AIR FORCE

SPACE COMMAND
50 YEARS OF SPACE & MISSILES
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LETTERS AND INTRODUCTIONS
7 Wayne Allard, United States Senate
8 Terry Everett, United States House of Representatives
9 Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force
11 General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
13 General Lance W. Lord, Commander, Air Force Space Command
15 Lt. Gen. Brian A. Arnold, Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center
INTERVIEWS
54 General Lance W. Lord, Commander, Air Force Space Command
By Scott R. Gourley
64 Lt. Gen. Brian A. Arnold, Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center
By J.R. Wilson
FEATURES
16 From Atlas to Peacekeeper
By Scott R. Gourley
[ 2 ]
CONTENTS
22 Signs From Above
For Almost 60 Years, Air Force Satellite
Programs Have Provided Insight from Space
By Eric Tegler
30 A Missile Shield for America
By Robert F. Dorr
36 Space and Missile Pioneers
By Scott R. Gourley
44 AFSPC History
By J.R. Wilson
50 History and Growth of SMC
By Andy Roake
60 Commanding the Future
Current Programs and Technologies of
Air Force Space Command
By Scott R. Gourley
68 Space-Based Technology
By J.R. Wilson
76 Warfighter’s Lynchpin
By Scott R. Gourley
84 Developing a Team of Space Professionals
By Robert F. Dorr
88 Operating Our Nation’s ICBM Force
By Scott R. Gourley
93 Lighting the Candle
The Air Force and Manned Spaceflight
By Dwight J. Zimmerman
99 Working Together
Interagency Cooperation
By J.R. Wilson
104 Directory of Advertisers
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AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
50 YEARS OF SPACE & MISSILES
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FROM
ATLAS
PEACEKEEPER
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By Scott R. Gourley
TO
N
amed for mythological gods and
American heroes, America’s
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) have played a critical role
in the nation’s defense strategy
while helping to lay the foundation for the explo-
ration of space.
America’s interest in and experimentation with
ICBMs actually dates back more than 50 years, to
the dark days of World War II and the initial reports
that the Germans had fired a “V-2” ballistic missile.
Those V-2s were relatively inaccurate, with a range
of 200 to 300 miles and a TNT warhead of approxi-
mately one ton. The Germans reportedly produced
approximately 6,000 of the V-2s during 1944 and
1945, firing more than 3,500 of them against the
Allies.
The end of the war was followed by significant
levels of technical assessment involving captured V-
2 (and V-1) hardware and technology. By early 1946,
more than two dozen separate missile projects had
been undertaken by the Army Air Force (AAF)
focusing on the captured V-1s and V-2s.
April 1946 saw the start of project MX-774,
designed to study rocket and missile capabilities that
might be applied toward ICBM development. The
MX-774 contract was with Consolidated-Vultee
(later to become Convair/Convair Division of
General Dynamics). Although the MX-774 project
was cancelled in June 1947, contractor-funded work
continued at a lower level, and three of the early test
missiles were fired late in 1948.
By 1951, a new project, designated Project MX-
1593, was evaluating the advantages of rockets versus
glide missiles. Based in part on the earlier MX-774
work, the ballistic approach was selected for concen-
tration in September of that year with the code name
“Atlas” assigned to the newly re-focused effort.
ATLAS
Component development activities started in
1952, focusing on a 5,500-nautical-mile ICBM sys-
tem that would be capable of carrying a nuclear pay-
load. Early interest in accelerating the Atlas program
helped stimulate the formal 1954 establishment of
the Western Development Division (WDD) and
assigning the new organization responsibility for the
development program for Atlas (formally designat-
ed as Weapon System (WS)-107A-1).
AI R FORCE SPACE COMMAND
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Opposite: The Bumper V-2 was the first missile launched at Cape Canaveral on July 24, 1950. America’s
initial interest in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) dates back to World War II and reports that
the Germans had fired a “V-2” ballistic missile. Above: The General Dynamics Atlas assembly plant on
Kearny Mesa near San Diego, Calif., is seen in this photo.
The Atlas measured approximately 70 feet in length
and 10 feet in diameter. Prime contractor for the
Strategic Missile (SM)-65 airframe was the Convair
Division of General Dynamics, with the Rocketdyne
Division of North American Aviation providing the
three liquid-propellant engines (two booster engines and
one sustainer engine).
Meanwhile, late in 1956, the Secretary of Defense
directed that the Army transfer part of Camp Cooke,
Calif., to the Air Force. The Army had operated the camp
as a training facility from 1941 to 1945, and again during
the Korean War. However, although the Atlas ICBM
would be tested at Cape Canaveral, Brig. Gen. Bernard
Schriever needed a facility closer to WDD. The first
ICBM squadron was activated at Cooke Air Force Base
in April 1958, with that facility subsequently renamed
Vandenberg Air Force Base.
Prior to the operational arrival of America’s initial
ICBMs, America’s strategic deterrent mission was per-
formed by the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Built on
the foundation of strategic air power demonstrated dur-
ing the latter stages of World War II, SAC’s bomber forces
had compressed both the movement and application of
decisive firepower from days to hours. The arrival of
ICBMs would further compress that action timeline into
minutes.
The ICBMs caused the conversion of SAC’s formerly
existing planning functions to mixed bomber and missile
operations. To facilitate this conversion, the new ballistic
missile force was integrated directly into existing SAC
organizational concepts of divisions, wings, and
squadrons.
While some of the integration was relatively straight-
forward – such as the establishment of SAC’s 1st Missile
Division at Cooke Air Force Base in 1958 – one early
complicating factor involved the availability of missiles
that had to be integrated into bomber operations.
Examples of the latter category included the non-ballis-
tic, air-breathing Snark as well as both GAM-63 and
GAM-77 air-to-surface missiles.
While strategic organizational issues were being
defined and refined, the Air Force used three develop-
mental / test models of Atlas – Atlas A, Atlas B, and Atlas
C – to help refine the program hardware. The first Atlas
test flight, for example, took place in June 1957.
Unfortunately, engine failure at 10,000 feet led to the
destruction of that missile. Another Atlas engine shut
down prematurely during a September test launch with
that missile also destroyed. Finally, on Dec. 17, the third
Atlas was successfully launched, with more successful
limited range Atlas tests on Dec. 17, 1957; Jan. 10, 1958;
Feb. 7, 1958; and Feb. 20, 1958.
Following the steep learning curves on the develop-
mental models, the initial operational Atlas D was placed
on alert at Vandenberg AFB on Oct. 31, 1959. The D
model Atlas was stored horizontally but later E and F
models were stored vertically in underground silos and
raised by elevators for above-ground launch. Many of
these later Atlas models would eventually be retrofit and
used as space-launch vehicles, highlighting the direct
contribution from early ICBM development to the U.S.
exploration of space. Atlas D, for example, served as a
launch vehicle for Project Mercury.
THOR
In May 1955, WDD began evaluating industry pro-
posals for an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
in the tactical 1,000-nautical-mile category. Over the next
year, IRBM #1 (Thor) would be assigned to the Air Force
ballistic missile program, while IRBM #2 (Jupiter) would
be designated as an Army development.
Designated as Weapon System (WS)-315A, the single-
stage Thor missile measured approximately 65 feet in
length and more than 8 feet in diameter. The SM-75 air-
frame was built by the Douglas Aircraft Company with
North American Rocketdyne making the single engine. As
with Atlas, the warhead section was made by General
Electric. Together with the Army-developed Jupiter,
Thor’s IRBM classification (range of approximately
1,500 miles), limited Thor’s role to overseas deploy-
ments.
TITAN
Formally designated as Weapon System (WS)-107A-
2, the two-stage Titan I missile was approximately 90 feet
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in length and 10 feet in diameter. In spite of its larger size
and two-stage design, Titan’s range was approximately
the same as Atlas – 5,500 nautical miles.
The Glenn L. Martin Company built the SM-68 air-
frame with the liquid propulsion system for both stages
provided by Aerojet-General (then a part of General Tire
and Rubber Company). Three contractors made the
Titan’s guidance system, with the warhead manufactured
by AVCO Corporation.
Air Force representatives said that the overlapping
Atlas/Titan I programs reflected Titan program origins
as insurance against possible Atlas failures. Although
both systems are generally considered to be first-genera-
tion ICBMs, Titan I was equipped with many of the tech-
nological refinements that were deliberately left out of
Atlas in an effort to accelerate that system’s deployment.
The USAF launched its first test Titan I on Feb. 6,
1959, and in April 1962, the first Strategic Air Command
squadron of nine Titan I missiles was declared opera-
tional. As in the cases of Atlas E (deployed 1960 to 1966)
and Atlas F (deployed 1961 to 1966), Titan I had to be
lifted from the silos to the surface by ele-
vator prior to launching. This configura-
tion was reflected in the eventual change
of the SM-68 missile designation to
HGM-25A to signify its silo-stored, sur-
face-attack, guided missile classification.
Eventually, squadrons of Titan Is
were deployed at five different bases in
the western United States. By 1965, how-
ever, Titan Is were being phased out in
favor of the LGM (silo-launched, surface-
attack, guided missile)- 25C Titan II,
which offered greater range and payload
and was launched from within its silo.
Just as the earlier Atlas design had
been used in the Mercury program, mod-
ified Titan IIs also were used as launch
vehicles in the Gemini space exploration
program. Subsequent members of the
Titan family were also grown into heavy-
lift space boosters.
MI NUTEMAN
On Feb. 27 and 28, 1958, even before
the launch of the first Titan I, the Air
Force received Department of Defense
approval and authorized the develop-
ment of its second-generation ICBM: the
SM-80 / LGM-30A “Minuteman I.”
Formal development activities began in
September, with the Boeing Airplane
Company selected as the prime contrac-
tor in October.
At a length of 55.9 feet and diameter
of approximately 6 feet (5.5 feet), the
Minuteman I was smaller than either the Atlas or Titan
series. But the most significant difference involved
Minuteman’s propulsion design. Unlike the first-genera-
tion ICBMs, the Minuteman design incorporated solid
propellant rocket engines, allowing the system to be
launched much more quickly than earlier liquid fuel
designs. Due to its size and design, the Minuteman was
optimized for maintenance in and launch from hardened
underground silos where the missiles would remain pro-
tected from an enemy nuclear attack.
SAC’s hardened dispersed launch facilities used for
the Minuteman series normally covered two or three
acres and were located several miles apart from each
other. Each “flight” of 10 ICBMs was controlled from a
Launch Control Center (LCC). Buried 50 feet below
ground, the LCCs were designed as blast-resistant, shock-
mounted capsules manned by two missile combat crew
members. The missiles within each flight were situated in
silos measuring approximately 90 feet deep and 12 feet in
diameter, with two equipment rooms located approxi-
mately 30 feet below ground around the silo casing.
AI R FORCE SPACE COMMAND
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Opposite: A Titan I ICBM is raised from its silo at Vandenberg Air
Force Base, Calif., in August 1961. Above: The first Minuteman III
ICBM is placed in silo H-2 in 1970.
Minuteman I became operational in 1962, with the
first Minuteman missile on alert during the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October. Initial operational capability
(IOC) for Minuteman I was marked in December of that
year with 20 missiles placed on operational alert. The
first full squadron of Minuteman I missiles went on
operational alert at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., at
the end of February 1963.
Minuteman I was actually installed in two sequential
variants. The initial variant, Minuteman IA, reportedly
featured a flaw in its first stage that reduced the
Minuteman I’s specified 6,300-nautical-mile range by
more than 1,000 miles. However, rather than delay the
introduction of this significant addition to the nation’s
deterrent capability, SAC allowed the installation of 150
of the “shorter range” Minuteman IAs at Malmstrom
AFB. Subsequent missile deployments consisted of the
Minuteman IB, with the first 150 IBs activated at
Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., in 1963.
In 1965, SAC began to incorporate a further
improved version of Minuteman, the LGM-30F
Minuteman II, into its inventory. The Minuteman II
looks very similar to its predecessors, utilizing the same
first- and third-stage solid-propellant rockets. However,
a slightly longer second stage provided Minuteman II
with a length of 57.6 feet, which translated to more range
than Minuteman I (8,300 nautical miles versus 6,300 for
Minuteman I). Additional improvements included high-
er payload (the Mk 11C reentry vehicle versus Mk 11
A/B on the Minuteman I), the pre-storage of up to
eight targets in guidance memory, and greater accura-
cy.
The first Minuteman II ICBM unit was activated
at Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D., in early February
1965. The new system became fully operational at
Grand Forks in October of that year. Eventually, oper-
ational Minuteman I and Minuteman II ICBMs were
dispersed across six Air Force sites in the Central and
Northern Plains states.
In 1966, development started for another series of
system improvements to Minuteman under the des-
ignation of LGM–30G Minuteman III. Production of
the Minuteman III missiles began in 1968. At a length
of 59.9 feet, the Minuteman III features an improved
third stage with increased diameter to match the sec-
ond stage and a new pointed arch shroud covering
the warhead. The new third stage made it possible for
Minuteman III to deliver a larger Mk 12 payload that
includes three independently-targetable reentry vehi-
cles and additional penetration aids to help counter
anti-ballistic missile defenses.
The first Minuteman III missiles replaced
Minuteman Is at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., in June
1970, with the first Minuteman III squadron reaching
operational status by the end of the year.
PEACEKEEPER
Less than a decade later, development work began
on another new generation of ICBMs designated as the
LGM-118A Peacekeeper. Measuring approximately 71
feet in length and 7 feet, 8 inches in diameter, the four-
stage missile was designed to carry up to 10 independ-
ently targetable Mk 21 reentry vehicles.
As originally envisioned at the start of full-scale
development in 1979, the Peacekeeper program would
include the deployment of 200 missiles in a “multiple
protective structure basing mode.” The multiple-basing
mode, which was designed at the height of the Cold
War as a way to achieve long-term ICBM survivability,
placed the ICBMs in both fixed silos and in a mobile
rail garrison configuration.
However, both program scope and basing modes
were subsequently scaled back during the 1980s, being
redesigned as a Minuteman silo-basing program. In
January 1984, the Peacekeeper in Minuteman silo-bas-
ing program began the transition from full-scale devel-
opment to production with the goal of 100
Peacekeepers in Minuteman silos.
In November 1985, however, the U.S. Congress
reduced the number of Peacekeepers to be deployed in
silos to no more than 50. Just over one year later, in
December 1986, Initial Operational Capability of 10
Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos was achieved
at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo. Full Operational
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A Peacekeeper ICBM during a test launch at Vandenberg
Air Force Base, Calif. The Peacekeeper missile is currently
being phased out.
Capability was declared in December 1988 with the
turn over of 50 Peacekeeper missiles to SAC.
As the Cold War wound down at the beginning of the
1990s, the United States’ land-based ICBM force consist-
ed of 50 silo-based Peacekeeper missiles, with 10 war-
heads each (initially fielded in 1986), 450 Minuteman II
missiles with one warhead each (initially fielded in
1965), and 500 Minuteman III missiles with three war-
heads each (initially fielded in 1970).
In addition to these standing protectors, other ICBM
concepts had emerged and submerged during the Cold
War. One concept called for the development and field-
ing of a one-warhead “small ICBM” system to augment
the existing force. Another had resurfaced the rail-gun
concept through a vision of improving Peacekeeper sur-
vivability by removing the missiles from silos and plac-
ing them on mobile platforms. Both programs, however,
did not survive the Cold War that spawned them.
Moreover, U.S. compliance with the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaties (START I and START II) led to fur-
ther changes in U.S. ICBM force structure, including
retirement of both Minuteman II and Peacekeeper mis-
siles. Additional treaty-driven reductions dropped the
number of warheads on the remaining Minuteman III
missiles.
MODERNI ZI NG
FOR THE FUTURE
Clearly their job of deterrence is not over yet. As
demonstrated by unfolding world affairs, the 21st centu-
ry has proven to be an extremely dangerous era. The
nation needs deterrent protection – perhaps now more
than ever. And once again, planners are shifting their
gaze to America’s ICBM sentinels.
In recognition of their continuing contribution to
national security, the Air Force has recently undertaken a
“six-plus billion dollar” program to sustain and modern-
ize its remaining Minuteman III fleet. The sequential
modernization packages will update and enhance all
aspects of the Minuteman III missile.
In addition, as these pages go to press, the Land
Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives is
looking at the possibilities of employing ICBMs in non-
nuclear response scenarios, equipping the missiles with
conventional warheads to provide the commander-in-
chief with an immediate global response option in future
scenarios.
One thing remains clear. After a half-century of serv-
ice, America’s ICBMs are still hard at work. It’s no won-
der that they’re named for gods and heroes.
AI R FORCE SPACE COMMAND
T
oday, satellites perform a range of func-
tions unimagined by their earliest propo-
nents. Weather forecasting, navigational
aid, and international treaty verification
are just a few of the satellite-enabled
processes we take for granted. Though their tasks may
differ, satellites share the same fundamental purpose –
they provide and transmit information. By lifting our
perspective hundreds of miles above the earth’s surface,
these largely invisible pieces of technology have provid-
ed the people and military of the United States with
irreplaceable signs from above.
AN UNEARTHLY I DEA
While the notion of an object orbiting the earth by
man's direction stretches as far back as the first balloon
ascensions in the late 18th century, the first truly practical
consideration given to operating satellites was made after
World War II. In 1946, the Army Air Force’s Project RAND
report (“Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-
Circling Spaceship”) authoritatively affirmed the potential
of satellites, stating, “A satellite vehicle with appropriate
instrumentation can be expected to be one of the most
potent scientific tools of the Twentieth Century.”
SIGNS
FROM ABOVE
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For Almost 60 Years, Air Force Satellite Programs Have
Provided Insight from Space
By Eric Tegler
Interestingly, the RAND report calculated that the
principal value of satellites would lie with their potential
for science, politics, and propaganda. They would prove
immensely useful in these areas, but eight years after the
initial report, a more powerful motivation for their
development came into force.
I NTELLI GENCE DENI ED
In the early 1950s, U.S. concern about Soviet expan-
sionism and strategic power peaked with the knowledge
that the U.S.S.R. had tested its first hydrogen bomb, had
initiated operations of the Bison bomber, and was active-
ly developing ballistic missiles. Simultaneously, the
Soviets became increasingly secretive about their capabil-
ities, rejecting a 1955 initiative to exchange aerial photo-
graphs of missile sites and other military infrastructure.
Denied access to Soviet airspace, President
Eisenhower authorized an intelligence-gathering pro-
gram called GENETRIX in which camera-carrying bal-
loons drifted across the U.S.S.R. at altitudes of up to
90,000 feet photographing areas of interest. Flights
began in January 1956 but were suspended in February
1956 following strong Soviet objection.
As the strategic balance between the United States
and U.S.S.R. was changing, the RAND Corporation in
March 1954 issued Report R-262, which called for the
development of a satellite surveillance program.
Following its recommendations and those of its own
ICBM Scientific Advisory Group, the Air Force issued
Weapon System Requirements No. 5 (WS-117L) to
develop a reconnaissance satellite program. WS-117L
would proceed under the direction of the Air Force’s
Western Development Division (WDD) at a convention-
al pace for two years but would swiftly accelerate.
The U.S.S.R. had made bold steps with the 1957
launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile and the
placement of the first satellite (Sputnik) into orbit in
October of that year. Meanwhile, the United States had
attempted five high profile missile tests without a single
success. The expression “missile gap” became part of the
American vernacular and anxiety over Soviet strategic
superiority soared.
Though GENETRIX had ceased, U.S. intelligence
gathering had resumed in July of 1956 with the start of
U-2 reconnaissance flights. These continued sparingly
until May 1, 1960, when Capt. Gary Powers was shot
down during a flight from Pakistan to Norway. The
United States was “blind” again. Against this backdrop,
Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy pushed for the accel-
eration of WS-117L as satellites became the only alterna-
tive for collecting intelligence over denied geography.
THE FIRST TASK – RECONNAISSANCE
By 1959, WS-117L had evolved into a family of
programs that could carry out different missions
including reconnaissance and missile warning. The
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Opposite: An artist’s conception of a weather-observation satellite planned by Lockheed Martin for the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Above: President Dwight D. Eisenhower, third from the left, and Gen.
Thomas D. White, Air Force chief of staff, center, view the Discoverer XIII capsule at the White House. The capsule
was the first object to be recovered from space.
first USAF reconnaissance satellite to fly would be a
film-return satellite called Discoverer. The Air Force
publicly presented the system as a scientific satellite
project, but in reality it was a pure reconnaissance sys-
tem known to only a few by the classified name
CORONA.
Discoverer I first flew on Feb. 28, 1959. Though it
carried no reconnaissance payload, the Lockheed-built
satellite established orbit and was declared a success.
Discoverer II, launched in April, became the first satellite
to be stabilized in three axes, to be maneuvered on com-
mand, and to send its reentry vehicle back to Earth.
Despite this success, the next 10 Discoverer satellites
failed due to problems ranging from inadequate boost to
improper reentry. Discoverer XV was the first truly suc-
cessful reconnaissance satellite, returning images of the
U.S.S.R. to U.S. intelligence in August 1960.
Publicly, the Discoverer program ended with the
launch of Discoverer XXXVII in February 1962.
However, it continued secretly as CORONA until
1972. It provided the first photos of Soviet mis-
sile-launch complexes, identified the Plesetsk
Missile Test Range north of Moscow, and yielded
continued information on Soviet missile develop-
ment.
The second system to spring from WS-117L
was the SAMOS program. SAMOS satellites were
heavier and designed to provide greater image
detail using film and radio transmissions. The
first SAMOS launch in October 1960 failed after a
second-stage malfunction. SAMOS II successfully
reached orbit in January 1961. Eight more
SAMOS launches were attempted through August
1962, several of which encountered technical
problems.
EARLY WARNI NG
The third derivative of WS-117L was to pro-
vide early warning (EW) by means of satellites
capable of carrying infrared sensors to detect hos-
tile ICBM launches. The satellites would work in
conjunction with ground stations known collec-
tively as the Missile Defense Alarm System, or
MiDAS.
The first MiDAS satellite was launched in
February 1960 but failed to achieve orbit. MiDAS
II took off in May 1960 but suffered telemetry
failure. MiDAS III reached orbit in July 1961 and
gave scientists their first concrete test data. Like
Discoverer/CORONA, the MiDAS program went
“black” in 1962.
A second group of infrared EW satellites,
known as Program 461, was launched in 1966.
Equipped with more powerful infrared sensors
capable of detecting solid propellant missiles,
these satellites proved more successful than their
predecessors. However, more than a dozen were required
in orbit for complete EW coverage, and DoD cancelled
the program, citing costs.
In the same year a proposal was made to use satellites
in geosynchronous orbit. With larger sensors to compen-
sate for their higher orbit, a few such satellites could
effectively detect launches. The Air Force chose TRW and
Aerojet to build the new satellites, and subsequently
renamed the project the Defense Support Program, or
DSP. The first DSP satellite took flight in 1971, and some
15 to 17 were launched through the early 1990s.
Improved DSP satellites demonstrated the ability to
detect other heat sources, including military aircraft, sur-
face-to-air missiles, nuclear reactor activity, and forest
fires. (Six pairs of Vela satellites were placed in orbit
between 1963 and 1970 to verify compliance with the
1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.) DSP sensing proved par-
ticularly useful during the first Gulf War and encouraged
the Air Force to embark on a new program using high-
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Above: A 12-foot inflatable ECHO Project satellite is seen
here. The passive-style satellite reflected messages sent to and
from ground terminal equipment. Opposite: The Horn reflec-
tor antenna at Bell Telephone Laboratories in Holmdel, N.J.,
was built in 1959 for work with NASA’s ECHO I communica-
tions satellite. The antenna structure, 50 feet in length and
weighing about 18 tons, was used to detect radio waves that
bounced off ECHO Project balloon satellites.
and low-orbit satellites known as the Space-Based Infrared System
(SBIRS).
SBIRS-High satellites are three-axis stabilized with improved sen-
sors capable of continuously monitoring targets. SBIRS-Low satellites
operate in low orbit, tracking missile trajectories with great accuracy.
Presumably, SBIRS would be a key element of the U.S. missile defense
anti-missile shield.
COMMUNICATION
The first Air Force communication satellite was launched under
Project SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbiting Relay Equipment)
in December 1958. SCORE had two primary aims; to demonstrate the
ATLAS missile as a booster and the functionality of a communications
repeater in a missile.
SCORE was followed by the Courier program, the chief objective of
which was to develop a higher-capacity, longer-life relay satellite for test-
ing. Unlike SCORE, Courier was a self-contained satellite. The first
Courier launch (fall, 1960) suffered a booster failure, but the second was
successful, facilitating testing with ground stations in New Jersey and
Puerto Rico. At about the same time, ECHO I was launched. Developed
at the Rome Air Development Center, ECHO I was a passive-style satel-
lite, which reflected messages sent from and to ground terminal equip-
ment.
While Courier went forward, the Advanced Research Projects
Agency undertook a program called Advent. Courier was an experimen-
tal satellite, but Advent was to be a truly operational one. However, the
project was too ambitious for the technology then available and was
cancelled in 1962. Another experimental project called West Ford
sought to develop a secure, survivable passive satellite using reflective
copper wires. Launched in 1963, it successfully relayed voice and data
but at such low capacity that it was discontinued.
A further six experimental satellites were launched between 1965
and 1968 for the Lincoln Laboratory, which used them to perfect oper-
ations with small, fixed, and mobile ground terminals. Dubbed the LES
series, the project continued through 1971.
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After the cancellation of Advent, a
new operational communications satel-
lite effort called the Initial Defense
Communications Satellite Program
(IDCSP) was launched. IDCSP consisted
of small, simple repeater satellites
launched in clusters. Some 28 were
placed in orbit in four launches from
June 1966 to June 1968. They provided
strategic communications for DoD until
the more sophisticated Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS II) was
fielded. Another experimental project
called Tacsat simultaneously explored
operations with small, mobile, land, air-
borne and shipborne tactical terminals.
DSCS II satellites were larger and
offered greater capacity than their prede-
cessors. They had longer operational life
and were positionable by ground com-
mand. The first pair of DSCS II satellites
reached orbit in November 1973, and by
1979 a full network of four DSCS IIs was
in place. Sixteen DSCS II satellites were
built, and the last was launched in 1989.
Planning for Phase III DSCS began in
1973. DSCS III satellites offered better
jamming resistance and still more com-
munications capacity. The first DSCS III
satellite was launched in October 1982,
and the five-satellite network was com-
pleted in July 1993.
The experimental trials with the LES
series and Tacsat paved the way for the
Fleet Satellite Communications System
(FLTSATCOM), the first operational sys-
tem serving tactical users. Managed by
the Navy, FLTSATCOM came online in
the late 1970s and would serve as a plat-
form for another user group – nuclear
capable forces. Their needs and those of
the Air Force would be served by the Air
Force Satellite Communications System
(AFSATCOM). The system relied on
transponders placed on FLTSATCOM
and other DoD satellites. AFSATCOM
attained full operational capability in
May 1979.
The latest communication satellite
system goes by the name MILSTAR.
Designed for robustness and flexibility,
MILSTAR satellites provide highly jam-
resistant communications for the
National Command Authority and tacti-
cal and strategic forces. The program was
inaugurated in 1982, and the first MIL-
STAR satellite took off in 1994. Block I
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MILSTAR satellites carry low-data-rate payloads, but
Block II MILSTARs, first successfully launched in 2001,
can accommodate medium-data-rate communications
as well.
NAVIGATION
Experimental use of satellites for navigation has its
origins in a Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
project to develop a system that would allow Polaris sub-
marines to accurately track their locations. The system
that emerged, called TRANSIT, began operating in 1964
with a constellation of five satellites. TRANSIT enabled
submarines to establish their position to within 25 meters.
In the late 1960s, the Air Force and Navy were devel-
oping satellite navigation systems in parallel. The Naval
Research Laboratory proposed a system called TIMA-
TION which used precision clocks in a network of 21 to
27 satellites in medium-altitude orbits. The Air Force’s
Space and Missile Systems Organization developed its
own 621B program. The 621B proposal envisioned a
constellation of 20 satellites in synchronous inclined
orbits. The system could provide altitude as well as lati-
tude and longitude data.
DoD directed the services to merge their programs in
1973 into a new effort called the Global Positioning
System/NAVSTAR (GPS/NAVSTAR). GPS/NAVSTAR
combined the best elements of TRANSIT, TIMATION
and 621B, and was deployed in three phases.
The first Block I satellite blasted off in
February 1978, and the system attained full
operational capability in April 1995. Further
launches have maintained the GPS network
at about 25 satellites, which provide invalu-
able support for navigation, instrument land-
ings, targeting, rescue missions, rendezvous,
mine operations, and a host of other applica-
tions.
WEATHER
Military planners have for generations
recognized the value of accurate weather
information. As communication, reconnais-
sance, and early-warning satellite programs
began in the 1960s, DoD directed the Air
Force’s Space Systems Division to initiate a
satellite weather-observation system that
eventually became the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).
The first weather satellite launches
occurred in the early 1960s. Early satellites
were 90-pound, spin-stabilized craft
equipped with TV cameras. The photos they
obtained were relayed to ground stations at
retired Nike missile sites in Washington and
Maine. They were then passed to Air Force
Global Weather Central at Offutt AFB, where
meteorologists would assimilate them to pro-
vide commanders and flight crews with
observations and forecasts.
Weather-sensing technology evolved sig-
nificantly through the 1970s and 1980s by
which time over 30 DMSP satellites had been
launched. The operational system was com-
prised of two or more weather satellites in
medium-altitude polar orbits. In 1998, con-
trol of DMSP satellites was transferred to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, which combined them with
its own weather satellites to form a single
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Opposite, top: A Defense Communication Satellite undergoes
work in a Lockheed Martin test cell in Sunnyvale, Calif. Opposite,
bottom: A MILSTAR satellite is seen during its cleanroom produc-
tion phase in this 1994 photo. Above: A Lockheed Martin employee
works on Global Positioning Satellite SV11.
system referred to as the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).
GETTING THERE:
BOOSTERS & UPPER STAGES
Getting satellites to the right orbit
and positioning them properly proved
nearly as challenging as developing their
remote sensing capabilities. When seri-
ous satellite programs got under way in
the late 1950s, there was but one type of
platform capable of taking them to space
– the ballistic missile.
Three different types were under
development at the time, including the
Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile (IRBM), the Atlas Interconti-
nental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and the
Titan ICBM. For the next 45 years, these
systems would be the main booster
types to propel satellites out of our
atmosphere.
Thor IRBMs were the first platforms,
powering the early Discoverer satellites
through the atmosphere. Produced by
the Douglas Aircraft Company, the first
Thor IRBM was delivered to the Air
Force in October 1956. The first
Thor/Discoverer launch fired off from
Vandenberg AFB in January 1959. Thor
boosters lifted most of the early KH
series reconnaissance systems as well as a
number of NASA and many civilian
communications satellites into orbit in
the 1960s.
The Atlas ICBM, designed and built
by Convair, first flew in December 1957.
Designed as a longer-range, single-stage
missile, Atlas extended America’s nuclear
reach well inside the U.S.S.R. A year after
its first launch, an Atlas booster rocketed
the first SCORE communications satel-
lite into orbit. Heavier MiDAS and
SAMOS satellites relied on Atlas boost-
ers, as did later KH series satellites and
other low-orbit payloads. In total, some
523 Atlas boosters were launched, most
successfully propelling their payloads to
space.
The two-stage Titan ICBM was
developed by the Martin Company as a
heavier payload missile to supplement
the Atlas. The Air Force took delivery of
the first Titan I in June 1958 and
launched it successfully in May 1959. The
upgraded Titan II first launched in March
1962, and more than 140 such Titans
were eventually built, becoming the USAF’s most prolific
booster vehicle. A wide variety of Air Force satellites relied
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A Lockheed Martin Defense Meteorological Satellite is seen atop a Titan
II launch vehicle at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.
on Titan variants to achieve medium/high orbit, from the first IDCSP
satellites to the latest MILSTAR communications satellites.
Despite their obvious power, converted IRBMs and ICBMs shared a
common problem as boosters. They were initially designed to deliver their
payloads to the Earth’s surface rather than into orbit. Upper-stage space-
craft had to be designed to kick satellites into orbit at the apogee of the
booster flight and to orient the satellite payload once in orbit. The most
widely used was the Lockheed RM-81 Agena.
Built around the Bell XLR81 liquid propellant rocket engine, the Agena
was initially known as the Hustler, since the XLR81 was designed for use in
a rocket-powered weapons pod for the B-58 Hustler bomber. The first
Thor-Agena launch in January 1959 was a failure, but the spacecraft would
go on to become the heart of Discoverer and many other Air Force satellite
systems. As flown on a Discoverer mission, Agena was made up of a three-
axis gyro guidance and control system, a battery-powered electrical system,
a telemetry command and tracking system, a thermally protected reentry
capsule, a parachute, and the 16,000-pound-thrust Bell rocket. The pay-
load housed a 70-degree panoramic Eastman Kodak Itek camera.
Subsequent Agena craft offered re-fireable engines with increased fuel
for extensive orbital maneuvers, more thrust, and larger payload capacity.
Some 365 Agena craft were launched into space by the Air Force and NASA
between 1959 and 1987.
SIGNS – PAST & FUTURE
Prior to the formation of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) in
September 1982, the development, operation, and control of Air Force
satellites was divided among a number of agencies, from the Air Force
Systems Command to the National Reconnaissance Office to Strategic
Air Command. Today, the spectrum of military satellite programs func-
tion under the direction of AFSPC, including: GPS/NAVSTAR, DSCS
Phase III, DSP, FLTSATCOM, and MILSTAR. AFSPC also provided
backup command and control for NATO IV and Skynet IV systems.
Reconnaissance satellites were the first to have a major impact on
national security, offering DoD strategic planners insight into military
activities behind the Iron Curtain and elsewhere. Early Warning satel-
lites provided SAC with additional response time during the Cold War,
helping prevent misunderstandings and significantly contributing to
mutual deterrence. Early communications satellites facilitated better
strategic communication during the Vietnam War, and meteorological
satellites provided tactical planners with better weather forecasts and
observations.
It was not until Operation Desert Storm that Air Force satellites
truly altered the global strategic and tactical environment. With the
remote sensing its satellites provided, AFSPC could effectively, intimate-
ly support the warfighter with timely information from communica-
tions to navigation to environmental sensing. Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have further highlighted the value of Air
Force Space Command satellites in providing comprehensive battlefield
awareness and clues to successfully prosecute the war on terror.
Military and technology affairs observers predict that in the near
future, rapidly proliferating commercial satellite systems will be
assigned many of the tasks traditionally performed by military satellites
as the government seeks to reduce costs and to leverage accelerating
commercial technology. The approval of Presidential Decision Directive
23 has opened a path for a number of U.S. corporate satellite ventures,
which will see AFSPC working more closely with the private sector.
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By Robert F. Dorr
A MISSILE
SHIELDFOR
AMERICA
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ong before the nation became vulnerable to
ballistic missile attack, Americans began
searching for ways to protect the American
heartland. The search continues today with
efforts to detect, identify, and track incoming
ballistic missiles, but its eventual goal is a shield that will
protect our cities, bases, and strategic missile forces.
When this volume went to press, a limited shield was
ready for initial operations, the latest development in the
long history of radar, missiles, and missile defense.
During the years it took to get that far, the threat was
viewed with nothing less than dread.
Before an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile sat in a
silo anywhere on the planet, the threat was portrayed
graphically on a 1954 cover of an industry magazine in a
painting that depicted an ICBM as a silvery, speeding
bullet, difficult to detect and impossible to stop. The
Soviet Union’s unexpected Oct. 4, 1957, launch of the
world’s first man-made satellite, Sputnik I, used the same
booster technology that could send such a speeding bul-
let over the North Pole toward American cities with a
nuclear warhead. Sputnik shocked Americans and
prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to order new
measures, including steps to detect and defend against
attack.
The Soviet Union was developing long-range mis-
siles. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, an independent
military service branch, were fielding and testing ICBMs
that could come down on American cities within an
hour of their launch. The Russian Strategic Rocket
Forces still exist today, and the United States still has no
defense against ICBMs, nor is any being planned, but Air
Force Space Command is very much in the business of
detecting missiles. The nation has now fielded the begin-
nings of a partial shield against missiles in the hands of
renegades, rogues, or bad-state actors like North Korea.
None of this would be possible but for radar.
MAKI NG RADAR WAVES
As far back as 1904, a primitive radar had been
demonstrated by a German Engineer named Christian
Hulsmeyer.
Just after World War I, in 1922, experts at the Aircraft
Radio Laboratory at Anacostia in Washington, D.C., were
experimenting with high-frequency radio transmission.
A. Hoyt Taylor and Leo C. Young were trying to transmit
between their radio station and a receiver located across
the Anacostia River at Haines Point. At one point during
the test, a passing river steamer interrupted their signal.
This suggested to Taylor that radio waves might be used
to detect the passage of a ship during a heavy fog or in
the dark of night.
Taylor submitted a report on “radio-echo signals
from moving objects” in November 1930 to the Navy's
Bureau of Engineering, Navy Department. In January
1931, the Bureau assigned the Naval Research Laboratory
the problem of investigating – secretly – the use of radio
to detect the presence of enemy vessels and aircraft.
By 1934, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, in fact all of the major powers, were also work-
ing on primitive radar systems. In the same year, Taylor
devised a way to send radio energy toward a suspected
target in short bursts, or pulses. In 1936, Taylor demon-
strated that this method could detect an aircraft 25 miles
away. It was named RAdio Detection And Ranging, or
RADAR. As the first operational units were developed on
the eve of World War II, the term ceased being used as an
acronym and took its place as a dictionary word.
In Britain in 1934, Robert Page developed a pulse
radar for the detection of aircraft. The following year,
Scottish scientist Dr. Robert Watson-Watt produced a
report, “The Detection of Aircraft by Radio Methods.” In
February 1935, Watson-Watt took part in a successful
trial in Britain in which short-wave radio was used to
detect a bomber. In 1936, a U.S. Army Signal Corps lab-
oratory at Fort Monmouth, N.J., began its own radar
project.
By the time German bombers were attacking during
the Battle of Britain in 1940, the British had a chain of
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o Opposite: An interceptor missile is launched from the
Army's Kwajalein Missile Range in the central Pacific
Ocean during a July 2000 test intercept. Above: This
ground-level view of the Clear Air Force Station,
Alaska, Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS) site shows a radar fan, at left, and a tracking
radar radome. The detection radars provide 30 minutes
warning of an ICBM attack, while tracking radars
enable operators to track most orbiting satellites.
radar stations covering the southeast of England. Radar
was a tool to the embattled Spitfire and Hurricane pilots
of Royal Air Force Fighter Command, who defeated the
Luftwaffe in history's first air-to-air military campaign.
As the war progressed, all nations had radar, but it was of
little use when Nazi Germany hurled ballistic missiles at
the British Isles in 1944 and 1945. There was no practical
way to detect an incoming V-2 rocket and no defense
against it.
When victory in World War II gave way to the ten-
sions of the Cold War, the United States was all too will-
ing to invest hundreds of billions of dollars to defend
itself. All along, some experts saw the V-2 rocket as an
omen, but the focus was a perceived bomber threat.
Experts in the West overestimated the Soviet bomber
force and underestimated the willingness of the Soviets
to leapfrog past the manned bomber to the missile. Even
during the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953, the Pentagon
spent more on defense against bombers than on fighting
in Korea. The building of Thule Air Base, Greenland,
begun in 1952, was one of the most ambitious construc-
tion projects ever undertaken, and the primary reason
was to support a Distant Early Warning line – a DEW
line – of radar stations running across the polar region
from Greenland to Alaska.
The DEW Line began operations in February 1954.
Radar stations dotted the tundra of northern Greenland,
Canada, and Alaska, each providing overlapping cover-
age to detect approaching aircraft. Logistics experts
brought tons of equipment to the Arctic and construct-
ed no fewer than 58 DEW Line sites in just over two
years.
It began with an experimental radar site.
In 1958, a handful of U.S. scientists, specialists, and
military men went to Trinidad in the British West Indies
to begin tests of a prototype for the nation's first missile-
detection radar. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System (BMEWS) Trinidad site was used to gather data
on friendly missiles fired over the Atlantic, as well as an
occasional meteor, but its purpose was to prove out a
concept for detecting hostile missiles – a significant step
toward creating a missile shield for North America.
The then Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Thomas D.
White, is usually credited with coining the term “aero-
space,” a word that has been in and out of favor since the
1950s as the Air Force has continuously redefined its
space, and space defense, mission. By 1959, the Air Force
had officially taken responsibility for the space arena and
the word “aerospace” had become part of its official
vocabulary.
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Above: In response to a perceived Soviet bomber threat at the onset of the Cold War, the United States established
a Distant Early Warning (DEW) line of radar stations running across the polar region from Greenland to Alaska.
Seen here is a DEW line radar station in Greenland. Opposite: An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) perimeter acquisi-
tion radar (PAR) that was used as part of the short-lived Safeguard program. Pursued for only a few months in the
mid-1970s, the Safeguard missile-intercept program sought to protect the United States’ stockpile of interconti-
nental ballistic missiles.
That year, the Air Defense Command, already
responsible for protecting the nation against bomber
attack, assumed the ballistic missile warning mission.
Also that year, the chief of naval operations, Adm.
Arleigh Burke, suggested that the Pentagon create a uni-
fied space command, responsible for all space assets and
missions. The Army liked the idea. The Air Force resis-
ted. The services continued to compete for space mis-
sions, although the Air Force now held the missile-warn-
ing job firmly in its hands.
In 1963, after Soviet cosmonauts and American astro-
nauts had been in orbit and both sides possessed opera-
tional ICBMs, the Air Force began work on the world’s first
phased-array radar. Work progressed at Eglin Air Force
Base, Fla., on the AN/FPS-85, a powerful space track sys-
tem intended to provide tracking data on thousands of
space objects per day. Plans to make the system operational
in 1965 were foiled by technical glitches and a major fire,
but the system did achieve initial operating capability in
1969.
Becoming embroiled in Vietnam, the United States
never took its eye off the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, both
sides fielded not only ICBMs, but also submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs. A submarine operat-
ing close to American shores could reduce the warning
time available to U.S. defenders to 20 minutes or less. To
provide timely warning against Soviet SLBMs, the Air
Force began work on an interim SLBM-detection network
consisting of several AN/FSS-7 radars located on the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. The network, eventually
controlled by the 4783rd Surveillance Squadron of the 14th
Aerospace Force, was fully operational by May 1972. By
July 1975, the AN/FPS-85 radar at Eglin AFB had been
reprogrammed to provide additional SLBM detection and
warning capability along with its original spacetrack mis-
sion.
While the Air Force honed its ability to detect, iden-
tify, and track missiles, the nation put into operation its
first attempt at a shield against missile attack – run by the
Army. The Nike Zeus series of missiles and an aborted
project called BAMBI, or the Ballistic Missile Boost
Intercept system, evolved into the LIM-49A Spartan and
FLA-38 Sprint ground-launched anti-ballistic missiles,
each armed with a 20-kiloton W-66 thermonuclear, neu-
tron-flux warhead. The Spartan and Sprint weapons
entered service as part of the Safeguard program (initial-
ly named Sentinel) at Grand Forks, N.D.
Believing that the United States could not stop an all-
out attack by the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, the
Lyndon B. Johnson administration decided to proceed
with a thin anti-ballistic umbrella to protect major U.S.
cities. When Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
announced the plan in September 1967, he made two
points that have regained currency today: (1) deploying
a comprehensive anti-missile system might exacerbate
the offensive missile race, and (2) the nation needed
enough of an umbrella to counter very limited threats
such as that posed by the small Chinese ICBM force.
In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union
signed the ABM Treaty, which limited both sides to two
anti-ballistic missile interceptor sites. A 1974 protocol
reduced the two sites to one each and to 100 interceptors.
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The Soviets elected to defend Moscow with their
nuclear-tipped Galosh system while the United States
opted to defend the Minuteman missile fields in the
northern tier of the nation. Safeguard became opera-
tional on Oct. 1, 1975, with 30 Spartans and 70 Sprints.
Some called the system a partial “shield,” but it was
flawed. For one thing, its radars would have been blind-
ed by the electromagnetic pulse from exploding nuclear
warheads on the Safeguard interceptors.
Primarily because of cost, Congress immediately
ordered the program shut down, and Safeguard went out
of the business of shielding America in 1976. Except for
radars associated with the system, Safeguard was fully
operational for only a few months. The process of shut-
ting it down was completed in 1978. The Soviet Union
retained its system and has updated the Gazelle anti-bal-
listic missiles in place today.
By then, the Air Force had been at work for several
years on an improved, phased-array radar known as Pave
Paws, or AN/FPS-115. Capable of detecting missiles at
greater distances and of identifying and tracking them
more accurately, Pave Paws began operations at Otis Air
National Guard Base, Mass., in April 1980. In due course,
Pave Paws sites operated at four installations in the
United States.
FORMI NG SPACE COMMAND
Air Force Space Command was created Sept. 1, 1982.
It resulted from a major restructuring of the oversight of
all space surveillance and missile warning assets, until
then operated separately by Air Defense Command and
Strategic Air Command. Although his predecessor Gen.
James Hill and others played a significant part, Gen.
James V. Hartinger is credited with the vision of a service
headquarters that would operate on a par with Strategic
Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military
Airlift Command.
As soon as it was activated, Air Force Space
Command began to grow. In 1983, the command
assumed responsibility for a worldwide network of more
than 25 space surveillance and missile warning sensors.
Among the radar sites passed to Space Command were
the AN/FPS-17 and AN/FPS-79 detection and tracking
radars at Pirinclik, Turkey. This site had been in opera-
tion since 1955, gathering intelligence on Soviet missile
launches.
On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan spoke
of countering the Soviet missile threat by developing
defenses that would make “nuclear weapons impotent
and obsolete.” The Air Force was involved mostly on the
periphery of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star
Wars, which cost $100 billion over the next decade and
contributed mightily to scientific knowledge, but never
provided a missile shield.
The command also took over the long-operating
Cobra Dane radar on Shemya in the Aleutian Islands.
The site had been created, largely in secret, to track
Soviet missile tests impacting on the Kamchatka
Peninsula. The site's advanced AN/FPS-108 phased-
array radar replaced two earlier radar systems similar to
those at Pirinclik. As the decade progressed, the com-
mand added other space tracking radars to its now-
worldwide network.
In 1991, Iraq used the Scud theater ballistic missile
against U.S. forces and its allies in the Persian Gulf. They
produced the first American combat casualties ever
caused by ballistic missiles. That year, under President
George H. W. Bush, the nation adopted a strategy of
developing a defense against limited missile strikes –
more than the theater defense mounted in the Persian
Gulf but less than a strategic effort. Numerous changes
in the missile bureaucracy and in terminology occurred
under President Bill Clinton and President George W.
Bush, while the target date for a limited missile defense,
operated by the Missile Defense Agency and manned by
Army National Guard personnel, kept slipping. The
threat of tactical ballistic missiles was soon reinforced by
the threat of intercontinental weapons in the hands of
rogue states, principally the Taepo Dong 2 ICBM fielded
by North Korea, which in 2004 acknowledged having
nuclear weapons.
The nation's ICBM forces were merged into Air
Force Space Command in 1993. They revert to U.S.
Strategic Command in wartime.
The command took over the former Naval Space
Surveillance System, also known as “the Fence,” the
nation’s oldest sensor built to track satellites and debris
in orbit around the Earth, during ceremonies at
Dahlgren, Va., on Oct. 1, 2004. The transfer of Fence
operations to the Air Force brings an end to more than
40 years of Navy control of the sensor. Lt. Col. James
Hogan, 20th Space Control Squadron commander, who
now operates the Fence, gave credit to the Navy for a long
period of tradition: “For 43 years, Navy has stood watch
over space with the Fence and has one of the first seats at
the table of space surveillance,” Hogan said.
MI SSI LE DEFENSE – AGAI N
In 2004, the nation was preparing to field its latest
space shield, under an arrangement that seemingly
placed operational readiness ahead of testing.
Pentagon officials said they would be unable to com-
plete an overdue flight test of critical elements of the
anti-missile system before activating the system in
October 2004. The decision delayed a key design
review for the Missile Defense Agency's Multiple Kill
Vehicles program by about four months. The Pentagon
said that more work, including unspecified “additional
risk reduction on critical kill vehicle subsystems,” was
needed.
The delay meant the system would be deployed
without a flight test having been carried out for two
[ 34 ]
AI R FORCE SPACE COMMAND
years. After several successful intercepts in 2001, the
system failed to intercept a mock enemy missile in a
test in December 2002. After that failure, officials
ordered a halt to more intercept tests until a newly
designed booster could be completed. The Pentagon
said it decided to delay the test again after learning of
modifications to the test interceptor that were not
checked out fully in ground tests. The Pentagon said
the program is “on track and making strong progress”
and that the MKV design “has matured significantly.”
Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, calls the deployment of
missile defense “essential in today's world.” A Pentagon
spokesman noted that, “Although the system will ini-
tially have a limited capability when it becomes opera-
tional ... it will mark the first time the United States has
a capability to defend the entire country against limit-
ed attack by a long-range ballistic missile.” In addition
to the kill vehicle, the interceptors rely on a booster
rocket. The kill vehicle is designed to separate from the
booster, identify the enemy warhead, and ram it.
Although Air Force Space Command doesn't oper-
ate the interceptors that make up this newest space
shield, the command is in constant coordination with
those who do. The missile agency has five interceptors
in underground silos at Fort Greely in central Alaska,
with plans to add 11 more by the end of 2005. Four
interceptors are being put in the ground at the backup
site at Vandenberg. A U.S. Navy destroyer has begun
patrolling the Sea of Japan with newly upgraded Aegis
radar capable of tracking any North Korean missile
launches and feeding information into the missile
defense network. The command's tracking radar on
Shemya, and an early-warning radar at Beale Air Force
Base, Calif., are both operational.
General Lance Lord, the longest-serving missileer in
uniform, has commanded Air Force Space Command
since April 2002. The command has two numbered air
forces: 14th Air Force at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
Calif., commanded by Maj. Gen. Michael A. Hamel, and
20th Air Force, at F. E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.,
commanded by Maj. Gen. Frank G. Klotz. The com-
mand's literature tells us that its assets are “a key factor”
in implementing the Air Force’s expeditionary strategy.
For the men and women of Air Force Space
Command – headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base
just outside Colorado Springs – contributing to today's
reduced ballistic missile defense means staying ready at
ICBM sites, monitoring telemetry, operating warning
satellites and warning radar stations, and coordinating
with the Missile Defense Agency and other players.
AI R FORCE SPACE COMMAND
SPACE AND
MISSILE
PIONEERS
By Scott R. Gourley
[ 36 ]
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he watershed events of 1954, including the July 1, 1954, establishment of the
Western Development Division (WDD) in Inglewood, Calif., form the
foundation for today’s Air Force space and missile capabilities. However,
while WDD is considered to be the birthplace of Air Force missile and satel-
lite development, “the division” accomplished nothing. It was the people
working in, for, and around WDD and its subsequent organizations that established those
capabilities. They are the space pioneers.
An example can be found in Brig. Gen. Bernard Schriever, a visionary leader who
assumed command just one month after the WDD was established. Often identified as
the first in a long line of space and missile pioneers, Schriever was born in Germany in
1910, immigrating to the United States with his parents seven years later. He began mili-
tary service in the U.S. Army field artillery, but transferred to the Air Corps in 1932, earn-
ing his wings one year later. After time as a test pilot at Wright Field, World War II found
him fighting in campaigns throughout the Pacific.
The WDD that he commanded would be credited for the design and development of
national assets, including the nation’s ICBM fleet, the CORONA/Discoverer satellite
imagery program, and the Missile Detection Alarm System (MIDAS). But it was the indi-
viduals involved who were truly responsible for the successes.
To honor those individuals and their contributions to the nation’s space posture, the
Air Force used the occasion of “Guardian Challenge 2004” to assemble a panel of distin-
guished visitors with personal knowledge of Air Force space and missile history. Speaking
to assembled participants at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., the panel members shared
many insights and observations surrounding the major issues, decisions, key efforts, and
events over the last 50 years.
AI R FORCE SPACE COMMAND
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“If I have seen further it is by standing on
the shoulders of Giants.”
- Sir Isaac Newton
Opposite: As a brigadier general, Bernard A. Schriever, seen at left standing behind the
Discoverer 13 capsule, took command of the Western Development Division (WDD)
just a month after it was established. He is now widely regarded as the father of the U.S.
space and missile program. Above: In July 1954, the Western Development Division
began operations in a converted parochial schoolhouse in Inglewood, Calif.
The distinguished panel members included co-mod-
erators – Maj. Gen. Michael A. Hamel, USAF
(Commander, 14th Air Force) and Maj. Gen. Frank G.
Klotz (Commander, 20th Air Force) – with panel mem-
bers Brig. Gen. William G. King, Jr., USAF (Retired); Maj.
Gen. Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF (Retired); Lt. Gen. Jay W.
Kelley, USAF (Retired); Maj. Gen. Donald G. Hard, USAF
(Retired); Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF
(Retired); Lt. Gen. Arlen D. Jameson, USAF (Retired);
Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Neary, USAF (Retired); and Lt.
Gen. Eugene D. Santarelli, USAF (Retired).
While some of the speakers used the occasion to
address current and future challenges, the bulk of the
speakers offered aspects of their personal experience
that helped illuminate the pivotal roles of the early
space and missile pioneers.
For example, in establishing a historical framework
for the early pioneering success, Maj. Gen. Hamel
opened the panel by explaining that the post-World
War II era was “a very different world” from what the
panel audience knew today.
“As the Cold War was developing, … we saw the
development of technologies that were able to underpin
our strategic nuclear deterrent and global stability for
nearly half a century,” he said.
“1954 was a pivotal year in the development of Air
Force space and missiles,” echoed Maj. Gen. Klotz. “In
February of that year, the Teapot Committee, which was
also known as the von Neumann committee [Dr. John von
Neumann was the committee chairman], released its
report, which urged the development of an American
intercontinental ballistic missile. The next month, RAND
Corporation released a report, R-262 – also known as
“Project Feedback” – which recommended that the Air
Force also develop a reconnaissance satellite program. In
July of 1954, the Western Development Division was acti-
vated and began the race with the then Soviet Union to
field an operational ICBM. The following month, then
Brig. Gen. Bernard Schriever assumed command of the
Western Development Division. In October 1954, the
ICBM Scientific Advisory Group recommended integrat-
ing space and missile programs under the Western
Development Division. Finally, in November of that piv-
otal year, the Air Force issued the requirement for weapon
system 117-L, to develop a reconnaissance satellite pro-
gram.”
“But 1954 was just the start of Air Force space and
missiles,” Klotz continued. “In those early years, the Air
Force fielded numerous research and development sys-
tems, many of which evolved into operational systems.
[ 38 ]
AI R FORCE SPACE COMMAND
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Clockwise from top left: Brig. Gen. William G.
King, Jr.; Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.; Dr. Simon
“Sy” Ramo; Dr. John von Neumann; and the
Honorable Trevor Gardner.
And I think that one of the things to beai in mind as we
look out acioss this audience and see wings fiom both
14th Aii Foice and 20th Aii Foice, is that the ICBM busi-
ness and the space business weie boin togethei. They
giew up togethei. They weie essentially pait of the same
family. And they still aie.’
Hamel•s intioduction of Biig. Gen. William G. King,
Ji. highlighted a panelist who had been involved in the
space and missile business since the 1950s, peisonally
seiving undei Schiievei duiing the foimative yeais.
Among his accomplishments, King was ciedited as being
“the diiving foice behind the WS-117 piogiam.’
Foi his pait, King categoiized himself as being
among “the oiiginal space ancestois,’ focusing his woids
on “what the woiking iunioi officeis weie doing in the
mid-‘50s.’
“These weie not ieally piehistoiic times,’ he began.
“But it was befoie space. Most of the geneial population
did not have space in its vocabulaiy. And neithei did the
Aii Foice.’
“In fact, one of the haidest things foi us to do was to
leain how to spell ‘satellite,•’ he ioked. “If you made a lot
of biiefings in those eaily days, you weie ieally upset
when you looked at youi chait and saw that ‘satellite• was
misspelled.’
Desciibing a small oiganization located at Wiight
Field that he ian as a lieutenant colonel, King explained,
“The ‘Feedback Repoit• |RAND Coipoiation “Pioiect
Feedback’] had an impoitant iecommendation in it.
And that was that the Aii Foice undeitake at the eailiest
possible time to complete an efficient satellite ieconnais-
sance vehicle. And in those days › 1954 and 1955 › you
would piesume that all the people had iead it, because
this was a veiy impoitant document that came out.
Absolutely not. No one had looked at it. So oui iob was
to get out on the ioad with ‘a dog and pony show• to tiy
to biing this to the attention of the people in the Aii
Foice. Oui goal was to get invited to vaiious laboiatoiies,
commands, and headouaiteis in Washington. We did
this by netwoiking with people that we alieady knew and
usually the audiences weie small and iunioi in natuie.’
King cited a numbei of fiustiations in these eaily
effoits, ianging fiom negative ieceptions at tiaditional
photo labs to at least one audience membei who piivate-
ly asked, “How does that thing stay up theie:’
As one invitation led to anothei, King and anothei
gioup membei eventually found themselves at the head-
ouaiteis foi Stiategic Aii Command (SAC), which was at
that time commanded by Gen. Cuitis Lemay. The small
Wiight Field team piesentation iaised the possibility of
modifying one of the captuied Woild Wai II V-2s, then
stoied at White Sands, N.M., to place a small “giapefiuit-
sized obiect’ in lunai oibit foi the Inteinational
Geophysical Yeai |1957 › 1958]. King said that the famed
geneial unexpectedly enteied the ioom, listened to the
piesentation, and then veiy pointedly inouiied how the
biiefeis had obtained the tiavel funds to come to SAC to
pitch such nonsense.
“But the landmaik of the whole opeiation was that
we did get invited to come in to see |Biig.] Gen.
Schiievei•s opeiation out at the Westein Development
Division. We had been out theie seveial times when they
weie in the old schoolhouse out theie but that was to see
fiiends and talk to them. But we finally got invited now
› a legitimate invite. And, suie enough, Gen. Schiievei
was theie, as was Sy Ramo |of Ramo-Wooldiidge, latei
TRW] and Gen. Putt |Lt. Gen. Donald Leandei Putt, who
ietuined to Aii Foice headouaiteis in Apiil 1954 and was
designated deputy chief of staff foi Development, and
militaiy diiectoi of the Scientific Advisoiy Boaid to the
chief of staff, U.S. Aii Foice].
“When we got done giving the biiefing, Gen.
Schiievei tuined to Sy Ramo and asked, ‘What do you
think Sy:• And Sy said, ‘I think they may be on the iight
tiack, but if this is allowed to continue in this mannei, it
will inteifeie with you, and you have the highest piioiity
in this nation to accomplish one of the most impoitant
things that needs to be done in this nation,•’ King said.
That discussion would eventually lead to the tiansfei
of piogiam effoits fiom Wiight Field to WDD.
Anothei eaily highlight identified by King was a
Pentagon biiefing that iesulted in the ieceipt of $2 mil-
lion of funding to solicit up to foui contiactois to come
up with the development concept foi space ieconnais-
sance. Thiee of the foui iesponded, with Lockheed
ieceiving the eventual awaid.
In summaiizing the othei eaily milestones, King
added, “Ceitainly Sputnik aleited the public that space
was heie and it could happen, with what the Russians
had done. Suddenly, theie was inteiest and paiticipation
by the CIA. They had a mission foi space and they could
invoke a seciecy that allowed us to pioceed. And I don•t
think anybody ought to doubt how impoitant that was
in getting us into space. And then the public•s attention
to the space activity that was in NASA › and theie was a
lot of exchange of infoimation with the Aii Foice and
NASA in the eaily days.’
Highlighting “the piioiities and leadeiship of Gen.
Schiievei,’ he continued, “We needed a boostei. We knew
that. And that•s why we weie happy when the eight oi
nine of us that weie woiking on the piogiam at that time
did get tiansfeiied out |fiom Wiight Field] undei the
special management of Schiievei.’
Mai. Gen. Rosenbeig addiessed a follow-on eia when
that satellite technology was evolving into a tool that
seived the nation duiing the Cold Wai. Coming to
Vandenbeig Aii Foice Base in 1958, Rosenbeig•s intio-
duction noted that he was an eaily launch officei foi
CORONA befoie moving up to Sunnyvale, Calif., wheie
he helped “push the state-of-the-ait in ieconnaissance
satellites foiwaid in the 1960s.
“Let•s go back to the beginning of the Cold Wai,’ he
said. “In the ‘50s, the woild was a faiily fiightening place.
Oui leadeiship was conceined with the bombei and mis-
sile gaps. But the ouestion loomed in the White House,
‘Was theie ieally a gap:• We knew the Soviets had the
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bomb. They tested theii fiist one ovei 50 yeais ago. But
would oui militaiy buildup tiiggei an aims iace: So on
July 21, 1955, Piesident Eisenhowei pioposed an ‘Open
Skies Tieaty• at the Geneva Summit. Khiushchev took off
his shoe, bashed it on the table, and said ‘Nyet. Nyet. I
will nevei peimit espionage ovei my countiy.• And, as
you•ve alieady heaid, then came Sputnik: the launch that
shook the fiee woild•s confidence in the U.S.
“|Piesident Eisenhowei] was shocked by Sputnik,’
Rosenbeig said. “That changed eveiything. He had pie-
vented the militaiy fiom puisuing space initiatives pub-
licly. When I fiist got heie to Vandenbeig, Gen. Gieei
stood in fiont of the piess and told eveiybody that we
weie going to launch photoieconnaissance satellites.
Then, a yeai latei, no one was peimitted to talk about it
at all.’
Rosenbeig desciibed one of his fiist assignments as a
lieutenant at Vandenbeig, duiing which he used a team
of contiactois to modify the softwaie and haidwaie of
the SAC Atlas sites to guide space ieconnaissance satellite
launches.
“We pushed it to the limit with the leadeiship
of guys like Bill |Biig. Gen. William G.] King•s
leadeiship,’ he added. “The lieutenant didn•t go
thiough the captain to the maioi to the colonel to
the geneial. As the ‘taigeteei,• it was my iob, undei
his leadeiship, to make suie that we did eveiy-
thing we could to fill up those film capsules with
cloud-fiee, high-piioiity imageiy of the Soviet
Union, the Waisaw Pact, and otheis.’
Ouickly ieviewing his subseouent assign-
ments thioughout the Cold Wai, Rosenbeig con-
cluded, “The Soviets continued to spend 13 to 15
peicent of theii gioss national pioduct on mili-
taiy weaponiy. They weie able to outnumbei us 2
to 1 in aiiplanes, 3 to 1 in tanks, and 10 to 1 in
aitilleiy, because they thought that mass gave
them theii supeipowei status. But it was that
ouantitative imbalance that led the leadeis of the
Aii Foice and DoD › like Lew Allen |Gen. Lew
Allen, foimei Aii Foice Chief of Staff], Haiold
Biown |foimei Secietaiy of Defense], Bill Peiiy
|foimei Secietaiy of Defense], and otheis › to
adopt a stiategy of ‘technology leadeiship,• wheie
it was ouality ovei ouantity. That led AFSAT,
DSCS, MILSTAR, GPS DSMP, and the otheis as
enableis foi diamatic foice multiplieis to develop
an awesome fighting foice of land, naval, and aii
combat foices to detei and contain, and eventual-
ly watch the collapse of the evil empiie. Satellites,
along with iadai and the atomic bomb, weie
amongst the most impoitant militaiy technology
developments of the 20th centuiy that led to the
end of the Cold Wai.’
Aiiiving in the field in 1964 and seiving the
maioiity of his eaily caieei in ICBMs, Lt. Gen. Jay
W. Kelley opened his ieview of ICBM foice devel-
opment by stating, “With ICBMs and the Aii Foice, it all
staited a long time ago in a place fai away, and I can tell
you that it was not a natuial act.’
To suppoit the asseition, he piovided a ouick histoi-
ical ieview of post-Woild Wai II decisions that had given
captuied V-1s to the Aii Foice and captuied V-2s to the
Aimy.
Foi changing the mindsets behind that soit of deci-
sion-making, he ciedited “folks like Gen. King, Gen.
Schiievei, Gen. Sam Phillips, many otheis, and a lot of
successes.’
Aftei ouickly ieviewing the evolution of ICBM
eouipment and stiategy / tactics, Kelley shifted his pies-
entation to the people behind the piogiams.
“The heiitage that we have coming out of Woild Wai
II came out of the bomb gioups › B-17s and B-24s,’ he
began. “And so did oui leadeiship. My fiist wing com-
mandei, DO |Diiectoi of Opeiations], souadion com-
mandei, chief of tiaining › weie all pilots out of Woild
Wai II. Neaily eveiy othei key position in that wing,
down to ciew commandeis, was filled by aviatois fiom
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othei types of aiiciaft. Oui wing stiuctuie looked iust
like a bomb wing. We leained opeiations and mainte-
nance fiom oui aii biotheis and only then, only then,
weie we allowed to step up. But step up we did.’
Following an amazingly complex ieview of evolution-
aiy teims and acionyms associated with ICBMs, Kelley
succinctly concluded, “What•s impoitant is that we eained
oui way. We established and matuied a gieat caieei field.
We taught oui Aii Foice about missiles. And we leained
how to be pait of an Aii Foice waifighting team.’
Mai. Gen. Don Haid addiessed the evolution of the
development and ieouiiements piocess suppoiting space
and missiles. Piioi to his piesentation, modeiatois noted
that his eaily peisonal Aii Foice space expeiience ianged
fiom the Manned Oibiting Laboiatoiy office to a “flight
gioup in Hawaii whose puipose was to iecovei photoie-
connaissance capsules as they ietuined fiom space.’
Taking the audience on a ouick walk thiough five
decades, Haid said that, “The beginnings weie all about
bold exploiation; pushing the envelope › by both Aii
Foice and NASA; acceptance of iisk; iecognizing that
theie would be failuies along the way › as we saw with
Discoveiei 13 and CORONA; and a ‘less iigoious,• pei-
haps, management appioach. We didn•t talk a lot about
what the ieouiiements weie. We iust went ahead and did
things. One wondeis if theie ieally weie ieouiiements foi
iadai. It was pietty tiansfoiming, as was space. And I
think in those days, we woiiied less about the ieouiie-
ments than about getting something to woik.’
Aftei identifying some eaily difficulties with opeia-
tions costs and othei piogiam challenges, he added, “The
opeiations weien•t ouite ‘ioutine checklist• opeiations.
We sciambled ouite a bit. And that caiiied us all into the
‘70s. By •75 we weie continuing development, though, of
new and impioved capability acioss the boaid. Not iust
the ‘photo iecce• stuff; not iust the waining; not iust the
weathei. But now we weie beginning to undeistand the
ieal advantage that could be exploited fiom space plat-
foims, and we weie ‘at that,• big time.’
Those weie followed by ‘80s milestones involving
influence of the space shuttle and the incieasingly com-
plex issues of integiation of space foices with othei seiv-
ice elements.
“We began to get a lot of inteiest fiom the highest
levels of the Aii Foice,’ Haid said. Pointing down the
speakeis• table towaid Gen. Thomas Mooiman, he
added, “I iemembei at the time, oui Chief |of Staff] at
the time, Gen. Laiiy D. Welch |Chief of Staff 1986-1990],
invited my comiade and I to come in and talk to him
about space. It ended up with ‘Piofessoi Mooiman•
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
speaking about space foi thiee oi foui houis. And
that was the ieally significant step foiwaid in the
integiation of aii and space.’
In addition to his significant discussions with
Welch iegaiding the integiation of aii and space,
Mooiman•s backgiound included the development
and piocuiement of Aii Foice systems ianging
fiom suiveillance, communications, navigation,
weathei, anti-satellite weapons, and giound-based
iadai systems.
Mooiman•s senioi billets included both Vice
Commandei and Commandei of Aii Foice Space
Command (AFSPC), and latei, Aii Foice Vice
Chief of Staff. His piesentation at the Guaidian
Challenge 2004 symposium focused on individuals
and piogiams suiiounding the cieation of AFSPC.
“Theie•s a big debate in the histoiy business,’
Mooiman explained. “And the debate is ovei
whethei histoiy is cieated by events oi enviion-
mental factois. Oi is histoiy cieated by gieat peo-
ple: The lattei is the so-called ‘Gieat Man Theoiy.•
In this case, I believe it•s a little bit of both.’
Aftei piesenting a iange of opeiational and
mateiiel piogiams that helped lead to the cieation
of AFSPC, Mooiman highlighted the effoits of
seveial specific individuals, beginning with Gen.
Jeiome F. O'Malley.
“Within the Pentagon, I need to go back to the
‘Gieat Man Theoiy,•’ he said. “An individual came
to foie who doesn•t get the ciedit that I believe he
deseives, and that•s Gen. Jeiiy O•Malley. At this
time, he was the Aii Foice XO and he had a vision
foi Aii Foice Space that was actually beyond even
what the ‘space zealots• believed. And he kind of
diove that vision › cieating an entity in the Aii
Staff and peopled it with a lot of shaip people.
Most of them have ietiied, but I•ll call youi atten-
tion to one individual that I think most of you
know and have been influenced by: Mai. Rogei
Dekok seived in that activity |as a lieutenant gen-
eial, Rogei G. Dekok would latei seive as AFSPC
vice commandei].
With its cieation diiven by O•Malley and oth-
eis, AFSPC was cieated in Septembei of 1985. The
fiist commandei was Gen. James V. Haitingei.
“Gen. Haitingei, known as ‘The Giii• › that
was something that you leained veiy eaily,’
Mooiman said. “It was to get the pionunciation of
his name iight. But it |was] also veiy suitable foi
his peisonality. He was a tough customei: He was
a caieei fightei pilot; a veiy seasoned opeiational
commandei; a haid-nosed commandei. But he
was a tiemendous cheeileadei and piobably the
best choice you could have had foi the fiist com-
mandei. Because if you could get something
thiough Gen. Haitingei, you could skate thiough
the Aii Staff.’
“Theie aie a couple of othei gieat people I
want to mention heie,’ Mooiman added. “One of
them is out of the public eye now: Secietaiy |of the
Aii Foice] Veine Oii › he was veiy ciitical foi the
cieation of the command. And anothei guy who is
veiy much in the public eye and whose tiack iecoid
now is 30 yeais of continuous involvement: Pete
Aldiidge |Edwaid C. Aldiidge]. Pete Aldiidge was
the Undeisecietaiy of the Aii Foice and he ieally
woiked behind the scenes |foi the cieation of
AFSPC].’
As with many fields of endeavoi, today's space and missile wai-
iiois stand on the shouldeis of a plethoia of giants who have col-
lectively paved the way to space with five decades of peisonal com-
mitment. While it would be impossible to individually iecognize
the complete contiibutions of these myiiad space heioes, a small
foimal step foiwaid was taken in May 1989 when the United States
Aii Foice and the National Space Club initiated unofficially the Aii
Foice Space and Missile Pioneeis Awaid. Ten honoiees ieceived the
awaid at that time:
Fianklin R. Collbohm, Mai. Gen. Richaid D. Cuitin, Lt. Gen.
Otto J. Glassei, Biig. Gen. William G. King, Ji., Col. Fiedeiic
C.E. Odei, The Honoiable James W. Plummei, Di. Simon
Ramo, Mai. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, Gen. Beinaid A. Schiievei,
Lt. Gen. Chailes H. Teihune, Ji.
In 1997, the awaid was foimalized into an official Aii Foice
awaid with a select few pioneeis honoied with the awaid since
that time.
з±²»»®- ·²¼«½¬»¼ ·² ïççéæ
The Honoiable Tievoi Gaidnei
Di. John von Neumann
ײ¼«½¬»¼ ·² ïççèæ
Kaiel J. Bossait
Di. Ivan A. Getting
Gen. Samuel C. Phillips
ײ¼«½¬»¼ ·² ïçççæ
Col. Edwaid N. Hall
Col. Ouenten A. Riepe
Di. Robeit M. Saltei, Ji.
ײ¼«½¬»¼ ·² îðððæ
Col. Thomas O. Haig
Col. Joseph W. Kittingei, Ji.
Di. Ruben F. Mettlei
Ò± ·²¼«½¬·±²- ·² îððï ¼«» ¬± ©±®´¼ »ª»²¬-
ײ¼«½¬»¼ ·² îððî (honoiees selected in 2001):
Col. Claience L. Battle
Col. Fiank S. Buzaid
Lt. Gen. Foiiest S. McCaitney
ײ¼«½¬»¼ ·² îððî (honoiees selected in 2002):
Di. James G. Bakei
Mi. James S. Coolbaugh
ײ¼«½¬»¼ ·² îððíæ
Biig. Gen. Maitin Mentei
Col. Albeit J. Wetzel
Capt. Robeit C. Tiuax (USN)
Mi. John C. Heithei
ײ¼«½¬»¼ ·² îððìæ
Col. Edwaid E. Blum
Mi. Wen Tsing Chow
Mi. Rodney C. Piatt
Rita C. Sagalyn
Lt. Gen. Kenneth W. Schultz
Mi. William O. Tioetschel
Foi moie infoimation:
https://www.peteison.af.mil/hoafspc/histoiy/pioneeis.htm
ÎÛÝÑÙÒ×Æ×ÒÙ ÌØÛ ÍÐßÝÛ
ßÒÜ Ó×ÍÍ×ÔÛ Ð×ÑÒÛÛÎÍ
“Coois Biewing Company takes gieat
piide and honoi in saluting the men
and women of the Aii Foice Space
Command. Youi couiageous effoits to
piotect oui space opeiations not only
piovides secuiity foi the nation but
technological advances foi the woild’.
Ú±½«-
Í¿¬»´´·¬» п§´±¿¼ Í«¾-§-¬»³- º®±³ ËØÚ ¬± ÛØÚ
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±² ¬¸» ßÛØÚ ¿²¼ ͵§²»¬ Ê ³·´·¬¿®§ -¿¬»´´·¬» ½±³³«²·½¿¬·±²- °®±¹®¿³-ò
Í
pace is the youngest militaiy fiontiei,
whethei dating its beginning to Oct. 3, 1942,
with the fiist successful launch of a Geiman
V-2 iocket (although it nevei left the Eaith•s
atmospheie as a weapon of wai) oi to 15
yeais and a day latei, when Sputnik made the Soviet
Union the fiist nation to oibit a satellite. Foi the United
States, militaiy space officially became pait of the lexicon
in 1954, with the cieation of the Westein Development
Division › now the Space and Missile Systems Centei
(SMC), the acouisitions aim of the newly ieoiganized
Aii Foice Space Command (AFSPC).
“Many in the inteinational community point to Oct.
4, 1957, as a day that changed the woild. We in the
United States Aii Foice maik thiee yeais eailiei › Aug. 2,
1954 › as the beginning of oui space and missile heiitage
with the establishment of the Westein Development
Division,’ AFSPC Commandei Geneial Lance W. Loid
Å ìì Ã
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ßÚÍÐÝ
Ø×ÍÌÑÎÇ
Þ§ ÖòÎò É·´-±²
told the Royal College of Defense Studies in London
on Feb. 3, 2004.
It has become ciowded in the neai-space of
Eaith•s oibit in the half-centuiy since Sputnik.
Today, AFSPC tiacks moie than 13,500 man-made
obiects that might piesent a hazaid to the
Inteinational Space Station, satellites launched by
the half dozen nations capable of doing so, oi
manned flights by the United States, Russia, oi, most
iecently, China. Fewei than 1,200 of those obiects aie
functioning satellites › about a ouaitei of those U.S.
spaceciaft, only 60 of which aie claimed by the mili-
taiy.
“Space is no longei foi the piivileged few.
Woildwide industiy continues to migiate missions to
space, moving infoimation vital to national and intei-
national economic well-being,’ Geneial Loid told the
Royal College of Defense Studies. “With iegaid to
national secuiity, each nation has ceitain national
inteiests that aie unioue to that nation in space. At the
moment, the United States is piobably the most heav-
ily dependent nation in the woild on space.’
The histoiy of space exploiation and exploitation
is the histoiy of militaiy space, fiom the Geiman
iocket scientists captuied by both U.S. and Soviet
foices at the end of Woild Wai II, setting the stage foi
the “space iace’ that began with Sputnik and essen-
tially ended with Neil Aimstiong•s “one small step’
on the moon in July 1969, to today•s space-dependent
aii, land, and sea foices. Aimstiong was by that time
a civilian › but the iocket science that put him theie
was deiived fiom militaiy ieseaich and development.
Fiom the Westein Development Division
(WDD) and its fiist commandei, Biig. Gen. Beinaid
Schiievei, came the foundation of U.S. militaiy space
opeiations, fiom the oiiginal ICBM fleet to the
CORONA/Discoveiei satellite imageiy piogiam to
MIDAS (Missile Defense Alaim System), the woild•s
fiist missile detection piogiam. But the U.S. militaiy
took its fiist seiious look at space a decade eailiei.
“The U.S. inteiest in long-iange ballistic missiles
began in summei 1943, when Allied intelligence
began heaiing about the testing in Geimany of what
became the V-2 iockets. When those began to hit
London, that inteiest became even gieatei,’ notes Di.
Rick Stuidevant, AFSPC deputy command histoiian.
“At that time, theie was an Aimy Aii Foices liaison ›
Col. W.H. Joinei › to what is now JPL |Jet Piopulsion
Lab, Pasadena, Calif.]. As the intel came in about
Geimany, he asked JPL › mostly giaduate students
woiking undei Theodoie von Kaiman › to put
togethei a iepoit saying we could develop eouivalent
missiles within a few yeais.’
Iionically, one of those students was Hsue-Shen
Tsien, who would be depoited fiom the United States
duiing the McCaithy eia. He latei became the fathei of
the Chinese missile piogiam.
“It was appaient to Hap Ainold by then that the wai
piobably would end by 1945, so he decided not to put a
lot of Aimy Aii Foices R&D money into long-iange mis-
siles when we had a substantial numbei of veiy capable
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ß·®½®¿º¬•- ïçìê Ю±¶»½¬ ÎßÒÜ -¬«¼§ °®»¼·½¬»¼ ¬¸¿¬ ¬¸»
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¿²¼ ·¬ ¼»-½®·¾»¼ °±¬»²¬·¿´ -¿¬»´´·¬» «-»- º±® ®»½±²²¿·-ó
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·²¬»®°´¿²»¬¿®§ ¬®¿ª»´ô ¿²¼ -°¿½»ó¾¿-»¼ ©»¿°±²- ±°»®¿ó
¬·±²-ò ̸» ÎßÒÜ ®»°±®¬ ©¿- ¬¸» º·®-¬ ½±³°®»¸»²-·ª»
¿²¿´§-·- ±º -¿¬»´´·¬» º»¿-·¾·´·¬§ô ¿²¼ ·¬ -»®ª»¼ ¿- ¬¸» º±«²¼¿ó
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bombeis in the pioduction line,’ Stuidevant said.
“Howevei, Aimy Oidnance said they might be inteiest-
ed, because missiles had some similaiity to aitilleiy.
“When the wai ended, Ainold asked von Kaiman to
send a team of expeits to Euiope to evaluate the Geiman
science and technology effoits. They looked at eveiything
fiom iamiets and othei piopulsion systems to iockets.
While Aimy aitilleiy was inteiested in long-iange mis-
siles, |what would become] the Aii Foice was most intei-
ested in developing iet piopulsion foi manned systems.
Both also ielied on industiy and academia, although the
Aimy geneially piefeiied to develop theii systems intei-
nally.’
The Navy also ioined the effoit in late 1945, piopos-
ing a ioint ieseaich pioiect to develop a space launch
capability, but theie was little inteiest within the budding
Aii Foice foi a ioint effoit. Instead, Cuitis LeMay, diiec-
toi of ieseaich and development on the Aii Staff, com-
missioned RAND › then a division of Douglas Aiiciaft ›
to pioduce its fiist iepoit, one concluding the Aii Foice
could develop an “expeiimental woild-ciicling spaceship’
within five yeais.
That iepoit, deliveied in May 1946, also elaboiated
on a single line fiom von Kaiman•s study of Geiman
technology › “the satellite is a definite possibility.’ Within
a decade, additional study concluded it was possible to
build nucleai waiheads small enough in size and weight
to be deliveied by long-iange missiles.
“Anothei iepoit, also in 1954, addiessed the concept
of ICBMs and iecommended acceleiation of theii devel-
opment,’ said Command Histoiian Geoige W. Biadley
III. “That led to the establishment in July ‘54 of the WDD.
That was impoitant because you needed good boosteis to
get into space, which is why 1954 was such an impoitant
yeai foi us. The Aii Foice also issued a weapon system
ieouiiement that fall foi development of a ieconnaissance
satellite piogiam.’
With the Soviet Union also developing ICBMs,
Piesident Dwight D. Eisenhowei gave piecedence to the
development of Atlas › which became ciitical to space ›
as a diiect iesponse, saying, “Space obiectives ielating to
defense aie those to which the highest piioiity attaches
because they beai on oui immediate safety.’
In the decades that followed, all thiee seivices con-
tiibuted to the development of iocketiy and ielated space
technologies, fiom weathei piediction to eaily waining of
any missile attack against Noith Ameiica to veiification
of aims contiol tieaties.
As had been the case since the U.S. militaiy initially
dismissed iocket expeiiments as meiely inteiesting toys
in the 1920s and ‘30s, pioponents of new and advanced
capabilities often found little suppoit foi theii ideas. One
such pioponent was Navy Capt. Robeit Tiuax, who felt
his inteiest in long-iange missiles would be bettei
Å ìê Ã
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ܱ²¿´¼ Ôò Ы¬¬ô ¼·®»½¬±® ±º ÎúÜô Ѻº·½» ±º ¬¸» Ü»°«¬§ ݸ·»º ±º ͬ¿ºº º±® Ó¿¬»®·»´ô ¿²¼ Ü®ò ß´¾»®¬ Ûò Ô±³¾¿®¼ô Ö®òô
¸»¿¼ ±º ¬¸» λ-»¿®½¸ Ü·ª·-·±² «²¼»® Ù»²ò Ы¬¬ò
ieceived by the Aii Foice, leading him to volunteei to
woik foi Aii Foice Gen. Schiievei, WDD•s fiist com-
manding officei. Tiuax was put in chaige of the Thoi
IRBM piogiam, but soon became iestless again when the
Aii Foice failed to addiess the new piimaiy focus of his
inteiests › development of ultia-low-cost iocket engines
and launch vehicles. Following his militaiy ietiiement in
1959, Tiuax ioined Aeioiet Coipoiation, wheie he iefined
his concepts befoie establishing Tiaux Engineeiing, Inc.,
in 1966 and paiticipating in seveial impoitant space and
missile-ielated effoits duiing the next 35 yeais.
The decade following Woild Wai II also saw the
implementation of Pioiect Papeiclip, a militaiy opeiation
that biought dozens of Geiman scientists to the United
States. Undei that effoit, many › including Weinhei von
Biaun › went to woik foi the Aimy. One who did not was
Di. Hubeitus Stiughold, who instead ioined the Aii Foice
team on a much moie esoteiic concept › the ieouiie-
ments foi putting a man in space.
“In Octobei 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik,
doing so without waining, when we didn•t think they
weie that advanced,’ Biadley said. “We didn•t match that
until Januaiy 1958, with the launch of Exploiei I, a JPL
satellite using an Aimy launch vehicle (Jupitei).
“One conseouence of Sputnik was oiganizational
development › the 1958 establishment of NASA foi civil-
ian manned space. The Aii Foice had been planning foi
what became Pioiect Meicuiy all along, undei theii
‘Man-in-Space Soonest• effoit. They gave that up to
NASA; the Aimy gave up von Biaun•s team at Redstone
Aisenal; and the Navy gave up its test centei in
Gieenbelt, Md. |which NASA ienamed in honoi of
Robeit Goddaid, geneially consideied the fathei of
Ameiican iocketiy, who had woiked foi the Navy Buieau
of Aeionautics and the Aimy Aii Coips duiing Woild
Wai II until his death in 1945].’
With man-in-space now the puiview of NASA, the
Aii Foice concentiated on satellites.
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“Navigation, missile waining, communications,
weathei › key militaiy missions foi the Aii Foice, as well
as impoitant to the othei seivices,’ Biadley continued.
“Fiom 1945 to 1960 was a peiiod of giowing inteiest in
space and development of the launch capabilities to get
theie. In 1961, Aii Foice Systems Command was cieated
and continued development of Vandenbeig |AFB, the
militaiy•s West Coast launch facility] and Canaveial |its
East Coast eouivalent at Cape Canaveial, Fla.].’
“Anothei impoitant yeai in space histoiy was 1959,’
Stuidevant added, “when the Navy pioposed a unified
space command, which the Aii Foice ieiected, saying
with Atlas, Titan, and Thoi, space was theii business.’
The Navy pioposal eventually was put into place,
howevei, 27 yeais latei, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
acknowledging the giowing impoitance of space to the
militaiy, cieated a new unified command › U.S. Space
Command › with a piimaiy goal of institutionalizing the
nation•s deteiience capability. The offensive side of the
eouation came to the foie with Deseit Shield/Deseit
Stoim in 1990-91, as space played its fiist maioi iole in
combat.
Even then, howevei, the dominant playei iemained
the Aii Foice. Yet anothei ieoideiing of the contiibu-
tions each seivice was making came on Oct. 1, 2002,
when U.S. Space Command was disestablished and its
iesponsibilities tiansfeiied to U.S. Stiategic Command
(USSTRATCOM).
This 2002 change came on the heels of a 2001 iepoit
by the Commission to Asses U.S. National Secuiity Space
Management and Oiganization, which iecommended
consideiable changes in the U.S. Aii Foice•s appioach to
space. The panel, headed by Defense Secietaiy Donald
Rumsfeld piioi to his ietuin to the Bush administiation•s
cabinet, advised sweeping changes to the Aii Foice•s cul-
tuie of space piofessionals, waining of “a weak space cul-
tuie iesulting in unfocused caieei development, educa-
tion, and tiaining,’ and uiged that the United States
iamp up the secuiity of its space assets to thwait any
possible attack by those hostile to the United States.
Effoits to centialize militaiy space powei undei one
command › including a unification within the Aii Foice
of the Space and Missile Systems Centei and Aii Foice
Space Command undei USSTRATCOM › and to devel-
op moie defined caieei fields among the Aii Foice•s
space piofessionals followed.
While the list of nations able to launch satellites into
oibit continues to giow › as, on a much slowei scale,
does the numbei capable of manned spaceflight › the
United States cuiiently dominates militaiy space to a
degiee that would take a massive commitment of
iesouices to match, even if the nation stood still with its
cuiient capability and foice stiuctuie › a postuie at odds
with the cuiient bluepiint foi the fuithei exploitation of
“neai space’ by AFSPC and USSTRATCOM. That also
means a continual effoit at “countei-access’ › the ability
to deny an adveisaiy access to whatevei space assets aie
available to him › as well as defending against an attack
on U.S. capability, in an effoit to blind and deafen an
incieasingly space-dependent U.S. foice, as well as those
who may, liteially, slip undei the iadai, as happened on
Septembei 11.
“Foi oui fiist 50 yeais, we have become victims of
oui own success,’ said Mai. Gen. Mike Hamel,
Commandei, 14th Aii Foice. “Oui toleiance foi failuie
and oui demand foi peifoimance have incieased consid-
eiably. The launch capability we have today doesn•t meet
those high standaids.’
As a iesult, he added, the nation must make a focused
investment in iesponsive, affoidable, ieal-time launch
capability that would allow access to space on a ioutine,
low-cost basis › a validation of Robeit Tiuax.
“A significant investment in that aiea has the poten-
tial to be a ievolutionaiy shift,’ Hamel said, “including
changing how we maintain constellations in time of cii-
sis. We•ie also making big investments in the aiea of
tiansfoimational communications. The concept that we
would be able to piovide expeditionaiy foices is adapt-
able, dynamic connectivity, using Inteinet-like access all
the way fiom high bandwidth down to netting togethei
fiie souads dispeised acioss hundieds of kilometeis.
That, too, would be tiuly ievolutionaiy, but a lot of tech-
nology needs to be developed and integiated to make
that happen.
“Revolutionaiy waifaie and conflict management
means global peisistent tiacking and taigeting,
day/night, all-weathei, any time of oui choosing, so we
can monitoi adveisaiies, discein theii intentions, note
theii opeiating patteins, and veiy iapidly tiansition
fiom suiveillance to tiacking and ultimately taiget with
long-iange piecision, even global stiike.’
AFSPC identifies five piimaiy mission aieas foi
which it now is iesponsible:
1. Space Foice Enhancement › pioviding weathei,
communications, intelligence, missile waining, and pie-
cision timing and navigation in suppoit of the waifight-
ei, and enhancing the effectiveness of militaiy aii, land,
sea, and space opeiations
2. Counteispace › focusing on capabilities to
attain and maintain a desiied degiee of space supeiioii-
ty by allowing fiiendly foices to exploit space capabilities
while negating an adveisaiy•s ability to do the same
3. Space Foice Application › maintaining and
opeiating a iapid iesponse, land-based ICBM foice, the
Aii Foice•s only on-aleit stiategic deteiient
4. Space Suppoit › employing the Aii Foice satellite
contiol netwoik to piovide satellite opeiations seivices to
select DoD, National, Allied, Civil and commeicial satellites
5. Mission Suppoit › pioviding infiastiuctuie,
sustainment, secuiity, and tiained peisonnel needed to
peifoim missions aiound the globe › they cut accioss all
five mission aieas to ensuie effective opeiations.
The Aii Foice has been an integial pait of U.S.
militaiy space since its days as the Aimy Aii Foices. As
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a iesult, in an aiena in which success is now taken foi
gianted and failuie tends to be both veiy public and
spectaculai, AFSPC and its piedecessois often have
found themselves pushing the envelope of the possible
while defending theii iecoid and theii futuie.
“We•ve been in space and missiles foi 50 yeais; Aii
Foice space has been a command foi 22 yeais, and much
has been wiitten about whethei oi not the Aii Foice has
been an able stewaid of militaiy space,’ Geneial Loid
said. “The colonels and young geneials leading AFSPC
today aie as able as any othei colonels oi geneials in any
othei command. We have ioom to giow and impiove,
but we aie much healthiei than many outside ciitics
believe.’
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ß°®·´ ïêô ïçìê › White Sands Missile Range (WSMR),
N.M., fiist launch in the United States of a captuied
Geiman V-2 iocket
Ú»¾ò îìô ïçìç › WSMR (now a unioue multi-seivice
test facility) launch of a WAC Coipoial iocket, devel-
oped by the Jet Piopulsion Laboiatoiy (JPL), atop a V-
2, setting a new iecoid foi altitude (244 miles) and
speed (5,150 mph)
Ü»½ò éô ïçëï › The 6555th Guided Missile Wing › pied-
ecessoi to the 45th Space Wing › makes its fiist success-
ful all-militaiy “blue suit’ launch fiom the Aii Foice
Missile Test Centei at Cape Canaveial, Fla., with a
Matadoi, the fiist missile evei deployed by the Aii Foice
Ö«´§ ïô ïçëì › Westein Development Division estab-
lished in Los Angeles, Calif.
ß«¹ò îô ïçëì › Biig. Gen. Beinaid Schiievei assumes
command of the Westein Development Division
ѽ¬ò ïëô ïçëì › ICBM Scientific Advisoiy Gioup
iecommends the integiation of Aii Foice satellite
and missile piogiams and assigns them to the
Westein Development Division
Ò±ªò îéô ïçëì › The Aii Foice issues Weapon System
Reouiiements No. 5 (WS 117L) to develop a iecon-
aissance satellite piogiam
Ó¿§ îíô ïçëè › Aii Foice cieated the fiist distinctive
missile badge that iecognized and identified those
individuals within the Aii Foice who, by viitue of
theii iob assignment, had a diiect iole in missile
opeiations and maintenance
ѽ¬ò ìô ïçëè › Cooke AFB, Calif., is iedesignated as
Vandenbeig AFB, honoiing the Aii Foice•s second chief
of staff, Geneial Hoyt Vandenbeig
Ü»½ò ïêô ïçëè › The fiist launch of a Thoi Inteimediate
Range Ballistic Missile fiom Vandenbeig
Ú»¾ò îèô ïçëç › Discoveiei I, the fiist polai-oibiting
satellite, is launched by USAF
Ó¿§ îìô ïçêð › U.S. Aii Foice oibits its fiist MIDAS
eaily waining satellite and iecoveis capsules eiected
fiom Discovei XIII and XIV
Í»°¬ò îô ïçêð › SAC•s fiist opeiational Atlas ICBM
complex is on aleit at F.E. Waiien AFB, Wyo.
ß°®ò îðô ïçêî › The fiist Titan Is weie placed on
aleit at the 724th SMS, Lowiy AFB, Colo.
ïçêë › Defense Meteoiological Satellite Piogiam
begins pioviding weathei data fiom space
Ö«²» ïêô ïçêê › Clustei of fiist seven satellites in
initial Defense Communications Satellite Piogiam
launched
Ò±ªò êô ïçéð › Fiist Defense Suppoit Piogiam missile
waining satellite launched fiom Cape Canaveial
Í»°¬ò ïô ïçèî › Aii Foice Space Command cieated, with
headouaiteis at Peteison Aii Foice Base, Colo.
Ü»½ò îîô ïçèê › U.S. Aii Foice begins to deploy the
Peacekeepei, fiist new ICBM since the 1960s
Ö¿²ò ïéô ïççï › The United States uses its space
assets extensively foi the fiist time in Opeiation
DESERT STORM. Aii Foice Chief of Staff Geneial
Tony McPeak calls the Peisian Gulf Wai “The Fiist
Space Wai’
Ö¿²ò ïíô ïççí › USAF Mai. Susan Helms becomes fiist
U.S. militaiy woman in space, aboaid Space Shuttle
Û²¼»¿ª±®
Ò±ªò ïô ïççí › Diawing on its Gulf Wai expeiience,
AFSPC opens the Space Waifaie Centei at Falcon AFB,
Colo.
Ú»¾ò éô ïççì › Fiist MILSTAR militaiy communica-
tions satellite launched by AFSPC
Ó¿®½¸ çô ïççì › Full constellation of 24 Global
Positioning Satellites is completed
ß°®·´ çô ïççé › AFSPC establishes Aii Foice Space
Battlelab at Falcon AFB, Colo.
Ö¿²ò ïïô îððï › Rumsfeld Commission issues “Repoit of
the Commission to Assess United States National Secuiity
Space Management and Oiganization,’ which iecom-
mends significant changes in USAF•s appioach to space
ß°®·´ ïçô îðð2 › AFSPC designated a sepaiate foui-
stai command and the lead foi all U.S. militaiy space
piogiams.
Ò±ªò îðô îððî › Fiist flight of Delta IV EELV › the
woild•s fiist all-ciyogenic satellite launchei
îððì › AFSPC celebiates the 50th anniveisaiy of
Aii Foice Space and Missiles
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hat goes aiound, comes aiound,’
is an old saying the seasoned
Aiiman wisely nods in agieement
to when it is used to iefei to
changes diiected fiom the biass.
Change is an inevitable pait of the militaiy, and an
oiganization like the Space and Missile Systems Centei
(SMC) at Los Angeles AFB, Calif., which can tiace its
ioots back 50 yeais, has seen moie technological and
oiganizational change ovei the yeais than any othei mil-
itaiy space oiganization.
SMC today is the centei foi technical excellence foi
ieseaiching, developing, and puichasing militaiy space
systems. SMC is space acouisitions. It is a dynamic
oiganization employing ovei 3,500 militaiy, civilians,
and contiactois woildwide. It manages between $50 bil-
lion and $60 billion in contiacts at any one time. The
centei is also iesponsible foi on-oibit checkout, testing,
sustainment, and maintenance of militaiy satellite con-
stellations and othei Depaitment of Defense space sys-
tems.
This yeai maiks the 50th anniveisaiy of Aii Foice
Space and Missiles. SMC is moie closely tied to each of
those 50 yeais than any othei existing militaiy oiganiza-
tion. Its histoiy is tightly inteitwined with the histoiy of
militaiy space, staiting fiom a dawn that was fiaught
with tension in a time of national emeigency.
“Histoiically speaking, the maioi diffeience between
space acouisitions and aiiciaft acouisitions is that space
acouisitions staited at full thiottle once they weie com-
bined with missile piogiams,’ said Di. Haiiy Waldion,
SMC histoiian.
SMC has its ioots in the Westein Development
Division (WDD), established by the Aii Foice in July
1954 at an empty chuich in Inglewood, Calif.
The 1950s weie a globally unstable time foi the
United States, with the Soviet Union peiceived as being
ahead in the aieas of Inteicontinental Ballistic Missile
and satellite development. The WDD was a iaie acouisi-
tion oiganization that hit the giound iunning with a
Cold Wai obiective of developing an Inteicontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) befoie the Soviets.
The Aii Foice appointed Biig. Gen. Beinaid A.
Schiievei to lead the WDD, and the push was on foi him
and his small team to fully develop and deploy an ICBM.
Jacob Neufeld, in his biogiaphical aiticle on Biig.
Gen. Schiievei in the spiing 2004 issue of ß·® б©»®
Ø·-¬±®§, emphasized the seiiousness and challenges of the
times: “|The WDD] began with twelve officeis and thiee
enlisted men and eventually giew to some 1,500 peison-
nel. |Biig. Gen.] Schiievei had to cieate an oiganization
to manage extiemely vaiied and novel science and tech-
nology, build facilities foi testing and pioduction, inte-
giate the missile systems, fit togethei the nucleai weapons
they would caiiy, and piovide the launching sites, eouip-
ment, and giound suppoit necessaiy to biing the missiles
to opeiational status. Moieovei, he had to accomplish all
of this within six yeais and befoie the Soviets could
themselves build, deploy, and taiget theii missiles against
the United States! It was a deadly seiious, ieal-life contest
of ‘beat the clock.•’
William Maikisch, Executive Diiectoi of SMC, points
out an additional inheient pioblem in space acouisition
that was as tiue in Schiievei•s time as it is today. “When
you look at an aiiciaft system, the vast maioiity of the
money is spent sustaining the system ovei its life cycle.
On the space side, the vast maioiity of the money is spent
in the acouisition of the launch vehicle and the satellite.
Theie•s a veiy small poition in the sustainment of it ovei
its life cycle. And if you don•t have it iight when you leave
the pad, you•ie in a woild of huit. It•s a diffeient enviion-
ment as you appioach the acouisition of the system.’
As the WDD conducted the concuiient development
of the Atlas ICBM and the Thoi inteimediate iange bal-
listic missile, Schiievei pioved to be both a visionaiy and
outstanding leadei duiing extiemely iapid giowth in his
oiganization•s iesponsibility.
“A yeai and a half latei, in Octobei of 1955, WDD
became iesponsible foi the fiist militaiy space develop-
ment piogiam, called Weapon System 117L,’ said
Waldion. “That was the point when SMC•s piedecessoi
became iesponsible foi space as well as missiles, which
was a piofound change.’
The Soviets incieased the psychological and political
piessuie on the United States and the Aii Foice when
they launched the woild•s fiist aitificial satellite, Sputnik,
using a Soviet ICBM boostei, on Oct. 4, 1957.
Funding foi ICBM and space piogiams iapidly
incieased due to the peiceived “missile gap’ between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The WDD and its
successoi, the Aii Foice Ballistic Missile Division,
ieached histoiical milestones duiing those eaily yeais
with the Atlas ICBM becoming opeiational in 1959,
meeting the six-yeai deadline. Weapons System 117L
evolved into thiee sepaiate satellite piogiams in the aieas
of photo and electiomagnetic ieconnaissance and mis-
sile launch detection. The fiist successful U.S. militaiy
satellite piogiam, the CORONA photo ieconnaissance
piogiam, iecoveied its fiist satellite film capsule in 1960.
Ovei the next 40 yeais, the ICBM and satellite
oiganization went thiough numeious changes as the Aii
Foice woiked with the development and opeiational
stiuctuie, sepaiating ICBM and satellite piogiams into
sepaiate oiganizations and biinging them back togethei
again seveial times.
“It•s unusual foi an oiganization to be this old,’ said
Waldion. “The oiigin of SMC•s unioueness is that space
and missiles have always been veiy closely ielated.
Sometimes missiles became such an impoitant acouisi-
tion in themselves that they weie laige enough to split
off, but most of the time they weie managed togethei
because they•ie so closely ielated. That•s, I think, the
oiigin of attempts to split them apait and put them
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togethei again. They aie so similai they can•t ieally be
managed sepaiately. They use too many of the same sys-
tems. Yet sometimes they aie so laige in themselves that
it is haid to manage both of them.’
WDD staited out as an oiganization focused on
acouisition and development but tiansitioned into opeia-
tions as ICBMs and satellite systems it developed came
on-line. WDD•s successois weie woildwide oiganizations,
with field units located aiound the woild, opeiating
iemote satellite contiolling, ieseaich, and launch facilities.
At the same time, these oiganizations weie piessed
with iesponsibility foi the development and opeiation of
some of the nation•s most vital weapon systems.
Ovei the yeais, the oiganizations developed moie
advanced and economical systems. In ICBMs, the solid
fuel, state-of-the-ait Minuteman III and Peacekeepei
missiles did theii pait to help win the Cold Wai. In satel-
lites, numeious militaiy satellite piogiams became moie
integiated into wai fighting.
“As eaily as the Vietnam Wai we weie suppoiting
the waifighteis,’ Waldion said. “In Vietnam, satellites,
giound teiminals, and data weie piovided foi opeia-
tions in weathei, communications, and ieconnaissance.
The eailiei Defense Meteoiological Satellite Piogiam
giound teiminals piovided weathei data in Vietnam
that ieduced the cancellation of soities due to cloud
covei, ieduced the use of aiiciaft, and piobably saved
lives.’
“Communication satellites weie at an even eailiei
stage of development at that time. The fiist opeiational
militaiy communications satellite system, the Initial
Defense Communications Satellite Piogiam, became
opeiational giadually between 1966 and 1968. It was
used to tiansmit both voice and imageiy to suppoit mil-
itaiy opeiations in Southeast Asia.’
Opeiation Deseit Stoim in 1991 was called the fiist
“space wai’ because satellite systems became moie inte-
gial to waifighting and moie visible to the public.
“Systems like the Global Positioning System (GPS)
and the Defense Suppoit Piogiam began to be used tac-
tically in Deseit Stoim,’ accoiding to Waldion. “GPS
had not even attained initial opeiational capability by
the time Opeiation Deseit Stoim was caiiied out; but
developeis and opeiatois iepositioned the constellation
of GPS satellites that had been launched up to that time
to suppoit opeiations in Iiao and Kuwait.’
The Defense Suppoit Piogiam, in addition to its
stiategic mission of ICBM launch waining, began to be
used in a tactical iole in detecting SCUD missile launch-
es by the Iiaois, which gave Coalition foices a vitally
impoitant capability of eaily waining of theatei missile
launches. Weathei and ieconnaissance satellites played
even moie impoitant ioles than they had in Vietnam.
In 1982, a maioi oiganizational change occuiied
when Aii Foice Space Command (AFSPC) was activat-
ed. Ovei the next seveial yeais, AFSPC giadually took
ovei opeiational command and absoibed functions pie-
viously accomplished by SMC•s opeiational field units.
This cieated a 180-degiee tuinaiound in the develop-
ment and opeiations oiganizational stiuctuie fiom the
fiist days of the WDD.
“Opeiatois and acouiieis weie undei the same
oiganization in the eaily yeais, and they aie also now, of
couise. But theie is a diffeience,’ said Waldion. “In the
eaily yeais, in the late ‘50s and eaily ‘60s when space
opeiations fiist came into existence, the developeis weie
at the headouaiteis and the opeiatois weie at the suboi-
dinate units opeiating the systems that the developeis
cieated. Now we have the ieveise. The opeiatois aie at
the headouaiteis, and the developeis aie suppoiting
them by fulfilling theii ieouiiements.’
Then in 1993, with the inactivation of the Ballistic
Missile Office, SMC absoibed its mission and finally,
aftei yeais of ieoiganization, a single unit was once
again iesponsible foi both space and missile piogiam
development.
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A histoiical milestone and dynamic change occuiied in
2001 as a iesult of iecommendations to Congiess by the
Commission to Assess United States National Secuiity
Space Management and Oiganization, moie commonly
known as the “Space Commission.’ Headed by Donald H.
Rumsfeld, now Secietaiy of Defense, the commission iec-
ommended iealigning SMC fiom the Aii Foice Mateiiel
Command (AFMC) to Aii Foice Space Command, biing-
ing developeis and opeiatois undei the one oiganization,
as had been in the eaily days of the WDD.
Maikisch has been with the oiganization since 1973
and has seen many of the changes ovei the yeais. “The
suppoit we get fiom Aii Foice Space Command has been
wondeiful. We find that we•ie woiking things a lot bettei
with the ieouiiements community and budget activities.
Theie•s much moie of a team enviionment. I think it has
woiked out to the nation•s advantage.’
Anothei maioi change iecommended by the Space
Commission and adopted by the Aii Foice affecting
SMC, was to tiansfei fiom the Pentagon to the SMC
commandei the iesponsibilities of piogiam executive
officei (PEO) foi Space. Foi the pievious 10 yeais, all Aii
Foice development piogiam manageis iepoited to a
PEO at the Pentagon foi theii paiticulai maioi acouisi-
tion aiea.
Today, Lt. Gen. Biian A. Ainold, Commandei of
SMC, not only iepoits to his maioi command, AFSPC, as
PEO foi Space; he also iepoits diiectly to Petei B. Teets,
Undei Secietaiy of the Aii Foice, foi matteis involving
space acouisition piogiams.
“We have a much bettei, a moie cleai alignment now
with Aii Foice Space Command,’ Maikisch said. “In the
past, you had foui oiganizations › AFMC, AFSPC, Aii
Staff, and SMC › and theie weie a lot of times when ele-
ments weie talking to each othei and not talking to the
commandei of SMC. With Gen. Ainold iepoiting diiect-
ly to Mi. Teets, it•s a much-simplified piocess. And what
you•ie seeing happening now with the othei PEOs mov-
ing out of Washington, I think that•s an endoisement of
the woik that Geneial Lance W. Loid, Commandei of
AFSPC, and Gen. Ainold and Mi. Teets have done in
making this piocess woik.’
The high-piioiity and high-inteiest mentality of the
eaily days has not diminished in 50 yeais, with space sys-
tems being so integiated into the waifighting piocesses
in Iiao and Afghanistan. Foi example, the maioiity of
bombs diopped in Opeiation Iiaoi Fieedom weie guid-
ed by GPS to theii taigets. Waifighting commandeis
iealize the vital impoitance of space assets and ICBM
deteiience to winning futuie conflicts.
This system integiation into waifighting piocesses
could not have occuiied without a multitude of people
to make it happen, acknowledged Maikisch. It takes mil-
itaiy membeis, Depaitment of Defense civilians, con-
tiactois, and a unioue nonpiofit oiganization that does
the systems engineeiing foi space and missile piogiams
› the Aeiospace Coipoiation.
“Without the Aeiospace Coipoiation, we would not
get the iob done,’ said Maikisch. “They aie tiuly oui
Libiaiy of Congiess. They know moie about this busi-
ness than anyone else in the woild. They•ve got the tal-
ent, and because of theii fieedom fiom conflict of intei-
est wheie they don•t build any haidwaie, they get to see
what all the contiactois aie doing, and nobody else in the
woild has that kind of peispective.’
SMC is the piemiei acouisition and development
oiganization today and the laigest space activity in one
geogiaphic location in the woild. The futuie of SMC
piomises steady giowth and matuiation as the nation
looks to build follow-on systems foi cuiient navigation,
communication, and missile-waining piogiams; to
develop a follow-on foi the Minuteman III ICBM to
meet futuie asymmetiical thieats; and to counteiact the
vulneiability of space systems by developing piogiams in
space contiol and space supeiioiity.
The changes to the oiganization ovei the past 50
yeais have biought the oiganization full ciicle in many
ways. The changes iecognized the ties that bind satellites
and missiles and they impioved SMC at the same time ›
which is why the biass makes all those changes in the fiist
place.
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iom his peispective as
Commandei, Aii Foice
Space Command, Geneial
Lance W. Loid looks at the
cuiient state of today•s Aii
Foice space foices with a mixtuie of
iespect and admiiation foi those who
have gone befoie and piide in the indi-
viduals who aie continuing the Aii
Foice•s space tiadition.
“As we look at Aii Foice involvement in the space and
ICBM business fiom the half-centuiy maik, we have to
look back at what Gen. Schiievei staited at the Westein
Development Division, in Inglewood, in August of
1954,’ he said. “I•ve talked to Gen. Schiievei in the yeais
past and, as a mattei of fact, spent a couple of houis with
him in the last six months. He•s still a vibiant foice in this
business.’
“I think we•ve achieved the goals and obiectives that
he initially set out,’ Geneial Loid continued. “In biing-
ing oui space and the missile foice to the status it is
today, we•ve biought unioue capabilities to enable the
foices on the giound to achieve victoiy. As I say, ‘If you•ie
not in space, you•ie not in the iace.• And what we•ve
pioven is that you can•t go to wai and win without space.
So, in the militaiy sense, space is an essential pait of what
we•ie doing eveiy day. In addition, in a bioadei national
sense, space is becoming an ‘economic centei of giavity•
foi eveiything we do. We have an asymmetiic advantage
because of oui space-based capabilities,’ he said.
As an essential element of daily militaiy opeiations,
Geneial Loid obseived that Aii Foice space assets aie
tiue enableis of othei seivice and DoD “tiansfoimation’
activities.
“Foi a long time, we•ve been talking about space as
an enablei foi othei foices,’ he said. “You know, a day
without space is ieally haid foi the Aimy; it•s haid foi the
Navy and Maiine Coips; and it•s haid foi the Aii Foice.
“I think that space powei ieally is tiansfoiming how
we all do business,’ he continued, “because space pio-
vides the capability to do the things with position navi-
gation and timing, with intelligence, with suiveillance
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and ieconnaissance, with space weathei, with communi-
cations. It piovides the capability to shoiten the distance
between wheie we aie and wheie we need to be. And it
allows us to ieally be able to look ovei the next hill and
woik togethei in an integiated fashion with oui ioint
paitneis.’
In teims of ioint opeiations, he added, “Space is
inheiently ioint to begin with. It•s ieally helped us shape
the battlespace. It•s helped us with piecision engagement
› to put less people at iisk, to cieate a situation wheie we
achieve oui obiective at less iisk to oui people, less col-
lateial damage, and even fewei enemy lost. We•ve been
able to substitute piecision foi massive foices. Space has
ieally tiansfoimed the way we do business.
“But with eveiy stiength you have, you need to make
suie you•ie not cieating a vulneiability,’ he cautioned.
“So we need to be smait about this tiansfoimation and
make suie that we piotect ouiselves › to avoid making
this a vulneiability. By that I mean that we ieally have to
think seiiously about ‘Space Supeiioiity.• We can•t
assume that space is going to be a benign enviionment.
We have to assume that we•ie going to have a competi-
tion in that enviionment. In fact, we have alieady seen a
little bit of that duiing Opeiation Iiaoi Fieedom when
Saddam tiied to iam oui GPS systems. That competition
in space is going to continue so we have to make suie that
oui foices aie stiong. Stiong space foices aie a deteiient,
and we have to make suie that we set ouiselves up to pio-
tect the assymetiic advantage that we have.’
“That•s why I•m slowly shifting oui geais fiom the
foice-enabling business to one wheie we actually think
about defending oui assets: doing the defensive kinds of
things and the situational awaieness things we need to
do in space to make that shift. So in that sense, we•ie
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staiting to look at oui command as a ‘space combat• kind
of command, if you will,’ he said.
In addition to the shift in mindset fiom foice
enabling to space supeiioiity, anothei example of ongo-
ing tiansfoimation activities can be found in the unfold-
ing “Space Piofessional’ piogiam. Accoiding to Geneial
Loid, the piogiam evolved out of the Rumsfeld
Commission that addiessed the management and lead-
eiship of space. “One of the obseivations that the
Rumsfeld Commission made was that the nation was not
yet at the point wheie it had cieated the space piofes-
sionals that it needed to ieally piospei and continue to
maintain oui advantage in space,’ Geneial Loid said.
“The woiding was along the lines of, unless we got ieally
seiious about doing space piofessional education and
development, we could end up with a Peail Haiboi kind
of event in space.
“So we had a pietty high level emphasis on making
suie that the Space Piofessional Development Piogiam
was cieated,’ he continued. “And I think we•ve made
tiemendous stiides since that document was published.
Obviously, we had alieady had people woiking haid in
the space business, but what this has done is to help us
focus oui effoits on the identification, tiaining, and edu-
cation of the cadie. It•s challenging, but it ceitainly has a
high payoff.’
Space Piofessionals iepiesent a subset of the bioad-
ly-defined space caieei field that encompasses a iange
of skills in communications, intelligence, maintenance,
logistics, weathei, and othei aienas. “As a subset of that
oveiall gioup, the Space Piofessionals consist of the
scientists, engineeis, piogiam manageis, and opeiatois
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who aie piincipally iesponsible foi taking oui militaiy
space piogiams fiom idea thiough development, thiough
opeiation and sustainment of those systems,’ he said.
Geneial Loid outlined a five-step piogiam that pio-
vides the foundation foi Space Piofessionals. “Fiist, we
identify, by name, each and eveiy membei of that
cadie,’ he said. “It took us about six months to go
thiough eveiybody•s iecoids and foldeis, but now we•ve
got the individuals identified. Second, we constiucted
an educational continuum that had a vaiiety of couises
to bettei piepaie these individuals. Thiid, we cieated a
level of ceitification; what we call ‘Space 100, 200, and
300,• and we•ll have a coiiesponding ‘Space Level I, II,
and III,• so that we have a way to identify the kinds of
education packages that we need. That ceitification also
piovides a feedback mechanism foi people to know kind
of wheie they aie on tiack in education, tiaining, and
expeiiences. Fouith, we•ie cuiiently taking a look at
eveiy billet that we have in the space business to make
suie that we•ve got it codified foi the iight kind of peo-
ple with the iight kind of expeiience and the iight kind
of education › so that we make suie we have the iight
ceitified people woiking in those iobs. Then, when those
foui steps aie complete, oui fifth step will be to make
suie that we delibeiately build space piofessionals. I am
the space caieei field managei, and we will synchionize
the building of space piofessionals with all of the foice
development that•s going on in the iest of the Aii Foice.’
When asked to comment on what he peiceives to be
the gieatest Aii Foice space successes ovei the last half-
centuiy, Geneial Loid pointed to the 1954 cieation of
the Inteicontinental Ballistic Missile foice. “We can
nevei foiget that this is what Gen. Schiievei laid the
foundation foi us to do,’ he said. “Then, two yeais aftei
that, he was given the iob of cieating the fiist satellite
piogiam. But the things he staited in 1954 with the
Inteicontinental Ballistic Missile foice have been cai-
iied on thiough today by this command and the piofes-
sionals that we have heie.’
He added, “We•ve got about 10,000 folks at Aii
Foice Space Command who ‘live noith of Inteistate 80•
and woik in the foundation of oui business, the ICBM
nucleai deteiient mission. They woik in an ICBM foice
that has been modeinized ovei the yeais. These people
aie pioud membeis of the Space Piofessionals Team,
and they•ie woiking haid to keep that mission going.
It•s tiuly amazing to me to look back to the ‘50s and
eaily ‘60s and iealize that we•ie still using some of Gen.
Schiievei•s technology › albeit iapidly impioved in
some gieat ways › to undeipin the fundamental nation-
al secuiity stiategy of the United States. As Geneial
John P. Jumpei, Aii Foice Chief of Staff, says, the ICBM
business is oui ‘Top Covei• foi eveiything that we do.
And that kind of fundamental deteiient woik and
opeiational capabilities aie ieflected into oui othei
space folks as well. Aftei all, we have a gieat blend of
space talents in this command.’
In teims of moie iecent success stoiies, Geneial Loid
obseived, “Immediately following Opeiation Deseit
Stoim we saw what we could do with the integiation of
space capabilities into teiiestiial opeiations. The concept
of piecision stiike was iust being invented. And that con-
cept and ability has evolved ovei the last 10 yeais. As
demonstiated duiing Opeiation Enduiing Fieedom and
Opeiation Iiaoi Fieedom, ... you can•t go to wai and win
without space.’
Looking towaid the futuie, Geneial Loid sees chal-
lenges in teims of peisonnel and oiganizational think-
ing. “Fiist, fiom a peisonnel standpoint, I think we•ve got
to make suie that we maintain, educate, and continue to
tiack the gieat young people that make the system woik,’
he said. “I sat down iecently with Mi. Sean O•Keefe, the
NASA administiatoi, and we talked about ieciuiting
smait, young engineeis and scientists fiom the public
sectoi. I think we•ie going to face a nationwide challenge
heie to make suie we can ie-instill inteiest in math and
science and the kinds of things that we need to help us
maintain oui edge in technology, engineeiing, and edu-
cation. Those aie the fundamental diiveis foi what we•ie
going to be doing. So we need to continue to tiack and
ietain the gieat piofessionals in the business.
“Fiom an oiganizational standpoint, I think oui
gieatest challenge is in making suie that oui nation
undeistands how impoitant it is to maintain oui supeii-
oiity in space. It•s no diffeient than aii supeiioiity oi
land supeiioiity oi sea supeiioiity. ‘Space supeiioiity•
has to ioll off oui tongues as easily as any of those othei
teims. We•ve gone fiom a nation that•s inteiested in space
to a nation that•s got national inteiests in space. And
we•ve got to piotect those inteiests. So we•ll continue to
do what we do to make suie that we•ie fully integiated
with the aii, land, and sea opeiations.’
He ieiteiated, “Space is inheiently ioint, and we•ie
involved in all seivice activities: Aimy, Navy, Aii Foice,
Maiines, and Coast Guaid. Eveiybody uses position nav-
igation and timing and oui othei pioducts fiom space.
And I think what it•s enabled us to do is help us ensuie
piecision and accuiacy, allowing the substitution of pie-
cision foi mass. I think that•s one of the single gieatest
advantages of oui foice. As Geneial Jumpei talks about
it, we•ie able to find, fix, taiget, tiack, engage, and assess
fastei. We•ve been able to minimize the time in that chain
of events so that we can do what we need to do; getting
in and getting out and achieving oui obiectives while
putting less people at iisk.’
Geneial Loid concluded, “We want to make suie that
we maintain space supeiioiity and undeistand that in all of
oui planning and in all of the things that we do, space can•t
be an afteithought. It can•t be ‘¿²¼ space.• It•s got to be
‘space• fiom the beginning. So we•ie woiking haid on what
we call oui Space Supeiioiity campaign planning, getting
involved with all oui colleagues in the othei seivices to
make suie they undeistand the challenges. We•ie all woik-
ing togethei to continue to piotect oui advantage in space.’
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ß
s pait of his oveiview of Aii Foice Space
Command, Geneial Lance W. Loid identi-
fied a numbei of evolving piogiams and
emeiging technologies that will help to
maintain Ameiica•s asymmetiic advantage in space.
ÍÐßÝÛ ÐÎÑÚÛÍÍ× ÑÒßÔÍ
One undeilying key to the successful application of
all othei technologies and piogiams noted by Geneial
Loid is the identification, development, and mainte-
nance of a team of tiained space piofessionals. In addi-
tion to theii vital iole within Aii Foice space piogiams,
those Aii Foice space piofessionals fall within a laigei
DoD iecognition that the most ciucial element of space
powei is found in a nation•s space piofessionals.
Foi example, in his own July 22, 2004, testimony
befoie the House Aimed Seivices Committee, the
Honoiable Petei B. Teets obseived, “In my iole of ovei-
seeing National Secuiity Space activities as Undei
Secietaiy of the Aii Foice, Diiectoi of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the DoD Executive
Agent foi Space, I am committed to pieseiving oui
advantage as the woild•s leading ‘spacefaiing• nation. I
am pleased that this committee shaies that commitment,
and that we all iecognize the need to develop well-edu-
cated, motivated, and competent people who aie skilled
in the demands of the space medium.’
Speaking befoie the same Congiessional committee,
Geneial Loid echoed the sentiments expiessed by Teets,
obseiving, “As you know, the Secietaiy of the Aii Foice
along with oui Chief of Staff of the Aii Foice, Geneial
John P. Jumpei and oui Undei Secietaiy, Mi. Petei Teets,
have made developing and maintaining oui space pio-
fessionals a top piioiity foi oui nation. Oui people
iemain oui most impoitant and piecious iesouice.
Peisonnel knowledgeable on the medium of space and
highly skilled in theii iespective fields of opeiations,
developmental engineeiing, acouisition, and ieseaich aie
indispensable to oui success today.’
Geneial Loid went on to outline the multi-step
piocess of developing the Space Piofessional Team, adding
that as of late July, the maioiity of the ieouisite Space
Education Couises had been consolidated into the Space
Opeiations School in Coloiado Spiings, Colo., now
known as the National Space Secuiity Institute. “Oui
vision is to evolve the National Space Secuiity Institute
into the centei of excellence foi space piofessional devel-
opment acioss all oiganizations, with the help of oui pait-
neis in the Depaitment of Defense and the Intelligence
Community,’ he said.
In a moie iecent inteiview, Geneial Loid ievealed that
consideiable additional piogiess has been made in Space
Piofessional tiaining. “We•ve got oui National Space
Secuiity Institute heie in Coloiado, which will be the
umbiella oiganization that will look at all Space
Piofessional education. We•ve made entiees and estab-
lished agieements with univeisities heie in Coloiado, as
well as distance ielationships with othei univeisities, to
cieate a system wheie people come into the business and
all the militaiy tiaining they•ve ieceived tiansfeis to col-
lege ciedits. Those ciedits will follow them and be aiticu-
lated acioss a bioad set of schools and univeisities intei-
ested in space education. We•ie ieally developing a centei
of giavity to piepaie the foice to do iust exactly what the
space commission wanted us to do.’
Geneial Loid and othei Aii Foice iepiesentatives aie
also ouick to highlight the contiibutions of the suppoiting
contiactoi peisonnel. “We talk about ‘Mission Fiist/People
Always,• and oui space piofessionals aie a wondeiful gioup
of folks,’ Geneial Loid added. “We cannot accomplish oui
mission in Aii Foice Space Command without the dedica-
tion of a gieat team. We•ve got about 40,000 people in oui
command, and a key pait of oui command is the contiac-
toi foice. We•ve got ciedentialed space waiiiois, and a lot
of those folks aie suppoited by pait of oui contiactoi
team. Sometimes we think that ‘blue suits• aie the answei
to eveiything, but in many cases we•ve got a foice that•s
made up of some wondeiful civilians as well as some won-
deiful contiactois who aie eveiy bit as dedicated.’
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ÚËÌËÎÛ
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ÌØÛ
ßÍÍËÎÛÜ ßÝÝÛÍÍ
ÍÐßÝÛ ÍËÐÛÎ× ÑÎ×ÌÇ
Two othei concepts that seem to go
hand in hand aie Assuied Access and Space
Supeiioiity. “Mi. Petei Teets, the Undei
Secietaiy of the Aii Foice, pushes haid on
mission assuiance,’ Geneial Loid
obseived. “That•s something we take veiy
seiiously, and we woik that haid.
Obviously, challenges foi the futuie
include assuied access to space › making
suie that we•ve got what we need to put
oui assets in space and piotect them once
they aie theie.’
Assuied access to space lays the
gioundwoik foi seveial themes emeiging
fiom Aii Foice Space Command. The
themes aie somewhat seouential in natuie,
beginning with the need to enhance space
situational awaieness to piovide planneis
with a bettei undeistanding of “what•s out
theie.’
In tuin, that undeistanding will estab-
lish the gioundwoik foi a iange of defen-
sive counteispace capabilities. These capa-
bilities will help defend U.S. systems in
space as well as the links and nodes that
delivei that space pioduct to useis on
Eaith. An example can be found in the con-
stellation of Global Positioning System
(GPS) satellites. In FY05, the Aii Foice will
begin launching a new geneiation of “mod-
einized’ GPS satellites, featuiing militaiy-
code and flexible powei capabilities. Even
gieatei defensive capabilities will be incoi-
poiated in the “geneiation aftei next,’
known as GPS III satellites, which will
iepoitedly include all of the legacy capabil-
ities, plus the addition of high-poweied,
anti-iam militaiy code, along with othei
accuiacy, ieliability, and data integiity impiovements.
When defense isn•t enough, the seouential themes
move to offensive actions, the ability to ieveise the
effects oi capabilities of those who might tiy to use
space against the United States.
Finally, an emphasis on emeiging command and
contiol piogiams will ensuie a seamless stiuctuie of
nodes, links, and systems. An example of this emphasis
on command and contiol can be seen in the Advanced
Extiemely High Fieouency (AEHF) system that will
ieplace the MILSTAR communications constellation.
The fiist AEHF satellite is slated foi launch in FY07 and
will piovide suivivable, piotected satellite communica-
tions foi stiategic and tactical useis. AEHF iepiesents a
significant step foiwaid in capability ovei cuiient sys-
tems, pioviding up to 12 times gieatei capacity than
MILSTAR with up to 4,000 simultaneous netwoiks while
hosting up to 6,000 useis pei satellite.
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ÔßËÒÝØ ÊÛØ× ÝÔÛ
One of the piogiams that will suppoit Ameiica•s
assuied access to space is an Aii Foice space lift modein-
ization piogiam called the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV). Designed to ieduce the cost of launching
by at least 25 peicent ovei cuiient Delta, Atlas, and Titan
launch systems, EELV featuies a paitneiing with indus-
tiy to develop a national launch capability that satisfies
both goveinment and commeicial payload.
The two piimaiy launch contiactois aie Lockheed
Maitin and Boeing, with theii iespective vaiiants being
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the Atlas V and the Delta IV. Atlas V achieved initial
launch capability in August 2002, with the Delta IV
achieving the same milestone in Novembei 2002.
“And we•ie woiking on additional bieakthioughs
and concepts to modeinize oui capabilities,’ Geneial
Loid added. “One of those concepts that we•ie ieally
excited about is called Joint Waifighting Space, wheie
we•ll be able to launch ouickly with a payload that will
be available foi a theatei commandei to use to suppoit
a paiticulai contingency oi opeiation. And we•ll be able
to do it in houis as opposed to the weeks oi months
that a noimal payload might take.
Geneial Loid•s comments echoed a Febiuaiy 2004
House Aimed Seivices Committee appeaiance by Undei
Secietaiy Teets. “We aie pioud of the success of both
families of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles
(EELVs),’ Teets said. “With six successful launches in a
iow, thiee fiom each piovidei, these aie the best launch
vehicles we•ve evei pioduced. Howevei, we aie not fin-
ished yet. Long-teim, we aie puisuing vehicle concepts
that can be launched on demand › in houis and days,
iathei than weeks and months › with the vision of ful-
filling time-ciitical waifightei ieouiiements. I•ve been in
the launch business foi 45 yeais, and we still launch satel-
lites about the same way we did in the ‘60s. We can do
bettei. The intent of Opeiationally Responsive Space
(ORS) is to cieate a moie iesponsive, ieliable, and affoid-
able lift family capable of fulfilling both cuiient and
futuie launch ieouiiements, and the coiiesponding
iesponsive and affoidable satellites. Neai teim, we plan
to demonstiate a moie iesponsive and less expensive
launch system with capabilities of 1,000 pounds to low
Eaith oibit. Concuiiently, Aii Foice Space Command,
AFRL, the NRO, DARPA, OSD's Office of Foice
Tiansfoimation, and oui national and Seivice laboiato-
iies aie sponsoiing Tactical Satellite (TacSat) initiatives
focused on iesponsive satellites and decieasing the size,
cost, and timelines of development. The combined
effoits of these initiatives › opeiationally iesponsive
launch and satellite development › will tiansfoim the
deliveiy of space-based capabilities. Similaily, oui launch
ianges must keep pace with modeinized launch vehicles
and futuie launch manifests.’
An example of one of those initiatives can be found
in the “Falcon’ Small Launch Vehicle (SLV). The goal of
the piogiam is to develop and demonstiate an affoidable
and iesponsive space lift capability. In mid-Septembei
2004, the Defense Advanced Reseaich Pioiects Agency
(DARPA) and the U.S. Aii Foice awaided funding to foui
teams foi the second phase of the Falcon SLV effoit. The
teams included: Aiilaunch LLC; Lockheed Maitin Coip.,
Space Systems Co.; Miciocosm Inc.; and Space
Exploiation Technologies Inc.
Undei the 2004 awaid agieements, each team will
conduct a 10-month phase IIA pieliminaiy design and
development effoit to matuie theii launch vehicle
designs. In addition, one of the companies, Space
Exploiation Technologies, will conduct an eaily, iespon-
sive launch demonstiation. In 2005, DARPA and the Aii
Foice will select one oi moie of the phase IIA teams to
conduct detailed design and fabiication of theii launch
vehicle. That phase IIB effoit will culminate in 2007 with
flight tests to launch a small satellite to validate vehicle
peifoimance.
In addition to DARPA and the Aii Foice, NASA has
also expiessed inteiest in the Small Launch Vehicle capa-
bility and is a foimal paitnei in the Falcon Small Launch
Vehicle development piogiam.
Along with new vehicle systems, Aii Foice planneis
aie also looking at the modeinization of existing plat-
foims. “We•ll also continue to modeinize the ICBM
foice,’ obseived Geneial Loid. “And we•ll look at the
speed, iange, lethality, and accuiacy capabilities of an
inteicontinental ballistic missile and iesulting potentials
foi offeiing non-nucleai options foi the futuie. Using
conventional waiheads, those modified systems could
give oui commandei-in-chief additional options should
we be involved in an anti-access situation in the futuie.’
Much of the Aii Foice examination of these capabil-
ities has been conducted undei a concept called the
next-geneiation Land Based Stiategic Deteiient (LBSD).
Outlining the LBSD concept in a ieouest foi infoimation
(RFI) ieleased in the fall of 2003, the goveinment noted
that, “Aii Foice Space Command (AFSPC) is investigat-
ing potential concepts to suppoit the LBSD Analysis of
Alteinatives (AoA) Study foi the next geneiation detei-
ient system. This RFI initiates a concept call foi tiansfoi-
mational deliveiy vehicles meeting the Land Based
Stiategic Nucleai Deteiient Mission Need Statement
(MNS) and LBSD Concept of Opeiations (CONOPS). In
addition, the AoA will study each concept•s potential as a
multiple-use platfoim; that is, how it might satisfy, oi
paitially satisfy, othei AFSPC mission needs such as
Piompt Global Stiike and Opeiationally Responsive
Spacelift. Concepts should addiess enhanced peifoim-
ance, decieased manpowei and ieduced maintenance
and opeiations footpiint. Commensuiate with this con-
cept call, this RFI ieouests an assessment of the feasibili-
ty, technical matuiity and giowth potential of the
enabling technologies foi each concept. This is one of
multiple RFIs that will addiess the entiie next-geneia-
tion deteiient system. The Aii Foice anticipates a futuie
competitive evolutionaiy acouisition piogiam staiting
in 2005 oi 2006 to begin ieplacing the existing system in
2018. This RFI includes the following sub-system aieas:
piopulsion, guidance, ie-entiy systems and ie-entiy
vehicles. The next-geneiation deteiient system may be
based in existing Minuteman III (MM III) silos, with sig-
nificantly updated suppoiting infiastiuctuie, wheie nec-
essaiy. The system may also use innovative deployment
and basing stiategies in addition to oi in place of exist-
ing MM III silos, including but not limited to: mobile
basing, fixed basing with mobile elements, new silo
schema, etc.’
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command pilot with moie than 3,100
houis in both fightei-bombeis and
heavy bombeis, Lt. Gen. Biian A.
Ainold is no stiangei to the navigation
and communications needs of today•s
waifightei. Add to that pievious postings as Diiectoi of
Reouiiements foi Aii Foice Space Command (AFSPC),
Diiectoi of Space and Nucleai Deteiience in the Office
of the Secietaiy of the Aii Foice foi Acouisition, and
commandei of the Aii Foice Mateiiel Command•s
(AFMC) Space and Missile Systems Centei (SMC), and
he came well-eouipped to his cuiient post as command-
ei of AFSPC•s Space and Missile Systems Centei.
SMC began life in 1954 as the Westein Development
Division foi the newly cieated U.S. Aii Foice. Today, it ›
and its commandei › aie iesponsible foi managing moie
than 6,500 SMC employees and a budget exceeding $10
billion each yeai on ieseaich and development, acouisi-
tion and sustainment of space launch and command and
contiol foi both missile and satellite systems, and
Inteicontinental Ballistic Missiles.
In addition, as Piogiam Executive Officei (PEO) foi
Aii Foice space, Ainold has oveisight iesponsibility foi
many of the nation•s most impoitant militaiy space effoits,
including the Aii Foice Satellite Contiol Netwoik, space lift
ianges, launch piogiams, the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle Piogiam, the Space-Based Infiaied System, mili-
taiy satellite communication piogiams, NAVSTAR Global
Positioning System piogiams, inteicontinental ballistic
missile piogiams, and the Defense Meteoiological Satellite
Piogiam, as well as emeiging tiansfoimational space pio-
giams such as space-based iadai, and a poitfolio of space
supeiioiity system piogiams.
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Ô¬ò Ù»²ò Þ®·¿² ßò ß®²±´¼æ Oui iole is the acouisition
centei of excellence foi Aii Foice Space Command. We•ie
also the centei foi space innovation, foi new technioues,
new technologies, and new ways to use space systems.
The most significant change occuiied in 2001 › when
we moved fiom AFMC to AFSPC. This was an oiganiza-
tional change iecommended by the Space Commission.
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In each of oui m·ss·on aieas, we•ie modein·z·ng and
upgiad·ng oui systems, as well as tiansfoim·ng and sus-
ta·n·ngò In the aiea of commun·cat·ons, we aie bi·ng·ng
on a new set of satell·tes, such as the W·deband Gapf·llei
Satell·te (WGS), wh·ch w·ll see the f·ist satell·te launch ·n
Decembei 05ò Shoitly aftei that, ·n the 2008 t·mefiame,
we w·ll launch oui f·ist Advanced EHF Satell·teò And we
aie ·n the eaily stages of development on oui
Tiansfoimat·onal Satell·te Commun·cat·ons System,
known as TSATò So, ·n all aieas of commun·cat·ons, we
aie ·ncieas·ng bandw·dth and capab·l·t·es, along w·th
piotected commun·cat·ons foi oui waif·ghteisò
In the wain·ng aiea, we have one moie Defense
Suppoit Piogiam (DSP) satell·te to launch, wh·ch ·s oui
non-·mag·ng IR |·nfiaied] system at geo |geostat·onaiy
oib·t]ò We w·ll be ieplac·ng those w·th the newei Space-
Based Infiaied System |SBIRS] sensois, both ·n the h·gh-
ly ell·pt·cal and geo oib·tsò We also aie cont·nu·ng to
develop the Space Tiack·ng and Suive·llance System,
wh·ch ·s ieally a M·ss·le Defense Agency system, but we
manage ·t heie at the pioduct centeiò It•s bas·cally a
SBIRS low systemò We•ie ·ncoipoiat·ng all of these ·nto
oui wain·ng constellat·onò
In the aiea of weathei, we w·ll cont·nue to suppoit
the Defense Meteoiolog·cal Satell·te Piogiam |DMSP]
w·th foui moie DMSP satell·tes, wh·le mov·ng on to the
new Nat·onal Polai Oib·t·ng Env·ionmental Satell·te
Systemò Those aie gieat oppoitun·t·es to ·nciease oui
capab·l·t·es ·n the weathei aienaò
In nav·gat·on, we have 30 opeiat·onal satell·tes on
oib·t today, piobably the most iobust nav·gat·on constel-
lat·on we•ve evei hadò We w·ll cont·nue to modein·ze
that w·th appiox·mately e·ght of the GPS IIR-M satel-
l·tesò We w·ll cont·nue to develop the GPS IIF and then
the GPS IIIò In all cases, we w·ll ·nciease the capab·l·ty,
accuiacy, as well as piotect·on, of the s·gnalò
On the GPS handheld teim·nal s·de, we•ve also devel-
oped an enhanced suiv·val iad·o system called the
Combat Suiv·voi Evadei Locatoi (CSEL)ò CSEL ·s need-
ed to enhance oui Combat Seaich and Rescue iesponse
capab·l·t·es to ou·ckly locate, ·dent·fy, and commun·cate
w·th ·solated peisonnel, ·ndependent of the·i locat·on oi
c·icumstancesò F·eld·ng staited th·s yeai w·th the UòSò
Navy, and the UòSò Aimy w·ll deploy to Opeiat·on Iiao·
Fieedom w·th CSEL eaily next yeaiò Ovei 3,000 iad·os
have alieady been del·veied to the seiv·cesò Full-iate pio-
duct·on awaid ·s planned 2nd ouaitei FY05ò
In ICBMs, we aie cont·nu·ng to modein·ze piopul-
s·on and gu·dance ieplacement piogiams and look·ng
out to the end of the next decade ieplacement of th·s
ICBM w·th some newei system that may even have a
convent·onal capab·l·tyò
We•ie ·nteiested ·n space s·tuat·onal awaieness foi
suive·llance, undeistand·ng what•s out theie and what
othei satell·tes aie up toò To do that, we aie upgiad·ng
oui giound contiol systems as well as develop·ng a new
space-based space suive·llance system, the SBSS, and w·ll
have a pathf·ndei of that system fly·ng ·n the next two to
thiee yeaisò
In offens·ve and defens·ve counteispace, most of oui
space systems aie veiy fiag·leò We have been d·iected by
the Space Comm·ss·on to pievent any k·nd of Peail
Haiboi ·n space, and we aie tak·ng act·on to do thatò
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We•ie upgiad·ng oui launch ianges by automat·ng
many of oui systems, enabl·ng the iange to tuin aiound
much moie ou·ckly than ·n the past, and go·ng to GPS
meti·cs tiack·ng, wh·ch w·ll allow us to take down some
of oui oldei iadais and save moneyò
We•ie also focused on some ·nnovat·ve aieas ·n
iespons·ve space, such as a iespons·ve boostei and a
smallei iespons·ve satell·teò We•ie look·ng at develop·ng
a small iespons·ve boostei ·n the $5 to $10 m·ll·on ne·gh-
boihood that could be iespons·ve w·th·n a day oi two of
call upò R·d·ng on top of that › a small iespons·ve satel-
l·teò Those boosteis w·ll allow us to put a satell·te on
oib·t ·n suppoit of a theatei waif·ghtei, to f·ll a gap they
may have ·n some aiea, such as ISR oi commun·cat·onsò
ɸ¿¬ ½¸¿´´»²¹»- ¿®» §±« º¿½·²¹ ·² ¬»®³- ±º ³¿²¿¹ó
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¬¸» ®»¯«·®»³»²¬- °®±½»--á
In teims of ieou·iements, we have suffeied thiough a
pei·od wheie we d·d not lock down the piogiam ieou·ie-
mentsò Th·s made ·t veiy challeng·ng to manage a “float-
·ng basel·neò’ We have now moved to a d·sc·pl·ned
“uigent and compell·ng need’ ieou·iement piocess
wheie AFSPC HO contiols new ieou·iements, and we do
not accept new ieou·iements w·thout piopei fund·ngò
ɸ¿¬ô ·º ¿²§ô -·¹²·º·½¿²¬ ½¸¿²¹»- ¼·¼ Í»°¬»³¾»® ïï
¾®·²¹ ¿¾±«¬ º±® ÍÓÝá Ú±® »¨¿³°´»ô ¸¿- ¬¸»®» ¾»»² ¿²
¿½½»´»®¿¬»¼ ¿½¯«·-·¬·±² -¬®¿¬»¹§ ¬± ¾®·²¹ ²»© ¬»½¸²±´±ó
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±°³»²¬ ¿²¼ ®¿°·¼ º·»´¼·²¹á
I•m not suie theie have been any acceleiated stiate-
g·esò But theie has been a fundamental change ·n oui
th·nk·ng about the absolute necess·ty of the space system
and ·ts conti·but·ons, both dui·ng waif·ght·ng and oui
global wai on teiioi·smò
The piessuie that puts on the nat·onal secui·ty space
acou·s·t·on piocess ·n teims of m·ss·on assuiance and
piogiam execut·on has nevei been h·gheiò
It also has ·ncieased the ci·t·cal·ty of oui m·ss·on and
led to the |A·i Foice] Ch·ef of Staff •s iecent push foi
space to be moie tact·cally oi·ented, what he calls the
“Jo·nt Waif·ght Space (JWS)ò’ We•ie woik·ng both w·th
oui tiansfoimat·on and development d·iectois and w·th
the othei labs out theie, such as AFRL |A·i Foice
Reseaich Laboiatoiy] and DARPA |Defense Advanced
Reseaich Pio¶ects Agency], to exploie a whole iange of
both launch and space veh·cle capab·l·t·es, to be cheapei
and moie iespons·ve to the tact·cal waif·ghtei than the
laige systems we have todayò
Now that we have the PEO and the commandei of
SMC undei one hat, we have d·iect ielat·onsh·ps w·th
AFRL ·n what we call PEO-TEO |techn·cal execut·ve
off·cei] iev·ews, wheie we cont·nue to ensuie v·tal l·nk-
age between the technolog·es we aie develop·ng ·n the
labs and the end usei, the waif·ghtei ·n the f·eldò Th·s
piocess enables us to iap·dly tians·t·on new technology
·nto the hands of the waif·ghtei by ensui·ng that no
technology ·s developed w·thout an endgame ·n m·ndò
We aie the ·nteiface foi thatò We developed a sc·ence and
technology ioadmap, foi example, to help push those
lead·ng-edge technolog·es ·nto the hands of the
waif·ghtei much ou·ckeiò
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²»--á
Piobably the most challeng·ng th·ng we face ·n space
·s the fiont-end development of a satell·teò Th·s piocess
must be veiy i·goious and d·sc·pl·ned, because space ·s
not a veiy foig·v·ng placeò It ·s veiy challeng·ng to bu·ld
a satell·teò F·ist you must put a lot of test·ng at the box
and total system level up fiont, then ·t must go thiough
th·s hoiiendous launch env·ionment, w·th a lot of thei-
mal and acoust·c v·biat·on, and f·nally the satell·te ·s
expected to woik on oib·tò So you have to put the satel-
l·te thiough that k·nd of i·goious test env·ionment on
the giound f·ist to make suie ·t w·ll woik on oib·tò All
th·s piesents a heck of a challengeò And f·nally the satel-
l·te ·s expected to last foi many yeais, even though the
env·ionment of space ·s veiy haish and unfoig·v·ngò It•s
a b·naiy bus·ness › e·thei ·t woiks oi ·t doesn•tò And you
don•t have the opt·on of go·ng up theie to f·x ·tò
Unl·ke the a·iplane bus·ness, wh·ch I•ve been ·n foi
most of my caieei, you also don•t have the advantages
you do ·n test·ng a·iplanes, wheie you can do slow-speed
tax·s, h·gh-speed tax·s, you can take off and leave youi
geai down ·f you have a bad dayò In oui bus·ness, once
you l·ght the f·ie on that iocket, ·t e·thei goes oi ·t does-
n•tò Wh·ch ·s why ioughly 70 peicent of oui ·nvestment
·s ·n development and the iema·n·ng 30 peicent on opei-
at·on and ma·ntenance, wh·ch ·s ¶ust the oppos·te of the
a·iplane bus·nessò
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ß®» ¬¸»®» ¿²§ °®±¹®¿³- ½±³·²¹ ¿´±²¹ › ±® ¼± §±« -»» ¿
²»»¼ º±® ¿²§ -°»½·º·½ »ºº±®¬- › ·² ¬¸» ¿®»¿ ±º ±²ó±®¾·¬
-»´ºó¼»º»²-»á
Theie aie many aieas you have to woiiy about ·n
defens·ve counteispaceò F·ist of all, the giound contiol
stat·ons themselves, pait·culaily the ones oveiseas, wh·ch
we need to piotect thiough noimal secui·ty piocessesò
Then you have the upl·nk s·gnal, the downl·nk s·gnal
and, lastly, the satell·te on oib·tò The eas·est way to attack
a satell·te ·s the s·gnal ·tself, w·th some k·nd of ·nteifei-
enceò So, we aie look·ng at vai·ous ways to piotect the
system, such as detect·ng whethei oi not the satell·te ·s
undei attackò We aie develop·ng a new system called
Rap·d Attack Ident·f·cat·on, Detect·on and Repoit·ng
System (RAIDRS), wh·ch we aie look·ng at to see what ·s
actually happen·ng to a satell·te ·f we see an anomalyò We
don•t have such a system today, so ·f we have a malfunc-
t·on of a satell·te on oib·t, we ieally don•t know whethei
someone ·s t·nkei·ng w·th ·t oi ·t ·s suffei·ng thiough an
onboaid abnoimal·tyò
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In the aiea of offens·ve systems, we aie look·ng at
countei-commun·cat·ons systems and ways to use
ieveis·ble effects aga·nst othei satell·tesò
ß- ¬¸» ¿½¯«·-·¬·±²- ¿¹»²¬ º±® ³·´·¬¿®§ -°¿½»ô ©¸¿¬ ®±´»
¼±»- ÍÓÝ °´¿§ ·² ¼»¿´·²¹ ©·¬¸ ¼·³·²·-¸»¼ ³¿²«º¿½¬«®ó
·²¹ -±«®½»- ¿²¼ ¬»½¸²±´±¹§ ·²-»®¬·±² -¬®¿¬»¹·»-á
When we stait a piogiam, the f·ist th·ng we do ·s look
at what technolog·es aie ava·lable and the matui·ty of those
technolog·esò Undei oui new Nat·onal Secui·ty ·n Space
D·iect·ve 03-01, we foim what ·s called an IPA ›
|Independent Piogiam Assessment] › led by a sen·oi leadei
who has expei·ence ·n piogiam managementò The IPA does
an ·ndusti·al base look to see ·f the compan·es that aie go·ng
to b·d on th·s pio¶ect have the capab·l·ty and capac·ty both
fiom the technology bases as well as fiom the pioduct·on
base › how aie they tooled up, aie the·i subvendois oual·-
f·ed, what ·s the·i past peifoimance › then we get a good
scope on what they aie capable of pioduc·ngò We also pei-
foim a deta·led ·ndependent est·mate of the pi·ce of the sys-
tem ·n teims of development and pioduct·on, ·nclud·ng
not only the haidwaie but the softwaieò In the past we have
undeiest·mated the complex·ty of the softwaie, so we have
placed much moie emphas·s on th·s aieaò
We aie focus·ng oui ·ndependent cost assessment on
what we call 80 peicent cost conf·dence, veisus the old 50
peicent cost conf·dence we•ve used befoieò
We ¶ust had a iev·ew by the Defense Sc·ence Boaid,
look·ng at aieas we need to ieally focus onò One of the·i
iecommendat·ons was to put moie management ieseive ·n
foi the piogiam managei ·n oidei to handle those
unknowns that typ·cally pop up ·n oui challeng·ng space
piogiamsò
ܱ»- ¿´´ ¬¸·- °´¿²²·²¹ ¿¸»¿¼ º±® ¿ ´±-- ·²½´«¼» °«¬ó
¬·²¹ ³±®» -°¿®»- ±² ±®¾·¬á
No, I don•t th·nk soò That•s been a tiad·t·onal ·dea,
but ·t hasn•t been a veiy effect·ve th·ng to do because the
satell·tes on oib·t aie spend·ng fuel ¶ust on stat·on keep-
·ngò What we geneially do, based on the Bioad Aiea
Rev·ew done at the end of the 1990s, ·s emphas·ze the
need to oidei a spaie satell·te on the giound ·n case we
lose one dui·ng launchò
̸» ³±®» ©» ¾»½±³» ¼»°»²¼»²¬ ±² -°¿½»ô ¼±²•¬ ©»
¾»½±³» ³±®» ª«´²»®¿¾´» ¬± ¿¬¬¿½µ- ·² ¬¸¿¬ ¿®»²¿á ر©
¼± §±« °´¿² ¬± °®±¬»½¬ ¿¹¿·²-¬ ¬¸±-»ô ¾±¬¸ ¼»¬»½¬·±² ±º
¬¸» ¿¬¬¿½µ ¿²¼ ®»-°±²-» ¬± ·¬ô ¬± -¿ª» ¬¸» -¿¬»´´·¬» ¿²¼ ·¬-
½¿°¿¾·´·¬§á
We•ie ieally not at l·beity to d·scuss oui tact·cs, tech-
n·oues and pioceduies (TTPs), but once you conf·im a
satell·te ·s undei attack, then the command takes the
piopei TTPsò That could be maneuvei·ngò Oi ·t may be a
haidened satell·te, such as what we have done w·th MIL-
STARò We•ve also developed iad-haid paits because oui
satell·tes ·n m·ddle Eaith oib·t (MEO) opeiate ·n a haish
iad·at·on env·ionment to beg·n w·thå as a conseouence,
that also piotects you aga·nst some k·nds of attackò
ɸ¿¬ ±¬¸»® -¬»°- ¿®» §±« ¬¿µ·²¹ ¬±¼¿§ ¬± »²-«®» ©»
¸¿ª» ¬¸» ³±-¬ ³±¼»®² -§-¬»³- ·² -°¿½»á
When we bu·ld a space system today, we aie ·nteiest-
ed ·n mak·ng suie ·t ·s hoi·zontally ·ntegiated w·th oui
a·i and space systemsò No longei do we have the luxuiy
of ¶ust bu·ld·ng a space system that ·s stove-p·pedò It
must be able to send ·nfoimat·on down to the waif·ght-
eis, iegaidless of who oi wheie they aieò R·ght now, space
·s an uni·valed advantage to the
UòSò and ·s becom·ng ·ncieas·ngly
moie ·ntegial to waif·ght·ng
opeiat·onsò Oui space capab·l·t·es
aie moie ·mpoitant to the
waif·ghtei than evei befoie, so we
need to emphas·ze netwoik-cen-
ti·c waifaie and the tact·cal use of
oui space capab·l·t·es, wh·ch I
bel·eve w·ll cont·nue to giow ·n
·mpoitance as pait of the ongo-
·ng tiansfoimat·on of oui ¶o·nt
waif·ght·ngò It ·s v·tally ·mpoi-
tant these waif·ght·ng capab·l·t·es
come to fiu·t·onò That•s why oui
pi·oi·ty heie at the pioduct cen-
tei ·s m·ss·on successò
To emphas·ze that, we have
cuiiently had 39 launches ·n a
iow w·thout a fa·luieò Typ·cally,
you lose one out of eveiy 10, so
theie ·s a cost avo·dance theie
that ·s due to an emphas·s on
m·ss·on successò
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×
t ·s now convent·onal w·sdom that Opeiat·on
Iiao· Fieedom was the f·ist tiue space wai, not
only because the Un·ted States, and theieby the
coal·t·on, iel·ed on space-based assets on neaily
eveiy fiont, but because the enemy attempted to
block at least one of those assets › an unsuccessful effoit
by Iiao to ¶am the GPS s·gnal that ·s at the heait of UòSò
piec·s·on weaponsò
Space made ·ts ·n·t·al entiy ·nto publ·c awaieness
dui·ng the f·ist Gulf Wai, wheie ioughly 10 peicent of
weapons employed ·n oust·ng Iiao· ·nvadeis fiom
Kuwa·t depended on oib·tal assets, w·th the iema·ndei
made up of “dumb’ mun·t·onsò By the t·me of OIF,
some 12 yeais latei, those numbeis weie ieveisedò That
was poss·ble as the iesult of a decade of iestiuctui·ng,
wh·ch culm·nated ·n the tiansfei of most iespons·b·l·-
t·es fiom the UòSò Space Command to the UòSò Stiateg·c
Command (USSTRATCOM), w·th the Aimy and Navy
Space Commands fold·ng the bulk of the·i effoits ·nto
the enhanced A·i Foice Space Command (AFSPC),
although both have ieta·ned some seiv·ce-spec·f·c
effoitsò
Not·ng A·i Foice Secietaiy James Roche has sa·d
OIF iepiesented space becom·ng a full and eoual pait-
nei w·th a·i-land-sea, Ma¶ò Genò M·ke Hamel,
Commandei of the 14th A·i Foice, sa·d he sees ·t moie
·n teims of space com·ng of age foi the ¶o·nt waif·ghteiò
“The most sti·k·ng th·ng ·s, wh·le we used space
extens·vely thioughout the Cold Wai, OIF was the f·ist
t·me we ieally used space ·n a compiehens·ve way ·n all
¶o·nt opeiat·ons › a·i, land, Spec·al Ops › all the way
fiom plann·ng the campa·gn to how we execute, to ·nd·-
v·dual a·iciaft soit·es, mun·t·ons feeds, etcò So ·t was
extiaoid·naiy ·n teims of how ·t was ·ntegiated,’ he sa·dò
Fouiteenth A·i Foice seives as USSTRATCOM•s
space task foice, iespons·ble foi the oigan·zat·on, tia·n-
·ng, eou·pp·ng, command and contiol (C2), and
employment of AF space foices to suppoit opeiat·onal
Å êè Ã
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ÍÐßÝÛóÞßÍÛÜ
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Þ§ ÖòÎò É·´-±²
plans and m·ss·ons foi UòSò combatant commandeis and
a·i component commandeisò
“M·l·taiy space w·ll cont·nue to giow, peihaps expo-
nent·ally,’ Hamel pied·ctedò “Once you put capab·l·ty
·nto the hands of end useis, they beg·n to ·nnovate ways
to explo·t capab·l·t·es we space piov·deis can•t even
beg·n to ·mag·neò GPS m·ght ¶ust be cons·deied a satel-
l·te to help nav·gat·on, but ·t helped piec·s·on waifaie
and synchion·zat·on, mak·ng ·t tiuly peivas·ve ·n teims
of how d·ffeient foices can explo·t that k·nd of accuiacy
and piec·s·onò The same ·s tiue w·th othei space assets,
fiom commun·cat·ng w·th fi·endly foices to tiack·ng the
enemyò’
AFSPC V·ce Commandei Ltò Genò Dan Leaf agiees,
but sa·d that ·ncieased awaieness also has ·ts diawbacksò
“We have a much closei connect·on w·th the develop-
eis today, but st·ll face challenges of t·me and moneyò We
aie pay·ng the p·pei foi acou·s·t·on iefoim and budgetaiy
cho·ces made, ·n some cases, a decade agoò As a iesult, ·t
·s tak·ng too much t·me and money to del·vei space-
based capab·l·t·es,’ Leaf sa·d, a fiustiat·on only he·ght-
ened by OIFò “Dui·ng OIF and OEF, we had a laige num-
bei of space piofess·onals deployed to the theatei, wh·ch
gave us d·iect combat expei·ence and a bettei appiec·a-
t·on of what the waif·ghteis ·n haim•s way now needò’
Ma¶ò Genò Doug Fiasei, AFSPC D·iectoi of A·i and
Space Opeiat·ons, sa·d most teiiesti·al waif·ghteis, as
well as p·lots fly·ng above them, alieady take foi gianted
that the capab·l·t·es piov·ded by space assets such as GPS
w·ll be theie when they need them, even though GPS only
got ·nto a·iciaft on a iout·ne bas·s ·n the last f·ve yeaisò
“Oui ab·l·ty to attack taigets has ·mpioved gieatly
s·nce Deseit Stoim, wheie we had a l·m·ted capab·l·ty foi
piec·s·on gu·ded mun·t·ons, most of wh·ch weie lasei-
des·gnatedò Now, w·th GPS-a·ded mun·t·ons and oui
ab·l·ty to caiiy those on bombeis oi f·ghteis, I can attack
mult·ple taigets fiom the same a·iciaft on the same soi-
t·eò That has had a diamat·c ·mpact on oui ab·l·ty to sup-
poit giound foices,’ he sa·dò
“MILSATCOM ·s anothei aiea wheie the waif·ghtei
assumes ·t w·ll be theieò We•ve gotten so used to the com-
mun·cat·ons capab·l·ty › 80 peicent us·ng commeic·al
satell·tes ·n OIF › that we•ve become veiy dependent on
space-boine satell·tes, m·l·taiy and commeic·alò As we get
moie piec·se ·n oui ab·l·ty to apply foice, the demand foi
·nfoimat·on to do that piec·sely has giown diamat·callyò’
But the moie ·mpoitant those assets become to the
Un·ted States, the gieatei effoit adveisai·es w·ll put ·nto
tiy·ng to thwait them, he added, mak·ng the ab·l·ty to
defend UòSò space assets wh·le deny·ng the enemy any he
m·ght have an ·ncieas·ngly ·mpoitant pait of m·l·taiy
stiategyò
“We don•t have anyth·ng on oui books i·ght now that
w·ll deny an adveisaiy the use of GPS, and I th·nk we
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
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should puisue thatò Theie was an attempt by Iian, ¶ust a
few months aftei OIF, to deny Vo·ce of Amei·ca bioad-
casts by ¶amm·ng the fieouency,’ Fiasei sa·dò “I th·nk
we•ll also be woik·ng that aiea, tiy·ng to deny the ab·l·ty
of otheis to commun·cateò We w·ll look foi those ways
we can piov·de/deny the use of space effects ·n a
ieveis·ble aspect › deny the effect, but not k·ll the capa-
b·l·tyò’
Whatevei the advance may be, ·t ult·mately must be
d·iected towaid the ab·l·ty of UòSò foices to ma·nta·n the
uppei hand aga·nst any enemyò Fiom Woild Wai II to the
f·ist Gulf Wai, that has meant a·i supei·oi·ty, wh·ch has
become v·itually a g·ven ·n iecent m·l·taiy confionta-
t·onsò In the futuie, even that may depend ·n laige pait
on a new paiad·gmò
“To piotect oui systems, we must th·nk space supei·-
oi·tyò We look at a·i supei·oi·ty as an ·nheient i·ght of
the Amei·can waii·oiò The last t·me UòSò foices weie
bombed by enemy a·iciaft was Api·l 1953,’ Leaf sa·dò
“Space supei·oi·ty ·s assumed, not ¶ust by the m·l·taiy,
but also by the c·v·l·an populat·onò If we don•t piotect
oui space capab·l·t·es, the commeic·al econom·c poten-
t·al ·s even gieatei than loss of the m·l·taiy capab·l·tyò We
can•t allow an ev·l-doei, who diaws no l·ne between c·v·l
and m·l·taiy, to affect the woild that wayò We saw the·i
lack of iespect foi boundai·es on behav·oi on Septembei
11ò If al-Oaeda oi a s·m·lai gioup wants to ·mpact the
whole woild, they could do ·t ·n a heaitbeat by attack·ng
space capab·l·t·esò We can•t let that happenò
“We need to be able to iecogn·ze an attack on oui sys-
tem w·th a iespons·ve s·tuat·onal awaienessò And we must
be able to deny the enemy, wh·ch ·s a d·ff·cult balance to
sti·ke › deny·ng an enemy and st·ll allow·ng all the com-
meic·al appl·cat·ons ·n space to cont·nueò Iiao demon-
stiated you can buy the ab·l·ty to ¶am and do not have to
be a woild-class space powei to tiy to deny space capab·l-
·t·esò Those also can be counteiedò To fully attack oui space
assets would ieou·ie a gieatei level of soph·st·cat·onò’
Befoie assum·ng h·s cuiient post of Secietaiy of
Defense undei Pies·dent Bush, Donald Rumsfeld cha·ied
a space comm·ss·on ·n the clos·ng yeais of the Cl·nton
adm·n·stiat·on that la·d out a bluepi·nt foi the ieoigan-
·zat·on of m·l·taiy space, wh·le wain·ng not enough had
been done to defend oib·tal assetsò
“A nucleai blast ·n oib·t used to be the pie-em·nent
postulated thieatò So we have to haiden some systems,
but ·t ·s much moie than that, such as someone tiy·ng to
affect ·t fiom the giound w·th h·gh-eneigy beams oi
¶amm·ng oi attack·ng oui giound system,’ Leaf sa·dò
“Th·s ·s not a monol·th·c oi s·ngle-vectoi thieatò The
Rumsfeld Space Comm·ss·on wained of the dangeis of a
space Peail Haiboi › and we must be able to coiielate
acioss the spectium, because an attack may not be as
biute foice oi as obv·ous as a nucleai detonat·on on
oib·tò’
Hamel sa·d the futuie of m·l·taiy space ·s fully
anchoied ·n the vai·ous tiansfoimat·on plans of the foui
seiv·ces, peihaps espec·ally so w·th the Aimy•s Futuie
Combat System (FCS), due to beg·n f·eld·ng aiound the
end of th·s decadeò
“FCS ·s absolutely, totally dependent on space-based
assets to peim·t the k·nd of opeiat·ons ·t env·s·ons ›
mov·ng ou·ckly acioss a l·neai battlef·eld, w·th coie
teams opeiat·ng v·a space connect·v·ty, g·v·ng them the
ab·l·ty to tiack eveiyone, to push ·nfoimat·on such as
thieat wain·ng and taiget·ng d·iectly to combat foices,’
he sa·dò “And the Navy has tiuly depended on space foi
yeaisò
“We don•t get to p·ck when and wheie we go to wai,
so we have to bi·ng all oui capab·l·t·es w·th oui exped·-
t·onaiy foicesò Weathei ·nfoimat·on and taiget·ng come
fiom spaceò The Navy leained that yeais ago as an expe-
d·t·onaiy foice at seaò The same ·s tiue w·th the A·i
Foice, wh·ch ·s now dependent on space foi GPS gu·ded
weapons, wh·ch have pushed oui tact·cal ait to a new
levelò’
The satell·tes that have allowed the seiv·ces to
advance to the levels demonstiated ·n OIF aie about to
be ieplaced by a new geneiat·on of technology that w·ll
leave the Un·ted States even moie alone ·n teims of space
dom·nat·on, accoid·ng to Ma¶ò Ei·k El·asen, AFSPC
Ch·ef of M·l·taiy Satell·te Commun·cat·ons (MILSAT-
COM) Opeiat·onsò Piev·ous commun·cat·ons satell·tes
fell ·nto thiee aieas › piotected, naiiowband, and w·de-
band › an aich·tectuie the A·i Foice ti·ed to ma·nta·n
w·th d·ffeient satell·tes ·n d·ffeient oib·ts, each w·th ·ts
own puipose and advantages, as well as d·sadvantagesò
“Today we aie ·n a pos·t·on, thiough oui ·nvestment
·n technology, to d·g·t·ze ·nfoimat·on acioss all systems
and shaie ·t ·n a way we have not been able to ·n the pastò
The wavefoims w·ll st·ll be a pait of ·t, the thiee-tiack
appioach, but d·g·t·zat·on w·ll allow us to shaie ·nfoima-
t·on bettei w·th the ¶o·nt waif·ghteis of today and
tomoiiow,’ Hamel sa·dò “The eventual goal ·s to let the
sensoi, wheievei ·t may be, shaie that ·nfoimat·on w·th a
shootei ·n a t·me that w·ll allow us to get ·ns·de the
enemy•s dec·s·on loopò Ma¶oi ·nvestments ·n technology
aie gett·ng us to that po·nt ·n t·me, espec·ally w·th TSAT,
wh·ch w·ll be a b·g enablei foi m·l·taiy and pol·t·cal dec·-
s·on-makeisò’
Wheie the ag·ng Defense Satell·te Commun·cat·ons
System (DSCS) piov·ded a long-haul commun·cat·ons
system to move laige ouant·t·es of data ovei gieat d·s-
tances, ·ts ieplacement › the W·deband Gapf·llei, wh·ch
beg·ns launch·ng ·n late 2005 › w·ll ·nciease that capac·-
ty fouifold, wh·le piov·d·ng a fastei and w·dei “p·pe,’ so
fai moie data gets to useis fai moie ou·cklyò
On the piotected s·de, the old MILSTAR system tiad-
ed a lowei data iate foi ·ncieased suiv·vab·l·tyò Its thiee-
satell·te follow-on › Advanced EHF, w·th a f·ist launch ·n
2007 › w·ll g·ve piotected useis a tenfold ·nciease ·n
capac·tyò
The cuiient naiiow-band system › UFO (UHF
Follow-On) › ·s pi·mai·ly foi mob·le and tact·cal useisò
Å éð Ã
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The follow-on › MUOS (Mob·le Usei Ob¶ect·ve System)
› also w·ll have s·gn·f·cantly ·ncieased capac·tyò The cui-
ient plan ·s to leave ·t w·th the Navy, wh·ch opeiates
UFO, when MUOS beg·ns launch·ng ·n 2009ò
Even w·th these new, s·gn·f·cantly h·ghei capac·ty
systems, the m·l·taiy expects demand w·ll fai exceed
capab·l·ty, as ·t d·d dui·ng OIF, when the goveinment
leased eveiy b·t of ava·lable commeic·al satell·te capac·ty
and even moved a satell·te leased fiom Austial·a ·nto a
new oib·t to piov·de bettei coveiage ovei Iiaoò
“We d·d max out capab·l·ty ·n OIF and may f·nd oui-
selves ·n a b·dd·ng wai ·n the futuie foi a f·n·te numbei of
l·nks,’ El·asen sa·dò “We aie woik·ng as haid as we can to
acceleiate the technology and the capab·l·ty, but I th·nk
what we w·ll see, as we cont·nue to netwoik the waif·ghteis,
·s a cont·nued m·x of m·l·taiy and commeic·al satell·tesò
“In the futuie, w·th a netwoik concept, we w·ll not
have that l·m·tat·on because theie won•t be ¶ust one l·ne
of commun·cat·on between waif·ghteis, but a mass·ve
numbei that can go anywheie › space, giound, RF, opt·-
calò Huge iedundanc·es bu·lt ·nto futuie systems that get
away fiom the c·icu·t-based m·ndsetò We do that
thiough the Tiansfoimat·onal Satell·te › TSAT › wh·ch
piov·des tiue netwoiked capab·l·ty thiough all those
vai·ous med·aò R·ght now we aie look·ng at an FY12
launch foi the f·ist TSATò’
Colò Heniy Dò Ba·id, AFSPC•s Deputy D·iectoi foi
Reou·iements, sa·d a key to meet·ng futuie space foice
needs ·s a change ·n the way ieou·iements aie acou·iedò
“We aie st·ll tiy·ng to educate the combatant com-
mandeis on what k·nd of space assets aie out theieò
They aie st·ll mak·ng the·i battle plans f·ist, then ask·ng
how space can suppoit themò Instead, we aie tiy·ng to
get them to cons·dei space as pait of putt·ng a whole
plan togethei,’ he sa·dò “And they aie beg·nn·ng to ask
foi s·tuat·onal awaieness and C2, be·ng able to be con-
nected and shai·ng ·nfoimat·on acioss all levels of the
battlef·eldò’
Ba·id sa·d theie aie now a vai·ety of gieat sensois ·n
d·ffeient categoi·es › IR, v·sual, space-based iadai › but
ty·ng eveiyth·ng togethei, whethei foi DoD oi the ·ntel-
l·gence commun·ty, ·n a cooid·nated p·ctuie ut·l·z·ng
·nfoimat·on fiom a lot of d·ffeient systems would cieate
an extiemely poweiful advantageò
“Theie aie ielat·onsh·p ·ssues as to who does what
foi whom, but we aie tiy·ng to ·ntegiate the space assets
¶ust as we aie homeland secui·ty and m·l·taiy opeia-
t·ons,’ he sa·dò “We•ie mov·ng moie towaid a space com-
bat command, s·m·lai to ACC, iathei than ¶ust an R&D
effoitò’
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î²¼ ß·® Í«°°±®¬ Ñ°»®¿¬·±²- ͯ«¿¼®±²ô ¿¬¬¿½¸»¼ ¬± ï-¬ Þ¿¬¬¿´·±²ô 쬸 Ý¿ª¿´®§ λ¹·³»²¬ô ï-¬ ײº¿²¬®§ Ü·ª·-·±²ò
Ma¶ò Andy Wulfest·eg, AFSPC Execut·ve Off·cei to
the D·iectoi of A·i and Space Opeiat·ons, po·nts out sys-
tems such as GPS often have moie to offei than ·s genei-
ally ieal·zedò Wh·le most cons·dei GPS to be pi·mai·ly a
locat·on and nav·gat·on a·d, ·t also ·s heav·ly ·nvested ·n
many systems as a piec·s·on t·m·ng capab·l·tyò
“The laige ma¶oi·ty of m·l·taiy eou·pment uses GPS
foi both pos·t·on·ng and t·m·ngò So when the p·lot ·n
the cockp·t checks h·s t·me com·ng ·nto a taiget zone, ·t
·s piobably based on h·s GPS s·gnal,’ he sa·dò “We iefei
to ·t as a global ut·l·ty › ava·lable foi eveiyone to iece·ve
and so ·mbedded that most useis don•t even ieal·ze they
aie us·ng ·tò Theie actually aie thiee pi·maiy GPS m·s-
s·ons › nav·gat·on, t·m·ng, and nucleai detonat·on
detect·onò The lattei ·s a tieaty mon·toi·ng m·ss·on foi
wh·ch GPS ·s a pait because of ·ts woildw·de coveiageò’
Wh·le GPS ieou·ies a constellat·on of 24 pi·maiy
satell·tes to meet guaianteed accuiacy and ava·lab·l·ty
standaids, theie cuiiently aie 30 ·n opeiat·on, piov·d·ng
24/7 global coveiage by a m·n·mum of foui satell·tesò
The compos·t·on of the constellat·on ·ncludes seveial
veis·ons, howevei, w·th 16 Block IIA
(manufactuied by Rockwell) now ·n oib·t
and anothei n·ne awa·t·ng launch thiough
FY07, followed by 16 Block IIR (ieplen·sh-
ment › Lockheed Mait·n) scheduled foi
launch fiom 2006 thiough 2013ò Those
·nclude e·ght modein·zed › Block IIR-M ›
scheduled thiough 2007ò The next geneia-
t·on between IIR and III › Block IIF
(Boe·ng) › ·s the follow-on, w·th 16 pio-
¶ected fiom 2006 thiough 2013ò
“They aie ¶ust an evolut·onaiy compo-
nentå w·th each block we get add·t·onal
capab·l·t·es › ·ncieased accuiacy and iel·a-
b·l·ty and, w·th mod·f·cat·ons to some of
the IIR and pio¶ected ·n IIF, some add·-
t·onal powei and s·gnals, ·nclud·ng a spe-
c·f·c m·l·taiy s·gnal, completely sepaiate
fiom the c·v·l·an s·gnalò We w·ll stait get-
t·ng that w·th the IIR-M (Lockheed
Mait·n), w·th the f·ist of those scheduled
foi launch next yeaiò Theie w·ll be e·ght of
those scheduled thiough 2007,’ Ba·id sa·dò
“The ·n·t·al launch date foi GPS III |cui-
iently ·n compet·t·on between teams led by
Boe·ng and Lockheed Mait·n, w·th down-
select and deadl·nes to be deteim·ned] ·s
2012ò Cuiient plans call foi 64 satell·tes,
·nclud·ng both on-oib·t and on-giound
ieplacementsò We cuiiently launch
ieplacements when needed iathei than
keep·ng them ·n oib·tò The constellat·on ·s
d·v·ded ·nto s·x oib·tal planes, and we
can•t move a satell·te fiom one plane to
anothei ·f one d·es, but by hav·ng add·-
t·onal satell·tes ·n oib·t, the oveiall ·mpoi-
tance of any one ·s not as gieat as ·t would be w·th ¶ust
the ieou·ied 24ò’
The GPS III satell·tes, wh·ch ult·mately w·ll ieplace
the ent·ie constellat·on, w·ll ·nclude all of the upgiaded
s·gnals and codes of piev·ous geneiat·ons, along w·th an
·nciease ·n powei that w·ll deciease oveiall vulneiab·l·ty
to ¶amm·ng oi ·nteifeienceò
“GPS bas·cally ·s a veiy weak s·gnal because ·t does-
n•t ieou·ie a lot of powei to get ·t to Eaith,’ Ba·id sa·dò
“It has been eouated to a 40-watt l·ghtbulb 11,000
m·les out ·n space, so ·t doesn•t take a lot of powei to
oveiwhelm that s·gnalò The III ·s st·ll ·n the ·n·t·al
des·gn phase, so theie ·sn•t a f·nal numbei on ·ts s·gnal,
although the ·n·t·al goal ·s a focused powei s·gnalò As
we modein·ze, we always have to be backwaid compat-
·ble so the iece·veis ·n use today woik w·th all satell·te
veis·ons, so putt·ng too much powei on ·t wouldn•t
woikò’
In add·t·on to advanced GPS, the m·l·taiy also ·s
look·ng at a vai·ety of new technology satell·tes, fiom
space-based iadai to lasei commun·cat·onsò Those have
Å éî Ã
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·² ±®¾·¬ò
the potent·al to bi·ng the flow of ·nfoimat·on down to
eveiy tank and ·nfantiyman on the battlef·eld › and
ietuin data fiom them back up the cha·n of commandò
“A lot of the d·ff·culty ·n bi·ng·ng out someth·ng
completely new and d·ffeient ·s we aie gett·ng by w·th-
out ·t today and ·t•s haid to ant·c·pate what actually
w·ll be needed ·n 15 oi 20 yeais,’ Ba·id adm·tted,
“much less f·gui·ng out how to meet that need, be ·t
giound- oi sea- oi space-basedò But theie aie some
amaz·ng technolog·es out theieò’
Impeifect foiecast·ng ·s ev·dent ·n the DSP
(Defense Suppoit Piogiam) constellat·on › 22 satel-
l·tes to date, w·th DSP-23 ·n 2005 end·ng a 30-yeai pio-
giam des·gned as a stiateg·c asset dui·ng the Cold Wai
and nevei ·ntended to suppoit theatei opeiat·ons ·n a
global wai on teiioi·sm, someth·ng the contiactoi
commun·ty ·s now woik·ng to iesolveò
The follow-on w·ll be SBIRS, w·th both HEO
(h·ghly ell·pt·cal oib·t) and GEO (geostat·onaiy oib·t)
components, commonly iefeiied to as SBIRS-HEO
and SBIRS-GEO, both pait of the SBIRS-h·gh pio-
giamò The f·ist HEO satell·te ·s expected to beg·n pio-
duc·ng data ·n 2006, w·th GEO not launch·ng unt·l
2008-2009ò
“The focal aiiays aie moie sens·t·ve, wh·ch ·s a ¶ump
·n technology, and the amount of bandw·dth has
biought a huge ·nciease ·n data,’ sa·d Ma¶ò Fianc·s
Doi·on, AFSPC Deputy Ch·ef of Space-Based Wain·ng
and command DSP leadò “The old DSP left someth·ng
l·ke 90 peicent of the data on boaid because ·t couldn•t
piocess any moieò These satell·tes w·ll ieveise those
numbeisò’
The ma¶oi pioblem foi DSP ·s the d·ffeience
between look·ng foi a Cold Wai ICBM, wh·ch buins hot
foi a long t·me, and tiy·ng to catch a theatei m·ss·le ›
such as Iiao•s Scuds › wh·ch have fai shoitei and lowei
buinsò Anothei d·ffeience ·s how data aie piocessed ›
today automat·cally, go·ng mach·ne-to-mach·ne d·iect-
ly to the theatei iathei than bounc·ng thiough a vai·ety
of giound stat·onsò
“The expectat·on ·s ·t w·ll be an oidei of magn·tude
leap ·n peifoimance, although exactly what and how we
can detect ·s class·f·ed,’ Doi·on sa·dò “That ·s based on
hav·ng the ent·ie constellat·on, HEO and GEO, although
theie w·ll be a maiked ·mpiovement w·th the f·ist
HEOsò’
Ltò Colò JòPò Scott, Ch·ef of AFSPC•s Wain·ng
Opeiat·ons Bianch, says ·t ·s not only DSP satell·tes that
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¿²¼ ¼®»¿³ ¾·¹ò
É»•®» °®±«¼ ¬± ¸¿ª» °´¿§»¼ ±«® °¿®¬ ·²
¼»ª»´±°·²¹ ¬¸» ˲·¬»¼ ͬ¿¬»-• »¨¬®¿±®¼·²¿®§
-°¿½» ¿²¼ ³·--·´» °®±¹®¿³ò
DZ«® »ºº±®¬- ¿´´±© ±«®
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have had to change fiom a puiely ICBM watch to a
m·xed iespons·b·l·ty that ·ncludes theatei m·ss·lesò
“R·ght now we have the m·ss·le wain·ng m·ss·on
ass·gned to DSP, but we ·n m·ss·le wain·ng alieady have
p·cked up a suppoit·ng iole ·n theatei m·ss·le defense,’
he sa·dò “So we can chaiactei·ze the event and iepoit
back to both the theatei and nat·onal commandeis an
·mpioved s·tuat·onal awaieness and what ·s tiuly hap-
pen·ng ·n theateiò
“We w·ll have global coveiage fiom these satell·tes,
wh·ch w·ll be constantly mon·toi·ng, so we w·ll be able
to covei any aiea of the planet that ·s of conceinò Both
HEO and GEO w·ll be a tact·cal sensoi foice, so we can
focus some of the·i capab·l·ty on spec·f·c thieat aieas foi
moie accuiacyò That ·s poss·ble because the GEO satel-
l·tes w·ll ·nclude a ‘staiei,• wh·ch ·s someth·ng we haven•t
done befoie, focus·ng ·n on a spot on Eaith to collect as
much ·nfoimat·on as poss·ble about a spec·f·c eventò
W·th the staiei, we can p·ck up hot, fast events, wh·ch ·s
a ma¶oi technology developmentò’
Foi now, Doi·on adds, the Un·ted States ·s “the only
nat·on des·gn·ng a system that ·ncoipoiates all th·s, but
we aie not the only ones develop·ng a m·ss·le wain·ng
capab·l·tyò And desp·te what has been wi·tten ·n some
iepoits, we aie veiy exc·ted about what SBIRS w·ll and
can doò’
Fiasei says all of these piogiams aie evolv·ng ·nto
what A·i Foice Ch·ef of Staff Geneial John Pò Jumpei
calls ¶o·nt waif·ght·ng space › capab·l·t·es that can be
piov·ded to the theatei commandei piomptly and eff·-
c·entlyò
“The ieal effoit, ·n my v·ew, ·s not oui ab·l·ty to
launch oi opeiate satell·tes oi get the ·nfoimat·on down
to the theatei and waif·ghtei › the ieal ·mpact w·ll be
on oui ab·l·ty to do that on a piompt bas·s, ·n houis oi
days, not months oi yeais,’ he sa·dò “That w·ll ieou·ie a
d·ffeient concept of opeiat·ons fiom what we now
have, w·th a w·ng composed of d·ffeient souadionsò We
w·ll have a ieady supply of satell·tes and boosteis that
can be launched w·th·n houisò Then we put foiwaid an
ab·l·ty to ·ntegiate that ·n as l·ttle as thiee days, to opei-
ate that system, not foi 10 yeais, but only foi s·x
monthsò If we can do that and ·ntegiate ·t ·nto a system
of systems, that w·ll be a b·g changeò’
In many ways, Ba·id notes, what ·s happen·ng ·n
m·l·taiy space today ·s a “Golden Age’ ·n wh·ch many
space capab·l·t·es aie beg·nn·ng to matuieæ “It•s amaz-
·ng ·t has taken th·s long to get the k·nd of systems the
commandeis depend on › 50 yeaisò And we aie ¶ust on
the edge of mak·ng some tiuly amaz·ng developmentsò
The ab·l·ty to know what ·s happen·ng and commun·-
cate w·th eveiyone on the battlef·eld ·s ¶ust ·ncied·bleò’
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Ñ
peiat·ons Deseit Sh·eld and Deseit
Stoim ·n 1990 and 1991 aie geneially
iecogn·zed as the f·ist m·l·taiy con-
fl·ct to h·ghl·ght the modein
waif·ght·ng conti·but·ons of A·i
Foice space technolog·esò
Fiom Defense Meteoiolog·cal Satell·te Piogiam
(DMSP) weathei satell·tes to Global Pos·t·on·ng System
(GPS) iece·veis to the Defense Satell·te Commun·cat·on
System (DSCS) to Defense Suppoit Piogiam (DSP)
satell·te assets, the A·i Foice space systems employed
dui·ng Deseit Sh·eld/Deseit Stoim piov·ded waif·ghteis
on the giound w·th a w·de iange of new capab·l·t·es and
enabl·ng technolog·esò
Howevei, wh·le ODS (Opeiat·on Deseit Stoim) ·s
geneially accepted foi ·ts m·lestone space status, the actu-
al employment of Un·ted States A·i Foice space assets ·n a
combat scenai·o occuiied ¶ust 10 yeais aftei the establ·sh-
ment of the Westein Development D·v·s·onò Accoid·ng to
A·i Foice h·stoi·ans, an expei·mental giound satell·te sys-
tem was iushed to V·etnam ·mmed·ately aftei the 1964
Gulf of Tonk·n Inc·dentò Wh·le the ·n·t·al system aich·tec-
tuie ·mpioved commun·cat·ons between Wash·ngton,
DòCò, and Sa·gon, the system was expanded ovei the next
thiee yeais to allow cont·nuous commun·cat·ons between
f·ie bases and the Wh·te Houseò
In subseouent decades, space assets weie also
employed ·n Opeiat·on Uigent Fuiy (the Invas·on of
ÔÇÒÝØÐ×Ò
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Gienada › 1983), Opeiat·on El Doiado Canyon (the
ietal·atoiy sti·ke on L·bya › 1986), and Opeiat·on Just
Cause (Panama › 1989)ò
Seiv·ce h·stoi·ans note, howevei, that the ·mpl·ca-
t·ons of the V·etnam appl·cat·on weie geneially not iec-
ogn·zed ·ns·de oi outs·de of the seiv·ces and that the fol-
low-on space asset appl·cat·ons weie “·ncomplete and
pooily plannedò’
ÌØÛ Ú× ÎÍÌ ÍÐßÝÛ ÉßÎ
As a iesult, ·t ·s ODS that iece·ves the cied·t as be·ng
Amei·ca•s “F·ist Space Waiò’ Yet ·n sp·te of that accolade,
A·i Foice h·stoi·es note that the opeiat·onal plann·ng foi
the use of space systems was st·ll pooily developed when
Iiao ·nvaded Kuwa·t ·n August 1990ò In fact, a iecently
declass·f·ed July 1991 aftei act·on assessment of these sys-
tems by A·i Foice Space Command notes both stiengths
and weaknesses ·n space system peifoimanceò
An example can be found ·n the aftei-act·on iev·ew of
DMSP weathei satell·tesò The launch of the piev·ously-
scheduled DMSP F-10 on Decò 1, 1990, had iesulted ·n thiee
“healthy satell·tes’ ava·lable to piov·de weathei suppoitò
In assess·ng the·i combat conti·but·ons, the iepoit
notes that, “Accuiate, ieal-t·me weathei data was ava·lable
to a·d the tact·cal usei ·n select·ng the most effect·ve a·i-
ciaft weapons load foi selected taigets based on known
weathei cond·t·ons ovei the taigetò Th·s ieduced m·ss·ons
aboited due to weapons load/weathei cond·t·ons m·s-
match, pait·culaily w·th piec·s·on-gu·ded (lasei and
opt·cal) oidnanceò’
Lessons leained, howevei, also ·ncluded iecogn·t·on
that the ex·st·ng “tianspoitable’ DMSP teim·nals, housed
·n Maik IV vans, weie “d·ff·cult to move, veiy laige and
heavy, ieou·i·ng a C-130 foi tianspoitò’
Satell·te commun·cat·ons (SATCOM) was also spot-
l·ghted foi the·i ODS stiengths and weaknessesò Foi
example, wh·le SATCOM was iecogn·zed foi piov·d·ng
80 peicent of the ·ntia- and ·ntei-theatei commun·ca-
t·ons, ·t was noted that cont·ngency commun·cat·ons
plans had s·gn·f·cantly undeiest·mated the connect·v·ty
demands of the actual deployment, ·dent·fy·ng a ieou·ie-
ment foi 12 giound teim·nals when ·t was actually 128
that weie eventually deployedò
Moieovei, the iev·ew authois acknowledged that the
assets weie not always ·n the i·ght place at the i·ght t·meò
In the case of the Defense Satell·te Commun·cat·ons
System, foi example, the need to ·nciease ODS aiea of
iespons·b·l·ty (AOR) coveiage piompted the iepos·t·on-
·ng of the Westein Pac·f·c ieseive satell·te to the Ind·an
Ocean foi ·ncieased SATCOM capac·tyò L·kew·se, DSP
Fl·ght 15 “was iepos·t·oned to piov·de an add·t·onal
launch detect·on asset to the theateiò’
Not·ng that “Deseit Stoim pioved that cuiient on-
oib·t space assets have a s·gn·f·cant element of flex·b·l·ty
to iespond to global cont·ngenc·es,’ the authois added,
Ñ°°±-·¬»æ ß ËòÍò -¿¬»´´·¬» «°´·²µ -¬¿¬·±² ·- ¼»°´±§»¼ ·² ¬¸» ¼»-»®¬ ¼«®·²¹ Ñ°»®¿¬·±² Ü»-»®¬ ͸·»´¼ò ß¾±ª»æ ËòÍò ß®³§
°»®-±²²»´ ±°»®¿¬» ¿ ¸¿²¼ó¸»´¼ Ù´±¾¿´ б-·¬·±²·²¹ ͧ-¬»³ øÙÐÍ÷ ®»½»·ª»® ¼«®·²¹ Ñ°»®¿¬·±² Ü»-»®¬ ͸·»´¼ñÜ»-»®¬
ͬ±®³ò Í°¿½»ó¾¿-»¼ ¬»½¸²±´±¹·»- °®±ª»¼ ª·¬¿´ ¬± ¬¸» ˲·¬»¼ ͬ¿¬»-• -©·º¬ ª·½¬±®§ ·² ¬¸» ½±²º´·½¬ô ¹»²»®¿´´§ ®»¹¿®¼»¼
¿- ß³»®·½¿•- “Ú·®-¬ Í°¿½» É¿®ò’
“Bioadei tact·cal flex·b·l·ty of oui satell·te systems would
·mpiove AFSPC•s ab·l·ty to iespond to cont·ngenc·esò’
The cleai w·nnei ·n ODS space assets was the GPSò
H·ghl·ght·ng the “f·ist w·despiead combat use of space
based nav·gat·on,’ the aftei-act·on assessment noted that
ovei 4,500 GPS iece·veis had been deployed by the end
of host·l·t·es on tanks, tiucks, sh·ps, planes, and w·th
othei f·eld un·tsò
Peihaps the most tell·ng f·nd·ng ·n the July 1991
iepoit ·nvolved the essent·al natuie of space pieplan-
n·ngò Obseiv·ng that the f·ve months of Opeiat·on
Deseit Sh·eld had affoided needed pie-plann·ng t·me to
·ntegiate add·t·onal space capab·l·t·es and cooid·nate
ieou·iements, the authois emphas·zed that futuie wai
planneis “must assume moie of a ‘come as you aie• wai
outlook foi space eou·pmentò’
Among the h·ghl·ghted lessons leained was that
“AFSPACECOM needs to woik w·th opeiat·onal com-
mandeis to tianslate and ·ncoipoiate space capab·l·t·esò’
Recommended act·ons ·ncluded the need to “stait the
space plann·ng piocess eaily’ and “get the woid |about
space conti·but·ons] out to CINCs |Commandeis ·n
Ch·ef] and Component Commandeisò’
Echo·ng the iepoit•s f·nd·ngs, Genò Chailes Aò
Hoinei, Commandei of Cential Command (CENT-
COM) A·i Foices dui·ng ODS (who would latei become
Commandei of A·i Foice Space Command), atti·buted
many of the challenges encounteied w·th the space assets
to a geneial lack of undeistand·ng of the·i capab·l·t·esò
And that feel·ng was w·dely shaiedò In h·s own June
1991 assessment of space foice employment dui·ng
ODS, Genò Donald Jò Kutyna, wait·me Commandei of
UòSò Space Command, obseived that, “Space foices weie
theie when ieou·ied, but s·gn·f·cant effoit was needed to
opt·m·ze the·i effect·venessò We may not have the luxuiy
of a s·x-month bu·ld-up pei·od to develop pioceduies oi
piocuie ci·t·cal eou·pment ·n a futuie confl·ctò Space sys-
tems and foices had a ma¶oi ·mpact on the execut·on of
these two opeiat·ons |Deseit Sh·eld and Deseit Stoim],
but the capab·l·t·es of these systems must be thoioughly
·ngia·ned ·n oui peacet·me plann·ng and tia·n·ng ·f we
hope to explo·t them fully ·n ci·s·s oi combatò’
ÞÔËÛ Î× ÞÞÑÒ ÐßÒÛÔ
The mult·ple analyses and assessments began to pave
the way foi the cieat·on of a ded·cated oigan·zat·on to
ensuie that space assets would be ut·l·zed to the·i opt·-
mum effect·venessò
That piocess got even moie suppoit ·n June 1991ò
About the same t·me that Kutyna was mak·ng h·s assess-
ment of space foice conti·but·ons to ODS, Genò Meii·ll
Aò McPeak iedef·ned the m·ss·on of the UòSò A·i Foice to
“defend the Un·ted States thiough the contiol and
explo·tat·on of a·i and spaceò’
Obv·ously, contiol and explo·tat·on would ieou·ie
the opt·m·zat·on of iesouices, and that opt·m·zat·on
needed to be based on a moie coheient space foice pol·-
cy, oigan·zat·on, and ·nfiastiuctuieò
W·th those needs ·n m·nd, the fall of 1992 saw the
chaitei·ng of the “Blue R·bbon Panel of the A·i Foice ·n
Space ·n the 21st Centuiyò’ The panel chaitei ·ncluded
the iev·ew of ex·st·ng A·i Foice space pol·cy, oigan·za-
t·on, and ·nfiastiuctuie, def·n·t·on of the A·i Foice•s
futuie iole ·n space, and the development of a stiategy to
meet that goalò
Led by Ltò Genò Thomas Sò Mooiman, Jiò, then v·ce
commandei of AFSPC, the Blue R·bbon Panel of 30 A·i
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Å èð Ã
Foice off·ceis and c·v·l·ans convened at Maxwell A·i
Foice Base between Septò 10, 1992, and Novò 5, 1992ò
Among the·i f·nd·ngs, the panel membeis obseived
that “Space systems piov·de key capab·l·t·es to ·ntegiate
and del·vei command, contiol, commun·cat·ons and
·ntell·gence (C3I) suppoit to the waif·ghtei • The ab·l-
·ty to piov·de th·s ·nfoimat·on to UòSò foices wh·le
s·multaneously deny·ng oi man·pulat·ng the enemy•s
·nfoimat·on thiough countei-C3I opeiat·ons ·s a poten-
t·ally dec·s·ve ‘s·lvei bullet• foi the theatei commandeiò’
A·i Foice h·stoi·es note that the panel f·nd·ngs also
·ncluded the undeily·ng piem·se beh·nd the need foi a
new oigan·zat·on des·gned to opt·m·ze the explo·tat·on
of space capab·l·t·es to fulf·ll opeiat·onal needsò
Refeii·ng to the not·onal oigan·zat·on as a “Space and
Appl·cat·ons Waifaie Centei,’ the panel f·nd·ngs env·-
s·oned “an oigan·zat·on devoted to develop·ng new
appl·cat·ons foi space systems, ass·st·ng combatant com-
mands w·th space system employment, and def·n·ng
ieou·iements foi new space systems and usei eou·pmentò
The centei should • focus onæ demonstiat·ng potent·al
space capab·l·t·es and tact·cal appl·cat·on to useis, sup-
poit·ng opeiat·onal tia·n·ng and exeic·ses and piov·d·ng
deployable teams to suppoit a·i componentsò’
ÛÍÌßÞÔ× ÍØ× ÒÙ ÌØÛ ÍÐßÝÛ
ÉßÎÚßÎÛ ÝÛÒÌÛÎ
Based on the panel•s iecommendat·ons, sen·oi seiv-
·ce planneis began the cieat·on of the new “Space and
Appl·cat·ons Waifaie Centeiò’
Challenges and changes ·n the establ·shment iepoit-
edly began w·th legal concein fiom the AFSPC Judge
Advocate•s off·ce ovei the woid “Waifaie’ ·n the new
oigan·zat·on•s nameò Howevei, aftei analys·s of ex·st·ng
tieat·es, legal iepiesentat·ves diopped the·i conceinò
Anothei eaily change ·nvolved Hoinei•s July 1993 dele-
t·on of “Appl·cat·ons’ fiom the new nameò
Oigan·zeis of the newly named Space Waifaie
Centei (SWC) then moved to the challenges of develop-
·ng an ·nfiastiuctuie to execute the env·s·oned m·ss·on
and select·ng a phys·cal locat·on foi the oigan·zat·onò
Accoid·ng to an AFSPC SWC oigan·zat·onal h·stoiy,
“On 2 July 1993 L·eutenant Geneial Mooiman ieouested
that HO USAF appiove the establ·shment of the SWC at
Falcon AFB Coloiadoò Mooiman chose Falcon AFB as
the SWC•s s·te foi two ieasonsò F·ist, as |the] piesent s·te
of the Nat·onal Test Fac·l·ty (NTF) › the centei of a
nat·onal netwoik of ieseaich fac·l·t·es establ·shed ·n the
m·d 1980s to suppoit then Pies·dent Ronald Reagan•s
Stiateg·c Defense In·t·at·ve › Falcon AFB offeied the
SWC planneis an ·n-place, secuie, goveinment owned
supeicomputei fac·l·tyò W·th ma·n fiame computeis and
ovei 500 woik stat·ons encompassed ·n the 22,000 souaie
foot complex, the NTF offeied an ·deal env·ionment to
execute space waifaie s·mulat·onsò Second, the NTF had
been a focus of fund·ng fiom the A·i Foice•s Tact·cal
Explo·tat·on of Nat·onal Capab·l·t·es (TENCAP) pio-
giam › a goveinment piogiam that emphas·zed the
explo·tat·on and ut·l·zat·on of nat·onal systemsò W·th the
pioposed act·vat·on of the SWC, TENCAP•s focus would
sh·ft fiom the NTF to the SWCò’
W·th ·ts phys·cal locat·on ·dent·f·ed, ·n July 1993
AFSPC establ·shed a woik·ng gioup to develop a pio-
giamm·ng plan that would fuithei def·ne SWC•s m·ss·on
wh·le ·dent·fy·ng add·t·onal establ·shment act·ons neces-
saiyò On Decò 20, 1993, the woik·ng gioup publ·shed HO
AFSPACECOM Piogiamm·ng Plan 93-14, wh·ch def·ned
SWC•s pi·maiy funct·on as “ensui·ng that ex·st·ng space
capab·l·t·es weie appl·ed adeouately to waif·ghteis• needsò’
The plan added that the SWC m·ss·on would be exe-
cuted by “·ncoipoiat·ng space capab·l·t·es ·n |Ma¶oi
Command], theatei and campa·gn wai plans • s·mula-
t·on, model·ng and waigam·ng act·v·t·es wh·ch w·ll
evolve w·th an a·m to ·ntegiate space ·nto othei comput-
ei model·ng centeisò F·nally, the USAFSWC w·ll lead
development effoits to ·mpiove waif·ght·ng appl·cat·ons
of space systems and ensuie that futuie space aich·tects
and systems aie des·gned w·th combat opeiat·ons ·nhei-
ent ·n themò’
The oigan·zat·on was act·vated on Novò 1, 1993, and
off·c·ally ded·cated on Decò 8, 1993, less than one yeai
aftei the Blue R·bbon Panel had ieleased ·ts suppoit·ng
iecommendat·onsò
Some of the eail·est appl·cat·on piogiams, des·gnated
as “Talon’ piogiams, weie all des·gned to ensuie that
Amei·ca•s waif·ghteis had access to the most cuiient and
useful ·nfoimat·on necessaiy to execute the·i m·ss·onsò
Anothei eaily SWC oigan·zat·onal effoit ·nvolved the
·ntioduct·on of Foiwaid Space Suppoit ·n Theatei (FSST)
teams, gioups of space expeits that could be deployed to
any theatei of opeiat·ons ·n cont·ngency s·tuat·onsò
Those pioducts and piogiams weie pait of a laigei
piocess of “space educat·on’ that coalesced and matuied
dui·ng SWC•s f·ist decade of opeiat·onò
“Pioducts as·de, the b·ggest accompl·shment ovei
the f·ist decade was that we took d·spaiate tia·n·ng
effoits › and I say ‘d·spaiate• because so many people
·ns·de the oigan·zat·on felt l·ke they had a pait on tiy·ng
to do tia·n·ng › and ovei a pei·od of t·me we stood up a
space ops school, wh·ch gave you ‘one stop shopp·ng• foi
space tia·n·ng,’ expla·ned J·m Blanton, Space Waifaie
Centei Sen·oi Techn·cal Adv·soiò
“In my m·nd, theie have been two b·g changes that
have taken place ·n oui 10 yeais › one ·s how we get peo-
ple tia·ned,’ he cont·nuedò “So many people had been
do·ng so many th·ngsò And they weie all coiiectò But they
weien•t ·n one placeò’
He added, “Geneial Loid veiy cleaily undeistands
and knows what ·t takes to put the people w·th the ‘i·ght
smaits• out foiwaid to get the i·ght ·nfoimat·on and
ieouests back to |AFSPC]ò The smaitei the people that
we put foiwaid, the bettei and eas·ei aie the ieouests
fiom the waif·ghteis that come back to Geneial Loid
that he can fulf·ll and make happenò If you look ovei the
piev·ous t·me span, we ¶ust d·d not have the i·ght num-
bei of educated space opeiatois foiwaidò A commandei
had to p·ck and choose who he would go to to get that
·nfoimat·onò Foi ·nstance, the l·nes weie bluiied on who
the spec·al·st was to ieouest SATCOMå oi who the spe-
c·al·st was to ensuie that GPS was go·ng to be theie when
you weie go·ng to need ·tò So the Space Waifaie Centei
accompl·shed the means to place knowledgeable ·nd·v·d-
uals foiwaid wheie they became the s·ngle focal po·nt
manageis foi spaceò
“The second most ·mpoitant change the Space
Waifaie Centei has made ·n the last 10 yeais ·s tak·ng
space-educated piofess·onals and putt·ng them foiwaid
·n a pos·t·on of iespons·b·l·ty, so that when that foiwaid
commandei ieou·ies a space effect, that peison who has
the backgiound and the knowledge knows exactly how to
ieach back ·nto Space Command, thiough Geneial Loid,
and fulf·ll the ieouest that has been placed on h·m,’
Blanton sa·dò
Us·ng an evolut·onaiy sp·ial analogy, Blanton
expla·ned how the past decade has w·tnessed an evolu-
t·on of pio¶ect and tia·n·ng syneig·esò
“Aftei the stand-up of the SWC ten yeais ago, oui
pio¶ects weie focused aiound ·nfus·ng space › ·n othei
woids, pioduce foi the waif·ghtei as many tools as pos-
s·bleå push as many space pio¶ects foiwaid as you can
getò Get ·t to the people who need ·t to execute the·i wai,
because that•s what the Blue R·bbon Panel sa·d,’ he
expla·nedò
“So as·de fiom the tia·n·ng, what we d·d ·nvolved
phys·cal th·ngs you could put on a·iciaft oi phys·cal
th·ngs you could put ·n the CAOC |Comb·ned A·i
Opeiat·ons Centei]ò Those weie the types of piogiams
that we could push foiwaid as fast as poss·ble to ‘get
space ·nto the cockp·t,•’ he sa·dò
Caut·on·ng that he was only expiess·ng h·s own
op·n·on, Blanton ie·teiated, “The ‘bow wave• was to get
as many th·ngs as we could out theie as fast as we couldò
And we d·d that veiy successfullyò Now, look·ng back at
·t, because we ¶ust ·nundated the woild so ou·ckly w·th
these space tools, my peisonal op·n·on ·s that the educa-
t·on of how to apply and explo·t those tools followed on
the next wave › ·t lagged b·t beh·nd the ·ntioduct·on of
the piogiamsò
“But we have matuied ovei the 10 yeais now fiom
that wave of push·ng th·ngs out and lagg·ng w·th tia·n-
·ng to now, wheie we•ve smaitly biought the tia·n·ng
back onl·ne w·th those piogiamsò Moie ·mpoitantly,
w·th the most iecent piogiams that we•ve g·ven out, the
Å èï Ã
Í»²·±® ß·®³¿² Ò¿§·¾» ο³±- ®«²- ¬¸®±«¹¸ ¿ ½¸»½µ´·-¬ ¼«®·²¹ ÙÐÍ -¿¬»´´·¬» ±°»®¿¬·±²- ¿¬ ͽ¸®·»ª»® ß·® Ú±®½»
Þ¿-»ô ݱ´±ò ̸» ±°»®¿¬·±²- ½»²¬»® ¿¬ ͽ¸®·»ª»® ßÚÞ ½±²¬®±´- ¿ ½±²-¬»´´¿¬·±² ±º íð ±®¾·¬·²¹ -¿¬»´´·¬»- ¬¸¿¬ °®±ª·¼»-
²¿ª·¹¿¬·±² ¼¿¬¿ ¬± ³·´·¬¿®§ ¿²¼ ½·ª·´·¿² «-»®- ©±®´¼©·¼»ò ß·®³¿² ο³±- ·- ¿ -¿¬»´´·¬» -§-¬»³ ±°»®¿¬±® º±® ¬¸» î²¼
Í°¿½» Ñ°»®¿¬·±²- ͯ«¿¼®±²ò
tia·n·ng and expeit·se has been i·ght theie w·th them,’
he sa·dò
As an example, Blanton c·ted iecent piess iepoits of
the extieme iespons·veness of B-2 bombeis to giound
foices dui·ng Opeiat·on Iiao· Fieedom (OIF)ò
“How d·d that happená’ he asked ihetoi·callyò “Well,
the Space Waifaie Centei helped make that happenò We
weie the ones that enabled those a·iciaft to have the
satell·te commun·cat·ons capab·l·t·es on boaid, and
¬®¿·²»¼ ¬¸»³ to know how to bi·ng the systems up, how
to use them, and who they would be talk·ng w·thò The
battlef·eld effect was we had a spec·al opeiat·ons usei on
the giound that could talk to an a·iciaft commandei
and, thiough space piogiams, the command and contiol
element of that a·iciaft all togethei ·ns·de of one convei-
sat·onal call › a confeience call ·n layman•s teims › of
eveiybody who needed to be ·n place so that the a·iciaft
commandei could ieouest authoi·ty to execute based on
the usei•s ieouest, iece·ve that authoi·ty, and then sti·ke
i·ght awayò That demonstiates how tia·n·ng caught up
w·th the del·veiy of piogiamsò
“I would say that the SWC•s giowth sp·ial may have
staited w·th a ‘get ·t out the dooi mental·ty,• w·th tia·n-
·ng beh·nd ·tò Now we have giown ·nto a pos·t·on of say-
·ng, ‘We need to get ·t out the dooi, but we•ve got to make
suie that ·t ·s usefulò• We•ie del·vei·ng tools and piogiams
that aie moie effect·ve because eaily on we•ve gotten
w·th the a·iciews, we•ve gotten w·th the people foiwaid,
and shown them how they can use ·t and make them-
selves moie effect·veò The waii·oi on the fiont ·s
‘smaitei• w·th h·s space ieou·iements than he was 10
yeais ago, and now the SWC ·s smaitei on what to pio-
duce foi h·m, ensui·ng a moie effect·ve use of spaceò
“In sp·te of the changes, I bel·eve the SWC•s focus
was coiiect 10 yeais ago,’ he notedò “What we accom-
pl·shed was not a negat·ve th·ngò We weie mandated by
the Blue R·bbon Comm·ss·on to ·nfuse spaceò The
ouest·on ·s, as a iesult of flood·ng the woild w·th space
pio¶ects, d·d we also make that usei smaiteiá D·d we
make h·s ¶ob and effects betteiá Oi d·d we ¶ust flood the
woild w·th systemsá My peisonal op·n·on ·s we del·v-
eied but lagged ·n effects tia·n·ngò We•ve caught up on
Å èî Ã
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ͬ»¿³ º®±³ ¬¸» ½¿¬¿°«´¬ -«®®±«²¼- ¿² ¿ª·¿¬·±² ±®¼²¿²½»³¿² ¿- ¸» ¹·ª»- ¿ ¬¸«³¾-ó«° ¿º¬»® ½¸»½µ·²¹ ¿ Ö±·²¬
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êí÷ ·² ß«¹«-¬ ïçççò ÖÜßÓ «-»- ¿ ÙÐÍó¿·¼»¼ ·²»®¬·¿´ ²¿ª·¹¿¬·±² -§-¬»³ ¬± ¹«·¼» ·¬- îôðððó ±® ïôððð󰱫²¼ ©¿®¸»¿¼
¬± ·¬- ¬¿®¹»¬ ©·¬¸ ¿ ¸·¹¸ ¼»¹®»» ±º ¿½½«®¿½§ò
that tia·n·ngò We•ve tia·ned space opeiatois to be smaitei about the
effects of the systemò We go out w·th systems and we show the opeiatoi
how to use themò Tia·n·ng ·s the one p·ece the iecent SWC command-
eis and Geneial Loid stiessed that enabled the successes of OEF and
OIFò In my m·nd, ·t•s moie than ¶ust pioduc·ngò It•s pioduc·ng and mak-
·ng the peison that you aie pioduc·ng foi smaiteiò And when he•s
smaitei, he knows how to make a bettei ieouest ‘foi spaceò• And when
that smait ieouest comes to space, we ·n tuin aie now smaitei know·ng
exactly what effects to piov·deò Some people w·ll say that I•m complete-
ly wiong, po·nt·ng to the fact that 10 yeais ago when we pushed piod-
ucts out we d·d g·ve tia·n·ngò Yes we d·dò But the tia·n·ng we gave w·th
the systems we pushed out was spec·f·cally focused on the ·nd·v·dual
system del·veiedò It wasn•t on how that system played ·n the b·g p·ctuieò
It wasn•t how space piov·des all of ·ts effectsò It wasn•t how that p·ece
appl·ed to a b·ggei p·ece, wh·ch appl·ed to an even b·ggei p·eceò The
focus 10 yeais ago was ·n gett·ng pio¶ects outò We d·d that successfullyò
But we pushed them out w·th knowledge of the pio¶ect onlyò Now the
pio¶ects aie com·ng out w·th ·ntegiat·on tia·n·ng, complete effects of
spaceò
“Anothei example of th·s ·s the use of a Jo·nt D·iect Attack Mun·t·on
(JDAM)ò Planneis know that the JDAM needs GPS and they must woik
w·th Space Command to ieouest GPS to be at ·ts opt·mum dui·ng the
t·me to use the weaponò• Weapon plann·ng now ·nvolves a space opeia-
toi tell·ng them, ‘If you use the JDAM at th·s t·me, f·ve GPS satell·tes aie
ava·lable, wheieas ·f you diop youi weapon two houis latei, I would only
have two satell·tes ava·lableò• You can undeistand that ·f you•ie us·ng a
GPS s·gnal, you would want to use youi weapon when theie aie f·ve
satell·tes ava·lable to g·ve you the best GPS s·gnal poss·bleò My peisonal
op·n·on ·s that 10 yeais ago we would push th·ngs out the dooi and say,
‘Heie•s a bettei weapon because ·t uses spaceò• We piobably d·dn•t look
at ·t fiom the peispect·ve of, ‘When you use ·t, heie•s how much bettei
·ts effects can be when you tiuly ·ntegiate all of what space piov·desò•
Now, us·ng the space opeiatois, you know that ·f you use youi GPS-
gu·ded mun·t·on dui·ng a pait·culai t·mefiame, you•ll have a h·ghei
piobab·l·ty to k·ll iat·oò’
H·ghl·ght·ng an eaily oigan·zat·onal accompl·shment of SWC,
Blanton added, “Ten yeais ago had the A·i Foice |Foiwaid] Space
Suppoit Teams fiom the 76th Space Ops Souadionò Those teams weie
done away w·th because Geneial Loid and the othei commandeis ieal-
·zed that they had accompl·shed the·i m·ss·onò They ·ntegiated space
and made the opeiatois ·n the f·eld smaiteiò We have people giaduat·ng
fiom oui space couises that aie spec·al·sts ·n all facets of spaceò’
“It•s been an evolut·onaiy piocess,’ Blanton sa·dò “It•s giown ovei 10
yeaisò Space educat·on ·s the foundat·on foi oui giowthò’
To put th·ngs ·nto anothei peispect·ve, the Space Waifaie Centei has
been ·n ex·stence foi about the same span of t·me that stietched between
the establ·shment of the Westein Development D·v·s·on and the f·ist
employment of space asset capab·l·t·es ·n V·etnamò The d·ffeience ·s that
the lattei t·me span has w·tnessed a tiue appiec·at·on and embiace of
space-based capab·l·t·es by Amei·ca•s ¶o·nt seiv·ce waif·ghteisò
Ovei the past 800 yeais, the woids “l·nchp·n’ oi “lynchp·n’ have
expanded ·n mean·ng and s·gn·f·cance fiom a lock·ng dev·ce at the end
of an axle oi shaft to someth·ng that holds togethei a complex systemò
Ovei the last 10 yeais, Amei·ca•s space assets have expanded the·i
own s·gn·f·cance to become an ·ntegial pait of UòSò battlespace capab·l-
·t·esò These space assets have become, and w·ll iema·n, “The Waif·ghteis•
Lynchp·nò’
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
Å èí Ã
É
hen Geneial Lance Wò Loid,
Commandei of A·i Foice Space
Command (AFSPC), unve·led the
A·i Foice•s new badge foi space
piofess·onals on Octò 7, 2004, he
evoked poweiful feel·ngs about the past and the futuieò
Geneial Loid ·s the A·i Foice•s longest-seiv·ng m·s-
s·leei, w·th moie than 35 yeais on dutyò Moie than most,
he undeistands the symbol·c value of the th·n, veit·cal
“pocket iocket’ badge that m·ss·le launch ciewmembeis
woie ·n some foim s·nce the 1950s › wh·ch w·ll eventu-
ally be d·scont·nued once the new badge ·s ava·lable foi
puichaseò Theie ·s a “cont·nu·ng v·s·on’ today about
what piofess·onal·sm ·n the space f·eld ought to mean,
Geneial Loid sa·d, and that ieou·ies a new ·con › one
that can be woin by both space and m·ss·le opeiat·ons
piofess·onalsò
“I commend Geneial Loid and oui A·i Foice foi
look·ng ahead and not dwell·ng on the past,’ sa·d iet·ied
Ltò Genò Jay Kelley, pies·dent of the Assoc·at·on of A·i
Foice M·ss·leeisò “Th·s new badge ·s not the one that ·s
tattooed on the heaits and ·n the m·nds of m·ss·leeis
today, so ·t ·s ·nd·cat·ve of the futuie and not the pastò
I w·ll always embiace the ‘pocket iocket• I eained, but I
w·ll also suppoit th·s new badge that the next geneia-
t·on w·ll weaiò The m·ss·le caieei f·eld that we so
pioudly and competently establ·shed ·s now pait of a
new A·i Foiceò Thus th·s new badge iepiesents fai
moie than the m·ss·on that challenged usò We all need
to suppoit th·s new geneiat·on wh·le always stand·ng
tall and conf·dent iegaid·ng oui m·ss·on and the
‘pocket iocketò•’
Ult·mately, a badge may be a meie p·ece of t·nò The
new one, howevei, iepiesents deep-iooted changesò
Geneial Loid ·s sei·ous about bi·ng·ng the space
bus·ness, and espec·ally the peisonnel s·de of the space
bus·ness, ·nto the 21st centuiyò In 2001, Defense
Secietaiy Donald Rumsfeld oideied the m·l·taiy to
develop space cadies, a concept iooted ·n the iecommen-
dat·ons of the Comm·ss·on to Assess UòSò Nat·onal
Secui·ty Space Management and Oigan·zat·on, the panel
Rumsfeld headed befoie ietuin·ng to the Cab·net ·n the
Bush adm·n·stiat·onò The A·i Foice•s iesponse ·s a sei·-
ous effoit iamiodded by Geneial Loid to ·mpiove the
oual·ty of the a·imen who develop, acou·ie, and opeiate
space systems and to ievamp not meiely a badge, but the
way the seiv·ce manages people and caieeisò
The Rumsfeld Comm·ss·on pulled no punches ·n
desci·b·ng the challengeò W·th·n the UòSò aimed foices,
the comm·ss·on found “a weak space cultuie iesult·ng ·n
unfocused caieei development, educat·on, and tia·n·ngò’
The black-boideied iepoit, ·ssued Janò 11, 2001, found a
lack of depth w·th·n space caieei-f·eld spec·alt·es,
unoual·f·ed leadeis seiv·ng shoit toui lengths, pooi
ietent·on iesult·ng ·n a shoitage of sc·ent·sts and eng·-
neeis, and a shoitage of peisonnel w·th both opeiat·ons
ÜÛÊÛÔÑÐ×ÒÙ ß ÌÛßÓ ÑÚ
Þ§ α¾»®¬ Úò ܱ®®
Å èì Ã
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
ÍÐßÝÛ
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and acou·s·t·on expei·enceò “The Depaitment of Defense
·s not yet on couise to develop the space piofess·onals
the nat·on needs,’ the iepoit concludedò
ÝßÎÛÛÎ Ú× ÛÔÜÍ
Even those fondest of tiad·t·on ·n the nat·on•s 50-
yeai-old space piogiam acknowledge that ·t was t·me foi
the A·i Foice to def·ne, expand, mon·toi, and develop
caieei f·elds foi all off·ceis, enl·sted membeis, and c·v·l-
·ans who woik ·n spaceò The new piogiam of educat·on,
tia·n·ng, and caieei enhancement w·ll focus on piov·d-
·ng, captui·ng, then cap·tal·z·ng on space expei·ence
giouped ·nto a sei·es of n·ne sk·ll aieas foi space piofes-
s·onalsò Accoid·ng to a chait piepaied foi AFSPC, the
numbei of ·nd·v·duals expei·enced ·n each of these cate-
goi·es (as of Octobei 2004) ·s as followsæ
· satell·te systems › 2,474
· nucleai systems › 3,057
· spacel·ft › 1,100
· wain·ng ›1,733
· space contiol › 1,077
· ·ntell·gence, suive·llance, and ieconna·ssance › 1,020
· k·net·c effects › 160
· space waifaie command and contiol › 634
· “othei’ › 4,020ò
The “othei’ categoiy accounts foi space-ielated woik
that doesn•t f·t neatly ·nto one of the othei e·ght f·elds,
such as sc·ent·sts peifoim·ng bas·c ieseaichò
A iesponse to the Rumsfeld Comm·ss·on ·s found, ·n
pait, ·n the wh·te papei “Space Piofess·onal Stiategy,’
s·gned off by Geneial Loid on Api·l 16, 2003ò The stiat-
egy papei comm·tted the A·i Foice to “bu·ld a
team sk·lled and knowledgeable ·n the develop-
ment, employment and ·ntegiat·on of space sys-
tems, concepts and docti·ne to ach·eve nat·onal
secui·ty ob¶ect·vesò’ W·th·n weeks of the papei•s
ielease, the Un·ted States susta·ned ·ts f·ist attack
on ·ts space assetså Saddam Husse·n•s foices set
up half a dozen s·tes aiound Baghdad des·gned
to ¶am the satell·te-gu·ded global pos·t·on·ng sys-
tem ·n an attempt to confound Coal·t·on a·i
attacks ·n Opeiat·on Iiao· Fieedomò A cooid·nat-
ed a·i and space effoit took out the ¶amm·ng
s·tesò
The stiategy papei made ·t cleai that nuitui-
·ng caieeis by space expeits w·ll now be meas-
uied and maikedò “Space piofess·onal·sm ·s a
giaded event,’ declaies a bi·ef·ng on the papeiò
Inst·tut·ng new peisonnel methods w·ll
mean a bettei shot at a iewaid·ng futuie foi
young piofess·onals such as the thiee l·eutenants
of the 1st A·i and Space Test Souadion at
Vandenbeig A·i Foice Base, Cal·fò, who weie
·nteiv·ewed foi th·s naiiat·veò 1st Ltò Maikyves
Valent·n, 2nd Ltò Maik W·lloughby, and 2nd Ltò
Weinei Gschwendtnei alieady know that the·i
woik ·s ·mpoitantò Now they know that ·t w·ll be iewaid-
edò In the past, the A·i Foice took a veiy ·nfoimal
appioach towaid encouiag·ng and iewaid·ng a space
piofess·onal at the beg·nn·ng, at m·d-caieei, and at the
sen·oi levelò Now, Valent·n, W·lloughby, and
Gschwendtnei w·ll be pait of someth·ng “b·ggei than
ouiselves,’ as Valent·n put ·tò They w·ll be ieady foi
advancement, foi command, peihaps even foi geneial•s
stais when the t·me comesò
They w·ll also be able to get moie iespect fiom a
publ·c that ·sn•t well veised on what they doò “We•ie the
geneiat·on that giew up on ͬ¿® Ì®»µ and ͬ¿®¹¿¬»,’ sa·d
Valent·nò “People watch these shows, but how many
undeistand the ·mpoitance of space ·n ieal l·feá Dui·ng
the Peis·an Gulf wai, the publ·c saw smait bombs and
ieal·zed that the satell·te-opeiated global pos·t·on·ng
system was used foi thatò’ S·nce then, a newei geneiat·on
of smait bombs has, ·tself, been satell·te-gu·dedò Today,
as the l·eutenants po·nted out, satell·tes aie used foi
almost eveiy aspect of command, contiol, commun·ca-
t·ons, and ·ntell·genceò Just to c·te one not-so-obv·ous
exampleæ the m·l·taiy•s new combat suiv·val iad·o, the
CSEL (Combat Suiv·voi Evadei Locatoi) ·s a softwaie-
piogiammable dev·ce that bounces messages off satel-
l·tes, mak·ng ·t poss·ble foi a downed a·iman to send a
message ovei a vast d·stanceò When Ma¶ò Dave M·chelett·,
CSEL deputy piogiam managei, told the tiade ¶ouinal
ß®³§ Ì·³»- that CSEL ·s “only go·ng to get bettei,’ he was
iefeii·ng to a new way of us·ng space technology that•s
essent·al to human l·fe ·n wait·meò The piofess·onals
who•ll develop and f·eld such technology bel·eve they•ie
on the giound flooi of a new eiaò
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
Å èë Ã
Í»½®»¬¿®§ ±º Ü»º»²-» ܱ²¿´¼ Øò Ϋ³-º»´¼ ¿²²±«²½»- ³¿¶±®
½¸¿²¹»- ¬± ²¿¬·±²¿´ -»½«®·¬§ -°¿½» ¿½¬·ª·¬·»- ¿¬ ¿ л²¬¿¹±² ²»©-
¾®·»º·²¹ ±² Ó¿§ èô îððïò ̸» ½¸¿²¹»- ©»®» ¾®±«¹¸¬ ¿¾±«¬ ·² ¿²
»ºº±®¬ ¬± ·³°®±ª» ¬¸» ´»¿¼»®-¸·°ô ³¿²¿¹»³»²¬ô ¿²¼ ±®¹¿²·¦¿ó
¬·±² ±º ¬¸» ²¿¬·±²•- ¼»º»²-» ¿²¼ ·²¬»´´·¹»²½» -°¿½» °®±¹®¿³ò
“We•ie ·n a good t·me foi the A·i Foice and foi the
m·l·taiy ·n geneial,’ sa·d Valent·nò “What•s ieally ·nteiest-
·ng ·s that young off·ceis now aie tuin·ng down p·lot slots
to get ·n at the beg·nn·ng of th·s new and exc·t·ng f·eldò’
A·i Foice peisonnel expeits sa·d they do not keep tabs on
how many new off·ceis choose space ·n piefeience to
p·lot tia·n·ngò
“I can see that ·n the futuie, one day we•ll get ·nto
hypeison·c veh·cles and tiavel gieat d·stances ·n a veiy
shoit t·me,’ sa·d Gschwendtneiò “It•ll be gieat know·ng
you weie ·n on the beg·nn·ng of thatò’
Peihaps then, too, the Un·ted States w·ll st·ll be tak-
·ng the f·ist steps towaid develop·ng a hypeison·c veh·cle
› as ·t has been do·ng foi a ouaitei-centuiy oi moieò
Then, as now, “space’ w·ll piobably cons·st mostly of
m·ss·les, satell·tes, and commun·cat·onsò But at least the
A·i Foice w·ll have a caieei plan foi ·ts piofess·onals,
even ·f Gschwendtnei iema·ns eaithboundò
ÐÔßÒ ÑÚ ßÌÌßÝÕ
To make th·s happen, AFSPC accepted maich·ng
oideis fiom A·i Foice Secietaiy Diò James Gò Roche and
went about develop·ng a plan to change how space pio-
fess·onal·sm ·s handledò AFSPC ass·gned ·tself to do the
follow·ngæ
· ·dent·fy who•s who among space piofess·onals and
def·ne the un·oue sk·lls that d·st·ngu·sh them fiom othei
caieeis
· ·nst·tute stiongei, techn·cally-oi·ented space edu-
cat·on and tia·n·ng piogiams
· ·mplement a iobust, thiee-level ceit·f·cat·on pio-
giam to measuie piogiess thioughout an ·nd·v·dual•s
caieei
· deteim·ne educat·on, expei·ence, and ceit·f·cat·on
ieou·iements foi each space piofess·onal b·llet
· establ·sh a peimanent Space Piofess·onal
Management Off·ceò
S·nce the stiategy papei was ·ssued, the seiv·ce has
moved away fiom the teim “space cadie,’ used by the
Rumsfeld Comm·ss·onò It piefeis “space piofess·onalsò’
As pait of the new appioach, the seiv·ce w·ll use Space
Expei·ence Codes (SPECS) as a common def·n·t·on foi
both ·nd·v·dual oual·f·cat·ons and ¶ob ieou·iementsò
ÌÎß× Ò× ÒÙ ßÒÜ
ÛÜËÝßÌ× ÑÒ
Undei A·i Foice Space Command•s new way of do·ng
th·ngs, moie than 500 space piofess·onals w·ll undeigo
classes at the Nat·onal Secui·ty Space Inst·tute, located ·n
Coloiado Spi·ngs, Coloò, each yeaiò One couise ·s also
be·ng conducted at Vandenbeigò Sa·d Valent·næ “We want
people who w·ll be bettei ·nfoimedò The planned classes,
Space 100, Space 200, and Space 300, w·ll help us make
bettei dec·s·onsò We w·ll be the expeits ·n oui f·eld, and
we w·ll make the best dec·s·ons at that po·nt ·n t·meò’ The
iesult w·ll be a commun·ty of ciedent·aled space piofes-
s·onals that ·ncludes, among otheis, eng·neeis, sc·ent·sts,
system opeiatois, and piogiam manageisò
On July 1, 2004, Geneial Loid•s command cieated an
off·ce to oveisee space peisonnel managementò Colò Cal
Hutto, the f·ist d·iectoi, sa·d the off·ce w·ll tiack the
caieeis of m·l·taiy › off·cei and enl·sted, act·ve duty,
guaid, and ieseives › and c·v·l·an space piofess·onals,
ta·loi the·i tia·n·ng to the·i needs, and iewaid those who
excelò Hutto•s t·tle ·s ch·ef of foice development and
iead·nessò H·s off·ce w·ll ieach thioughout AFSPC and
the A·i Foice, and ·s a ieact·on to the comm·ss·on•s con-
cein that the m·l·taiy must ·mpiove ·ts space peisonnel
thiough educat·on and tia·n·ng measuies and bettei
caieei developmentò
Hutto and othei off·c·als say the A·i Foice hasn•t
always had the best aiiangement foi tiack·ng space pio-
fess·onals and f·ll·ng space pos·t·onsò In the past, the sei-
v·ce•s human iesouices expeits d·d not always know who
was best oual·f·ed foi a slot, and d·d not always have the
best data on an ·nd·v·dual•s oual·f·cat·onsò Now, caieei
management pi·nc·ples that aie w·dely used ·n othei
f·elds w·ll be appl·ed to those who woik ·n space ¶obsò
Hutto desci·bed the way the educat·on and tia·n·ng
effoit w·ll woik “by piov·d·ng ceit·f·cat·ons at vai·ous
levels of ach·evement,’ a way of iat·ng and mon·toi·ng
space piofess·onals that hasn•t ex·sted piev·ouslyò
Space piofess·onals who have a Level 1 ceit·f·cat·on
w·ll have one-yeai•s expei·ence ·n a space-oi·ented ¶ob
and complete the f·ist tia·n·ng couise ·n the sei·es,
Space 100ò AFSPC launched a piototype of Space 100 at
Vandenbeig to ·ntioduce the fundamentals of space
acou·s·t·on, the systems opeiated by the·i seiv·ce, and
the·i funct·on ·n combatò A typ·cal student would be a
second l·eutenant (space opeiatoi oi acou·iei), an a·i-
man f·ist class, oi a c·v·l·an GS-9ò A un·veis·ty degiee iel-
evant to space tia·n·ng ·s des·ied at th·s ¶unctuie ·n a
caieeiò
Level 2 ceit·f·cat·on w·ll apply to space piofess·onals
who have s·x yeais of space expei·ence and who undeigo
the m·d-level Space 200 couiseò The Space 200 couise has
actually been undei way longei than the lowei-level class,
hav·ng begun ·n Maich 2004ò It offeis what Hutto called
a “bioadei and deepei’ look at the A·i Foice•s space
acou·s·t·on and opeiat·onsò It piov·des a iefieshei of the
eail·ei couise, and then delves much moie deeply ·nto
space des·gn, development, and acou·s·t·on, and ·nto
space ·ntegiat·on and tact·cs ·n ¶o·nt waifaieò A typ·cal
student would be a ma¶oi fiom any of the foui seiv·ces,
a techn·cal seigeant, oi a GS-11ò
The top-diawei piofess·onals who ieach Level 3 cei-
t·f·cat·on w·ll have n·ne yeais of expei·ence ·n the space
f·eld and w·ll complete the sen·oi Space 300 couiseò The
couise w·ll covei stiateg·c docti·ne and pol·cy ·ssuesò It
w·ll piov·de a iefieshei of the second-level couise, and
then puisue ieou·iements, stiategy, pol·cy, docti·ne, and
law, and w·ll ·nclude content ta·loied to piepaie students
Å èê Ã
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
foi sen·oi leadeish·p iolesò That couise ·s st·ll be·ng
developed and ·s scheduled to open the doois foi ·ts f·ist
students ·n Octobei 2005ò Repiesentat·ve students w·ll
·nclude A·i Foice, Aimy, and Mai·ne Coips l·eutenant
colonels oi Navy commandeis, mastei seigeants, and
GS-14sò
Hav·ng thiee levels of caieei development piov·des
“a cont·nuum,’ sa·d Huttoò “These couises |w·ll] bi·ng
space piofess·onals togethei seveial t·mes dui·ng the·i
caieeis ·n oidei to stay cuiient on evolv·ng m·ss·ons,
technolog·es, and capab·l·t·es and to piepaie the ·nd·v·d-
ual foi the next level of iespons·b·l·tyò’
AFSPC expects to cont·nue w·th othei tia·n·ng as
wellò Th·s w·ll ·nclude an advanced space opeiat·ons
couise that w·ll ·nclude tiavel and w·ll typ·cally take
1,000 students ·n a yeai, a couise on Space ·n the A·i
Opeiat·ons Centei (AOC), and a Sen·oi Space Off·cei ·n
Theatei couise to focus on how space assets aie leveiaged
·n an AOC ·n a combat zone › typ·cally w·th as few as 20
studentsò
The command w·ll also cont·nue to send piofess·on-
als to the A·i Foice Weapons School foi advanced tia·n-
·ng ·n weapons and tact·csò
As iepoited by T·m Roedei ·n the ݱ´±®¿¼± Í°®·²¹-
Ù¿¦»¬¬», AFSPC also ·s launch·ng a plan to cooid·nate
educat·on of space expeits w·th the Un·veis·ty of Coloiado
at Coloiado Spi·ngsò Geneial Loid and Un·veis·ty
Chancelloi Pam Shockley-Zalabak desci·bed the plan
iecently to the Stiateg·c Foices Subcomm·ttee of the House
Aimed Seiv·ces Comm·ttee ·n Wash·ngton, DòCò
×ÓÐÑÎÌßÒÝÛ ÑÚ ÍÐßÝÛ ÛÈÐÛÎÌÍ
Geneial Loid says that the new emphas·s on space
development means theie aie now moie oppoitun·t·es
than evei befoieò He emphas·zes that the new appioach
·s a peimanent piogiam › one that bu·lds foi the futuieò
And Geneial Loid says the new appioach to piofess·on-
al·sm w·ll pay offò
“The m·l·taiy space commun·ty ·s fieouently accused
of stovep·p·ng oui opeiat·ons and development effoits,’
Geneial Loid sa·d iecentlyò “But we aie woik·ng haid to
el·m·nate that d·v·s·on and ·ntegiate acioss all aspects of
spaceò
“Oui space systems aie nat·onal assets,’ Geneial Loid
sa·d, “but oui space piofess·onals aie nat·onal tieasuies
• and we must ensuie endui·ng a·i and space supei·oi-
·ty by cont·nu·ng to pol·sh the·i knowledge and help·ng
them giowò It ·s oui obl·gat·on to oui m·l·taiy foices and
·t ·s oui iespons·b·l·ty to the nat·onò’
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
Å èé Ã
ß·® Ú±®½» ͬ¿ºº ͹¬ò Þ®·¿² Þ»´¿³ ¬·¹¸¬»²- ¼±©² ¿ ³·--·´» -·´± °±©»® ½¿¾´» ¿¬ Ê¿²¼»²¾»®¹ ß·® Ú±®½» Þ¿-»ô Ý¿´·ºòô ¼«®ó
·²¹ ¿ ³·--·´» ³¿·²¬»²¿²½» »¨»®½·-»ò Þ»´¿³ ·- °¿®¬ ±º ¿ ¬»¿³ º®±³ ¬¸» çï-¬ Í°¿½» É·²¹ ¿¬ Ó·²±¬ ß·® Ú±®½» Þ¿-»ô
ÒòÜòô ¬¸¿¬ ©¿- °¿®¬·½·°¿¬·²¹ ·² Ù«¿®¼·¿² ݸ¿´´»²¹»ô ¿² ¿²²«¿´ ½±³°»¬·¬·±² ³»¿²¬ ¬± ¬»-¬ ¬¸» ©¿®¬·³» ®»¿¼·²»--
±º ¬»¿³- ®»°®»-»²¬·²¹ »¿½¸ ³·--·´» ¿²¼ -°¿½» ©·²¹ «²·¬ º®±³ ß·® Ú±®½» Í°¿½» ݱ³³¿²¼ò ݱ³°»¬·¬·±² »ª»²¬-
·²½´«¼» ¬·³»¼ »¨»®½·-»- ·² ³·--·´»ó½®»© ±°»®¿¬·±²-ô ³·--·´» ¿²¼ -°¿½» ³¿·²¬»²¿²½»ô -°¿½»´·º¬ ±°»®¿¬·±²-ô -°¿½» ¿²¼
³·--·´» ½±³³«²·½¿¬·±²-ô ³·--·´» ½±¼» ½±²¬®±´ô ¸»´·½±°¬»® ±°»®¿¬·±²-ô ¿²¼ -»½«®·¬§ º±®½» ±°»®¿¬·±²-ò
×
t•s the same way eveiy moin·ngæ Young UòSò A·i
Foice “m·ss·leeis’ assemble ·n bi·ef·ng iooms at
seveial s·tes acioss the Noithein Pla·ns to piepaie
foi anothei cycle of nevei-end·ng deteiient pio-
tect·on foi the nat·onò Suppoited by a iange of
h·ghly spec·al·zed ma·ntenance, secui·ty, and suppoit
a·imen, the teams of combat ciewmen w·ll move out to
w·dely scatteied Launch Contiol Centeis (LCCs), wheie
they w·ll take anothei tuin undeigiound ·n a decades-
long cycle of cont·nu·ng deteiienceò
ɸ·´» ¬¸» ݱ´¼ É¿® ³¿§ ¾» ±ª»®ô ¬¸» ²¿¬·±²•-
-¬®¿¬»¹·½ ²«½´»¿® ©»¿°±²- ¿®» ¿ ª·¬¿´ ¿-°»½¬ ±º ±«®
¼»º»²-»ô ¿²¼ »ª»®§ ¼¿§ ß·® Ú±®½» °»®-±²²»´ °®±ª·¼»
¼·´·¹»²¬ ¼»¬»®®»²½» º±® ¬¸» ²¿¬·±²ò
Å èè Ã
Þ§ ͽ±¬¬ Îò Ù±«®´»§
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ß¾±ª»æ ß Ì·¬¿² ×× Ô¿«²½¸ ݱ²¬®±´ Ý»²¬»® ¿¬ Ü¿ª·-óÓ±²¬¸¿² ßÚÞô ß®·¦òô ·² ïçéèò ߬´¿- ¿²¼ Ì·¬¿² ³·--·´»- º±®³»¼ ¿
½®«½·¿´ °¿®¬ ±º ß³»®·½¿•- ²«½´»¿® ¼»¬»®®»²¬ò
Headouaiteied at Fò Eò Waiien A·i Foice Base, Wyoò,
the membeis of 20th A·i Foice po·nt to a pioud tiad·-
t·on as Amei·caùs f·ist long-iange stiateg·c foiceò
Act·vated Api·l 4, 1944, the un·tùs B-29 Supeifoitiesses
stiuck at the veiy heait of the Japanese home ·slandsò
Two 20th A·i Foice bombeis, the Enola Gay and Bockùs
Cai, foiced an eaily end to Woild Wai II aftei they
diopped the f·ist atom·c bombs on Japan and ·nauguiat-
ed the 20th as the woild•s f·ist nucleai-capable combat
foiceò
Inact·vated on Maich 1, 1955, the un·t was ieact·vat-
ed at Vandenbeig AFB, Cal·fò, on Septò 1, 1991, as a com-
ponent of the Stiateg·c A·i Commandò Dui·ng an eia of
tumultuous downs·z·ng follow·ng the end of the Cold
Wai, the 20th expei·enced thiee ma¶oi command
changes ·n less than a decadeæ one yeai as pait of
Stiateg·c A·i Commandå one yeai ·n A·i Combat
Commandå and, beg·nn·ng ·n July 1993, ·ntegiat·on
undei A·i Foice Space Commandò That yeai also saw
Headouaiteis, 20th A·i Foice move fiom Vandenbeig to
Fò Eò Waiienò
As desci·bed ·n command oveiv·ews, Headouaiteis,
20th A·i Foice ·s un·oue ·n that ·t has dual iespons·b·l·-
t·es to A·i Foice Space Command and Un·ted States
Stiateg·c Command (USSTRATCOM)ò As the m·ss·le
Numbeied A·i Foice foi AFSPC, 20th A·i Foice ·s
iespons·ble foi ma·nta·n·ng and manag·ng the A·i
Foiceùs ICBM foiceò Des·gnated as USSTRATCOMùs
Task Foice 214, 20th A·i Foice piov·des on-aleit, com-
bat-ieady ICBMs to the pies·dentò Comb·ned w·th the
othei two legs of the countiy•s stiateg·c nucleai foices,
bombeis, and submai·nes, USSTRATCOM piotects the
Un·ted States w·th an umbiella of deteiienceò
In h·ghl·ght·ng the cont·nu·ng ·mpoitance of
Amei·ca•s stiateg·c nucleai deteiient, Ma¶ò Genò Fiank Gò
Klotz, 20th A·i Foice commandei, iecently obseived that
the deteiient umbiella piov·des the nat·on w·th seveial
fuithei ·mpoitant piotect·ons moie than a decade aftei
the end of the Cold Waiò
“Those funct·ons have been d·v·ded ·nto foui sepa-
iate tasks,’ Klotz expla·nedò “The f·ist ·s to d·ssuade any
othei potent·al adveisaiy, now oi ·n the futuie, fiom
develop·ng weapons of mass destiuct·on that ·t could
use to thieaten the Un·ted States, ·ts foices stat·oned
abioad, oi ·ts all·esò And we do that by ma·nta·n·ng a
s·gn·f·cant capab·l·ty ·n stiateg·c nucleai foicesò In a
sense, what we do ·s to ‘ia·se the bai• foi anybody else
who m·ght th·nk that, w·th a modest ·nvestment of
money, they could somehow match oi thieaten the
Un·ted States ·n teims of stiateg·c nucleai capab·l·tyò So
we ma·nta·n oui nucleai foices at such a level that we
d·ssuade anybody else fiom tiy·ng to get ·nto the gameò’
“The second ob¶ect·ve that we ach·eve by hav·ng
iobust, capable, and v·able stiateg·c nucleai foices ›
·nclud·ng the ICBMs › ·s to assuie oui all·es of oui
iesolve to take whatevei act·ons we need to piov·de foi
not only oui secui·ty but the·i secui·ty as wellò We•ie
t·ed to the NATO nat·ons and othei nat·ons by a num-
bei of d·ffeient tieat·es and aiiangements by wh·ch we
extend a secui·ty guaiantee to themò Oui w·ll·ngness to
ma·nta·n th·s pait·culai type of capab·l·ty assuies them
of oui puipose,’ he sa·dò
Klotz cont·nued, “The th·id ob¶ect·ve we accompl·sh
·s someth·ng that oui stiateg·c nucleai foices have always
doneæ to detei anybody fiom us·ng a weapon of mass
destiuct·on aga·nst the Un·ted States, oi ·ts foices abioad,
oi ·ts fi·ends and all·esò’
“F·nally, ·f deteiience fa·ls, obv·ously oui weapon sys-
tems aie theie to actually defend the Un·ted States, ·ts
foices abioad, oi ·ts all·es w·th the capab·l·ty of pievent-
·ng anyone who would use weapons of mass destiuct·on
aga·nst us fiom do·ng so,’ he addedò
Klotz was ou·ck to acknowledge that today•s ICBM
deteiience m·ss·ons aie peifoimed aga·nst a backgiound
that ·s ·nheiently d·ffeient fiom the one undei wh·ch ·t
was ·n·t·ally cieatedò “Pi·oi to the end of the Cold Wai,
we weie focused on the thieat posed by a monol·th·c and
host·le Sov·et Un·on,’ he sa·dò “S·nce then, the Sov·et
Un·on has d·ssolvedò The Waisaw Pact has d·ssolvedò
Russ·a and the Un·ted States aie now coopeiat·ng ·n a
host of aieasæ pol·t·cal, econom·c, and secui·tyò
Theiefoie, we•ie not fac·ng the same k·nd of thieatò But
theie aie st·ll people out theie who, e·thei now oi ·n the
futuie, m·ght tiy and develop weapons of mass destiuc-
t·on that can thieaten usò And th·s ·s one of the ways that
we detei themò It•s not the only way ·n wh·ch you detei
teiioi·sts oi othei nat·ons fiom us·ng weapons of mass
destiuct·on aga·nst the Un·ted States, but ·t ·s one of the
ways that you do ·tò’
The ongo·ng changes ·n the woild pol·t·cal cl·mate
noted by Klotz have also been accompan·ed by s·gn·f·cant
changes w·th·n 20th A·i Foice•s ICBM foice stiuctuieò
Spec·f·cally, dui·ng the 1990s alone, the ICBM foice was
ieduced fiom n·ne w·ngs to thiee w·th the numbei of
m·ss·les on aleit cut ·n halfò “That ·s someth·ng that•s
somet·mes lost ·n a lot of the academ·c d·scuss·on and
pol·cy debates concein·ng oui stiateg·c nucleai foices,’
Klotz obseivedò “But we have gone thiough a s·gn·f·cant
pei·od of down-s·z·ng, deact·vat·on, and even ‘de-aleit-
·ngò• When I peisonally ¶o·ned the m·ss·le bus·ness, we had
n·ne opeiat·onal ICBM basesò Today we have thieeò When
I ¶o·ned we had 1,054 m·ss·les on aleitò Today we have 513,
and we•ie go·ng down to 500 by th·s t·me next yeaiò’
Although decl·n·ng to speak on behalf of othei ele-
ments w·th·n the nat·on•s nucleai deteiient foice stiuc-
tuie, he d·d obseive that the Navy was also ·n the piocess
of ieduc·ng ·ts numbei of ball·st·c m·ss·le submai·nes
fiom 18 to 14, w·th two of those pio¶ected to be ·n ovei-
haul at any po·nt ·n t·meò “So we aie ad¶ust·ng to the
chang·ng natuie of the thieat and we•ie do·ng ·t w·th oui
foices peifoim·ng the foui key funct·ons ment·onedæ
d·ssuade, assuie, detei, and defend,’ Klotz sa·dò
That be·ng sa·d, he emphas·zed that some aspects of
ICBM deteiience have iema·ned the same ·n the post-Cold
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Wai eia. “Eveiy day, we man oui Launch Contiol Centeis
with a two-officei ciew that peifoim aleit aiound the
clock,’ he said. “And we continue to have a veiy high
tempo of sending out maintenance technicians and secu-
iity foices to suppoit maintenance that•s going on in the
field.’
Emphasizing that 20th Aii Foice has “always taken
the secuiity and safety of oui ICBM foice veiy, veiy seii-
ously,’ the commandei highlighted seveial examples of
existing foice piotection infiastiuctuie. “We have a 110-
ton blast dooi that sits on top of the missile silo. We have
sensois both above giound and below giound that mon-
itoi any activities out on the launch facilities. We have
secuiity foices deployed out in the field to iespond to any
secuiity alaim 24/7/365. We•ve always maintained the
highest standaids of tiaining and peifoimance on the
pait of oui secuiity foices. And we•ve been doing that foi
40 yeais,’ he said.
“But since 9/11, we aie focusing even moie on the
issue of secuiity,’ he added. “And we aie staiting the
piocess of adapting new types of technologies to make
what I considei a veiy secuie foice even moie secuie › to
tiy to convince any potential teiioiist oi adveisaiy who
would say, ‘Let me thieaten Ameiica•s ICBM foice oi take
some soit of action against it,• to come to the conclusion
that it is iust too difficult a task; it is iust too haid a tai-
get to even tiy it.’
Along with implementation of a wide iange of
unspecified secuiity initiatives, 20th Aii Foice is also
undeigoing significant foice modeinization to its
Minuteman III fleet. Recent piogiam pioiections place
the value of the ongoing ICBM modeinization initiatives
at appioximately $6.2 billion.
One aspect of the Minuteman III modeinization
effoit is called the Piopulsion Replacement Piogiam
(PRP). “Undei PRP, we aie ieplacing the solid iocket fuel
in all thiee stages of the missile,’ Klotz explained. “We
have done that befoie with the second and thiid stage,
and it•s time to do the second and thiid stages again. We
have nevei done it with the fiist stage.’ He added that the
PRP had iecently passed “the centuiy maik,’ with ovei
100 of the new boosteis alieady in the giound and
appioximately 400 to go.
Anothei modeinization effoit is the Guidance
Replacement Piogiam (GRP). “Basically what we•ie
doing is taking out paits fiom the Minuteman III guid-
ance system and putting in new paits to actually make it
moie sustainable,’ he said. “A lot of the technology in
theie is 1960s- and 1970s-eia and we have bettei ways of
doing those things now. But |GRP] does not impiove the
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accuiacyò It•s a common m·sconcept·on
that we•ie ·mpiov·ng the accuiacy of the
M·nuteman IIIò But we•ie not do·ng thatò
We•ie ¶ust mak·ng some smait changes
that w·ll extend the mean t·me between
fa·luies on oui gu·dance system so we
don•t have to do as much ma·ntenance on
those systemsò And that ·s the b·ggest di·v-
ei foi oui heavy-duty ma·ntenanceæ
ieplac·ng the gu·dance systemsò’
Anothei M·nuteman III modein·za-
t·on ·n·t·at·ve ·s called the Safety
Enhanced Reentiy Veh·cleò Undei that
piogiam, 20th A·i Foice w·ll take some of
the modein waiheads that aie on the
Peacekeepei m·ss·les now be·ng deact·vat-
ed and deploy some of those waiheads on
the modein·zed M·nuteman III m·ss·lesò
Othei enhancements aie focused on
M·nuteman III command and contiol
fac·l·t·es and ·nfiastiuctuieò One example
can be found ·n the block softwaie
upgiade now be·ng appl·ed to the Rap·d
Execut·on and Combat Taiget·ng
(REACT) command and contiol consoles
located ·n the undeigiound aleit capsules
at the LCCsò F·ist deployed ·n the m·d-
90s, the REACT consoles w·ll have
expanded capab·l·t·es thiough the appl·-
cat·on of the new softwaieò
“At all oui un·ts, we•ie also enhanc·ng
the commun·cat·ons capab·l·ty to allow
us to make full use of the constellat·on of
MILSATCOM MILSTAR satell·tes,’ Klotz
added, expla·n·ng that the enhancement
w·ll allow “use of all the fieouency spec-
tium that the satell·tes have, ·nclud·ng
enciypted capab·l·t·es, and enhanc·ng oui
capab·l·ty to use oui vai·ous low-fieouency
and veiy-low-fieouency tiansm·tteisò So
we w·ll have s·gn·f·cantly ·ncieased com-
mun·cat·ons connect·v·tyò It•s alieady veiy
goodò In fact, one of the advantages that
the ICBM bi·ngs to the f·ght ·s the iedun-
dant commun·cat·ons path ·nto a Launch
Contiol Centei › moie so than w·th the
submai·nes oi w·th the bombeisò The
ICBMs g·ve a veiy h·gh assuiance that
you can both contact and be contacted by
a Launch Contiol Centeiò And th·s
upgiade w·ll enhance that capab·l·ty even
fuitheiò’
F·nally, the enhancement package w·ll
encompass a bioad spectium of c·v·l
eng·neei·ng effoits to upgiade the env·-
ionmental contiol systems at both launch
s·los and LCCsò “The whole ob¶ect·ve of
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all th·s ·s to susta·n the M·nuteman m·ss·le unt·l the yeai
2020 › at least unt·l the yeai 2020ò By that t·me ·t•s oui
hope that we w·ll have a follow-on Land Based Stiateg·c
Deteiient system ieady to take M·nuteman III•s place,’
Klotz sa·dò At the same t·me that the tiansfoim·ng foice
·s apply·ng these s·gn·f·cant M·nuteman III upgiade
packages, 20th A·i Foice ·s also cont·nu·ng the deact·va-
t·on of ·ts 50 Peacekeepei m·ss·les, a m·ss·on staited ·n
Octobei 2002ò “We•ie down to 13 Peacekeepeis on aleit
i·ght now,’ Klotz sa·d, add·ng that the deact·vat·on
piocess “·s not a ti·v·al taskò’
Pait of the woik challenge stems fiom Peacekeepei•s
bas·c m·ss·le des·gnò Unl·ke the M·nuteman III m·ss·le, ·n
wh·ch the thiee stages aie mated at the depot and del·v-
eied oi iemoved fiom the s·lo togethei as one package
(w·th gu·dance and waihead sect·ons added oi iemoved
sepaiately), Peacekeepei ieou·ies the foui laigei-d·ame-
tei stages to be ·nd·v·dually stacked and destacked ·n the
s·loò “In that iespect, Peacekeepei ·s soit of l·ke a space
launch veh·cle,’ Klotz addedò “So the deact·vat·on of a
Peacekeepei ieou·ies 10 full days on s·te, then two weeks
oi moie back on base, piocess·ng all the paits and gett·ng
them ieady foi sh·pment to the po·nt wheie they w·ll
ult·mately be stoiedò It•s not a ti·v·al task, but ·t•s one that
we have done safely, secuiely, on schedule, and on budg-
etò By the end of Septembei 2005, Peacekeepei w·ll be
completely deact·vatedò’
Look·ng towaid the futuie of 20th A·i Foice, Klotz
sees s·gn·f·cant challenges ·n the need to conduct the
myi·ad susta·nment, modein·zat·on, and secui·ty
upgiade piogiams on t·me, on schedule, and on budgetò
“It ·s an enoimous undeitak·ng,’ he caut·onedò “I•ve
heaid ·t sa·d by people who have been ·n the bus·ness
s·nce ·ts ·ncept·on that th·s ·s piobably the h·ghest opei-
at·onal tempo that the M·nuteman foice has had s·nce
we f·ist put the m·ss·les ·n the gioundò I mean, we aie l·t-
eially chang·ng oi affect·ng eveiy ·nch of the 60-foot
M·nuteman III m·ss·le › fiom the nose t·p to the f·ist
stage nozzles › as well as eveiyth·ng that suiiounds ·t,
·nclud·ng command and contiol, commun·cat·ons,
secui·ty, and env·ionmental contiol systemsò And we•ie
do·ng ·t w·th the expectat·on of hav·ng most of ·t done
by the yeai 2011 › much of ·t befoie thatò’
“That•s go·ng to be the b·ggest challenge,’ he cont·n-
ued, “ma·nta·n·ng that ops tempo w·th the s·ze foice we
have, w·th the suppoit eou·pment, and the veh·cles that
we have, ovei that pei·od of t·meò All the wh·le we w·ll
keep oui eye f·imly f·xed on the need to ma·nta·n the
h·ghest levels of secui·ty and safety as we do all of th·sò’
Clos·ng the ·nteiv·ew w·th some peisonal obseiva-
t·ons iegaid·ng the cont·nu·ng eff·cacy of a m·ss·le foice
foi the nat·on, Klotz noted that, “The M·nuteman and
Peacekeepei foices have been laigely geaied to stiateg·c
nucleai deteiienceò But ·t ·s my sense that ovei the next
decade oi two we would be well-seived as a nat·on by
hav·ng a capab·l·ty to del·vei a weapon halfway acioss
the woild to any po·nt of the globe w·th absolute piec·-
s·on ·n oidei to ach·eve an ·mpoitant m·l·taiy ob¶ect·ve
› an ob¶ect·ve that you wanted to ach·eve befoie you
could get othei UòSò oi coal·t·on foices to the taigetò’
“Theie•s a lot of talk about ·t, but as I look at the tech-
nology that•s out theie now, what you can ach·eve ·n the
next 10 to 20 yeais ·s piobably some convent·onal vai·a-
t·on of the ICBM › some vai·at·on of the cuiient types of
technology that we haveò If that k·nd of capab·l·ty was
needed, then I th·nk that would be an ·mpoitant aiiow to
put ·n the ou·vei of oui nat·on-
al leadeish·pò We st·ll have to do
a lot of th·nk·ng about how we
would do that, but that•s the
k·nd of a capab·l·ty that would
be well-seived foi the nat·on to
have as we look out 20 oi 30
yeais ·nto the futuie,’ he sa·dò
“As we look at the last 50
yeais of space and m·ss·les, we
need to diaw on that expei·-
ence,’ Klotz concludedò “Not
¶ust ·n teims of the technology
·tself, but ·n teims of oui con-
cepts foi opeiat·ng, ma·nta·n-
·ng, secui·ng, and suppoit·ng
the ICBMò And then we need to
use those as a spi·ngboaid foi
how we th·nk about develop·ng
add·t·onal capab·l·t·es foi the
nat·onal leadeish·p to use ·n
t·mes of confl·ct oi ci·s·s to
ach·eve UòSò nat·onal secui·ty
ob¶ect·vesò’
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Ì
he hope foi a new woild of peace follow·ng
the end of Woild Wai II ·n 1945 was
dashed by the Cold Wai, that pei·od of
·nteinat·onal tens·on caused by ·iieconc·l-
able pol·t·cal d·ffeiences between the
Un·ted States and the Sov·et Un·onò In add·t·on to
·nsp·i·ng the aims iace, the Cold Wai was both the back-
diop and ·mpetus foi anothei iace › one that would
iesult ·n mank·nd•s gieatest ach·evement ·n the 20th
centuiyæ the land·ng of a man on the moon on July 20,
1969ò
The compet·t·on between the Un·ted States and the
Sov·et Un·on to ieach, exploie, and conouei space was
·ntenseò The costs weie enoimous and the technolog·cal
challenges weie m·nd-boggl·ngò Of iocket, satell·te, and
human peifoimance and enduiance ·n “the W·ld Black
Yondei’ l·ttle to noth·ng was known, almost eveiyth·ng
was con¶ectuie, and the only way to know foi ceita·n was
to doò The Un·ted States enteied the manned space fl·ght
aiena w·th the X-15 and astionaut piogiams chi·stened
Meicuiy, Gem·n·, and Apolloò
These piogiams weie p·oneei·ng effoits, w·th the
men ·nvolved l·teially wi·t·ng the ioadmap that otheis
would followò Gene Kianz, a foimei A·i Foice p·lot who
became one of NASA•s f·ist fl·ght d·iectois iecalled the
s·tuat·on when he ¶o·ned the Meicuiy teamæ “S·nce theie
weie no books wi·tten on the actual methodology of
space fl·ght, we had to wi·te them as we went alongò’
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Because “no fiame of iefeience’ was a constant in those
eaily days, Ameiica•s manned space piogiam took a
seiies of what Kianz called “baby steps,’ caiefully and
thoioughly piepaiing foi missions by conducting
exhaustive simulations and unmanned tests of pioce-
duies and eouipment. It was absolutely vital, totally nec-
essaiy, and, to the geneial population, thoioughly boiing
› paiticulaily because the Russians weie giabbing intei-
national headlines with theii space piogiam achieve-
ments. On Octobei 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successful-
ly launched Sputnik 1, the woild•s fiist satellite. The
“space iace’ was officially on, with the Soviet Union
leaping to a spectaculai lead. This was followed by
anothei fiist on Apiil 12, 1961, when cosmonaut Yuii
Gagaiin became the fiist man in space. The United States
was in the uncomfoitable position of playing catch-up,
big time.
The fiist piogiam in Ameiica•s manned space effoit
was the X-15. The X-15 was one of a seiies of expeiimen-
tal ultia high-speed, oi hypeisonic, aiiciaft that included
the X-1, the X-2, and the Dyna-Soai X-20.
The X-15 piogiam contained nine phases that stud-
ied and tested eveiything fiom new engine design,
hypeispeed flight, flight contiol systems, fuel systems,
and metal duiability to human suivivability.
Twelve pilots paiticipated in the piogiam. All weie
eithei on active duty oi had foimeily seived in the mili-
taiy. Five had been combat pilots in Woild Wai II and
thiee saw combat in the Koiean Wai. One, Neil
Aimstiong, would latei become the fiist man to walk on
the moon.
A lot of theoiy and speculation suiiounded the con-
cept of whethei oi not an aiiplane and its pilot could fly
at hypeisonic speeds of Mach 5 and above. The math
claimed it was possible. Wind tunnel tests tended to
agiee. But the only way to know foi ceitain was to build
it and fly it. Milton O. Thompson, an X-15 test pilot, suc-
cinctly stated the two ouestions that would dominate the
X-15 piogiam, “Could we design an aiiplane that would
be contiollable outside the atmospheie at high speed and
steep entiy angles: Moie impoitant, could a pilot suivive
and function adeouately in this high-eneigy enviion-
ment:’ In an inteiview at the time, Aii Foice Reseaich
and Development Command Geneial Beinaid A.
Schiievei added, “The X-15 will piovide a gieat deal of
infoimation about man in his enviionment in space ›
and it will be the fiist expeiiment in which man will have
to peifoim functions in space: moie functions than in
|NASA•s Meicuiy piogiam]. . . . the X-15 has the poten-
tial of taking a laige step foiwaid in the development of
man•s enviionment › leading to his peifoiming a useful
function. |The X-15 will also] give veiy valuable infoi-
mation on aeiodynamics and contiol chaiacteiistics › in
the ie-entiy into Eaith•s atmospheie.’
The oiiginal design specifications called foi the X-15
to achieve a minimum top speed of Mach 6.6, oi 4,430
miles pei houi, and an altitude of 250,000 feet, oi 47
miles. Today, populai imagination, laigely fueled by ͬ¿®
É¿®- movies, has single oi two-seat spaceciaft looping,
iolling, and peifoiming split-S, Immelmann, and othei
aeiial aciobatic maneuveis utilizing iuddeis, aileions,
and elevatois. Nothing is fuithei fiom the tiuth, because
at that altitude no aii exists foi those flying suifaces to
giab. Instead the X-15, because it would follow a ballistic
tiaiectoiy, was installed with a ballistic contiol system
consisting of eight small maneuveiing iets in its nose and
foui in its wings. These weie designed to achieve the coi-
iect ie-entiy angle › too high oi too low and the X-15
and its pilot would be vapoiized by atmospheiic fiiction.
Noith Ameiican won the contiact to build the X-15.
Among the many challenges the 125 engineeis assigned
to the piogiam encounteied was that of cieating metals
that could maintain stiuctuial integiity in an enviion-
ment that included tempeiatuie extiemes ianging fiom
a low of minus 300 degiees Fahienheit to a high of 1,200
degiees Fahienheit. As if that weien•t challenge enough,
the metals also had to be as light as possible. Eail Sykes,
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one of the eng·neeis on the piogiam, acknowledged that
fiom the beg·nn·ng, “The n·ghtmaie foi eveiybody |was]
we·ghtò’ Eveiy ti·ck fiom the f·l·ng and shav·ng of
unstiessed paits to us·ng d·ffeient weld·ng techn·oues
was ut·l·zed to diop the spaceciaft•s we·ght as much as
safely poss·bleò The iesult was at one po·nt a sav·ngs of
300 pounds on the 31,275-pound X-15ò Th·s y·elded the
potent·al add·t·on of an extia 102 m·les pei houi to the
max·mum speedò
Anothei pioblem that eng·neeis expei·enced was that
of contioll·ng the explos·ve chaiactei·st·cs of piessui·zed
l·ou·d oxygen (lox), wh·ch ·s h·ghly volat·le ·f stiuckò Th·s
po·nt was biought home when a iubbei gasket became
peimeated w·th lox and, dui·ng a giound test, acc·dental-
ly exploded when an ob¶ect tapped ·tò
In the n·ne yeais of ·ts ex·stence, fiom June 8, 1959,
when Aò Scott Ciossf·eld flew the f·ist m·ss·on, to Octobei
24, 1968, the day of ·ts f·nal m·ss·on, the X-15 made 199
fl·ghts, set an unoff·c·al woild alt·tude iecoid of 354,200
feet (67 m·les) and a woild speed iecoid of Mach 6ò7
(4,520 mph)ò Ciossf·eld sa·d, “The X-15 Reseaich
A·iplane opeiat·on ò ò ò cieated a ma¶oi technolog·cal step-
p·ng stone to spaceò’ M·lton Thompson, ·n h·s book ߬
¬¸» Û¼¹» ±º Í°¿½», l·sted 25 accompl·shments of the X-15
piogiamò These ·nclud·ng such f·ists as the f·ist appl·ca-
t·on of hypeison·c theoiy and w·nd tunnel woik to an
actual fl·ght veh·cle, the f·ist d·iect measuiement of
hypeison·c sk·n fi·ct·on, and the development of the f·ist
piact·cal full piessuie su·t foi p·lot piotect·on ·n spaceò
The X-15 was oveishadowed by the moie glamoious
astionaut piogiamsò The f·ist was Meicuiy, des·gned to
caiiy one man ·nto oib·t aiound Eaithò The next stage
was Gem·n·, whose capsules caii·ed a two-man ciew,
des·gned to test human enduiance ·n space and the
eou·pment and technolog·es that would be used foi m·s-
s·ons to the moonò The th·id and gieatest of the eaily
space effoits was Apolloò Its capsules conta·ned a ciew of
thiee, and ·t was the piogiam des·gned to fulf·ll
Pies·dent John Fò Kennedy•s challenge to land a man on
the moon and ietuin h·m safely to Eaithò
On May 28, 1959, NASA announced the seven men
who would become Amei·ca•s f·ist astionautsò All had
come fiom the m·l·taiyò These men, dubbed the
“Magn·f·cent Seven,’ weie Donald Kò (Deke) Slayton,
V·ig·l Iò (Gus) Gi·ssom, and Goidon
(Goido) Coopei fiom the A·i Foiceå John
Glenn, fiom the Mai·ne Coipså and Alan
Shepaid, Wally Sch·iia, and Scott
Caipentei fiom the Navyò They weie the
suiv·vois of a giuel·ng select·on piocess
that had begun w·th 110 p·lotsò In the
woids of one NASA off·c·al, these seven
demonstiated “the most outstand·ng pio-
fess·onal backgiound and knowledge ·n
ielat·on to the ¶ob ieou·iementsò’ NASA•s
announcement thiust these men ·nto the
spotl·ght, wheie they became ·nstant
heioesò One of the f·ist ouest·ons posed to
them dui·ng a piess confeience was wh·ch
one of them expected to be the f·ist
Amei·can ·n spaceò In iesponse, all seven
piomptly ia·sed the·i hands, w·th Sch·iia
and Glenn ia·s·ng bothò Glenn, among the
most peisonable and chai·smat·c of the
gioup, also ou·pped that the ieason he
became an astionaut was “because ·t ·s the
neaiest to heaven I•ll evei getò’ The piess
loved ·tò
The f·ist Meicuiy piogiam boosteis
weie Redstone m·ss·les, adapted fiom the
Aimy des·gnò Wh·le the Redstone was used
foi the f·ist two suboib·tal fl·ghts, a moie
poweiful boostei was needed to powei the
Meicuiy capsules ·nto oib·tò The A·i
Foice•s Atlas, the f·ist Inteicont·nental
Ball·st·c M·ss·le (ICBM), was soon adapt-
ed foi the piogiamò Foi the latei Gem·n·
piogiam, named ·n pait foi the fact that
two astionauts would p·lot the capsule,
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the A·i Foice•s newei T·tan ICBM was usedò Wh·le the
Gem·n· piogiam moved foiwaid as a c·v·l·an pio¶ect,
the A·i Foice was also push·ng to expand ·ts own
manned space piogiam w·th a sei·es of planned pio¶-
ectsò One of these was the X-20 Dyna-Soai, a manned
ieusable space plane that began development ·n 1959
and would have flown almost 20 yeais befoie the space
shuttleò Manned by a s·ngle p·lot, the spaceciaft would
have been boosted ·nto oib·t by a T·tan III, compi·s·ng
a manned m·l·taiy patiol capab·l·ty able to mon·toi
giound s·tes and piotect assets alieady ·n spaceò Desp·te
pos·t·ve goveinment iev·ews, howevei, Defense
Secietaiy Robeit McNamaia cancelled the piogiam ·n
1963, a dec·s·on many st·ll iegaid as wiong and shoit-
s·ghtedò At the same t·me, howevei, McNamaia
announced the development of the Manned Oib·t·ng
Laboiatoiy (MOL), a small space stat·on that would
have taken on a numbei of ieconna·ssance funct·onsò
Boosted ·nto oib·t by a mod·f·ed T·tan m·ss·le, the ciew
of two would i·de ·nto oib·t ·ns·de the laboiatoiy, caiiy
out vai·ous tasks foi up to 40 days, and then use an
attached Gem·n· capsule to ietuin to Eaithò Wh·le some
·nfoimat·on st·ll iema·ns class·f·ed, ·t ·s bel·eved that
both opt·cal and iadai suive·llance eou·pment would
have been caii·ed by MOLò Would have been, that ·s,
because the piogiam was canceled ·n 1969ò The next
manned ventuie aftei Apollo, NASA•s Space
Tianspoitat·on System (Shuttle), offeied anothei
oppoitun·ty foi a manned m·l·taiy m·ss·on ·n spaceò
And, the A·i Foice piov·ded s·gn·f·cant fund·ng to
NASA to develop the shuttleò In fact, a m·l·taiy veis·on
of the shuttle was planned, and a launch s·te, SLC-6 at
Vandenbeig AFB, was bu·lt to suppoit the m·l·taiy shut-
tleò Fund·ng constia·nts and the Januaiy 1986
ݸ¿´´»²¹»® d·sastei, howevei, ended th·s piogiamò Fiom
that t·me on, A·i Foice peisonnel would only hope to
i·de ·nto space ·n c·v·l·an (NASA) veh·clesò
NASA•s Manned Space Piogiam ·ncoipoiated the
most advanced computei and commun·cat·ons technol-
ogy of the dayò But th·s was a pei·od when calculat·ons
weie st·ll done by sl·de iule, and ioom-s·zed computeis
us·ng laige spools of magnet·c tape and punch caids
conta·ned less memoiy and powei than one of today•s
off-the-shelf desktop peisonal computeisò
A global netwoik of tiack·ng stat·ons had to be con-
stiuctedò Some, such as those ·n Cal·foin·a and Hawa··,
weie conven·entò But many weie iemote, ·solated, and
somet·mes, thanks to pol·t·cal ·nstab·l·ty, dangeiousò In
Maich 1961, a total of 21 s·tes, 13 of them manned, weie
declaied opeiat·onalò They weie located ·n such coun-
ti·es as Austial·a, Beimuda, N·gei·a, and Zanz·bai, and
on conveited Woild Wai II caigo vessels sa·l·ng ·n the
Atlant·c, Pac·f·c, and Ind·an Oceansò Commun·cat·on
was thiough Teletypeò In·t·ally, data packets weie tians-
m·tted by Teletype tape ·n a piocess that took houisò Foi
Gem·n·, h·gh-speed d·g·tal systems weie ·nstalled capa-
ble of tiansm·tt·ng 2ò4 k·lob·ts pei secondò
Geoige Low seived ·n a numbei of sen·oi manage-
ment posts ·n NASA•s Manned Space Fl·ght Piogiamò In
defense of Amei·ca•s “go slow’ effoits at a t·me when ·t
appeaied that the Sov·et Un·on was w·nn·ng the space
iace, he expla·ned to the med·a that w·th Meicuiy, “It has
been a ma¶oi eng·neei·ng task to des·gn a capsule that ·s
small enough to do the m·ss·on, l·ght enough to do the
m·ss·on, and yet has iel·able subsystems to accompl·sh
the m·ss·on safelyò’
That steady comm·tment was iewaided when, on
May 5, 1961, Alan Shepaid became the f·ist Amei·can ·n
spaceò Then, on Febò 20, 1962, John Glenn became the
f·ist Amei·can to oib·t the Eaithò The last Meicuiy m·s-
s·on, caiiy·ng Goidon Coopei, was launched on May 15,
1963ò Of the oi·g·nal seven astionauts, only Deke Slayton
had not flown a m·ss·onò D·agnosed w·th an ·d·opath·c
ati·al f·bi·llat·on › a sl·ghtly “eiiat·c’ heait iate › Slayton
was gioundedò Slayton would iema·n at NASA, f·ist as a
cooid·natoi of the astionaut coips, latei as the deputy
foi fl·ght opeiat·onsò Eventually he would be cleaied foi
space fl·ght, and ·n 1975 would f·nally ieach space ·n the
Apollo-Soyuz m·ss·onò
Meicuiy pioved that Amei·ca could launch a man
·nto space and Eaith oib·tò Gem·n· would test man•s
enduiance ·n space and the technolog·es and eou·pment
needed foi a iound ti·p fl·ght to the moonò Fl·ght plans
extended to 14 daysò Ciewmembeis pait·c·pated foi the
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f·ist t·me ·n extiaveh·culai act·v·ty (EVA), moie famous-
ly known as “walks ·n spaceò’ Ed Wh·te ·n Gem·n· 4 was
the f·ist astionaut to do soò Attached to the ciaft by a
tethei, and maneuvei·ng w·th the a·d of a compiessed-a·i
gun, Wh·te iepoited, “Th·s ·s the gieatest expei·enceå ·t•s
¶ust tiemendousò’ Gem·n· 6 and Gem·n· 7 peifoimed the
f·ist iendezvous ·n spaceò Numeious pioblems, laige and
small, occuiied dui·ng the piogiamò Ne·l Aimstiong and
Dav·d Scott weie almost k·lled when Gem·n· 8 spun out
of contiolò They iega·ned contiol us·ng the ie-entiy con-
tiol systemò In oveicom·ng all of the pioblems, valuable
expei·ence was ga·nedò When the piogiam concluded
w·th Gem·n· 12 ·n Novembei 1966, ·t appeaied that
Amei·ca was ieady to make good on Pies·dent Kennedy•s
piom·se to ieach the moon befoie the end of the decade
w·th Apolloò
Gus Gi·ssom, Ed Wh·te, and Rogei Chaffee weie
announced as the ciew foi Apollo 1ò A pie-launch test
was set foi Fi·day, Janò 27, 1967, on Pad 34ò The ciew
enteied the module ¶ust aftei 1æ00 pòmò At 6æ31 pòmò,
the m·ss·on contiol ioom heaid Gi·ssom suddenly
shout, “Heyÿ’ and Chaffee iepoit fiom the module,
“Theie•s a f·ie ·n heieÿ’ W·th·n m·nutes, the thiee
astionauts weie deadò Autopsy iepoits would latei
ieveal that the thiee had d·ed of ·nhalat·on of tox·c
gasesò A boaid of ·nou·iy was foimed, headed by Floyd
Lò Thompson, d·iectoi of the Langley Reseaich Centeiò
The atmospheie ·n the command module was 100
peicent oxygen undei piessuieò Th·s cieated a potent·al-
ly explos·ve env·ionmentò But ·t had been used ·n
Meicuiy and Gem·n· w·thout ·nc·dentò That iecoid
ended on Janò 27ò It was an enoimous tiagedyò But,
someth·ng good d·d come out of ·tò Waltei
Cunn·ngham, a membei of the ciew of Apollo 7, the
f·ist manned launch aftei the acc·dent, wiote, “The
death of Gus Gi·ssom•s ciew at the Cape, on the pad,
made ·t poss·ble to land a man on the moon on sched-
uleò Indeed, ·t may have saved Amei·ca•s space piogiamò
So we cannot cons·dei the·i deaths to have been ·n
va·nò’ Cunn·ngham added that the f·ie d·d someth·ng
else, as wellò “It iem·nded the Amei·can publ·c that men
could and would d·e exploi·ng the heavensò’
All Apollo m·ss·ons weie put on holdò Eveiy aspect
of the piogiam was iev·ewedò New tests weie conduct-
edò New des·gns of the spaceciaft and the iockets weie
diawn up and put ·nto pioduct·onò On Novò 9, 1967, the
unmanned Apollo 4 was launchedò The m·ss·on was
flawlessò At a post launch news confeience, Weinhei von
Biaun stated, “No s·ngle event s·nce the foimat·on of
the Maishall Centei ·n 1960 eouals today•s launch ·n s·g-
n·f·canceò’ On Octò 11, 1968, Apollo 7, conta·n·ng the
ciew of Wally Sch·iia, Don E·sele, and Walt
Cunn·ngham, blasted offò The m·ss·on was not as much
of a success as eveiyone had hopedò Pait of the ieason
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was because Sch·iia had a head cold that was passed to
the iest of the ciewò
Apollo 8, launched on Decò 21, 1968, w·th a ciew of
Fiank Boiman, James Lovell, and W·ll·am Andeis, was
aiguably the second most famous of the Apollo m·ss·onsò
Foi the f·ist t·me ·n h·stoiy, man would c·icumnav·gate
the moonò Some of the most ·mpoitant photogiaphs ·n
h·stoiy, ·nclud·ng the eaithi·se ovei the moon, weie
taken by the ciew of Apollo 8ò But what was etched ·n the
memoiy of eveiyone who heaid ·t was the message iead
by the ciew on Chi·stmas Eveò W·ll·am Andeis began
w·th the gieet·ng, “Foi all the people on Eaith, the ciew
of Apollo 8 has a message we would l·ke to send youò’ He
then staited iead·ng fiom the book of Genes·sæ “In the
beg·nn·ng, God cieated the heaven and the eaithò’ Lovell
and Boiman cont·nued the message, iead·ng add·t·onal
passagesò NASA d·iectoi Chi·s Kiaft stated, “No eye was
diy ·n m·ss·on contiolò ò ò ò |oi] ·n the newsioom packed
shouldei to shouldei w·th iepoiteis covei·ng the gieatest
stoiy of the·i l·vesò’
The p·nnacle of Apollo and of man•s ach·evement ·n
space was Apollo 11, the m·ss·on that would have the
f·ist land·ng of man on the moonò The ciew was Ne·l
Aimstiong, Buzz Aldi·n, and M·ke Coll·ns (both Aldi·n
and Coll·ns weie A·i Foice off·ceis)ò W·th M·ke Coll·ns
p·lot·ng the command module Columb·a, Aimstiong
and Aldi·n enteied the lunai module, named Eagle, and
piepaied foi the·i h·stoi·c voyageò On July 20, 1969, the
Eagle sepaiated fiom Columb·aò At 4æ17 Eastein Dayl·ght
T·me, Ne·l Aimstiong tiansm·tted, “Houston,
Tianou·l·ty Base heieò The Eagle has landedò’ S·x and a
half houis latei, th·s was followed by an even moie h·s-
toi·c message, as Aimstiong stepped off the Eagle•s lad-
dei and onto the suiface of the moonæ “That•s one small
step foi ò ò ò man ò ò ò one g·ant leap foi mank·ndò’ It was
est·mated that 600 m·ll·on people, a f·fth of the woild•s
populat·on, watched the eventò
Congiatulat·ons came ·n fiom all ovei the woildò
Russ·an Konstant·n· Feokt·stov, a sc·ent·st who had
flown w·th cosmonauts, pia·sed the·i ach·evement, stat-
·ng that he and h·s countiymen “ie¶o·ce at the success of
the Amei·can astionautsò’ It was a giac·ous acknowledg-
ment of the fact that Amei·ca had won the space iaceò
Today theie aie ovei 50 foimei A·i Foice astionauts,
as well as moie than 20 who aie cuiiently seiv·ngò
Many have flown ·nto space aboaid the space shuttle,
and doubtless moie w·ll woik aboaid the ag·ng space
plane dui·ng the f·ist decades of th·s centuiyò In the
meant·me, new spaceciaft aie ·n development, new
m·ss·ons to the moon and Mais aie be·ng planned, and
new challenges awa·tò Those who weai A·i Foice blue
w·ll no doubt be a b·g pait of that futuieò
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pace has nevei been a one-man showò Fiom
NASA•s manned and unmanned exploiat·on
piogiams to the Defense Depaitment•s m·l-
·taiy appl·cat·ons, success has ieou·ied the
conceited effoits of a vast numbei of gov-
einment agenc·es and pi·vate contiactois, all woik·ng
towaid a common goalò
As A·i Foice Space Command (AFSPC) moves ·nto
the 21st centuiy w·th new iespons·b·l·t·es iesult·ng fiom
the iestiuctui·ng that closed down the UòSò Space
Command, wh·ch sh·fted most of ·ts act·v·t·es to the new
Stiateg·c Command (USSTRATCOM) and much of the
seiv·ce space commands• poitfol·os to AFSPC, ·nteia-
gency coopeiat·on becomes even moie ·mpoitantò
“Pass·ng the iespons·b·l·ty foi global space to
USSTRATCOM was a change, but not a ievolut·onaiy
change,’ AFSPC V·ce Commandei Ltò Genò Dan Leaf
sa·dò “That d·d not necessai·ly change the paitneis › the-
atei combatant command and the·i components aie
paitneis ·n a benef·c·aiy sense, benef·t·ng fiom oui space
capab·l·t·eså we piov·de GPS as a ut·l·ty they access w·th-
out much day-to-day d·iect ·nteiact·onò And we piov·de
a component iole to USSTRATCOM and, as we saw ·n
Opeiat·on Iiao· Fieedom, that ·s usually thiough a space
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cooid·nat·ng authoi·ty, such as the ¶o·nt foice a·i com-
ponent commandei (JFACC)ò
“We st·ll paitnei w·th the Navy and Aimy space ele-
ments, both ·n opeiat·ons and ·n development and acou·-
s·t·onò We have the bulk of the budget, capab·l·ty, and peo-
ple, but ·t ·s ·n no one•s ·nteiest foi the othei seiv·ces not
to be ·nvolved ·n spaceò We need the othei seiv·ces to
advocate the development of space capab·l·t·es and, as a
capab·l·ty piov·dei, we undeistand the un·oue ieou·ie-
ments of the othei seiv·cesò Oui othei paitneis ·nclude
othei goveinment agenc·es, such as NRO |Nat·onal
Reconna·ssance Off·ce], wh·ch has the gieatest ·nvestment
·n teims of A·i Foice peisonnel ass·gned to themå NSA
|Nat·onal Secui·ty Agency]å NGA |Nat·onal Geospat·al-
Intell·gence Agency]å NASAå and otheisò’
Indeed, the l·st of agenc·es play·ng some iole ·n the
futuie development of m·l·taiy space coveis v·itually
eveiy aspect of goveinmentò W·th·n DoD, that ·ncludes
the Aimy Space and M·ss·le Defense Command, Mai·ne
Coips Space Integiat·on Bianch, Naval Netwoik and
Space Opeiat·ons Command, Defense Advanced Reseaich
Pio¶ects Agency (DARPA), and the M·ss·le Defense
Agency, among many otheisò Outs·de the m·l·taiy, pait-
neish·ps cont·nue w·th NASA, the Nat·onal Ocean·c &
Atmosphei·c Adm·n·stiat·on (NOAA), the Nat·onal Space
Weathei Piogiam (NSWP), the Nat·onal Sc·ence and
Technology Counc·l (NSTC), the Depaitments of
Commeice and Eneigy, even the UòSò Tiade Repiesentat·ve
and the Nat·onal Econom·c Counc·lò
Outs·de of goveinment, AFSPC woiks w·th a host of
un·veis·t·es, ·ndustiy contiactois and subcontiactois, as
well as all·ed goveinments, academ·a, and ·ndustiyò
As w·th ·ts c·v·l·an counteipaits, AFSPC•s technology
ieou·iements and potent·al customeis aie global ·n
natuieò
“The paitneish·p w·th ·ndustiy ·s un·oue foi space
because we have to get th·ngs i·ght the f·ist t·me, wh·ch
makes development veiy challeng·ng, both fiom the
standpo·nt of a successful launch and ensui·ng ·t woiks
piopeily once ·n oib·t, because we can•t f·x ·t,’ Leaf
notedò “It ·s not how complex what we do ·n space ·s ›
and ·t ieally ·sn•t › but the phys·cs and the extiaoid·nai-
·ly haish env·ionmentò So gett·ng ·t i·ght the f·ist t·me
ieou·ies a veiy close paitneish·p w·th ·ndustiyò
“The bi·dge foi that paitneish·p, even though they
often piov·de an analyt·cal capab·l·ty, ·s Aeiospace Coipò
We iely veiy heav·ly on ·t foi oveis·ght, expeit·se, and a
second op·n·on foi do·ng these d·ff·cult th·ngsò’
Woik·ng w·th academ·a ·s not ou·te as d·iect a pait-
neish·p as that w·th othei goveinment agenc·es oi ·ndus-
tiy, but, Leaf emphas·zed, ·t ·s no less ·mpoitantò
“MIT-L·ncoln Labs, wh·ch ·s not exclus·vely a space
paitneish·p, ·s an ·mpoitant example of how we pait-
nei,’ he sa·dò “As we cont·nue to ief·ne oui development
of space piofess·onals to meet the challenges of the
futuie, a huge pait ·s piov·ded by academ·aò That•s not a
iece·ve-only paitneish·p › the fiont·eis we exploie and
the boundai·es we cioss piov·de an ·mpetus to c·v·l·an
ieseaichò’
It was not the d·ssolut·on of USSPACECOM and the
tians·t·on of most of ·ts funct·ons to USSTRATCOM
that affected most AFSPC paitneish·ps, Leaf sa·dò
“Many of us bel·eve oui acou·s·t·ons-iefoim ·n·t·a-
t·ves have d·vested much of the m·l·taiy ·nvolvement and
decieased oui ab·l·ty to ·nteiface w·th academ·aò We now
have to iely moie on and ·nteiact w·th ·ndustiy,’ he sa·dò
“As we went to cheapei, bettei, fastei, and all the acou·s·-
t·on-iefoim buzzwoids, we d·vested s·gn·f·cantly moie
of the development piocess to ·ndustiy and ieduced oui
space piofess·onal team, wh·ch cost us a lot of expeit·seò
“We aie iebu·ld·ng that thiough an emphas·s on
space piofess·onal development and caieei managementò
It•s not ¶ust the i·ght ass·gnment, but the expei·ence they
have and what they need and that we piov·de mean·ng-
ful piofess·onal and academ·c oppoitun·t·es, thiough
the m·l·taiy and academ·a and w·th ·ndustiyò’
In one aiea, howevei › ieseaich and development ›
the changes ·ncieased AFSPC•s contiolò
“AFSPC has s·gn·f·cantly moie contiol ovei the effoit
·n geneial because of the tiansfei of SMC |Space &
M·ss·le Systems Centei] fiom AFMC |A·i Foice Matei·el
Command] to AFSPC,’ Leaf sa·dò “That ·s, ·n fact, moie
s·gn·f·cant than the d·ssolut·on of USSPACECOM and
the tiansfei to USSTRATCOMò It has ·ncieased and
·mpioved the bond and commun·cat·on between the sc·-
ent·sts, eng·neeis, developeis, and the opeiat·onal com-
mun·ty that must apply the capab·l·t·es they piov·deò
Å ïðð Ã
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
Ô¬ò Ù»²ò Ü¿² Ô»¿ºô Ê·½» ݱ³³¿²¼»® ±º ß·® Ú±®½» Í°¿½»
ݱ³³¿²¼ò
That ·s un·oue to spaceò That tiansfei at the same t·me
we d·ssolved USSPACECOM has diamat·cally
·mpioved commun·cat·ons between piov·dei and useiò
“SMC has piogiam execut·ve off·cei iespons·b·l·-
t·es and oveisees the opeiat·ons of the vai·ous piogiam
off·ces and d·iectoisò They woik veiy closely w·th 14th
A·i Foice on the launch campa·gn s·de of space and
m·ss·le systems acou·s·t·onò They have the tiad·t·onal
ieseaich and acou·s·t·on capab·l·tyò’
Undei the ieoigan·zat·on, USSTRATCOM took on
the bulk of USSPACECOM•s iespons·b·l·t·es, wh·ch
Leaf sa·d cieated a fai moie funct·onal ielat·onsh·pò
“We now have a moie noimal ielat·onsh·p › a com-
batant command piov·d·ng stiateg·c gu·dance, ·nclud-
·ng m·ss·on oideis and commandeis• ·ntentò I expect
fuithei ief·nement ·n that ielat·onsh·p
ovei the next seveial months, wheie we
w·ll become a funct·onal component,
but ·n a ¶o·nt sense, piov·d·ng C2 capa-
b·l·t·es as a tiue component, and they
w·ll be a tiue combatant commandò
“We do need a bettei ielat·onsh·p
w·th the opeiat·onal s·de to the sup-
poited combatant commandeiò Theie
w·ll be a iev·sed oigan·zat·onal stiuc-
tuie that piov·des stiong leadeish·p on
the A·i Foice s·de and the ¶o·nt s·deò
That w·ll be a s·gn·f·cant tians·t·on, and
the change fiom USSPACECOM to
USSTRATCOM makes that poss·bleò
I•m hopeful w·th·n a few months we
w·ll make some s·gn·f·cant movements,
but ·t has been a gi·nd·ng effoitò’
Ma¶ò Genò M·ke Hamel, commandei
of the 14th A·i Foice (14th AF), bel·eves
the ieoigan·zat·on w·ll open new
oppoitun·t·es foi ·nteiagency coopeia-
t·on as ·t bieaks the Cold Wai mold ·n
wh·ch A·i Foice space oi·g·nally was
foimedò As one of two numbeied a·i
foices ·n AFSPC, the m·ss·on of the 14th
AF ·s to contiol and explo·t space foi
global and theatei opeiat·onsò The 14th
AF ·s also the A·i Foice Space Task Foice
to USSTRATCOMò The 20th A·i Foice,
led by Ma¶ò Genò Fiank Klotz, ·s iespon-
s·ble foi ma·nta·n·ng and opeiat·ng the
A·i Foice•s ICBM foiceò
“I would chaiactei·ze oui space
capab·l·ty today, ·n teims of technology
and peifoimance, as uni·valed ·n the
woild, but because of some of the hei-
·tage dat·ng back to the Cold Wai, we
st·ll have a lot of stovep·ped systems,’ he
sa·dò “So theie ·s often not much ·nte-
giat·on between vai·ous space plat-
foimsò One of the most ·mpoitant
th·ngs we can ach·eve ·s do·ng a bettei ¶ob of hoi·zon-
tally ·ntegiat·ng oui space capab·l·ty, to develop a s·ngle
·ntegiated p·ctuie, desci·b·ng the full p·ctuie on a glob-
al bas·s and poitiay·ng ·t ·n a useful fash·on, fiom the
pi·vate ·n the i·fle souad all the way up to the pies·dentò
“W·th emeig·ng ·nfoimat·on technology and some
C2 systems now emeig·ng, theie ·s a gieat oppoitun·ty
to develop th·s s·ngle ·ntegiated p·ctuie fiom space
that w·ll allow commandeis fiom all m·ss·ons to know
what capab·l·t·es they have and what they can ieouest
fiom spaceò So we aie woik·ng veiy d·l·gently to devel-
op the tools and the·i ielat·onsh·p, both ·ns·de the A·i
Foice and w·th the othei seiv·ces, and, ·n some cases,
even c·v·l and commeic·al piov·deis, so we can undei-
stand how they aie deployedò’
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
Å ïðï Ã
̸» Í»°¬»³¾»® ïçèè ´¿«²½¸ ±º ¬¸» ÒÑßßóïï ³»¬»±®±´±¹·½¿´ -¿¬»´´·¬»
º®±³ Ê¿²¼»²¾»®¹ ß·® Ú±®½» Þ¿-»ô Ý¿´·ºòô ±² ¿ Ì×ÎÑÍóÒ -°¿½»½®¿º¬ò
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´¿¾±®¿¬»-ò
As they move foiwaid towaid that goal, ·t also ·s
·mpoitant to closely watch developments elsewheie,
ensui·ng the Un·ted States ma·nta·ns ·ts cuiient lead ·n
m·l·taiy space and assui·ng combatant commandeis w·ll
have the assets they need › and the enemy won•tò
“That means ma·nta·n·ng space supei·oi·ty and
·mpiov·ng oui oveiall s·tuat·onal awaieness and oui
ab·l·ty to ant·c·pate pioblems and, ·f necessaiy, defend
oui space capab·l·t·es should they be d·siupted oi
attackedò And we have to be able to deny the enemy•s
ab·l·ty to access space,’ Hamel sa·dò “So theie w·ll be a
tiemendous amount of effoit ·n the next 10 yeais to
·nciease oui ab·l·ty to iespond to attacksò We have a lot
of ·n·t·at·ves on the diaw·ng boaid, and that w·ll be a
veiy h·gh pi·oi·tyò
“I th·nk we w·ll cont·nue to ·mpiove and enhance
space ·ntegiat·on ·nto theatei ci·ses as well as waif·ght-
·ngò One of the most ·mpoitant th·ngs that came out of
OIF was not ¶ust the suppoit foi ·nd·v·dual systems, but
a piocess was put ·n place to ·mpiove the plann·ng, cooi-
d·nat·on of suppoit, and ·ntegiat·on of space ·nto the-
ateiò Foi the f·ist t·me, the iespons·b·l·ty foi theatei-w·de
space cooid·nat·on was ass·gned to the ¶o·nt foice com-
mandeiò That allowed us to focus all space needs w·th·n
the theatei, to be undeistood by the a·i component com-
mandei and ieach back to home stat·on capab·l·t·es to
synchion·ze thatò So ·nstead of hav·ng a mult·tude of
people seek·ng a mult·tude of th·ngs fiom space, we bu·lt
a ieasonable cha·n of commandò’
OIF piov·ded a numbei of lessons leained that w·ll
be taken ·nto cons·deiat·on by all elements of AFSPC
and ·ts paitneis w·th·n DoD, othei goveinment agenc·es,
and ·ndustiy, as well as all·ed goveinments and even aca-
dem·a, to ief·ne tact·cs, techn·oues, and pioceduies
(TTPs) foi space cooid·nat·on thiough exeic·ses aiound
the woildò As h·gh as the bai was set by expectat·ons met
and exceeded ·n OIF, Hamel pied·cts ·t w·ll be set even
h·ghei w·th each futuie confl·ctò
“Theie ·s a cont·nu·ng educat·on go·ng on › and
that•s a two-way stieetò The deployment of space sup-
poit teams ·nto the Aimy, Navy, and othei foices helps
educate the a·i, giound, and sea foices and tells us what
those customeis needò And that can covei a lot of teii·-
toiy as we suppoit foices now know·ng bettei how to
explo·t space capab·l·t·es and the space commun·ty, ·n
tuin, undeistand·ng what they need to piov·de and
ant·c·pat·ng that,’ he sa·dò
In some iespects, m·l·taiy space may have iel·ed too
heav·ly on commeic·al space development to help meet
some of those needsò
“We devote a substant·al amount of taxpayei dollais
to oui space capab·l·t·es › and that has giown ovei the
past decadeò The s·tuat·on we f·nd ouiselves ·n now ·s that
many of the piogiams now undeiway weie the pioduct of
the 1990s, wheie we weie expect·ng a much moie iobust
commeic·al space maiket foi launch, satell·te commun·-
cat·ons, and othei seiv·ces that we could leveiageò That
d·dn•t matei·al·ze, so we now have a numbei of piogiams
pied·cated on that foi wh·ch we w·ll have to foot the b·ll
beyond what we ant·c·patedò So pait of oui challenge has
to be gett·ng oui piogiams back on tiack and have the
conf·dence we can del·vei when needed,’ Hamel sa·dò
“Much of what we talk about foi the futuie ·s cleaily
w·th·n oui ieachò We have to demonstiate we can del·vei
on what we piom·se, wh·le at the same t·me ·nvest·ng ·n
the technolog·es that w·ll bi·ng that new geneiat·on of
ievolut·onaiy capab·l·t·es on l·neò’
Anothei aiea wheie ·ncieased ·nvestment ·s needed ·s
educat·on, woik·ng w·th the A·i Foice Space Academy
and othei seiv·ce academ·es and publ·c un·veis·t·es to not
only teach couises fundamental to futuie space develop-
ment, but to ieciu·t the next geneiat·on of space leadeisò
“Foi a numbei of yeais, the Academy has had a num-
bei of academ·c ma¶ois and couises ielat·ve to space and
they aie do·ng a veiy good ¶obò But we ·n the A·i Foice
need to do a bettei ¶ob of ieciu·t·ng young off·ceis com-
·ng out of the Academy and othei venuesò Th·s ·s a veiy
exc·t·ng t·me ·n my 30-plus yeais ·n the space bus·ness,
but we need to do a bettei ¶ob at ieciu·t·ng the futuie
leadeis ·n space,’ Hamel sa·dò “The development of a
cadie of space piofess·onals w·th the ieou·s·te educat·on,
tia·n·ng, and expei·ence to become woild-class leadeis
foi space ·s mandatoiyò
“Be·ng a student of space h·stoiy, we need to undei-
stand oui ioots and how we have evolved as a waif·ght-
·ng commun·ty w·th·n the A·i Foiceò All oui upcom·ng
space waii·ois need to undeistand what biought us to
wheie we aie today and wheie we aie go·ngò Theie ·s no
t·me of moie piofound oi conseouent·al change than
wheie we aie todayò I bel·eve we aie on the veige of a
ma¶oi upsw·ng ·n space•s iole ·n oui nat·on•s secui·tyò’
One agency w·th wh·ch AFSPC ·s hav·ng an ·ncieas-
·ng ·nteiface ·s the Nat·onal Reconna·ssance Off·ce
(NRO), wheie Bi·gò Genò Iiv Haltei, dual-hatted as
Deputy D·iectoi-M·l·taiy Suppoit and Deputy D·iectoi-
Nat·onal Systems Opeiat·ons, bel·eves a two-decade-old
piogiam › Tact·cal Explo·tat·on of Nat·onal Capab·l·t·es
(TENCAP) › ·s help·ng move elements of m·l·taiy space
thioughout the fedeial system wh·le bi·ng·ng the best of
othei agenc·es to AFSPCò He also c·tes the nat·onal secu-
i·ty and space off·ce cieated by Undei Secietaiy of the
A·i Foice Petei Teets foi woik·ng acioss NRO, all DoD
agenc·es, and NASA to cooid·nate all space effoitsò
“We do not pioduce ·ntell·gence pioducts, but help
othei people do that, woik·ng thiough othei agenc·eså oui
¶ob ·s to move data › iaw oi f·n·shed pioducts › down to
the lowest levelò We have des·gned, stiuctuied, and f·elded
ways to get data out ·n ieal t·me,’ Haltei sa·dò “We also
have developed seek algoi·thms that allow people to locate
oi even man·pulate that dataò Theie aie ways data aie
be·ng man·pulated that we had nevei cons·deied befoieò
“We aie woik·ng w·th all oui paitneis on f·gui·ng
out ways to have eveiybody able to access eveiybody
else•s dataò We can•t have seciets fiom each othei w·th·n
Å ïðî Ã
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
the ·ntell·gence commun·tyò It•s Muiphy•s Law › the one p·ece of
data you don•t shaie, foi whatevei ieason, ·s the one p·ece that w·ll
be ci·t·cal to solv·ng a pioblemò So all these databases need to be
able to talk to each otheiò’
Insofai as m·l·taiy space ·s conceined, Haltei says the coopeia-
t·ve effoit ·s w·th USSTRATCOM•s new iole as lead agency foi
space and as DoD•s “global ISR guiuò In both of those, NRO ·s a pi·-
maiy playei, so we woik veiy closely w·th them to f·guie out how
we can best collaboiate w·th themò’
W·th NRO peisonnel at all the ma¶oi combatant commands, as
Teets• peisonal iepiesentat·ves, data aie constantly flow·ng out fiom
NRO to those commands and back up the cha·nò About a yeai ago,
an NRO team headed by Haltei completed a study of lessons
leained fiom the ·n·t·al combat phase of OIFò
“The oveiaich·ng ·ssue we came away w·th ·s, unl·ke Deseit
Stoim, the nat·onal system played an act·ve iole ·n the k·ll cha·n, all
the way fiom stiateg·c down to tact·cal levelò It ·s no longei a n·che
capab·l·tyò People do use ·t › even ·f they don•t know they aie › and
·t makes a d·ffeience,’ he sa·dò
One of the most ·mpoitant technolog·cal challenges fac·ng
NRO ·s f·nd·ng new ways to get data fiom spaceò
“We have not exploied all those yetò Oui advanced technology
folks at NRO aie constantly look·ng foi new ways and means to col-
lect data and get ·t back fiom spaceò Theie•s some exc·t·ng stuff out
theie,’ Haltei notedò “Obv·ously, eveiybody has budget constia·ntsò
We and the iest of the space commun·ty spend a lot of t·me f·gui-
·ng out new ways to bu·ld and launch spaceciaftò We staited go·ng
down that ioad ·n the ‘90s and d·scoveied when you put budgets
and schedules ·n fiont of m·ss·on success, you end up pay·ng a pi·ce
you m·ght not want to payò SBIRS |Spaced-Based Infiaied System]
has been a tioubled piogiam foi that veiy ieasonò
“Look·ng at technolog·es that may allow us to do th·ngs fastei
and cheapei, such as iap·d launch, those aie the bieakthioughs
we•ie look·ng foiò In the meant·me, we st·ll have a customei base ›
on both the nat·onal and m·l·taiy s·de › that ieou·ies us to cont·n-
ue to piov·de the same level of seiv·ce they have become accus-
tomed to ·n the past seveial yeais,’ Haltei sa·dò
Ma·nta·n·ng a collaboiat·ve ielat·onsh·p w·th Amei·ca•s closest
all·es also ·s an ·mpoitant po·nt ·n how NRO moves data aiound
the battlef·eld › know·ng whom to shaie data w·th and wheie to
bieak down baii·eis, when appiopi·ateò
“The NRO•s ma·n ¶ob ·s ·n space, so the way ·t ·s be·ng used by
m·l·taiy folks ·s giow·ngò That doesn•t mean we aie fly·ng moie
b·ids oi putt·ng moie th·ngs ·n oib·t, but that the data gatheied ·s
be·ng used by moie folks,’ Haltei sa·dò “We have the ab·l·ty now to
paise data, move ·t aiound, do whatevei ·s necessaiy, so oui data
may be eoually useful to the folks who bi·ef the pies·dent and the
guy on the battlef·eld who may need ·tò
“Space go·ng to USSTRATCOM changed th·ngs foi NROò We
had a veiy close ielat·onsh·p w·th A·i Foice Space Command,
wh·ch was the laigest p·ece of USSPACECOM,’ he iepoitedò “We
have put ·nto place an extia l·a·son at USSTRATCOM and oui
opeiat·ons centei heie iepoits the status of oui systems to all iele-
vant agenc·esò When USSTRATCOM took up the SPACECOM
iespons·b·l·ty, we made suie we had the ielevant connect·ons theieò
And we st·ll ma·nta·n oui l·nks w·th AFSPC and w·th 14th A·i
Foiceò So theie ieally wasn•t a ma¶oi iestiuctuieò’
ß× Î ÚÑÎÝÛ ÍÐßÝÛ ÝÑÓÓßÒÜ
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Jackson and Tull ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò5
Lockheed Mait·n Space Systems ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò òBack Covei
Metio Denvei Econom·c Development Coipoiat·on ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò73
Metio Goldwyn Mayei ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò74
Phoen·x Management, Incò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò òIns·de Fiont Covei
Phys·cal Sc·ence Laboiatoiy - New Mex·co State Un·veis·ty ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò14
Raytheon - Space & A·iboine Systems ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò12
SecTek, Incò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò98
Space Foundat·on ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò78
SpaceOuest Ltdò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò29
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