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L-4606, May 30, 1952
FACTS On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition was held in Naga City. Felipe was one of the Judges and was the chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the second price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting refused to the verdict their and alleged that one of a the judges in committed a mathematical error on computing the scores. The Board amend award, Imperial filed complaint court. She asserts that she should have ranked 3rd place in the vote, which makes her score 9 or the First place. ISSUE Does the Judiciary have the power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest? HELD No. The Judiciary does not have the power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. No jurisdiction. Error is contemplated by law as a misapplication of a statute or provision. There could be error in the computation of final scores, but it is not error in context of law. The Court would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar contests. The decision of the board in such contests, although only implied, is final and unappealable. Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.
PHILIPPINE SOAP BOX DERBY, INC vs. YABUT G.R. No. 108115, October 27, 1995
FACTS John Elston Yabut was disqualified from joining the third race for violating the weight requirement for soap box derby after winning father, the first race. As a result disqualification, the private respondent Geminiano Yabut, Jr. (together with
Roadway Express, Inc.) filed a complaint for actual, moral and exemplary damages with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City alleging that the arbitrary disqualification of his son caused embarrassment and humiliation resulting to "mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation and sleepless nights.” ISSUE Does disqualification and from the race that the resulted into embarrassment humiliation entitle private respondent
Germiniano Yabut, Jr. and his son to claims to moral damages? HELD No. Disqualification and from the does race not that resulted the into embarrassment damages. John Elston Yabut should have observed the rules of sportsmanship and sporting play. The maxim that "the judges decision is final" simplifies sports adjudication to a degree which the larger arena of life does not ordinarily mirror. Nonetheless, it is simplicity in procedure which we of the courts ought to altogether idealize or sometimes aim for. humiliation entitle private
respondent Germiniano Yabut, Jr. and his son to claims to moral
Decision dated December 9, 1992 is hereby REVERSED and the trial court's decision REINSTATED.
PE vs. PE G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
FACTS Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador the present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE Are the plaintiffs-appellants correct in filing a case against the defendant-appellee for tarnishing their honor and name by having an affair with the daughter of the first?
no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately. who seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. The plaintiffs-appellants are correct in filing a case against the defendant-appellee for tarnishing their honor and name by having an affair with the daughter of the first. succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he. Defendant is sentenced to pay the plaintiffs for damages.HELD Yes. Indeed. HERMOSISIMA vs. CA 4 . but through a clever strategy. Costs against appellee.
he married another woman. and for other damages. she being a woman after all.R. Moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry. This served as the cause of action of the complainant to file a complaint against the petitioner. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter. but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. to pay. Section 1. L-14628. filed with said of her child. Soledad Cagigas. Upon her motion. Because of petitioner's seduction power. overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control.G. the complainant. September 30. as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. the complaint. Chris Hermosisima. No. Article 2217 of the Civil Code provides: 5 . ISSUE Whether or not the moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry HELD Yes. said court ordered petitioner. However. 1960 FACTS The complainant was 10 yrs older than the petitioner but they had a very intimate relationship that's why they are regarded as engaged then they had a child. the petitioner breaches his promise to marry the complainant and married a woman named Romanita Perez. by way of alimony pendente lite.
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. or other lascivious acts. control. which were increased to P5. moral shock. wounded feelings.25 for compensatory damages and P7. the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. It appeared that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive prowess. On appeal taken by petitioner. plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self- 6 . except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages.000. social humiliation. Though incapable of pecuniary computation.00 for moral damages. abduction. Article 2219 also states that: Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction.614. rape.Moral damages include physical suffering. besmirched reputation. fright. and similar injury. mental anguish. serious anxiety.
21. 1966 FACTS Apolonio Tanjanco. It was also established that their sexual relationship continued even after Tanjaco’s refusal to marry Santos. ISSUE Whether or not breach of a promise to marry can be consider HELD No.R. such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. (defendant) and Araceli Santos have a carnal relationship in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage (undying love. Where for one whole year. mental and emotional anguish and social humiliation. Because of their sexual relationship. a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse. no case is made under Art. (Art 21 of the new Civil Code) The Lower court dismissed the case due to failure to state the cause of action. Santos claimed that defendant caused her moral shock. No. and no other cause of action being alleged. the plaintiff conceived a child and the defendant refused to marry Santos. L-18630. etc). Hence. Plainly. SANTOS G. no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. 7 .TANJANCO vs. there is voluntariness and mutual passion. December 17. The Court of Appeals favored Santos.
HELD No it is not.R. Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner (DominadorAytona) as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. 1962 FACTS December 29. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the ex-president. and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.AYTONA vs. 1961. such appointments fall beyond the intent and constitutional granting Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments. Aytona took the corresponding oath. and therefore. Macapagal averred that the ex-president’s appointments were scandalous. In the case at bar. President provision Garcia exercised the double care. CASTILLO G. January 19. Such appointment is not valid. irregular. hurriedly done. contrary to law and the spirit of which. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the same time he appointed Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. 8 . L-19313. No. it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments spirit of the in one night. ISSUE Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post. When Macapagal took his office as the next president he issued Order No.
1964 FACTS December 26. 29. 28. 1961 where the exec sec informed her of her “withdrawal” in view of Pres. January 31. Solicitor General for the respondent contested that because that was withdrawn and recalled pursuant to Administrative Order No. that her participation in the examinations and the on the effected of the permission that in former Executive could the Secretary of the Board of Examiners. absence successor. 1962 Corazon C. L-20741. FERNANDEZ G. 2 On Dec. Gillera accepted the appointment. took oath on Dec. but by virtue of the two presidential designations on January 11 and May 18. Order No. Fernandez was appointed to the position which was already occupied by petitioner. 1961 Socorro Gillera was appointed as interim member of the board of pharmaceutical examiners by Pres. of petitioner under continue Fernandez (Gillera) discharging to was the office of Dr. and assumed office until Dec. Carlos P. No. Garcia for three years. 1961 validly recalled or withdrawn? 9 .R. Admin. ISSUES Is the ad interim appointment of the petitioner on Dec. Amado del Rosario. 2 of the President. that "the designation of respondent position Cruz of petitioner occupying by designation" indicated that the latter's right to the same position had already ceased. which July. 1962. 1961.GILLERA vs. terminated 1962 upon the was belief of the a release of the upon examination the verbal results on June 14. 31. 1962. virtue examiner which her "hold-over" doctrine. 28.
RULING The court has decided that petitioner’s appointment is valid and she is entitled to the position as member of the board of pharmaceutical examiners. this Court not only did not categorically declare Administrative Order No. 2 valid and all appointments ineffective, made but by then outgoing indicated President that its Garcia, clearly
decision was more influenced by the doubtful character of the appointments themselves and not by the contention that the President had validly recalled them. As a matter of fact, in the decision in that Aytona case it was stated that, "the filling up of vacancies (by the outgoing President) in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration It is for of the need for basic was not the appointment and i.e., the the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted." the and foregoing that it consideration, one of those necessity of filling the position, that the appointee is qualified, "mass ad interim appointments" issued in a single night, that this Court upheld the validity of an appointment to the position of Auxiliary Justice of the Peace,
extended by President
Garcia and released on December 20, 1961, notwithstanding Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal. In the instant case, even the new President recognized the need for the immediate filling of the position of Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners, in view of the examinations that were given on January 2, 3, 4, and 7, 1962, that he (the President) saw it fit, "as a matter of emergency "designate" in order not to disrupt to public same service" position to to petitioner herself the
which she was previously appointed and had qualified. There 10
is also no allegation that petitioner is not qualified to the said office, or that her appointment was one of those attended by the "mad scramble in Malacañan" in the evening of December 29, 1961. On the contrary, it is not controverted by respondents that petitioner's appointment was extended on December 26, 1961 or even before the actual expiry of the term of Examiner Cruz, which was a few days before the examinations would take place, although said appointment was to take effect only on December 28, 1961, and in fact petitioner took her oath of office only on the latter date. Clearly, it cannot be said that in the instant case, petitioner's appointment was not the result of the President's deliberate action, considering her qualification and the exigency of the service.
ALBETZ INVESTMENTS, INC. vs. CA G.R. No. L-32570, February 28, 1977
FACTS The Calma spouses were the lessees of a lot in Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., it the lessor, upon needing of the the premises Calma in order to construct a new building, demanded delivery of the lot to and refusal Spouses, Albetz Investments, Inc. brought an action of unlawful detainer against Vicenta Calma. Judgment by default was rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering Vicenta Calma and all persons claiming under her to vacate the premises and to pay the corresponding Atty. was Macario granted rentals. The judgment director having become and lawyer issued of the final, Albetz writ S. Meneses, and the
Investments, Inc., filed a motion for execution. The motion Municipal Court of execution. To forestall the enforcement of the writ of 11
execution, certiorari performance Four days
wit; petition for certiorari and injunction, petition for prohibition, specific
eighteen months from the date of the issuance of the writ of execution and the consequent writ of demolition, the Sheriff, at the instance of defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., thru its lawyer, Atty. Meneses, demolished the house of' the spouses Calma without any issued by new the writ or order Court that house were for demolition having been Instance defendants of Manila. the and They the Municipal others the
.They commenced the instant action in the Court of First contend sheriff personal among and deputy demolished
carelessly placed, resulting in their being damaged, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs .The Court of Appeals affirmed en toto the decision of the Court of First Instance. ISSUE Whether or not the lower courts erred in awarding damages in favor of Calma Spouses RULING Negative. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Certainly, the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of the house no time 12 at all to remove
No damage worth mentioning would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments. had been instructed to allow said occupants to remove their personal properties. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. On April 20. FERRARIS G. 2004. petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Inc.their belongings there from. 162368. considering that this would not have taken a considerable length of time FERRARIS vs. led by the Sheriff. 2001. could not have given valid assumption thereof. respectively. Branch 151 rendered decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris.R. On June 9. July 17. 2004. Court of Appeals resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. No. or knowing them. Armida Perez-Ferraris. 2001. 2006 FACTS On February 20. if their men. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record was insufficient to prove infidelity. 2003 and February 24. denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the said court dated April 30. for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. 13 . the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming.
it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. illness. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity “to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage SEVILLA vs. The evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. The Court found Brix’s alleged mixed personality disorder. not physical. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage. the "Leaving-the-house" attitude whenever he and Amy quarreled. or that those are incurable.ISSUE : Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage will render the judgment in favor to the petitioner? RULING The petition is DENIED WITH FINALITY. preference family. it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological. CARDENAS 14 . irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. are condition essential abandonment rooted of support. of the sexual and than his his the of infidelity. the violent tendencies the to but not a spend mere during more epileptic and lack with or attacks. mates to time his band on some debilitating unwillingness A mere psychological assume showing refusal obligations marriage.
No. no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. For her part. It is based its ruling in the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar that no marriage license was issued in favour of the parties.R.G. Also. he claimed employed that upon through him by machinations. Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime and claimed that she and Jaime were married civilly and in a church ceremony thereafter. duress Cardenas and and intimidation the latter’s father. 2006 FACTS In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Consequently. he never applied for marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry. According to Jaime. thus the marriage license number appearing in the marriage was fictitious. he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and signed a marriage contract before the Minister of the Gospel. July 31. retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines. Carmelita N. she contends that he is stopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having married to her for 25 years. ISSUE Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar stating that no marriage license was issued are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio. She claimed that both marriages were registered with the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. Sevilla before the RTC. The trial court declared the marriage void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license. RULING 15 . 167684.
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable official presumptions. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said 16 . – Thus the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. that the logbook just cannot be found. Marriage License is an essential requisite for the validity of a marriage. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28. Rule 132 of the rules of Court. A marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. It can also mean. 2770792. the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications. – Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. Presumption of regularity. acts may be The presumption by of regularity evidence of of rebutted affirmative irregularity or failure to perform a duty . rebutted. 2770792 may have been entered. is effectively rebutted. According to Section 3(m). Moreover. as [th]e [Court[ believed true in case at bar. the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.The petition is DENIED. The certification must state that the document does not exist.
logbook, [th]e [Court] cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
The State’s policy is towards the strengthening of the family. – Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans towards the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favour. It is not to be lightly replied; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
FAMANILA vs. CA G.R. No. 150429, August 29, 2006
FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC which dismissed petitioner’s complaint for payment of disability and other benefits. Petitioner vessel Roberto Famanila and was hired its was by the respondent NFD
International Manning Agents, Inc. as a Messman for Hansa Riga, a registered owned Limited. by He principal, respondent by the barbership Management repatriated
principal because of his permanently disability. With this, he signed a Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991 and settled his claim by accepting the amount of US$13,200 from respondents. Petitioner filed a complaint praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the was insurance affirmed proceeds, by the moral NLRC damage the and CA. attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint due to prescription, which and Petitioner contends that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because of his disability. He argued that such disability as well as financial constraints vitiated his consent, making the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable. ISSUE Whether the Receipt and Release is valid and enforceable. RULING The petition is DENIED. The Receipt and Release signed by petitioner is valid, absent of vitiated consent. Disability is not a factor that may vitiate consent. – A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under 18
violence, is given
through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is voidable. A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a proper action in court Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. Dire necessity is not a ground for annulling the Receipt and Release. – it is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of in keeping with what has been expressly stipulated but also good faith, usage and law. Further, dire to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has not been shown that petitioner was forced to sign it.
The Ca affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that petitioner-spouses cannot claim that the error of the construction of the fence was due to the unilateral act if respondent spouses in building the fence without their consent as they gave their word that the boundaries laid on through the concrete monuments are correct. 2006 FACTS Spouses Luz and Kenichiro contracted the services of FrankBatal to survey the lot they purchased. 163601. Erlinda.R. No. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent spouses. and reconstruction spouses of the portion that of the fence. and held that encroachment of the perimeter fence on the right of way was cause by the negligence of petitioner-spouses. they constructed concrete fence on said land. and claimed that the fence was already erected on the house and lot of respondent spouses before they were contracted to do a resurvey and laying out of concrete monuments. but he failed to deliver. 20 . September 27. Based on such survey. They found out that Frank was not the licensed geodetic engineer but his wife. Frank admitted his mistake and offered to share in the expenses for file the a demolition complaint. A case was filed against them for alleged encroachment of a designated right of way. SPS LUZ G. prompting respondent spouses to Petitioner contend Erlinda supervised her husband’s work. ISSUE Whether petitioners exercised the required diligence in laying out the boundaries on respondents’ property as a basis for the erection of a perimeter fence.SPS BATAL vs.
who is the licensed geodetic engineer and who is. – in the present case. Culpa culpa aquiliana aquiliana. upon assurance given by petitioner Frank Batal that they could proceed with the construction of the perimeter fence 21 . already or as culpa contractual. while culpa contractual is governed Article 1170 to 1174 of the same code. Erlinda. As a result. exercise markings requisite concrete placement perimeter fence that was later constructed. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately following Articles. failed of to the in carrying the the for out their contractual diligence obligations. petitioner Erlinda Batal. the one qualified to do the work. or – Culpa. the placement of the monuments did not accurately reflect the dimensions of the lot. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. and which liability such existing obligation. may be understood in two different senses: either as wrongful negligent omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation. therefore. The respondents.RULING The petition is DENIED. it is clear in that the the petitioners. increases which the is the fault from or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which existed. Petitioner Frank Batal’s installation of the concrete cyclone monuments had been done without the adequate supervision of his wife. vis-a-vis which is culpa the contractual. It was later discovered that it was not he but his wife. Petitioners committed breach of contract. act or or negligence. The placement of the markings had been done solely by petitioner Frank Batal who is not a geodetic engineer.
Because of the encroachment. Being guilty of a breach of their contract.R. erected their fence which turned out to encroach in an adjacent easement. thus. in turn. 1996 FACTS Ministry of Education Culture issued a check payable to Abante Marketing and drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB). it filed a civil suit against PBCom which in turn. PBCom. No. however. However. Capitol could not in turn. PNB cleared the check as good and thereafter. Capitol deposited the same in its account with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) which. returned the check to PBCom. April 25. Capitol sought clarification from PBCom and demanded the re-crediting of the amount. debit Abante Marketing's account since the latter had already withdrawn the amount of the check. Since the demands of Capitol were not heeded. CA G. PBCom credited Capitol's account for the amount stated in the check. filed a third-party complaint against PNB 22 . the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and. then proceeded to debit the latter's account for the same amount. and subsequently. the reason being that there was a "material alteration" of the check number. On the other hand. Abante Marketing. 107508. sent the check to PNB for clearing. deposited the questioned check in its savings account with Capitol City Development Bank (CAPITOL).by relying on the purported accuracy of the placement of the monuments. In turn. PBCom followed suit by requesting an explanation and re-crediting from PNB. suffered damages. PNB. as collecting agent of Capitol. sent the check back to petitioner. petitioners are liable for damages suffered by the respondents in accordance with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code PNB vs. PNB returned the check to PBCom and debited PBCom's account for the amount covered by the check.
for reimbursement/indemnity with respect to the claims of Capitol. filed a fourth-party complaint against Abante Marketing. The Trial Court rendered its decision. is a material alteration. HELD NO. on its part. Any alteration which changes: (a) The date. any change alters effect instrument material alteration. whatever Abante amount Marketing PNB pays to to indemnify PBCom. 225. (b) The sum payable. either for principal or interest. The appellate court modified the appealed judgment by ordering PNB to honor the check. The court dismissed the counterclaims of PBCom and PNB. ordering PBCom to recredit or reimburse. PNB. (e) The medium or currency in which payment is to be made. Sec. it the amount. (d) The number or the relations of the parties. (c) The time or place of payment. or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect. the court ordered PBCom to re-credit Capitol's account with that ISSUE: Is the alteration of the serial number a material alteration. PNB to reimburse and indemnify PBCom for whatever reimburse amount and PBCom pays PNB to for Capitol. 23 . What constitutes a material alteration. After the check shall have been honored by PNB. the PNB filed of the the petition for is a review on certiorari averring that under Section 125 of the NIL. (f) Or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified.
I.” Justice Jose C.” 24 . In his book entitled “Pandect of Commercial Law and Jurisprudence. a material alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of NIL. An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. 1. but the holder may enforce it only according to its original tenor. It means an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party.Petitioner alleges that under Section 125(f). N.L. Vitug opines that “an innocent alteration (generally. In other words.) and spoliation (alterations done by a stranger) will not avoid the instrument. changes on items other than those required to be stated under Sec. The court does not agree. any change that alters the effect of the instrument is a material alteration.
Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. Thus. thereafter. 1985. nullified herein third terminated. at the RTC of Quezon City. 2000 FACTS On October 21. Thereafter. marriage 1996).MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage annulled. yet 25. 138509. July 31. 25 . and with with a Ma. BOBIS GR No. prejudicial question. contracted Marbella Julia second petitioner marriage certain Hernandez. The RTC granted the motion. Dulce nor Javier. With he Imelda with said marriage a (on not Jan. 25. while petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. a decision in the civil case is not essential to It is therefore not a Respondent cannot be permitted to use his the determination of the criminal charge. 1998. ISSUE Whether or not of the subsequent of a filing previous of a civil action for a declaration nullity marriage constitutes prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy HELD Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. of his first marriage license.
and.A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. Prior to such declaration of nullity. a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again. respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. the validity of 26 . In the case at bar. a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime the but guilt so intimately innocence connected of the with it that Its it two determines or accused. without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. In Article 40 of the Family Code. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. It is. Thus. In the current jurisprudence. The reason is that. otherwise the second marriage will also be void. without a judicial declaration of its nullity. cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. not a prejudicial question Parties to a its marriage should only not be permitted courts to judge for such themselves nullity. therefore. essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action. competent having authority. (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. respondent.
170516. No. July 16. 2008 27 . AQUINO G. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy POLITICAL LAW AKBAYAN vs.the first marriage is beyond question.R.
Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA. but at the same time. trade in services. The Highest Tribunal 28 . Aquino et al” (G.R. concerning trade in goods. 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. etc. from the negotiation process RULING The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16. rules of origin. customs procedures. the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed. No. ISSUES 1 Whether or not petitioners have legal standing Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress. including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan. exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties. 2006. Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. Congresspersons. investment. citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA. Thomas G. Particularly. 170516).FACTS This is regarding the JPEPA. paperless trading. petitioners – non-government organizations.
the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006. The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus. where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of 29 . which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same.dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition. insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues. In its Decision. however. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo.” It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. Notwithstanding this.
R. GRP PANEL G. 2008 FACTS The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought aboutby the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed inKuala Lumpur. ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions onpublic consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional HELD: 30 . October 14. 183591. NORTH COTABATO vs.This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus andProhibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TemporaryRestraining Order.lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. The agreement mentions "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which itgrants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of theBangsamoro. authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. Theagreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region inMuslim Mindanao and the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA). No. Malaysia.
It cannot be the source of. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims. nor be capable of violating. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. with no legal force or binding effect. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute.RULING Since the MOA has not been signed. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper. a court of law. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. after all. whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. The instant Petitions. and all other oppositions to the MOA. have no more leg to stand on. in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor.GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation andthe right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it areunconstitutional because it is contrary . which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. In acting on supposed abuses by 31 . therefore. We are. They no longer present an actual case or a justifiable controversy for resolution by this Court. any right. its provisions will not at all come into effect. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character. and not of public opinion.
No. 2009 FACTS 32 .other branches of government. LEGAL ETHICS CERVANTES vs. the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.M. July 31. MTJ-08-1709. PANGILINAN A.
00 which is covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure. The case of simple slander is punishable by arresto menor with a fine of not more than P200. 2002 a Motion to Admit Counter-Affidavit. He could have ordered Lanie Cervantes to file her Counter-Affidavit within ten (10) days as provided by [t]he Rules before arraignment ISSUE Is Judge Heriberto Pangilinan liable with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Gross Ignorance of the Law? RULING Yes. Judge Pangilinan advised complainant that he could not accept her belatedly filed Motion because she had already been arraigned. Pangilinan issued on December 5. Pangilinan GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law.000. was tasked to investigate the complaint made by Cervantes. Warrant of Arrest should not have been issued against Lanie . Cervantes charged Judge Pangilinan with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Ignorance of the Law Executive Judge Perfecto Pe of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City through a Resolution. Respondent Judge manifested a lack of 33 . the Court finds Judge Heriberto M. Judge Pe made the following investigation: Judge Heriberto Pangilinan failed to diligently observe the Rules on Summary Procedure in criminal cases. filed on January 22. 2001 a warrant of arrest in a criminal case for Slander against the therein 18. accused-herein posted 2001.Respondent Judge Heriberto M. bail complainant at pleaded Lanie On not Cervantes arraignment She who on later subsequently December fixed P2. complainant guilty.
000. judges may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment absent any bad faith or malice. 337 SCRA 632 (2000). Judge Pangilinan fixing issued the a Warrant of the of Arrest in against the Lanie of Cervantes. a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Pacris vs. When the law is sufficiently basic.mastery of the provision of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure.] not the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. 337 SCRA 638 ASTURIAS vs. Fabillar. 6538. The claim of good faith and absence of malice in glaring instances of incompetence and ineptitude does not abate a judge’s consequent liability. 2005 FACTS Dr.C. 331 SCRA 531). A. anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Creer vs. Asturias filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) and Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City where it was docketed as Civil Case 34 . While ordinarily. Pagalilauan. bond accused amount Php2. The requirement for the accused to p[o]st bail is part of the regular procedure[. Buban. they nonetheless have obligation to keep abreast of all basic laws and principles (Belga vs. SERRANO. et al. November 25. No.00.
FSCC did not make an appeal regarding the decision and thus it became final and executory. who were members of the Board of Directors and unit owners of FSCC. 1999 However on July 1. there must be a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. the decision of the RTC was notified at the very latest on August 11. RTC decided in favor of the complainant on April 6. 2003. stating that they just discovered the decision in March 2003. 1999. Upon which it will then be determined whether the respondents are guilty of perjury because of the sworn statement that they executed. 1992 to be affirmed by the Court of Appeals with Modification that the complaint is hereby DISMISSED on July 31. In this case. RULE The burden to prove that the respondents indeed received the decision on August 1999 lies with the complainant. Asturias has not shown any evidence with regard to the case. the counsel of FSCC filed a petition to annul the RTC judgment invoking Rule 47 of Rules of Court. 1998. This is backed by a verification subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public which was made by the respondents. This was contested by the complainant because according to her. in order to consider a scenario to be perjurious. Then complainant filed a motion of execution on August 10.No. basing it on the Sheriff’s report that the copies of the decision were furnished to the Administrative Secretary of FSCC. 35 . as it has been mentioned in the previous paragraph. 16640. Also. ISSUE It is being contested whether the respondents indeed received the RTC decision last March 2003 or not. Dr.
FAROLAN G. vs.151370. LABOR LAW ASIA PACIFIC CHARTERING (PHILS. FACTS The termination of a managerial employee on the ground of ´loss of confidenceµ should have a basis and the determination of the same cannot be left entirely to the employer.) INC.R.the complainant hasn’t produced or shown any evidenced that would prove that the respondents have willfully and deliberately sworn a falsehood in the verification made in the presence of a notary public. 2002 . 36 December 4. No. Therefore the petition for review is DENIED.
The Labor Arbiter found that the dismissal was illegal for lack of justcause. Bondoc Petitioner Asia. Hence. and (b)dismissal must be for a valid cause. he must be given opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. The manner Farolan to be by which Respondent of and 37 fairness to Farolan and was due being evidence dismissed process in her afforded violated Respondent thebasic precepts was heard dismissed.e. Asia claims that the increase in sales revenue was due to Zozobrado·smanagement. Zozobrado informally took over Farolan·s marketing and sales responsibilities butshe continued to receive her salary.Upon Vice President Bondoc·s request. (Bondoc).offered Respondent Farolan (Farolan) the sales manager position to which Farolan accepted. (Asia) is tasked with the selling of passenger and cargo spacesfor Scandinavian Airlines Catalino System. i.) Inc. Asia directed Roberto Zozobrado (Zozobrado)to implement solutions. On appeal.the Court of Appeals upheld the labor arbiter·s decision. without present theopportunity . however. to for wit: a valid the dismissal of an be employee (a) employeemust afforded due process. such decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) stating that the termination of employment due to loss of confidence is within management prerogative. Asia then sent a letter of termination forcing to Farolan tofile on a the ground of for loss of confidence Farolan complaint illegal dismissal. through its Vice Maria President Linda R.. ISSUE Whether or not Respondent Farolan·s dismissal was illegal HELD A statement is of thus the in requisites order. Consequently. the filing of this petition.Petitioner Asia Pacific Chartering (Phils. Farolan submitted a detailed report attributing the drop of salesrevenue to market forces beyond her control.
with theexception of her salary and allowances. particular dismissal personnel. Even assuming. knowingly andpurposely. and the terms and conditions of her employment. Romeo dela Cruz (respondent) is an employee of Bacolod-Talisay Realty Development Corporation(Bacolod-Talisay) as an overseer. April 30. et al.R. He was suspended for 30 days for payroll paddling. were never reduced to writing. selling canepoints without the knowledge and consent of management and 38 . With and dismissal requiresproof of involvement in the alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions andaccusations by the employer has for will not be the sufficient. vs. She as was or of never by given a written respect as notice the to stating the for and for her file valid acts loss omission trust constituting confidence grounds rank ground required law. loss of confidence. 2009 FACTS The twin notice requirement provided by law should be observed in order for a dismissal to be valid. however. that Farolan was a managerial employee.Loss of trust and confidence to be a employee·s dismissal must based a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts. the stated ground (in the letter of termination) for her dismissal. BACOLOD-TALISAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.It is not disputed that Farolan·s job description. 179563. without justifiable excuse. mere existence of abasis for believing that such valid employee ground breached an employer be would on suffice for his dismissal. should have a basis and determination thereof cannot be left entirely to the employer. trust of But his as regards a managerial employee. DELA CRUZ G. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally.defense.
procedure effecting same observed. A case for illegal dismissal was filed by dela Cruz. and.misappropriating the proceeds thereof. The letter dated June 3. a second notice to him that his employment is being terminated. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRCfinding that the Bacolor-Dalisay did not comply with the guidelines for the dismissal of an employee. It did not comply with the requiredfirst notice. he received a letter informing him that he was dismissedfrom his work.Respondent dela Cruz and Bacolod-Talisay had a confrontation before the barangay council but they did notreach any settlement. while the dismissal of dela Cruz was for a just cause. and it was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter as well as the NLRC.1997 sent to dela Cruz was a letter of suspension.In was not apprise the employee of the cause for termination and to opportunity in explain the fine. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner. In other words. Bacolod-Talisay failed to afford dela Cruz due process by failing tocomply with the twin notice requirement in dismissing him. viz: 1) 2) a first notice to apprise him of his fault. give himreasonable the the purpose to of which his is to side. On the other hand. and renting out tractor for use in another farm. Bacolod-Talisay observed due process in dismissing Romeo dela Cruz HELD The Court of Appeals correctly held though that Bacolod-Talisay did not comply with the proper procedurein dismissing respondent. After 30 days. 39 .
December 22. compensating taxes and import processing fees in the aggregate sum of P 5. 86625.00.R. and in connection therewith paid to the Bureau of Customs duties.562.TAXATION DBP vs.926. No. CA G. It 40 . 1989 FACTS The Development Bank of the Philippines imported IBM computer equipment from the United States.
inter alia.. agencies and corporations-the one of late enactment." In the CA the case Ninth Division rendered judgment under date of October 3. 7 (2) of R.. 1988.D...thereafter asked for a refund of the amount paid. By Resolution of the Court en banc dated September 15.had been superseded by said P.562. 129. taxes and fees had been correctly imposed and collected. 1125 in regard to the manner of settlement of disputes involving customs duties. No. 242 and Sec. Jan. The DBP appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). his appeal being docketed as G. 1087 (eff." The Commissioner in turn came up to the Supreme Court on an appeal by certiorari. No. maintaining that the customs duties. No. 1125-pursuant to which the CTA had therefore been exercising exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties. The Customs Commissioner refused to grant the refund. 242.D. (which) shall be applied and credited to the payment of the subscribed capital stock of the Government in the Bank.00 it paid to the Bureau of Customs .R. 79635. 20. fees or other money charges. 1987. invoking Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. it being "a settled rule of statutory construction that where there is irreconcilable repugnancy between two statutes anent the same subject matter-as there is between P. however. 1987 adjudicated the controversy in its favor. the appeal was referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) for the reason that "(s)uch cases emanating from the Court of Tax Appeals now fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.A. The CA ruled that Section 7 (2) of Republic Act No. ordering the Commissioner of Customs "to refund to ..926. etc. annulling and setting aside that of the CTA. between government offices. which on July 31.1986). (it [the DBP]) the amount of P 5. No. being the 41 .
" The fact that.. should prevail over the other which is of earlier enactment. or commissions. boards or commissions. as the DBP argues. decisions. but also "all final judgments. resolutions. except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution. DECISION The Court reaffirms its earlier resolution that it is the CA which is now vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the CTA and other quasi-judicial agencies. but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by Section 9 of the Batas. except those falling jurisdiction 42 . is that the law did not." ISSUE Whether or not the CA has exclusive jurisdiction to review cases decided by the CTA. is of no moment. boards or commissions.latest expression of the legislative will. and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. orders within or the awards appellate of . decisions. Court in instrumentalities. instrumentalities. orders awards Courts quasi-judicial agencies. as the DBP imagines. In view of the comprehensive provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 granting or to the of IAC(now Regional the Trial CA) "(e)xclusive and appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments. boards.. quasi-judicial of the Supreme agencies. deal only with "Changes in the rules on procedures. What is essential. the CTA is not among the agencies reorganized by said Batas Pambansa Bilang 129." and that not only was the Court of Appeals reorganized. resolutions. the provisions of this Act. and indisputable. instrumentalities. Its appellate jurisdiction was also extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts.
consistently with mode of appeal from other quasi-judicial bodies and agencies prescribed by Republic Act No. It is on this basis that the interim or transitional rules adopted in this Court's en banc Resolution of January 11. it follows that the mode of appeal from the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals should be by notice of appeal cum petition for review. and that formerly provided for by Republic Act No. September 9. et al. and since appeals by certiorari may properly be taken only to this Court.accordance with the Constitution. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B. 158881." it being noteworthy in this connection that the text of the law is broad and comprehensive. and the explicitly stated exceptions Appeals. April 16. Blg. and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. vs. boards. is stressed from the paragraph only the under Section Code provisions. appellate further excludes have Indeed. 43 . no reference of the last whatever to Court of to the the Court over 9 of of Tax and the intention expand original jurisdiction by its orders Appeals of the Labor quasiwhich and the judicial agencies. 5434 (eff. 129. 2008 G. or commissions. issued "decisions interlocutory Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. No." PETRON CORP. supra. TOBIAS." Since final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are now within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.. the provisions of this Act. 1983 on the subject prescribe that appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. instrumentalities.P.R. 1125.1968).
captioned "Final Demand to Pay. The Mayor did not respond to this last letter. it has engaged in the selling of diesel fuels to vessels used in commercial fishing in and around Manila Bay.62.FACTS Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas Fishport Complex in Navotas. It argued that it was exempt from local business taxes in view of Art. as well as a ruling of the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance dated 31 July 1995. in a letter dated 8 May 2002. Through that depot. 259. Petron. The computation sheets that were attached to the letter made reference to Ordinance 92-03. though such enactment was not cited in the letter itself. respondent Manuel T." The stated total amount was P6. Enriquez. a figure derived from the gross sales of the depot during the years in question. 44 . the latter stating that sales of petroleum fuels are not subject to local taxation. from the office of wherein from the On 1 March 2002. This was followed by a letter from the Mayor dated 15 May 2002. or the New Navotas Revenue Code (Navotas Revenue Code)." requiring that Petron pay the assessed amount within five (5) days from receipt thereof. replied to the Mayor by another letter posing objections to the threat of closure. 232(h) of the Implementing Rules (IRR) of the Code. through counsel. with a threat of closure of Petron’s operations within Navotas should there be no payment. Petron duly filed with Navotas a letter-protest to the notice of assessment pursuant to Section 195 of the Code. Petron received a letter Navotas was Mayor.087. to the "relative due corporation to figures covering sale of diesel declared by your Navotas Terminal 1997 2001. The letterprotest was denied by the Navotas Municipal Treasurer. assessed respondent taxes Toby Tiangco.
Is the challenged tax prohibited by Section 133(h) under the proviso. Is the challenged tax on sale of the diesel fuels an excise tax on an article enumerated under the NIRC. Eleven days later. ISSUE 1. Petron filed with the Malabon RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment for Deficiency Taxes with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. It is evident that Am Jur aside. the current definition of an excise tax is that of 45 a tax levied on a specific . enjoining the respondents from closing Petron’s Navotas bulk plant or otherwise interfering in its operations. directing Petron to cease and desist from operating the bulk plant. On 5 May 2003. fees or charges on petroleum products"? RULING 1. The quested TRO was not issued by the Malabon RTC upon manifestation of respondents that they would not proceed with the closure of Petron’s Navotas bulk plant until after the RTC shall have decided the case on the merits. but this was likewise denied. Petron also filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial. on 20 May 2002. this Court issued a TRO. "taxes. thusly prohibited under Section 133(h) of the Code? 2. However.Thus. but this was denied. On 4 August 2003. Petron sought a TRO from the Malabon RTC. Petron received a Closure Order from the Mayor. while the case was pending decision. respondents refused to issue a business permit to Petron. thus prompting Petron to file a Supplemental Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against respondents. the Malabon RTC rendered its Decision dismissing Petron’s complaint and ordering the payment of the assessed amount.
The Court can concede that a tax on a business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. and not those previously defined "excise taxes" which were not integrated or denominated as such in our present tax law. that our current body of taxation fact. The palpable absurdity that ensues should the alternative interpretation prevail all but strengthens this position. law does any not explicitly adoption of accommodate the the traditional definition of excise tax offered by Petron." This prohibition must pertain to the same kind of excise taxes as imposed by the NIRC. fees 46 . carrying on." at least not to the extent of equating excise with business taxes. as imposed under the NIRC. In absent statutory traditional definition. carrying on. that a business tax is distinct from an excise tax. or for that matter. It is quite apparent. At the very least." This current definition was already in place when the Code was enacted in 1991. for the phrase "taxes. or the exercise of an activity.article. 2. it may be said that starting in 1986 excise taxes in this jurisdiction refer exclusively to specific or ad valorem taxes imposed under the NIRC. The Court thus can assert with clear comfort that excise taxes. such distinction is immaterial insofar as the latter part of Section 133(h) is concerned. therefore. do not pertain to "the performance. or exercise of an activity. and we can only presume that it was what the Congress had intended as it specified that local government units could not impose "excise taxes on articles enumerated under the [NIRC]. However. rather than one "upon the performance. it is this concept of excise tax which we can reasonably assume that Congress had in mind and actually adopted when it crafted the Code.
" The earlier reference in paragraph (h) to excise taxes comprehends a wider range of subjects of taxation: all articles already covered by excise taxation under the NIRC. fees and charges. in crafting Section 133(h). goods made the of and such non-essential metals. including 133(h). mineral products. While local government units are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with "taxes. The language of Section 133(h) but makes all plain "taxes. fees yachts and other vessels intended for pleasure or sports. fees or charges that could withstand the absolute prohibition imposed by the provision. tobacco products. to goods as and and precious reference perfumes. a specific prohibition is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to petroleum products. business taxes. barred "excise taxes" or "direct taxes." excepting excise taxes. The absence of such a qualification leads to the by conclusion Section that all Where sorts the of law taxes does on are not petroleum prohibited products. In automobiles. we should not distinguish. charges.or charges on petroleum products" does not qualify the kind of taxes. 47 . charges" pertains only to one class of articles of the many subjects excise taxes. for then it would be understood that only such specified taxes on petroleum products could not be imposed under the prohibition. specifically." or any category of taxes only. jewelry. "petroleum products". distinguish. of later "taxes. such as alcohol products. It would have been a different matter had Congress. that fees the and prohibition with respect to petroleum products extends not only to excise taxes thereon. contrast.
Navarro and Leonardo Atienza Abad Santos to be divided among them equally. and 30% for the fourth partner Estrella Abad Santos.. prayed ordered render accounting partnership business and to pay her corresponding share in the partnership profits after such accounting. an Estrella and The Abad Santos. had been paying dividends to the partners except to notwithstanding to to to pay to or give demands and any let defendants examine regarding the her that of refused continued books the be affairs refuse her her in to June 28. 1955the Articles of Co-partnership was amended as to include Leonardo herein Atienza of respondent.. with herein petitioners Domingo C. Abad Santos each.. FACTS On October 9.COMMERCIAL LAW EVANGELISTA & CO vs." On December 17. No. inter alia. a Conchita amended P. Evangelista. Domingo C. 1973 partnership partnership declared by defendants information share therefore dividends partnership. as industrial partner.500 Articles provided. that "the contribution of Estrella Santos consists industry being industrial partner". 31684. Evangelista." On June 7.. Jr. 1954 a co-partnership was formed under the name of "Evangelista & Co. SANTOS G. 48 . Abad Jr. in the proportion of 70% for the first three partners. capacity. the original capitalist partners. alleging her. which her her She was also the made a partyhad the the the the defendant. Conchita P. 1963 herein respondent filed suit against the three other partners in the Court of First Instance of Manila.R. remaining in that with contribution of her P17. plus attorney's fees and costs. and that the profits and losses "shall be divided and distributed among the partners . and that that and the partnership.Navarro.
she without joined express consent as herein defendants'. instead she has been and still is a judge of the City Court (formerly Municipal Court) of the City of Manila. to the alleging filing reached their Supplemental defendants' answer subsequent complaint.ISSUE Whether or not Abad Santos is an industrial partner and is entitled to the shares of the partnership? HELD Yes. interests or participation. why did it take appellants many years before excluding her from said company as aforequoted allegations? And how can they reconcile has such exclusive been such with a their main theory "The that real appellee never partner because agreement was to grant the appellee a share of 30% of the net 49 . as an alleged industrial partner. on the ground plaintiff has never contributed her industry to the partnership. That appellee has faithfully complied with her prestation with respect to appellants is clearly shown by the fact that it was only after filing of the complaint in this case and the answer under thereto the appellants art just exercised mentioned to their by the right of in of an exclusion codal Answer. in the defendant partnership and/or in its net profits or income. and deprived of. defendants agreement whereby the herein plaintiff been excluded from. Having always knows as an appellee as a City judge before appellant company industrial partner. her alleged share. the aside from teaching of an the in law Manila. It is not disputed that the provision against the industrial partner engaging in business for himself seeks to prevent any conflict of interest between the industrial partner and the partnership and to insure faithful compliance by said partner with this prestation. devoting her time to performance of her duties as such judge and enjoying the privilege and emoluments appertaining school even in to the said office.
000. 154127. LLAMAS G. 2003 FACTS A complaint for sum of money was filed by respondent Dionisio Llamas against Petitioner Romeo Garcia and Eduardo de Jesus alleging that the two borrowed Php 400. Respondent’s 50 . According to the CA.000.000. the check was issued precisely to pay for the loan that was covered by the promissory note jointly and severally undertaken by petitioner and de Jesus. The Court of Appeals ruled that no novation. less the amount of Php 120. 1955. December 8. until the mortgage of P30. had taken place when respondent accepted the check from de Jesus. 1997 until the same shall have been fully paid.00 representing the principal amount plus interest at 15% per month from January 23. express or implied.00 representing interests already paid. GARCIA vs. They bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the loan on or before January 23.R.profits which the appellant partnership may realize from June 7. The trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the respondent and directed petitioner to pay jointly and severally respondent the amounts of Php 400. Petitioner resisted the complaint alleging that he signed the promissory note merely as an accommodation party for de Jesus and the latter had already paid the loan by means of a check and that the issuance of the check and acceptance thereof novated or superseded the note. The loan remained unpaid despite repeated demands by respondent. No.000. 1997 with a 15% interest per month.00 obtained from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporal shall have been fully paid.00 from him.
Wellsettled person is of the the rule that be novation clear and is never It presumed. to the obligation the incurred by him upon and its petitioner was joint and several. The parties did not unequivocally declare that the old obligation had been extinguished by the issuance and the acceptance of the check or that the check would take the place of the note. the check which had intended extinguish obligation bounced presentment. (2) Whether or not the defense that petitioner was only an accommodation party had any basis. ISSUES (1) Whether or not there was novation of the obligation. is thus Consequently. was totally in accord with the terms thereof. Neither could the payment of interests. (2) the parties concerned must agree to a new contract. like the check. the old must be expressly released from the obligation. HELD For novation to take place. Such payment was already provided for in the promissory note and.acceptance of the check did not serve to make de Jesus the sole debtor been because first. Also unmeritorious is petitioner’s argument that the obligation was novated by the substitution of debtors. the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a previous valid obligation. In order to change the person of the debtor. and the third person or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the relation. that which arises from a purported change in the debtor must express. and (4) there must be a valid new contract. which in petitioner’s view also constitutes novation. and second. (3) the old contract must be extinguished. There is no incompatibility between the promissory note and the check. change the terms and conditions of the obligation. incumbent on petitioner to show clearly and unequivocally that 51 .
still petitioner would be liable for the note. In a solidary obligation. Besides. the note was made payable to a specific person rather than bearer to or order—a requisite for negotiability. one of principal and surety.novation has indeed taken place. petitioner is therefore liable for the entire obligation. The relation between an accommodation party and the party accommodated is. The promissory note is thus covered by the general provisions of the Civil Code. the latter knew the former to be only an accommodation party. It is a settled rule that a surety is bound equally and absolutely with the principal and is deemed an original promissory debtor from the beginning. An accommodation party is liable for the instrument to a holder for value even if. the law requires that the creditor expressly consent to the substitution of a new debtor. not by the NIL. in effect. Hence. the creditor is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors. It is up to the former to determine against whom to enforce collection. at the time of its taking. Having made himself jointly and severally liable with de Jesus. Even granting that the NIL was applicable. Note also that for novation to be valid and legal. (2) By its terms. petitioner cannot avail himself of the NIL’s provisions on the liabilities and defenses of an accommodation party. a non-negotiable note is merely a simple contract in writing and evidence of such intangible rights as may have been created by the assent of the parties. The liability is immediate and direct. CRIMINAL LAW 52 .
Inc transactions (private reflected in one to account have a in which complainant) decided thorough investigations on fraudulent crediting..FRANCISCO vs. Jr. Solidbank. Sometime in August 1999. No. par. petitioner Eliseo Francisco. as defined in Article 315.R. despite the absence of an element in the crime charged for which petitioner was indicted RULING 53 . branch 267. one of the companies which issues credit cards. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Francisco was an employee of Bankard Inc. (Francisco) was charged with Estafa in an Amended Information. it is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit cards and in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card holders using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other banks and credit card companies. February 18. which was filed on 13 November 2000 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. PEOPLE G. ISSUE Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed reversible error in affirming the assailed order and decision of the regional trial court of pasig city. 2009 FACTS In an Amended Information dated 9 November 2000. 177720. relayed to Bankard that there were four questionable Bankard.
or falsely pretends to possess agency.The element of estafa referred to by petitioner Francisco is the third one under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code in the following list provided by this Court in several cases: (1) the accused uses a fictitious name. fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. power. It does not require that the false pretense. even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended party. 54 . fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party.) The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense. other imaginary employs similar deceits. business influence. fraudulent act or fraudulent means. fraudulent act or fraudulent means. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him. or credit. but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof. fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (Emphasis supplied. transactions. such person is liable for estafa under Article 315(a). Thus. and (4) as a result thereof. (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense. (2) such false pretense. property. the offended party suffered damage. that is. he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense. in this case wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa). or qualifications.
Jr. Public they are entitled to an to amnesty Rebels. then to a secluded area in Antipolo where they were shot dead. The reports made by the Investigating Panel disclose that respondent Kapunan. and Violations of the Article of War. and Creating a National Amnesty Commission) criminal liabilities. the victims were seized and to a "safe house" in Cubao. ISSUE The main issues raised are whether or not the grant of amnesty under Proclamation No. had created the CounterIntelligence and special project team which headed the surveillance of Olalia and that Legaspi was present in the safe house when they brought Olalia and Alay-ay. and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Against Crimes Committed Furtherance of Political Ends. in (Proclamation Crimes entitled Order. Nos. RULING The Panel refused to consider petitioners’ defense of amnesty on the ground that documents pertaining to the amnesty failed to show that the Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied 55 for and their criminal uplifting their . 148213-17.KAPUNAN vs. 347 or 348 extinguished their criminal liability. "Granting Other Amnesty March 13. FACTS Eduardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi who were the members of the AFP were allegedly charged with the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver. 1986. thus 347.R. Leonor Alay-ay. Being members of the AFP who claimed that the act was done for a furtherance of a political claim. On the night of November 12. The Panel and the Department of Justice denied their petition. 2009 Insurgents. No. CA G.
San Jose del Monte.. At this juncture. and dragged him inside Appellant Reyes Pataray and Thereupon. at about 11:00 p. Raymond (children) Abagatnan (Abagatnan) (housemaid) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo.liabilities were not uplifted. the Yao family. the van stopped again. arrived and immediately boarded the van. Yao San (father) alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm. No. male approached.R. appellants Arnaldo Flores. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van. arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo. G. and their cohorts. there was no rebellion yet launched against the Cory Aquino government. PEOPLE vs. It was held that the killings were not committed in furtherance of a political belief because at that time. with the other male companion. drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle. of The petition was denied for and reconsideration the Court of to the Department Justice Appeals affirmed the same.m. March 17. Reyes and a certain and Juanito also Pataray boarded with (Pataray) the two van. Per order of appellants Robert. 2009 FACTS On 16 July 1999. Appellant Flores. companions. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million 56 . and Chua Jona Ong Ping Sim (mother). Bulacan. on board a Mazda MVP van. After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road. DOMINGO. Pataray and one of their male companions. poked their guns at Yao San. Later. 178300. the van stopped. et al. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. appellant the van. all armed with guns.
appellants escorted instructed in Abagatnan to look to the for Yao San in the Upon poultry farm.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim. and after 30 minutes of trekking. Bulacan where they spent the whole night. On the morning of the following day. 57 . In the safe-house. Robert and appellants left the safe-house. left appellants Arnaldo and companion Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house.. Abagatnan searched for Yao San. at around 4:00 a. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao Reyes San and about the ransom their demanded. Upon arriving at the poultry farm. appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Robert. appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled. arriving therein. appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded. Thus. Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. Robert.pesos (P5. Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Meanwhile. but the latter could not be found. Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Thereafter. Raymond and Abagatnan. Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. while Yao San. Chua Ong Ping Sim. appellants abandoned Robert. Lenny. but the latter could not be reached. Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts.000. Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte. male Thereafter. Matthew.000. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion Abagatnan proceeding poultry farm.m. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left.
Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p. Bulacan. On 23 July 1999.On 18 July 1999. Yao San left. Yao San acceded to appellants’ demand. On 26 July Quezon 1999. Quezon City. Litex Road. but none came. Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. San Jose del Monte. appellants Arnaldo and Reyes 58 . in the Usan dumpsite.m. appellant Thereupon. Novaliches. assistance of Atty. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the payoff at 4:00 p. City. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores. appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. to with the the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame. Cristo. executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam.m. Thus. Arnaldo appellant surrendered Arnaldo. Yao San waited for appellant’s call. appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. On the morning of 19 July 1999. but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Quezon City.. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim. Fairview. Uminga. Both died of asphyxia by strangulation. Subsequently. Thereafter.
were identified in a police line-up by Yao San. As can be gleaned of from and the credible and their testimonies appellant at Yao and San. sworn and and statements Abagatnan. appellant a Flores. Afterwards. Arnaldo and Flores conspired in kidnapping the Yao family and. 2.) Whether or not the appellants committed special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. ISSUES 1. On 10 August 1999. there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San. of Atty. with a view to the attainment of the same object. Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers. one performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete the crime. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective among the accused. Robert poked Yao. Rous. agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan. with the assistance executed written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident. Batangas. Appellant Flores then took the driver’s seat and drove the van. conspiracy exists. while each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo 59 .) Whether Reyes. RULING Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code. When the accused by their acts aimed at the same object. guns Reyes Pataray approached thereafter dragged the latter into the van.
Thereafter. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping acts of of the family. (b) it is committed by simulating public authority. Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. the Yao family 60 . appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Raymond and Abagatnan. or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor.and their cohorts inside the van. their the foregoing individual appellants cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose of extorting ransom. First. Second. and (4) in the commission of the offense. Robert. Further. Under Article (1) 267 the of the Revised is a of Penal private Code. All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan. appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. and Clearly. or a public officer. (3) act is detention (a) kidnapping kidnapping illegal. any of the following circumstances present: detention lasts for more than three days. Robert. appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim. (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made. or in any manner deprives the latter liberty. female. or the kidnaps or detains another. the crime (2) of he is or kidnapping is committed with the concurrence of the following elements: of his offender the individual. Third.
and with it. No. struck the lower back Chy found an opportunity to escape. Garcia suddenly punched him. portion of Chy’s head. GARCIA vs. August 28. that Chy died of myocardial infarction. mauling. of homicide. reached for a bottle of beer.R. 171951. found later unconscious on the kitchen floor.was taken against their will. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victim’s heart is healthy. 2009 FACTS The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him. Chy was about to come out of his house He also and upon being summoned. PEOPLE G. Two days later. he He was He was ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the He also complained of difficulty in breathing. And fourth. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted ISSUE 61 . Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy. threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females. Esquibel. salivating. the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister.
as minimum. reclusion temporal in its minimum period. the years of prision mayor. a non-violent related cause of death RULING The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of the victim. PEOPLE 62 . imposable penalty should be in the minimum period. Nevertheless. Article Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by of the Revised Penal Code.If Garcia is liable for the death of Manuel Chy despite the fact that the cause of death is myocardial infarction. if the latter’s heart is in good condition. of ten Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. that is. penalty maximum. said law. said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with 13(3) circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. to trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate (10) fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as CALIMUTAN vs. Considering this mitigating circumstance.
the Cantre family requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim by the NBI. Petitioner picked-up a stone which is as big as man’s fist. Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacao because he is suspecting the latter as the one responsible for throwing stones at his house on previous night. On their way home. Both Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses. Ulanday . 1996. such as a stone. 152133. Dr. he again complained of backache and also of stomachache. together with two other companions had a drinking spree in a videoke bar at ten o’clock in the morning of February 4.Thereafter. ran toward Cantre.the Municipal Health Officer and made a findings that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. bulalacao ran away. Sanano tried to pacify the two. and at around three o’clock in the following morning. Right after his death. February 9. Cantre died. hitting him at the left side of his back. When Cantre arrived at his house. When he saw the victim was about to stab Bulalacao.G. After being hit. He’s condition immediately became worse.R. Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and reported that the cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen. and threw it to the latter. 2006 FACTS Victim Cantre and Sañano. Conchita S. Unsatisfied. The victim suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument. they decided to part ways and went to their respective houses. Cantre and Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao. he picked up a 63 . At that night. Cantre was examined by Dr. When Cantre turned his attention to the petitioner. he complained of the pain in the left side of his back which was hit by the stone. Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim but the latter refused and pulled out eight-inch Balisong. No.
the act or omission of the offender is malicious. these case.The offender. Article according to 3 of the the Revised by Penal which Code they classifies are felonies in means committed. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender. and (2) culpable felonies. The RTC rendered a decision. In intentional felonies. the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). Hence. particular: (1) intentional felonies. In culpable felonies. which was later affirmed by the CA. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to kill the victim and thus liable for homicide? DECISION While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen which is the result by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. holding that petitioner was criminally liable for homicide and that the act of throwing a stone from behind was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony which caused the death of the victim and held that the accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. has the intention to cause an injury to another. He was able to hit the victim. the act or omission of 64 . He contended that the throwing of the stone was in defense of his companion.stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. In the language of Art. 3. it nonetheless. in performing the act or in incurring the omission. is at variance with the RTC and the CA as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for.
and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was. beyond Instead. of harming the victim Cantre. much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre. much less to kill. 939). at that point. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was. in good conscience. as rendered by the RTC and affirmed culpable by the Court of Appeals. 65 . it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. the wrongful act results from imprudence. Sara. 3. this Court cannot. As stated in Art. the victim Cantre. The injury caused by the offender to another person is unintentional. this Court of in finds the petitioner Calimutan guilty reasonable doubt felony of reckless imprudence resulting homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing. negligence. or at the very least.the offender is not malicious. as earlier described. this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide. attribute to petitioner any malicious intent to injure. In the Petition at bar. lack of foresight or lack of skill. the victim Cantre. 55 Phil." (People vs. and in the absence of such intent.
Barangay Puerto. 1995. He also added that because he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction. 131588. DE LOS SANTOS G. the accused was found guilty. In the lower court. by of reason the taking of inexcusable performing precaution person into March 27. Because of the incident. the accused only exhibit an inexcusable lack of precaution. CDO. (2) his degree of 66 . ISSUE Whether or not the accused intentionally caused the death and injury of the PNP joggers? RULING No. in Maitum Highway. In his appeal. 11 were seriously wounded and 10 sustained minor injuries. 12 PNP joggers were killed on the spot.R. reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily. he testified that he had drunk three (3) bottles of beer earlier before the incident. FACTS On the cloudy morning of October 5. 2001 perform consideration (1) his employment or occupation. doing or failing to do an act from lack or which of failing material to damage on the such results part act. the accused continued to travel. No. the accused surrendered. He only realized he hit something until he noticed the thuds and he couldn’t distinguish what he hit because it was dark. but without malice.PEOPLE vs. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Two hours later. Isuzu Elf. Glenn delos Santos in his driven motor vehicle. he was not able to see the joggers. ran over members of the Philippine National Police (PN) who were jogging in the same direction as the truck was proceeding. Instead of applying his brake.
intelligence. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that any person who. the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give. and (3) other circumstances regarding persons. (4) his physical condition. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. by reckless imprudence. fifth constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the degree. Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving. As to penalty. would constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. This failure to render penalty exercise assistance by one to the victim. the same to be applied in its maximum period. had it been intentional. As to its verdict. In this case. the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed. the court shall its sound discretion without regard prescribed in Article 64. or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. therefore. modifying circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty. time and place. the accused should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. shall commit any act which. Moreover. the paragraph to the thereof rules provides that in the imposition of the penalty. escaped from the scene of the 67 . in felonies through imprudence or negligence. Elsewise stated. it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that the accused. and if it would have constituted a light felony.
Because the accused. accused sentenced to suffer. failed to render aid to the victims. for each count.000 to each of those who suffered minor physical injuries. 68 .000 to each of those who suffered serious physical injuries and of P10.000 for each group of heirs of the trainees killed. the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. As far as the award of damages is concerned. leaving behind the victims. for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. for lack of factual basis. resulting For in reckless the imprudence may be slight physical injuries. Likewise. the trial court’s award of death indemnity from P75. Hence. the penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. the awards of P30.000 to P50.incident. should be imposed. which is prision mayor in its medium period. the Applying separate Article offenses 48. the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period. of the maximum of said penalty.
Eugenio Baguio was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for he committed acts in violation of Act No 1757 or known as Gambling Law. consists: (a) in the playing of any game for money or any representative of value or valuable consideration or thing. No. the result of which game depends wholly or chiefly upon chance or hazard. directed and managed association “Turnuhan” and denominated “Samahan Abuluyan ng Salapi” between November 1913 till May 1914. Eugenio Baguio of Paete an Laguna said to known have as organized. 14258." as defined by Section 1 of Act No. BAGUIO FACTS The defendant. 1919 US vs.R. the member will pay P1 peso every Sunday and entitled to win a premium of P500 pesos by drawing lots conducted on the same day every week. In return.G. ISSUE Whether or not Eugenio Baguio committed acts in violation of Gambling Law. 1757. HELD The accused. and a Each member of the said association was subscribed by one or more shares. The said association was conducting a prohibited given game a of chance called “Loteria” book) (Lottery). “Libreta” (memorandum number representing each share. "Gambling. or (b) in the use of any mechanical invention or contrivance to determine by chance the loser or winner of money or of any representative 69 . August 2. The accused used to receive two (2) centavos for every peso of the amount of the premium as a recompense for his work as director and manager of the society or “Turnuhan”.
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. charged and sentenced to pay a fine of P100 pesos and in case of insolvency.of value or of any valuable consideration or thing." The lower court held that the defendant was guilty of conducting a lottery in violation of the law and was duly arrested. jueteng. or the use of any mechanical invention or contrivance to determine by chance the winner or loser of money or of any representative of value or of any valuable consideration or thing. 70 . and to pay the costs. or any form of lottery or policy or any banking or percentage game." Section 7 further provides that "any person taking any part therein or owning or operating any such mechanical invention or contrivance shall be punished as provided in Section 3 of said Act. Section 7 of said act prohibits absolutely "the playing at and the conducting of any game of monte.
2. ISSUE 1. No. “Ignorance facti excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties. They went to the suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas Galanta sleeping with his or back towards the fired door. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) 71 the offender acted in the . HELD 1. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. 1943 FACTS Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict. and if overpowered. 2. No. July 27. at Oanis him and simultaneously successively which resulted to the victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping. an innocent man. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. OANIS 74 Phil 257 G. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. Anselmo Balagtas.R. L-47722. to get him dead or alive.PEOPLE vs. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty. Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas. No.
R. In this case. 1988 FACTS Urbano had a dispute with Javier due to latter’s opening of irrigation system which flooded farmer’s palay storage. ISSUE Whether or not Urbano is criminally liable? HELD No. (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. NO. Proximate cause is that cause. in natural & continuous sequence. & logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a criminal conviction). URBANO vs. Infection of wound was efficient intervening cause between wounding & hacking w/c was distinct & foreign to the crime. Death wasn’t directly due to the hacking. The petitioner at the very least is guilty of slight physical injury. Civil liabilities only. January 7. produces injury & w/o w/c the result wouldn’t have occurred. only the first requisite is present. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. 72964. But because Urbano & Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators 72 to effect a compromise . unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. natural. Javier died due to tetanus. w/c.perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo but they had amicable settlement later on. 22 days after incident. IAC G.
despite defendant's warnings. AH CHONG G. He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts. 73 March 19. ISSUE Is the defendant guilty of homicide due to negligence? HELD No. without malice. the criminal liability is wiped out by virtue of PD 1508. The defendant killed the latter under the impression that the first was being attacked in their own room by robbers or ladrons. FACTS The defendant Ah Chong lived in a quarters together with Pascual Gualberto.agreement. §2(3) w/c allows settlement of minor offenses. 1910 . US vs. The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be REVERSED. The defendant claimed that Pascual forced open the door of their sleeping room. No. L-5272.R. or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge." and works an acquittal. if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent. Ignorance or mistake of fact. and the defendant ACQUITTED of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated. The defendant acted in good faith. or criminal intent in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense. with the costs of both instance de oficio.
presence aggression. 168051. Second. No.PEOPLE vs. Revised Penal Code. Given that Habla have indeed insulted and challenge Beltran to a fight. There were multiple and lethal blows 75 . Honorato Beltran suddenly attacked Norman Habla while the latter was resting along the road. Par. Beltran repeatedly and lethally hacked Habla with a bolo until the victim died. ISSUE(S) Can Beltran be free of criminal liability by using the justifying circumstance of Self Defense? Article 11. September 27. for Self Defense the under of Justifying unlawful Circumstance First. Revised Penal Code. the manner on how Beltran retaliated shows excessive use of force or means. BELTRAN G. 2006 FACTS On the night of October 25. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals have found Beltran guilty for the murder of Habla and ordered Beltran to pay damages to the family of Habla. 4. The following events happened before the actual attack. HELD The first two are elements missing. 1999. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or avoid it. The mere act of insulting and provoking the defendant to a fight are not considered as unlawful aggression since there is no immediate threat to Beltran’s life and limbs. Beltran also claimed that the victim shouted invectives to him and his mother and challenged him to a fight moments before the attack. Can Beltran’s criminal liability be mitigated because the victim provoked and threatened the defendant and the two have a previous disagreement? Art 13.R. Beltran and Habla quarrelled on October 22. 1999 where Beltran claimed that the victim mauled him.
Their dispute was settled in the Office of the Barangay. The second issue focuses on the possible points that will mitigate Beltran’s criminal liability. the manner on how Beltran attacked the victim was treacherous in nature that aggravates his liability under the Principles of Aggravating Circumstance (Art 14. RPC).inflicted to the victim and most of them landed in the neck and area. however this cannot be applied to this case. Beltran carefully planned his execution in order to ensure the success of his attack and eliminates the victim’s chance to defend himself and retaliate. Beltran also continued to attack the victim even the latter fell to the ground and was defenseless. PAERA. To make matters worse. The defendant cannot also use their previous in order disagreement to mitigate between his the victim and the defendant criminal liability. PEOPLE 76 . The victim may have earlier provoked the accused but moments before the victim was attacked he was just resting and no provocation occurred. vs. The following issues were used by the Supreme Court to uphold with modifications the decision of the lower courts that the accused is guilty and ordered to pay damages to the family of the victim. The facts show that the elements are missing to claim self defense as justifying circumstance. The defendant cannot claim his acts were immediate vindication against Beltran since three days have already lapsed since their quarrel and Beltran’s participation in the settlement is a testament that he has no longer grudge or anger against Habla. Beltran stalked the victim before launching the surprise attack. The attack is not proportionate to the insults of the victim.
Due Process Mischief in Raising New Issues on Appeal The court would applied this rule if were it not for the fact the petitioner’s liberty is at stake. repeated causing distribution him lose perspective angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm. 2011 FACTS Santiago Paera(petitioner) the punong barangay of Mampas. 181626. refusal to to borne follow his out his of the water and Darong’s namely Vicente Darong. HELD The rule of the court is affirmative. Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten 77 . Diosetea Darong and Indalecio (complainant) scheme. The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the concepts of continued and complex crime preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory. Negros Darong Occidental acted with resentment. Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats Petitioner’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threat because he only had a single mental resulotion.G. The threats were consummated as soon Darong’s family heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks and spoken the threat at different points in times to the three individual. a single impulse and single intent to threaten the Darongs. Branch 39 is affirm. No. Bacong.R. the petition is denied and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. ISSUE The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats. May 30.
provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge. as here. No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioner’s Commission of Grave Threats The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3.another with the infliction upon the person of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime" This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened. resentment or other evil motive." The Prosecution Proved the Commission of Grave Threats Against Vicente The court affirm the ruling because no law requires of private complainant as condition for finding guilt for grave threats especially if. In the fulfilment of duty of exercise of office the petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darong’s with bladed weapon. there were other victims or witnesses who attested to its commission against non testifying complainant. 78 . Article 11 of the RPC. threatening harm on their person for violating his order. this case the petitioner failed to obtain the three requisites. In. which negates criminal liability of -anyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger.
was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death plus civil liabilities (According to court a quo. was acting strangely in his home. Wapili. Leydan. Accused-Appellant justifying prays for of acquittal. Wapili sustained 5 gunshots wounds. Leydan. Later on. he banged latter’s vehicle. the cause of death is multiple gunshot wounds but the wound in the head caused the victim’s instantaneous death. due of to a self-defense and circumstance fulfillment September 20. Ulep came closer then pumped another bullet to his head. ISSUE 79 .in -law.PEOPLE vs. with the help of 2 neighbors tried to tie him with rope but were unsuccessful. SP01 Ulep and 2 other police officers went to the scene where they saw Wapili armed with a bolo and a rattan stool (but according to Wapili’s relatives and other witnesses. he had no bolo. His brother. Wapili completely gone crazy kept running without to particular the direction. literally blowing his brains out. so she called for assistance. but Leydan as Wapili went to a the policewoman report incident passed Court. having imposed by the trial court made the case for automatic review by the Supreme duty. ULEP G. was trying to calm him down. having a high fever. Wapili fell to the ground.R 132547. 2000 policewoman's house. Ulep fired a warning shot but Wapili charged towards them so Ulep shots him on various parts of his body. only rattan stool). FACTS SP01 Ernesto Ulep. Death penalty. he went out from his room naked and chased his brother-inlaw. Ulep voluntary surrendered himself to the police headquarters after the incident. the killing of Buenaventura Wapili was attended by treachery thus qualifying the offense to murder).
complete or incomplete. The trial courts erred in charging Ulep murder and sentenced to death penalty? The evidence at hand does not favor Ulep’s claim of self-defense. From that moment. The Court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right.when accused-appellant shot him in the head. the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites. par. 11. The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense. the records show that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground. he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office.Whether or not Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili considering his claim of self defense and fulfillment of duty? RULING WON. Under Art. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case. Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 69 of RPC. 5. possibly unconscious . unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. "a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability 80 . namely. there was no longer any danger to his life. and that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. that 1. of RPC may be successfully invoked. In the present case.
The Court credited Ulep with the mitigating circumstance SPO1 of voluntary surrender. 81 . 11 and 12. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons. PEOPLE vs. four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. Appealed Judgment is MODIFIED.in the several cases mentioned in Arts. Accused-appellant went to the scene in pursuance of his official duty as a police officer after having been summoned for assistance. Accused-appellant ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE. methods. instead of Murder. et al. without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” This Court disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that the killing of Wapili by accused-appellant was attended by treachery. and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years. two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as minimum. The victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given more than sufficient warning by accused-appellant before he was shot. The killing of Wapili was not sought on purpose. to six (6) years. employing means. GEROLAGA. He was also asked for indemnification as a civil liability. or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution. provided that the majority of such conditions be present.
treachery chest. 89075. failed refused consider exclusively. equally as guilty as Roberto Gerolaga who while admitting the killing of the victim proffer self defense as a justifying circumstances? on the consideration and other reward. assault and stab Antonio Sy with a double bladed dagger. or upon ground to doubt. On the defense of Gerolaga theory. 82 penal jurisprudence fundamental precepts.R. Ativo conspiring and helping one another . Ruado price the Gerolaga. thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous HELD In Regional Trial of Court the it Decision. hitting death. Philippines. and to observe with liberality. with intent to kill. or in the case at . the following requisites must be clearly proven. abdomen parts of body.G. as are applicable to. 21. 1996 FACTS In the morning Roberto of of March Aroroy. October 15. or consistent justice. ISSUE Whether or not other accused Remedios Ruado Sy and Efren Ativo who were unquestionably absent from the crime scene. 1987 at of the and Poblacion Remedios of a of the Sy or Municipality accused Province Efren and in Masbate. to appreciate self defense. only the purely admissible factual and more credible circumstantial evidence obtaining in this case. proper dispensation and of the criminal bar. evident premeditation. having convicted the all the of accused for murder through conspiracy or by and for not having acquitted reasonable all accused having herein. with the the law.
However. Moreover. As there the is no other evidence in to prove the conspiracy except the affidavit of confession. five of them fatal. On Appeal. the justifying circumstances of self defense may not survive in the face of Gerolaga’s flight from the crime scene. even the Solicitor admitted that Lower Court erred finding existence of conspiracy. The prosecution attempted to establish conspiracy by showing that the reward was financed by appellant Remy Ruado.000. There was no reasonable necessity to inflict upon Antonio Sy numerous wounds. his concealment of the weapon and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. not murder as no qualifying circumstance have been proven beyond reasonable doubts because no mitigating or aggravating circum.stances attended the killing.1. He shall be liable only for homicide.Sy and that Efren Ativo delivered the amount to the killer. However. she set aside the P3. 2. 83 . Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel and 3. accused Gerolaga’s criminal liability is individual and separate.Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The second requisites have not been met. no criminal intent to kill Anotnio Sy could be attributed General to them. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.00 as reward for the indemnification and apprehension of Commander Helen Lipanto and the fact Activo merely obeyed the order of his employers to deliver the amount to whoever could identify and apprehend said NPA commander. even the first and the third requisites were to be appreciated in favor of Gerolaga. the unrebutted testimony of Ruado-Sy that with the approval of her husband.
petitioner grabbed the gun which was tucked on the holster at the waist of Butad and then heard a gun shot. 168818. but during the presentation of the evidence for the defense. there is a drinking spree outside a store with Nicanor Butad. Thereafter. Andresa you” Nilo Sabang(petitioner) and Butad uttered and the spouses words. Villamor.” After which. Randy Sabang(son of the petitioner) surprisedly came shoot Petitioner reacted saying. PEOPLE 518 SCRA 35 G. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner’s insistence on the justifying circumstance of defense of relative deserves merit? HELD During the arraignment.00).Appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren Ativo are hereby ACQUITTED and are ordered released immediately. March 9. SABANG vs. 2007 FACTS On the eve of the fiesta. a civilian Cruz “I will and agent(victim). unless they are detained for some other legal cause. “Just try to shoot my child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat. petitioner pleaded innocence. Suddenly.000. according to the witnesses. to Randy.R. Appellants Roberto Gerolaga is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of crime of homicide for which he is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prison mayor medium as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos P50. Butad lying on the floor sustaining four gun shot that caused his death. he claimed to 84 .
The Court finds that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Butad since there was no imminent threat on his son’s life. Petitioner even said a words dismissing what Butad uttered. Further. 138471 October 10. that indicates petitioner did not consider Butad’s words a theart at all. in order to claim that he acted in defense of a relative. and 3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant.have acted in defense of a relative – which is a justifying circumstance. PEOPLE VS. petition is denied for lack of merit. the four gun shot wounds sustained by Butad negates the claim that killing was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. The assailed decision of the CA and RTC were affirmed with modification on the award of moral damages. PRUNA G. The Court ruled that. 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression.R. the accused must prove the concurrence of the three requisites: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured. The Court said that. should any provocation been given by the relative attacked. 2002 85 .
respectively. the victim’s mother.FACTS On January 3. Noticing that her daughter is not yet home she decided to look for her and she saw her crying and then Lizette narrated what happened. Defense Witness and their Statements: Carlito Bondoc – testified that Boy was at home during the time the incident occurred because he & Carlito were having coffee. Is Lizette a credible witness despite of her age? 86 . Boy was later on arrested. Boy) called her attention while sniffing rugby among his friends.a. Upon responding to Boy’s call. Dr. Prosecution Witnesses and their Statements: Jacqueline Gonzales. Teresita Quiroz and Teresita Magtanob examined the victim and corroborated the findings of medico-legal examination. Lower court ruled guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape and is sentenced to death penalty. thus it is automatically subject to an immediate review. a certain Manuel Pruna (a. She also told the court that she knew that it was a sin to tell a lie. Examination shows that there are sperm cells present within the girl’s vagina signifying sexual intercourse.k. he then placed her on his lap and tried to touch her sensitive parts and later on proceeded to bring her along the grassy area and raped her. ISSUES 1. 1995 while a certain Lizette Arabelle Gonzales was defecating in the grassy area near their neighbor’s backyard. Lizette also stated that she knew the accused and said accused was the one who inserted his penis into her vagina as she was laid down on the grassy area. narrated to the court that she was fetching water from the well when the incident happened.
Because there is no concrete evidence proving the age of the victim. and the imposition is of death of proper. In this case. Though the defense tried to contest the credibility of Lizette because of her tender age. which if true would qualify accused to death penalty. that’s why accused is not guilty penalty of is qualified not rape. the court presumed that the child is a competent witness because test of competency relies on intelligence.2. Is Lizette’s minority properly established and if the imposition of death penalty is proper. stating that the best evidences of age are: the birth certificate. the court cannot assume an age for Lizette. and that Pruna is convicted of statutory rape of a girl below 12 years old and is sentenced 87 to the penalty of reclusion . testimony of the mother and the testimony of the person concerned (provided it is express and clear). it is presumed that a witness is competent and the burden to prove incompetence lies on the party contesting the competency of the witness. not age. In this case there was no document presented that can attest to the fact of age of the victim. However. Court set out guidelines for the appreciation of age as evidence. it does not mean that the prosecution is relieved from the burden of proving Lizette’s age and also not a proof that indeed Lizette is below 7 years old. similar authentic certificates. despite that the incident happened when she was three years old and that the case was filed when she was five years old. Yes. knowing the consequences of lying proves this. accused guilty statutory rape because of the mother’s testimony. 2. The fact that the child was able to perceive the correct impressions during the incident and narrate it to the courts. RULING 1.
R. Concepcion fired two shots past the ear of the victim without injuring him. Furthermore. he tried to grab the gun from the accused. CONCEPCION. But herein lies the differences in the testimonies of the witnesses. he was merely pacifying Galang when the victim became so unruly that the accused fired two warning shots. According to the accused. The accused claims that he should be thus. Galang was not scared. Later on. instead. Two shots were accidentally fired which hit Galang. Concepcion fired three more shots which hit the victim in the chest and killed him. ISSUE • • Whether or not appellant is exempted from criminal liability under Article 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. PEOPLE VS. 88 . causing his death. FACTS 386 SCRA 74 August 1. 136844. According to the testimonies of both parties. Whether or not treachery and abuse of public position are qualifying circumstances. The accused then came to the barangay hall to question Galang. G. Lorenzo Galang was brought to the barangay hall because he was so drunk and unruly at the town plaza and was continually disturbing the peace. the civil liability for indemnity is not enough. exempted because he was performing his lawful duty as a police officer and that the shooting was purely accidental. he hit the victim in the abdomen and fired a shot which wounded Galang in the thigh and then. 2002 The accused Concepcion is a police officer charged with murder for the killing of Lorenzo Galang.Perpetua. The prosecution witness (two of them) testified that while interrogating Galang. The Court found Concepcion guilty. moral damages should also be awarded.
Also. causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. By invoking mere accident as a defense. The court finds this inconceivable. it was not believable that a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle from a police officer who also had a handgun tucked by his waist. alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to murder. appellant’s gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victim’s body which the court do not think as purely accidental. in this case. under Revised 89 . the testimony of the accused was full of inconsistencies which failed to discharge the burden. Unfortunately. Concepcion claims that when the victim tried to grab his gun. Lastly. Treachery is attended in the commission of the crime. treachery was is only in an the aggravating information. said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel. For one. Any person while performing a lawful act with due care. The rule in criminal cases is that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused.RULING No. was not circumstance. Furthermore. When the accused admits to the commission of offense charged but raises an exempting now has circumstance the burden of as a defense. that the he burden is of proof to is shifted to him. Concepcion claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the barrel of the gun. Since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder. the prosecution witness categorically testified that he saw Concepcion shoot the victim with the M-16 rifle. Though treachery stated it However. appellant proving entitled that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4)of the Code.
could not be appreciated to increase appellant’s liability. 90 . The penalty for homicide under ART 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. Consequently. treachery has to be considered as generic aggravating circumstance. The appellant is guilty of homicide. the crime committed by appellant is homicide and not murder.Rules on Criminal Procedure. There being one mitigating aggravating circumstance circumstance of of voluntary treachery. surrender the penalty and should one be imposed in its medium period. not having been alleged in the information. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position.
Whether the and court gravely erred in not considering fear. before midnight. 186420 August 25. May 17. Lumbayan admitted Chairperson to the Borbonan. Andromeda and and Perater. His body was found by Miguel Platil. The following to day. appellant Barangay brought that he and Lumbayan of surrendered 18. 2009 FACTS On May 16. No. Whether the court gravely erred in appreciating treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances.PEOPLE vs. appellant claimed poking Costan that a he only at the cooperated with Lumbayan out of fear of being stabbed by Lumbayan incident. 5 Bislig. ANOD G. 1997. was knife at appellant's breast. the appelant's claim on the exempting circumstances of irresistible force uncontrollable 2. The Barangay Chairperson testified before the RTC that appellant killed However. 1997. ISSUE 1. The evidence on record showed that the appellant had the chance to 91 at for the his time defense of The the the and Lumbayan Costan. appellant stabbed once . Surigao del Sur (Borbonan).R. 1997. RULING 1. Samuel Anod (appellant) and his co-accused Lionel Lumbayan stabbed and hacked to death Erlando Costan in his house situated in Barangay Borbonan. back. who. before whom they admitted the killing of Costan. The appellant failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error for not appreciating the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. On May appellant narrated were to her police station.
Thus. ensuring without risk SIERRA y CANEDA vs. fear. a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force. A threat well-grounded not enough. for such a defense to prosper. directly specifically. appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. to thus. However. induce is a imminent and impending. without defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make. arising execution. apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat. Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against execution ensure its persons. The court held that in order for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply. the killing of the victim was attended by treachery. future injury 2. risk methods and him to or forms in from the to any tend. No. In this case. them. the duress. force. because such person does not act with freedom. PEOPLE 92 . as appellant was also holding a knife at the time. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury.escape Lumbayan's threat or engage Lumbayan in combat. the appellant tied Costan while the latter was lying down before he and the Lumbayan execution stabbed of the the crime latter to death. Indubitably. and or of of intimidation such nature must as be to present. thereof employing which means.
The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner warned them not to tell anybody of what they did. AAA told the incident to her teacher (Elena Gallano) and to the parent of her classmate (Dolores Mangantula) who both accompanied AAA to the barangay office. Afterwards. 182941 July 3.A No.A 9344 on the petitioner’s exemption from criminal liability. testimony corroborating . (2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense to present the petitioner’s birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A No. to deviate from the lower court’s findings of guilt. 9344. HELD (1) After the examination of the CA decision and the records of the case. ISSUES (1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R. AAA was later subjected to physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. 2009 FACTS In August 2000. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her.GR No. he turned to AAA undressed her. and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. thirteen year old AAA was playing with her friend BBB in the 2nd floor of her family’s house in Palatiw Pasig. The records show that the prosecution established all the elements of of AAA the and crime the 93 charged other through the credible evidence. the petitioner was charged rape. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings.
000 as moral damages. such with the 94 . Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the victim. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of R. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen. Pursuant to Section 64 R. in which minor shall be proceeded against in accordance provisions of article 80 of this Code.A No 9344 Criminal Case No120292-H for rape filed against petitioner Robert social Sierra welfare y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. and P 30.A. Section 7 R. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal. not on the civil liability. unless he has acted with discernment.A No. who Petitioner proceed is in REFERRED to the appropriate local and development officer shall accordance with the provisions of R.000 as exemplary damages.A 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may be determined. case. (2) The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the crime. No.9344.sexual intercourse indeed take place as the information charged. AAA P 50.
. 2008 FACTS On July 4. swerved avoid oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading. They were delivering vehicles tire commercial a parked night mover not while prime a Joana mover The Paula with a passenger trailer. No. Cresilito substantial bus owned was by cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. 161803. February 04. askew driver a Limbaga. G. In between the two was private respondent Liberty Forest. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover.m.going to Surigao City. CHING. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Butuan City. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring his headlights break and the approaching to the passenger left to bus. portion parked prime prime was occupying with of the national highway. with helper Romeo Catamora. became inoperable incident. et al.R. He the pumped slowly. as the trailer suffered a blowout the mover the before. collapsible reflectorized plates. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor as a injuries. vs. 1995. Rogelio Ortiz. October 31. result of The the Nissan van. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint. On however. onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van.. 1995. Inc. 95 . INC. Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. along the National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon. on the lane of the passenger bus. The equipped triangular. the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right. at around 4:45 a.DY TEBAN TRADING. Inc. petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against prime mover owner and driver with theft in Butuan City. the early warning device as substitute.
The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. to operate vehicle. was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring of that the the the prime reveal mover that was in proper the rear condition. The evidence on record shows that it failed to provide its and prime mover and of trailer the with the required and the early warning devices with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance condition prime mover trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer were provided with worn out tires and with only one(1) piece of spare tire. Defendant Liberty Forest. Inc. failed to give the Joana Paula bus the space road it needed. on the ** Facts case when Ortiz. Inc. its driver of the truck. Inc. which required highly specialized driving skills. was utterly negligent in allowing novice driver. did not exercise the diligence of a good father of family in managing and running its business. Liberty Forest. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk. or at least minimize it. We find that private respondent Liberty Forest. Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway. This made plaintiffs-appellants/appellees conclude that the JoanaPaula bus 96 . It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. such as a truck loaded with bulldozer. The employer clearly failed to properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover. latter vehicle scraped right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and the impact threw the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck.ISSUE Whether or not Prime Mover is liable for the damages suffered by the Nissan Van HELD YES. We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the national highway. like Limbaga.
the following requisites must concur: the (a) fault damage or suffered by plaintiff.occupied its lane which forced Ortiz.**The two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two (2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle and with the location . the driver of the truck. and (c) connection of cause and effect between negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff. to swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer. (b) fault or negligence of defendant.** To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict. it would have the other beam suffer the flat tires as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8bulldozer 97 .
However. the accused denied the charge claiming that the police only arrested. No. the prosecution said those claims were not necessary to prove the offense charged. the RTC found all four guilty of the crime charged and sentenced each of them to the penalties of reclusion perpetua and fine of Php500. RULING First. The accused appeal but CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. 181422. beaten and that they would be charged in connection to drugs unless they paid up. appellants claim that there was a switching of evidence.00. failure of the police to apply fluorescent powder to the boodle money and the prosecutor should have presented the informant to prove that there was really a buy-bust operation that took place however. G. Though. 1999 of the Service Support of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group. that September 15. Lastly.R. ISSUE Babangol and Naranjo question the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence proving that there was really a buy-bust operation. the custody and test of the substance confiscated “shabu” was merely affirmed by the Forensic Chemist that it was truly forwarded on the laboratory and the sample he took for of testing entire 98 was logically presumed to be the representative its contents. Second. Two of the accused Babangol and Naranjo appeal to SC. FACTS Four men were arrested through a buy-bust operation held on May 18. 2010 . the custody and quantity of the substance “shabu” that has been confiscated by the police and the conspiracy acted by Naranjo (driver of the van used by the accused.000.PEOPLE vs. et al. BABANGOL.
Anita Busog The De Valencia appealed y Rivera to the and CA Jacqueline and. The Court also orders the release of the KIA Besta Van with plate number UUA 480. Finally. to its registered owner. the Court Affirms in toto the judgment of conviction against accused-appellant Arnel Babangol. Naranjo of the charge for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and ORDERS his immediate release from detention. 1999. G. Decision was promulgated. 2009 Entrapment by the NBI with marked money on Aug 21. in that: (a) Gemma Jacinto stands. The court ACQUITS accused-appellant Cesar R. on October 4.R. 162540. Cecillia L. FACTS PEOPLE July 13. Wherefore the SC modified the CA’s decision on November 14. Naranjo. three December 16. JACINTO vs. of a qualified theft. 1997. which the police confiscated as a result of this case. thus: the decision of the trial court is modified. No. the RTC decided that: The Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa. 99 . the dispositive portion of which reads. The trial of the three accused went its course and.prosecution failed to proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Naranjo was acted in conspiracy with the other accused since he had not done an overt act in pursuit of the crime. That only Babangol only carried the bag of Shabu to the pretend buyer. on Capitle guilty 2003. (b) Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium. 2006.
PEOPLE vs. ISSUE 1. 2. Petitioner is found guilty of an impossible crime and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor. but the same was denied.(c) Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. A Partial Motion for Reconsideration was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No. The decisions are modified. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information. 181083. RULING The petition is granted. SOBUSA G. and to pay the costs. January 21. Whether or not worthless check can be object of theft. and 3. 2010 100 .R.
He was convicted for rape beyond reasonable doubt by the lower court with a penalty of death and to pay damages that was later on affirmed with modification by the appelate court giving him a penalty of reclusion perpetua. However. He claims that the case was only instigated by the relatives of AAA's mother because they don't like him and accuses him of being a drunkard and a gambler. Sobusa however claims that he did not rape AAA and voluntarily surrendered to the police. AAA underwent medico legal with the findings of incomplete old healed hymenal laceration at 10 & 12 o clock position with fungal infection. ISSUE 101 . He said that he could not have raped AAA because he treats her as his own and that he works during night time as a security guard.FACTS On May 23. The following day she even told her papa that there are bloodstains in her pillow and panty that was overheard by her Tita Bebing who is the sister of Sobusa and told her to just keep quiet. she was raped by Sobusa in her room. She said that days before the Holy week of the same year. They reported it to the barangay captain and the latter reported it to the municipall hall and a warrant of arrest was issued for Sobusa. AAA a 10 year old girl filed a rape case against her step father Herminigildo Sobusa. 2000. in May 2000 she told her two friends about the incident who told her to tell it to her Aunt DDD. The doctor said that this could have been inflicted on the victim a month or more and could be caused by trauma which in this case was through a forcible insertion of a stiff or hard penis into the vagina of the victim.
138984. TORPIO G. (3) physical evidence consistent with AAA’s assertion that she was raped. Anthony tried to let Dennis drink gin and as the latter refused. PEOPLE vs. 1997 Anthony went to the house of Dennis and invited the latter for a drinking spree. Manuel his father tried to scold his son and tried to confiscate from him the knife but failed to do so. (2) AAA’s positive identification of accused-appellant as the one who raped her. and (4) the absence of ill motive on AAA’s part in filing the charge. Dennis crawled beneath the table Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 inch fan knife but did not hit him Dennis got up and ran towards their home. RULING The higher court affirmed the ruling on the following basis: (1) AAA’s credible testimony concerning the rape incident. he got a knife alarmed by the action of Dennis his mother shouted. Dennis went back to the cottage upon seeing Anthony . when he was hit Anthony ran but got entangled with a fishing net and fell on his 102 .R. Afterwards both left the house of named Porboy Perez the three proceeded on the shoreline in a cottage. June 4. Upon reaching home. the latter ran towards the creek but Dennis blocked him and stabbed him. resulting Manuel incurring a wound in his hand. 2004 FACTS In the evening of October 11.Sobusa insists that the court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt in him for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. No. Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times.
103 . Dennis was humiliated. It was none the less a grave offense for which Dennis the may be given the benefit of of a mitigating sufficient circumstance. attack on the appellant by Anthony.back Dennis them mounted on him and continued stabbing him resulting to latter’s death. mauled and almost stabbed by Anthony although the unlawful aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony. PEOPLE vs.e. However. ISSUE Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of grave offense is appreciated? RULING The Supreme Court held that the mitigating Circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. BI-AY JR. i. After the stabbing Dennis left and went to Camp Downes and slept there the next morning Dennis voluntary surrendered himself to Boy Estrera a well known police officer. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident. so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. mitigating circumstance provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense.
was following him and told his son to stay behind. Rodrigo then went out of the house carrying the two (2) cups of coffee. Francisco saw appellant delivering hacking blows on his son who was then lying on the ground face up. 1996. to the appellant ground. while accused Jorge and Alex immediately withdrew and fled as Francisco nearly approached them. the eldest in the group. and suddenly stabbed hacked him on the nape which caused him to lose his balance and fall followed suit Rodrigo at the back by thrusting a bladed instrument. Alex Lingasa. Within ten (10) meters away. Witnessing the vicious assault on his father. Jorge Bi-ay. accused Jorge Bi-ay. at around 7:00 in the evening. Eliseo Accused who Alex was ahead of him. guilty 2003. When he was about to proceed. which Rodrigo acceded. Baby Boy Claro. and appellant Eliseo Bi-ay. together with his son Baby Boy Claro. Baby Boy Claro ran and shouted to his grandfather for help who then went out from his house with a bolo. approached Francisco and asked for coffee. Accused Jorge also went towards Rodrigo and stabbed him. 2010 FACTS On December 26. victim Rodrigo Claro. While Rodrigo and Francisco were talking with each other. Dec. Francisco Claro.R No. On March 27. 192187. appellant also ran away after all of them took turns in hacking the victim which caused his untimely death. Thereafter. he noticed that his 10 year-old son. the RTC rendered a decision of murder finding as the accused beyond reasonable 104 doubt charged .G. Jr. were in the house of the victim’s father. accused Alex and appellant Eliseo. 13. alias “Gideon” arrived. Francisco readily gave coffee and the accused Jorge requested the victim Rodrigo to serve coffee to his two companions who were waiting outside.
Appellant is hereby directed to pay the heirs of Rodrigo Claro the amounts of P50. 105 . finding accused-appellant Eliseo-Biay. is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. causing the latter to immediately lose his balance and fall to the ground. P25. the July 16.00 as civil indemnity awarded by the trial court. 2009. premises considered the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court. 000. 000.00 as moral damages. 000. 000. the Court cannot hold the accused liable as a mere accomplice because his active and direct involvement in the brutal killing of the victim was too obvious. he initiated the deadly assault by hacking the hapless victim on the nape.00 as exemplary damages.00 as temperate damages in addition to the P50. WHEREFORE. and P25. Considering the circumstances he admitted that he delivered the first blow on the unwary victim. Negros Occidental. 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. the CA rendered a decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of murder with treachery as aggravating circumstance? RULING On July 16. WHEREFORE.qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Rodrigo Claro. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder.
Metro Manila. When said property was purchased by Mabasa. Burgos Street from respondent’s property. Burgos Street. Burgos St. it is about 26 meters. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to respondents herein. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises. As an access to P. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa’s residence to P. Said adobe fence was first constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length. sometime in February. In passing thru said passageway. Court of Appeals.. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses of the petitioners the second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from Mabasa’s residence to P. he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width.Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and Maria Cristina Santos vs. Heirs of Pacifico C. Tipas. Palingon.R. has to be traversed. However. No. Burgos Street. February 9. there are two possible passageways. 1996 Facts The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Tagig. 1982. there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. 116100. Mabasa G. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such 106 .
000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. The CA rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification only insofar as the. Petitioner. Trial court rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners Custodios and Santoses to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress. Herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Issues: Whether the grant of right of way to herein private respondent Mabasa is proper. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because of some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners. hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein.a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. Ma. the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. grant of damages to Mabasa The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Whether the award of damages is in order. to the public street and Mabasa to pay the Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8. 107 . Held: No. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way.
although there was damage. It is within the right of petitioners. there was no legal injury. as owners. or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. Pacifico Mabasa.However. hurt. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Thus. to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls. the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. hence not contrary to morals. or harm which results from the injury. ditches. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains. live or dead hedges. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff. he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it (damnum et injuria. good customs or public policy.” 108 . (damnum absque injuria). damage is the loss. without other limitations than those established by law.No. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.) In the case at bar. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. 109 . the lot was not subject to any servitude. Hence. To repeat. prior to said decision. whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. either by law or by contract.At the time of the construction of the fence. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents.
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