This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
............................ ........ .................................... 2 The reasons Transcendental method ............................................... .......... ................................... 2 Objections Buddhist logicians ............................................. .... ........................... 7 Doubt as essential category of philosophy ...................................... .... 7 ........ The transcendental ego 14 Manifestation transcendental ............................................... ... ................................ 14 Conclusion 21
He will be here to compare the theories of Nietzsche and Descartes with those of a set of thinkers who lived in the ninth century in Kashmir. It is surprising to see here a thinker stranger to lights Greece qualified philosopher. What allows us to operate such a comparison? Consideration thoughts or "wisdom" gives non-European usually rise to two types of reactions, also ruinous for thought. Either we holds that it is not philosophy, it is assumed that this is like our philosophy. Or it is not philosophy, in which case the comparison with a real philosophy would not be legitimate or philosophy in question could be reduced to a Western systems, in which case there would be little interest to confront it. Here we must avoid two pitfalls by showing a thought which, though no other thing that philosophy, is not less a different philosophy and, as such, deserves bother to see the relevance of his theories examined fairly. But what do we mean by philosophy here? It would appear at first sight the determination of its essence is a genuine problem for philosophy Western. If you want to support the idea that the only true philosophy is West should be able to produce a particular definition can include all Western thoughts and be able to exclude all other speech. This seems very difficult. In fact, it is quite clear that many European thinkers hold theses closer to some authors Orientals as some authors Westerners. That is why we adopt as a criterion rather the maxims of common sense 1 proposed by Kant: think for yourself, think putting himself in the place of anot her; think in accord with himself. Of particular note is the second maxim, that the judgment. It says in effect that the issue of adequate philosophy - to rise to t he point universal view of reason - is primarily an ideal. But it also allows to distingu ish a philosophy of simple exegesis of sacred texts. The philosopher relies on
arguments acceptable by any human being as he is simply not endowed with reason and not as it is European or Indian confidant to a particular revelation. The exeget e argues well, but his arguments presuppose more theses accepted by faith. "This is true because it is God who said". For the philosopher, the priority is reversed: it is 1 Faculty of judgment, paragraph 40.
--------------------------------------- 2 2 (Possibly) because it is true that God has spoken. Seen, there is a back there difference of degree, and we recognize countless possible intermediate between t hese two poles. I therefore intend to philosophy by rational discourse aimed knowingl y humanity and not to a particular community of faith. Presentation of the philosophical project The reasons But this is precisely the purpose of Utpaladeva. Although the author belongs to a 2 particular contemplative tradition, he declares at the outset that seeks to make it possible, in the 3 justifying the recognition of one's identity with the Lord. It is stated that th is recognition is the sovereign good, accessible to all, without distinction of any kind that capacity due to its good behavior (that is to say the lead to the true sattarka rather than to win at all costs - kutarka). But we say, perhaps with Nietzsche, it would be very naive to believe that the r esearch the truth is really a search for the truth. Nietzsche tried to show that the desire for truth is only the mask of a desire for revenge. In short, the project Utpaladeva is it an exotic version of the weak seeking revenge by persuading the strong ideas that culpabiliseront? And to formulate an objection to the ways supporters suspicion in the humanities, the project justification and redemption are univer sal Should not be explained rather by a desire to dominate from the social group and 4 religious represented by the author to ensure its prestige and its domination? B ut it This is more so to question the relevance of non-European philosophy, but more radically about the existence of philosophy itself. Most approaches Indian thoughts specialized explain the effect of a set of "non-factors epistemic ", such as the social context or language. In other words, we make trial of intentions. However, thinkers ® ivaïsme non-
dual are aware of such an objection. They replied that there was no reason 5 priori to believe that motivation is not disinterested. We believe our from any fair comparison to the other requires that we will at least accordions benefit of the doubt. The review will decide. Transcendental method 2 Utpaladeva (825-875) was the author of a philosophical poem, The stanzas on the recognition Lord itself, as well as two autocommentaires, plus two large comments by Abhinavagupt a (975 1050). These five treaties constitute the corpus of the school recognition (prat yabhijñ ). They are followers of ?? Ivaïsme non-dualistic, that is to say, this part of the teachings ® iva (= God) p roclaiming the identity of creator, creation and creatures, as well as the uselessness of the values ??pres cribed in the tradition Brahmin (good-evil, pure-impure etc.). 3 IPK 1.1.1 4 This thesis is supported by one of the greatest specialists?? Ivaïsme Kashmir, Pr ofessor Alexis Sanderson Oxford. 5 Vimar?? 1.1.1 in ...
--------------------------------------- 3 3 Finally, we are aware that it criticizes the lack of Indian thought conceptual rigor and his ignorance of the principles of reason, such as the prin ciple of contradiction. What is the method used by Utpaladeva? To demonstrate his thesis which each is God, he presented his speech as an explicit inference five members. What relationship with Descartes and Nietzsche? This: Nietzsche's theses 6 theses correspond to the Buddhist logicians; theses correspond to Descartes those of some allies Utpaladeva. Given the problem of the essence of the subject we see - in short - what is the solution proposed by Utpaladeva. Utpaladeva, having declared his plan for a universal salvation by reason Ad 78 briefly his method: a strategy transcendental. ® The Aivas seek to show outset that neither Buddhists nor anyone can disprove the existence of God becau se God is the condition of possibility, validity, intelligibility of everything. Descartes with skepticism, utpala will seek to show that the arguments Buddhist validity condition for the validity of his own theses. In other words, Buddhists, for why should first admit they are wrong. Therefore, as the Buddhist thesis contradicts himself fatally, the thesis is necessarily ut
pala true. For this, his immediate goal is to explain how the recognition. This system is itself a target soteriological. She is then seen as "exercise spiritual "(Pierre Hadot). That is to say, the system is also "means for the Person who is the witness, who is none other than the Unsurpassable (that is to say about the ultimate 9 absolute 'unsurpassable' in the sense that it can never be the object of a subje ct). In addition, Utpala proclaims at the end of his treatise that proposes a new way to men, alth ough qu'Abhinavagupta states that this doctrine was already implicit in the texts taught by iva ®. To do this, utpala designing a project justification particularly complex. They 10 appropriate the inferential scheme developed by the Ny is called "inference others. " Before briefly describe this scheme, it should be noted however that the utpala speech contains many denials of any method aimed at light is an absolute condition of possibility of all. Thus the second dice stance, utpala asks, "What could ever be smart or deny establish topic knowing and acting, the self, the Great Lord, establishes from the beginning? ". Indeed, since the self is what makes possible all thought, it is something paradoxical in its demonstration project discursive. It must be admitted that he re Pratyabhijñ is influenced to some extent by the specific apophatism Advaita 11 Ved?-Nta ® a of kara. The self (tman ), which is the absolute (Brahman) is self-evi dent ( svaprak a). The self knows itself forever in a timeless consciousness virgin 6 We denote this expression by a particular school founded by rti and Di ... Dhar mak Än ga. It is a book critical epistemology, critical realism background and nominalism, although all schools Buddhists are concerned with logic and epistemology. 7 By which he here means that which relates to the condition of possibility of ex perience. 8 That is to say mainly Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. 9 API 1.1 10 Ny Brahmanic there is a school specializing in logic. This is the main opponent of Buddhists and an ally of Aivas ®. 11 ® a kara (700-750), perhaps the most famous Indian thinkers for whom only the sel f as 'consciousness' is real (as permanent), all objects are false and illusory.
--------------------------------------- 4 4
of discourse (vikalpa), but essential to any worldly cognition. In fact, all the system back to highlighting the paradox that nothing can make something that is law always already there. In his commentary to the second stanza cited above, Ab hinava attempts to show that the only subject that can prove or disprove anything shoul d be identical to the omniscient and omnipotent Lord. He argues that it is ridiculous to be proves or disproves his own self. In short, we can not prove the absolute. 12 God or the ultimate principle is indeed Manifestation. He is the source and loc ation of any event. It can not not be obvious. Be and is to be manifest. The idea the non-existence of which - for the idea of ??non-existence can happen - must e xist, is contradictory. The operation of the means of knowledge, evidence against him inevitably would reverse the dependency relationship. This thesis is itself very old in India. Abhinava cites also a famous passage from B? HAD ra yaka Upani?? ad: in truth, what can one know the knower? And he added with humor: As I said: "All are ashamed [when they realize:] 13 'I was objectified / is an object of knowledge'. How then the Great Lord Could it be that the object of knowledge? Of course, Abhinava is fully aware that the problem of objectification of the Ab solute the word can not be completely overcome. Any talk of God is by definition a speech in the third person. He also admits that objective discourse is possible on the empirical subject, who is identified with objects like the body, the internal se nsation, the internal sense etc.. The self is always already known as a kind of a priori intuition. Why then the individual does not recognize it not? The easiest way to explain th is stupidity by some illusion own mechanism to maintain the continuity of the subje ct empirically. Therefore, the operation of recognition can only be negative. The system does that eradicating a misconception that we would not aware of our selfhood. The following passage sheds useful light on this point: Nothing new is done. There is not highlighted in any something really hidden. [Rather] the assumption that what is manifest is not clear is eradicated. Since the liberation [that is to say the highest good], which is to achieve the status of the Supreme Lord, is that eradicate this [false assumption]. The Cycle [the alienated existence, sas ra] is nothing else but not eradicating it. Both [conditions liberation and alienation] are in essence that assumption. And both are 14 expressed by the Blessed One. However, we should not believe that this acute awareness of the futility of any action to achieve the absolute or thinking has led these thinkers to take refuge in the
quietism. In contrast to all Misologie, Abhinava never misses an opportunity to 15 remember that this theory should not be used with "asylum of ignorance." 12 I'm trying to translate the term prak ?? Was literally means light, illumination , lighting, and apparently came to light, illustration. It is also consciousness. 13 Mahe vara, one of the names ® iva. 14 IPV 2,3,17 15 Because the denial of any way correlated to grace one of five actions iva ®.
--------------------------------------- 5 5 Only this argumentative strategy transcendental denies outright any method, system provides a kind of victory a priori. Anyway, utpala also uses a method borrowed from the more positive common logic of India, Ny ya. In this tradition, we list sixteen items for philosophical discourse. And, though in truth not build Recognition nothing positive, it takes a form consistent with the discursive logical criteri a is Ny. Abhinava explains that the system's ability to reach agreement based on the application of these standards: The ultimate goal of this [treaty] other [as a justification of the sixteen categories], such as the means of knowledge [pram Ã], etc ... When the sixteen categories are articulated, the auditor is required to fully understand what is 16 to understand. These categories include the means of knowledge (pram n ), the nature of knowable (prameya) sections corresponding approximately to epistemology and onto logy. Followed by a preliminary philosophical debate in good and due form, namely doubt (his?? aya), purpose (prayojana), empirical (d??? ~ nta) assumptions (Siddh nta ), the line of argument (avayava), the reason (tarka) and rational dec ision (Nir aya). Finally, the categories used to distinguish different forms of debate a nd sophistry. Of course, some of these topics overlap and no philosophical text India will not implement one by one. They simply refer to a set of concerns Commons. The most important for our purposes is the "line of argument" (avayava) as It is this category that makes possible a universal intelligibility. This scheme comprises the steps of "inference to others" (by rth num na). She receives a thorough explanation to provide a logical justification for any gifted person of common sense: What is the purpose described in relation to others? This [treaty] is the unders tanding of others. 17 And this is possible through inference for others.
The highlighted segments inference for recognition demonstrate these thinkers seek to make good for their thesis. This inference has five members. Here they are illustrated by an example Traditional: 1. The thesis (pratijñ ): "there is fire on the hill." The hill is about inference. The fire is what needs to be established. 2. Reason (hetu): "Because there's smoke." 3. The general principle and example (ud hara a): "where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen instead of the lake. " 4. The application (upanaya): "the hill, because it has smoke has fire. "This step explicit membership subject to the concurrent relationship shown in step Previous. 5. The conclusion (nigamana): "Therefore there is fire on the hill." This repeats the thesis, as it is now established. 16 IPV 2,3,17 17 LPI 2, 3, 17
--------------------------------------- 6 6 Abhinava is so aware of the importance of the rational scheme there will see structure of the poem Stanzas to recognize the Lord himself. This is fully consistent with the ideals for which are Ny any treaty (?? stra ) actually consists of an inference to others, and [the so] creates for him an adequate understanding. Thus the text and comments will be divided into five main parts corresponding to the five members of the inference. The thesis established by this inference is that it is itself identical to the L ord. The subject (pak?: A) the thesis is the person, and probandum (s dhya ) is that h e or she is Lord. What is then the reason (hetu)? The detailed discussion of these arguments form the body the Treaty. But the key is in already in the first stanza. The main argument is that the Lord is the condition of possibility of any argument. Abhinava comments: 'All' [referring to all] what is existing and not existing, internal or external , as blue, fun etc.. There are fulfilling or setting all this is the manifestation as such. [With this system we now justifies there this achievement has] a complete understanding, that is to say a deepening of the judgment. This [understanding the performance of all] the reason [justifying] the [validity] of this recognition. This is we teach the ultimate realization of the subject [= the Lord] by cognitions like blue, fun etc.. appears clearly [in the experience common] ... The purpose [eg blue, pleasure] which we explained that was designated by the words' the fulfillment of all is at first sight cause / reason of virtue, sin, etc.. which [in turn] cause radical cycle [= sas ra]. Otherwise it can be explained as [indicating] means 18 a path of transcendence of the world [as we do now].
19 This passage which plays on the ambiguity Abhinava several terms means that recognition is achieved through the study of what makes possible the manifestati on, setting light of objects interiors and exteriors. So we are in the presence of a kind transcendental investigation. The thesis is justified by highlighting the recogn ition what justifies everything. ® The Aivas not trying to justify their argument as if it were a simple object of experience. They argue instead that their Lord is necessary t o both the justification and the manifestation of these objects. But what is it Lord? According to the myth of origin revealed by ® iva himself 20 ® iva projects the universe by his power (his consort). The identity of the Lord a nd His Power is illustrated by the fire and its heat, or by the sexual union of a human couple. It will therefore be to show that the subject is the cause and rea son for the universe. The subject (apparently) is limited ® iva, iva ® because as it is the source of everything. The soul is, without knowing the necessary agent of universal creation: The recognition of this [Lord] that, although [always already] experienced is unnoticed because of the strength of the delusion, is experienced through the 21 revelation of [its] power. 18 IPV 1.1.1 19 siddhi bed. 'Fulfillment': also means justification, demonstration, proof. 20 Akti ®. 21 IPK 1.1.2
--------------------------------------- 7 7 This revelation is made by the detailed arguments in the following text. This on e 22 is divided into two parts corresponding to the two Powers of Knowledge and Actio n, epistemology and ontology respectively. These powers are those of anyone. Before proceeding to the presentation of theses Buddhists recapitulate the infer ence that must 23 establish recognition: (1) The subject is the Lord. (2) Because he / she has the Powers of Knowledge and Action. (3) Everyone has the Powers Knowledge and Action is Lord, as the Lord described in the Scriptures, and as the king. (4) The subject has since he is the King, the Lord. (5) The subject is Lord. ® The Aivas also use the notion of dependency:
That to which something [in] the Lord, like a king on his field. [But] the same universe [depends] you. "Or:" He in whom something that appears contains something like a cassette [containing] the 24 jewels. The universe since [feature] Sad Earth to iva, [is] in you, which 25 the nature of consciousness. Remains to elucidate the nature of the Lord, to show how it is an ego and justif y its necessity. Objections Buddhist logicians Doubt as essential category of philosophy This is precisely why all the 'Buddhist logicians' radically challenge question. However, one may wonder why utpala takes the trouble to collect these objections and respond to the challenges they raise. It is here, as in Descartes, doubt is a necessary element of the transcendental method. On the theological antithesis is a time of procession / conversion divine We praise ® iva, which manifests the universe as an argument prima differential 26 facie, and then returns to the unit as a conclusion drawn. In this utpala is no exception. He considers all thinkers in Sanskrit doubt that (her?? yaa) is a (sixteen) of all categories needed philosophical discourse: The nature of the Ultimate Reality is here [in the system] explained from the consideration the views of opponents, their doubts and their refutation and is 27 this way clearly highlighted. 22 kriy?? akti na and JN 23 IPV 1.1.3 24 A higher degrees in the ontology scalar thirty-six specific categories ivaïsme ® in general. 25 IPV 02/03/17 26 API 1.2, verse tribute. 27 API 1.2, introduction.
--------------------------------------- 8 8 In fact, as we have seen, Utpaladeva will seek to show that the erroneous theses is possible if and only if hers are real. In other words, the vagaries of men contribute to the glory of the Lord:
Tribute to God, having created the error of those who are lost in the Cycle, reduced to nothingness and having hidden bliss beyond [couples] contrary, reveals. What are theses errors? Are those Buddhists Dharmak ... rti and commentators. According to them, the criterion of reality of things and our repr esentations is ability to produce effects ( arthakriy tvam). Exist is to produce some effect. Be one thing is to be a cause. However, in passing also means cause an effect. Be i nvolved therefore not be permanent. Only real entities are instantaneous. Logicians Buddhists seem to discern two types: atoms and cognitions. 28 But the key point for our purposes is that the structure of reality is divided i nto two: 29 on one side there is the singular realities, seized by intuition of the other ca tegories General trumped by the understanding. Both spheres have nothing in common. The images we carry in effect build comparisons and generalizations collected directly from things. But they are absolutely unique. Each is single point that nothing we can say there is adequate. This means that in gener al language has nothing in common with things as they are. Our interpretations are always false, if we accept that truth is the character of our discourse when like what they are talking with. This means in particular that the concepts or representations resulting from synthesis are as beings of reason. However, the i dea of ??a "Lord" agent and universal subject is precisely - as a unit ultimate all - more illusion of all. These objections are exposed by Utpaladeva in the second chapter of the IPK. As clearly shows DP Lawrence, Buddhists make their objections are three objects : Self, to know its power and its power of action. These objects each receive th ree objections. First the self, for example, is reduced to a multitude of empirical states: None of the two kinds of cognition [intuition and inference] does not depend on an entity separate these cognitions themselves in the form of consciousness, since the oth er 30 entity is not perceived. So what is so permanent?. Similarly, the notion of 'I', as expressed, that is to say, always discursively to reduced to a variety of states collected. Second, the self is not perceived, and therefore can not be inferred. It is therefore by no means proven valid knowledge (S dhakapram SAM). Thirdly, the notion itself is a contradiction, since it coexist in both the one and the many. There is therefore a proof to refute (B dhakapram SAM) self. Let us now examine these arguments, especially by our attention on those who seem to rely on the problem of the one and the multiple, that is to say third kind of objection that every time is to show the contradictory nature theses Utpaladeva.
28 IPK I.2.1 29 svalak Asa litt. 'Which has character [something absolutely] own. " 30 IPKV 1.2.1-2.
--------------------------------------- 9 9 A. The so First, the self is contradictory. For, indeed, what the self? It is a eternal cause, that is to say, a thing that produces effects without itself unde rgoing change. However, it follows from standard Buddhist reality that this is impossib le. In fact, be a cause, this is nothing other than an effect, so to speak, exhausted all his be in this realization. In other words, cause it is changed, it is a moment exis t only. The relationship of cause and effect here is the "nature of two objects su ch as 31 change in one causes a change in the other ", ie a dependence mutual. So if you want to preserve the value of self explanatory as the cause of all, have to admit that nothing is eternal. But if we chose instead to do something eternal, then, plays no role in the explanation of things, it's just a guess 32 Free and unnecessary. How does he relate to the problem of the one and the many? In fact the self is h ere considered as a cause from which proceeds a succession of cognitions, that is to say, a multiplicity of events inside what remains yet, according Utpaladeva a only infinite manifestation, he calls the Lord. By transposing the same objectio ns in this register, it appears that Utpaladeva is forced to choose between the nat ure of consciousness (cittat ) which is reduced to a succession of instantaneous cogniti on without beginning or end, and so reduced to witness the successive transformations of th e nature, and not universal agent and knower. B. The power of knowing Secondly, the power of knowledge is also reduced to cognition Instant episodic. However, a more unifying cognition cognition is impossible. Ca r cognitions succeed in different times. Transcendent cognition, to achieve to unify, should be able to keep itself in different times. It should be the it is entirely passed in cognition, and even be entirely in the cognitions later. However, it is impossible for a thing to be also present in tw o 33 mutually distinct things.
In addition, if there is a universal knower, each would know everything or nothi ng. If I 'm about the same as any other, I would know everything simultaneously and the l argest confusion would follow. So that this universal subject knowing that allegedly ma kes possible all of our knowledge rather destroy. C. The action Thirdly, and finally, the action is the subject of a review focusing specificall y on contradiction enveloped by the idea of ??a God with the ability to unify multipl e. Indeed, what action according to common logic of India? It is an entity whose Each (a projection of a movie, for example) has a substrate (the projection room ), and which at the same time manifests itself in a succession of cognitions, "snapshot s" (the 31 Lalande, p.912. 32 In the context of explaining the recall: IPKV I.2.6, I.2.6 IPV. 33 IPV I.2.7 (I, p.102).
--------------------------------------- 10 10 images, summaries of traits resulting from the power of knowing). The Power of K nowledge, for example, the power to form a perception, while the Action is Power to form a series of perceptions. Paradigm criticized the action in the first pla ce 34 by Buddhists is that of grammarians. For them, the model of the action is the sentence. It is what produces a sense from multiple factors such as the acti on subject, object, instrument, etc. instead. The core unifying the verb. Despite t he 35 multiplicity of factors of the action (or rather because of it, according Bhart Uhari), say "Devadatta rice cooked in the kitchen with a pot ", it is describe an action, that is to sa y, a real entity that exists in addition to the series of images collected. However, for Buddhists, all of this is reduced to a succession of cognitions, wh ich similarities give rise to the impression of continuity of a real identity. But " unity" action is trumped "the same action [does not exist because] it consists the appearance of body etc.. in different places etc.., and nothing else, since nothing more is 36 perceived. " That Pierre arrived in Paris, it's actually assign a sequence of im ages mental perceptions and assumed invariant to a substrate. This person, one and th
e same, is not given: it is constructed and projected onto the given. No substrate is seen more of these moments. Because only moments 37 appear in succession [and therefore a multiplicity] phenomenal. And even the idea of ??a sequence or a sequence is constructed and therefore fal se: Priority and posteriority times is due to synthesis intellection discursive. However, nothing is so earlier or later. Because there is only realities [singular]. This is why a succession - that is to say before and after action which are produced by conceptual construction - has nothing in common wit h the 38 momentary reality. Because the moments are not [even] in mutual relationship. Indeed, the concept of sequence depends on those posteriority and priority chara cters who are not given the realities singular in question, but they are assigned after they have summers compared. Now, compare it to connect. This implies that compared the two terms appearing in consciousness coexist. For this, it would ha ve the moments last longer than a moment, which is impossible if they are to produc e a effect and thereby claim to some reality. In addition, real moments are in fact so singular can not be legitimately grouped and assigning them a "before" and "after". They have nothing in common. A "sequence" of time is an order dummy wrought by the mind, and has nothing in common with reality as it is given. In o ther words, a succession is a synthesis, an abstract generality and as such, a mere fiction. To say that the unity of action can be inferred from its effects, it can not be, inferred because it is linking a perceived object (smoke) to one that is not cur rently perceived, but that was (fire). The inference is a synthesis between two percept ions, one object directions, the other memory. However, a so-called reality as the action has nev er been seen In addition, the singular realities. So we can infer this because supposedly uni que from its "effects" multiple. More effect is that the final moment of succession. 34 Particular philosophical founded by Bhart Uhari (seventh century). 35 raka, capital notion, which literally means the different cases (there are se K ven in Sanskrit nominative accusative, dative, instrumental, ablative, locative, vocative, genitive being c onsidered as a special case, since it is on a name, not the verb). 36 IPK 1.2.9. 37 ibid. 38 ibid.
--------------------------------------- 11 11 For example, if we say that we can infer that the action "Peter goes to Paris" i s the actual cause that "Peter is in Paris," Buddhists meet this "effect" is the last when a sequence of times and nothing else. Only the multiple is real, because he alone product this is called a "perception". Anyway, and this is the strongest objection Buddhist logicians, the action itself is contradictory. Indeed, even assuming that we perceive something as the 'unit' of the action, still it contradicts the phase sequence component Action: It is not permissible [action] is also characterized by one or an estate. Indeed, the character of the succession envelope multiplicity, since there no succession where there is unity: Being an estate is to be a variety, since there is not [inheritance] in which is no diversity. Being a diverse and be contradictory. Henceforth, how [Action] can it be successive and? [...] How the substrate affected by various moments of action, which are differentiated by their place, their time a nd their form, can it be? Therefore recognition "This one is Devadatta, he arrived at the village, "can not prove a real unity [but only one unit fictitious and conventional relative] (IPV.I.2.9). In addition, as this is succession and not a mere aggregation, we can not invoke the example of collective bodies endowed with efficiency and therefore a specific reality. As in an army, all soldiers are simultaneously present, while 39 moments of action do not exist simultaneously (except under ® iva, whose contemplation phenomenal series in eternity will be precisely defined as a Looking back on the events that we simultaneously appear in succession). So say "we spend a movie" is a false interpretation, unrelated succession of singular realities that delivers sensible intuition, to an extent that the real is neither one nor multiple: it is truly indescribable or ineffable. D. The relationship All these objections are summarized by the objections to a category collects all the others that relationship. The category of relationship is the m ost necessary, it is recognized both in metaphysics, because it is a category withou t what to think is impossible, as it is true that thinking is always ask or at lea st discover relationships. Similarly Lalande defines the relationship as it logicia ns India. "Relationship is the character of two or more objects of thought as they are des igned as, or may be included in a single intellectual act, determined nature. These are for example the identity, coexistence, succession, correspondence, 40
causality, affiliation, etc.. "This wording is very similar to the relationship as "Bilocation" (dvi?? ~ hat) in Utpaladeva. It appears that this group plays a fundamental in his system. Indeed, for the thesis utpala be meaningful, it is necessary that the Lord eithe r itself or relationship with its powers of knowing and acting. In other words, the event 39 This is specified in Abhinava IPVV I, p.186-87. 40 Vocabulary, P.911.
--------------------------------------- 12 12 transcendental, the universal subject, must coexist with an infinite multiplicit y of perceptions and thoughts, and thought of perceived objects (IPV 1.2.10). But how many predicates can co-exist in the same subject? And this being admitted, how to account for the causal connection, for example, without admitti ng 'Relationship' cause and effect? In fact, according to the Buddhists, the relati onship of cause and effect is not really. There is no relation type action factors of action, since such 41 'Relationship' is not perceived apart. According Dharmak ... rti causation is a regular succession "this product is 42 it. " But M dhyamikas go further in deconstructing saying: "This being, it appears. " This formula does that describe a relationship that is not one. Car although the formula unifies and do two things coexist, it is clear that the int ention here is nothing to suggest any substrate of 'this' and 'that', but rather means this is only the present, beyond judgment. Only regular connections are not they required to operate in the world and to be able to transcend? Yes, but this meet Buddhists, it Just find regular succession. Discernment requires minimalism in the material, and perceived the obvious: Things appear in conjunction with the presence of certain other: here everything we perceive and nothing more. There are no other relationship as that of cause 43 effect. This is the only permissible relationship, and yet it is a construction of the mind: Anticipation and posteriority proved one thing to another is relatively heard in everyday life through a mental construct. This is 44 is meant by 'cause and effect'.
For example, soft clay and informs is perceived, then there is a perception of a bowl clay. But nobody sees, no substance is perceived. Basically, one can not speak relationship of cause and effect. There is a series of perceptions. And again sa y that requires a unit. The only proper speech is the silence that comes naturally in mind (if there is still a mind!) of those who understand it. However, let us remember also that although the Buddhist logicians formulation l eads to indescribable beyond any linking the relationship is allowed in terms of the 'tr uth 45 conventional 'and necessary for the intelligibility of progress towards enlighte nment. By Therefore, it is equally difficult for them to clarify this 'non-relationship'. For even in their minimalist description of the relationship of cause and effect, they are f orced to admit 'Anticipation and posteriority' and therefore the category of relation. In other words, some a coexistence of the one and the multiple is in fact accepted. The Buddhist posi tion, trying to describe what in his words is radically indescribable, is doomed to contradiction. In this sense, these objections are aimed at both objectors. 41 IPKV 1.2.10. 42 g rjuna. Another school founded by the famous N 43 IPK 1.2.10. 44 IPK 1.2.11 45 The Awakening, that is to say, the state of a buddha, with three bodies and fiv e principled knowledge, the Double omniscience, etc.. So that Buddhists theses are articulated at one end ra dically different Nietzsche.
--------------------------------------- 13 13 Anyway, the only relationship recognized by Buddhist logicians can not establish a relationship between the Lord and cognition, as there is that cognit ions: Therefore we have the experience of momentary entities. Nothing more 46 appears in the direct perception. Finally, at the end of chapter II.2, Buddhists emphasize the contradictory natur e any relationship: [None of the definitions we give the relationship is not eligible] because, as It is based on two related terms, it can not have the same nature.
The gloss says: A relationship is based on two terms (dvi?? ~ Ha) and it is not logically tenabl e 47 it is in two while preserving its unity. The relationship indeed been defined in different ways, but all surround the ide a of "Bilocation" (dvi?? ~ hat). According to this view realistic relationship requir es that both related terms are also present simultaneously. If the relationship is the unity of many things, it must lose its unity precisel y Because of this association with a multiplicity: A relationship is the mutual contact of two things. [Or do you think the relatio nship same time] is one. How is this possible? What are all a place can not exist in another. Because there would be this consequence unaccept able 48 it is separated from its essence. Abhinava gives the example of a jar which exists in two houses (API 202-3). However, can we conceive the relationship as a dependency or need ( pek?: A) between particular things? For example, we say that the shoot 'needs' of seed, or that the genitive in the phrase 'the servant of the king (r jña puru?? ã ) 'Requires' name. Dharmak ... rti replied that this was likewise inadmissible, be cause it implies as contradiction. First indeed, particular things exist insofar effects as they are produced, they are 'done'. Henceforth, they are perfect that they are everything they should be. They exist by themselves. They have therefore need anything "... since a thing is [already] done does not need a 49 other. " But should we not assume a substrate to these individuals when they are by products yet? No, because then they do not exist. Or there can be a relations hip between two things that do not exist. In other words, if a thing is, it does not need an ything, and so it is not, it may have no need. Moreover, this need is not reciprocal. Or relationship requires mutual dependence. The need must also be present in the two terms connected. We must distinguish between the expectation (unmukhat ) that may exist between two beings (for example between two lovers), and the relationship. For this expectat ion does not coincide necessarily. When only the relationship accepted by Dharmak ... rti, the cause and effect, it is not a relationship in the sense understood by realists. Cause and effect are in fact n ot 46 IPV I.2.9. (I p. 115). 47 IPKV 1.2.11. 48 Ibid. 49
--------------------------------------- 14 14 simultaneously present: they belong to the contrary at different times. As we said above, this relation is false as a relationship (: as it implies a generalization), being ultimately reduced to a mere succession presence and absence (bh abh will go). In other words, the unity of a multiplicity and not as a multiplicity unit. Any judgment - and thus any recognition of a self or a single Lord - Are impossible. For Buddhists, it is all simply imagined. Thus appears better what is at stake in this issue. Indeed, if things are not a condition of possibility only one Lord, who has so to speak, then I could not recognize "me that has these attributes, I am the Lord." Now see the responses proposed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. The transcendental ego Transcendental Manifestation In Chapter I, utpala summarizes his argument: "The establishment [= the existence] of inert entities [= objective] is based on living [= cognitive operations]. The lives of the living, we want it consists in the [Power] Knowing and acting. " This argument is divided into two major movements: (1) be objects depends cognitions. (2) Any cognitive apparatus (including Buddhist objections) depend o n cognition unlimited unlimited Manifestation ® iva what is. Utpala demonstrate his thesis that nothing occurs outside the Event, which is transcendental in that it is the condition of possibility of all. This argument, of course next to the idealism of Berkeley, is developed in Chapter I, 5. It is pretty much inspired by the Buddhist school of idealism (Yog cara). In this discussion, the opponents are those who believe in the exist ence of objects outside of consciousness (that is to say both the event). Pratyabhijñ doctrine of the event by itself (or auto-brightness svaprak ?? ATVA) purports to explain how a conscious epistemologically based all cognition. Most of the arguments advanced by the idealistic ® Aivas is that consciousness is not only a subjective element of any cognition, but is subject to these cognitions: If the object was not the nature of consciousness / event, it would appearance as before. Being manifest can be different [from 50 object]. The event is the essence of the object. 50 IPK 1.5.2
--------------------------------------- 15 15 In addition, any event is also representation (Vimar?: A). Because without this ressaisissement self, consciousness is like a mirror or a crystal, that is to sa y an object: The essence of the event is the representation, otherwise the event, although that 'colored' by the objects is similar to an inanimate object, such as a 51 crystal [which is 'transparent', but unconscious]. Both terms refer to one and the same reality, consciousness. Opponents' idealist critics "make it so that the objection that the object outside can not be seen, it can nevertheless be inferred as follows: The cause of each of the various events is unknown. This makes it necessary inference of a [subject] outside. For consciousness, which is [itself] without 52 diversity can not be the cause of the extraordinary diversity of events. Therefore it must be assumed that the objects are the cause of events as they reflection in the clear mirror of consciousness. Utpala responds, in agreement with the majority of Indian thought, that the infe rence of a relationship between cause and effect depends on the observation of their invari able succession During a series of direct perceptions. The inference therefore lack of realistic essential empirical basis: Inference certainly can not be allowed on an object that is never appeared. [But] there has never been a demonstration outside the object 53 event. Therefore it can not be established by inference. In his commentary, Abhinavagupta offers a rebuttal by the absurdity of this socalled evidence: Inference, as it is a conceptual construction, is [so] of awareness / event. If the object - blue for example - is not even including by this [kind of consciousness that is the inference], then it can not be inferr ed. If [Object] is included in [the consciousness], then it has the fuel awareness / demonstration under the principle "The object is not set light / visible / displayed as before. " It is not outside. By Therefore, any evidence adduced to prove that there is an external object, prove s on the contrary it is not outside. So that [your argument] contradicts itself. However, this does not imply a devaluation mere abstraction, as we will see later. This inference is not only illogical, but it is more useless on the epistemological. Can account for the ordinary experience without the assumption of objects outside:
You try to establish external objects with a conjecture which difficulty [: inference]. Nothing is explained by the [alleged objects external]. Because the behavior is established worldly / explained simply by 51 IPK 1.5.11 52 IPK 1.5.4 53 IPK 1.5.8-9
--------------------------------------- 16 16 these appearances / events that you have listed. There can be 54 worldly behavior with something that is always subject to inference. In other words, let us not the thing itself, the asylum of ignorance. It is unne cessary to explain the known by the unknown. However, unlike Leibniz and Buddhist idealism, not reduce the Aivas ® not the consciousness of individual series, without doors or windows. " Having r educed the object to the conscience, they will then show that consciousness is universal. In other words, there is ultimately a single subject. In the first chapter, as they discuss the presence Powers of Knowing and Acting in all beings, and Abhinava utpala explain that knowledge of others is expected from observing their actions. But this vision of knowledge / awareness of others, if it can escape solipsism, is temporary. Subsequently Abhinava effectively reduces the supposed conscience in others a same subject in the same way that objects have reduced summer: Consciousness does not appear as [an object other than itself expressed as of] 'this'. As being 'this' [of being outside of consciousness] is noncognition [: the opposite of awareness]. Something that appears with a nature could appear with another. Therefore, only consciousness appears. And what is not a nature, that the 'I'. Even aware of other [: objects] is nothing other than our own self. Otherness is fully due to accidental attributes such as the body, etc.. And it [: attribute acciden tal as the body] was determined as not being other [consciousness]. Of so that everything can be found in the subject category. In reality, there is a single subject. And he alone exists. Thus he was told: 'There is the consciousne ss of our own self in the form of ourselves and of others. " Therefore, a start with the 'Supreme Being knows' to 'the worm knows' - there is 55 one subject. All cognitions, possessions apparently several topics that do not belong the same consciousness. Consciousness, that is to say, being manifest, that never goes without a conscie nce what is clear, is not a private property. In this respect, it resembles rather space, the presence of different containers seems accidental break also in separate spaces. Individual subjects are only visible boundaries,
thus appearing within this event that is unlimited consciousness. It is therefore established that consciousness is the condition of possibility o f all. Alone is independent - since it has no contrary - and this is its independent sovereignty. Since consciousness reveals objects without material or instrument as like a magician, it is the Lord. This sovereignty is called "will." Abhinava explains that this is because awareness created objects by sheer will qu'Utpaladeva uses the term 'God'. It is clear that this series of idealistic arguments, as they demonstrate that t he subject possesses this creative power called Power, themselves already point to conclusion: the identity of the perceiver with the Lord. However, all the objections made by the Buddhists have not yet found reply. Buddhist logicians in effect claiming that any recognition is incorrect definition, since the objects are singular. Each is a kind of absolute , and words, such as "thieves entering an empty house" are but vain sacrilege. Any language, as it is an aggregate of generalities, is a tissue of error. 54 IPV 1.5.6 55 IPV 1.1.4
--------------------------------------- 17 17 Responses ® Aivas take advantage of this paradox that "any proposal wrong ", as we have shown in the first part. This second set of arguments focuses on consciousness as representation and self ressaisissement. In any experience, it is the event (called the Lord), which is itself same (this is called the Power). As the Lord is the Manifestation Unlimited makes possible any event, the power is limitless Representation enables all representations, social judgments. This power is identified with the Supreme Word, the absolute knowledge that takes forever to h is same. It is a recognition that a judgment based all judgments. Abhinava here repeats the arguments of philosopher grammarian Bhart hari who sai d that "There is no cognition in the world that is not accompanied by speech. Each cognition is thought as woven word. If this eternal condition of cognition / consciousness wi th the nature of the speech should cease, consciousness can not be conscious. It is thi s 56 [Condition] that enables the judgment / recognition. "The Aivas ® agree with grammarians say that primordial unity is necessarily our relationship judgments and situations to which they apply. Indeed, contrary to what people th ink relativists, no thought is possible without an absolute foundation. Any interpre tation object, as contingent as it is based on an interpretation not contingent. In oth er words, there is no true perception exists that envelope and also a judgment So one interpretation (inner speech is often not discursive: for example in situations of extreme urgency, or animals), but then it is also true that
arguments in general and especially those Buddhists are intelligible only if the thesis of utpala is true. Similarly Abhinava noted that learning a language is conventional impossible if not already aware of a linguistic nature. Memory would impossible. Conscience, as soon as it perceives an object, remain mired in virtu ally He would become inert by itself would lose its nature of consciousness (that is to say the subject). Distraction, versatility are not a defect of consciousness, but one aspect of its power ressaisissement infinite, which makes it great. It therefore appears that the Aivas ® invert the Buddhist understanding of the rel ationship between universals and singulars. Buddhists hold that consciousness is to gross the singular, only real and linguistic constructions that are applied mistakenly take the form of universals or relationships. ® Aivas the contrary, mak e récognitifs judgments that are the first syntheses linguistic elements, and take that are singular developed a second time by synthesizing these summaries! These are universals which stand by combinations. Abhinava explains the formation of by singular synthesis of universals with time and place, which are themselves universals, according to taste, purpose and education of the perceiving subject. For example, a pitcher appear as different things depending on its use as a container designed water so urce profit or solid object. Finally, the effectiveness causal criterion of reality according to the Buddhist logicians, is to the ® Aivas one manifestation among others, part of a universal synthesis for produce a singular. Efficiency is reduced to the externalization: cause is simpl y manifest itself as other than itself. These are the basic arguments about the transcendental representation. Idealistic arguments associated with the event, they show how representation is constitutive of the object: 56 Cited in IPV 01/05/14
--------------------------------------- 18 18 Here, things exist insofar as they are shown / judged. It is as well as the existence depends on the event. That is to say, the manifestation of existence depends on the representation that is generated by this consciousness. Car if something was not represented / rekeying, we could then respond to the question of why it is neither blue nor yellow, neither existing nor non-existent . Therefore, there is one thing in the exact extent it is represented and 57 is not contradicted [by another representation]. It is this idealism that strengthens the arguments against skepticism ® Aivas Budd hist. Because
consciousness in which everything has been reduced is unique, any interpretation / representation must be a self-representation. The following passage summarizes how the epistemological argument demonstrates the reality of Manifestation ® iva-/ ® akt iRepresentation: Power (?? Akti) due to be creative, which has the nature of sovereignty, contains all the Powers. This [creative power] to the nature of the Representation. The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of the event, because of it s own self an object of cognition, because there is a knower [...] In so, because it represents / recognizes his own self, and because everything is 58 contained in it, it appears as [such objects] as blue etc.. Not only the subject is the cause of thoughts, but it is just as well because what he perceives. But it is not wrong to say that neither is what he thinks. Memory is obviously wrapped up in this argument, and treated particularly in two important chapters. According to the Buddhist logicians, rem embering is possible only through the print left by past experiences, and without it is necessary to assume a consciousness remaining outside the series cognitions. The Aivas ® will show them some of the characters do not recall beings can only explained by the impressions of memory. First, they start by admitting that impressions can account the similarity of cognition memorial with direct experience of the object. For Abhinava, impressions act as a sort of 'shape memory', comparable to one that allows a branch folded to recover its previous position. But memory is more than cognition cognition similar to the past. If there were that the recall would result in a type cognition 'is a crock,' and not 'I've seen this pitcher. " This recognition memorial in summary form can be explained without assuming an awareness about both the original experiment and the present experiment. This argument is based on a thesis shared by Buddhists and Aivas ®, according that knowledge is not a permanent arrangement of the subject but a succession of episodic cognitions. Each knows his own cognitive content but is unable to highlight, demonstrate another cognition. Each being "confined to her same, "it is necessary to admit that a subject performs synthesis. It can not be in turn inert. It can not be that consciousness: A memorial cognition is produced by the impression of a past experience. However, since it is contained in itself, it does not know previous experience. A cognition highlights herself. It is 57 IPV 1.1.3 58 IPV 01/05/19
--------------------------------------- 19 19 not subject to another [cognition] as cognition of taste [not object] 59 cognition of a color.
The same applies to the understanding of the similarity of content of experience . Printing memorial itself is inert and incapable of recognizing its similarity to the original experience. Such is the power of recollection, modality of consc iousness self. In other words, if the Buddhists were right, the world would be destroyed during the. And The same would apply if, as the Buddhists still believe, remembering, as linguistic construction, was an error (since the singular - only for real object s efficient - by definition are absolutely different from each other). The retort ® Aivas coherence and congruence observed in worldly behavior they exclude based on errors: So [the perspective bouddhis you] the course of the world would be destroyed. Ho wever, it is not destroyed by this single curse you love "Whether destroyed! ". Since it appears it is established. And an effort should be made t o make 60 account. However, in another chapter on "Power exclusion semantics", which seeks to show how discursive language is founded in reason and possible from a kind of Word, Abhinava admits that the world as a multiplicity contradicted by t he unit absolute consciousness, can not be fully possible: This [object] which is manifested [and so real it is nevertheless] separated fro m the consciousness. Consciousness [separated] from him. Consciousness [separated] fro m other consciousnesses. An object of consciousness [separated] from another objec t consciousness. This [triple] exteriority is not really possible. So we say it is simply a manifestation / appearance of separation. As such, this [Separation] is not ultimately real. For this [event transcendental] is the ultimate reality of all creation. Because of this externalization of all sides, refers to a state of complete separation. The ability to manifest this [separati on] 61 Power is the exclusion semantics. This means that any externality, as it appears, exists within the consciousness, which is being manifest highlighted. The externality is only poss ible in the interiority of the show. In this sense, it is an illusion. Now, since the ego is the absolute manifestation / representation, and that it i s foundation on which events / performances are only fragments or episodes, it is clear that the empirical ego, which are series of cognition, are only frag ments the absolute ego. Donations must recognize that the empirical ego is not really a object sequence. This topic is intended as a summary of objects. But by the powe r which this synthesis is possible and done, is not subject itself or the result o f a
synthesis. This is the ultimate subject, the ego absolute absolute because it's never been an issue. So that he who represents himself as an aggregate of objects more or less unifie d saying, 'I am this body, this sensation,' or this or that idea, as is one of the ten idiots in history when, having crossed a river, each of the ten in nine other ac count forgetting to count himself. When the thesis that consciousness is discontinuous because it disappears during deep sleep, coma or fainting, she still relies on 59 IPK 3.1.2 60 IPV 1.3.7 61 Ibid.
--------------------------------------- 20 20 confusion of subject and object. Used during the day to identify objects well delimited, the subject takes the disappearance of objects to a disappearance of itself, which is impossible, because no conscience, no objects could be recognized (and remembere d the clock). This lack of effect object is still an object, a kind of blueprint o f the object and externality, which can not be revealed by consciousness. Here and in other arguments that we can not explain in detail (especially those on the power of action, cognition is a kind of action), the pattern is always the same: reduce all categories than the relationship. So that all the objections Buddhists, for whom only the multiple is real, only confirm the unit consciousness. Finally, we must show how this consciousness deserves the title of ego. Accordi ng to the Pratyabhijñ , selfhood is nothing other than what ressaisissement infinite consciou sness, synonymous Representation, Judgment Recognition. It is the consciousness of the Event. However, according Dharmak ... rti, this ego is only linguistic construct ion, since it not only has the nature of representation, but, like all ideas, there is in opposition to another. Indeed, for the Buddhist logicians as For Derrida, the words do not refer to extralinguistic reality, but only other words, like the words in a dictionary that is defined by negation reciproc al by 'différance'. The word "I" has no real content, it is the result of a negation, an arbitrary reduction, since its existence does body as a counterpart "Other", ie both the other series psychic other objects. Utpaladeva replied that the representation "I," which is the essence of the even t, is a mental construct, although it is embodied in a nutshell. For construction is an act of mental determination with a duality. In other words, even associate d with speech, the "I" is not a word, because the words are determinations that are the negation of the contrary. However, to operate this denial should be able to represent the same plane somehow the event and its opposite. But this
For the event, a contrast can not be perceived or represented, since the fact to be evident is the essence of any representation. Since then this "I" is not o n opposite end, it is the absolute selfhood. It is then necessary to understand is that the ego ego is not worldly, but the ultimate subject, beyond subject and object. Or rath er, the ego relative, that is the absolute ego, when it takes a finite object, the other out side, etc.. But Here it is important to understand that the finite ego is somehow deduced necess arily the absolute ego, because the self can not help but objectify, to demonstrate an d back constantly. Creativity is the only more or less adequate to the conditions of possibility of his being. Where a fundamental distinction made between the empir ical ego, which there is not gasoline, processions in various more or less adequate, and procession "pure" in which the subject-object duality has recovered adequately a s inner consciousness. There are so many "I". The following passage summarizes these points: The nature of this [so] as Grand Lord consists in the fact that it recognizes it has a continuous recognition that its existence (= its event) does not depend on anything else, and it is [that] a mass undivided bliss. Declaratory judgment that presenting himself as an "I" is the pure and absolutely unique knowledge / action of God, which is illustrated in a game etc.. Knowledge is Manifestation. Action is representation, which consists of a independence characteristic of the agent. In addition, the performance envelope is be manifest. So that knowledge and action are ultimately that representation. However, cognition is in all respects just
--------------------------------------- 21 21 representation. That is why we said no to it [consciousness] would 62 an inert object. And the same [representation] is Action. But if everything is subject to a single topic, everything should appear simult aneously, that is to say atemporellement. And - Utpaladeva answers - this is indeed the ca se. For God, everything is eternally manifest. How, then a succession of cognitions / events it is possible? That is to say, how an action is possible? Abhinava think the action as a transition from a single unit in the unity of a multiplicity: The essence of things, although under the Representation wrap it contrary aspects of his essence. Due to their chagrin, these [aspects] appear in a sequence, thereby making this [gasoline] substrate 63 unifying action. This is as empirically:
By force of this consciousness which is a strong recognition [Self] there apprehension that "this is essentially the same hand." [In this experience, there is first] no differentiation of the body (that is to say the hand). However, there are also [ironically] a variety of forms which, Because of their characters to the contrary, can not exist in the same species [ ie hand in an instant given]. This [diversity unit] is thought of as 64 action. Time, where change is a way for God to overcome the contradiction.
Conclusion Ultimately, ® Aivas looking for a way to avoid extreme alternatives which Buddhists (and both thinkers Brahmanists) wanted to be relegated. In their conceptual syntax and ritual, Buddhists, like the majority of Indian thinkers tend to focus on the object (ie, factors of action semantics, that is the accusative, instrumental, ablative and locative). The Aiv as ® instead value the agent (the nominative). Thus qu'Abhinava sees the supreme agent until in the grammar Agent empirical Here [in our] action is in reality nothing more than the will of Supreme Lord. [This will] is a continuous self-awareness whose nature the unfettered freedom [clean agent], which depends on nothing other ... For [subjects such as finite] Caitra and Maitra, willingness / intenti on [Expressed as] "I cook" is the action. Thus, although [the cook] is in connection with many movements like putting something on the fire etc.., the [intention] "I cook" is uninterrupted. This is nothing other tha n for "I cook" which appears in these movements. However, there can be no sequence in the [intent]. The same self-consciousness of the Lord, consisting of a desire [which can be expressed as] "I reign" "I is", "I illustrated in the universe," "I created drunkenness" and "I 62 IPV 08/01/11 63 IPV 2.1.1 64 IPV 2.1.5
--------------------------------------- 22 22 realizes / is me. " The essence of such representations is none other than 65 "I", and it has no sequence. So that in a sentence like "Devadatta cooked rice in the pan with wood ", the factors such as wood, pot etc.. appear immersed in the action. And action in turn rests on the agent. For Aivas even actions which appear to be object (such as "move this chariot") based on the agent in its power synthetic representation.
Finally, the unity allows interpret highlight
note that this explanation of the action in general as indicative of of consciousness that is the subject, is crucial for Aivas ® because it ritual activity, as a kind of action designed to implement the underlying unity in action:
All things rest without separating ® iva, which has all the perfections complete. Henceforth, through [this kind of action] what worship, [the adept ach ieves that] the factors of action [are not separated from the absolute ego, ® iva]. In t he case of worship [indeed], all factors of the action is shown as are not separated ® iva. This also occurs in [ordinary activities such that] walking etc.. A horse that has been trained to carry loads in no encloses not betray his training even on the battlefield. Similarly, one who factors identified with ® iva action during training what activity ritual eliminates the duality between the factors of action [and selfhood of the follower as absolute selfhood], even [when engaged in worldly activities such as] walking, etc.. So, for those who exercised and unity, the universe appears immediately and clearly [...] as the fullness of God. 65 IPV 2.1.8