NOTICE: To request limited oral argument on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Court at (916

) 874-7848 (Department 54) by 4:00 p.m. the court day before this hearing and advise opposing counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. Local Rule 3.04.
Department 54 Superior Court of California 800 Ninth Street, 3rd Floor Shelleyanne W.L. Chang, Judge E. Higginbotham, Clerk C. Chambers/T. Fazzi, Bailiff Wednesday, October 31, 2012, 9:00 AM Item 1 2008-00008867-CU-FR Anthony Hill vs. Broadway Auto Repair and Tire Center Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Withdraw as Counsel Filed By: Semmens, Michael P.

The motion to be relieved as counsel is DENIED without prejudice. In support of a motion to withdraw, counsel must lodge and serve the notice of motion and motion to be relieved of counsel (Civil Form MC-051), declaration (Civil Form MC052) and order (Civil Form MC-053) pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1362(c),(d) & (e). This is a mandatory requirement. Counsel’s moving papers do not contain the required judicial council declaration form, and the motion is therefore denied without prejudice. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.
Item 2 2008-00012827-CU-BC Bahija Iken vs. Robert Charles La Bella Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Sanctions Filed By: Parker, Alden J.

Defendants Robert Charles LaBella, et al’s Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED, as follows. Defendants contend that sanctions against pro per Plaintiff Bahija Iken are warranted as a result of her issuance of a subpoena to the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) after the discovery cut-off in this action, and refusing to timely withdraw the subpoena. Discovery in this action was required to have been completed by September 10, 2012. Trial was initially set for October 9, 2012. On September 12, 2012, Plaintiff served a subpoena on the DRE. Plaintiff did not notify Defendants that the subpoena had been served. On September 21, 2012, Defendants received a letter from the DRE notifying

Defendants that Plaintiff had requested various records via subpoena, and that the records would be provided unless Defendants confirmed their objection to the subpoena. (Brannen Decl. Ex. B.) On the same day, Defendants’ counsel contacted Plaintiff to inform her that the subpoena was improper because it was not served on Defendants and because it was served after the discovery cut-off. (Parker Decl. ¶2.) Defendants’ counsel informed Plaintiff that unless she provided notification by the end of the day (September 21, 2012) that Plaintiff would withdraw the subpoena, Defendants would file a motion to quash the subpoena. (Parker Decl. Ex. A.) Plaintiff did not respond that she would withdraw the subpoena. (Parker Decl. ¶3.) On October 1, 2012, Defendants notified Plaintiff that they would be appearing ex parte on October 4, 2012 in order for the Court to hear their motion to quash the subpoena. (Brannen Decl. Ex. D.) Defendants stated that if Plaintiff wished to settle the matter before that date, she was to contact Defendants’ counsel “before October 4, 2012, in writing.” (Brannen Decl. Ex. D.) On October 2, 2012, Defendants filed their ex parte application. Defendants contend that Plaintiff called Defendants’ counsel on October 2, 2012 after receiving Defendants’ moving papers and informed him that she wished to withdraw the subpoena. (Parker Decl. ¶6.) Defendants’ counsel informed Plaintiff that they would not withdraw Defendants’ ex parte application unless Plaintiff provided written confirmation that she would with draw the subpoena, and provided Defendants with a courtesy copy of the letter to the DRE withdrawing the subpoena. (Parker Decl. Ex. C) Defendants assert that the following day, October 3, 2012, Plaintiff wrote to Defendants’ counsel that she had left a phone message with a DRE agent, whose last name she did not know, requesting to withdraw the subpoena. (Parker Decl. Ex. G.) Defendants contend that their counsel attempted to contact DRE to confirm that the subpoena would be withdrawn, but was unable to do so by the end of the day on October 3, 2012. (Brannen Decl. ¶10.) On 11:30 a.m., on October 4, 2012, two hours before the ex parte hearing, counsel for Defendants received a phone call from DRE confirming that the subpoena had been withdrawn. (Brannen Decl. ¶10.) At the ex parte hearing, the Court denied Defendants’ application to quash the subpoena and for sanctions on the grounds that because the matter was set for trial on October 9, 2012, there was insufficient time for the Court to consider the application. The application was denied without prejudice to Defendants’ resubmitting the application to the trial judge. However, earlier that day, the presiding judge granted Plaintiff’s ex parte application for an order continuing the trial to November 6, 2012. Accordingly, Defendants now resubmit their request for sanctions against Plaintiff by noticed motion. Defendants argue that despite being informed on September 21, 2012 that the DRE subpoena was improper, Plaintiff failed to timely withdraw the subpoena and never provided Defendants with the written confirmation of the withdrawal they requested. Defendants contend that as a result of Plaintiff’s conduct, they were forced to incur the costs of preparing the ex parte application, and that monetary sanctions against Plaintiff are appropriate. In opposition, Plaintiff disputes that she failed to timely withdraw the subpoena, and argues that Defendants’ ex parte application was unnecessary. Plaintiff contends that on October 2, 2012, after the conclusion of the deposition of Plaintiff’s expert witness in San Francisco, she advised Defendants’ counsel that she was withdrawing the subpoena. (Iken Decl. ¶8.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ counsel told her he would

withdraw the ex parte application and request for sanctions if she sent him a copy of her request to the DRE to withdraw the subpoena. (Iken Decl. ¶8.) Plaintiff argues it was understood that this could not take place until the following day, when she returned to Sacramento. Plaintiff contends that on October 3, 2012, she contacted the DRE to withdraw the subpoena, and sent a copy of the letter requesting withdrawal of the subpoena to Defendants’ counsel. (Iken Decl. ¶10-13.) Therefore, Plaintiff contends she complied with Defendants’ counsel’s instruction to confirm withdrawal of the subpoena before October 4, 2012 in order to avoid Defendants’ application for an order quashing the subpoena and request for sanctions. On reply, Defendants do not appear to dispute that Plaintiff provided written confirmation of the withdrawal of the subpoena on October 3, 2012. However, it is apparent that Defendants first demanded that Plaintiff withdraw the subpoena on September 21, 2012, nearly two weeks earlier, and that Plaintiff only agreed to withdraw the subpoena after Defendants filed their ex parte application to quash the subpoena. Plaintiff’s service of the subpoena after the discovery cut-off and refusal to timely withdraw it constitutes misuse of the discovery process. Monetary sanctions are appropriate. Defendants seek sanctions in the amount of $2,650 for attorney’s fees and $120 in costs. The Court finds this proposed amount excessive, particularly in light of the fact that Defendants appear to have had the opportunity to withdraw their ex parte application on October 3, 2012, when Plaintiff contends she first provided written notification that the subpoena had been withdrawn. Accordingly, sanctions are awarded as follows. Plaintiff shall pay to Defendants a monetary sanction in the amount of $870 ($250/hr x 3 hr + $120 filing fees). The monetary sanction is to be paid on or before November 26, 2012. If the sanction is not paid by that date, Defendants may prepare for the court’s signature a formal order granting the sanction, which may be enforced as a separate judgment. (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.) The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Item 3

2010-00077089-CU-PA Benny Tomasetti vs. Hemi Express Inc Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Quash Subpoena for Business Records Filed By: Rolfe, Randee

Plaintiffs Benny Tomasetti and Lorraine Tomasetti’s Motion to Quash Subpoena for Business Records of Machado Trucking, Inc. is GRANTED. This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident involving a commercial tractor trailer driven by Plaintiff Benny Tomasetti and a second commercial tractor trailer driven by Defendant George Popovich. Plaintiff alleges he was injured as a result of the accident and seeks damages, including damages for lost income. Defendants Popovich and his employer, Hemi Express, Inc. issued a subpoena to non-

party Machado Trucking, Inc., a “sub-hauler” for Plaintiff’s employer, Tomasetti Livestock Transportation, Inc. The subpoena seeks documents related to work done by Tomasetti Livestock Transportation, Inc. (“Tomasetti Livestock”) for Machado, including work done by Benny Tomasetti and any other employees. At the outset, Plaintiffs state that they do not object to the production of documents related to Benny Tomasetti personally, as they concede these documents are relevant to the claims in this action. However, Plaintiffs move to quash the subpoena as to Demand No. 1, because it seeks private information about the employees of Tomasetti Livestock, including “log books, Form W-2s, Form 1099s, or any other record of payment to Tomasetti Livestock Transportation, Inc.”. Plaintiff contend that this information is confidential to Tomasetti Livestock and that Defendants have not provided proper consumer notice to the employees as required by CCP §1985.3 and §1985.6. In opposition, Defendants contend that Machado Trucking’s records of hauling by Tomasetti Livestock are relevant to Benny Tomasetti’s claims of lost income. Defendants argue that Benny Tomasetti is the owner, president and chief financial officer of Tomasetti Livestock, and thus that the operations of the company, whether performed by Benny or another employee, are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims of lost income. However, Defendants do not address Plaintiffs’ argument that the subpoena seeks private employment information of non-party employees of Tomasetti Livestock. Defendants do not appear to dispute that notice to employees was required under CCP §§1985.3 and/or 1985.6, as Defendants served Plaintiffs with a Notice to Consumer or Employee regarding the subpoena at issue. However, Defendants do not dispute that no such notice was served on any other employees whose records were sought. Further, no provision appears to have been made for redacting employeeidentifying information prior to production. (See CCP §§1985.3(i); 1985.6(h).) To the extent that the subpoena’s Demand No. 1 seeks employment records such as W2 and 1099 forms for third party employees of Tomasetti Livestock, with no provision for protecting the privacy interests of the employees whose records are sought, the Court agrees the subpoena is over-broad. Moreover, the Court notes that the information sought can be obtained by less intrusive means. The motion to quash is GRANTED. Machado Trucking is directed not to produce records responsive to Demand No. 1 in the subpoena. Plaintiffs shall give notice of this ruling to Machado Trucking.
Item 4 2010-00090773-CU-WT Carla Fowler vs. State of California Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication Filed By: Thomas, Shanna

This matter is continued to 11/20/2012 at 09:00AM in this department.
Item 5 2010-00093725-CU-OR

Item 5

2010-00093725-CU-OR Richard Givens vs. Paramount Mortgage Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Vacate Plaintiff's Voluntary Dismissal Filed By: Sutherland, Richard R.

Defendant’s Homeward Residential, Inc.’s, Motion to Vacate Plaintiff Richard Givens’s Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED. On August 20, 2012, this Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff was order to file his Third Amended Complaint no later than August 30, 2012. On August 31, 2012, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal without prejudice as to Defendant Homeward Residential. Defendant now moves to vacate the request for dismissal without prejudice on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to file either the request for dismissal or the TAC within the time provided in the Court’s August 20, 2012 order. Defendant argues that Plaintiff filed the request for dismissal one day late, and thus the dismissal should be vacated in order to permit Defendant to file a motion to dismiss the action with prejudice under CCP §581(f)(2). “[Once a general demurrer is sustained with leave to amend and plaintiff does not so amend within the time authorized by the court or otherwise extended by stipulation or appropriate order, he can no longer voluntarily dismiss his action pursuant to [revised] section 581, subdivision 1, even if the trial court has yet to enter a judgment of dismissal on the sustained demurrer.” (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 789.) Under Wells, Plaintiff’s failure to file the request for dismissal until after the time provided for amendment expired barred him from voluntarily dismissing the action. Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the instant motion is construed as a concession to the merits. The motion to vacate the voluntary dismissal without prejudice and order dismissal of the action with prejudice is GRANTED. The Court will sign the order submitted with the moving papers.

Item 6

2011-00097867-CU-MM William T Smith vs. Catholic Healthcare West Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Seal Filed By: McPherson, Dennis P.

The motion to seal is continued to November 14, 2012. On October 10, 2012, the Court ordered the moving party to submit redacted copies of the medical records it sought to seal. On October 15, 2012, the moving party filed

"redacted" exhibits containing the medical records at issue. However, upon review, it is clear that the exhibits contain unredacted patient-identifying and private medical information. The matter is continued to permit the moving party to further redact the records to protect patient information. Where appropriate, multiple pages of medical records may be redacted in their entirety. The submitting party may replace those pages with a single page which identifies all the pages of the exhibit (e.g., Pages 1-25; Pages 1-100, etc.) which have been redacted to protect the patient’s privacy. Additionally, because the exhibits filed on October 15, 2012 were not properly redacted, the moving party shall file an appropriate motion to seal these materials no later than November 7, 2012 The clerk is directed to modify the security clearance for the "Paper Exhibits" filed by Catholic Healthcare West on October 10, 2012.
Item 7 2011-00106971-CU-PA Emma Townsend vs. Troy Lee Wood Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Claims Filed By: Rudy, Christopher G.

Defendant Troy Lee Wood’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Emma Townsend et al’s First Amended Complaint is DENIED. This action arises out of an automobile accident in which Defendant’s pickup truck crossed into the oncoming traffic lane and struck Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damage allegations. However, as Plaintiffs contend in opposition, Defendant’s responsive pleading is untimely. On August 22, 2012, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to file a first amended complaint. Defendant was ordered to respond within 10 days after filing and service of the FAC, and within 15 days if the FAC was served by mail. On August 28, 2012, Plaintiffs filed and served the FAC by mail. Thus, the deadline for Defendant to file the instant motion was September 12, 2012. However, Defendant did not file the motion until October 2, 2012. The motion to strike could be therefore be denied on this basis alone. Nevertheless, even if the Court were to consider Defendant’s motion, the motion would be denied on the merits. In order to state claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civil Code §3294 (a).) “Malice” under Civil Code §3294(c)(1) means conduct intended to injure the plaintiff or despicable conduct by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of others. Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendant decided to pass the car ahead of him on a blind hill where there was a solid yellow line on his side of the road, knowing “that passing on a blind hill is unsafe and to do so is to completely disregard the rights and safety of others.” (FAC ¶16) These allegations are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Item 8

2012-00118019-CU-PO Janet Zagon vs. Summerville at Hazel Creek LLC Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories Filed By: Buckley, Christopher S.

Plaintiffs Janet Zagon, et al’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) is GRANTED. This is an action for elder abuse. Plaintiffs allege eight causes of action against various defendants, including Defendant John Sorensen. Plaintiffs allege Sorensen “owned, managed, controlled, maintained, and/or operated” Defendant Rosewood Terrace Care and Rehabilitation, and its parent company, Defendant North American Health Care, Inc. Plaintiffs move to compel Sorensen to provide further responses to Form Interrogatories 2.5, 2.2, and 2.7. These interrogatories seek (1) the respondent’s present residence address and residence addresses for the past five years (Form Interrogatory 2.5); (2) the respondent’s date and place of birth (Form Interrogatory 2.2); and (3) the respondent’s educational history (Form Interrogatory 2.7.) Defendants object to these interrogatories on the grounds that they seek information that is not relevant to the subject matter of the action. Defendants argue that they have already provided detailed contact and background information for numerous witnesses, and thus that Sorensen should not be required to provide his own such information. Defendants also contend that Sorensen has a privacy interest in his residential address. Defendants argue that the information sought by the interrogatories at issue is unnecessary for the prosecution of Plaintiffs’ case, and suggest that Plaintiffs have requested the information in order to “vex and annoy” Sorensen.” However, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that these form interrogatories request general background information that is appropriately sought in litigation. As Plaintiffs note, Defendants propounded identical form interrogatories on Plaintiffs, to which Plaintiffs responded. The Form Interrogatories are approved by the Judicial Council, and are widely used in many types of civil actions, including elder abuse cases. As Defendants concede, discovery requests are permissible if they are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (CCP §2017.010.) Further, Defendants have made no showing that disclosure of Sorensen’s address, which Defendants concede is ordinarily not recognized as protected information, would pose a threat of “true danger” or otherwise subject Sorensen to harassment or improper contact. (Cf Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008.) Accordingly, the motion to compel further responses is GRANTED. Defendants shall

provide further responses no later than November 13, 2012. Plaintiffs withdrew their request for sanctions on reply. Defendants’ request for sanctions is denied. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Item 9

2012-00129887-CU-PT In RE: Chalena Nanthaveth and Samer Abukheit Nature of Proceeding: Petition for Change of Name Filed By: Nanthaveth, Chalena

The petition for name change is granted.

Item 10

2012-00129889-CU-PT In RE: Manuel Alfredo Barron Nature of Proceeding: Petition for Change of Name Filed By: Agueros, Kathy

Appearance required. The petitioner is ordered to appear to affirm that the statements made in the declaration in support of the petition are under penalty of perjury.

Item 11

2012-00131550-CU-PT Fair Political Practice vs. Americans Responsible Leadership Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Preliminary Injunction Filed By: Winuk, Gary

Petitioner Fair Political Practices Commission’s (“FPPC”) application for preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Background The FPPC seeks a preliminary injunction pursuant to Gov’t Code §91003(a) ordering Respondent Americans For Responsible Leadership (“ARL”) to immediately produce all records requested by the FPPC and answer any and all questions relevant to its audit related to ARL’s contribution of $11,000,000 to the Small Business Action Committee PAC on or about October 15, 2012 to defeat Proposition 30 and support Proposition 32. FPPC argues that a review of the documents is needed before the November 6, 2012 General Election to ensure that ARL complied with applicable

disclosure laws. ARL is an Arizona non-profit corporation. ARL’s campaign contributions have primarily been for campaigns in Arizona. There is no record of ARL making contributions in the State of California prior to the contribution in question here. In response to the contribution, the FPPC initiated an audit of ARL’s records. ARL did not produce records and the FPPC filed the instant Petition and seeks a preliminary injunction compelling ARL to produce all records related to the October 15, 2012 contribution to the Small Business Action Committee PAC within 24 hours of this ruling. “[T]rial courts should evaluate two interrelated factors when deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. The first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” (Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal. App. 4th 435, 446.) A mandatory injunction such as the one requested here (i.e. compelling Respondent to perform an act or surrender property), “is rarely granted." (Id.) Such an injunction is not permitted except in "extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established and it appears that irreparable harm will flow from its refusal." (Id.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the FPPC has met this burden. Analysis Reasonable Probability of Prevailing on The Merits The FPPC contends that pursuant to Gov’t Code §90003 it may conduct an audit or investigation with regard to any reports or statements required by the Political Reform Act of 1974 (the “Act”). (FPPC’s MP&A’s 4:18-23.) The FPPC argues that it seeks to verify whether ARL solicited funds and received contributions totaling $1,000 or more, thereby becoming a committee pursuant to Gov’t Code §82103(a). In the event ARL is a committee pursuant to Gov’t Code §82103(a) and contributes ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more in connection with an election, ARL must file a supplemental pre-election statement no later than 12 days before the election. (Gov’t Code §84202.5.) Moreover, if ARL earmarked the contribution for a specific committee, the organization was required to inform the Small Business Action Committee PAC (“SBAC”) of the earmarking and the SBAC is required to disclose the donor(s) prior to the election. (Gov’t Code §84302.) FPPC further contends that the ARL is a “major donor” pursuant to Gov’t Code §82103(c). ARL does not dispute that the FPPC has the legal authority to conduct an audit; the question before the court is whether the FPPC may audit ARL’s records now or after the November 6, 2012 General Election. ARL argues that the action is premature because Gov’t Code §90002 only authorizes an audit or investigation after an election. (ARL’s Opposition, 5:19-26; Gov’t Code §90002.) Gov’t Code §90002, however, is not applicable here. That section expressly states that “no audit or investigation of any candidate, controlled committee, or committee primarily supporting or opposing a candidate or a measure in connection with a report or statement required by Chapter 4 of this title, shall begin until after the last date for filing the first report or statement following the general, runoff or

special election for the office for which the candidate ran, or following the election at which the measure was adopted or defeated…” (Gov’t Code §90002) (emphasis added.) However, as the FPPC notes, ARL is not a “candidate, controlled committee, or committee primarily supporting or opposing a candidate or a measure.” Indeed, ARL is 501(c)(4) non-profit corporation based in Arizona and is not any of the entities specified in Gov’t Code §90002. The Court, therefore, finds that Gov’t Code §90002 does not limit FPPC’s audit authority to post-election audits or investigations of ARL’s records. The FPPC has the authority to audit ARL’s records to determine whether ARL's donors earmarked their donations or whether ARL solicited any donations, thereby triggering the disclosure requirements of 2 CCR §18412 pursuant to its authority under Gov’t Code §90003 without waiting for the General Election to occur. ARL further contends that the FPPC did not follow its own procedures for responding to a complaint filed with the FPPC. ARL contends that the FPPC’s Executive Director may not make a “final determination on any items listed in subdivisions (f)(1)(A-E) until 14 calendar days have passed from the date the complaint was received by the Enforcement Division, unless the final determination is to take no action.” (2 C.C.R. §18360(f)(3).) Here, the complaint was filed with the FPPC on October 18, 2012 and the Petition was filed seven calendar days later on October 25, 2012. The 14 days period, however, only applies when the Executive Director makes a final determination to: (a) investigate the allegations of the complaint, (b) refer the complaint another governmental agency, (c) take no action on the complaint, or (d) take additional time to evaluate the complaint to determine whether an investigation should ensue. (2 C.C.R. §18360(f)(1)(A)-(E).) Here, the Executive Director has not yet made a final determination on the items listed in 2 C.C.R. §18360(f)(1)(A)-(E). Indeed, according to the FPPC, the complaint is currently under review for potential investigation by the FPPC. (Reply, 4:5-6.) The FPPC is conducting an audit pursuant to Gov’t Code §90007 in order to “encourage compliance and detect violations of the [Political Reform] Act”; it asserts that it is not conducting an investigation which is statutorily defined as part of a process to determine the facts and circumstances of a potential violation and any appropriate penalty; the regulation does not prohibit the Executive Director from conducting an audit prior to the expiration of the 14-day time period. ARL further contends that the FPPC initiated civil litigation without following the procedures identified in 2 C.C.R. §18361.2(a)-(b). However, the “civil litigation” contemplated by the Act is one for “penalties and remedies” under the Act. (Gov’t Code §91001.) Here, FPPC merely seeks to audit ARL, there has been no investigation to determine whether there has been a violation of the Act, and no decision to seek penalties against ARL. Moreover, the Executive Director has been delegated authority to act in the name of the FPPC between meetings of the FPPC. (Gov’t Code §83108.) Thus, the Executive Director did not violate its own procedures by filing the instant Petition and the Court rejects this argument. In sum, the Court finds that the FPPC has satisfied its burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the Petition. Specifically, that it has the general authority to audit ARL prior the November 6, 2012 General Election to determine: (1) whether the ARL is a committee pursuant to Gov’t Code §82013(a) or a “major donor” pursuant to Gov’t Code §82013(c); (2) if it is a committee pursuant to Gov’t Code §82013(a), whether ARL violated the pre-election reporting requirements; and (3) whether any donations were earmarked for specific purposes.

Balancing of Harms The Court finds that the balancing of the harms clearly favors FPPC. ARL argues that ordering the production of documents will violate ARL’s, as well as, its donors’ First Amendment Rights. ARL fears that “once disclosed, this information can never be fully withdrawn from the public record, and no remedy exists to make whole the victim of the unlawful disclosure.” (Supplemental Opposition, 13:7-9.) Here, ARL’s concerns are alleviated because FPPC keeps its audit records confidential. (Reply, fn. 30.) As FPPC confirms “[t]he FPPC’s audit of Respondent’s records may in fact show that disclosure has been appropriate and lawful. Or it may show that further disclosure is needed. In either case, the records of the audit will not be subject to public release and all legal requirements and processes will be followed by the FPPC.” (Reply, 13:14 -17. Emphasis Added.) In addition, ARL’s due process rights will not be violated because, in the event the audit finds a violation, the FPPC is required to follow certain procedures prior to imposing a penalty. The Court has no quarrel with the premise cited by Respondent in its Supplemental Opposition that non-profit corporations have constitutional rights and that citizens may associate together in non-profit corporations to exercise their constitutional rights (Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 130 S.Ct. 876, 900), that, however, is not the constitutional right at stake here and that case is inapposite. Citizens United did not address the issue of whether donors should be publicly disclosed. By this preliminary injunction, however, the FPPC is not seeking to restrict, and the Court is not, limiting expenditures by ARL. The Court is simply concluding that the FPPC, under its statutory authority can conduct an audit to determine whether it has complied with applicable California law and regulations and whether, under applicable California regulations, the FPPC can determine whether the donors’ identities must be disclosed. Nothing in Citizens United prohibits this state-mandated disclosure. On the other hand, the court finds that the People of the State of California will suffer irreparable harm. Without the FPPC’s audit and review of appropriate records, potential disclosure of information prior to the General Election critical to the public in deciding how to vote for Propositions 30 and 32 may not be made. Thus, under the legal standard established by Davenport v. Blue Cross, 52 Cal.App.4th 336, the Court finds that the FPPC has clearly established a right to a mandatory injunction. The Court further finds that irreparable injury to the People of the State of California will flow from a refusal to grant the preliminary injunction requested. Finally, the Court did not consider the Appendix of Media Statements filed by Respondent as it is irrelevant to the legal issues presented. No undertaking is required pursuant to CCP §529(b)(3). The Court will sign the formal order lodged by the FPPC.

Item 12

07ED12178 State of California EDD vs. Augustine U Eneh Nature of Proceeding: Notice of Hearing on Claim of Exemption

Nature of Proceeding: Notice of Hearing on Claim of Exemption Filed By: Beil, K.

The claim of exemption is denied. The Sheriff is therefore directed to garnish $75 per pay period (weekly), not to exceed $300 per month, from the judgment debtor’s earnings, and to return to the judgment debtor forthwith any funds it is holding greater than that amount. The employer may send one payment of $300 per month to avoid unnecessary administrative expenses. (CCP §706.025.)
Item 13 2011-00112322-CL-OR Jonathan G Bowler vs. Greentree Servicing LLC Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Deem Matters Admitted Filed By: Richardson, Jason M.

Defendants Greentree Servicing, LLC and National City Mortgage/PNC's motion for an order deeming admitted the matters in its requests for admission (set one) is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED unless Plaintiffs Dagmar P. Bowler and Jonathan G. Bowler serve “before the hearing on the motion,” proposed responses that are in substantial compliance with CCP § 2033.220. (CCP § 2033.280(c).) No sanctions were requested in connection with the instant motion, and none are ordered. The Court received the peremptory challenge filed on October 29, 2012. However the challenge is denied as untimely. (CCP 170.6(a)(2).) The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.
Item 14 2011-90003404-CL-OE State of California EDD vs. Daryl V. Hawkins Nature of Proceeding: Notice of Hearing on Claim of Exemption Filed By: Beil, K.

The claim of exemption is denied. The Sheriff is therefore directed to garnish $95 per pay period (weekly), not to exceed $380 per month, from the judgment debtor’s earnings, and to return to the judgment debtor forthwith any funds it is holding greater than that amount. The employer may send one payment of $380 per month to avoid unnecessary administrative expenses. (CCP §706.025.)
Item 15 2011-90003734-CL-OE State of California EDD vs. Oshakie A Barker Nature of Proceeding: Notice of Hearing on Claim of Exemption Filed By: Beil, K.

The claim of exemption is denied. The Sheriff is therefore directed to garnish $100 per pay period (weekly), not to exceed $400 per month, from the judgment debtor’s earnings, and to return to the judgment debtor forthwith any funds it is holding greater than that amount. The employer may send one payment of $400 per month to avoid unnecessary administrative expenses. (CCP §706.025.)
Item 16 2011-90018768-CL-OE State of California EDD vs. Kiesia Harmon Williams Nature of Proceeding: Notice of Hearing on Claim of Exemption Filed By: Beil, K.

The claim of exemption is denied. The Sheriff is directed to garnish $250 per pay period (monthly), from the judgment debtor’s earnings, and to return to the judgment debtor forthwith any funds it is holding greater than that amount.

Item 17

2012-90004418-CL-OE State of California EDD vs. Scott R. Dominguez Nature of Proceeding: Notice of Hearing on Claim of Exemption Filed By: Beil, K.

The claim of exemption is denied. The Sheriff is therefore directed to garnish $50 per pay period (weekly), not to exceed $200 per month, from the judgment debtor’s earnings, and to return to the judgment debtor forthwith any funds it is holding greater than that amount. The employer may send one payment of $200 per month to avoid unnecessary administrative expenses. (CCP §706.025.)

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