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Asian Arms

Control Project
Government Department

Prospects for Chinas Participation


in Nuclear Arms Limitation
Government Department

Edited by

Aleksey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin,


and Sergey Oznobishchev

, ,

Institute of World Economy and International Relations


of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Nuclear Threat Initiative Foundation




Moscow IMEMO RAS 2012
2012
Georgetown senior Jonathan Askonas, co-founder of the Asian Arms Control Project website, acquired the
original Russian document and managed the translation team of James F. Shipp and Dr. Phil Petersen that
completed this version on 24 October 2012. The Russian research findings are reproduced here solely to facilitate
academic analysis. This version is not for sale and all rights and ownership remain with the originating institutions.

Asian Arms
Control Project
Georgetown Unversity
Government Department

Forward

forces targeted Chinas expanding posture


with tactical, operational and strategic nuclear
weapons with war-fighting objectives of
preemption and damage limitation;

As the 21st Century dawns, America and


Russia find themselves in a brave new world of
geopolitics. The old comfortable paradigm of bipolarity is being fractured by a variety of changing
power dynamics one of the most dramatic of
these being the stunning rise of China. While
PRCs modernization has been led by economic
growth, China is now investing its economic
gains in building a military commensurate in
size to Chinas place in the global economy. The
implications of this change for global security, for
regional prosperity, and superpower relations are
still unclear.

This close proximity and long experience


means that Russian realism about Chinese
nuclear force potential cannot be blithely ignored
or discounted as paranoia. Their warning against
American idealism needs to be taken seriously.

These commentators Russias foremost


experts and practitioners of strategy and arms
control provide a number of insights useful to
American policymakers. First, Russias current
brand of political realism lends itself to a political/
strategic analysis freed from lingering ideology.
Their willingness to view strategic balance and
negotiated constraint as two sides of the same
coin is refreshing

Third, these experts can speak to the sorts of


strategic interconnections and security dilemmas
that are politically taboo in Washington. Because
they work outside the budget fights and pet
projects that distort Beltway analyses, these
experts have provided a remarkably balanced view
of Chinas potential buildup, displaying neither
the saber-rattling of pundits nor the rosy views of
professional disarmamentniks.

Second, the Russians have had unique insight


into Chinas nuclear development;

The most important takeaway from this


collection, though, is not any particular fact or
proposition. It is a new strategic reality. China is
modernizing its military in a way that challenges
the security interests of other Great Powers
interested in Asian stability.

Since the end of the Cold War, thousands of


Russian engineers and designers have worked
closely with the Chinese in transferring a wide
range of military technology.

In the 1950s it was Russian assistance in


nuclear physics, reactor design and missile
technology that allowed the PRC to make a
strategic great leap forward that accelerated
their posture by decades;

Jonathan Askonas, Student Director

For three decades the Soviet Strategic Rocket

Institute of World Economy and International Relations


of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Nuclear Threat Initiative Foundation

Prospects for Chinas Participation


in Nuclear Arms Limitation

Edited by
Aleksey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin,
and Sergey Oznobishchev

, ,

Moscow IMEMO RAS 2012


2012

Universal Decimal Classification (UDC) 327.37


Library Bibliographic Classification (LBC) 66.4
Individual bibliography (Ind. bib.) 278
Collected authors:
Aleksey Arbatov, Viktor Yesin, Aleksandr Lukin, Vasiliy Mikheyev,
and Aleksandr Khramchikhin
Ind. bib. 278

Prospects for Chinas Participation in the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons. Edited by A. G. Arbatov,

V. Z. Dvorkin, and S. K. Oznobishchev. IMEMO of the RAS, Moscow, 2012 83 pp.
International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 978-5-9535-0337-2
The present publication is the eighth in a series of works within the framework of a joint project of the
IMEMO of the RAS and the Nuclear Threat Initiative Foundation (Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc. NTI) under
the general title: Russia and Deep Nuclear Disarmament. It is based on materials from a conference held
on June 28, 2012, at the IMEMO of the RAS.
This study was prepared within the framework of the Nuclear Security Project (NSP) with the support
of the NTI. Additional information can be found on the NSP website http://nuclearsecurity.org. The views
presented in this work are those of the authors and do not reflect the positions of the IMEMO or the NSP.
The publications of the IMEMO of the RAS are placed on the website http:/www.imemo.ru.
ISBN 978-5-9535-0337-2
327.37 66.4
278

2012 by the IMEMO of the RAS

:
, , , ,

278

. . .. , ..

, .. . .: , 2012. 83 .
ISBN 978-5-9535-0337-2

(Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc NTI)
: . ,
28 2012 . .
(NSP)
NTI. NSP http://nuclearsecurity.org
NSP.
Prospects of Chinas Participation in Nuclear Arms Limitations
This is the eighth publication of the series titled Russia and the Deep Nuclear Disarmament, which is to be issued
in the framework of joint project implemented by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc. (NTI). It is based on the discussion at the conference held in IMEM RAN on June
28, 2012.
This research report was commissioned by the Nuclear Security Project (NSP) of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).
For more information see the NSP website at http://www.nuclearsecurity.org. The views expressed in this paper are
entirely the authors own and not those of the IMEMO or NSP.
http://www.imemo.ru
ISBN 978-5-9535-0337-2

MO , 2012

Table of Contents
Summary

Introduction

1. China Security Threats

V. V. Mikheyev
..

2. Chinas Foreign Policies: Modesty or Revitalization 14


: 15 ?

A. V. Lukin
..

3. Nuclear Might of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)

28

V. I. Yesin
..

4. Chinas Military Preparations

39

A. A. Khramchikhin
..

5. Prospects for the PRC Acceding to the Limitation


of Nuclear Weapons

58

A. G. Arbatov
..

Conclusions

77

Appendix I 1

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Military Spending of the PRC

86

Appendix II 2

Abbreviations Used

89

Appendix III 3
91

List of Participants in the Conference Held on June 28, 2012 at the

IMEMO of the RAS


, 28 2012 .

Summary

,


,
.

In this work, based on the proceedings of the


conference held at IMEMO of the RAS, the
authors present their assessment of the prospects
and possibilities of China joining the nuclear
arms reduction process being carried out by the
US and Russia.


-
. ,


. ,
,
,
. ,
,
.

Authoritative specialists provide an analysis


of the domestic and foreign policy dimension of
Chinese policies. It is noted that rapid changes
in China are making it difficult for them to
adequately perceive the outside world. On the
one hand, while China is also a competitor for
the West in the economic sense, it is operating
by market rules. On the other hand, China is
politically alien, since the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) still holds a monopoly on power
therein.

,

,

,

. ,

Experts agree that China will underpin its


rapid economic growth with an increase in
military spending, striving to take up positions
alongside recognized world leaders, which
implies the enhancement of opportunities for
influencing international processes. A number
of experts believe that Chinas new foreign policy
self-assertiveness should be taken in stride as
the aspiration of a major and successful power to
defend its foreign interests.

, ,




. ,


.

At the same time, it is impossible not to note


that successful economic development over
past decades and the strengthening of Chinas
international positions have led to a conspicuous
increase in nationalism among the ruling elite
and in society. But it is also clear that serious
discussions and even sparring are under way in
Chinese society and among its leaders concerning
the future course of foreign policy. If there is

, ,


.

actually a rift between the positions of political


and military leaders in Beijing, Russias security
interests might then be affected in a very direct
manner, depending upon which line prevails.



.

,

.

A major program is presently being


implemented in China that is aimed at building
up and modernizing the armed forces. Taking
the highly secret nature of this Chinese military
program into account, it is extremely difficult
to estimate the true scope of these military
preparations.


,
.
,
,
. ,

, , ,

,
,

, .

The development of nuclear weapons, which is


also secret in nature, gives rise to special concern.
There are serious fears concerning the fact that
the nuclear potential of the PRC is appreciably
higher than had been previously thought. It is
entirely likely that, even as we speak, the PRC is
the third nuclear power after the US and Russia,
and that it undoubtedly has the technical and
economic capabilities needed in order to quickly
increase its nuclear firepower if necessary.

,



, ,
,
.
-



, ,
.
, ,




, .

Despite the fact that the need for acceding to


the process of the limitation of nuclear weapons
in the foreseeable future is being unanimously
rejected at all levels in China, definite
prerequisites exist, in the opinion of experts, for
discussing its participation therein. At the same
time, persuading China to undertake any real
arms control or greater nuclear transparency
as a gesture of good will, or even a minimal
contribution to the transition to multilateral
disarmament, will obviously fail. China may
only agree to this if it feels that the reciprocal
concessions and limitations of the other nuclear
powers fully warrant Chinese steps of good will,
and in the end nominally strengthen the strategic
positions and security of the PRC in the way
that the countrys military and political leaders
perceive them. In other words, the US and Russia
must make the transition from good intentions
and appeals to the Celestial Empire to a sober

,

,


.

analysis of what they are prepared to sacrifice in


the political and strategic sense in exchange for
equivalent concessions by the Chinese side.

A number of measures of practical importance


are proposed in the work at hand for enticing
Beijing to limit nuclear weapons.

Introduction

,

.
?

The authors of the study at hand attempted to


peer past the horizon of the present-day process
of the reduction and limitation of weapons.
The prospects and the potential elements of its
subsequent stages are still unclear; likewise,
there is no clearly expressed consent on the part of
England and France to accede to it. So can Chinas
participation therein be seriously discussed?

, .

.


1968 .
,

.
, ,
,


. ,
-

,

, ,
.

The feeling is that this is not only possible, but


necessary. Today, China is the most problematic
country of the nuclear five. It is the only one
of the five nations possessing nuclear arms
and officially recognized by the 1968 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty that does not provide any
official information about its nuclear arms. In
addition, China is the only country, other than
the US and the Russian Federation (RF), that has
great economic and technical potential for the
rapid buildup of its strategic nuclear forces (SNFs)
and other nuclear assets. Finally, the PRC is not
a military or political ally of any of the nuclear
superpowers; thus, there is no outside political,
strategic, or technical monitoring of its nuclear
forces, the programs for their development, its
doctrine, and its tactical deployment strategy.

,

, ,
,



,
.

In this regard, while technically acceding to


disarmament would perhaps be a relatively easier
task for Great Britain and even France, the PRCs
accession to the process in one form or another
is a much more urgent necessity in terms of
global and regional strategic stability, security,
and prospects for the continuation of nuclear
disarmament.

The real Chinese nuclear strategy and nuclear


potential are not transparent at all. Under these
conditions, most foreign politicians and experts
view statements concerning adherence to the
principle of no nuclear first strike as nothing
more that a propaganda slogan.


-
. ,

.

For this reason, an active discussion is under


way in the world expert political environment
concerning the real military and political
objectives of the Chinese leadership. It is also no
surprise that the opinions of authoritative experts
within the framework of this work are far from
unanimous.
In point of fact, Beijing itself primarily needs
the assurance of the openness of the Chinese
nuclear weapons program, if it does, in deed and
not in words, intend to build a harmonious world
of common prosperity. However, at this point,
Chinese representatives often shun even the mere
presence of prospects for the countrys accession
to the process of the limitation of nuclear weapons
in discussions of Chinese nuclear strategy and
forces or brush them off by repeating the official
position in sacramental language.

,

, ,

.


,



.


,


.

. ,



,
.

Meanwhile, a critical line is already seen in


the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons
that Russia and the US are in no position to cross
without the accession of third countries that have
nuclear arms. Due to a number of circumstances,
China in particular is the most important among
them. It is also obvious that the long-term
objective of making the transition to a nuclearfree world will be absolutely unachievable without
Chinas active participation in the subsequent
stages of the practical resolution of the problems
that stand along the way.

China: Security Threats


:

V. V. Mikheyev
Deputy Director of the IMEMO of the RAS, Corresponding Member of the RAS
..
, -



:



.

For the purpose of analyzing this issue as


objectively as possible, it seems necessary to
carefully study two aspects of it: how China
perceives threats to its security, and; what threats
to global and regional security China itself poses.


, -

,

.

First and foremost, it should be noted that


China has significantly stepped up the pace of
its internal transformations during the past fiveseven years, which has caused no less palpable
changes in its international behavior and
positioning.

.
,
,

.


. ,
,
, ,
, -,

Major trends in Chinas development.


China has become a normal market country
and a significant part of the world economy, albeit
with its own specific features in domestic policy
and international behavior. A distinctive feature
of the internal situation in China consists of the
Communist Party holding a monopoly on power.
In the foreign policy sphere, on the one hand,
it would like to position itself as a player that is
equal to world leaders, but on the other hand, it is
still unwilling, as before, to assume responsibility

Chapter I



,
.

for world affairs, and at the same time is seeking


popularity in the Third World by proclaiming the
status of a developing nation.



,
.


,
.

Under the new Chinese leadership, the


performance of political reform in the domestic
sphere can be predicted, although without
going to a real multi-party system. In domestic
policies, an increase should be anticipated in the
international activity of the PRC as a world leader,
but not the only one and not the most important
one.

Chinas essential transformations over a quite


short period of time are creating difficulties in its
perception by the world community.

-,

.

First, it is difficult for the world to follow and


adequately perceive the rapid changes in China.

-,


,
, , , .

Second, rapid changes in a positive direction


continue to coexist with the traditional negative
image in Chinas perception from the outside,
which although diminishing in significance,
nonetheless persists.

-,


. ,
,
. ,


.

Third, the US and the West as a whole continue


to perceive China in two ways. Economically it is
one of their own, and although it is a competitor, it
does play by the market rules. However, politically
it is alien, since the CCP holds a monopoly on
power, as well as due to the unpredictability of its
foreign and military policies.

.


.


,
, ,
.

External threats for China. At the present


time, Beijing does not view military intervention
on the part of the US and Russia as a real threat.
Otherwise, it would have to radically reorient the
vector of internal development toward preparing
for war with the severest of consequences to the
economy, the standard of living of the people, and
consequently, social and political stability.

China: Security Threats



,

.
:
,

,
,
. ,



.

China views the main external threats to


national security from the aspect of how they
affect internal stability and problems of the
countrys economic development. The logic
here is quite simple: if external risks inhibit
economic development, this can then lead to the
deterioration of its economic position, then to
social and political destabilization, which would
ultimately pose a threat to the power of the CCP.
Accordingly, the new Chinese leadership will
also view the promotion of political reform in
particular in the context of maintaining internal
stability and retaining power.

,
, ,
,

.
,


.

Hence, it follows that the strategic external


threats to China primarily involve the development
of the world economy and the possibility of a new
severe economic crisis. Based on this view of
external threats, China is banking on interaction
with the US and the West in maintaining the
positive dynamics of the world economy.



- .
,
,


.

(, , , ,
..): ,
,

, ,

.

The PRC also views threats of military and


political crises in this same way, through the
prism of threats of an economic crisis and
internal political destabilization. Beijing feels
that a global cataclysm is unlikely; however, it
is afraid that the regional conflicts and clashes
of major powers might hypothetically create
threats to global stability. Hence, the strategic
approach to conflicts in areas that are not vital to
it (Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, etc.): not
to exacerbate the situation, to act by diplomatic
means, and to attempt to maintain its economic
presence, as well as access to sources of raw
materials, supply lines, and markets during any
variation of the progression of events.


( )

Such
an
approach
reflects
Chinas
unwillingness (today) to actively participate in
regional conflicts outside the geopolitical areas of

Chapter I


(,
, -
, ,
).

its vital interests (Taiwan, the Korean peninsula,


the South China Sea, and the Himalayan border
with India, by implication Kashmir).

,
,
,
. -
, ,
:


-
.
-,

:

.

It appears that, contrary to its rhetoric, China


really does not see a nuclear threat posed by the
leading nuclear powers the US and Russia. The
Chinese nuclear missile program is primarily
a status symbol: one of the worlds economic
leaders with claims to the role of one of the worlds
political centers of power must have appropriate
nuclear missile potential. Secondly, this program
is aimed at regional targets: nuclear deterrence by
means of political pressure on Taiwan and India.




, , ,
.

If China shows readiness for a dialog with


the US and Russia in the future concerning
the limitation of nuclear weapons and strategic
stability, it will then primarily be motivated by
status.

. ,

,
. ,


,
.

Regional threats. In all likelihood, China


will not deviate from its course of reunification
with Taiwan, but will not take steps of a military
or political nature to achieve this objective. The
motivation is the same any initiatives that might
damage the PRCs economic growth and that, in
a chain reaction of relations, might threaten the
power of the CCP are unacceptable to the Chinese
leadership.

,
.

, .
,


.


-.

In addition, it is important to bear in mind that


Taiwan is not raising the question of independence.
According to the current Constitution, Taipei
purports to represent the whole of China. True,
political forces exist on Taiwan that favor changing
the Constitution and renaming the island the
Republic of Taiwan. However, their real impact on
Taiwans internal political situation is not critical
to changing the present situation of status quo.

China: Security Threats

Nevertheless, China is using its vast program


for the modernization of the armed forces to exert
a full range of military and political pressure on
Taiwan for the purpose of dissipating the efforts
of separatists through the inherent threat of
military intervention.




.

,
,

.
,
(
)

At the same time, Beijing is banking heavily


on involving Taiwan in economic cooperation and
a broad cultural dialog. The possible eventual
emergence of political reforms in China at the level
of a real multi-party system may, as an alternative,
lead to Taiwans return to being a single nation
with China, with the island retaining greater
autonomy. In any event, one of the alternatives
being discussed by Chinese analysts (but not yet
by sitting politicians) for political reform in China
implies a return to the prewar two-party system of
the CCP and the Kuomintang [National Peoples
Party (NPP)] following reunification with Taiwan.

. , . ,

- ,


.

China will continue to defiantly, sharply, and


fiercely react to American deliveries of arms to
Taiwan. First, it diminishes the potential for the
PRCs military and psychological pressure on
the island. Second, this reaction in particular
is dogmatically reinforced and is traditional in
the mentality of Chinas military and political
leadership, which perceives the Taiwan question
as the main handicap to its great power status.

-
,


. ,

:

Not seeing a direct threat of a nuclear missile


attack on the part of the US, China at the same
time does see an aspiration to appreciably limit
the regional role of China in Washingtons Pacific
policies. It is assumed that the US is intent on
forming an arc of containment for China:

- -
;

To the northeast through the military and


political alliances of the US with Japan and
South Korea;

10

Chapter I


,
;

To the south by revitalizing military


cooperation with Australia and the Philippines,
as well as Vietnam in the future, and;

To the west of the region by arranging a


political partnership between the US and
India.
China intends to create a counterbalance to US
activities of this type by increasing its own
military might, improving its strategic mobility,
extending itself outside the confines of the US
arc of containment, and establishing military
strongholds in distant foreign countries.



,
,


.


-
-
.

In the demographic expansion of North Korean


refugees into northeast China, Beijing sees a
direct threat to its interests as the socioeconomic
situation in North Korea deteriorates.

,

,


,

.


,
,
.

China believes that a market economy and


openness will make it possible for North Korea to
improve its economic situation, which will result
in Pyongyang abandoning its military nuclear
program its main commodity today in
exchange for regular sales of which the North
Korean leadership will receive foreign economic
assistance. The PRC is banking on involving
North Korea in economic cooperation based on
market principles which, in Beijings opinion,
might ensure the positive transformation of the
North Korean regime.



: ,
,

,
..
, ,

,
,

Beijing is considering a specific scenario for


a military threat on the part of North Korea: the
collapse of the North Korean regime, loss of control
over its nuclear potential, nuclear arms getting
into the hands of North Korean terrorists, their
sale in other countries, etc. In this context China
is apparently conceding the alternative of military
intervention in North Korea for the purpose of
gaining control of its nuclear facilities however,
more than likely, only within the framework of
a peacekeeping mission under a United Nations

11

China: Security Threats

(UN) mandate.


.
,
-
,
( ).

In the South China Sea region, China considers


the unresolved nature of the problem of reciprocal
territorial claims to be a threat to its economic
interests. In this region, Beijing is banking on a
dialog, but with the support of its superior naval
might and without the participation of countries
that are not located in this region (which includes
the US and Russia).


, - ,

. -

,

- .

( ), (
).

In Central Asia and Afghanistan, Beijing sees,


first, a source of terrorist and separatist threats
to Chinas integrity. And second a platform
for realization of its own economic interests as
far as the development of the backward regions
of northwest China. In this regard, the US
and Russia are perceived both as partners (in
combating evil) and as competitors (in the
rivalry for economic space).


.
,

,
.

Chinas approach to India is diversified. In


Beijing, this country is regarded as an important
economic partner, but at the same time, as a
potential threat in terms of the territorial disputes
in Tibet, as well as between India and Pakistan
in Kashmir. Also, India is perceived as the main
potential military and political competitor in the
struggle for oil resources and supply lines for their
transportation within the Indian Ocean basin.

? ,

.

. , ,

( )

, . ,

China as a threat? It appears that China does


not represent a strategic nuclear threat to the US
and Russia. Their perception of China as a threat
may be due to two principal factors. First is the
traditional, although antiquated view of the PRC
as a communist (or nationalist) aggressor because
of a delayed reaction to the rapid positive changes
occurring in this country. Second is the question
of sizing up the increase in Chinas military
spending as concealing a threat to regional and
global security.

12

Chapter I

.
,
(. 1, .
3 4), . ,



.

(.
1, 1 2)
.

Meanwhile the challenges associated with the


growth of Chinas military might are another
matter (see Attachment 1, as well as Tables 3 and
4). It can be asserted that China will underpin its
aspiration of world political leadership in concert
with other leading countries by increasing its
military spending. However, the mainstay of
Chinas political positioning will be to increase
its role in supporting the stable development of
the world economy (see Attachment 1, as well as
Tables 1 and 2).


, ,
,
,

,
.
,

.



,


.

The perception of a challenge is mostly due


to the fact that China, having the status of a new
member of world club of political heavyweights,
and at the same time a newcomer, is still
behaving, according to form, more aggressively in
upholding its interests, striving to take its proper
place among the old-timers. But this external
aggressiveness has limits that China will not
exceed because of the cornerstone of its world
prominence. The latter consists of the deepening
economic and financial interdependence of China
with the US, as well as other world economic
and energy centers, which it can only upset with
unacceptable damage to its economy and internal
political stability.



.
,
,
, .
,



.

It is possible for China to offset this current


peculiar noncritical aggressiveness through
its involvement in a broad security dialog with
Russia and the US. It appears that the prospective
topics to this end will be strategic stability, North
Korea, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. Here, it is
necessary to realize that, for objective reasons, the
most problematic issues in Chinas interrelations
with the outside world will continue to be the
disputes surrounding the continental shelf of the
South China Sea and Taiwan for some time to
come.

13

II

Chinas Foreign Policy: Modesty


or Revitalization?
:
?

A. V. Lukin
Vice-Chancellor for Scientific Work and International Relations of the
Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of Russia
..

.
.
1950-



.
,

.

From the very start of reforms, the government


of Deng Xiaoping determined that the countrys
foreign policy course had to undergo radical
changes. The foreign policies of the PRC went
through several stages. During the 1950s, a
strategic and ideological alliance with the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) basically
defined it, and it was aimed at assisting the
latter in combating world imperialism. China
was afforded some autonomy in Asia and Africa,
and it was promoted to the role of the leader of
the third-world nations that were amicable to
socialism.

, ,

,
,
,
,

. 70- ,
,

During the period of estrangement from the


USSR, and especially the cultural revolution,
Beijing, being guided by revolutionary dogmatism,
tried to incite the Asian continent by supporting
radical anti-Western movements there. During
the 1970s, following rapprochement with the US
on anti-Soviet grounds, Mao Tse-Tung advanced

14

Chapter II

,

.

-
,

.

70- .



.

the theory of three worlds, within the framework


of which China was declared the leader of the
developing nations of the Third World. The
Second World, led by the social-imperialistic
USSR, was heralded as the main danger, in the
struggle against which it was possible to cooperate
with the less dangerous First World, headed by
the US. Notions of creating a unified front against
the USSR persisted until the late 1970s. Then the
necessity of seriously addressing internal reforms
and normalization of relations with Moscow
eventually resulted in abandoning them.

XII ,
1982 .,

,

- ,

,

.

. .

At the 12th congress, which took place in


September of 1982, the concept of independent
and autonomous foreign policies was
formulated, the essence of which came down to
not entering into allied relations with any of the
superpowers; that is to say, equating the USSR
and the US as partners or adversaries, but most
importantly subjugating foreign policies to the
objectives of the countrys economic development.
This concept officially defines the foreign policy
course of Beijing even today. It comes down to the
following points.


.
,
,

:
,


,
, .

China always adheres to independent and


autonomous principles. Based on the vital
interests of the Chinese people, the peoples of
the world, and real events, China formulates
its own position and policy course on all
international matters: it does not submit to
any outside pressure, does not establish any
strategic relations with major powers or blocks
of countries, does not participate in the arms
race, and does not pursue military expansion.


. ,

, , ,

.

China opposes hegemonism and defends


world peace. It believes that governments are
not divided into large and small, strong and
weak, and rich and poor, but rather that they
are all equal members of the international
community. Conflicts between countries are
resolved in amicable means. It is not necessary

15

Chinas Foreign Policy

.
,

.



.

to resort to weapons and to threaten each other


with force, and it is not possible to intervene
in the internal affairs of other countries under
any pretexts. China never imposes its social
order and ideology on other countries, and it
does not allow other countries to impose their
social order and ideology on it.

. ,


,

China actively promotes the creation of a


fair and rational new international political
and economic order. China believes that the
new order must reflect requirements of the
march of history and secular progress, and
that it must express the general desires and
interests of the peoples of the whole world.
The five principles of peaceful coexistence and
other generally accepted rules of international
relations must be the basis for the creation of
the new international political and economic
order.




, :

,

,

, ,
1.

China wishes to create and develop friendly


cooperation with all countries based on
the five principles of peaceful coexistence,
namely: mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression,
nonintervention in one anothers internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence1.

, 80-


, ,

,
.

In reality, since the early 1980s, China has


striven to create conditions that favor economic
development by means of building good working
relations with all the countries of the world,
especially with those that are able to offer it
the greatest assistance in this area, to make
investments, and to provide new technologies.
Special attention has been given to its neighbors,
with which China has attempted to resolve

1
//
. 25
, 2003 . (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/
wjdt/wjzc/jbzc/t1992.htm).

1 Chinas Independent and Autonomous Peaceful Foreign


Policies. Foreign Ministry of the Peoples Republic of
China. February 25, 2003. (http://www.fmprc.gov.ch/
rus/wjdt/wjzc/jbzc/11992.html

16

Chapter II

, ,
,

-
,
. ,
:
,
,

.

,
, ,
,

.

territorial and other disputes in every possible


way, among them, by way of compromises, for the
sake of the development of trade and economic
cooperation, including in the frontier areas. The
PRC has identified the vital interests that it cannot
relinquish: the recognition of Taiwan and Tibet,
and earlier Hong Kong and Macao as a part
of the PRC, as well as other matters of territorial
integrity. On other questions, Beijing has behaved
modestly, has not intervened in international
conflicts that do not directly concern it, so as
not to expend resources in vain, and has usually
confined itself exclusively to stating its point of
view concerning them.

, ,
.

. -,


,

,
, . -,
,
,
, ,
.
,
. ,
,


, .

In recent years, however, the situation


has begun to change somewhat. The logic of
development itself compels Beijing to take a
more active role in world politics. First, as a result
of successful economic development in past
decades, the countrys might has increased to
such an extent that it is difficult to imagine the
resolution of many economic and even political
problems that pertain to the world as a whole
without Beijings participation. Second, the model
of Chinas economic development, which is based
on explosive growth and exports, is leading to a
shortage of resources, primarily raw materials,
and the necessity of finding new sales markets.
And both these things lie outside the confines of
the PRC. Finally, problems with the environment
and an overabundant work force,as well as Chinas
other internal difficulties, have begun to directly
impact other countries, primarily neighboring
ones.


,

,
, 2003 .

,
.
,

Attempting to theoretically justify the escalation


of the PRCs role in the world arena, as well as to
dispel fears abroad concerning the potential threat
that the new powerful China might pose to the
world, the countrys leading ideologists advanced
the theory of peaceful ascent in 2003, which
its leaders also embraced. Its essence consisted
of the fact that the strengthening of the PRC did
not bring any harm to the outside world, and

17

Chinas Foreign Policy

,
, ,
,
.
,
, .

that primary attention in the country was being


given to growth, during which it was said that this
growth was even beneficial to its neighbors, since
it would also foster their development. One means
of peaceful ascent, although not the primary one,
was declared to be culture.

,
, ,
,
. ,

,
,
, ,
,
.

Despite the good intentions of the authors,


the idea of ascent, peaceful or not, gave rise to a
mixed reaction throughout the world, and even
frightened some. Consequently, the Chinese
government discarded this concept as the official
one and went back to the idea of peaceful
development that Deng Xiaoping had previously
advanced, then replaced it with the concept of a
harmonious world that Beijing is now officially
striving to create.



2005 .
.
60-


.
2006 .
,
.


,

,
[] 2 .

At the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta in April


of 2005, Chinese leader Hu Jintao talked for the
first time about the need for jointly building a
harmonious world. During the celebration of
the 60th anniversary of the UN in September of
that same year, the Chinese leader suggested that
a harmonious world of common prosperity be
created. In his address at Yale University in April
of 2006, Hu Jintao stated that social harmony had
always been important to China. Now the PRC is
proceeding with building a harmonious society
within the country, is simultaneously striving
to use the achievements of other civilizations for
progress toward peace and development through
cooperation, and is attempting to play its role in
building a harmonious world, lasting peaceful
[relations], and general prosperity2.

XVII

,
. :
,

At the 17th congress of the CCP, the idea of a


harmonious world was not only heard in Hu
Jintaos report, but was also incorporated into the
partys charter. The Chinese leader said: We are
proud of the fact that the peoples of all countries,
through common efforts, have championed the

2http://www.yale.edu/opa/hu/download/transcript_
Hu_20060421.doc

2http://www.yale.edu/opa/hu/download/transcript_
Hu_20060421.doc

18

Chapter II


.
,



, ,
.

,

.

,

,
.
,

,

.
,
,
,
,
.

,

3 .

creation of a harmonious world with stable peace


and general prosperity. Therefore, pursuant
to the preamble and the principles of the UN
Charter, as well as based on strict compliance
with international law and the generally accepted
rules of international relations, it is necessary in
these relations to cultivate the spirit of democracy,
accord, cooperation, and mutual gain. In the
political sense, it is necessary, while respecting
one another and consulting each other on equal
terms, to jointly promote the democratization of
international relations. In the economic sense
while cooperating with one another and providing
each other with extant advantages, to jointly
shift the development of economic globalization
toward beneficial and profitable growth that is
equitable for all. In the cultural sense while
learning from one another, finding common
ground when differences exist, and respecting
the diversity of the world, to together stimulate
the prosperity and progress of human civilization.
In terms of security while trusting one another,
strengthening cooperation, and taking a firm
stand on the resolution of international disputes
by amicable means instead of through warfare,
to collectively defend peace around the world and
to support stability. In terms of environmental
protection while helping one another and
together furthering this cause, to collectively
preserve the common home of mankind our
planet Earth3 .

,

. :
,
, ,
.
,

In essence, this is the selfsame program of


independent and autonomous foreign policies
under new conditions. Its significance: to mollify
the world as far as the objectives of Chinese
expansion, as well as to demonstrate that the
PRCs role in the world is constructive and that its
strengthening is even beneficial to everyone else.
This peace offensive on the part of Beijing and
its skillful use of soft power yielded certain
results. The change of administration in the
US from the confrontational G. Bush, Jr., to the

3 17- (
) (http://russian.china.org.cn/china/archive/
shiqida/2007-10/25/content_9120930_ 21.htm).

3 Report of Hu Jintao at the 17 th Congress of the CCP


(full text)(http://russian.china.org.cn/china/archive/
shiqida/2007-10/25/content_9120930_ 21.htm).

19

Chinas Foreign Policy

. . .

-
.

more constructive B. Obama, as well as Chinas


successful emergence from the [recent global
economic-financial] crisis, forced many people to
reevaluate its role in the world.

2009 .
.
.
,

, ,

.

. ,
:
,
, ,
.

In early 2009, two masters of American


foreign policy thought, Zb. Brzeziski and H.
Kissinger, came up with proposals for how to
solve the worlds problems in the new situation,
having essentially formulated these proposals for
the newly elected American president, B. Obama,
in line with a change in the US foreign policy
course. Despite a number of disagreements, they
agreed on one thing: the stable future of the world
depends on whether or not the United States and
China, setting aside their differences, are able to
establish constructive cooperation.


. -,


. -, ,

,
,
, , .
,

(
,
). -,

,
,
,
,
.

The proposals of these well-known foreign


policy experts were put forward for a number
of reasons. First was a common understanding
of the failure of the previous administrations
foreign policy course and the desire to change it.
Second was the recognition of the fact that not
only Americas political approaches, but also its
economic models, had lost popularity around the
world as a result of the crisis, while alternative
ideas had conversely gained popularity. One
such model was the Chinese one, which Western
economists dubbed the Peking consensus (by
analogy with the Washington consensus, which
it countered). Third was the acknowledgment of
Beijings increasing role in world politics, which
was due to both its real economic achievements
and expectations that China would emerge from
crisis with fewer losses than many other major
economies.

, 2010 .
.

. ,

(assertive)
,

However, by 2010, the mood in the West had


changed. Around the world, the new trends
in Chinas foreign policies began to be widely
discussed. In the opinion of a number of observers,
its economic successes during past decades
had resulted in a more self-assured (assertive)
approach to the outside world, a tendency to

20

Chapter II


,
,
, . ,

, ,
,
,
.

810%- .

,
,

,


,
.

exhibit greater inflexibility in relations with its


partners, a lesser predilection for concessions,
and inclinations to answer blow with blow and
pressure with pressure. They said that this trend
was especially heightened as a result of Chinas
successful emergence from the world financial
crisis in the opinion of Chinese authorities,
during which China sustained fewer losses than
other leading economies around the world. After
all, even during the crisis years, Chinas economy
grew by 8-10%. By way of an example, they cited
Chinas firm stand on the Tibet question, its
tenacious unwillingness to compromise with the
Dalai Lama, unreasonably harsh sentences for
certain dissidents, an anti-Western position on
the global warming issue, and the repudiation
of pressure on the North Korean regime for
the purpose of compelling it to execute the UN
Security Council resolutions that Beijing itself
had previously voted for.

,

.
,



.

It appears that Chinas new foreign policy


self-assuredness can be calmly perceived as
the aspiration of a major and successful power to
actively defend its foreign interests. At the same
time, it is impossible not to note that successful
economic development during past decades and
the strengthening of the countrys international
positions have led to an increase in nationalism
among the elite.



, ,
,
,
,
.
2009 .
, ,
,

, .
,
,

At the end of the first decade of the new century,


articles and books began to be openly published in
China in which statements were made to the effect
that Beijing must actively safeguard its economic
interests around the world, including through
the use of its army and navy, and even monitor
world resources and their distribution. In a book
that appeared in early 2009, Unhappy China,
which became a bestseller, without offering
sufficient proof, it is asserted that the Chinese
are ostensibly the best in the world at handling
natural resources, which their country lacks.
From this, the conclusion is drawn that Beijing
must take control of the worlds resources in the

21

Chinas Foreign Policy

.
, ,

4 .
,

5 .

future in order to manage them for mankinds


benefit. According to authors, the Chinese army
must actively support the PRCs quest for
resources outside its borders 4 . Earlier, one of
the authors of this book, Wang Xiaodong, had
already written that Chinas main problem was a
shortage of vital space5 .


, ,

,
.

Official Chinese representatives and experts


usually explain that the ideas expressed by the
group of journalists who authored the book
Unhappy China are just the private thoughts
of certain individuals. However, in more frank
conversations, some Chinese have acknowledged
that certain circles within the power structures
support similar nationalist theories.


2010 .
,
. ,

6
(
),
, XXI
.
. ,
, ,
,
,
7.

By the way, this open secret was fully revealed


in 2010 following the publication of several books
and articles by a number of official military
analysts in which similar ideas were expressed.
In this vein, in a book that immediately gained
great popularity, Chinas Dream6, a professor
at the University of Defense (which is a part
of the Ministry of National Defense network),
senior colonel Liu Minfu, reckoned that China
must strive to become the number one power
in the world as far as might in the 21st century.
Otherwise, in his opinion, the efforts of the
US, with which a fight and perhaps a war for
leadership is inevitable, would cast it aside along
the path to world development7.

4 , , ce,
: . ,
.
, 2009. . 8081, 9899, 106108.
5 .
// . No 5.
2000.
6 ( )::
( : ). ,
, 2010
7China PLA officer urges challenging U.S.
dominance (http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE6200P620100301).

4 Song Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Huang Jisu, Song Qiang,


and Liu Yang. Unhappy China. The Great Time, Grand
Visions, and Our Challenges. Nanking, 2009, pp. 80-81,
98-99, and 106-108.
5 Wang Xiaodong. Theory of Contemporary Chinese
Nationalism. Chzhanlyue Yuy Guanli,* No. 5, 2000.
6 (Liu Minfu)::
(Superpower Thinking in the Post-American World. The
Chinese Dream). ,, 2010
7 Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Officer Urges
Challenging U.S. Dominance (http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE6200P620100301).

22

Chapter II


,

,
. ,


: , ,
. ,

: XIX ,
,
,
.
, ,
,
, 8 .

All these same arguments are encountered in


another book with the characteristic title The
C-Shaped Encirclement: How Will China Break
Through the Encirclement Under Conditions
of Domestic Difficulties and Foreign Pressure,
which was written by a colonel in the Air Force
(AF) of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army
(CPLA) and a well-known military journalist,
Dai Xu. According to Dai Xu, under overall
coordination on the part of the US, Chinas
neighbors Japan, Vietnam, India, and the US
itself in Afghanistan are encircling it with tight
military half-ring. The author maintains that
China has always waged war for its existence
with great powers: with Europeans, led by the
British, in the 19th century, with Japan during the
first half of the last century, with the USSR in the
second, and now with the US. War with the latter
is almost inevitable and it is necessary for China
to strengthen its army, primarily the air force and
navy, in order to ensure commanding positions88.

.
2009 .
-
:

:
, ...
9 .
2010 .

-

,

-

One possible means for counteracting the


encirclement is to establish military bases
abroad, following the example of the US. Calls
to create a foreign infrastructure for the CPLA
and to actively operate outside the borders of the
PRC are prevalent among the recommendations
of military analysts. For example, in November
of 2009, the director of the Strategy Institute of
the University of Defense, rear admiral Yang Yi,
stated: We must decisively and pointedly tell
the United States and other nations that China
must increase its military presence abroad, which
is due to foreign national interests9 . And in
early 2010, an interview with retired admiral Yin
Zhuo that was placed on the official Internet site
of the Ministry of National Defense, in which he
proposed that a Chinese naval base be established
in Gulf of Aden for the purpose supporting the
operations of the Chinese navy in combating sea
pirates, produced a sharp reaction abroad.

8 ( ):C(
:

). ,, 2010,3-4
9South China Morning Post 28.11. 2009.

8 (Dai Xu):C (The C-Shaped Encirclement.


How Will China Break Through the Encirclement
Under Conditions of Domestic Difficulties and Foreign
Pressure). ,, 2010,3-4
9 South China Morning Post, 11/28/2009.

23

Chinas Foreign Policy

,
,

.
1979 .
,

,

.
.
, ,

.

Similar statements drew close attention


because they contradicted both the official
doctrine and the practices of the Chinese military
establishment. Following the fiasco of Chinas
blood lesson in Vietnam in 1979, the CPLA did
not show any activity abroad, with the exception of
participating in UN peacekeeping operations and
exercises carried out within the framework of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Taiwan was
always considered to be the primary objective of
the army and the navy. In the opinion of experts,
the modernization of the armed forces and basic
procurements of arms were aimed at Taiwan in
particular.


.
-

,
,

.

Chinese diplomacy also made every effort


to demonstrate that Chinas objectives were
exclusively peaceful and that its foreign policies
were aimed at ensuring conditions that favored
domestic development. Beijing studiously avoided
talking about any interests outside its territory
and did not intervene in international conflicts,
confining itself to the verbal statement of its
position, which usually came down to calls for all
disputes to be resolved amicably and by means of
negotiations.

, ,
,
.

,
,
70-
,
.
, ,
,
1989 .10

Officially, this course remains unchanged;


however, it is readily apparent today that it has
numerous critics, many of whom wear the
epaulets of the CPLA. Without directly rejecting
the line of the political leadership, they are actually
creating a new ideology of foreign and defense
policies that contradicts the course that Deng
Xiaoping set in the late 1970s, the slogan of which
was modesty. It is not necessary to be praised;
the more we develop, the more modest we must
be, the Chinese leader exhorted in 198910 .

10 (
. .3) ,,1993320

10 (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping.


Vol. 3) ,,1993320

24

Chapter II

,


.
,
,


.

,
,
.
,
,
,
,

. ,


.

Today, it is clear that serious discussions and


even infighting are under way within Chinese
society and government concerning future
foreign policies. Some people deny that Chinese
foreign policies have become more offensive,
asserting that China must just more clearly
state its positions on key problems and defend
these positions. Regarding the aforementioned
books, the proponents of this line usually assert
that they did not have any serious impact on the
attitudes of the citizens of the PRC, since Chinese
readers in general scarcely noticed them at all.
In their words, the strengthening of the PRCs
influence in the world arena, up to and including
the possibility of gaining control over the worlds
raw material resources, is nothing more than a
dream of the Chinese, and they do not give any
serious thought to its realization. It is noted that
the Chinese as a whole do not support the ideas
set forth in the book Chinas Dream and are not
trying to transform the PRC into a superpower.

,


. ,
,

.
,
.
, ,
.

They claim that Chinas rapid development


does not in any way signify the inevitability of
war and that it is committed to peaceful means
of development. According to this position, the
present world differs from former one, in which the
rapid development of one country led to warfare.
Now, global development implies cooperation, an
example of which is the cooperation between the
PRC and RF. China needs a strong Russia, and
conversely, Russia needs a strong China.

,

: , ,
,
, ,

,
,
,
.

In the opinion of moderate analysts, two groups


of problems stand before the PRC today: old ones
such as security, territorial integrity, sovereignty,
the question of borders, the Taiwan problem, and
the PRCs low-level role in international arena,
and; new ones an increase in investments
outside China, a rise in the number of Chinese
people moving abroad, the level of the PRCs
involvement in globalization processes, and the
problem of resources. And all these problems
must be resolved through cooperation and the

25

Chinas Foreign Policy

,
, .

improvement of the PRCs economic integration,


including that with Russia, the US, and other
countries.
But, in real life, everything does not work out as
smoothly as in sonorous Chinese doctrines of the
harmonious world type. One of the most vivid
examples of this trend is the serious deterioration
of Beijings relations with Washington. The US is
displeased with Chinas escalating international
activity, its economic expansion, both close to
and far from its borders, for example, in Africa,
Latin America, and the Middle East, and Chinas
position on global warming, wherein it views
itself as the leader of developing countries, which
are trying to shift all responsibility for climate
changes to the developed world.


,
.


.
,
,
, ,
,
,
,
,

.
,
,



.


,


.
,

. ,

.
,

, .

-
.

, ,
.

.

However, perhaps the greatest disappointment


in Washington and the European capitals comes
from Beijings tenacious unwillingness to accept
an increase in the yuan exchange rate. In the US
and the Western Europe, the understated Chinese
currency exchange rate is regarded as a tacit
subsidization of exports that promotes growth,
as well as an already huge foreign trade deficit
between most Western countries and China. Nor
is the US satisfied with Chinas position on a
number of regional questions, in particular, on
the North Korean nuclear problem. Washington
feels that Beijing is showing insufficient diligence
in exerting pressure upon Pyongyang. The same
is also true of the Iranian nuclear problem, in
regard to which Beijing, together with Moscow,
is pursuing the line of softening the sanctions
proposed by the West. As a result of the reboot
of American-Russian relations, Moscows position
on the Iranian nuclear problem at one point came
closer to the American one. In Beijing, however,
they were urging either that sanctions not be
imposed at all or that they be softened, thereby
eviscerating their content. Ultimately, Beijing
and Moscow acted in concert on the UN Security
Council (SC) against any new sanctions.

26

Chapter II



.
-

,
,

, .
-,
.

In Beijing, discontent with Washingtons


policies is also being exhibited in a number
of areas. In addition to ongoing military and
technical cooperation with Taiwan, there is also
pressure on Beijing in economic matters, as well
as intervention in the internal affairs of China
regarding the observance of human rights and B.
Obamas meeting with the Dalai Lama, who is
considered to be a separatist in Beijing.


. -
-.

,

,


.

American-Chinese instability is also reflected


in relations between Beijing and Moscow.
Russian-Chinese relations are much more stable
than their American-Chinese counterparts. There
are no particular political differences between
Moscow and Beijing, a firm base of converging
interests underlies the ramified mechanism
of cooperation, and Russia also shares many
of Chinas fears concerning the foreign policy
ambitions of the US.


,

. ,
, ,
,
,

, .

Nonetheless, one no longer has to proceed


on the basis of the fact that any deterioration of
relations between two corners of a triangle is
necessarily in the interest of the third party. In
addition, the growth of Chinas self-assuredness,
if it occurs on the basis of nationalism, may affect
not only the interests of the US, but to an even
greater extent, the position of Chinas neighbors,
including Russia.

27

III

Nuclear Might of the PRC


V. I. Yesin
Lead Research Associate of the US and Canada Institute of the RAS, Col.
General (retired)
..
, - ( )



1968 .
,

.
-
,

,
.


: 240300
10000 .

At the present time, the PRC is the only one


of the five nations possessing nuclear arms
and officially recognized by the 1968 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty that does not provide any
official information about its nuclear arms. For
political propaganda purposes, Beijing claims
that Chinas nuclear forces are few in number and
are not comparable to those of other members of
the nuclear five, such as the US and Russia. But
the quantitative estimates of the PRCs nuclear
arsenal that are prevalent within the expert
community fluctuate over a quite wide range:
from 240300 to 10,000 nuclear warheads.


1.

Taking the foregoing into account, the


following estimates of the PRCs nuclear potential
can be presented1.

Manufacture of nuclear munitions. The PRC


has at its disposal a well-developed military
nuclear industry, completely self-sufficient, for

1 .

1 Here and further on, the authors estimates are cited.

28

Chapter III



:

.

,

,

.

( ),
( ),
( ).

, (
).

ensuring the series production of the entire


spectrum of nuclear munitions needed for the
countrys nuclear forces: from aerial bombs to
warheads for missiles with various applications.
There are two virtually independent groups of
enterprises in the PRC northern and southern,
each of which includes plants for the production
of special fissile materials, the manufacture
of components, and the assembly of nuclear
munitions. The structure of the northern group
includes four industrial centers in Baotou (an
autonomous region of Inner Mongolia), Koko Nor
(a province of Tsing Hai), Lanzhou, and Yumen
(both in the Gansu province). The southern group
includes three industrial centers in Guangyuan,
Ebyan, and Tszytun (all in the Sichuan province).


(
) ,
2011 . 40
10
.
3600 (1600
2000 ).

The estimation of the output capacities of


Chinese plants for the production of special
fissile materials (taking into account the real
time frames for putting them into service) reveals
that they could have turned out up to 40 tons (t)
of weapons-grade uranium and approximately
10 t of weapons-grade plutonium as of 2011.
This is enough to manufacture of 3,600 nuclear
warheads (1,600 uranium and 2,000 plutonium).

,
,


.

.
,
, ,
16001800 .

800 900 .,


.

By analogy with the practices of other nations


of the nuclear five, it is entirely likely that far
from all the weapons-grade nuclear materials
produced is being used to manufacture
munitions in the PRC. Warehouse inventories
of such materials may account for half or more
of the amount produced. If one proceeds on the
basis of this assumption, then the PRCs nuclear
arsenal probably numbers 1,600-1,800 nuclear
warheads. Among them, 800-900 units may be
intended for operational deployment, while the
remainder is intended for long-term storage, and
in turn, for recycling following the expiration of
the established operational lifetimes.

Of course, the estimates cited are approximate

29

Nuclear Might of the PRC


, , ,
,
.

and do not profess to be completely accurate, but


it appears that they are all considerably closer to
the real figures than those mentioned at the start
of this article.


,
,
:

As far as the line of nuclear munitions that


the PRCs military nuclear industry produces, it
includes the following complement:

-4 (
5 20 )
- -5
;

Aerial bomb B-4 [several versions with a


capacity of 5 to 20 kilotons (kt) each] for the
Qiang-5 fighter-bomber and other tactical
strike aircraft;

-5 ( 2 )

-6
(
-16);

Aerial bomb B-5 [with a capacity of up to 2


megatons (Mt)] for the Hong-6 long-rage
bomber (a licensed version of the Tu-16 Soviet
long-range bomber);

(
2 )

() -4
() -5;

A single warhead (two versions with a capacity


of up to 2 Mt each) for the Dongfeng-4
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and
the Dongfeng-5A intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM);

(
500 ) -31;

A single warhead (with a capacity of up to 500


kt) for the Dongfeng-31 ICBM;


( 300 ) 31;

A nosecone that has a detachable warhead (with


a capacity of up to 300 kt) for the Dongfeng-31A
ICBM;

(
350 )
-21/21
() -1;

A single warhead (two versions with a capacity


of up to 350 kt each) for the Dongfeng-21/21A
MRBM and the Tszyuylan-1 submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM);

(
5 20
) -
() -15/15/15 11/11,
() - 10
(-10);

A single warhead (several versions with a


capacity of 5 to 20 kt each) for the Dongfeng15/15A/15B and Dongfeng-11/11A short-range
missiles (SRMs), as well as for the Donghai-10
(DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile
(GLCM);

A single warhead (with a capacity of up to 500

30

Chapter III

500 ) -2.

kt) for the Tszyuylan-2 SLBM.

()
( ).

-5 -31,
-2.


2011 . .

An advanced development is the multiple


independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV).
This warhead is intended for modified Dongfeng5A and Dongfeng-31A ICBMs, as well as for the
Tszyuylan-2 SLBM, which was recently introduced
into the arsenal. Presumably experimental
MIRV prototypes may have been fabricated and
undergone in-flight practice firing in 2011.



,
-6,
, -5


-30.

Air component of nuclear forces. The air


component of the PRCs nuclear forces consists of
strategic aircraft, the makeup of which includes
Hong-6 long-range bombers, tactical aircraft, as
represented by Qiang-5 fighters-bombers, and
other strike aircraft, the prototype of which is
Russias Su-30 multipurpose fighter.


60 6
.
-6
-5
5800 .
120 -5.

The effective combat strength of the strategic


aircraft comes to approximately 60 Hong6 bombers, with roughly just as many under
warehouse storage conditions. The maximum
flight range of a Hong-6 bomber with one B-5
thermonuclear bomb on an internal suspension is
approximately 5,800 kilometers (km). Altogether,
up to 120 B-5 aerial bombs have been allocated for
the subject aircraft.
The effective combat strength of the tactical
aircraft comes to a sum total of more than 300
Qiang-5 fighter-bombers and other strike aircraft
that are certified for the performance of nuclear
missions. The maximum flight range of these
aircraft with one B-5 atomic bomb is 1,400-2,000
km. Altogether, 320 B-4 aerial bombs have been
allocated for the subject tactical aircraft.



300
-
-5 ,

.
-4
14002000 .
320 -4.

-4 -5
440 .

Thus, the total stock of B-4 and B-5 aerial


bombs intended for operational deployment
comes to 440 units. In peacetime, they are stored
on air bases in special structures separate from

31

Nuclear Might of the PRC

,
.

the aircraft.

.


().

Land component of nuclear forces. The


land component of the PRCs nuclear forces
consists of the Strategic Missile Forces and the
missile complexes of the Ground Forces of the
Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA).


.
.

The so-called Second Artillery of the


CPLA represents the Strategic Missile Forces. It
structure includes six missile bases.


51- ,



-21 ( 2000
). 28 .
35 35 .

The 51st Missile Base is deployed within the


Shenyang Military District, the makeup of which
includes three missile brigades armed with
ground-based mobile missile systems that have
two-stage solid-fuel Dongfeng-21 MRBMs (a firing
range of up to 2,000 km). Altogether, there are 28
missile launchers. The combat reserve consists of
up to 35 missiles and 35 nuclear warheads.


52- .
,


-21 ( 2800
3000 ),

-15/15/15 (
600 )

-11 ( 300
). 84 (24
- 21, 24 -15/15/15
36 - 11).
- 21
30 30
. -15/15/15 11 , .


30 .

The 52nd Missile Base is deployed within the


Nanking Military District. Its makeup includes
seven missile brigades, two of which are armed
with ground-based mobile missile systems that
have Dongfeng-21A two-stage solid-fuel MRBMs
(a firing range of 2,800-3,000 km), two others
ground-based mobile missiles systems that
have Dongfeng-15/15A/15B solid-fuel SRMs (a
firing range of up to 600 km), and three more
ground-based mobile missile systems that have
Dongfeng-11A solid-fuel SRMs (a firing range of
up to 300 km). Altogether, there are 84 missile
launchers (24 with Dongfeng-21A MRBMs,
24 with Dongfeng-15/15A/15B SRMs, and 36
with Dongfeng-11A SRMs). The combat reserve
for the missile launchers with Dongfeng-21A
MRBMs comes to 30 missiles and 30 warheads.
The Dongfeng-15/15A/15B and Dongfeng-11A
SRMs can be outfitted with both high-explosive
fragmentation warheads and nuclear warheads.
The stored munitions allowance for these SRMs
may include a sum total of up to 30 nuclear
warheads.
The 53rd Missile Base is deployed within

32

Chapter III


53- ,


-21/21. 24
. 30 30
.

the Chengtu Military District, the makeup of


which includes two missile brigades armed with
ground-based mobile missile systems that have
Dongfeng-21/21A MRBMs. Altogether, there are
24 missile launchers. The combat reserve is up to
30 missiles and 30 nuclear warheads.


54- .
:


-5 (
12000 ),

-4 (
5200 )

-31
( 8000 ). 24
( 5, -4 12
-31). 28 28
.

The 54th Missile Base is deployed within the


Jinan Military District. Its makeup includes
three missile brigades: the first is armed with silo
missile systems that have Dongfeng-5A two-stage
liquid-fuel ICBMs (a firing range of up to 12,000
km), the second with silo and ground-based
missile systems that have Dongfeng-4 liquid-fuel
MRBMs (a firing range of up to 5,200 km), and
the third with ground-based mobile missile
systems that have Dongfeng-31 three-stage solidfuel ICBMs (a firing range of up 8,000 km).
Altogether, there are 24 missile launchers (six
with Dongfeng-5A ICBMs, six with Dongfeng-4
MRBMs, and 12 with Dongfeng-31 ICBMs). The
combat reserve consists of up to 28 missiles and
28 nuclear warheads.


55- ,
,
- 5,
,

-4. 17
(12 -5
-4). 20 20
.

The 55th Missile Base is deployed within the


Guangzhou Military District, the makeup of
which includes two missile brigades armed with
silo missile systems that have Dongfeng-5A
ICBMs, as well as one missile brigade armed with
silo and ground-based missile systems that have
Dongfeng-4 MRBMs. Altogether, there are 17
missile launchers (12 with Dongfeng-5A ICBMs
and five with Dongfeng-4 MRBMs). The combat
reserve consists of up to 20 missile and 20 nuclear
warheads.
The 56th Missile Base is deployed within the
Lanzhou Military District and consists of two
missile brigades: one is armed with ground-based
mobile missile systems that have Dongfeng-21A
MRBMs, while the other is armed with groundbased mobile missile systems that have Dongfeng31A three-stage solid-fuel ICBMs (a firing range of
up to 12,300 km). Altogether, there are 30 missile
launchers (12 with Dongfeng-21A MRBMs and 18
with Dongfeng-31A ICBMs). The combat reserve
consists of 35 missiles and 35 nuclear warheads.


56-
:
21,

-31
( 12300 ). 30
(12 -21
18 -31). 35
35 .

33

Nuclear Might of the PRC


207
(48 , 99 60
).
238 208
.

All told, 207 missile launchers are deployed


within the Strategic Missile Forces (48 with
ICBMs, 99 with MRBMs, and 60 with SRMs).
The combat reserve for these missile launchers
comes to 238 missiles and 208 nuclear warheads.

,

,
,
.

-11 ( 300
), -10 (
1500-2000 ).

As concerns the Ground Forces, they are


armed with two types of ground-based mobile
missile systems that can launch missiles with
both conventional and nuclear warheads. One of
these systems is outfitted with Dongfeng-11 solidfuel SRMs (a firing range of 300 km), while the
other is equipped with Donghai-10 GLCMs (a
firing range of 1,500-2,000 km).

-11
100 ., - 10 350
. ( 500 .).


150 .

The number of missile launchers deployed


with Dongfeng-11 SRMs comes to on the order of
100 units, while those deployed with Donghai-10
GLCMs up to 350 units (according to other data
up to 500 units). The stored munitions allowance
for these missiles may comes to a sum total of up
to 150 nuclear warheads.

,

360
.
,

(
,
).

Thus, within the land component of the


PRCs nuclear forces, approximately 360 nuclear
warheads may be intended for deployment. In
peacetime, the bulk of them are stored separate
from the missiles, but not all contrary to a
statement of certain experts based on leaks to the
mass media (MM) (in all likelihood, sanctioned
by Chinese authorities).

31/31, ,

. ,
,

-
,

. -

Based on the fact that a continuous combat


alert has been organized within missile brigades
armed with ground-based mobile missile systems
that have Dongfeng-31/31A ICBMs, it must be
assumed that these systems are kept in readiness
for immediate use with the approval of the
countrys leadership. And this means that the
nuclear warheads are permanently attached to
missiles on launchers in their transportation and
firing tubes. If the Chinese proceeded otherwise,
then they would not be the pragmatists that the
world recognizes them to be: a continuous combat

34

Chapter III

, ,
:


.

alert for missiles with the nuclear warheads


detached is total operational nonsense.

,



,
.

. ,
,
.

Yet another significant fact consists of the


construction of an elaborate series of underground
tunnels by military builders in Chinas central
provinces, which could house bulky military
hardware. The existence of these tunnels,
which have a total expanse of several thousand
kilometers, suggests that they may contain a
considerable number of standby mobile missile
launchers with ballistic and cruise missiles, as
well as nuclear munitions storage facilities. It is
simply not possible to imagine any other military
use for these grandiose structures. At the very
least, this issue should not be ignored when
addressing the question of estimating the nuclear
might of the PRC.

.


():
( 092) 12

-1
( 2400 )
094 12
-2
.
8000 .

Sea component of nuclear forces. The sea


component of the PRCs nuclear forces includes
two types of nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (NPBMSs): one submarine of the Xia
type (project 092) with 12 Tszyuylan-1 two-stage
solid-fuel SLBMs (a firing range of up to 2,400
km) and two project 094 submarines with 12
Tszyuylan-2 three-stage solid-fuel SLBMs on each
one. The firing range of this SLBM is up to 8,000
km.


-1
90- .
-1
15 .

The construction of NPBMs of the Xia type


and the production of Tszyuylan-1 SLBMs was
halted in the 1990s. Nuclear warhead reserves for
Tszyuylan-1 SLBMs are estimated at 15 units.

094
2001 .
(
).

The construction of project 094 NPBMs began


in 2001. It is assumed that a total of not less than
four submarines were built (according to other
data not less than five).

35

Nuclear Might of the PRC


094

.
30 -2 30
.

Two project 094 NPBMSs placed into the


operational arsenal of the PRCs navy are used
for military patrols in the seas adjacent to China.
Their total combat reserve is estimated to be 30
Tszyuylan-2 SLBMs and 30 warheads.

,
36
-1/2,
45
.

Thus, 36 single-warhead Tszyuylan-1/2 SLBMs


are presently deployed within the sea component
of the PRCs nuclear forces, the munitions
allowance of nuclear warheads for which comes
to 45 units.


.
, ,

,
,
,
.

.
,
,
.

Prospects for the development of nuclear


forces. It appears that external factors will
decisively determine the thrust of development
of the PRCs nuclear forces. In particular, this
will depend upon the configuration used for the
global anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system being
created by the US and its allies, as well as how the
nuclear forces of the Celestial Empires neighbors,
primarily India, are deployed. Prospects for the
resolution of the long-standing Taiwan problem
will also have some impact. For the time being,
however, a judgment will have to be made
concerning the future of the PRCs nuclear forces
based on the sparse official information at the
disposal of the expert community.



-6.

-

,
()
.
-10.

In keeping with plans for the development of


strategic aviation, the modernization of existing
and the series production of new versions of
Hong-6 long-range bombers are under way. These
aircraft are being outfitted with new targeting and
navigation equipment, and will have an expanded
complement of arms, including air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) with nuclear warheads.
Donghai-10 GLCMs serve as the prototype for
these ALCMs.

In improving the land component of nuclear


forces, emphasis has been placed on outfitting
existing and future ballistic missiles with multiple
reentry vehicles and penetration (PEN) aids. In
addition to this, the development of two new solidfuel ballistic missiles is under way: MRBMs of the

36

Chapter III


: -25
-41. -25

-31



. ,
4000 .

-4. -41
,

,
610

.

Dongfeng-25 type and ICBMs of the Dongfeng-41


type. The MRBMs of the Dongfeng-25 type are
being created on the basis of the first and second
stages of the Dongfeng-31 ICBM, and they are
being outfitted with multiple reentry vehicles
that have three independently targeted warheads.
It is assumed that the firing range of these
missiles will be up to 4,000 km. They are being
counted on to replace the outdated Dongfeng-4
MRBMs. The ICBMs of the Dongfeng-41 type
are being created as general-purpose missiles
intended for deployment on two types of mobile
missile systems ground-based and rail-based.
According to available information, they will be
outfitted with multiple reentry vehicles that have
6-10 independently targeted warheads.

094,


.

-2 .
,

(- ).

096.
24 -2
. ,
20142015 .

Primary efforts in developing the sea


component of nuclear forces are presently being
aimed at stepping up and improving the quality
of the construction of project 094 NPBMSs, as
well as helping the crews of these submarines
acquire the skills needed in order to operate them
and to ensure all their navigation performance
conditions in ocean areas. Tszyuylan-2 SLBMs are
simultaneously being modernized and outfitted
with MIRVs. In addition, the creation of the
infrastructure needed in order to base NPBMSs
on Hainan Island (the South China Sea) is
nearing completion.
A promising area consists of the construction
of a prototype project 96 NPBMS. There will be
24 Tszyuylan-2 SLBMs with MIRVs onboard this
submarine. It is anticipated that this vessel will be
deployed during 2014-2015.

.
,
. ,

, , ,

Nuclear potential of the PRC and


its significance. The analysis conducted
suggests that the world community obviously
underestimates the nuclear potential of the PRC.
It is appreciably higher than many experts think.
In all likelihood, the PRC is already the third
nuclear power today, after the US and Russia,
and it undoubtedly has technical and economic

37

Nuclear Might of the PRC

capabilities that will permit it to rapidly increase


its nuclear might if necessary.

,


-

.
, ,
.
, ,

,

,
.

This means that the Chinese factor should


necessarily be taken into account when
considering the possibility of the conclusion of
any subsequent Russian-American agreement on
the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.
The time has come to involve the PRC in one way
or another in negotiations concerning nuclear
disarmament. Unless this is done, it scarcely
seems possible to give additional impetus to this
process, even if the current differences between
Russia and the US concerning ABM problems,
nonstrategic nuclear arms, and the militarization
of space are resolved.

38

IV

Chinas Military Preparations


A. A. Khramchikhin
Deputy Director and Head of Analytical Department of the Political and
Military Analysis Institute
..

.
-
()
().
. ,
,
.

.

System of military control of the PRC. The


Central Military Commission (CMC) runs the
Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA).
The post of chairman of the CMC is de facto
considered to be the most important position in
the PRC. Only after a person holds this post can
he or she be considered a completely legitimate
leader of the country. This fact, in and of itself,
signifies the exceptionally high role of the army
in Chinas political system.

:
(
),
(), ,
,

( ,
, , , ,
).
(

)
(, , ).

The CMC oversees four branches of the armed


forces: the land-based strategic missile forces
(Chinese name the Second Artillery), the
ground forces (GFs), the air force (AF), and the
navy, as well as seven military districts, through
which the command is accomplished by the GF
units that are a part of their structure (the district
headquarters are located in Beijing, Shenyang,
Jinan, Nanking, Lanzhou, Guangzhou, and
Chengtu). The supervision of troops also goes
through the General Staff (with the exception of
the Second Artillery, which the CMC directly
oversees) and three CPLA departments (political,
logistics, and weapons). The centralization of

39

Chapter IV


:
,

.

control is exceptionally high: the CMC must


authorize the movement of any detachment
larger than a battalion, which includes any troop
movement across military district borders.



()
.

-
.
,
, .. ,
.

The Ministry of National Defense performs the


day-to-day supervision of military construction
and is a part of the structure of the State Council
(the government) of the PRC. The General
Political Department oversees party political,
agitation, and propaganda work within the CPLA.
There are party structures within all the units and
formations of the CPLA, and no order, including a
combat order, has any force without the signature
of the political commissar.

30 .

1835
,

36,5 . .

.

The CPLA is recruited on the basis of


conscription. Contract service also exists with
periods of three to 30 years. No men 18-35 years
of age who are conscripted for the military serve
in the reserve within the peoples emergency
volunteer corps system, the ranks of which
presently number 36.5 million persons. It is
considered to be an organized combat-ready
reserve of the CPLA and a base for the partisan
movement.


. 1,52
,
1418% . 2001 .
17 . .,
2011 . 91 . . ,
10 5 (.
1).
,

1,53 ,

,
,
, ,
.

China is rapidly increasing its military


spending. Its rate of growth exceeds that of the
GDP by 1.5-2 times, coming to 14-18% a year.
While this spending equaled approximately 17
billion dollars in 2001, it reached 91 billion dollars
in 2011. Thus, spending rose by more than 5 times
over a 10-year period (see Attachment 1). Here,
all foreign researchers without exception agree
that the official spending figure is understated
by 1.5-3 times as compared to the real one, since
outlays for imported weapons, revenues from
exports, expenses for nuclear arms, SNFs, and the
National Armed Police, subsidies for the militaryindustrial complex (MIC), and appropriations for
research and development (R&D) are not included
in it.

.
,

Ground forces. The cornerstone of the


CPLAs might has been, is, and will be its ground

40

Chinas Military Preparations

,
,

,
.

,
,

.
,
.

forces, since the countrys enormous population,


as well as a surplus of men in the younger age
groups, gives the leadership of the PRCs Military
Commission (MC) a unique resource that the
military and political leaders of other countries
can only dream about. Despite technically lagging
behind a number of the worlds armies somewhat,
China is capable of crushing by mass any
opponent that it meets in a traditional ground
war within its territory or near to it. It is possible
to make a judgment concerning who China
considers an opponent based on army deployment
patterns.



,
(
,
).

, 12
.

(
,
,
)1.
, ,


,

, ,
.

Among Chinas seven military districts, the


most powerful ones are those with headquarters
in Beijing and Shenyang, which abut the RF
border [the former is oriented toward the Siberian
Military District of the RF Armed Forces (AFs)
and the latter toward the Far East Military
District]. Four of nine armored divisions, six of
nine mechanized infantry divisions, and six of
12 armored brigades of the CPLAs ground forces
fall within these districts. Another two armored
divisions and one brigade are a part of the Lanzhou
Military District (MD) (it occupies the western
part of the country, being oriented toward Central
Asia, Mongolia, and Siberia west of Baikal)1. In
addition one armored division, one mechanized
infantry division, two armored brigades, and a
single mechanized infantry brigade within the
CPLA are a part of the Jinan district. which is in
the center of the country and is a strategic reserve
for the Peking, Shenyang, Lanzhou, and Nanking
districts.

, 38-



.
,
, , ,

In particular, the 38th Army of the Peking


MD is a proving ground for working out
new organizational and staffing measures,
as well as methods for using new types of
combat hardware. The artillery in this army is
completely mechanized; it is still inferior to its
American counterpart as far as accuracy, but is

1: . . .
(). :
, 2006.

1 See K. V. Chuprin. Military Might of the Celestial Empire.


Armed forces of the PRC (A Reference Book). Kharvest
[Harvest] Publishing House, Moscow, 2006.

41

Chapter IV

,
,
. , 38-
6-
, -96.
38- 1000
(150 ). ,
4- -
,
(, ,
).

in all likelihood superior to the Russian version.


The armored forces are being rapidly updated,
and their attack momentum based on training
experience is higher than in the RF AFs. In
particular, the structure of 38th Army includes the
fully mechanized 6th Armored Division, which
is outfitted with Type-96 tanks. The attack
momentum of the 38th Army comes to 1,000 km
a week (150 km a day). Finally, the structure of
this army includes the 4th Air Defense Brigade,
which is Chinas most up-to-date air defense (AD)
military formation [it includes, in particular, a
Russian Tor [Thor] surface-to-air missile system
(SAMS) battalion].

,

8- 127-
.

A second proving ground where new


methods for using GFs are worked out is the Jinan
reserve district, which includes the inveterate
8th Armored Division and 127th Light Motorized
Infantry Division, equipped with the latest
hardware.


(
)
,
. ,
,

.

25 . .
( , 10 . )

.

The remaining mobile formations of the


CPLAs GFs (the armored and mechanized
infantry divisions) are a part of the Nanking
Military District, which is oriented toward
occupying Taiwan. In particular, both
amphibious mechanized infantry divisions, a
single amphibious armored brigade, and a single
special-purpose amphibious brigade are deployed
here. The total strength of these formations
comes to 25,000 persons. Taking the navys
marine infantry into account (two brigades, or
10,000 persons) China has the second largest
contingent of marine infantry in the world, after
the US.
The weakest districts are those that house the
headquarters in Chengtu and Guangzhou, which
abut the borders with India and the countries of
Indochina. In particular, they do not have a single
armored or mechanized infantry division; i.e., the
Chinese command does not anticipate waging
any large-scale offensive actions in the southerly
direction. The forces in these districts basically
consist of motorized infantry (former infantry)
divisions, the most archaic type of formation
among the CPLAs GFs. In other districts, most


,
.
, ,
, ..

-
.

( ) ,
.

42

Chinas Military Preparations


.

,
. ,
,

,
.

divisions of this type are being transformed


into brigades. The transition from divisions to
brigades is quite actively occurring within the
CPLA, although this process cannot be seen as
absolute. As far as it is possible to judge, there are
no plans to transform armored and mechanized
infantry divisions, which represent the principal
GF strike force, into brigades.

()
4 . 99 -96, 100
() 223,
(WAC-021) (-100, WM-80, WS-1)
, 27 () -1.

Approximately 4,000 Type-99 and Type-96


tanks, 100 2C23 self-propelled guns (SPGs), and a
few hundred Chinese-produced SPGs (WAC-021)
and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs) (A100, WM-80, and WS-1), as well as 27 Thor-M1
surface-to-air missile systems (SAMSs), can
presently be included in the weapons and military
hardware (W&MH) arsenal of the CPLAs GFs.


2,53 . -96 600-800
-99 (
1,5 . -96
200 -99 20052006 .).

200
( 400500), ,
,
( ,
).

On the whole, the makeup of the ground forces


includes 2,500-3,000 Type-96 tanks and 600800 Type-99 tanks (the figures found in certain
sources 1,500 Type-96 tanks and 200 Type-99
tanks are for the years 2005-2006). Here, both
these types of tanks continue to be produced at an
overall rate of not less than 200 a year (probably
400-500), which is more than in all the other
countries of the world combined (tanks are not
presently being manufactured at comparable
rates either in the West or in Russia).


, , ,
. ,


6-
, .
,
-
.
,
,

( 1,5 . )

The development of a fundamentally new tank


is also under way in China, which will apparently
have a two-person crew and an unmanned turret.
It is anticipated that, in addition to the basic
weapons, this tank may be armed with two rapidfire 6-barrel guns for air target kills, including
antitank guided missile (ATGM) systems. The
tank will also possibly carry a small robotic vehicle
onboard for performing reconnaissance. Ground
forces are quite actively engaging in combat
training, some aspects of which cannot help but
be disquieting, since it includes deep offensive
operations (up to 1,500 km) that involve the use of
considerable troop deployment patterns. It is clear
that there are no physiogeographic expanses for
these operations in the south, east, and west of

43

Chapter IV

. , ,
.

the country.


,
, .
, ()
ZBD-05,
( 250
)
( , ZTD-05 .).

WZ502G,
,
.
, ,
30
1000 ,
14,5
200 . , 30
-2 (
25- ),
14,5

),

12,7 .

Recently, hardware appeared in the arsenal


of the CPLA that has no obvious analogs either
in Russia or in the West. For example, the ZBD05 armored personnel carrier (APC), which was
specially created for the marine infantry (not less
than 250 vehicles in various versions have been
procured) and has become the basis for a whole
family of vehicles (a command staff vehicle, the
ZTD-05 SPG, etc.). As an extension of these
vehicles, the WZ502G APC was created, which
does not have amphibious capabilities, but does
have significantly reinforced armor plating. In
Chinese sources, it is claimed that the turret, as
well as the front of the body, will withstand the
impact of a 30-millimeter (mm) armor-piercing
shell from a distance of 1,000 meters (m), while
the sides of the body will withstand the impact
of a 14.5-mm round from 200 m. It is necessary
to emphasize that 30 mm is the caliber of the
Russian BMP-2 gun (the American Bradley APC
has a 25-millimeter gun) and that 14.5 mm is
exclusively the caliber of Russian machine guns
(they are installed on all armored personnel
carriers), while the caliber of American and
Western machine guns in general does not exceed
12.7 mm.
Traditionally, the strongest aspect of the CPLAs
ground forces has been the rocket artillery. During
the 1970s and 1980s, China was as independent
as possible from the USSR in this area. A number
of prototype multiple-launch rocket systems
(MLRSs) were created within the country, both
Soviet-based and fully proprietary. In particular,
it is logical that the most powerful and longestrange MLRS in the world, the WS-2 (6 x 400
mm), was created in China, the first versions
of which had a firing range of 200 km, while a
later version (the WS-2D) had a firing range of
350-400 km. Neither American MLRSs and highmobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARSs) nor
the Russian Smerch [Tornado] came even close to
the WS-2 as far as performance characteristics
(PCHs).



. 7080-

.

(), ,
. ,

WS-2 (6400 ),

200 , (WS-2D) 350
400 . MRLS HIMARS,

-
() WS-2.

44

Chinas Military Preparations

,
,
.

,
.
,
.

,
. ,
.
, WS2. ,
()
,
.


.

In general, using an MLRS on ground site


targets is much more advantageous than using
aircraft on them. After all, there is no risk of
loss of an extremely expensive aircraft and its
crew in this instance, in addition to which no
quite costly fuel is expended. Only munitions are
expended, and they are cheaper for an MLRS than
for an aircraft. The considerable number of shells
that are released in a single volley offsets the low
firing accuracy of an MLRS. In addition, MLRS
shells have recently become correctable. This is
true of WS-2 shells in particular. Moreover, every
rocket launcher (RL) of this MLRS will have a
personal surveillance drone, which will even
further increase its firing accuracy. MLRSs are
also considerably superior to tactical missiles as
far as combat power at a much lower shell cost as
compared to missiles.

.
, ,
. WS2D
,
.
(
!)


--.

The main shortcoming of the MLRS as


compared to aircraft and tank-launched rockets was
previously considered to be an insufficient firing
range. Recently, however, the Chinese overcame
this deficiency. From the depths of Manchuria,
the WS-2D is capable of instantly covering all
units of the RF AFs in the Vladivostok-Ussuriisk,
Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk-Belogorsk
regions. And from Manchurias frontier areas (but
nevertheless inside Chinese territory!), this MLRS
can strike Russian troops and air bases in the
Chita region, as well as the strategic enterprises
of Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

WS-2D
,

5 .
.
,

,
(

).

The WS-2Ds small shells have hypersonic


speed and their flying time, even at maximum
range, does not exceed 5 minutes. Russian AD
not only wont be able to intercept them it will
not even be able to detect them. Furthermore, it
will be virtually impossible to detect the MLRSs
deployment within Chinese territory, since its
RLs resemble conventional trucks (the guides
have a box shape that is extremely amenable to
disguising them as a truck body).

45

Chapter IV

, ,
,
,
5 .,
2 . ( ,
)
. ,
WS-2, .

American Tomahawk sea-launched cruise


missiles (SLCMs), of course, have a long flying
range, but they have subsonic speed; therefore,
their flying time at maximum range is not 5
minutes, but rather 2 hours. Besides, their RLs
(on cruisers and destroyers at least) are such
that it is impossible to disguise them. None of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
countries have anything with PCHs even remotely
comparable to those of the WS-2.

. 90-
.
.

- 27/J-11 (-27, , J-11,
, J-11,
)
300 . ,
, 500. J-11
J-8, -27.
J-10, 220,
, J-7,
1000.
(
,
300,
, ,

.)

Fighter aviation. Since the early 1990s,


Chinas fighter aviation has been reequipped with
the newest aircraft. The number of heavy fighters
from the Su-27/J-11 family (the Su-27s were
bought in Russia, the J-11As were manufactured
under a license, and the J-11Bs are now being
produced without a license) in the CPLAs AF and
naval aviation has already exceeded 300 units, and
it will be brought up to a minimum of 500. Here,
the J-11Bs will replace not only all J-8s, but also
the Su-27s. The J-10 lightweight fighters, which
now number more than 220, will more than likely
fully replace the J-7s, in which case there will be
more than 1,000 of them in the CPLA AF alone
(although it continues to be said in Russian and
Western sources that only 300 of these aircraft
will be produced, it is absolutely unclear where
this figure came from, as well as when and to
whom the Chinese General Staff divulged its
plans).
The average flight time of pilots on modern
fighters comes to 200 hours a year, almost as
much as in the US and 4-5 times more than in
Russia. In the CPLA AF (like the USAF) there is
a squadron the aggressor, which is made up
of the best-trained pilots in Su-27 fighters. They
simulate the actions of the RF and Taiwan AFs; i.e.,
presumably Chinas principal likely opponents.
Pilots of other CPLA AF units participate in
training dogfights with the aggressors, thereby
improving their skills and learning the tactics of
future enemies.


200 ,
, 45
, . (
) ,

-27.
, ..

.

,
.

Chinas greatest problems continue to be in


the area of strike aircraft. The modernization of

46

Chinas Military Preparations

-6 (-6)
-
.
Q-5,

. ,


- ,
(WJ-600, -3,
.). ,

JH-7. ( 200 .,
,
,
, 300400 .) , ,
, 100
-30 (76 ,
24 )
J-16, , ,
.

the H-6 (the X-6) as an ALCM carrier has done


little to change the situation due to this aircrafts
overall obsolescence. The Q-5 strike aircraft is
also extremely outdated, and developing countries
could only manage to upgrade it with Western
avionics. However, the shortage of strike aircraft
is partially offset by the existence of a considerable
number tactical and short-range missiles, as well
as the appearance of strike drone aircraft (DA) (the
WJ-600, the CH-3, the Ilong [Pterodactyl], etc.).
In addition, the JH-7 bomber is on its way into
AF and naval aviation arsenals (approximately
200 units are now available, fairly evenly split
between the AF and naval aviation, they continue
to be produced, and may presumably reach 300400 aircraft). Apparently, 100 imported Russian
Su-30s (76 in the AF and 24 in naval aviation),
as well as their unlicensed J-16 knockoffs, the
production of which will obviously begin in the
near future, will be primarily aimed at solving
strike problems.

2010 .

, .. WJ- 600, -3,
, . ,
,
,
.

At the air show in Zhuhaiin in the fall of


2010, China unveiled a significant number of
DAs, including the combat WJ-600, CH-3, Ilong,
and Antszyan. It is not ruled out that China
has outflanked even the US in this area, and a
comparison with Russia is simply impossible,
since the latter lags so far behind.


-300.
, , -300
( ) - 3001, 150
555,
. -300-2,
15 16
(4 ). ,
(900 486) .


Q-9 ( -300) HQ-16 (
).

The CPLAs ground AD made the transition


to a new level of quality with the acquisition of
the S-300 SAMS from Russia. Here, however, the
two S-300PMU battalions and eight S-300PMU-1
battalions (two regiments), for which only 150
5V55R surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were
purchased, have quite limited capabilities. They
are much higher with the S-300PMU-2, of which
China has 15 or 16 battalions (4 regiments).
However, the munitions allowance for them
(900 48N6 SAMs) is rather small. Therefore, the
Chinese-produced HQ-16 (created on the basis of
the Buk [Beech] SAMS) will determine the real
capabilities of the CPLAs AD.

Naval forces. During the past two decades,

47

Chapter IV


: ,
-, , -
(
)
,
, ,
- .

Chinas navy has been expanded at an accelerated


pace. The countrys leaders are setting very
important objectives for the fleet: first, to be
able to ensure the occupation of Taiwan; second
the uninterrupted delivery of raw materials
(primarily oil) from Africa and the Persian Gulf,
as well as the protection of oil production on the
shelves of the seas adjacent to China, and; third
the protection of its coast.

,
,


.



,
. 80%
,
,
, ..
. ,

.

It is clear that even the US navy will not


storm ashore on the PRCs coast, since it would
undoubtedly be doomed to utter annihilation in
skirmishes against the CPLAs infinitely larger
ground forces. The ability of the US navy and
AF to launch strikes on Chinas new economy
facilities, which were built during the reform
years, using precision weapons are much more
serious causes for concern to the PRCs leadership.
More than 80% of the modern enterprises that
represent the Chinese economic miracle are
located in the coastal zone; i.e., they are extremely
vulnerable to attack from the sea. Accordingly, the
PRCs navy must extend its line of defense as far
as possible out into the ocean.


, ,
.


(
),
(
),

.

In order to facilitate the efficient achievement


of these objectives, the PRCs navy is obligated,
according to the plans of the countrys military
and political leaders, to go through three stages
of development. During stage one, the Chinese
fleet must ensure favorable operating conditions
within the confines of the first island chain
(from Japans Rjukju Islands to the Philippines),
during stage two within the confines of the
second island chain (from the Kurils through
the Mariana Islands to New Guinea), and during
stage three it must operate freely at any point on
the world ocean.
Regarding the navy, the 12 Russian project
636 and 877 diesel-electric submarines (SMs), 23
Chinese-produced project 039 and 041 SMs (the
latter are close in design to both the French Agosta
SM and the newest Russian project 677 SM), 13
destroyers (various versions of projects 956, 052,

12 636 877
23 039 041
(
,

48

Chinas Military Preparations

677), 13
( 956, 052 051
), 10 054.

and 051), and more than 10 project 054 frigates


can be considered the most modern vessels.


( 70)
.
.
093
091, 041 (039/)
033 035
. 041

. ,
,
. 25
039G, 877 636, ,
.

China is in first place around the world as far


as the total number of diesel SMs and generalpurpose nuclear submarines (GPNSs). Here, this
number is being maintained at a stable level. New
project 093 GPNSs are replacing and augmenting
project 091 GPNSs, while project 041 (039A/B)
SMs are gradually replacing the earlier series of
project 033 and 035 GPNSs. In this instance, the
project 041 SMs have advanced air-independent
propulsion. More than likely, a large series of them
will be built, during which they will continuously
be improved. At the same time, the 25 project
039G, 877, and 636 SMs will apparently remain
in service for some time to come.




-
. ,

,

.

Today, Chinas submarine fleet is already able


to ensure a naval blockade of Taiwan, as well as
to create big problems for the US and Japanese
navies in the northwest part of the Pacific
Ocean. In the long run, as the number of GPNSs
increases and bases are established abroad, the
CPLAs submarine fleet will become a geopolitical
factor in the Pacific and Indian Oceans on a scale
never before seen.


956
,
052
.
(
-300)
,
.

Four project 956 destroyers acquired in Russia


are intended for fighting surface targets, while
two Chinese-produced project 052C destroyers
will solve the problem of ship formation AD.
To this end, they are equipped with Russian Rif
[Reef] SAMSs (the naval version of the S-300) and
a general-purpose combat system similar to the
American Aegis system.

052



.

,
,
-803 (

Project 052C destroyers can be cited as


the clearest example of the Chinese policy of
synthesizing foreign technologies. These ships
are outfitted with Ukrainian-produced Zarya
[Dawn] gas-turbine engines, and in addition
to the Russian Reef SAMS, they are armed
with Chinese C-803 antiship missiles (ASMs)
(which themselves are a synthesis French Exocet

49

Chapter IV


),
100-

(),
68 - , 7-
30- ,
,

Yu-7,

-46, Z-9,
SA-365.
, ,
,
.
( 10
.),

Q-9 ( HQ-9).

[Flying Fish] ASM and the Israeli Gabriel ASM),


a 100-millimeter gun mount (GM) copied from
the M68 GM of the French firm Creusot Loire,
a 7-barrel 30-millimeter automatic antiaircraft
gun copied from the Dutch Goalkeeper, Yu-7
antisubmarine torpedoes copied from the
American Mk-46 torpedo, and a Z-9 helicopter
that is a copy of the French SA-365. With the
exception of the helicopter, all the other pieces of
weaponry copied from foreign analogs are being
produced in China without licenses. In particular,
a large series of these destroyers will be built (not
less than 10 units), during which the proprietary
HHG-9 (the naval version of the HQ-9) will be
installed on the newer versions instead of Russian
SAMSs.

,



(Austal) 6080
022.

As concerns the mosquito fleet, then instead


of numerous old missile and torpedo boats, 6080 project 022 missile boats, the most powerful
in the world, will be built in China based on the
high-speed catamarans of the Australian firm
Austal.

-
- () 071.

20 . . 800
50 . ,



.

. 2011 .
, .


28 . .
(
840
. .), ,

Recently, the first project 071 amphibious


transport dock (ATD) was put into service in
Chinas navy. Today, this is the largest ship in
the Chinese fleet, with a displacement of 20,000
t. It carries up to 800 marines and 50 armored
vehicles, which can be redeployed from ship to
shore using the four air-cushion landing craft
and four helicopters that are present onboard the
ATD. The ATD has already visited the Somali
coast for the purpose of fighting pirates. In late
2011, a second such ATD went into the navys
arsenal and two more are being built. The design
of aircraft carriers that employ the technologies
of the Varyag [Varangian] aircraft carrier, partially
built for the USSR navy and procured in the
Ukraine for a total of 28 million dollars, is actively
under way (the full engineering specifications
for it were purchased from the Neva Design
Bureau (DB) in St. Petersburg for the purely
symbolical sum of 840,000 dollars), together
with the technologies of the Melbourne aircraft

50

Chinas Military Preparations

. , ,

,
(,
)
.
J-15 -10
( -33),
.

carrier, which the Australian navy withdrew


from service and which was acquired at the scrap
metal price. Moreover, the Varyag, which was
officially purchased for conversion into a floating
entertainment center, has been fitted out as an
aircraft carrier (possible for training purposes)
and will be put into service in the PRCs navy in
the near future. The J-15 carrier-based fighter will
be created for it using the T-10K (a prototype of the
Su-33), also acquired in the Ukraine, as a model.


,
. ,

,

,
,


. ,
.

The Varyag cannot be a prototype for the


construction of new aircraft carriers, and will
almost certainly remain a single copy for training
and experimental purposes. China will have to
create full-featured aircraft carriers on its own,
albeit using foreign experience. But the very fact
that China is completing the construction of a
ship that is not a full-featured aircraft carrier and
cannot serve as a prototype for new vessels, as
well as that it intends to put this ship into service,
unequivocally suggests that China assigns
exceptionally great importance to the development
of its navy and that it is making preparations to
build a fleet of aircraft carriers. Otherwise, it
would not need a training aircraft carrier.

,
(
)
,

- ( -),
-
, , .
,
20
052 - .
,
052,
HN-2 (
,
, )
HQ-9 (, -300).

Consequently, the construction of genuine


aircraft carriers will necessarily begin in the
PRC in the near future (with allowance for
the experience acquired in completing the
construction of the Varyag and putting it into
service), during which China will certainly build
not less than three to four (possibly five to six) of
them, since building one or two aircraft carriers
for a country like China makes no sense. This
inherently implies the necessity of building not
less than 20 more destroyers of the project 052
type, or any new project. As previously stated,
the project 052C destroyer has been selected as
a basis, the weaponry of which includes HN-2
SLCMs (this is considered to be an analog of
the Tomahawk systems obtained from Sudan,
Serbia, and Pakistan) and HHQ-9 SAMSs (Fort
and S-300F). Since the construction of ships of this

51

Chapter IV

(
,
), ,
,
.
054,
, ,
.



,
.


.
,
,
.

type was resumed after a brief interruption [using


not the Russian SAMSs, but rather proprietary
versions, as well as a new radar system (RS)], they
will also probably become the principal surface
vessels of the Chinese navy, apart from aviationcapable ships. Among frigates, a choice has been
made in favor of the project 054A, a large series of
which is already being built and will probably be
improved over the course of construction.
The existence of aircraft carriers and large
landing vessels will give the PRCs navy
fundamentally new capabilities, first, in the
struggle for Taiwan, then for operations on the
world ocean. The absorption of Taiwan would lead
to a dramatic increase in Chinas might, as well as
the establishment of control over sea lanes in the
western part of the Pacific Ocean and in Southeast
Asia. In this instance, China would break through
the island barrier that stretches along its coast
and its navy would get maneuvering room on the
ocean.

,
,

,

. ,


,
, .

To all appearances, the PRC is already making


preparations for this breakthrough, since the
share of ocean-going vessels in its fleet is rapidly
rising due to a decrease in the number of ships
and boats intended for operations near its coast.
In fact, the appearance of just one aircraft carrier
will make it possible for the CPLAs navy to
provide itself with favorable operating conditions
within the confines of the second island chain,
including Sakhalin, the Kurils, and Kamchatka.

, -

,

(

, ,
,
. ,
15% (
, ..
).

Apparently, the efforts of the PRCs military


and political leaders in coming years will be
aimed at ensuring that a fairly small (by Chinese
standards), modern, high-tech army takes shape
within the CPLA that is capable of successfully
opposing the AFs of the US, the RF, Japan, and
India, not to mention any other country. It will
probably account for approximately 15% of the
CPLAs overall strength (here, reference is made to
its peacetime strength; i.e., before mobilization).

For this army, the newest American concepts

52

Chinas Military Preparations


.

,

, ..
.
, ,
,
. ,

. 2000 .
.
2007 .

. 1999 .
(
),
2 .

,
.

of military construction will be taken into


account to the greatest extent possible, in
particular the concept of netcentric warfare.
Since it will be difficult for China to implement
this concept within its AFs in the foreseeable
future, considerable attention will be given to
asymmetric warfare; i.e., acting on the nerve
centers of an enemy army. Here, reference
is made to electronic and fire damage to an
opponents command posts (CPs), earth satellite
vehicles (ESVs), and communication centers,
as well as to disinformation and camouflage
measures. In particular, hacker subunits are
already being created for this purpose in China
at the present time. In 2000, network forces
became a separate combat arm of the CPLA. And
in early 2007, antisatellite weapons tests were
successfully conducted in the PRC. The book
Unrestricted Warfare was published in China
in 1999 (the authors are two CPLA officers),
which takes a look at the strategy of asymmetric
warfare2. Its essence consists of the phrase the
main rule of unrestricted warfare is the absence
of rules full freedom of action.

, , ,

(
),

.
:
,
;
,
;

;

.

In addition, China, like the US, is actively


developing Special Forces (hand-to-hand
subunits), which solve four types of problems.
They can be used in the capacity of: door
openers for inflicting blows on vital targets
and punching holes in an opponents positions;
scalpels for inflicting blows on targets that
paralyze an opponents combat potential; steel
hammers for capturing vital enemy positions,
and; starting motors for accelerating the
pace of a campaign and opening up new areas of
combat operations.



. , ,
,

Chinas use of cyberwarfare will be an integral


part of realizing a given plan. In this vein, the acts
of aggression that the PRC commits against its
neighbors can be heralded as self-defense aimed

2: . : ( .
. . .). ., ,
2006.

2 See: C. Menges. China: A Growing Threat (Translated from


the English by A. G. Bulychev). Nezavisimaya Gazeta
[Independent Newspaper], Moscow, 2006.

53

Chapter IV

(,
1979 .
).

at correcting historical errors (for example, the


Chinese refer to the 1979 attack on Vietnam as a
defensive counterstroke).

,
,
,

.
,
.

Conceptual support for military policies.


In China, based on the dramatically decreasing
likelihood of a world war, the concept of local
wars has been created; here, China does not rule
out its own initiative in the development of local
military conflicts. The smallest number of troops
that makes it possible to throw an opponent off
balance will participate in a local war.


, .
,
,
.


,


.

At the same time, the concept of a peoples


war that Mao Tse-Tung created has also not
been vacated. This means that every Chinese is
considered to be a member of the armed forces and
that the country is regarded as a single military
camp. During the Mao era, the essence of this
concept consisted of luring a technologically
stronger opponent deep into China, where a largescale partisan war would unfold against it with the
support of Chinas enormous human resources.

,

. ,

,



.

As far as it is possible to judge from works


of Chinese military specialists, this concept has
been updated and now envisions grinding down
an opponent to the greatest extent possible in
border fights and making a rapid transition to a
strategic offensive, or even limited aggression,
which is defined as a defensive strike for
purposes of self-defense. Thus, it substantively
overlaps the concept of active defense, which
means active strategic defense at boundaries that
have been prepared in advance for the purpose of
changing the parity of forces in ones own favor
and subsequently making the transition to a
counterattack.

,

, ,

These two concepts, together with the


concepts of national security, a limited nuclear
counterstrike for purposes of self-defense, rapid
reaction, a triune system of armed forces, local

54

Chinas Military Preparations

,
,

, , ,
-,
.
(,
, ):
;
;
;
( ,
-
); ,
.

,
,

.

wars, and strategic borders and vital space,


comprise the apparently real military doctrine of
China, unlike its formally official one. The new
tactical concepts within the framework of the
doctrine of active defense (which is, in point
of fact, offensive in nature) are: victory using
elite forces; gaining the initiative by means of
first strike; victory over the weak by virtue of
superiority; deep strikes (exclusively deep
operations, including rocket artillery strikes and
landings), and; rapid combat in order to achieve
a quick outcome. The term active defense can
be interpreted as readiness to wage offensive
operations, since China itself determines what
nation is treating it hostilely and what comprises
this hostility.



, , ,

3 .

.
,




.
,

,

.

Special attention should be given to the concept


of strategic borders and vital space, which
apparently has no analogs among the military
concepts of other countries3 . Frankly, no other
country asserts a right to military aggression due
to a lack of resources and land area. This concept
is based on the point of view that a population
increase and a meagerness of resources gives
rise to natural needs for the expansion of space
in order to support the future economic activities
of a nation, as well as to increase its natural
sphere of existence. It is assumed that territorial
and spatial boundaries only mean the limits
within which a nation can effectively defend its
interests by means of real force. The strategic
boundaries of a vital space must be moved as the
comprehensive might of a nation increases. This
concept means transferring combat operations
from frontier areas to strategic border areas, or
even beyond their confines, so that the difficulties
encountered over the course of ensuring the legal
rights and interests of China in the Asian-Pacific

3 . . -
. //
. 2001, No 6. . 31-44

3 G. D. Agafonov. The Asian-Pacific Region and Russias


Naval Potential. Problemy Dalnego Vostoka [Far East
Problems], No. 6, 2011, pp. 31-44.

55

Chapter IV



,


. ,

,
,
.

Region (APR) may become reasons for military


conflicts. In China, it is felt that the boundaries
of the vital space of strong powers extend far past
their borders, and that the sphere of influence of a
weak country is smaller than its national territory.

.
,
, ,


4 . ,
,
.

SNFs are being developed pursuant to the


concept of a limited nuclear counterstrike for
purposes of self-defense. It has been officially
announced that China will not use nuclear
weapons first, but according to some data, this
alternative [does not] mean in the event of the
crushing defeat of the CPLAs conventional
forces4 . In addition, the limited nature of forces
implies an early and rapid strike in order to inflict
damage on an opponent.

, ,

.
,
10
(..
)
,

.
,
, ,


. ,
.

On the whole, it can be concluded that the


Chinese army is rapidly becoming a major factor
in the worlds strategic environment. It is quite
indicative that the fivefold increase in its military
spending over a 10-year period and the enormous
increase in its combat might in physical terms
(i.e., in weapons and hardware procurements) are
occurring under conditions of the artificial selfrestriction that the PRCs leaders are imposing on
the development of the CPLA. In Beijing, lessons
have been learned from the bitter experience of
the USSR, which hurt itself with the arms race
and came to the conclusion that it is first necessary
to achieve a high level of economic development,
then to build the armed forces on this basis. This
approach should apparently be recognized as
quite effective.
If the restrictions on the development of the
AFs are lifted, the CPLA will be quite capable
of making a huge leap; i.e., emerging at a
completely new level. Here, the situation might


,
, ..

4 .
: ,
. //
. 2009, No 6. . 14-25.

4 S. Ponamarev. PRC Policies in the Area of the


Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Far East
Problems, No. 6, 2009, pp. 14-25.

56

Chinas Military Preparations

.
,
,

be complicated when the army itself becomes a


factor in economic development that ensures the
success of outward expansion and pushes the
strategic boundaries of its vital space far beyond
present-day borders of the PRC.

57

Prospects for the PRC Acceding to


the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

A. G. Arbatov
Director of the International Security Center of the IMEMO of the RAS,
Academician of the RAS
..
,

.

.


: , .

Overall strategic context. Relations between


China and the US will determine security within
the APR in the foreseeable future. In the strategic
context, the interaction or opposition of three
powers will be crucial: the PRC, the US, and
Russia.




(
) . ,

,

,
.

Military strategic relations within the great


triangle have been tied into a Herculean knot
of intertwined common general interests and
differences of the parties in the spheres of
offensive and defensive strategic (as well as
nonstrategic) weapons. Here, contrary to popular
belief, relations between the PRC and Russia in
many instances are no closer than those between
the RF and the US or between China and the US.


,
,

In the foreseeable future, the United States


and Russia will have a common position that
contradicts the PRC line on the following

58

Chapter V

questions:


()
;

The refusal to accept unconditional


commitments concerning the non-use of
nuclear weapons (NWs) first;

,


,
;

The refusal to declare that the use of nuclear


weapons or the threat of their use will be never
directed against a nonnuclear nation or a
country, the territory of which is free of nuclear
weapons;

( , )
(
);

The intention (however proclaimed) to engage


in the joint development of ABM systems
(which the PRC has not been invited to do);

The desire for nuclear missile forces and


programs of the PRC to be more open;

The desire for the PRCs promptest possible


accession to disarmament;


()

;

The refusal to conclude a comprehensive


nuclear disarmament treaty (convention) early
and to declare nuclear weapons above the
law, and;

The refusal to cancel nuclear guarantees of


security for its allies.

On their parts, the United States and China are


united in counteracting Russia by the desire:

To transact a subsequent strategic offensive


arms (SOA) treaty with a considerable decrease
in the number of nuclear weapons;

()
() (
);

To limit the (nonstrategic) tactical nuclear


weapons (TNWs) of the US and the RF (nothing
has yet been said about China), and;

To limit the NWs of the US and the RF in


warehouse storage.

, , ,
, :

Finally, the RF and China, contrary to the US,


have agreed on the necessity of:

59

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

Limiting global and regional ABM systems;

Limiting precision long-range conventional


weapons;

Limiting space and fractional orbital strike


systems, and;

The unacceptability of NATOs proposal to


move Russias TNWs from the west to the east.

,
-
,
.

Neither the US nor the PRC considers Russia


to be a sound military and political ally similar to
those of the US under NATO or those of Russia
under the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO).
In this regard, Moscows periodic and
extremely ill-advised initiatives to secure a
strategic partnership or coalition relations1
one day with the West and another day with
China do not give it any additional weight or
respect in the eyes of Washington, Beijing, Tokyo,
and the European capitals. This is especially true
in that the RF in practice does not do much in its
economy, domestic policies, foreign policies, and
military policies to be a desirable partner for other
leading centers of power in any area other than
raw material exports.




116
,
, ,
.
,
,
, ,

- ,
- .


,
-
,

.

, ,
. ,

In addition, one of the main priorities of the


foreign policies and security strategy of both the
US and the PRC is not to permit Russia to enter
into a military and political alliance with China
or the United States, respectively, even though
nothing in this vein has been said at the official
level. Russia could use this situation to great
benefit for itself, but this would require different
economic, foreign, and military policies. The
question of what policies in particular far exceeds
the bounds of the topic under consideration here.

1,
,
20102011 .,
.

1 For example, reference is made to the idea of Russias


updated coalitions with Western countries that was
put forth during 2010-2011, then happily forgotten.

60

Chapter V

.
.
,

.

Chinas strategic position. Despite their


apparent soundness and conciseness, the PRCs
position and policies in the nuclear strategy
sphere are quite contradictory.

,
,

, .

On the one hand, China is unique among


great powers in that it has a commitment at the
official level not to use NWs first, without any
reservations.

20102




,
...


3 .

The Chinese white paper entitled Chinas


National Defense in 20102 contains an appeal to
all nuclear nations to reject policies of nuclear
restraint based on the use of nuclear weapons
first, as well as to make an absolute commitment
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against a nonnuclear nation or an area that is free
of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.
Nuclear nations must conduct negotiations and
conclude a treaty not to use nuclear weapons first
against one another3 .


- ,

(
).
,

,
4.

The PRCs approach to strategic stability differs


from the Russian-American one in that it is not
based on proximate nuclear missile parity and
the concept of guaranteed mutual obliteration
(a retaliatory strike). As concerns the size of the
nuclear forces that China needs, it is said that they
will be maintained at the minimum level that
national security demands4 .

At the same time, China is the only one of the


five great powers that are permanent members of
the UN Security Council and the five recognized

2Chinas National Defense in 2010: II. National


Defense Policy // China.Org.Cn (http://www.china.
org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011- 03/31/
content_22263420.htm).
3Ibid.
4Ibid.

2 Chinas National Defense in 2010: II. National Defense


Policy. China.Org.Cn(http://www.china.org.cn/
government/whitepaper/2011-03/31/ content_22263420.
htm).
3Ibid.
4Ibid.

61

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons



(),

.

nuclear powers of the Nuclear Nonproliferation


Treaty (NPT) that does not provide any official
factual information about its nuclear forces and
the programs for their development.

, ,
,

.
,

,
,



.

In the past, when the Chinese GDP, military


budget, and nuclear forces were rather modest,
the other powers took this in stride. But the
past decade of the PRCs economic growth, its
emergence in second place in the world after
the US as far as the size of its military budget,
its major programs for the modernization of its
nuclear forces, conventional forces, and arms,
its impressive military parades in Tienanmen
Square, and its increasingly ambitious foreign
and military policies have changed this attitude.

,
,

. ,

,
,


.

Now, no position concerning a purely defensive


nuclear doctrine, the refusal of first strike, or the
maintenance of minimum necessary nuclear
forces will be taken on trust. Moreover, without
official information on Chinas nuclear forces
and the programs for their development, even the
most general in nature, any such declarations will
have a directly opposite effect as an indicator
of the desire to hide the truth and to put other
nations off guard.

,
,

,
.


( )
,
. ,


, :
. ,
,
.

Today, Chinas thousand-year-old traditions are


seemingly being revived in many areas within
the Celestial Empire and may take on greater
importance than the sacramental positions of the
semiofficial newspaper of the CCP. In this regard,
it is useful to recall the ideas that the greatest
Chinese military theoretician (the first strategist
in world history), Sun Tzu, put forth in his treatise
The Art of War. Twenty-five hundred years ago,
when people in present-day Russia and all the
NATO countries dressed in animal skins and
carried clubs, he wrote: All warfare is based on
deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must
seem unable; when using our forces, we must
seem inactive; when we are near, we must make

62

Chapter V

, .
, ,
...5 .

the enemy believe we are far away.5 .

-
, , ,
,
800900

(440
, 360 ,
, 45 6).

(80 . ). ,
40
10 .
3600 7,
,
, ,
.
, ,
.


- .

Without dwelling on the military and technical


details, we recall that, in the estimation of the most
authoritative Russian specialists, China has some
800-900 nuclear munitions that are intended
for operational deployment (440 nuclear aerial
bombs on aircraft of various types, 360 warheads
on ICBMs, MRBMs, and SRMs, and 45 warheads
on SLBMs6). All of them can be deployed within
striking range of Russia (80 units within striking
range of the US). It is possible that China has a
total of 40 t of weapons-grade uranium and 10 t of
plutonium. This is enough to make 3,600 nuclear
warheads7, although a considerable part of the
weapons-grade materials, like the warheads, is
probably housed in storage facilities as reserve
stock. Thus, more than likely, China is the third
nuclear power after the US and the RF. In this
event, the economic and technical potential of the
PRC will permit it to achieve a rapid increase in its
nuclear missile weapons.



,


.

,
5000 8 .
,

,
(

The PRC is also making efforts to increase


the survivability and efficiency of its groundbased and space-based early warning systems
(EWSs), as well as its tactical control systems,
and is implementing R&D programs in the area
of ABMs and anti-satellite weapons. Information
periodically surfaces concerning the enormous
tunnels built and under construction in China,
the overall expanse of which is estimated to
be roughly 5,000 km8 . It is interesting that
Second Artillery personnel are performing
5 See: Sun Tzu translated and annotated by Lionel Giles
(2005). The Art of War by Sun Tzu. Special Edition.
Norte Press, El Paso. R. D. Sawyer. The Art of War.
Westview Press, 1994.

5.: Sun Tzu translated and annotated by Lionel Giles


(2005). The Art of War by Sun Tzu Special Edition.
El Paso Norte Press. /Sawyer, R.D. The Art of War.
Westview Press. 1994.
6 ... // . 2012. No 17. .5.
7 .
8Stephens B. Plumbing the Secret Underground Great
Wall // The Wall Street Journal. October 24. 2011.

6 V. I. Yesin. Third After the US and Russia. VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer [Military-Industrial Courier], No.
17, 2012, p. 5.
7Ibid.
8 B. Stephens. Plumbing the Secret Underground Great Wall.
The Wall Street Journal. October 24, 2011.

63

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

). ,

,
-
, .


- , 9 .

this construction, since armed forces of this type


are responsible for ground-based strategic forces
[such as Russias Strategic Rocket Forces (SRFs)].
More than likely, these tunnels may be intended
for the concealed storage of reserve mobile missile
launchers, strategic and short-range missiles,
and nuclear munitions. According to various
estimates, thousands of nuclear munitions and
hundreds of ground-based reserve mobile ICBMs,
medium-range missiles (MRMs), and SRMs could
be housed there9 .

, ,

Proceeding on this basis, it can be assumed


that the true reasons behind the total secrecy of
information concerning Chinas nuclear forces
are not weakness or small numbers, but
rather the superabundance of the PRCs nuclear
potential.


,
,

,
- .
(
,



70- .)

In laying the groundwork for its nuclear


policies, China is not repeating the experience of
the US and the USSR, which deployed large series
of each new type and version of their weapons
systems, flaunting it in every possible way for
the political propaganda effect (it is sufficient to
recall Nikita Khrushchevs bluff that the USSR
made missiles like sausages, or the declarations
of American leaders concerning the potential
for massive retaliation and the indisputable
nuclear superiority of the US all the way up to
the early 1970s).

,
,




,
,
. ,
-31
-41, -25
-2. , ,
,
,

China, on the other hand, practices sequential


experimentation with new types and versions of
its weapons systems, either without making the
transition to deployment or with the deployment
of compact series, apparently trying to get
optimum NW systems with minimal outlays.
The Dongfeng-31A and Dongfeng-41 ICBMs,
the Dongfeng-25 MRBM, and the Tszyuylan-2
SLBM will possibly follow this same path. In
this instance, it is quite likely that China, while
officially playing down its nuclear potential,
will begin to deploy the first three systems in
plain sight on limited scales, but a much larger

9Ibid.

9Ibid.

64

Chapter V

,

.

increase in its missile forces will take place in the


tunnel structures of the Second Artillery.


.

, ,
,

. ,
,
( ),
() . ,
,
()
, ,

(),
,


.

.

Everything is also far from clear as far as


Chinas absolute commitment not to use NWs
first. As compared to the publicly declared nuclear
doctrines of the US, Russia, Great Britain, and
France, almost nothing is known about Chinas
real strategic concepts. This general feeling is
that a nuclear power that has rejected first strike
(the use of NWs) is relying on the concept and
power of a retaliatory (second) strike. However,
according to generally accepted estimates, as long
as Chinas strategic nuclear forces (SNFs) are in
the shape that they are perceived to be in abroad,
like its early warning systems (EWSs), they are too
vulnerable and insufficiently effective to ensure
the possibility of retaliatory operations following
a hypothetical disarming nuclear attack by the US
or Russia. Moreover, Chinas SNFs do not have the
ability to mount a retaliatory counterstrike based
on EWS information concerning an instance of a
missile attack.




(
1982 .),

. ,
,
,
. , ,



- ,

,
.

,

Therefore, many foreign specialists primarily


interpret the official doctrine of the PRC
as a propaganda tool (like the 1982 Soviet
commitment not to use NWs first) and as not
reflecting real operational planning of the SNFs.
Perhaps a preemptive strike is in fact planned in
a situation when the countrys leaders decide that
war is inevitable. However, it is also not ruled out
that a retaliatory strike is the working concept
of operational planning if a large nuclear
missile force reserve that a probable opponent
knows nothing about and that has a high level
survivability, but cannot be immediately used,
is stored in the underground tunnels. For the
purpose of reinforcing the deterrent effect in a
time of crisis, part of this reserve might be revealed
to the world in order to destroy an enemys plans.

65

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

.
,
.

, (,
. ..)
; ;
;

10 .
,
-

, ,
,

By the way, this alternative is entirely in


keeping with the traditions of the Chinese school
of strategic thought. As Sun Tzu wrote in his
timeless treatise, the pinnacle of excellence
[the best scheme or scenario. Aleksey Arbatov
(A. A)] of war is to destroy an enemys plans;
then to destroy its alliances; then to attack its
army; and finally to attack its fortified cities10 .
Traditionally, American and Soviet nuclear
strategies, accenting the technical mathematical
modeling of an exchange of blows, placed
emphasis on the fourth and third tasks as criteria
of potential deterrence. The Chinese school of
strategic thought probably goes its own way,
gives much more attention to the foreign policy
functions of military strategy, and assigns other
priorities to deterrence.


.



.
.


, , ,

.

() ( ..
) . (

11.)

This is especially important against the


background of the modernization of the PRCs
general-purpose forces. The growth of its nuclear
forces provides China with a thick strategic cloak
for the superiority of its general-purpose forces over
those of all its regional neighbors. This prospect
is extremely unsettling for India. It casts doubt
on the creditability of US security guarantees to
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, prodding them
toward a policy of pacifying Beijing. Another
possible outcome the amalgamation of forces
and/or military (including nuclear) independence
(information concerning an increase in these
attitudes recently caused a stir in Japan11).

,
-
- .

This is also raising concerns among the


Southeast Asia countries with which the PRC is
clashing in disputes over the South China Sea
shelf oil.

10.: Sun Tzu. Op. cit.


11ASIA NEWS, October 2011.

10 See: Sun Tzu. Op. cit.


11 ASIA NEWS, October 2011.

66

Chapter V

.



(, )
- ,



.

For Russia, given all the current plans for


a strategic partnership with the PRC, these
trends are fraught with disturbing consequences.
An increase in Chinas potential for a nuclear
strike in the European part of its territory would
mean blocking the RFs advantages in the area of
medium-range equipment (aircraft and SLCMs)
and that of the short-range class, which presently
offsets the superiority of the PRCs conventional
armed forces and weapons near Siberia and the
Russian Far East.

.

,

. ,

, ,



,

.

China and ABM systems. The likelihood


of an increase in the PRCs nuclear forces is
creating a substantial, albeit tacit stimulus for the
development of the ABM system of the US and
its allies in the Far East. Despite the fact that the
immediate reason is repelling the missiles of the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK),
Washington is in fact apparently trying to use
missile defense to complicate and fend off insofar
as possible the prospect of China acquiring the
potential for nuclear deterrence based on the
guaranteed possibility of a retaliatory strike
against the US, not to mention the achievement
of strategic parity by Beijing.

,
,
.
,
.

For obvious reasons, this is causing even


greater concern in China than the NATO ABMs in
Russia. It is being answered with the development
of PEN aids and anti-satellite weapons (ASWs), as
well as its own ABM system.

,

.

,
,
,
,
. ,

The RF-US/NATO negotiations concerning


cooperation in the development of ABMs in
Europe caused Beijing considerable alarm, since
they were perceived in the PRC as a military
rapprochement of two powers against China.
Russias proposal concerning the creation of a
common sectoral ABM system in which each
party would intercept missiles flying over its space
in the direction of another party left a number of
crucial questions unresolved. For example, would
Russia have to intercept Chinese missiles flying

67

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

,

?

over Russian territory toward the US or Western


Europe?


,
- .

- , , , . ,


,
.


- ,


.

By definition, a strategic ABM system is global


in nature, especially as concerns command
information systems. It is scarcely possible to
limit the ABM cooperation of powers to any
specific region, say, the Euro-Atlantic Region.
Here, if the US even theoretically left open the
possibility of ABM cooperation with Russia, then
nothing can be said about interaction with China
in this area. While for the RF, the creation of a
joint or interconnected ABM system with the US
is fraught with enormous difficulties for military
and political relations with the PRC, a forced
increase in its nuclear forces, and direct damage
to Russian security.

, ,

.
,
,
.

Therefore, China was a constant, albeit


invisible presence at the Moscow and Washington
ABM negotiations. Although this problem was
not openly discussed either in Brussels or at the
summits, it was surreptitiously one reason that
the negotiations failed.

The failure of the negotiations temporarily


alleviated Chinas preoccupation with it, but the
likelihood of their resumption continues to be an
important aspect of the PRCs strategic planning.


,
.

Strategic systems in a nonnuclear


modification. The United States is attempting
to weaken the dependence of their guarantees to
allies upon NWs by developing not only defensive,
but also offensive weapons in a conventional
modification.




():

This is causing enormous concern in China,


especially in terms of the development of
American long-range vehicles with precision
nonnuclear weapons (PNWs): sea-launched and
air-launched cruise missiles combined with space
surveillance (especially electronic), navigation,

68

Chapter V

( ),
.

and communication systems.

-



( -37
2010 .12
IV). , , ,

.
,

,
-
13 . , , ,




,
.

An even bigger concern surrounds the


prospective creation of fractional orbital rocketglider hypersonic systems with precision
conventional weapons within the framework
of the American concept of a global blitzkrieg
attack (experiments with X-37B space plane in
April of 201012 and Minotaur IV Light system
launches). It is interesting that, as in Russia,
China is projecting the threat of using such
systems exclusively on itself. In this instance,
virtually one conflict scenario is commonly and
seriously considered in China, which is a clash
of arms with the US over an attempt to resolve
the Taiwan problem by means of force13 . The
PRC probably believes that the aforementioned
offensive systems of the US might inflict massive
and multiple disarming blows on its precision
rocket vehicles in a nonnuclear modification that
are intended for striking the US fleet.



.

,
.


.
,
,

.

No less alarming to Beijing is the likelihood of


counterforce nonnuclear strikes on the countrys
nuclear forces. This possibility undermines the
official nuclear doctrine of China, which is based
on the absolute commitment not to use NWs
first. In principle, it does not anticipate nuclear
retaliation in response to an attack involving the
use of precision conventional weapons. In any
event, the US can rely on this indecisiveness on the
part of the PRC, having tremendous superiority in
both nonnuclear and nuclear strategic weapons.

,

,

This is perhaps the precise context in which


China views the maintenance of the large reserve
of missiles hidden in its tunnels, if the suspicions

12Saalman L. China and the US Nuclear Posture


Review. Carnegie - Tsinghua, 2011. P. 33.
13bid. PP. 22, 35.

12 L. Saalman. China and the US Nuclear Posture Review.


Carnegie Tsinghua, 2011, p. 33.
13 Ibid., pp. 22 and 35.

69

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

.





.

concerning their existence are justified. Another


thrust of countermeasures is the intensive
development of MRBMs and SRMs with precision
nonnuclear warheads for destroying aircraft
carrier formations and other valuable objectives
of an opponent in response to an attack involving
the use of nonnuclear strategic assets.

,

(
- ).




(GBI),

( /-3).

In addition, for the purpose of increasing


the survivability of its nuclear forces, China is
implementing a program for the development
of NPBMSs and SLBMs (three to four GPNSs
are under construction). Here, China is quite
concerned about the ability of the US to repel
SLBM strikes from the current Chinese missile
delivery vehicle combat alert areas in the coastal
seas using the ABM systems in Alaska and
California [ground-based interceptors (GBIs)],
as well as on US combat vessels, and at the land
bases and on the ships of Japan (the Aegis/SM-3
system).
The construction of the new Chinese NPBMSs
and their probable deployment on the high
seas will make it possible for China to bypass
the US ABM intercept sector within the APR
from the south, which may entail the expensive
reorganization of the US antimissile defense in
order to cover the southern azimuths.




,


.


.

,


. ,
.

For the purpose of cloaking the new strategic


and multipurpose GPNSs, China is implementing
a grandiose program for the development of the
navy. The yellow sea fleet must be transformed
into a blue water fleet on both the Pacific and
the Indian Oceans for the purpose of creating
and expanding an area of PRC naval dominance,
as well as gaining control of hydrocarbon supply
lines. This worries both India and Japan.




( ,
).

China is also placing emphasis on its systems


in a nonnuclear modification primarily MRBMs
with precision conventional warheads for striking
the US fleet (in particular, around Taiwan).

China and the limitation of nuclear arms.

70

Chapter V

,
,


1015 .




.
, ,
,
,
.

China is the only country, other than the US and


the RF, that has great economic and technical
potential for rapidly and repeatedly increasing
its SNFs over the next 10-15 years. Therefore, it is
already necessary to take Chinas nuclear forces
and the programs for their development into
account when discussing any subsequent RussianAmerican agreement on the reduction of strategic
weapons following the new Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START). The difference here
consists of Great Britain and France in that they
are allies of the US, their forces are being reduced,
they are sufficiently open and predictable, and
they do not have and do not foresee having the
potential for a rapid increase in NWs.

,
,

.
240300 ,

.
,

,

.

Here, transparency is of enormous importance,


since it would precisely define the real size,
characteristics, and potential of the increase in
Chinas nuclear forces. If they consist of 240300 warheads, it is then scarcely possible to pose
the question of their legally binding limitation
in the near future. A political commitment not
to substantially increase them under conditions
of further reductions in the SNFs of the US and
Russia would seem to be sufficient.

800900
,
,


,
.

However, if they number 800-900 warheads,


plus the assets in the tunnel structures, then
further reductions by the two other powers are
impossible without their limitation even if they
reach agreement on ABMs, TNWs, and strategic
systems in a conventional modification.

...,

...

,
, ,

.
,

Beijings official position consists of the


fact that countries possessing the largest
nuclear arsenals must also decisively reduce
their arsenals in the future in a verifiable,
irreversible, and legally binding way in order to
create conditions that favor the total elimination
of nuclear weapons. When the appropriate
conditions are in place, other nuclear nations will
then also enter into multilateral negotiations on

71

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

14 .

nuclear disarmament14 .

,

(, , )


.

As far as information disclosure, China


officially propounds the requirement that the US
(and, by default, Russia) rejects the concept of
using nuclear weapons first as a condition of the
greater transparency of Chinas nuclear forces.

,
,

.

,


.



.

At first glance, this appears to be well-founded,


but in fact, it is total nonsense, because Beijings
official information concerning the quantity
of its nuclear assets does nothing to mitigate
the targeting of a disarming strike by the US
or Russia. In planning of such operations, they
are obliged to rely on their own reconnaissance
data, all the more so in that Beijings official
information does not necessarily include the exact
coordinates of all its strategic objectives. However,
transparency with respect to Chinas forces and
programs would be very useful in Moscow and
Washington for the purpose of planning START
talks.

, ,

.

,
,
, .



.

In fact, the PRC probably considers


transparency to be a major bargaining chip.
Therefore, it will more than likely not be possible
to convince China to make the move to nuclear
transparency as a gesture of good will and a first
step toward, or a minimum contribution to, the
transition to multilateral disarmament. At best,
Beijing intends to hold a hard auction on this
matter and will attempt to sell each partial
fragment of transparency to its counterparts at
the highest possible price.


, ,

.

:
-

Prerequisites for the PRCs participation


in the limitation of weapons. Nevertheless, it
appears that China may gradually be drawn into
the process of the limitation of nuclear weapons.
But the path does not lie through noble wishes
to expand the number of process participants: it
will not be possible to school China in Russian-

14Chinas National Defense in 2010: X. Arms Control


and Disarmament ...

14 Chinas National Defense in 2010: X. Arms Control and


Disarmament...

72

Chapter V

,
.
: ,

-
( )
, .

American lessons, it will create its own path.


The PRCs involvement will only be possible on
a singularly pragmatic basis: if it feels that its
concessions as far as transparency and any limits
on weapons are repaid by concessions of the US
(and, by default, Russia) on matters of interest to
Beijing.

,
,
2009
. -1 , ,
(
,
,
..).

-
,
-

(, 1000 ).

First of all, Beijing considers the new START


to be an intermediate document that was hastily
endorsed to replace START-1, which expired in
2009, and in a way regards it as a desecration of the
reduction of SNFs (the minimum real reductions,
the specific counting rules, a reduction by means
of moving warheads to warehouses, etc.). In order
to seriously approach even a theoretical discussion
of any limitations on its nuclear weapons, China
will wait at least until the next Russian-American
START talks concerning the real reduction of the
SNFs of these two powers (for example, to 1,000
warheads).

As is generally known, the prospects for such


an agreement are now quite doubtful due to
disagreements on ABMs and nonstrategic nuclear
arms, as well as for political reasons.

,
( )


.

,
, ,
.

,



.

In addition, the PRC is insisting that the US


(and, by default, the RF) reject the concept of
using NWs first, as well as that they acknowledge
the status of mutual nuclear deterrence with
the PRC based on mutual vulnerability. For the
US, these steps are fraught with complications
in relations with its allies, which are dependent
upon security guarantees, including nuclear
ones, from Washington. And for Russia, they may
be perceived as a threat to its own security in the
west and in the east, especially when the PRCs
geostrategic advantages near Siberia and the
Russian Far East are taken into account, as well
as its increasing superiority in the area of generalpurpose forces.

Thus, Chinas accession to the nuclear


disarmament process is not only a matter of

73

Prospects for the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

,

.

changing Beijings position, but a matter of a


fundamental and painful change in the military
policies of the US and Russia.

,
,
. VI ,
.
,


.

,

, (
, ).

Furthermore, if Washington and Moscow


seriously want transparency or the limitation
of the PRCs nuclear forces, simple pleas, noble
wishes, and an appeal concerning Article VI
of the NPT will, as before, remain futile. The
two leading powers must soberly assess what
they are willing to sacrifice in terms of the
reduction and limitation of their own weapons
and modernization programs in exchange for
corresponding concessions on the part of China.
Otherwise, Beijing will not come around and
will continue to maintain its position of a neverending circle, demanding that the RF and the US
reduce their nuclear forces to levels that are closer
to Chinas (without disclosing, in the bargain,
what these levels are).
It appears that the real prerequisites for getting
China to agree to the gradual disclosure of its
strategic weapons and their limitation (even if this
is through a commitment not to further increase
their numbers) are as follows:



(
) :


( );


,


;

A US commitment not to increase its sealaunched and ground-launched ABM assets


within the Pacific Ocean (this is also dependent
upon Japan);
A US and Russian commitment that if
they reach an understanding concerning
cooperation on ABM development in certain
areas (for example, the exchange of EWS data),
China will be able to take part in them in a
format that is acceptable to it;
The transition of the US and the RF to
negotiations concerning the next START,
including the elimination of strategic delivery
vehicles and the limitation of nonnuclear
assets, and;



( ,
).

The advancement of the limitation of the


nonstrategic nuclear weapons of the US and
Russia (excluding their movement from
Europe to Asia, contrary to the NATO position).

, ,

(,
),
;

74

Chapter V

,



.
,

,
.

Here the first, second, and fourth items


would constitute an indirect acknowledgment
of relations of mutual vulnerability and mutual
nuclear deterrence with China on behalf of the
two leading powers. Both US commitments to
its allies and the security of Russias eastern
boundaries would have to be supported through
the use of general-purpose forces (GPFs), as well
as by political and economic means.

,



.

The likely format for negotiations would be a


bilateral dialog between the US and the PRC in
tandem with START talks between the US and
Russia, as well as regular strategic consultations
between Russia and China.


.
, ,
( ).


: ,
( 200-300 )
, .
,
,

.
,
,

.

A trilateral or quadrilateral format is


exceedingly difficult. But it is nonetheless possible,
as exemplified by cooperation in the ABM sphere
(the exchange of EWS data). Trilateral agreements
on the limitation of SNFs may also come to pass
further down the line: for example, by way of equal
total ceilings (of 200-300 missile launchers) for
the ICBMs, plus the MRBMs, of Russia, the US,
and the PRC. Here, this means that the mediumrange missiles of the US and the RF would be
eliminated, while the PRC would be afforded
the opportunity of removing its MRBMs and
putting ICBMs into service in their place. Russia,
much less the US, would scarcely welcome this
prospect, but it is necessary to take into account
the fact that without these agreements, the PRC
might do this anyway, or increase its ICBMs in
addition to its MRBMs.
To conclude, China would make an unexpected
and impressive step, if it suggested, in response to
the calls to engage in nuclear disarmament, that
it is ready to join the [new US-Russian START
Treaty of 2010]. Possible reaction of Moscow
and Washington to such a gambit would make a
subject of a separate analytical exercise, although
of a purely abstract nature, as apparently there is
presently no new Sun Tzu in China.

,
, , ,


-
.

, ,
.
, -,
.

75

Conclusions

1.

,
.


. - ,


. -,
,

,

,

,
.

1. In its foreign and defense policies, China adheres


to its own principles based on independence
and sufficiency. The logic of Chinas headlong
development in past years is requiring Beijing to
more actively participate in world economics and
politics. First, its explosive economic and financial
growth has resulted in a noticeable increase in
Chinas importance in world politics. Second,
the model of Chinas economic development
based on a rapid increase in consumption, as
well as imports of energy resources and other
raw materials, and the aggressive expansion of
industrial and agricultural exports is inevitably
forcing Beijing to become increasingly involved in
the various problems of regions that supply and
engage in the transit of raw materials, which are
of great importance to the Chinese economy.




, ..
,
.

The quite high pace of economic growth is


a necessary condition for social stability and
the preservation of the PRCs existing political
system; i.e., the perpetuation of the power and
well-being of the CCPs nomenclature, the
military establishment, and big business.

2.



2003 . .

2. For the purpose of justifying Chinas


increasing role in international affairs and
alleviating the uneasiness of other countries
in this regard, the ideologists of Chinese
policies proclaimed a doctrine of peaceful
development in 2003. This declared objective
was later transformed into the concept of

76

Conclusions

building a harmonious world. The essence of


this idea consists of pursuing independent and
autonomous foreign policies as a demonstration
of the PRCs intentions to play a constructive role
in the world and to realize its interests exclusively
by peaceful means.


, ,

.

,

,
.

There is evidence that Chinas leadership sees


major direct threats to its economic development,
which also means to the security of the PRC, in
the consequences of the ups and downs of the
world economy. China is extremely dependent
upon economic cooperation with the US and the
other developed countries of the West, which are
consumers of Chinese exports, as well as sources
of capital investments and high technologies.

3.
,
XXI .
.
,

,

.

3. At the same time, an idea is in vogue


amongst the Chinese public that China must
transform itself into the mightiest power in the
world during the 21st century. In this regard, it
is anticipated that a heated struggle with the US
for leadership on the regional and global scales
is forthcoming, and that America will try to do
everything possible to once again relegate the
PRC to the fringe of world development.


,
,
,
,
(
) .
, ,

A component part of these views that has been


openly expressed amongst Chinese politicians,
the military, and experts in recent times is the
notion that a clash of interests and rivalry (if not
a direct confrontation) between China and the
US is inevitable in the future. Proceeding on this
basis, it is being affirmed that China must achieve
strategically advantageous positions in the world
and strengthen its armed forces.

-
. ,

Although Beijing is rigorously proclaiming


the peacefulness of its foreign policies at the
official level, there are signs of the surreptitious
formulation of a different confrontational military
and political course for the country. It is entirely
possible either that the official peacefulness is

77

Conclusions

a screen for it or that serious disagreements


and conflicts are taking place within Chinese
ruling circles regarding Chinas future political
and military line in the international arena. The
duality of relations between the PRC and the
West is reflected in the existence of alternative
positions on Chinas foreign and military policies
within the Chinese ruling circles.

,

,
,




.
7080-
,


.

It is also impossible not to take into account


the specific nature of Chinas political system,
the ideological and personnel-oriented thrust of
the CCPs leadership role, the poor development
of civil society, all-encompassing military
secrecy, and the embryonic state of independent
strategic expertise and critical analysis. Under
these conditions, the countrys practical
military strategy and military construction are
characterized by considerable autonomism, and
are defined by the purely military aspirations
of the generals against the background of an
enormous increase in defense funding, as well
as the intensive assimilation of foreign and
proprietary technological innovations. A similar
situation took shape in the USSR during the 1970s
and 1980s, when the actually peaceful policies of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
were combined with the forced escalation of the
full range of offensive military might.

4.

- ,
, ,
,
, , .


,
.

4. The program for modernizing and


increasing its nuclear missile potential that China
is quite cautiously implementing, at least to the
extent that the outside world is aware of it, is first
of all apparently a status symbol. But this in no way
cancels out the programs aim of strengthening
the potential for nuclear deterrence with respect
to the US, India, and Russia. By virtue of the
traditions and the national specificity of Chinas
strategic thinking, this course can be followed
using methods that are quite unexpected for the
West and Russia.

78

Conclusions

,



.

In the context of relations with Taiwan, nuclear


deterrence has the purpose of preventing other
countries from intervening in the resolution of
this problem given any scenario of the progression
of events.

,
, (
,
). ,
-

,

. ,

.

China is gradually, but consistently increasing


the number and improving the characteristics of
its strategic missiles and medium-range missiles,
as well as its short-range missiles (the latter two
classes of systems are outfitted with both nuclear
and conventional warheads). The bulk of the
PRCs nuclear missile potential is possibly hidden
in underground tunnel structures, which has no
precedent in the world history of the arms race
during the second half of the last century. In
addition, China is experimenting with creating
its own ABM system and anti-satellite weapons.



, , ,
,

, (
)

,
.


,

( , ).

Furthermore, the PRC is steadily increasing


and modernizing its general-purpose forces
ground forces, the AF, the navy, and amphibious
units, and is improving their strategic and
tactical mobility. It is quite obvious that China is
trying (although not officially announcing it) to
achieve military dominance over the territories
and offshore zones that adjoin its borders in
all directions. The first tenuous expeditions of
Chinese armed forces far beyond immediately
adjacent areas and the quest for military strong
points in remote regions (in particular, in the
Indian Ocean) have taken place in recent years.

5.
,

.

,

.
,

5. China is the only nuclear power of the big


five that does not provide any official information
concerning the makeup and numerical strength of
its nuclear forces. For propaganda reasons, China
insists that its nuclear arsenal is small and is not
comparable in any way to the sizes of those of the
US or Russia. By virtue of the secrecy of Chinas
nuclear programs, foreign expert estimates of the
number of this countrys nuclear warheads vary
from 240-300 to 3,600 units.

79

Conclusions


240300 3600 .
6.


, 2011 .
40
10 .
,
,
, ,
16001800 ,

800900 .
,

(
),
,

,
, .

6. An analysis of the potential for the


production of special fissile materials reveals
that China could have turned out up to 40 t of
weapons-grade uranium and approximately 10 t
of weapons-grade plutonium by the end of 2011.
Pursuant to the widespread practices of nations
that are a part of the nuclear five, the PRCs
nuclear arsenal probably contains 1,600-1,800
nuclear warheads, 800-900 units of which may
be intended for operational deployment. Not even
counting the mysterious underground tunnels
being built by Second Artillery personnel (the
Chinese analog of Russias Strategic Rocket
Forces), it is entirely likely that China is presently
the third nuclear power after Russia and the US,
and it does not lag as far behind as it is customarily
thought abroad.

,


,

.

,


, (,
)
.

Contrary to official statements, the total secrecy


of information on the PRCs nuclear forces may
in fact be explained not by their small size and
vulnerability, but quite the opposite to furthering
the aim of concealing the great superabundance of
its nuclear arsenal. In contrast to Beijings public
rejection of the idea of nuclear parity with the
US and Russia, its nuclear might may in fact be
entirely comparable to the potential of the US and
Russia, and in some areas (for example, mediumrange and short-range missiles), even superior to
it.

,
,
,


.

.

In addition to everything else, China is the only


country in the world aside from the RF and the
US that has the economic and technical potential
to rapidly increase its nuclear might over a fairly
short period of time. None of the six other nations
that have NWs is comparable to the PRC in this
respect.

7.

7. This means that it is necessary to take the

80

Conclusions





,
.

Chinese factor into consideration during the


formulation of any new initiatives for limiting
or reducing the nuclear weapons of the US
and Russia, both within the framework of the
negotiating process and as unilateral measures of
good will.

8.
,
,

(
),
,

(,

,
,
, ..).

8. To date, Chinas position has been that it


can only accede to nuclear disarmament after
the US and Russia have significantly reduced the
numbers of their nuclear weapons (coming closer
to Chinas level), have made the commitment
not to use nuclear weapons first, and have also
eliminated other destabilizing factors (for
example, the deployment of American NPBMSs
in the Pacific Ocean, the expansion of ABMs in
the Far East, the development of space weapons,
support for Taiwan, etc.).

, ,


.


.

This position on the part of Beijing apparently


constitutes political propaganda and has no
bearing on practical considerations. It helps the
PRC play for time in strengthening its strategic
positions as it awaits more interesting offers
from the great powers.


,

,


. VI ,
,
.

At the same time, the line of the US and Russia


appears to be quite naive as they urge China to
accede to the nuclear disarmament process, and
to disclose its forces and programs, or at least
to make a commitment not to increase its nuclear
potential to simply proceed on the basis of the
commitment set forth in Article VI of the NPT
as a gesture of good will for the sake of making
a contribution to the noble cause of nuclear
disarmament.
9. All things considered, China can only be
engaged in the process of nuclear arms control
on a pragmatic basis, not based on appeals for
disarmament or noble wishes.

9. ,

,

.

,
,

This means that China can accede to this


process if its feels that its concessions as far as
transparency and any limits on weapons are repaid

81

Conclusions

-

(, , )
,
. ,
, ,


,
.

by concessions of the US (and, by default, Russia)


on military and political matters of interest to
Beijing. In other words, it can change its present
position if it believes that lagging behind in the
disarmament process will be less favorable for it
in military and political relations than acceding to
it in a given format.

,
,
-

-
. ,

(, ,
),
,

,
.

By the same token, the notions of Chinas


accession to nuclear arms control, accession to
American-Russian negotiations, or borrowing
American-Russian experience are absolutely
unrealistic. At best, China will only participate in
negotiations with the US (and possibly on certain
issues with Russia and India), the format of
which China itself sets based on its own strategic
objectives and within a conceptual framework
that corresponds to its interests.

10. , , ,

,

,

.



.

10. In particular, China will more than likely


not take part in the dialog on strategic stability
that the US is proposing as a way of achieving the
transparency of the PRCs nuclear forces, either
as a gesture of good will or as a prior condition for
the transition to the real limitation of weapons.
Beijing will use the question of transparency
as a major bargaining chip for the purpose of
securing the best possible concessions from the
US in its favor.

11.



,
.

11. In a sense, the possibility of China entering


the nuclear arms control process involves not only
the problem of it changing its traditional position,
but also the issue of the revision of the military
policies of the US and Russia.

It is a question of the direct or indirect


recognition of relations of mutual nuclear
deterrence with China and its right to have the

82

Conclusions

,
.
,

.



.

ability of a guaranteed, but limited retaliatory


strike. This may affect the security guarantees
that the United States has given to its Asian allies.
It also implies a decrease in Russias reliance
on the nuclear component to make up for the
increasing gap in conventional armed forces in
Siberia and the Russian Far East.

12. ,

(

) :

12. It appears that the prerequisites for China to


consent to the gradual disclosure of information
on its potential and on the subsequent limitation of
nuclear weapons (at least through a commitment
not to increase the number of certain kinds and
types) are:



(,
);

A commitment on the part of US not to


increase its sea-launched and ground-launched
ABM assets within the Pacific Ocean (possibly
also including Japans antimissile assets);

,

(,
)
;

,


;

A commitment on the part of the US and Russia


that if they reach an understanding concerning
cooperation on certain ABM development
projects (for example, the exchange of EWS
data), China will be able to take part in them in
a format that is acceptable to it;
The commencement of negotiations between
the US and the RF concerning a subsequent
START, which will include the elimination of
strategic delivery vehicles and the limitation of
long-range precision nonnuclear missiles, and;



( ,
);

Progress on the limitation of the nonstrategic


nuclear weapons of the US and Russia
(excluding their movement from Europe to
Asia, contrary to the NATO position).

,



.

Here the first, second, and fourth items


would constitute an indirect acknowledgment
of relations of mutual vulnerability and mutual
nuclear deterrence with China on the part of
Washington and Moscow.

13.

13. The likely format for negotiations is a

83

Conclusions

,


-

bilateral dialog between the US and the PRC in


tandem with START talks between the US and
Russia, as well as regular strategic consultations
between Russia and China.

) .

(
).

A trilateral or quadrilateral negotiation format


(with the accession of India) scarcely seems
possible. The only exception might be the issue
of cooperation in the area of ABMs (the exchange
of EWS data).

.
,


, .

However, trilateral agreements on the


limitation of weapons are possible further down
the line. In this vein, the limitation of strategic
forces can be achieved by means of setting equal
total limits on the ICBMs, plus the medium-range
and short-range missiles, of Russia, the US, and
China.




.
,

,

(
500 ).

Such an approach might somewhat consolidate


agreements between the US and Russia on
strategic offensive weapons (SOWs), as well as
medium- and short-range missiles (MSRMs), and
might give them a trilateral format. Since the US
and Russia do not have medium- and short-range
missiles, such agreement for them would only
envision the limitation of the number of ICBMs,
whereas China would have to limit the number of
all its missiles (with a range in excess of 500 km).

,
,



2020 ., .

Of course, this is only an illustration of the


idea of what kind of innovative approaches to
the limitation of weapons by the year 2020 and
in the future can be devised under conditions
of constructive relations and a stable strategic
environment.

84

Appendix I
1

GDP and Military Spending of the PRC


Table 1. GDP of China (trillions of dollars), 2000-2011


1. (. .), 2000-2011 .

2000 2001

2002

2003

2004

1.20

1.45

1.64

1.93

1.32

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

2010

2011

2.26

5.93

7.30

2.71

3.49

4.52

4.99

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF). (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx)


: , (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.as px)

Table 2. GDP of China (trillions of yuans), 2000-2011


2. (. ), 2000-2011 .

2000 2001
9.9

11.0

2002

2003

2004

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

2010

2011

12.0

13.6

16.0

18.5

40.1

47.2

21.6

26.6

31.4

34.1

Source: National Statistics Bureau of the PRC. (http:/ww.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/)


: , (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/)

85

Appendix I

Table 3. Military spending of China, 2000-2011


3. , 2000-2011 .

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Billions
of
Yuans

184

227

262

288

331

379

Billions
of
Dollars

33.49

41.17

47.82

51.95

57.54

64.72

% of
GDP

1.9

2.1

2.2

2.1

2.1

2.0

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Billions
of
Yuans

452

546

638

764

820

923

Billions
of
Dollars

76.06

87.73

% of
GDP

2.0

2.1

96.66 116.66 121.06 129.27

2.0

2.2

2.1

1.96

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (http://milexdata.sipri.org)


: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (http://milexdata.sipri.org/)

86

Appendix I

Table 4. Military spending of China (according to official Chinese data, 2012 planned expenditures),
2000-2012
4. ( , 2012 . ) 2000-2012 .

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Billions
of
Yuans

121.3

141.0

166.0

185.3

206.5

247.7

Billions
of
Dollars

14.6

17.0

20.0

22.4

25.0

29.9

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Billions
of
Yuans

280.0

350.9

417.8

480.7

532.1

601.1

670.0

Billions
of
Dollars

35.3

45.0

57.2

70

78

91.5

106.4

Source: prepared using materials from the Xinhau News Agency (http://www.xinhuanet.com/) and the National Statistics Bureau of
the PRC (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/dennis)
: (http://www.xinhuanet.com/)
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/)

87

Appendix II
Abbreviations Used
ABM

antiballistic missile

AD

air defense

AF

air force

AFs

armed forces

ALCM

air-launched cruise missile

APC

armored personnel carrier

APR

Asian-Pacific Region

ASM

antiship missile

ATD

amphibious transport dock

ATGM

antitank guided missile

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

CMC

Central Military Commission (of the PRC)

CP

command post

CPLA

Chinese Peoples Liberation Army

DA

drone aircraft

DB

design bureau

ESVs

earth satellite vehicles

EWS

early warning system

GDP

gross domestic product

GFs

ground forces

GLCM

ground-launched cruise missile

GPFs

general-purpose forces

GPNS

general-purpose nuclear submarine

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

IMEMO RAS

Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian


Academy of Sciences

kt kiloton
MD

military district

MIC

military-industrial complex

MIRVs

multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles

ML

missile launcher

MLRS

multiple-launch rocket system

MRBM

medium-range ballistic missile

88

Appendix III

MRM

medium-range missile

Mt megaton
N navy
NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NB

naval base

NFs

naval forces

NPT

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

NPBMS

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

NSP

Nuclear Security Project

NTI

Nuclear Threat Initiative

NWs

nuclear weapons

PCHs

performance characteristics

PNWs

precision nonnuclear weapons

PRC

Peoples Republic of China

R&D

research and development

RS

radar system

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SAMC

surface-to-air missile complex

SAMS

surface-to-air missile system

SIPRI

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLBM

submarine-launched ballistic missile

SMFs

strategic missile forces

SNFs

strategic nuclear forces

SOWs

strategic offensive weapons

SPG

self-propelled gun

SRM

short-range missile

START

USSR-US Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991)

W&MH

weapons and military hardware

89

Appendix III
List of Participants in the Conference Held on June 28, 2012 at the IMEMO of the RAS
1. Anshuman, First Secretary of the Embassy of India in the Russian Federation
, .

2. A. G. Arbatov, Director of the International Security Center of the IMEMO of the RAS,
Academician of the RAS
.. ,
, .

3. I. A. Akhtamzyan, Associate Professor of the International Relations and Foreign Policy


Department of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MSIIR)-University of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the RF
.. ,
- .

4. Eldar Bayramov, First Secretary of the Embassy of Azerbaijan in the Russian Federation
,
.

5. F. G. Voytolovskiy, Section Head of the IMEMO of the RAS


.. , .

6. N. P. Voloshin, Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center at the Academician Ye.
I. Zababikhin Russian National Institute of Applied Physics
.. ,
.
.. .

7. Jacek Wesolowski, Deputy Attach for Defense of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland,
Lieutenant Colonel
,
, .

8. Sebastian Gerhardt, First Counsel of the Embassy of Germany in the Russian Federation
,
.

9. P. V. Goncharov, Political Commentator of Golos Rossii [Voice of Russia] Radio


.. , .

10. M. G. Yevtodyeva, Senior Research Associate of the International Security Center of the
IMEMO of the RAS
.. ,
.

11. S. M. Yermakov, Senior Research Associate of the Russian Strategic Research Institute
.. ,
.

12. V. I. Yesin, Lead Research Associate of the US and Canada Institute of the RAS, Col. General
(retired)
.. , ,
- ( ).

90

Appendix III

13. A. V. Zagorskiy, Head of the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Department of the IMEMO
of the RAS
.. ,
.

14. P. S. Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the US and Canada Institute of the RAS, two-star general
(retired)
.. , ,
- ( ).

15. V. M. Ivanov, Political Commentator of the Interfaks [Interfax] News Agency


.. ,
.

16. T. T. Kadyshev, Lead Research Asociate of the Center for the Study of Disarmament, Energy,
and Environmental Problems
.. ,
,

17. N. I. Kalinina, Chief Research Associate of the International Security Center of the IMEMO of
the RAS
.. ,
.

18. Karina Katap, Officer of the Political Department of the Embassy of Germany in the Russian
Federation
,
.

19. E. V. Kirichenko, Director of the North American Research Center of the IMEMO of the RAS
.. ,
.

20. I. Ya. Kobrinskaya, Lead Research Associate of the IMEMO of the RAS.
.. , .

21. Roman Kovalchuk, First Counselor of the Embassy of Poland in the Russian Federation.
,
.

22. D. V. Kochegarova, Research Associate of the G. V. Plekhanov Russian Economic University


.. ,
. .. .

23. O. V. Kulakov, Professor of the Military University of the Ministry of Defense of the RF, Colonel
(retired)
.. ,
, ( ).

24. M. B. Kustovskiy, First Secretary of the Department on Security and Disarmament Matters
of the MFA of Russia
.. ,
.

25. V. N. Litovkin, Editor-in-Chief of the Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Independent Military


Review] newspaper, Colonel (retired)

91

Appendix III

.. ,
, ( ).

26. A. V. Lukin, Vice-Chancellor for Scientific Work and International Relations of the Diplomatic
Academy of the MFA of Russia
.. ,
.

27. Liao Weijing, Chief Correspondent of the Newspaper Tszintszi Zhibao [Jingji Daily]
, - .

28. A. A. Makhlay, President of Public Policy Research Center Independent Nonprofit Organization
(INO)
.. ,
.

29. V. V. Mikheyev, Deputy Director of the IMEMO of the RAS, Corresponding Member of the
RAS
.. , , -
.

30. Ye. V. Myasnikov, Director of the Center for the Study of Disarmament, Energy, and
Environmental Problems
.. , ,
.

31. V. Ye. Novikov, Lead Research Associate of the Russian Strategic Research Institute
.. ,
.

32. S. K. Oznobishchev, Section Head of the International Security Center of the IMEMO of the
RAS
.. ,
.

33. A. N. Perendzhiyev, Associate Professor of the Political Science and Sociology Department of
the G. V. Plekhanov Russian Economic University, Lieutenant Colonel (retired)
.. ,
. .. , (
).

34. A. V. Radchuk, Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the AFs of the RF, Colonel (retired)
.. , ,
( ).

35. O. S. Rozhdestvenskaya, Program Manager of the Russian Council on International Affairs


.. ,
.

36. N. P. Romashkina, Senior Research Associate of the International Security Center of the
IMEMO of the RAS
.. ,
.

37. V. I. Rybachenkov, Senior Research Associate of the Center for the Study Disarmament,
Energy, and Environmental Problems at the Moscow Institute of Applied Physics (MIAP)-

92

Appendix III

University
.. ,
, -.

38. L. F. Ryabikhin, Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Scientists for International Security
.. ,
.

39. Ye. K. Silin, Director of the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Association


.. , - .

40. V. I. Sotnikov, Senior Research Associate of the International Security Center of the IMEMO
of the RAS
.. ,
.

41. Yu. V. Tavrovskiy, Editor-in-Chief of the Diplomat magazine


.. , .

42. G. D. Toloraya, Regional Director for Asia and Africa, head of the regional projects department
of the Russian World Foundation
.. , ,
.

43. P. V. Topychkanov, Senior Research Associate of the International Security Center of the
IMEMO of the RAS
.. ,
.

44. A. A. Khramchikhin, Deputy Director and Head of Analytical Department of the Political and Military
Analysis Institute
.. ,
.

45. S. V. Tselitskiy, Research Associate of the International Security Center of the IMEMO of the
RAS
.. ,
.

46. Guan Tszyanbin, Moscow Bureau Chief of the Zhungo Tsinnyanbao [Peoples Daily ] newspaper
,
.

47. V. I. Tsymbal, Head of the Defense Economy Laboratory of the Ye. T. Gaydar Economic Policy
Institute
.. ,
. .. .

48. Chi Ye, Correspondent of Peoples Daily newspaper


, .

49. D. A. Chizhov, Research Association of the International Security Center of the IMEMO of
the RAS
.. ,
.

93

Appendix III

50. B. A. Shmelev, Director of the Political Research Center of the Economics Institute of the RAS
.. ,
.

51. Yang Zheng, a Political Commentator of the Guanmin Zhibao [Guangming Daily] newspaper.
, .

52. O. V. Yarkova, Research Associate of the Academy of Civil Protection of the Ministry of Civil
Defense, Emergency Management, and Natural Disaster Response [Emercom] of Russia
.. ,
.

94