that shapes a country's attitude toward citizenship policy. On the one hand, it could push toward a legislation that allows automatic citizenship granting for all newborn. On the other, migration could also drive toward restrictions of the same principle in countries where it was originally applied. According to some sociopolitical theories, the combination of these forces tends to induce convergence toward a mix of jus soli and sanguinis provisions for countries coming from different legal traditions (Weil 2001). For the case of Europe, Baubock et al. (2006) instead stress the presence of divergent trends, towards liberalization in some countries and toward restriction of access to citizenship in others. The influence of other economic forces is also recognized. Since citizenship rights determine the ability to enjoy welfare benefits, the shaping of nationality laws has been linked with the nature of the welfare state, with a large government representing a potential obstacle to the retention of jus soli (Joppke 1998). This argument, however, has to be weighted against the potential gain coming from the acquisition of relatively young new citizens for countries with expensive

pension systems and in the midst of a demographic crisis. Political factors have also been found relevant. The presence of a consolidated democracy is expected to lead to the adoption of jus soli, viewed as a more equal treatment of aliens. Stabilization of state borders should reduce the pressure to preserve a national identity through jus sanguinis. Finally, an additional factor that has been the subject of debate is the influence of national character and culture. The theory advanced by Brubaker (1992) focuses on France and Germany as two antagonistic kinds of nationhood, the former more assimilationists, and the latter more ethnocentric, which also differ in their definitions of citizenship. In this paper we formalize the above hypotheses within a simple median voter model which can guide our empirical investigation by generating testable implications and by offering an interpretation of the resulting evidence.
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The model is based on the assumption that the laws regulating citizenship acquisition can be viewed as the outcome of the decision problem faced by a native median voter, in a context where citizenship confers the right to vote over policy variables. In making this decision, the native median voter takes into account the associated benefits and costs, which depend on the share of migrants over population and the other factors suggested by the literature. The model indicates that the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous impact on the decision to grant citizenship and voting rights to migrants, since it increases the loss, for the native median voter, of letting migrants vote, but it also increases the cost associated with their exclusion. Moreover, the natives' decision is positively influenced by a relatively high income level of the migrants, a small welfare state, a relatively old native population, a high level of democracy, a stable national border, and an inclusive national culture. We test the above empirical implications and find that in the postwar period citizenship laws have responded endogenously and systematically, through a slow but steady process of adaptation, to economic and institutional factors. Overall, our results suggest that migration pushes national legislations in the direction of jus sanguinis, not jus soli. In particular, when we take into account the legal tradition established in the matter of citizenship, we find that countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. On the other hand, in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration has been negligible. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mixed regime, since migration tends to induce restrictions, but not extensions. Other economic factors also matter. While the welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation, demographic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes.

Turning to institutional factors, we find that a high degree of democracy is significantly associated with a jus soli legislation while border instability, in particular following the decolonization phase, decreases its likelihood. Cultural characteristics captured by religion and ethic fractionalization are not found to play a significant role. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 reviews the historical and legal background for the issues we address. Section 4 presents our model of citizenship laws determination. Section 5 describes our dataset on citizenship laws around the world 4

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Section 6 investigates empirically the determinants of current citizenship laws and presents our main results, together with a set of robustness checks. Section 7 develops an alternative empirical strategy that highlights the determinants of change in citizenship laws. Section 8 concludes and indicates directions for future research. The Data Appendix collects information about the data employed. 2. Related Literature Our work is related with several branches of the economic literature. First of all, this paper adds to research on international migration and migration policy. Timmer and Williamson (1998), Hatton and Williamson (2006) and Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) empirically analyze immigration policies enacted at the end of the 19th century during the mass migration era, while O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Mayda (2006) estimate voters' attitudes toward immigration in the postwar period. The political economy of migration has been modeled, among others, by Benhabib (1996), Gradstein and Schiff (2006), and DeVoretz (2006). More specifically, the role of citizenship policy has been discussed by DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2006), who investigate the economic costs and benefits derived from citizenship, by Pritchett (2006), who evaluates citizenship policy within a broader discussion on labor mobility and

Balas et al. our work contributes to the research program which has focused on the historical determinants of institutions. This paper also relates to the comparative legal approach initiated by La Porta et al. and Robinson (2001) contribute to the understanding of how institutions evolve by using historical variables as instruments for contemporary measures of the quality of institutions. with contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). who evaluate the determinants of the decision to naturalize. Since our theory emphasizes that citizenship rights imply the right to vote. On the other hand. the issue of franchise extension has recently received considerable attention within the literature. and Swagel (2002) and Dolmas and Huffman (2004). . Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) highlight the relevance of wealth inequality and political factors in accounting for how fundamental economic 5 Page 7 institutions developed over time. We add to this stream by focusing on the determinants of the dynamic adaptation of nationality rules. our work is also related to Razin. More broadly. However. The basic premise of this research line is the recognition that laws in different countries are adopted or transplanted from a few legal traditions and that the resulting legislative bodies reflect both the influence of the legal origin and the subsequent revision specific to individual countries. who compare the impact of migration on the welfare state with or without voting rights for the migrants.immigration policies. and by Chiswick and Miller (2008). while Bertocchi (2007) concentrates on the conflict between men and women. Johnson. Acemoglu. Bertocchi and Spagat (2001).. (2008) specifically analyze the evolution of an index of formalism of legal procedure. they do not examine the determinants of these alternative regimes. but with a focus on the conflict between rich and poor. (1998). Sadka.

However. contrary to other migration policy measures such as quotas and visa requirements. that are typically adjusted to the business cycle and to the current government orientation. . At the same time. and also because borders play an important role on the determination of citizenship rules. Japan also adopted jus sanguinis in this phase. citizenship laws reforms tend to be the outcome of long-term processes of adaptation often involving constitutional amendments. Continental modern citizenship law was subsequently built on these premises. The French Revolution broke with this heritage and with the 1804 civil code reintroduced the ancient Roman custom of jus sanguinis. is also relevant to our approach. On the other hand. and thus state borders. Citizenship Laws in Historical Perspective Citizenship policy can be viewed as part of broader migration policy. both because country size in this literature is the same as population size and is potentially influenced by migration and by the legal status of immigrants. By imitation. By the end of the 19th century. In 18th century Europe jus soli was the dominant criterion. During the 19th century the jus sanguinis principle was adopted throughout Europe and then transplanted to its colonies. 3. the British preserved their jus soli tradition and spread it through their own colonies. starting with the United States where it was later encoded in 6 Page 8 the Constitution. recent work by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) on the optimal determination of the size of nations.Finally. following feudal traditions which linked human beings to the lord who held the land where they were born. the process of nation-state formation and the associated codification effort were completed in Continental Europe.

1 In particular. Therefore. most countries of the world had established specific provisions regarding citizenship acquisition within a relatively well-developed legal system. However. ranging from immigration policy to naturalization requirements. and 19th century colonization had extended the process of transplantation of legal tradition to the rest of the world. with its colonies. Debate about possible restrictions did arise recently. but never led to actual change. the next century witnessed a continuous process of transformation of citizenship laws across the world. drawing mostly from Joppke (1998). and with a general positive attitude toward economic liberalism. 2001) and Brubaker (1992). Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2000. while civil law France. 2 Australia Current citizenship law in Australia differs considerably from that of the United . Below are some specific cases. had by then already moved toward a mixed regime. civil law Latin America had embraced jus soli early on. with the specific purpose to protect the birthrights of black slaves. Consistently with its history as a country of immigrants. For instance. despite important exceptions. jus soli came under attack in the 1980s regarding its applicability to the children of illegal immigrants. The United States Jus soli was encoded in the US Constitution through the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment. and jus sanguinis regulating citizenship law in most civil law countries. A relatively young and thin welfare state contributes to the fiscal sustainability of jus soli in this country.the revolutionary phase was over in those countries that had been the subject of the earlier colonization era. with jus soli being the norm in common law countries. by that stage. the US approach is still remarkably consistent with its original attitude in all its aspects.

At independence. Pritchett (2006) discusses the possible advantages of guest-worker programs which do not contemplate citizenship. the country went through numerous legislative and administrative reforms. Mexico represents a special case where jus soli was also . if compared to residency. Huntington (2004) has criticized current nationality regulations on the grounds that they represent a “devaluation of citizenship”. for instance. this area has followed a rather peculiar pattern. most of Latin America was already a jus soli country before the 19th century immigration waves began. Jus soli was encoded in the Constitution of Brazil in 1824. potentially relevant consideration: in the US. while afterwards a person born in Australia must have at least one parent who is either an Australian citizen or a permanent resident in order to acquire citizenship. most of the incipient states chose jus soli as a way to break with the colonial political order and to prevent the metropoles from making legitimate claims on citizens born in the new countries. in the sense that it confers few additional benefits if compared with residency. 2 The relative thickness of the concept itself of citizenship.1 In his analysis of Mexican immigration. is a related. Jus soli survived until 1986. of Venezuela in 1830. of Argentina in 1853. Therefore. even if it is no longer attracting immigrants. Latin America In the face of a civil law tradition which had been transplanted by the European powers. 7 Page 9 States. Jus soli had also been introduced in Australia by the colonists. from the perspective of poor countries. Jus soli is still the prevalent rule in the area. citizenship is relatively thin. despite the common origin as countries of immigration. In the postwar period.

The United Kingdom British nationality law has been deeply affected by the imperial experience. Following a postwar wave of colonial immigration. K. up to World War II. since all subjects of the British Empire had equal access to British citizenship simply by establishing residence in the UK. large-scale immigration. France The emergence of the nation-state in Continental Europe was the main factor that shaped citizenship law in this area. even though military consideration introduced early on elements of jus soli. making the experience of this country a unique one. only to come back to stay with a Constitutional Amendment in 1937. even though special status is still attributed to citizens of the British Commonwealth. as a form of selective immigration policy. but was then abandoned in 1836. the concept of nationality in the UK was. Citizenship issues and the rights of immigrants became the object . since the 1980s. Because of its colonial history. In order to secure immigrants' children born in France to the draft. qualifies for British citizenship only if at least one parents is a British citizen or resident. The revolutionary experience was particularly important for France. this open-door policy was progressively restricted. where jus sanguinis was first introduced with the 1804 Civil Code and maintained 8 Page 10 for the entire course of the 19th century. in 1889 double jus soli became automatic. particularly extensive.adopted in the 1814 insurgent Constitution. The 1948 Nationality Act created the status of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies for people with a close connection to the UK and its colonies. especially from North Africa. Redefinitions of national citizenship have been effectively employed. After World War II. The 1984 British Nationality Act restricts jus soli by establishing that a child born in the U. raised concern regarding assimilation.

Prior to that. Achieving border stability was a decisive factor in pushing Germany toward the longdelayed adoption of jus soli elements. and at the same time with millions of ethnic Germans living behind the Iron Curtain. had started to put under strong pressure. A major overhaul of the legislation. Brubaker (2002) has influentially argued that the different path followed by these countries has been shaped by their cultural difference. the original Wilhelminian citizenship law of 1913. Germany found itself in the paradoxical situation of having to live with a large population of disenfranchised foreigners born on its soil at home. With the foundation of the GDR and the consolidation of the Eastern Block. The case of France is frequently compared with Germany. with France sticking to its tradition of assimilationist nation. the massive guest-worker immigration of the postwar period. which paved the way for the achievement of stable national borders. In 1993 Chirac introduced a restrictive revision to the legislation. A first step in this direction was the new Foreigner Law in 1990. mostly from Turkey but also from Southern Europe. With the Left regaining political power in 1997. nor declined it. but to no avail. that required a formal citizenship request from second-generation immigrants. was finally approved in .of heated debate in French politics. with the automatic assignment of citizenship at age 18 to those immigrants' children born in France who had neither requested. however. and Germany to its ethnic identity. which had established strong sanguinis ties with German overseas emigrants. these restrictions were considerably revised. which turned naturalization from the discretionary exception into the rule. Germany The single most relevant event in the history of German citizenship law is certainly the fall of the Berlin wall. following an intense political struggle.

restricted forms of double jus soli are de facto applied. in the entire EU. The vast majority of the African colonies that were subject to civil law countries practicing jus sanguinis stuck to this principle after independence. Jus soli is now the norm in Germany (under the mild requirement that one parent has lived in the country for eight years). the strong ethnic character of German national identity. in the vast majority of European countries. but had recently to adapt to the quickly changing conditions. which recently adapted their legislation to the globalization of international migration and its increasing impact on Europe. On the other hand.1999. In the evaluation of the German experience. In particular. other factors that may have delayed the introduction of jus soli are. especially for high-immigration Sweden. As documented by Weil (2001). with the exceptions of Austria. access to citizenship by second and third generation is facilitated. . where jus sanguinis was functional to the large past emigration flows. For instance. by now. Decolonization Postwar decolonization had a major impact on citizenship rules applied around the world. and the thick nature of the 9 Page 11 German welfare state. Greece and Luxembourg. The latter aspect may have played a role in shaping the evolution of citizenship policies in several other European countries and especially the Scandinavian ones. as mentioned in the introduction. and not only through the indirect impact on the metropolitan countries we previously examined. many former British and Portuguese colonies rejected the jus soli tradition and switched to an often strongly ethnically-tinged version of jus sanguinis.

In 1981 Mobutu signed a new law on nationality requiring an ancestral connection to the population residing in the territory as far back as 1885. At the same time. The 1964 Congolese Constitution. In situations where instability was pushed to an extreme degree by the young age and the arbitrary borders of these countries. ethnic conflict lies at the roots of a chronic manipulation of citizenship rules in favor of one ethnic group over others. stateless. To these days.Sierra Leone's 1961 Constitution established that citizenship is transmitted only by descent and only to children whose father and a grandfather were Sierra Leoneans of AfricanNegro descent. During the following decades millions of Russians were encouraged to settle in Latvia and Estonia (less so in Lithuania) in order to Russify them. jus sanguinis tended to prevail as a way to control more easily the formation of national entities. Marginalization and de facto statelessness of significant strata of the population is the unavoidable outcome of these policies. however. To these days. sizeable minorities . in an effort to exclude Rwandan immigrants. 10 Page 12 The disintegration of the USSR Another major wave of citizenship law codification followed the disintegration of the USSR. recognized citizenship only for persons whose parents were members of one of the tribes established within the territory by 1908. The Soviet Union had occupied Estonia. the associated exclusive notion of ethnic and tribal identity caused enormous problems in countries where colonial rule had left shaky democratic institutions. there had been considerable migration within. The area had been sealed toward international migration but. and was compounded with deep ethnic division. large Russian-speaking. Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. as for all empires.

In the anticipation of EU integration. while Lithuania. The Model This section develops a simple theoretical model which formalizes the hypotheses that a widely interdisciplinary literature has advanced with respect to the determinants of citizenship laws. in a context where citizenship confers the right to vote . this perception as a country of emigrants pushes toward the persistence of jus sanguinis as the main principle. The issue for these states was how to balance a need to reconstitute their national identity around an ethnic model. By contrast. even though small concessions to jus soli have been made. the salient fact in shaping current citizenship policy is the perception that many of its citizens are outside its borders. 4. for the case of the Russian Federation. We can view the laws regulating citizenship acquisition as the outcome of the decision problem faced by a median voter. The hostile attitude toward ethnic Russians was especially strong in Latvia. Estonian and Latvian laws were sharply criticized by international organizations on the grounds of human rights. the new citizenship laws of these three states reflected this heritage with an emphasis on jus sanguinis as the basis for acquiring citizenship. and a commitment to democratic values with respect to the rights of minorities. showed a more open approach. After independence. spread around the former regions of the USSR. these recommendations were indeed fulfilled in the more recent legislation of the Baltics.are still present. which was less affected by Soviet immigration policy. The aim of the model is also to generate testable implications that can guide our interpretation of the empirical evidence. while most other countries of the area still persist with discriminatory policies. Again.

Migrants are poorer than natives since they are relatively unskilled. to migrants. therefore the model's predictions can be applied to the laws concerning both citizenship at birth and naturalization. the same approach could be extended to consider alternative agenda. when considering the decision to grant citizenship. in our oneperiod framework the distinction between different ways to acquire citizenship becomes irrelevant. namely. Second. economic and social goals.over policy variables. A few warnings are in order. and 11 Page 13 thus the right to vote. beside the right to vote. a redistributive tax scheme which finances a public good. and y = N P y . We consider an economy where a population of mass P consists of natives with mass N and migrants with mass M. even if the model concentrates on voting on a specific policy. is driven by the benefits and costs associated with this decision. where y N and y M denote average income for natives and migrants. First. before we present the model's details. and also implies some duties. while in practice citizenship acquisition implies a larger set of rights. Finally. where M + N = P and M < N. namely. our focus on the right to vote as the main benefit of citizenship is easily justified. respectively. A native voter. y N >y>y M . since political rights can be viewed as an instrument through which migrants could achieve broader political.

We also assume that income distribution is skewed to the right for each group. median income is lower than average income both for natives and migrants. such that 0 < τ < 1. c i . Each enfranchised individual casts a vote on the tax rate. and thus for the economy as a whole. according to u i =c i + λg (1) where λ is a positive preference parameter. Tax revenues are used by the government to finance the public good according to the following balanced budget constraint: g = τy − τ 2 2 y (2) where the second term captures tax collection costs.N + M P y M is the economy-wide average income. according to a proportional income tax rate τ. and a public good. g. namely. Assume initially 12 Page 14 . as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Both natives and migrants derive utility from consumption of a private good. The tax rate is set through a political choice under majority voting. Both groups pay taxes.

as captured. Equivalently. according to k=K+h M P (3) where K reflects the degree of cultural inclusiveness and h > 0. The cost enters the individual budget constraint as follows: c i ≤ (1 − τ)y i −k (4) where y i denotes individual income. Assume also that society bears a cost k for the exclusion of migrants from citizenship. The expression for the indirect utility function of a native voter with income y N i is given by v N i = (1 − τ)y N i − k + λ(τ − τ 2 2 .that only natives are citizens and are therefore allowed to vote. by a jus soli tradition. for instance. The cost is also affected by factors that determine the degree of inclusiveness of a country's culture. k could enter directly the utility function. This cost increases with the share of migrants over population. reflecting the possibility that their disenfranchisement can lead to social unrest and even violence.

since migrants also pay taxes. The native median voter could avoid the cost k by granting citizenship to the migrants and thus accepting the tax rate that would prevail under universal enfranchisement. which is given by .)y (5) which is single-peaked with respect to the tax rate. according to τ N ∗ =1− 1 λ y N ∗ y (6) The level of the tax rate increases with the intensity of the preference for public goods and with inequality. To be noticed is that under our assumptions about income distribution it is not necessarily the case that y N∗ y < 1. according to which the equilibrium tax rate is the preferred tax rate of the native median voter with income y N ∗ .which implies that the tax rate is going to be positive only if y N∗ y < λ. which is measured by the ratio of native median income over the economywide average income. We can therefore apply the median voter theorem.

The difference between τ N ∗ and τ ∗ increases with the income gap between natives and migrants and with the share of migrants over population. If migrants vote. If migrants cannot vote. he has to face the cost k. The native median voter faces a simple set of costs and benefits when considering the decision to grant citizenship. it follows that τ N ∗ <τ ∗ .τ ∗ =1− 1 λ y ∗ y (7) 13 Page 15 where y ∗ is the economy-wide median income. It follows that the native median voter decides to grant citizenship to migrants if and only if . given our assumptions on income distribution. namely. In particular. Since y N ∗ >y ∗ . but can enjoy a smaller tax. he has to pay more taxes but k is avoided. the tax rate chosen by the native median voter is lower than the tax that applies under universal suffrage. the latter is certainly positive.

Both the disenfranchisement cost and the fiscal gain associated with the no-franchise status quo increase in the share of migrants over the population. the fiscal gain also increases with the income gap between natives and migrants.(1 − τ N ∗ )y N ∗ − k + λ(τ N ∗ − τ N ∗ 2 2 )y ≤ (1 − τ ∗ )y N ∗ + λ(τ ∗ − τ ∗2 2 )y (8) where following (5) we find on the left hand side his indirect utility function when migrants cannot vote and on the right hand side his indirect utility function when migrants can vote. we can think of its dynamic implications in terms of a sequence . Even if the model is static. Besides. while the cost increases with the degree of inclusiveness K of the country's culture.

of repeated decisions. it can also encompass restriction. since it is the share of migrants over population that matters. or equivalently a particularly generous naturalization policy. . To be noticed is that a given stock of migrants has a stronger impact on countries with a relatively small native population. the economy is shocked by an increase of the migrants share. they will decide whether or not restricting the current regulation taking into account the incoming waves of immigrants and following the simple logic previously illustrated. migrants who are already in the country and have thus become citizens are simply to be considered as natives themselves. following a sequence of stationary decisions. due to a large inflow. The predictions so far obtained from the model indicate that a decision to extend citizenship and the associated voting rights is facilitated by a smaller income gap between natives and migrants and by a larger degree of inclusiveness of a country's culture. When the status quo is a jus soli regulation. Finally. While the present formulation of the model is designed to establish conditions for extension of citizenship rights to migrants. it follows that jus sanguinis countries will be more reluctant to change. The net effect will depend on which factor is stronger. If. generating a trade off. If we interpret a jus sanguinis tradition as a low degree of inclusiveness and thus a low cost of exclusion. the median voter will respond taking into considerations all the channels involved and this may result in an adaptation of the regulation. Together with the ethnic natives. the effect of an increase in the share of migrants is potentially ambiguous. since a higher share increases 14 Page 16 both the cost and the fiscal gain of disenfranchisement.

and thus the population share of migrants. Third. the impact of the size of government on citizenship laws can be captured by assuming that different countries exhibit different preference parameters toward government. First. is subject to uncertainty. 15 Page 17 . the associated tax rate will be higher than otherwise. at any given level of income. If only rich natives are allowed to vote. we can interpret our tax as a life-long contribution.The basic model can be extended to consider several other potentially relevant factors. by increasing the tax differential. which is higher for a migrant. as captured by λ. Second. Fourth. could make an open citizenship policy more costly. The testable implication is that the decision to grant citizenship is positively influenced by the domestic level of democracy. thus amplifying the tax cost which follows the decision to allow migrants to vote. Empirically. While our one-period model cannot explicitly reflect these aspects. demographic aspects could be considered by assuming that the migrants' younger average age implies a larger ability to contribute to the welfare state. the level of democracy can influence the outcome since it implies a constraint on the political rights of the natives themselves. border instability could be captured in a version of the model where the size of the native population. we should therefore expect a negative impact of the size of government on the degree of inclusiveness of citizenship laws. Thus a relatively large government size. which can be modelled with an income franchise requirement. This should facilitate the decision to grant them citizenship and implies that countries with a relatively old native population should be particularly sensitive to these considerations and thus display a more open attitude.

Citizenship at Birth We attribute to each country an appropriate code for citizenship laws in 2001. even though there were nearly no reforms in citizenship laws during the first half of the century.1. the Library of Congress. for the native median voter. We take 1948 as the starting point. since it increases the tax disadvantage. 5. so that . We supplement this information with additional one from the CIA World Factbook (2002). a high level of democracy. 5. The sources for this directory were Embassies. to introduce a random component in the model should affect the voting decision by reducing the tax rate. Moreover. To summarize. the main problem is to establish who can be considered as a native. but we also collect information about naturalization requirements. The principal source for the information we codify is a directory published by the Investigations Service of the United States Office of Personnel Management in 2001. 1975 and at the beginning of the postwar period. and the survey in Weil (2001).Indeed. a stable national border. and a large native population. a relatively high income level of the migrants. which provides synopses of the citizenship laws currently practiced in 190 countries. and the Department of State. when the national border is unstable. a small welfare state. we expect the natives' decision to be positively influenced by an inclusive national culture. The Data: Citizenship Laws of the World We compile a dataset of citizenship laws across the countries of the world for the postwar period. of letting migrants vote. The principal focus of our codification is citizenship acquisition at birth. Under standard risk aversion behavior. a relatively old native population. the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2003). the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous impact on the natives' decision to extend citizenship and voting right to migrants. but it also increases the cost associated with their exclusion.

(1998). This approach is justified by our primary interest in the potential impact of citizenship laws on immigrants. 4 Our dataset includes those 162 countries for which we were able to collect information on both original . rather than emigrants. In our classification we focus on the presence of jus soli elements in a country's legislation. 16 Page 18 the analysis of legal origins in La Porta et al. For 1948. the subsequent half century did not see further evolution. and countries subject to full jus soli (Group 3). A mixed regime includes elements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis. By coding citizenship laws in the intermediate year 1975. we include the postwar decolonization phase with the exemption of the Middle East. while the 19th century witnessed a first wave of adaptation of citizenship legislation from the civil vs. we treat the specific legal provisions regulating access to citizenship in 1948 as predetermined. 1975 and 2001. we divide countries into three groups: countries subject to jus sanguinis without any jus soli element (Group 1). Indeed. at least relative to the subsequent developments that are the focus of the present investigation. 3 As in 3 By treating 1948 as the initial year. countries that apply a mixed regime (Group 2).most of the legislation in place in 1948 had actually been developed much earlier. we divide the postwar period into two subperiods of equal length. which gained independence from the British and French administration in the 1943-1948 period. despite the occurrence of major historical events such as World War I. common law tradition.

and current citizenship laws, and for which migration data were available for the postwar period. 5 INSERT TABLE 1 The differential patterns of evolution that citizenship laws generate in 1948, 1975 and 2001 are summarized by the transition matrices in Table 1, which reveals considerable variations both across countries and over time. The table shows that in 1948 jus soli was the rule in about 47% (namely, 76 out of 162) of the countries, while jus sanguinis dominated in 41% (namely, 67 out of 162), and the mixed regime was adopted in the remaining 12% (19 countries). Among the countries that were under jus soli in 1948, we find the United States, Canada, all the Oceanian countries, most of Latin America, within Africa and Asia the British and Portuguese colonies, within Europe the UK, Ireland and Portugal. On the other hand, in 1948 jus sanguinis predominated in most of Europe, including its Eastern part. As explained in Section 3, France was unique in its early choice of a mixed regime. Since we 4 For details on our classification criteria see the Data Appendix, part A. 5 For details on migration data see the Data Appendix, part C. 17
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treat colonial territories as subject to the metropolitan countries' regime until independence, the group applying the mixed regime in 1948 includes France and its colonies. By 1975, 31% (namely, 50 out of 162) of the countries had jus soli, 62% (101) jus sanguinis, and 7% (11) a mixed regime. The main event justifying this evolution is decolonization, with many former colonies switching to jus sanguinis, from jus soli when the UK and Portugal

were the metropolitan country, and from the mixed regime in the case of France (see Section 3). As of 2001, 24% (namely, 39 out of 162) of the countries apply jus soli, 54% (88) jus sanguinis, and 22% (35) a mixed regime. It has mostly been the adaptation of the legislation of many European countries, relaxing pure jus sanguinis in favor of a mixed regime, that explains the pattern observed for the second subperiod. Among the countries that still adhere to the jus soli principle in 2001 are the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland (which - however - recently introduced restrictions to jus soli with a June 2004 referendum). The United Kingdom and Australia, on the contrary, no longer adhere to it and now adopt a mixed regime. Overall, jus sanguinis is currently the most common regime, with 69% of the countries in Africa, 83% in Asia, and 41% (down from 88%) in Europe. The growing group where a mix of provisions is applied is particularly well-represented in Europe, with 56% of the European countries including the formerly jus soli United Kingdom. On the other hand, jus soli predominates in the Americas, with 89% of the countries in Latin America, and the entire North America (namely, the U. S. and Canada). Table 1 reveals three different patterns of transitional dynamics: stability, switch, and convergence. Stable countries lie along the diagonal. Looking at the 1948 to 2001 transition, we see that a large fraction (28%, namely, 46 out of 162) have started and ended as jus sanguinis. In other words, it is 69% (namely, 46 out of 67) of the originally jus sanguinis countries that have remained so. By contrast, 22% (36 out of 162) are steadily jus soli countries: this means that only 47% (36 out of 76) of the originally jus soli countries have not changed their policies. Off diagonal, there is a sizeable proportion of countries (19%, or 31 out of 162) that have switched from jus soli to sanguinis, by completely eliminating

birthplace as a criterion: most of them - as mentioned - are former African colonies of the UK and Portugal, which made this radical choice at independence. Looking at the two 18
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subperiods, we see most of these switches occur between 1948 and 1975. Finally, there is evidence of a process of convergence to a soli/sanguinis mix, which affects 18% of the countries (29 out of 162, of which 20 converge from jus sanguinis by adding jus soli elements, while 9 converge from jus soli by restricting it) and intensifies between 1975 and 2001. INSERT TABLE 2 In Table 2 we present further information on citizenship laws evolution by reporting changes in citizenship laws, organized by original laws. Over the 1948-2001 period, 74 countries (46%) have gone through a change in the laws. Of these, 51 have changed toward jus sanguinis and 23 toward jus soli, while 45 changes have occurred in the first subperiod and 33 in the second. 6 In particular, in the first subperiod, the majority of the countries that went through a change (29, or 64%) were originally jus soli. As mentioned, this pattern is determined largely by the behavior of former colonies. In the second subperiod, the majority of the countries that went through a change (20, or 61%) were originally jus sanguinis, most of which adopting a more open legislation. The above discussion suggests a relevant role of border stability. To investigate this issue, we introduce a set of dummies capturing a country's history of border changes. In particular, we distinguish across three different causes of border instability: decolonization, Berlin wall, other border changes. 7 If we compare the transitional dynamics of the full sample with those

of the subsample of countries that did not go through a border change, we count for the latter a much smaller proportion of switches from jus soli to jus sanguinis. This pattern confirms the relevance of border changes, especially those due to decolonization. INSERT TABLE 3 Summary statistics for our citizenship laws dataset are reported in Table 3. The correlation between 1948 and 2001 citizenship laws is 0.42, which points to some persistence, as confirmed by the even higher correlation between 1948 and 1975 (0.60) and 1975 and 2001 laws (0.81). 6 A few countries went through more than one change. 7 The Data Appendix, part B describes how the three border change dummies are constructed. 19
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5.2. Citizenship by Naturalization and the Citizenship Policy Index Naturalization policies are also relevant to the issues at hand. Indeed, to facilitate naturalization for immigrant parents may represent a substitute mechanism to attribute citizenship to children born in jus sanguinis countries. Besides, the general attitude revealed by a country's regulation of citizenship at birth may be reflected in its naturalization laws, with jus soli countries traditionally making naturalization much easier, at least for resident aliens. Within jus sanguinis countries, naturalization requirements again tend to be correlated with the revisions introduced for citizenship at birth. Basic rules for naturalization may include a period of residence, renunciation of other citizenship, familiarity with the language and customs of the country, and the availability of adequate means of support. We code naturalization only for 2001, on the basis of the available information on 142 of our 162 countries. We classify countries on the basis of the number of years of residence

8 In our dataset 62 countries (namely.54.required for naturalization. 6 to 14 years. To construct the index. (2006) collect statistics on acquisition of nationality. by associating jus soli elements with lower number of years of residence required for naturalization. which can be explained by the fact that the correlation between citizenship laws and naturalization is only 0. while Baubock et al. while 46% require more time and only 10% are more open. 4 years or fewer). 44%) require five years of residence. We construct an index of citizenship policy defined on the 0-1 interval. The corrected Cronbach's alpha of the indicator is 0. by constructing four classes (more than 14 years. We then combine the information we collected on citizenship at birth and naturalization within a single measure. but we do not use this variable due to limited information. the British Council has compiled an index of civic citizenship and inclusion (see British Council Brussels 2005).37. even though data on naturalization are only available for the year 2001 and for a subset of countries. 20 Page 22 . 9 Table 3 reports summary statistics for naturalization and the citizenship policy index. 10 8 We do not consider naturalization by marriage. 9 Dual citizenship provisions constitute another potentially relevant aspect of citizenship policy. we treat citizenship laws in 2001 as an ordinal variable. 10 For European countries only. which can be considered a relatively open attitude. 5 years. since it is heavily dependent on family law. Alternative ways to define naturalization classes yielded similar conclusions.

for example. To control for other cultural characteristics. Further discussion on this point is postponed to the sub-section on robustness. Empirical Specification In bringing our theoretical model to the data. 2 if the country has a mixed regime. and 3 if the country has a jus soli regime. the size of government. an ordering by increasing inclusiveness toward immigrants. this choice does not impose any ex ante ordering among the three regimes. Border stability is measured through our border changes dummies. . Moreover. We also control for countries with a particularly small population size. we employ measures of migration. The empirical investigation is performed using a panel sample which includes information on two cross sections of 162 countries: the first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod. or else may not have any effect at all (and vice versa). In fact. which is categorical and can take three values: 1 if the country has a jus sanguinis regime.1. The Determinants of Citizenship Laws 6. we also consider religion and ethnic diversity. and the age structure of the population. we select the following variables. We interpret the presence of a jus soli tradition as an indicator of the degree of inclusiveness of national culture. with jus soli being associated with maximal. in order to investigate the determinants of citizenship laws evolution in the postwar period. Among regressors. We use a multinomial logit specification to achieve maximum generality.6. The dependent variable is citizenship laws. while we cannot gauge the impact of the income gap between natives and migrants due to lack of data. and jus sanguinis with minimal inclusiveness. in principle those regressors that affect the probability of being a jus soli country may not always have the opposite effect on the probability of being a jus sanguinis country.

M it is migration stock as a percentage of the population in country i at the beginning of period t. 11 In specification (9).2 (where t = 1 refers to the 1950-1975 period and t = 2 refers 21 Page 23 to the 1976-2000 period).162 and t = 1.. S it is a dummy for the presence of jus sanguinis in country i at the beginning of each subperiod. the multinomial logit model we run has the following form: L it = a + bM it + cS it + dM it S it + eT t +Z 0 it f+ it .. M it S .. a is a constant term.the second cross section to the 1976-2000 subperiod. In the full specification we present.. L it represents citizenship laws in country i at the end of period t. (9) with i = 1.

we will organize our comments in terms of the effects of each of our regressors on the probability of adopting either a mixed or a jus soli regime instead of jus sanguinis. Throughout the following. Within this group we consider the border changes dummies and dummies for Latin American. INSERT TABLE 4 We can now suggest a number of specific hypotheses. regarding the potential role of the above mentioned factors. The second group of explanatory variables includes the size of government as a share of GDP. T t is a period dummy. starting with the variables we consider focal to our analysis. immigration and legal tradition. Z it is a vector of additional explanatory variables. This follows the specification of our multinomial logit estimates. proxies for cultural characteristics such as religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. and a measure of democracy. namely. Southern European and small countries. and it is an error term. where we take jus sanguinis as the reference category. 12 The set of explanatory variables Z it can be divided into two groups. consistent with the model previously outlined.it is the interaction between the previous two variables. the share of young in the population. Migration (M . Table 4 presents their summary statistics. The Data Appendix collects information on the definitions and sources of all variables we employed. The first group includes dummies capturing the country's geopolitical position.

since it is unlikely that stocks evaluated at the beginning of the period can be affected by subsequent changes in citizenship laws. the available data refer to the stock in 11 We also run multinomial logit models for two types of more parsimonious specifications. for comparison purposes. 22 Page 24 1960. 13 while for the second they refer to the stock in 1980. M i1 is migration stock in country i in 1960 and M i2 is migration stock in country i in 1980.it ) is measured by the stock of migrants in percent of the population at the beginning of each subperiod. we avoid any potential endogeneity problem of migration with respect to citizenship laws. T 1 = 0 and T 2 = 1. For the first subperiod. 12 In particular. L i1 and L i2 are citizenship laws in country i in 1975 and 2001. S i1 = 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in 1948 and S i2 = 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in in 1975. respectively. 14 A positive coefficient . By entering the migrant stock near the beginning of each period.

its coefficients would indicate that those jus sanguinis countries facing high migration tend to add jus soli elements. On the other hand. and similarly for the jus soli regime. A negative value of the dummy's coefficient for a mixed and jus soli regime would imply that jus sanguinis countries are less likely to end up in the mixed and jus soli groups. the natives' reaction could be a conservative one. as suggested by some of the political theories introduced in Section 1. In particular. we should expect negative signs for the coefficients for our border change dummies.for the mixed regime would indicated that high migration pushes toward it rather than toward jus sanguinis. thus suggesting a particularly significant role of this initial legislation. The interaction between the jus sanguinis dummy and migration should reveal additional information: if positive. Turning to our geopolitical dummies. thus confirming persistence of the original laws. To assess the total impact of migration for jus sanguinis countries we also need to take into account the interaction's coefficients. as previously discussed. A crucial control in our regressions. a positive coefficient for the mixed regime would suggest convergence toward the intermediate group. if border stability really counts as a prerequisite for the introduction of automatic birthrights for the immigrants. We introduce the Latin America dummy to capture the peculiarity of this continent's experience. We measure it with a dummy for countries that apply jus sanguinis at the beginning of each subperiod (S it ). As explained in Section 3. is the legal tradition in the matter of citizenship. We select this dummy because jus sanguinis is the most persistent of the three regimes. the coefficients of the interaction could also turn out to be negative since. most of Latin America 13 . in the presence of a large stock of migrants.

The size of government is meant to proxy for the nature of the welfare state: if a thicker. we would found negative coefficients. Finally. since migration data reveal that countries with a small population tend to have large and erratic figures. where alternative measures of migration are introduced. On the other hand. 23 Page 25 adopted jus soli long before our sample period. we would find that countries with a higher share of young in . see the Data Appendix. 14 Even taking into account the anticipation of future changes of citizenship laws in making migration decisions. with most of the revision to the legislation toward mixed regimes occurring in the past 15 years or so.Earlier data are not available. part C. we should expect a positive coefficient for the mixed regime since these countries have been experiencing quickly increasing migration during the second subperiod. with a disproportionately small impact on their legislation. For Southern Europe. The potential endogeneity of migration is further addressed in sub-sub-section 6. we should expect negative signs for this dummy's coefficients. so its current position is not determined by postwar developments and in particular by its postwar migration experience.3. the endogeneity of our migration measure is ruled out by the fact that such changes had been extremely rare during the first half of the 20th century. if young immigrants could offer a solution to domestic demographic imbalances.1. If indeed the behavior of Latin America differs significantly from the rest of the sample in being associated with a higher probability of adopting jus soli. it should exhibit a positive coefficient for this kind of legislation. more expensive and more redistributive structure would represent an obstacle to automatic citizenship granting to the children of relatively poor immigrants.

In an effort to capture additional dimensions of cultural differences. these stylized facts are in line with previous research and economic intuition.43).36). Pairwise correlations between all our independent variables are not reported for brevity and can be summarized as follows. Current citizenship laws.15). Political rights tend to be low in countries with high ethnolinguistic fractionalization (-0. while its correlation with the civil law dummy is much lower (-0. the small country dummy. political rights. The establishment of a consolidated democracy .31) and Latin America (-0. beside legal tradition.measured by the political rights variable . thus displaying negative coefficients.total population would be less prone to adopt jus soli elements. The dummy reflecting jus sanguinis as the initial law is negatively correlated with decolonization (-0.35). Citizenship laws are also significantly 24 Page 26 correlated with migration. The share of young in population is positively associated with migration stocks (0.64). The Latin America dummy is positively associated with the Catholic share (0. . Overall. INSERT TABLE 5 Pairwise correlations among our dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 5. the dependent variable. the Catholic share. is highly correlated with the initial citizenship laws as identified by the jus sanguinis dummy (-0. and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.52).should exert a positive effect on the probability of a jus soli legislation even though even in a democratic country hostility toward the assimilation of outsiders may persist for a protracted period of time. we include the share of Catholics in total population and an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.

The period . relative to jus sanguinis. plus the period dummy. which adds to (a) the dummies we discussed above. In specification (b). while migration 25 Page 27 only remains significantly negative for the probability of applying a mixed regime. the jus sanguinis origin still exerts a negative impact on the probability of applying a mixed or jus soli regime.2. which adds to (b) the other potentially relevant economic and institutional regressors. Results The results of our multinomial logits are presented in Table 6. while both coefficients are positive for the period dummy. namely. Finally. The table reports three different specifications. Multinomial logit (a) is the core specification. INSERT TABLE 6 Starting with the core specification (a). the results reported in the table indicate the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing either the mixed or the jus soli regimes. migration and jus sanguinis display negative coefficients for both the mixed regime and jus soli. Multinomial logit (b) is an expanded specification. This means that high migration and a jus sanguinis origin decrease the probability of applying a mixed or a jus soli legislation rather than jus sanguinis. Jus sanguinis is the reference category for all the results shown. multinomial logit (c) is our full specification. Hence. which includes the dummies. we find that the core variables are all significant. and that in the second subperiod the probability of applying a mixed or jus soli legislation increases.It is also clear that several of our independent variables are closely interrelated and that it may be difficult to disentangle their specific effect on the evolution of citizenship laws. which includes only the core variables. In particular. migration and jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law. 6.

The small country dummy is not significant in this specification. while the share of young in the population exerts a negative impact. In this extended version the coefficient for decolonization loses significance. while a high degree of democracy . The size of government has a positive and significant coefficient for the probability of applying a jus soli regime. However. The role of the Latin America and Southern Europe dummies is confirmed. while the small country dummy now reveals a negative impact on the probability of applying a mixed regime. As expected. Finally. 15 The interaction term between migration and jus sanguinis origin is significant and positive for both the mixed regime and jus soli. the total effect of migration becomes negligible. the decolonization dummy displays two negative coefficients. Latin America has a positive coefficient for jus soli. since these countries have a higher probability of applying this regime. South Europe has a positive coefficient for the mixed regime. the impact of migration. a jus sanguinis origin and the period dummy are confirmed. namely. having gone through a decolonization border change negatively affects the probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime. if one evaluates the coefficients of migration and of the interaction together.dummy is significantly positive only for the probability of a mixed regime. uncovering a tendency for countries with a jus sanguinis origin which are exposed to high migration to add jus soli elements. confirming that Southern European countries have a higher probability of becoming mixed. The share of Catholics and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are both insignificant. in the full specification (c). in support of the hypothesis that countries with a relatively old population are more likely to choose mixed and jus soli regimes. the strength of this tendency is questioned by the fact that.

In particular. Besides. and decreases the probability of having a mixed regime by 2.3%. we verified that our results are not driven by outliers. . 17 The estimated marginal effects are calculated by holding all the independent variables at their mean 26 Page 28 decolonization reveals that this regressor retains a significantly negative impact on the probability of jus soli.positively affects the probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime. the marginal effect of 15 For both multinomial logit (a) and (b) we obtain the same results using a balanced sample composed by the 224 countries which constitute the reference sample for the estimation of our full specification. inspection of the marginal coefficients in Table 7 confirms that migration increases the probability of jus sanguinis and decreases that of a mixed regime and that the interaction between jus sanguinis and migration is negative. The marginal effects also allow to quantify the impact of our regressors. having gone through a decolonization border change decreases the probability of being jus soli by about 14%. while an increase in migration of one percentage point increases the probability of being a jus sanguinis country by about 2. 17 Moreover.7%.5%.5% increase due to direct effect of migration. 16 For all three specifications. to be evaluated together with the 2. an increase in migration of one percentage point for a jus sanguinis country decreases the probability of being jus sanguinis by about 2. consistently with the positive coefficients for jus soli and a mixed regime in Table 6. 16 For the full specification (c).

18 However. In levels. Moreover. A dummy for socialist countries could instead work as an alternative to our Berlin wall border change dummy. a dummy for oil countries could account for the fact that most of them have been experiencing huge immigration which has had no impact on their still very restrictive legislation (often based on Islamic family law). and that other factors such as government size. the original laws and our geopolitical dummies exert a significant impact on current citizenship laws. more equal country is more prone to adopting jus soli elements. . both per capita GDP and the Gini index of inequality tend to be associated with migration.48. we cannot include in the regressions the socialist and oil dummies. demographics and democracy also contribute to their determination. and also with democracy and fractionalization.We also consider additional covariates that have often been found significant in related research on the determinants of institutions. so they are unlikely to add independent explanatory power to a regression. 18 The correlation between Berlin wall and socialist is 0. 19 INSERT TABLE 7 Overall. For dichotomous independent variables the marginal effect is the change from 0 to 1 holding all other variables at their means. our results indicate that migration. Quantitative and qualitative development indicators such as income per capita and inequality could reveal if a richer. However. as well as the Berlin wall and the other border changes dummies. due to the fact that all countries identified by them do not exhibit enough variability with respect to the dependent variable. In fact they fail to add any further significance to the previous results.

the welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation. On the other hand. not jus soli. as predicted by the model. on balance. Therefore. the evidence does not the hypothesis of convergence toward a mix of provisions suggested by some political theories (see Section 1). However. However. we show that the legal tradition tends to affect the current legislation persistently. Contrary to the model's implications. On the one hand. The presence of countervailing forces highlighted by the model is therefore confirmed by our findings. for countries with a jus sanguinis origin which have experienced more immigration. the legal tradition interacts with the way countries react to migration in a complex way. 27 Page 29 particular. even though the process of transplantation can prove discontinuous in the case of former colonies. Overall. countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. this could be explained by the fact many of the countries with extended welfare systems may favor immigration because of their demographic crisis. our results suggest that migration pushes national legislations in the direction of jus sanguinis.19 For example. there is evidence of a tendency toward adding jus soli provisions so that. because liberal countries tend to restrict while restrictive countries tend to resist innovation. Indeed. this correlation covers a more complex pattern which can be revealed once the interaction between migration and the legal tradition in the matter of citizenship is considered. demo- . in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration turns out to be negligible. In addition. countries affected by Berlin wall have always applied jus sanguinis.

graphic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes. while cultural traits captured by religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to be irrelevant. First. 21 In the Table Appendix. 20 the coefficients for migration turns out to be insignificant in all three specifications. our migration measure was chosen to minimize a potential endogeneity bias. Robustness In this section we present a number of alternatives to our benchmark regressions to investigate whether they are robust to different specifications.1. Finally. In sum. This could suggest that migration flows are endogenous with respect to citizenship laws. and provide a deeper understanding of the forces shaping citizenship laws. Moreover. relative open socialdemocracies. the impact we observe for the size of government could be explained by the fact that it proxies for European-style. 28 Page 30 6.3. Further tests involve alternative measures of migration stocks. When we replace our migrations stocks with average migration flows (computed with reference to each subperiod). in particular as far as the impact of migration is concerned. Alternative Specifications We experiment our multinomial logit specifications with alternative covariates. 6. samples and estimation techniques. our empirical findings match the theoretical insights coming from the model. the evidence confirms that a higher degree of democracy is associated with more jus soli elements. As outlined above.3. we replace our measure of migration with a range of alternative measures. .

24 When we replace the jus sanguinis with the civil law dummy (see Table A. and the 1960-70 and 1980-90 averages. 23 If the coefficients of the two alternative dummies were the same.45. . and citizenship laws could be viewed as part of migration policy. Some differences emerge in the coefficients for migration and its interaction with jus sanguinis. as possible alternatives.1. the simultaneous determination of citizenship laws and migration does represent a concern when we enter within-the-period data on migration instead of beginning-of-period data. 22 We also experiment with a specification entering the migrant stock in 1960 for both subperiods. column (2)). our beginning-of-period migration stocks prove to be the most adequate measures of the role of migration. 22 Since jus sanguinis and jus soli are in principle closely linked to the civil and common systems of laws. one could conclude that our detailed codification of the original citizenship laws does not add much to what we can already learn from a country’s broader legal tradition. respectively. respectively.Table A. Since in the postwar period migration has been highly regulated by policy in most receiving countries.1. 21 Namely. the latter turns out to be substantially less significant and reduces the 20 Migration stocks and flows show a correlation of 0. for the first and the second subperiod we select the years 1970 and 1990. To sum up. Results from this instrumented specification are similar to those presented in Table 6. column (1) presents the full specification with the 1960-70 and 1980-90 average migration stock. respectively. with the latter losing significance. the influence of the legal tradition can also be analyzed through a dummy capturing the presence of a civil law tradition.

an (unreported) alternative multinomial probit model delivers the same qualitative results. namley.35. which we assume here to be ordered by increasing inclusiveness. When we replace the Southern Europe dummy with migration flows. since it is the quickly increasing second-subperiod immigration which determines the peculiar behavior of this region. These results are reported in Table A. Our previous conclusions . suggesting that civil law is a much weaker predictor of current citizenship laws than the original citizenship laws. we find that its coefficient is insignificant.3.2.23 The dummy is equal to 1 if a country belongs to the civil law tradition and to 0 if a country belongs to common law. we assume that jus sanguinis corresponds to minimal and jus soli to maximal inclusiveness. We also run ordered logit regressions where current citizenship laws are explicitly treated as an ordinal variable.35.3. 24 The correlation between the two dummies is 0. 25 but both alternatives are associated with insignificant coefficients. possibly because flows are multicollinear with respect to stocks and endogenous with respect to the dependent variable. We also replace our decolonization dummy with a dummy for British or Portuguese colonies (identifying those countries that were characterized by a jus soli legislation during the colonial period). In particular.2 and A. Alternative Estimation Techniques Alternative estimation techniques broadly confirm the same results from Table 6. The correlation between civil law and jus sanguinis is 0. and with the subSaharan Africa dummy. 29 Page 31 significance of most other regressors. 6.

namely. The test is an approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories. 27 The results for this cross section reveal a much lower level of significance for several covariates. 26 6.31). 28 The same applies to alternative variants with a cross section over each subperiod. the test provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated.are confirmed.3. an alternative ordered logit regression also achieves much weaker results than in the panel. with migration and a jus sanguinis origin exerting a negative impact on the application of jus soli.3. 27 Here the dependent variable is citizenship laws in 2001. we run a test for the parallel regression assumption. in particular for migration and for its interaction 25 Decolonization shows a significant correlation with the dummies for British or Portuguese colony (0. Our multinomial logit specification is hence superior to an ordered logit specification. In all cases.30) and for sub-Saharan Africa (0. 29 while ordinary least squares regressions with our citizenship policy index in 2001 and an indexed version of . 26 For all specifications. 30 Page 32 with the initial laws. while migration stock refers to 1960 and jus sanguinis in 1948 is the initial law. 1950-1975 and 1976-2000. Alternative Sample Criteria We also run multinomial logit regressions on a cross-sectional sample composed by country averages over the 1950-2000 period. For the same cross section.

(10) where α is a constant term and η it is an error term. we developed an alternative specification which is designed to capture more specifically the determinants of a change in the laws. 30 These results may be due to the fact that a single cross section of countries includes less information than our panel.1. we run a multinomial logit model of the following form for its full specification: V it = α + βM it + γT t +Z 0 it δ+η it . Empirical Specification In the alternative specification. and 1 if the country changes its laws toward jus soli. While specification (9) focuses on current citizenship laws as the dependent variable.2001 citizenship laws as alternative dependent variables both show an insignificant coefficient for migration (see Table A. 0 if no change occurs. An Alternative Approach: The Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws In this section we study citizenship laws evolution using an alternative approach which is able to provide additional insights.4). Z it contains all the variables previ- . the dependent variable is categorical and can take three values: -1 if the country changes its laws toward jus sanguinis. 7. 7. For our panel.

Results Regression results for the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 8. Hence.2. to show that they are not driven by outliers. 30 The same qualitative results arise in an unreported regression with naturalization in 2001 as dependent variable. and 28 We also experiment with migration stocks in 1970 and 1980. Pairwise correlations among our new dependent variable. Decolonization and Southern Europe exert a positive impact on change in both directions. Migration has a positive impact on the probability to restrict and a non significant impact on the probability to expand. its interaction with migration. except for those which present zero-cell problems. The size of government's negative coefficient . and the Latin America dummy. while the opposite holds for Southern Europe. more significantly so for restriction for the case of decolonization. showing that migration is again negative correlated with the dependent variable. changes in citizenship laws. with similar results. 31 Page 33 the independent variables are presented in Table 5. where the reference category is no change. jus sanguinis as the initial citizenship law. 29 We apply to the above results the Cook's distance method. 7. namely.ously described. the results reported in the table indicate the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing either restriction toward jus sanguinis (first column) or expansion toward jus soli (second column). and with average migration flows. The period dummy indicates that the second subperiod witnesses an increase in the probability to expand.

31 Moreover. The subSaharan Africa dummy is not significant when entered instead of decolonization. while again a relatively young population provokes resistance to extension. Ethnic diversity emerges as a significant factor of change toward jus sanguinis. INSERT TABLE 8 Table 9 reports the marginal coefficients for the regressions in Table 8 and confirms the restrictive impact of migration emerging from Table 8. INSERT TABLE 9 As for specification (9). Overall. Alternative measures of migration confirm an irrelevant impact on change in the laws. 32 Page 34 impact on expansion. which reports the marginal effects for the multinomial logit specification. it emerges as a factor that facilitates change toward sanguinis. the alternative dummy is again significant. The Gini index once again fails to add any significance. For instance. When we replace our decolonization dummy with the dummy for British or Portuguese colonies. in Table 7 decolonization exerts a significantly negative impact on the probability of having a jus soli legislation. while per capita GDP reveals a significant 31 The estimated marginal effects are calculated as explained in footnote 17. these results are complementary to those of Section 6 since they highlight which . due to the removal of the Latin America dummy which comprises several former Portuguese colonies. meaning that relatively old countries are more likely to liberalize their legislation. which is consistent with the fact that. the implications of Table 9 are in line with those of Table 7.for restriction confirms that this factor actually prevents it. in Table 9. we perform a full set of robustness checks for (10).

jus soli countries have reacted to increasing migration through restriction. We developed a simple median voter model where citizenship rights are granted by natives to migrants on the basis of the associated benefits and costs. 8. Border instability emerges as a decisive factor in shaping citizenship laws. In particular. In bringing the model to the data. Countries with larger welfare systems.factors have induced the observed evolution of the legislation. migration is confirmed as a factor that favors change toward restriction. we found that indeed citizenship laws have responded endogenously and systematically to a number of economic and institutional factors. as reflected by the original citizenship legislation. on the basis of a new dataset we compiled. The model predicts that migration has a potentially ambiguous impact on the legislation and that this impact is also affected by cultural factors including a country's degree of inclusiveness. Conclusion We studied the theoretical and empirical determinants of the legal institution of citizenship in the postwar period. while in jus sanguinis countries the impact of migration has been negligible. Therefore. the legal tradition has affected the way countries have responded to migration. reflecting discontinuities for the transplanting process of legal institutions. the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mixed regime that includes both jus soli and jus sanguinis elements. Moreover. particularly in connection with the decolonization phase. Our investigation reveals that migration has had an overall negative impact on liberalization of the legislation and the adoption of jus soli elements. for each possible direction of change. older population and more extended political rights tend to be associated with more diffused elements of jus soli. In particular. .

By showing that citizenship laws are shaped not only by the broader legal origins. labor regulation. since they do adapt both to economic and non-economic factors.have already been investigated. In the application of jus sanguinis. within a legal system. Finally. but also by other institutions such as the internal system of political rights and the international system of relations as reflected by state borders. regardless of the child's actual country of birth.More generally. Data Appendix A. by using projections of international migration patterns in combination with the available predictions about the future course of democratization and border changes. and government activities . The Citizenship-at-birth Classification Group 1 (jus sanguinis countries): We include countries where citizenship is passed on to a child based upon at least one of the parents being a citizen of that country. and women's rights. Our methodology can be extended to the study of other evolving bodies of the law.such as commercial law. citizenship laws can be viewed as a link. rules of inheritance. and where citizenship is not granted due to birth within the country. a clear implication of our investigation is that institutions should not be 33 Page 35 presumed to be exogenous. we also establish that different institutions are interrelated. The endogeneity of institutions to economic factors represents a challenge for research aimed at demonstrating that institutions are crucial determinants of economic performances. between the public and the private sphere of influence. countries may differ on some . Citizenship laws are still changing. such as family law. This represents another challenge for further research on the process of formation of legal rules and on the impact of institutions on economic outcomes. Further research will study the future evolution of citizenship policy. Many issues that fall within the former .

the age of maturity) subject to either residence requirements or application. automatic citizenship for the children of those immigrants who were also born in the country). we interpret as an element of jus soli. For example. Group 2 (countries with a mixed regime): We include those countries where elements of jus soli are recognized. Another is the ability. for example on the father's vs. Moreover. regardless of the parents' citizenship or status. the requirement of citizenship for one or both parents. and the requirement that parents must be citizens other than by descent. . the relevance of the marital status of the parents. to acquire citizenship at some later point (for example. residence requirements for parents. for a child born in a country were jus sanguinis prevails. Group 3 (jus soli countries): We include those countries where citizenship is automatically granted due to birth within the country. the existence of a provision that birth in the country matters for naturalization. Since we focus on the presence of jus soli elements in a country's legislation. albeit in a restrictive form. Examples of restrictions are generational requirements limiting the principle of citizenship by descent to the first or second generations of individuals born and residing abroad. mother's right to transmit citizenship by descent. and coexist with varying degrees of jus sanguinis. Most of these factors depend on the interaction between local family law and citizenship law. that justifies the inclusion of a country within Group 2.factors. A common exception to the general principle of jus sanguinis is automatic citizenship attribution to children of unknown parents. a frequent provision that limits jus soli is double jus soli (namely. our classification does not emphasize how narrowly 34 Page 36 jus sanguinis can be specifically applied to emigrants.

West Germany in 1990. for border changes we include a few earlier events occurred in the 1943-1948 period that fit within the phase of post-colonial independence. and State Creation. and the USSR in 1991. the State Demise of Germany in 1945. The Border Change Dummies We construct three border change dummies (namely. State Transformation. and Other Border Changes) based on data collected from Polity IV (2002). Decolonization. the State Transformation of Germany in 1990. State Disintegration. Berlin Wall. We refer to Bertocchi and Strozzi (2009) for further detail on the data set on citizenship laws. In particular. The countries affected by State Creation are the most numerous. They include the new countries gaining independence . Even if we set 1948 as the initial date for our citizenship laws analysis. residence requirements). State Demise. for example.in the postwar decolonization phase.and therefore state borders . and Russia in 1992). plus a few additional observations not linked to these two waves. We . the new countries formed in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. East Germany in 1945. there is substantial overlap among the observations recorded in the Polity IV dataset.Normally countries that apply jus soli combine it with jus sanguinis provisions for the children of their citizens born outside of their territory (although limitations to the ability to transmit citizenship acquired in this manner to the next generation usually apply through. East Germany in 1990. Examples of the events contained in the Polity IV 35 Page 37 (2002) dataset are the State Disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. from the Polity IV variable CHANGE we record information on four types of events capable of affecting state borders. namely. Clearly. West Germany in 1945. B.

The data refer 36 Page 38 to incoming international migrants less outgoing international migrants. occurring again to Germany. was obtained from the CIA (2002). but also the State Demise of Germany in the same year. 1970.000 total . the State Transformation of Germany in 1990 and the State Demise of East and West Germany in the same year. and other border changes (identifying countries which went through other types of boundary changes. the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan counts for two events. 1980. On this basis. the absence of border changes. For instance. more than the direction of a change in terms of a country's size.adapt these data to our needs by matching them to the 162 countries appearing in our citizenship laws dataset. 1990 and 2000. The data are taken from United Nations (2003) and are available for 1960. because it concerns two countries which are in our sample. when necessary. Definitions and Sources of Other Covariates Migration stock: International migration stock (% population). we count as a single event. Migration stock is the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. C. Net migration flows: International net migration rate. Berlin wall (identifying countries which went through a post-1989 Berlin wall border change). and the unification of Vietnam). Likewise. per 1. On the other hand. including refugees. Additional information. namely. To be noticed is that the way our variables are coded reflects stability of borders. we treat as another single event. we construct our three border change dummies for each period under consideration: Decolonization (identifying countries which went through a post-colonial redefinition of their borders). occurring to Germany. the State Transformation of East and West Germany in 1945. of which examples are the split between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Angola. Political rights: Political rights index. Moreover. German. since they do not present any significant difference for the issue of citizenship. (1999). Information is from La Porta et al. The source is the Correlates of War 2 Project (2004). British or Portuguese colony: Dummy for countries that were British or Portuguese colonies any time after 1918. (1999) introduce a separate class for socialist-law countries. The source is the United Nations (2005). Bahrain. Small country: Dummy for countries with a population size of less than one million over all available years between 1960 and 1995. taken from Penn World Tables (2002). as in Easterly and Kraay (2000). The data are available over five year intervals from 1950. Southern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa: Dummies for countries belonging to Latin America. taken from Penn World Tables (2002). we assign them to their own class of common or civil law as it prevailed before the communist period. INSERT TABLE APPENDIX References 37 . Socialist: Dummy for socialist countries. Oil: Dummy for oil countries (OPEC countries plus Oman. (1999). within the broader civil law tradition. and Brunei). among the French. Gini index: Gini index of inequality.population. without distinguishing. taken from Easterly and Levine (1997). Civil law: The source is the legal origin classification in La Porta et al. and Scandinavian versions. Latin America. Catholic share: Percentage of Catholics in 1980. taken from Freedom House (1996). Qatar. with projections until 2050. The data are taken from United Nations (2005). while La Porta et al. (1999). Government consumption: Government share of GDP in current prices. taken from La Porta et al. Southern Europe and subSaharan Africa. taken from Deininger and Squire (1996). GDP per capita: Logarithm of real GDP per capita at current international prices. The classification is from UN (2002). Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Composite index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. We retain only the two main families of common and civil law. Share of young: Share of young between age 15 and 34 (% population).

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ITIZENSHIP L AWS E VOLUTION :T RANSITION M ATRICES Citizenship laws in 2001 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 46 20 1 67 Mixed regime 11 6 2 19 Jus soli regime 31 9 36 76 Total 88 35 39 162 Citizenship laws in 1975 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1948: .

Jus sanguinis regime 63 3 1 67 Mixed regime 10 7 2 19 Jus soli regime 28 1 47 76 Total 101 11 50 162 Citizenship laws in 2001 Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Total Citizenship laws in 1975: Jus sanguinis regime 81 20 0 101 Mixed regime 2 9 0 11 Jus soli regime 5 6 39 50 .

Total 88 35 39 162 Page 45 Table 2 C HANGES IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 2001) No change Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 46 0 21 67 Mixed regime 6 11 2 19 Jus soli regime 36 40 0 76 Total 88 51 23 162 Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 1975) No change .

Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1948: Jus sanguinis regime 63 0 4 67 Mixed regime 7 10 2 19 Jus soli regime 47 29 0 76 Total 117 39 6 162 Changes in citizenship laws (1975 to 2001) No change Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Total Citizenship laws in 1975: Jus sanguinis regime 81 0 20 101 Mixed regime 9 2 0 11 Jus soli regime 39 11 .

685 .835 1 3 Citizenship laws in 1975 162 1.916 1 3 .0 50 Total 129 13 20 162 Page 46 Table 3 C ITIZENSHIP L AWS D ATA S ET :S UMMARY S TATISTICS Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Citizenship laws in 2001 162 1.698 .

173 .299 0 1 Page 47 Table 4 S UMMARY . laws (1948 to 1975) 162 .Citizenship laws in 1948 162 2.043 .920 1 4 Citizenship policy index in 2001 142 .204 . laws (1948 to 2001) 162 -.415 .488 -1 1 Changes in cit.941 1 3 Changes in cit.056 .451 -1 1 Changes in cit. laws (1975 to 2001) 162 -.655 -1 1 Naturalization in 2001 142 2.458 .

673 Net migration flows 318 -.011 70.646 9.519 .875 1 3 Changes in citizenship laws 324 -.713 .485 -1 1 Jus sanguinis as initial cit.691 .673 .500 0 1 Civil legal origin 324 .470 0 1 Migration stock 300 5.080 .116 . law 324 .S TATISTICS Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Current citizenship laws 324 1.

043 .8.052 .223 0 1 Other border changes 324 .551 -47.95 63.204 0 1 Small country 324 .368 0 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 324 .35 Decolonization 324 .250 .160 .379 0 1 Southern Europe 324 .022 .434 0 1 Berlin wall 324 .146 0 1 Latin America 324 .173 .

281 0 1 Political rights 276 3.349 .173 .890 Government consumption .442 0 1 British or Portuguese colony 324 .535 35..730 2.040 1 7 Catholic share 324 31.379 0 1 Oil 324 .572 0 97.3 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 272 .472 0 1 Socialist 324 .299 0 .086 .333 .265 .

The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod.180 N OTE .263 19. The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries.249 4.36 Page 48 Log GDP per capita 263 7. For details about the construction of the variables see the text.47 27.617 11.54 3.342 2.425 9.495 63.979 10.233 Share of young 324 34.966 20.488 1. Page 49 Table 5 P AIRWISE C ORRELATIONS A .01 53.492 72. The reference period is 19502000.060 Gini index 155 40.

06 Jus sanguinis as initial cit.12* .33** Decolonization -.60** .04 Southern Europe -.08 .14* -.15** .42** Berlin wall -.07 -.09 -.24** Other border changes -.05 .64** .11 + -.12* Net migration flows -.02 Latin America .48** Civil legal origin -.12* -.10 + Small country .MONG D EPENDENT AND I NDEPENDENT V ARIABLES Citizenship laws Changes in citizenship laws Migration stock -. law -.

02 -.14* Oil -. The reference period is 1950-2000.10 + -.06 Political rights .10 + Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -.03 .20** Log GDP per capita .Sub-Saharan Africa -.18** Catholic share .13* -.19** British or Portuguese colony .25** .12* -. The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries.20** Government consumption -. .24** Page 50 N OTE .29** .22** -.03 -.34** Gini index .26** Socialist -.05 .06 Share of young -.39** .

Page 51 Table 6 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT E STIMATES Specification (a) Specification (b) Specification (c) Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock -.05. * p < . For details about the construction of the variables see the text.055** .10.01. ** p < .051 + -.The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod. + p < .

28) (-.887** 1.045 (-1.79) (-1.87) (-3.30) (-1.-.032 -.41) (-.39) (-5.86) (-2.27) Decolonization -1.167* -.55) .43) (-4.47) (2.59** (-4.296 + -2.044** -6.99) (-4.193** 1.712** -6.90) (-5. law -2.523 (-1.272 2.53) Jus sang.054 + -.65) (.385** .117** -4.048** -2.409* -.81) (-1.28) (3.211** -.61) (-2. as init.38) Period 1. cit.02) (2.24) (-4.568** -7.084 -1.211 (4.09) (-1.

03) (-.87) Latin America -.224* -.799 2.156 + .234 + 1.495** (-.51) (2.804 .187 (2.866** -.Southern Europe 1.69) (-1.64) Jus san.566 + .81) (1. X migration stock .69) (.084 + (1.14) (1.88) (.73) (-.07) (2.035 .153 1.70) (3.23) (.063** (1.523 (-1.621 4.68) .415 -2.93) Small country -.75) Government consumption .

70) Ethno.626* -.548** .716 11.Share of young -.02) (1.48) (-.73) (2.193 + -.43) (1.426* (2.012 .43) Page 52 Catholic share .397* (-1. fractionalization .165* (-2.09) N 300 300 300 300 .024 1.46) Constant -1.46) (.03) (2.05) (2.092** .353* 3.277 (.023 1.02) Political rights .75) (-2.84) (2.01 (1.

Jus sanguinis is the reference category.64 N OTE .29 .45 .57 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 .58 .32 .55 . The reference period is 1950-2000.32 .4 .71 .79 Count R 2 .94 -95.68 . .53 . Robust z statistics in brackets.81 .68 McFadden's R 2 . clustered at country level.44 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .83 Adjusted Count R 2 .46 .24 Maximum Likelihood R 2 .224 224 Log likelihood -195.77 -155.

** P < .7) . law .10.05.193* -.+ P < . Page 53 Table 7 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ARGINAL E FFECTS (M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT .875** -.023* -.34) Jus sanguinis as initial cit.09) (-.49) (-2. * P < .F ULL S PECIFICATION ) Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock .025* -.01.001 (2.681** (18.

77) Southern Europe -.56) (-7.805** (-4.51) (1.194** .03) (.121 (-1.59) (-3.170 .80) (.16) (.85) (5.139 + (.44) Decolonization .291 .86) (-.027* .95) (2.203** .123 .034 (-1.114 (.303 + .51) Latin America -.92) Period -.13) (-1.088 -.336** -.86) Jus sanguinis X migration stock -.611** -.15) (-2.(-2.016 -.75) Small country .

98) (.92) Government consumption -.152 (-.96) Political rights -.007* (-1.069** .043* (2.004 .50) Ethno.50) .124 -. fractionalization -.018 -.65) (-1.010* .037 + (-3.16) (.36) (1.18) (-2.15) Catholic share -.14) (..002 .061** -.76) (2.001 Page 54 (-1.001 .50) (.021 .107** .028 .29) (1.56) (-.01) Share of young .006 (-2.

Page 55 Table 8 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C HANGE IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMINAL L OGIT E STIMATES Toward jus sanguinis Toward jus soli Migration stock .61) (1.05.(2.90) N 224 224 224 N OTE .039 + . The above marginal effects refer to the multinomial logit estimates of our full specification (specification (c) in Table 6). ** P < . Robust z statistics in brackets. + P < . The reference period is 1950-2000.10.01. clustered at country level. * P < .

736 + (.898** 2.05 + .73) Decolonization 2.593 (.68) Southern Europe 2.02 -.50) (.12) Period .652 1.2 + 2.493** (.032 (1.82) (1.058 + (2.82) Catholic share -.90) (.006 .-.12) Share of young .60) Government consumption -.15) (2.155** (1.65) (1.006 (1.95) (1.001 (.341 -.44) Small country -.70) .94) (3.

981* 2.771* Page 56 (.81 Adjusted Count R 2 .08) Constant -4.52) Political rights .3 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 .(.04) N 224 224 Log likelihood -107.96) (2.15 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .234 (.58 Maximum Likelihood R 2 .45 Count R 2 .104 .508 (2.23) (1.84) (1.33 McFadden's R 2 .364 9.12) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1.16 .

* P < .01. ** P < .003* -. Page 57 Table 9 T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C HANGE IN C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ARGINAL E FFECTS (M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT ) Toward jus sanguinis No change Toward jus soli Migration stock .003 -. No change in citizenship laws is the reference category.000 (2.N OTE . The reference period is 1950-2000. + P < .01) (-1. clustered at country level. Robust z statistics in brackets.26) .10.05.

42) (1.415* .102 .33) (1.16) Southern Europe .(-.58) (-1.015 (-.53) (.069 (2.05) Decolonization .19) Period .299 -.116 (1.31) (2.013 -.001 (-2.003 .044 -.016** (.003 .022 .442* .10) (-2.038 -.27) (1.06) Small country -.374* -.29) .65) Government consumption -.02) (1.28) Share of young .004* .74) (-.058* (.00) (-2.

015 .1 .75) (-1. Page 59 Table Appendix Table A.60) (.007 (. * P < .05.12) N 224 224 224 Page 58 N OTE .39) (1.01.000 .19) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization . The reference period is 1950-2000.000 .12) (-2.145* -.077 + (2.74) Catholic share -. clustered at country level. The above marginal effects refer to the multinomial logit estimates in Table 8.000 (-. Robust z statistics in brackets.10) (1. + P < .71) (. ** P < .10.007 -.89) Political rights .18) (-2.(1.223* .

A LTERNATIVE C OVARIATES Specification (a) Specification (b) Mixed regime Jus soli regime Mixed regime Jus soli regime Migration stock -.052 (-2.36) Average migration stock -.81) (-.12) (-1.152* -.62) Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law -4.T HE D ETERMINANTS OF C ITIZENSHIP L AWS :M ULTINOMIAL L OGIT E STIMATES .013 (-.056 -.533** -7.344** .

31) Decolonization -.509 + -.76) (1.742 + (1.595 (1.33) (2.140 -1.436** .12) Civil legal origin .(-5.88) Period 2.68) (.003 (-.84) (-1.649 (2.062 .260 1.42) Latin America -.667 4.16) (-1.941 -1.22) (.317** -.54) (1.01) Southern Europe 1.09) (-4.21) (-1.64) (.218 1.397** .908 .046 5.834** -.79) (-.525 1.

67) (-1.560 -1.25) (2.59) Share of young -.036 .55) (2.019 -.068** (1.23) (-1.043 .61) Civil legal origin X migration stock .140 + .65) (1.64) Small country -2.09) (2.90) (.128 (-1.03) (3.110 (.(-.29) Jus san.10) Government consumption .894 + 1. X average migration stock .503 + .063** .89) (1.040 Page 60 (1.65) (.402* .73) (-.197 + -.

58) (1.017 (1.290 1.46) (-1.011 .08) (2.096 -.03) (.98) Catholic share .539** .78) (2.85) (1.11) .276 (2.38) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -.567 4.74) Political rights .52) (2.563* .035 1.78) (-2.006 .81) (1.273* -3.56) Constant 3.527 (1.831 11.436* .012 .52) (.029 1.247* (-1.75) (.-.950 + (-.03) (1.16) (-1.

44 . .78 .55 McFadden's R 2 .64 Count R 2 .83 .(-1.05.74 -132.75 Adjusted Count R 2 . The reference period is 1950-2000.01 Maximum Likelihood R 2 . * P < .04) (1.68 .41 McFadden's Adjusted R 2 . ** P < . + P < .10. Jus sanguinis is the reference category.01) N 224 224 224 224 Log likelihood -95.48 N OTE . Robust z statistics in brackets.01.28 Cragg & Uhler's R 2 .64 .57 . clustered at country level.

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