1G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975 SEC. QUIRICO P.

EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners. Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3 b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines. c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... . h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4 Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality. On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6 As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10 We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory

function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none. Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15 Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22 There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations. We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination. A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35 Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue. WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result. Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.

Separate Opinions

. . decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled to testify.FERNANDO. 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers. it cannot be said. however. At any rate." 1 While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO. but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process. This Court has spoken to the same effect. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual.. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1. For the present. to such an aspect.. sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency." 4 Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway. . It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference. that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. TEEHANKEE. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and respect. the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of Davis 1 and that of Jaffe. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a witness not as the party proceeded against.. happily."" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. concurring: The opinion of the Court. Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity. by all means. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz. go so far as to render it meaningless.. that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. What is more. v. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent.. 2. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement. consistently with the Constitution. Jr. the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation. Morton Salt Co. expressed in terms. . Candor compels the statement. 7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin.. 9 It suffices. Although the "right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. As of now then. . concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin. . dissenting: I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. 14 There is. They are endowed with public attributes.. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. The doctrine formulated in such American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.." .. call for respect. he is not without a remedy. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. ably penned by Justice Martin. While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation. 1. even if far from detailed. read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. 4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt. 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges". is both learned and comprehensive. is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such. That for me does not conclude matters though. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Boyd having been cited in a number of cases." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. American Tobacco Co. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.. .. respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination. 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee.. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside.... it may suffice if I express my misgivings. Federal Trade Comm. Hence this separate opinion. . J. however. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration.. I can yield my concurrence." . therefore. from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities.. investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila.. with the question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us. corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot. to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause.. in the light of the ruling in Planas v. which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. 3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation. 11 I would. They have a collective impact upon society. Gil.. J.

GUEVARA. like what was done in other cases. any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court. must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. Pascual Jr. petitioner. viz." 13 There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . Enrique M. as a pure matter of legal principle. the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight." 8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee. such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1. Dayot for respondent. BAUTISTA ANGELO. and to be informed of such right" (Article IV. current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. along with other rights granted an accused. since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly. and as conceded in the petition itself. Kapunan. No. vs." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas. supra."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated. More and more in line with the democratic creed. after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office. had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence. J. Bd. The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena. 1958 JOSE L. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect. that "since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action. of going further into this issue. Fernando for petitioner. respondent. supra. 6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him. the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.. 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit". of Examiners 7 is equally in point.All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. Dominador D. petition. the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. G. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment. Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants. precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion. which tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending . silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. but also to take the witness stand. wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions. however. The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing.: Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2." That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above. he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand. 14 I find no need. graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy.R. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual. vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22. To quote from Chief Justice Warren. stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed. is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City. under settled doctrine. whether physical or mental.) Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs.. L-12596 July 31. the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions. as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect.

1957 which. a newspaper of nation-wide circulation. and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials" (Section 2. Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of May 13. and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections. Hence the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC. Inc. 1957 and was denied on May 17. b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists.000 ballot boxes to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists. awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO). Among these powers are those embodied in Section 5 thereof which. Any controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried. Nacionalista Party vs. In this sense.. after hearing. 5." be applied to the case at hand. as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same. under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. On May 28. The Commission. 1957. including the determination of the number and location of polling places. awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34. after hearing. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14. respectively. Inc. for ready reference. — The Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it. Its powers are defined in the Constitution. On May 8.00. Co. (ASIATIC). 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. Any decision. affecting elections. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court. bring into disrepute. And as an incident of this power. the same cannot be applied to the instant case. (ACME). Thereafter. said provision would be unconstitutional. all administrative questions. 1957. The Solicitor General. answering summons issued to him by the Commission. and on June 4. 1957. and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions. 1957 and the supplementary petition thereof of June 1.... Gaz. 1957. where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative function for purchasing ballot boxes.000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. 85 Phil. the Commission. 1957. 1957. The second petition was filed on May 16. after proper negotiations. said power cannot apply to the present case because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a closed case when the article in question was published. On May 13. we quote: SEC.. The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of free. 11. The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2. the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing. both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. The Revised Election Code supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16. The third petition was filed on May 20. hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. Co. and which article likewise tended to degrade. the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12. Inc.00 each. 1957 which. 73 Phil. save those involving the right to vote. and delegate such power to any officer. 2356). Inc. appeared and filed a motion to quash on the following grounds: a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. orderly.. 180. 101. vesting the Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for in Rule of the Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. 1957. The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2. the 11. 1957. was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May 16. It shall decide. on May 4. and honest elections (Sumulong vs. . after these corporations had filed their answers. order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt of the Commission.000 ballot boxes at P17. etc. praying for reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission of May 4 and 13. Powers of Commission. It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try." Petitioner. heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is filed.000 and 11. Commission on Elections.64. tended to interfere with and influence said Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. according to the charge. one-half each. Article X). Co. the Commission held a formal hearing thereon on May 24. It provides that it "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. for should Section 5 of Republic Act No. P14. order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court. the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. 1957. The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections. the Acme Steel Mfg. Any violation of any final and executory decision.. 47 Off. and the respective answers of the latter two corporations to said petitions. 1957. 1957. the article in question was a fair report because it could be assumed that the news report of the respondent was based on the motion for reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel where there was an allegation of fraud. the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending. and P17. 288. Co.000. issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it. 1957. denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in connection with the alleged publication. 1957 issue of the Sunday Times.investigation and determination before said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20.

Enage. Montemayor. 47 Off. 80 Phil. On the other hand. vs. it did not exercise any judicial function. in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Gaz. and to investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of canvassers (Ramos vs. R. J. 135. Lugay. it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections are to be held. 271. while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought it for determination. Gaz. 810). influence and interference from any private person or public official. 680). 2570. and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials. 93 Phil. U. 867.. Wherefore. Director of Prisons. for it is merely an independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. B. 126. in all their sessions. et al. Endencia and Felix. printing of election forms and ballots. Commission on Elections. And as to what are the ministerial duties which the Commission on Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of elections. Such being the case. Vera. Director of Prisons. 103 Phil. In Re Sotto.. 190. In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. 3863). Padilla. 47 Off. its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings. et al. saving the right to vote. et al. 80 Phil. 296 P. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the case set forth in its resolution of June 20. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case before us. Of these preparatory acts. Decker. As to what question may come within this category. Commission on Elections. 2851). Case No. individually and as a whole. neither does it have the power to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon the courts or the electoral tribunals (Ibid. (Decision of the Commission on Elections.. establishment of precincts and designation of polling places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters.E. 944). neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. Paras. In proceeding on this matter. It is further essential that once organized. orders and mandates of courts. Commission on Elections. All these preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of the Commission to resolve. .. honestly and in an orderly manner. consequently.). It is also essential that the printing of election forms and the purchase of election supplies and their distribution are done freely. appoinments of members of the board of inspectors. printing of election forms and ballots.. But this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise. JJ. appointments of members of the boards of inspectors. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for investigation. In Re Sims 37 P. 94 Phil. are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their duties without any pressure. Imperial. and. But it is clear that. Ibid. so as to as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery. A. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction. 271)..although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13.. C. 85 Phil. in establishing precincts or designating polling places. Hacney. It is essential that the Commission or its authorized representatives. 58 S. concur. 136). 148. G. Gaz.. et al. 49 Off. S. anomalies and misconduct committed by any official in these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the Commission to correct. We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration. it is the duty of the Commission to see that the boards of inspectors. orderly and honest elections. 36 Phil. for such power is inherently judicial in nature. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent. Article VIII). and to the enforcement of judgments. 46 Off.. the boards of inspectors shall be given all the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance with law freely. it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election which might not have been free. It stems from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections and in so proceeding it provoked a dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job. the preparation of the permanent list of voters is the matter involved in this case. nor does it have the power to order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the election returns for it is a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. In Re Kelly. It is incumbent upon the Commission on Elections to see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely.W.). which to our mind is completely an administrative matter. Reyes. 196)1 Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies. 31 N. 1957. L. vs. to annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers (Mintu vs. orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. with pronouncement as to costs. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Gaz. 744. appointment of precincts and designation of polling preparation of registry lists of voters. 35 Phil. It is incumbent upon the Commission to see that all these preparatory acts will insure free. Reyes. 722).. October 28. In other words. the first duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies... Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers. Loo Hoe. all administrative questions affecting elections. All irregularities.. Prudente.. L-1834). Roberts vs. 1951. to come under its jurisdiction. may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. 85 Phil. No.. Imperial. it only discharged a ministerial duty. it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law.. petition is granted. honestly and in an orderly manner. honestly and in an orderly manner. honestly and in an orderly manner. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. and only very recently this Court has held that the Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. 58 Phil. J. the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election.. that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. 722).. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs.. It is further essential that the political parties or their duly authorized representatives who are entitled to be represented in the boards of inspectors must have the freedom to choose the person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the country. it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano.. Swena. so as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery in order that the people who are legally qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able to cast their votes to express their sovereign will. the following resume made by the Commission itself in a controversy which was submitted to it for determination is very enlightening: In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Thus. including the determination of the number and location of polling places. 2375). must act freely. All provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations relative to these processes preparatory for election day.

it is whether respondent Court. in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. "The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor organization shall be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof. 1966. et al.. The challenge to such competence sought to be fortified by the allegation of the absence of procedural due process was rejected. and to render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities open to inspection by the members. it was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer."4 There was a motion for reconsideration on January 2. Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador. L-27392 January 30. which were all unavailing. after due hearing and judgement. therein named as respondents and petitioners before us. on December 28. The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April 13. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO TABANIAG. as set forth at the opening of this opinion. as President. 1967.3 Then came the order of December 29. As set forth in the brief for the petitioners. 1966.2 Thereafter. receipts. by Associate Judge Joaquin M. respondents. vouchers and other documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition on January 3. 1966.. respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members. vs. de la Rosa for petitioners. Hence the present petition filed on April 3. limited itself to requiring and directing "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador.." only to be met with a refusal on their part to comply. union funds. 1966. With Associate Judge Ansberto P. 1. 1967 and petitioners were required to submit their brief within thirty days under this Court's resolution of July 14.ñèt There was thereafter a general membership resolution reiterating previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union. (h). president and treasurer. After a careful study of the matter.: It is a novel question that presents itself before this Court in this petition for the review of a resolution of respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Ernesto Estrella for respondents.1 can require a labor organization's "books of accounts. Salvador and thereafter en banc.lâwphî1.. receipts. to deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of accounts. but then. pass books. specifically . first acting through Associate Judge Joaquin M. Said respondents are hereby required to comply strictly with this Order. was again elected as President in an election on November 15. Respondents did not take the trouble of filing an answer within the period expired on June 17. from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union. a legitimate labor organization duly registered. union funds. to declare present petitioners. There was no brief for respondents. the President and Treasurer. upheld its power to do so. the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President and Treasurer of the union.000. 1967." 6 . vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such labor organization. FERNANDO. there was. of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association. "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by a resolution of the majority of the member. a complaint against them under Section 17 filed by the prosecution division of the respondent Court. petitioners. Salvador which. respectively..00. In the light of the interpretation to be accorded the applicable legal provisions and after a careful consideration of the contention that such a power to issue the challenged order cannot be deemed as possessed by respondent Court which moreover did not accord petitioners procedural due process. pass books."5 . the complaint sought. In the complaint. we have reached the conclusion. Pablo Catura. The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to assure compliance with internal labor organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate to substantiate alleged violations may be found in paragraphs (b). respectively. they were responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966 demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial transaction of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to inspection by the members. The order as issued first by Associate Judge Joaquin M. 1967 with a preliminary injunction issued upon petitioners' posting a bond of P2. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision on October 4. We have no reason to reverse. being heard prior to the issuance of such order. on December 27.R. of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association. instead of granting the injunction sought. 1971 PABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR. No. cancelled such meeting. Thus: "The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the organization. J. the principal complainants being now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization.G. 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued. that petitioners cannot prevail. 1967. the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc on February 28. 1968. guilty of unfair labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act. bank accounts. sought an injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who. as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents Court. we cannot say that thereby respondents Court was in error. After setting forth that complainants had exhausted all remedies provided in the union's constitution and by-laws. as respondents. and (l) of the aforecited Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. for them to cease and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of. it turned out."7 To repeat. 1967 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. bank accounts. Paredes dissenting. It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership meeting so that petitioners could be confronted about the status of union funds. The respondent Court. thus compelling the members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any success. which moreover in their opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. Joselito J. Specifically." but again there was no response. Such a brief was duly filed on September 19 of that year. Salvador and thereafter by respondent Court en banc must be sustained.

Teehankee. the petition for certiorari is denied.J. 1979 were posted in different places within the premises of the Central Azucarera Don Pedro Lumbangan. alleging that as the Batangas Labor Union."8 WHEREFORE. 1973 and the election scheduled for March 3. Inciong. Villamor and Makasiar. 2 Petitioner was not informed of the action taken on such motion. 1972. Moreover. 6 Subsequently. petitioner. since as was shown in the very brief of petitioners. it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration.' There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party was heard on a motion for reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. TOLENTINO. 1 Upon receipt of such verified complaint on January 9. the substance rather than the form being paramount. it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. 1973. instead. AMADO INCIONG. No such showing has been made. G. charging petitioner Arcadio R. Nasugbu. Batangas. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law. 1973. the place of employment. pass books. As was stated in a recent decision. there should be no question about the correctness of the order herein challenged. Thus: "As far back as 1935. JJ. FERNANDO. there was a motion for reconsideration. All that the challenged order did was to require petitioners. On its face.B. respondent National Labor Relations Commission issued an order directing the Batangas Labor Union "to hold its election of officers within twenty (20) days from receipt" thereof "in accordance with its constitution and by-laws under the supervision of the Registrar of Labor Relations who shall thereafter report the result to the said respondent National Labor Relations Commission. to be conscientious and rational at the very least. thru its then Chairman. J. Domingo Cinco for himself as private respondent. So it was held by this Court in a recent decision. Amado G. It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute. 1973 a copy of such order and on February 8. 2. and no useful purpose would be served by first hearing petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued. Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that there was a denial of procedural due process. Barredo. informed the herein petitioner that the elections of officers of the Batangas Labor Union would proceed as scheduled on March 3. has no cured. Porfirio E. C. the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with.. petitioner filed a notice of appeal on February 20.J.R. Makalintal. Zaldivar. bank accounts. For the court to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is. as its president. in this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. perhaps the allegation of the absence of due process would not be entirely lacking in plausibility. Concepcion. 4 As such motion for reconsideration was not acted upon despite repeated requests. No.. notices of the said elections for March 3. and praying that such election be conducted immediately. To paraphrase Justice Laurel. 1973 be suspended in the meanwhile." 3 Petitioner received on February 5. C. the power to investigate. respondents. vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the petition before it on January 3. on February 26. but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. to call for the election of officers in the month of November. 1973 with the Secretary of Labor. 1973.. as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and DOMINGO CINCO.recited an unauthorized disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by the members. HON. Reyes.ñët The facts of this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction speak for themselves. Villanueva & Julio F. 'What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority. 5 Respondent National Labor Relations Commission. 1973. 1973. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. . the Batangas Labor Union filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Batangas. the absence of any hearing. what 'due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice. Tolentino with violating the constitution of the Batangas Labor Union by refusing. receipts. Belmi for petitioner. Jr. Castro. 1979 ARCADIO R. and. 1967 is dissolved and declared to be without any further force or effect. The writ of preliminary injunction issued under the resolution of April 13. filed a motion for reconsideration.:1äwphï1. To repeat. the matter was deemed serious enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. 1967. concur. L-36385 July 25. to "deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of its book of accounts. 1973. Such is not the case however. They demonstrate beyond doubt that the remedy prayed for must be granted. If it were otherwise. beyond question. the due process guarantee was not observed in the issuance thereof and that the subject matter of such complaint is not one of those enumerated under the Rules of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission. a formal motion to such effect being filed on January 11.' the conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process. petitioner on the same date sent an urgent telegram to the respondent National Labor Relations Commission for the cancellation of the hearing of such complaint set for January 12. no such showing can be made. This litigation started with private respondent Domingo Cinco filing a verified complaint on December 12. 1973 as he had to appear on that very day before the then Court of Industrial Relations. which has a separate and distinct personality from the herein' petitioner was not a party in the case before respondent Commission.L. for the Public respondent. 1972 with the then National Labor Relations Commission. as a matter of fact. even if on the assumption purely for argument's sake that there was such a requirement. as President and Treasurer of the labor organization. union funds. vs. Dizon. The pertinent section of the Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of accounts and other records of the financial activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor organization. as above noted. he was notified that on January 30. praying at the same time that the pre-election conference set on February 22. Pedro N. Andres. Clearly. If the books and records sought to be delivered and deposited in court for examination were the private property of petitioners. requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions.

are on leave. 8 After such hearing. Instead. 1973. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to explain why he should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the Commission under Presidential Decree 21 and. to explain why he should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the Commission under the aforesaid Presidential Decree 21. All that was alleged was that he would not enforce the contempt citation. Such an eventuality.5 requiring me to file an answer to the petition for prohibition of the preliminary injunction within ten (10) days from notice. petitioner was served with a copy of a subpoena dated February 28. So the rule of law requires. Manila. Aquino and Concepcion. 21. Had respondent Inciong made clear that he would quash the contempt citation. The union election has been held in accordance with our order and the winner duly proclaimed. requiring the respondents to answer the petition herein. we are evolving a de-legalized labor management system in this country. Subido: 15 "Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power. in March 22. L-10280 September 30. Third. and we expect the fullest cooperation of the Supreme Court in this endeavor. 10 The case was filed on. concur. No. not rights. 1973 and on March 6. both orders having been issued beyond the power of respondent Amado Inciong to issue. It would be a reproach to any legal system if an individual is denied access to the courts under these circumstances. The answer filed by him was of the same tenor. Antonio. It reads in fun as follows: "This refers to your summons in connection with G. March 2. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. There was no retreat from his indefensible position. Phoenix Building. 1973. L-3638. this Court issued this resolution: "Considering the allegations contained. As set forth at the outset. VII. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute." 13 An answer was filed on April 2. but as neither did so.ñët Santos and Abad Santos. did not grant the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte as prayed for in the petition but instead set the application thereof for hearing on March 1.. 1973. No. counsel for respondent Inciong reiterating that the case had become moot and academic as he had no intention of enforcing the contempt citation and alleging that the power to punish for contempt was provided for under Sections 7 and 10 of Presidential Decree No. the plea that a case had become moot and academic would be granted. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. Correctly construed. 3rd Floor. 14 Both petitioner and respondents were required to submit their respective memoranda. "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" 17 certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of first instance. . requiring him to appear at the National Labor Relations Commission.. Enclosed is a copy of Presidential Decree 21 for your information and guidance. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the State is express and enforced. That was an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 6. what was set forth by him in the letter had to be expunged. As was so well stated by Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.. the Supreme Court. and (b) to require said respondent to [comply] with this Court's resolution of March 6. being served with a copy of the subpoena also requiring him to appear likewise before the respondent National Labor Relations Commission. effective immediately until further orders from this Court. after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. received in the Supreme Court on March 15 which. Chairman of the then National Labor Relations Commission. In the absence of a valid grant. is impressed with unorthodoxy. shortly before noon and within the court premises. Department of Labor. the Court Resolved: (a) to require the respondents to file an [answer] thereto within ten (10) days from notice hereof. 942 for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction. reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised. it is admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles. they are devoid of power. docketed as Civil Case No. 9 On the same date. the writ of prohibition is granted and the assailed order of February 28. 1973. as well as petitioner Arcadio R. 1973. took him to task in this resolution: "Considering the letter of Chairman Amado G. stating in chief that the issue evolved in this case is now academic and that the Court has no jurisdiction over the Commission in view of the Presidential Decree No. 1973. 1973.Branch No. Ordinarily. WHEREFORE. 21 be attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising a power not conferred by such decree. under the New Society.. and not to move to dismiss the petition. 1963 . then this litigation could have been terminated. JJ. we must take all pains to avoid. to say the least. Judge Jaime delos Angeles reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. He ought to have known that the competence. citing the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. It must ever be borne in mind by an administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law.R. Tolentino for contempt." 11 There was a letter from respondent Inciong dated March 14. the Court Resolved: (a) to [expunge] said letter from the records of this case. prohibition lies. within five (5) days from notice hereof. It is true that courts." 12 Accordingly. 1. seeking to annul the order of January 30. That is the very essence of a judicial power. JJ. Intramuros. it cannot cover the case likewise of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. Instead." 19 3. more or less." 16 The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. on March 2. It is understandable then why this Court in the resolution above-cited. Let the Secretary of Labor be [furnished] with a copy of the letter of Chairman Amado Inciong and the resolution of March 6. As set forth in Villegas v. R. seeking shelter in the opprobrious term "old society tactics. G. respondent Inciong took the precipitate step of citing him for contempt. 18 The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it. with neither the Commission nor the then Secretary of Labor appearing through counsel. Balayan. Batangas. the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. like any other governmental agencies. although petitioner did. 1973. Inciong of the National Labor Relations Commission. as wen as in the resolution requiring that memoranda be submitted by the parties. the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over us. Second." is an implied admission of his actuation being devoid of support in law. 1973. with Judge Jaime delos Angeles. Jr. filed with reference to the resolution of March 6. at the same time and date. either express or implied.1äwphï1.. Neither was there any contumacious act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial remedy. declared void and of no force or effect. In this particular case. 21. the case was deemed submitted for decision. The resort of respondent Inciong to what has been derisively referred to as epithetical jurisprudence. was of the belief that the legal issues presented should be decided. First of all the issue is not [sic] academic since we do not intend to continue with the contempt proceedings against petitioner Arcadio Tolentino. 7 The court of first instance then presided by Judge Jaime delos Angeles. and (b) to have a [temporary restraining order issued]. now retired. We start with a fundamental postulate. There must be a delegation of such authority. 1973 with due notice to all the parties. against the respondent Domingo Cinco and the National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor. must observe the limits of its jurisdiction. 1973 issued by respondent Amado Inciong. Barredo. not so much because of its offensive tone but much more so by its lack of appreciation for what the law ordains. 2. 1973 is hereby made permanent. 1973 and to prohibit the respondent National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor from enforcing it.

" While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens. maintaining among others. for the power to deport to be exercised. On July 29.00 each.. Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua. Chua Chu Tian. L-6783). Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U. sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him. petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented against them in the Deportation Board for the reason. CHAN TIONG YU. No. by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan.. certiorari. pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. dollars in the total sum of $130. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. Chan Tiong Yu. it is claimed. briefly stated. and that. JAMES UY. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the Deportation Board. with having purchased U. welfare and interest of the State. . 613 (Immigration Act of 1940). R-425 against petitioners. deportation. It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail.QUA CHEE GAN.000. but before the charges filed against them were actually investigated. without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines. consequently. DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel. but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila (G. BARRERA. and their exclusion. At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5. the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition. respondent-appellee. In other words. petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza. or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation. herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty. of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. 1953. After due trial.1 Following the filing of said deportation charges. CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING. SEC. and repatriation therefrom. and now before us. the petitioners instituted the present appeal. as an agent of the President. The court. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and.000. expelled. and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. 613.00.S.00 from the Clark Air Force Base. And the. J. THE DEPORTATION BOARD.00 and cash bond for P10. 20037) denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition. vs. first before said body.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported. 52. P.37). The facts of the case. 1956. the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien. 1952. Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.000. On May 12. likewise. Section 69 of Act No. and Capt. Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank. wherein said petitioner was involved. the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone. and inferentially a ratification. 1952.R. Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac. exercise of this power by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by . with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twentyseven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: . while petitioner Qua Chee Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official. however. which petition was given due course in our resolution of July 7. on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. Special Prosecutor Emilio L. CUA CHU TIAN. he was found in the same decision of the trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of $130. Under Commonwealth Act No. Act No.000. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:. upholding the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security. Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua. 1953. among others. No. Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. petitioners-appellant raised the question of jurisdiction of the Deportation Board. restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges No. that the Deportation Board. a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court.00. there must be a legislation authorizing the same. the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate. after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec. and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners. petitioners-appellants. U. On September 22. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the Board of February 9. SEC. The case was docketed in the lower court as Special Proceeding No. With the enactment of this law. and Basilio King. then in the Court of First Instance. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. James Uy. and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. Charak of the OSI. Consequently." (Comm. 613).S. the court rendered a decision on January 18. Oben for petitioners-appellants. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines. has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest.000. 20037. are as follows:. it provides:. the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition.S. but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation proceedings. unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. dollars. and Basilio King. conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent. that the same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country. 1953. because in its Section 52. A. Proc. Upon their filing surety bond for P10. Qua Chee Gan. to produce witnesses in his own behalf.

and make the corresponding recommendation. 37. And. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 494. Constitution. 1947. Manuel Roxas. all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter. upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners. 613. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted him. Villamiel. dated July 29. (65 Phil. and by the Commissioner of Immigration. 239). dollars. do hereby order that all respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such conditions as he may prescribe. it is. i.S. Furthermore. any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination. to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein provided. after due investigation. 613. the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President. and particularly describing the place to be searched. Be this as it may. does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. the same is declared a popular right of the people and. therefore. in a number of amendatory acts. I. to make arrests. et al. leading to an administrative investigation. why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation. et al. July 26. under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent. Under our Constitution. The right of the People to be secure in their persons. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U. still he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board. 1934). Thus. pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. xxx xxx xxx Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien under investigation. President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable. III. 3 Since then.S. In this connection.this Court in several decisions. as amended. and on no other. however. whether the same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board. fails to provide the President with like specific power to be exercised in connection with such investigation. Philippine Constitution). the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first time. Hence. by virtue of the powers vested in me by law." The first executive order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No.. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent. President of the Philippines. . even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause. houses. constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners. upon whose authority the President's power to deport is predicated.2 Under the present and existing laws. indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Petitioners contend. . papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. 613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act. to conduct investigations and thereafter make recommendations. 3. 1947.. whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of. and facilitating the execution of the order of deportation whenever the President decides the case against the respondent.e. etc. The President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. Bill of Rights. therefore.nèt Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. among others. Under the express terms of our Constitution." (Sec 1. Art. considering that whenever the legislature believes a certain act or conduct to be a just cause for deportation. as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive. in violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. dated January 4. unlike Commonwealth Act No. This is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation. This contention is not without merit. 613. if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him. of course. As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez. deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President. as well as other laws which provide deportation as part of the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation thereof. 1951. such as the authority to order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable. under their provisions. this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. by a judge. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. as justifying deportation of an alien. v. As has been pointed out elsewhere. There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. and if it does. and the persons or things to be seized. must be determined by the judge after examination under oath. 69. 33 dated May 29. a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued.1awphîl. it invariably enacts a law to that effect. it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:. This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation. 398. when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his Executive Order No. grounds have been added to those originally contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. By virtue of Executive Order No. 1936. It was only on January 5. providing — For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board created under Executive Order No. and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport. hoarding or blackmarketing of U. to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board. 230.

must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people.. 398.. reserved his vote. during the investigation. that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person. duly affirmed by the Board of Commissioners. he disclaimed. vs. He retracted his confession in March. it is not imperative for us to rule. for having entered the Philippines "by means of false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry. page 4)." The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when. J. Bureau of Immigration.R. . the first four on 18 November 1959. Dizon. Reyes. however. and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. Paredes. such as his security to life and liberty. concur. JOSE CALACDAY. Respondent's Manifestation. paternity of the respondents because they refused to give him money (Annex "I" to Answer). Padilla. an implied grant of power. It is enough. So ordered. for example. paragraph 4. MONTESA. 1963. Isaac Calacday confessed before an immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons (Petition. such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board. in this proceeding .: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the order of 27 May 1965 of the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila. With the foregoing modification. It may be stated. there is already an order of deportation. 60906. Sometime in February.. J. the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest. VIVO. REYES. official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment. docketed as Civil Case No. To carry out the order of deportation. as amended. Manuel and Benito. The fact that the Constitution itself. nebulous as it is. No.J. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of them an identification certificate as a Filipino citizen. 29 November 1965. Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents. Upon their arrival they sought admission as Filipino citizens. L-11511. under oath. and the last three on 6 December 1959. 60906. Bengzon.either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose. Such. On 9 May 1963. in its decisions of 7 and 11 December 1959.B. with the notation that their admission as such was by a decision of the board of special inquiry. that the power of arrest was not squarely raised in that proceeding. G. page 2. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS. as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.B. AGUSTIN P. as well as the statute relied upon. certainly. as was true before the executive order of President Quirino.R. stating in said warrants their deportability under Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition. all upon the claim that they are Filipino . the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. L-24576 July 29.. As a consequence. if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. Regala and Makalintal. in a fit of anger. namely: to restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have not been arrested. The others remained at large. In other words. as already stated. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether. 1963. After investigation. the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. Be that as it may. 1968 MARTINIANO P. C. page 4. praying for three principal reliefs. Hojilla for respondents. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion.L. No. HON. Executive Order No. Indeed. Unquestionably. ET AL. to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested. why they should not be deported (Annexes "B-1" and "B-2" to Petition). conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of. must be viewed with caution. that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation. Annex "I" to Answer. Bureau of Immigration and DEPORTATION OFFICER. J. with a view to deporting the herein private respondents. took no part. and thus admitted them into this country. Marcelo. Julio. insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens. all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong. The private respondents Juan. however. Pedro. If this is so. one Isaac Calacday.1958). found them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen. Bautista Angelo. prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued. JJ. for them to show cause. or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. But. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On 26 April 1965. Deportation Board (G. in an investigation in the Department of Justice. the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. is declared illegal. may not be so delegated. as Acting Commissioner of Immigration. J. Labrador. Nov. series of 1951. respondents. as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. to determine whether under specific circumstances. No costs. Edgardo R. then guarantee a delegation of that implied power.L. not being properly documented for admission. conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners. We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. which enjoined the above-named immigration officers from arresting and detaining. petitioners. with the explanation that. Annex "C" to Petition. would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING.and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only. if any there be. Branch XIX. Concepcion. a board of special inquiry. 28.. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated. Jose. decreed cancelled. it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested.. the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's proposition that the President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against him did not constitute ground for deportation. in its Civil Case No.

. the dispositive part of which states: . The Deportation Board. within 48 hours after the filing of the said bond to guarantee their appearance here and at the investigation of their case by the Board of Immigration. As this Court ruled in a recent case: .R. conflicts with paragraph 3. it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. y si la apelacion fracasa. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. which includes certiorari and prohibition. the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case.. The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship. why he should not be deported from the Philippines". upon the filing by the petitioners of a bond in the amount of P10. In line with the views expressed by this Court in the case of Federico M. Before the Board reaches a decision. solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued. on the ground that habeas corpus would be proper only to the one already arrested but not to those not yet arrested. Quezon Province. the Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. supposed mother of the petitioner Melanio Porta Perez as given in the birth certificate presented by him to the immigration authorities to the effect that the said birth certificate refers not to the said petitioner but to one Melanio Perez now living in Pagbilao. not to be deported. On 27 May 1965. the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration. 533. 1955. White. the respondents by way of special defense. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. 531. L-22696.Collector of Customs.citizens. G. Nevertheless. The Deportation Board. It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judge exclusively. resolving the issue only of "whether the respondent Acting Commissioner of Immigration (therein petitioner) can summarily order the arrest and deportation of the petitioners (therein respondents) .000 each. Resuelto por la Junta que tiene jurisdiccion. IN VIEW THEREOF. 613).. Their decision on the question is. 94 Phil. 21. No. L-6272.S.] If such is the primary duty of petitioners. but the respondent court invoked its general jurisdiction. The respondents Calacdays.A. And in Miranda vs. The proper procedure is for said respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as evidence on their part to show cause why they should not be deported." (Llanco vs. el caso habra terminado totalmente. and the persons or things to be seized. L-9236. It is not therefore correct to state that the question of citizenship should be determined exclusively by the court. 29 May 1964..These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C. That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship. as expressly recited therein. vs. 259 U. enjoining the respondents from arresting and detaining the petitioners herein. and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens. Si la Junta halla infundados los cargos de indeseabilidad del recurrente. and urge that they be allowed to proceed with their investigation until they shall have finally determined whether petitioners are or are not Filipino citizens. and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions. entonces sera el tiempo de considerar si demonstrando causa razonable debe haber un juicio ulterior sobre la ciudadania Filipina que alega mediante habeas corpus. but "to show cause. We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of respondents Calacdays. Chua Hiong v. and particularly describing the place to be searched. Therefore. And there being thus substantial evidence that petitioners are not Filipino citizens but are Chinese nationals who have gained entry into this country through false representations. and relying on the case of Commissioner of Immigration vs. the motion to be well-founded. if any there be. and insisted that habeas corpus is the proper one.ñët While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board as an instrument of the Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists only when the person arrested is an alien. 275). There was no case of "summarily arresting and deporting" the respondents Calacdays. the Court finds. March 19. we are of the opinion that. prom. the respondent court.. In the meantime. are not being deported. now being questioned before this Court. to answer for whatever damages may be sustained by the respondents as a result of the issuance of the said writ. issued the order. 37). where the Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary.". not final but subject to review by the courts. es obvio que debe proseguir con el caso hasta su terminacion. searches and seizures shall not be violated. therefore. In view of the non-completion of the proceedings. deportation proceedings had been started against the respondents (petitioners below) but had not been completed. or essential to the efficient exercise of. Board of Special Inquiry. Respondent Commissioner of Immigration questioned the propriety of the remedy of prohibition. 35-36. pero si la halla indeseable. of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution. papers and effects against unreasonable.6038. We find merit in this contention. with a view to their deportation. The present case is not one where the Philippine citizenship of the persons threatened with deportation is admitted or conclusively appears. wherein we said: . The respondents impugn petitioners' claim to Philippine citizenship on the strength of a sworn Statement of Tecla Socella. No. houses. providing: . it follows that the Deportation Board has the necessary power to pass upon the evidence that may be presented and determine in the first instance if petitioners are Filipino citizens or not.S. L. G. Section 1. of course.. Said warrants required the respondents to be brought to the immigration authorities. however. 3. Petitioners should make "a showing that his claim is frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho vs. [Kessler vs.1äwphï1.. there being reliable evidence that herein petitioners are aliens who have succeeded in gaining entry into this country through false representations. and so hereby orders that the writ of preliminary injunction issued (sic) during the pendency of this action. et al. This is inherent-in.) It is well to note here that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition (the respondent judge considered it as such) was filed. we think it would be in the sound judicial discretion to allow the respondents to continue the proceedings already begun by them until they have determined whether or not the petitioners are aliens. unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined . the power of the Deportation Board (Laurencio vs. puede apelar contra el fallo. February 22. It is clear from the order complained of that the court below misapprehended the import of the warrants issued by the Commissioner herein. 29 May 1956. as unwarrantedly assumed by the court below. this Court said: . contend that the present action is premature. We have so ruled in Porta Perez. without giving them a chance to be heard as Filipino citizens".R. there is nothing so far for the courts to review. Fernandez. 1954. 35 Phil. et al. Deportation Board. No. Strecker (1939) 307 U. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. the respondents are hereby ordered to release Manuel Calacday and any other of them who may now be detained by virtue of the order of arrest issued by the respondents. or are or are not subject to deportation.

The lower Court granted his request and the hearing was set anew for January 25. promulgated on September 30 1963. not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official. Deportation Board 1 is decisive of this appeal filed by the respondent Commissioner of Immigration from an order of the lower court in a habeas corpus proceeding to release petitioner Lucio Santos. The constitutional guarantees of individual liberty must be liberally construed and applied if we are to enjoy the blessings of a regime of justice. issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. The application for habeas corpus was filed by petitioner. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father..M. Respondent official could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation. 1967-B. The Court remarked in said case: Section 1 (3). against herein respondents Calacdays are declared null and void. L-25694 November 29. He stated that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese subject whose real name is Ong Hiong King. respondent-appellant. Such. Then as set forth in the brief of respondent: "On January 18. But the warrants of arrest heretofore issued by the petitioner. leading to an administrative investigation. Sta. Ibarra and Solicitor Bernardo P. their arrest upon administrative warrant violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights. The assertion that he was an alien was denied by him in his petition. But as long as the illegal entry or offense of the respondents Calacdays has not yet been established and their expulsion finally decided upon. 1976 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 1966 at 8:30 A. but did not authorize his arrest. of July 29. G. in pursuance of a valid legislation. J: The ruling in Qua Chee Gan v. the lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the Commissioner of Immigration to produce before it on January 19. we perceive.M. Makalintal. to explain under what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained.which public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. that the lower Court is without jurisdiction . such as a legal order of deportation. it is evident that petitioner is a Chinese because. as already stated. in the execution of a final deportation order and arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. and the proceedings ordered discontinued. Dizon. only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation.. this Court said in the same case: . 69 of President Roxas should not apply to deportation proceedings initiated by the Immigration Commissioners. 1947. * * * On January 21. vs. respondent Commissioner asked the lower Court for three days within which to submit his written return. LUCIO SANTOS. C. that deportation proceedings against petitioner were pending hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry. vs. distinguished between administrative arrest.ñët Under the express terms of our Constitution it is. even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause. petitioner-appellee. 30 June 1967. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION. Such notice and bonds should suffice to ensure the subject's appearance at the hearings without prejudice to more drastic measures in case of recalcitrant respondents. Angeles and Fernando. Deportation Board. Castro. THE COMMISSIONER. until final determination of their right to stay in the Philippines. certainly during the investigation. FERNANDO. liberty and democracy that the Philippine Constitution sought to secure and consolidate. 20 SCRA. the order issued in Civil Case No. Concepcion. who was detained under a warrant of arrest issued by respondent on the ground of his being a Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally. Following the same trend of thought. xxx xxx x x x1äwphï1. the writ prayed for is hereby granted. the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. 60906 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is set aside. this Court. does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him. Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. issued by President Roxas. Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the issuance of administrative warrants of arrest. Sanchez. by a judge. and to show cause why he should not be set at liberty. Article III of the Constitution. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when. No costs. Ana and Mariano for appellee. that petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation. To carry out the order of deportation. in order to guarantee their appearance at the hearings and other proceedings in their case. as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only probable cause. without prejudice to said respondents being required to furnish bonds in such reasonable sums as the Immigration Commissioners may fix. the person of Lucio Santos." 2 Such was not the case here as admitted in the brief of respondent. Zaldivar. Pardo for appellant. considering the identity of ends sought to be served. 69. in prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens. 562. Vivo (L-22196. * * * On the scheduled day. 1966. that petitioner had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to this country. for example. Phil. 1966. his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino citizenship. Solicitor General Antonio Barredo. or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation. this Court pointed out that Executive Order No. as was true before the executive order of President Quirino. therefore. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power 1 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action. So ordered. it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. page 741). either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose. et al. Immigration Commissioner. there is already an order of deportation. And in Qua Chee Gan. We see no reason why the cautionary bond requirement of the 1947 Executive Order No.R. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. L20280. It s enough.J. JJ. as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. respondent official filed his return to the write of habeas corpus. in Morano vs. No. But. 1966 at 8:30 A. that based on his own application for registration with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong for documentation as a Filipino. concur. would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation.

J. the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee But. No costs. The Que Chee Gan ruling speaks too clearly to be misunderstood. 1966 is affirmed. It was answered in the negative. either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose. or on 29 February 1988. vs. It should not escape attention that under the present Constitution. JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT. respectively.R. without passing on the question of citizenship. therefore. Justice Barrera. another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. And. however. * * *. On 4 March 1988. are both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan. G. by a judge. In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report. as undesirable aliens. took no part. even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause. however. certainly. this Office charges the respondents for deportation. respondent. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION. during the investigation. Such. Concepcion Jr. and Martin. or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation. 1988 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY. It appears clear. Two (2) days after apprehension." 5 This case. The "Operation Report. Aquino. Thus: "Under the express terms of our Constitution. only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation. was whether the power of the President to conduct an investigation leading to deportation carries with it the authority to order an arrest. The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia: Wherefore. This order was appealed to this Court. Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman. it is therefore. The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. and that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies * * *. finds support in Qua Chee Gan We cannot set it aside. as already stated.: A petition for Habeas Corpus. in that: they. that at the time of the challenged order. it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. Barredo. is governed by the former Constitution. ordered the release of petitioner upon posting a bond of P5. if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him. Laguna. 52 and 72 years. while Adriaan Van Elshout. the order of the lower court dated February 5. 58 years old. Moreover. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. are .000 to insure his appearance at the deportation hearing when ordered to do so. Laguna. 82544 June 28. One was released for lack of evidence. the release was provisional. RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room. 1. according to the ponente." 3 The lower court. Thus. JJ. The question that had to be decided in Qua Chee Gan. Antonio. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when. No. petitioners. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No. Laguna. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act." dated 27 February 1988 read in part: Noted: There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite sometime. the deportation proceeding was still pending. WHEREFORE. MELENCIO-HERRERA.because the subject matter of the action — the deportation of petitioner — is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation. leading to an administrative investigation. therefore. Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan. seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. there is already an order of deportation.. a warrant of arrest may issue on a showing of "probable cause to be determined by the judge. of the original twenty two (22). HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO. concur. The crucial facts as thus noted would render clear that the appeal cannot prosper. 88-13)." on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated: xxx xxx xxx ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys. why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation. as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan." 4 2. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. To carry out the order of deportation. for example. being pedophiles. J. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. The conclusion reached by the lower court.

80 Phil. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code. although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs." (People vs. 1975.1985 Rules on criminal Procedure). Villanueva. has become legal. 1987 ed. 1971 ed. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. November 17. L-24646 & L-24674. June 20. the ones with John Sherman being naked. his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code. 1983. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. 120 SCRA 525). 1980. the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. cited in CRUZ. Constitutional Law.inimical to public morals. At any rate. it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed. Section 13. are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. Garcia. are therefore. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and. in fact. including aliens.22 SCRA 857. spiritual. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37.. is available to all persons. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General. on 4 March 1988. The Writ has served its purpose. In this case. 101 SCRA 86. L-27360. Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest. Alverez vs. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. To avoid congestion. as heretofore stated. On 4 April 1988. 77 Phil. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. 1968. 1979. L39823. p. 667 [1937]. Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37. on p. respondent denied considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. 89 SCRA 717). That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. 101. in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. search and seizure as required by the said provision. respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio. On 7 March 1988. 1 [1948]. Director of Prisons. as undesirable aliens. People vs. 33 [1937]). 1050 [1947]). Mago. Rule 126. April 30. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country. Court of First Instance of Rizal. coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles. L-49014. "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal." On 7 April 1988. Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives. On 14 March 1988. 555. petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which. whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. however. However. The restraint against their persons. petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Montoya. which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them. January 31. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed. L-41686. 64 Phil. the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. Villaraza. 2) Respondent violated Section 2. public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. 1987 Constitution). 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ. or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence. respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners. Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. admissible in evidence (Section 12. Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition. We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General. People's Court. L-61770.. the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. 77 SCRA 377. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going. CFI. 62 SCRA 543). Bagcal vs. moral. "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee. On 22 March 1988. who certified that petitioners were healthy. Section 5). been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113. February 28. But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception. Section 37(a) provides in part: (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other . Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof. therefore. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms. petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. 143). p. and (2) when an offense has. 3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles. and social well-being of our youth (Article II. actually committing. 1977. Syjuco 64 Phil. February 25. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release.

June 30. the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. 270 F.. deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel. L-9700. xxx xxx xxx . What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported.1962. expelled." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs.. contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. September 30. Deportation of subject of foreign power. 1963. as heretofore stated.S. Hughes. Vivo. L-22196. "The requirement of probable cause. 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. 33 Phil. provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Stracker 307 U. vs. Clark. [2d]. 1967. Deportation Board (G. 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. 577. Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration. 53 F. 437). Pedaris. De los Santos. 628. and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. infra). 53 F. (U. as amended. 32). 597. 20 SCRA 562)." Before that. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. 20 SCRA 562). Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides: Sec. Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. 613. June 30. that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel. are administrative in character. Murdock vs. 10280." For. To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State. only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. G. Deportation proceedings. 153). A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Thus. (Ng Hua To vs. 104 Phil. leading to an administrative investigation.. Ward. citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. vs. which gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds required for the stay. July 29. R. No. to produce witnesses in his own behalf. is not unconstitutional. Ex parte Jew You On. Section 37 of the Immigration Law. otherwise. 682 [1948]). Vivo. It is preventive. does not extend to deportation proceedings. Commissioner of Immigration. 104 F. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action. R. However. February 28. R. The ruling in Vivo vs. 27 F. 14. 949 [1958]). Commissioner. it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U. or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation. Montesa. 24576. that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him. to be determined by a Judge. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country. if desired. "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail. The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued. vs. (Morano vs. 264 U. Montesa (G. Fabre 81 Phil. 55 F. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for . There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings. supra. 155. the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated. [2d]. of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. which are substantially Identical. February 29. The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions. 1968..S. (U. conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted. (Kessler vs. Thus.S." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. 10 SCRA 411).officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. No. Uhl 211 F. 10145. on the other hand. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail. probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. [2d]. however.S.S. conflicts with paragraph 3. 1964. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.. that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution). They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37. 155). 4 SCRA 442). Vivo. which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed. 1967. xxx xxx xxx The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding. the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. (Lao Tang Bun vs. The order of deportation is not a punishment. it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause. The deportation proceedings are administrative in character. Eby. also challenged by them.. Clark. (Maliler vs.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel. and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. [2d]. if he so desires. 16 F. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. Deportation Board. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. 397). No. not a penal process. Commissioner of Immigration... Sercerchi vs. Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Baker. 69. supra). It is essential. Galang. 22) summary in nature. relating the facts relied upon. Supp." (Morano vs. L-22196. supra. was in order because in deportation proceedings. [2d]. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs.

1987. WHEREFORE. 1981 as a temporary visitor. authority or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because under the 1987 Constitution. 1987. There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. To date. an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick. cruelty. HON. accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress. June 28. petitioner. Fabre 81 Phil. 41 [1918]). No. acted in the interests of the State. Finally.. Once again petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in and in the ensuing struggle. supra. that he has thereby made himself an undesirable alien subject to deportation. A return of the writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on June 17. 38 Phil. infra)." 4 The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner has been resolved in the case of Harvey vs. September 30. Acting Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and JOHN DOES. On June 10.: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Lucien Tran Van Nghia alleging that he was arrested without warrant and deprived of his liberty by respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation and his agents. 534 [1910]). agents of the CID. 1987. supra. the aforementioned CID agents went to petitioner's residence in Sta. respondents.R. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect.its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to avert the "threatened removal" of petitioner from PGH and to question the validity of his detention by respondent Commissioner. No. A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on June 2. his status was changed to that of an immigrant on November 16. RAMON J. . 10280. Thereafter. citing Tiu Chun Hai vs.J. Padilla and Sarmiento.. Said warrant was based on the following acts and circumstances: That he applied for and was granted permanent status on his representation that he is financially capable of investing in the Philippines but he made no investments but engaged in tutoring in French and practice of acupressure. Originally admitted to the Philippines on November 1. the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. C." 2 On June 2. Sales for petitioner. respondent Commissioner Liwag issued on June 1. both petitioner and the lawmen were injured. 9 SCRA 27 [1963] reiterated in Vivo vs.1963. Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner insists that respondent official has no power. Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Deportation Board (G.. 1989 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA. 682 [1948]). petitioner.. Manila. Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G." 1 Acting thereon. where the Court. SO ORDERED. through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera. FERNAN. Jr. Section 3[2]). Ana. G. The immigration agents then sought the assistance of members of the Western Police District. concur. Chuoco Tiaco et al.. Vivo. upon request of the French consul. abuse. allegedly petitioner's landlord. 1988. the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. JJ. C. said: The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge. LIWAG. Ana to invite the latter to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but petitioner and his then lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents. Paras. in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners. 3 By reason of the injuries he allegedly sustained when he was "brutally seized" by the CID agents. Commissioner. it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by authority other than a judge .J. Cabrera. Emmanuel O. Montesa. however. was transferred from his detention cell at the immigration office to the Philippine General Hospital for urgent medical treatment.R. and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV. respondent CID Commissioner Ramon J. 78596 July 13. it is provided that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce . 1984 based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines. The power to deport aliens is an act of State. exploitation. petitioner was subdued and immediately taken to the CID Intelligence Office.R. vs. Yap. On May 28.. 16 Phil.' (Morano vs. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. 1987 a mission order to a team of seven (7) CID agents for them "to locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report. No. G.1987. The core issue is the legality of the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation proceedings. that he wilfully refused to recognize the authority of immigration agents who were sent to invite him to CID for verification of his status and physically resisted being taken in by the agents resulting in physical injuries to himself and the agents. Defensor-Santiago. that 'under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution)). 1987 but there is nothing in the records to convince this Court that said warrant was served on petitioner prior to his apprehension. petitioner has not made any investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of acupressure. does not extend to deportation proceedings. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. 82544.

Firstly.. Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street. .if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause. in execution of such judgment .: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code. 6 In Moncupa vs. viz: 04. The facts are as follows: xxx xxx xxx 1. herein petitioner was "invited" by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. ACHACOSO.. in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar. The Court subsequently nullified said conditions and ruled: Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. 5 The general rule in a number of cases is that the release. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo? . supra. if desired. 11 WHEREFORE. to change his abode and to grant interviews to members of the mass media without official permission. Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner. In the Moncupa case. of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. No. On October 21. concur.. unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action.000. HON. records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has. Enrile. in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. and after conviction.00 during the pendency of the administrative proceedings by the CID or until further orders of the Court. become arbitrary. leading to an administrative investigation.. and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Gutierrez. The only condition in his bailbond is that ordinarily found in any other analogous undertaking. J. So ordered.. which is "to appear and answer the complaint x x x. Mandaluyong. amenable to the orders and processes of the Court. Mla.R. Leveriza. S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. and FERDIE MARQUEZ.. in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs. The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose. . 7 Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms. 81510 March 14. respondents. 1987. On June 20. G. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent. The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by respondent Commissioner. vs. Bidin and Cortes." 9 Secondly. is on leave. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay. 10 The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person has therefore become legal. 05. it was shown that attached to his discharge was the prohibition to travel. where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. Jr. in the light of subsequent developments.. will at all times hold himself .. Feliciano. 8 Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly restrained. 1987. Lukban rule. .. 1990 HORTENCIA SALAZAR. that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel. He was also ordered to report regularly to the military authorities. Santos. . the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus inspite of the fact that petitioner Moncupa had been temporarily released from detention on orders of the defense minister. — Horty Salazar — 615 R. certain events have supervened to render his petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. whether permanent or temporary. TOMAS D. petitioner was released upon the posting and approval of a personal bailbond on June 19. where there is present a denial of due process. petitioner is no longer under confinement.1987 in the amount of P20. prohibiting illegal recruitment.O. he will surrender himself . . It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.. the petition is DISMISSED. petitioner. But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning. SARMIENTO. J. JJ.. Pasay City.. For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period during which their activities were monitored.

On November 3. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Mandaluyong. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing.. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil. Your acts also violate Sec.S. and the entry. Art. search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. Santos. 2. Flora Salazar. and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons. to protect our client's interests. Doing so. On January 26. houses. we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26. public respondent Atty. together with grave abuse of the color of authority. petitioner filed with POEA the following letter: Gentlemen: On behalf of Ms. POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal. 1920 and Executive Order No. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof. 1 On February 2. 1988. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned. The premises invaded by your Mr. papers. before POEA could answer the letter. POEA BLDG. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. this 3th day of November. On the same day. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko. . Horty Salazar of 615 R. of the Philippine Constitution. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. we shall feel free to take all legal action. thereby making prohibition too late. I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. docketed as IS-88-836. civil and criminal. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency. Estelita B. Art. Metro Manila. the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family.). 1988. Mandaluyong. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. 1988. ay hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment. it having verified that you have — (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment. we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. Santos St. 4. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan.000. Santos St.O. On February 2.O. hence the Closure and Seizure Order No." 3. On January 28. Metro Manila.O. Jovencio Abara and Atty. ORTIGAS AVE. on even date. Among our reasons are the following: 1. 1205. 2. Mrs. Mandaluyong. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari? S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. 1022. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6. 1205 dated November 3. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. 1205 which reads: HORTY SALAZAR No. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. Done in the City of Manila. when required to show credentials. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW. Before entering the place. Mandaluyong. the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Santos St. the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside. EDSA COR. petitioner filed the instant petition.. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. 615 R. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Atty. public respondent Administrator Tomas D. We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters. 1987. 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution. 6. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli. III. 1. 1987. Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. Marquez. Inside the studio. 2. 615 R. 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Metro Manila Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 7. However. 5. she was unable to produce any.O. sent to the petitioner the following telegram: YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R. 06. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils.

8 The above has now been etched as Article 38. conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated. unconstitutional. this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase. Mr. Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor. Unlike a magistrate. 3 In one case. deport them". stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. or was meant to exercise. with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth. warrants of arrest or search warrants. 228 U. We have held: 11 xxx xxx xxx The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. he. was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1987. to Presidential Decree No. invariably. 41). paragraph (c). 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos. as now written. the function of determining probable cause and issuing." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 10 It is valid. prosecutorial powers. 1986. we declare Article 38. even in the absence of express law." he stands. In re McCulloch Dick. "he may. To that extent. "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution. 1125). 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. when he is neither. the date of its ratification by the Filipino people.S. on the basis thereof. Presidential Decree No. no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Ed. That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. (Forbes vs. Vivo involved a deportation case. to our mind and to that extent. governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. 4 Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body: We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises. The Minister shall order the closure of companies. 568. much less issue orders of arrest. however. 1985. paragraph (c).Under the new Constitution. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield. 1984. an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives. promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1693. in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2. . Marcos. establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. may be validly exercised only by judges. We have ruled that in deportation cases. Under the latter. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The law has since been altered. 40 Phil. 5 Section 38. a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. unconstitutional and of no force and effect. the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers: (c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. which states: . the authorities must go through the judicial process. and on that ground. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed. is to make him both judge and jury in his own right. may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused. paraphernalia. in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. Section 143 of the Local Government Code. . aside from judges. paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. Forbes. of the Labor Code. warrants of arrest. Mr. That makes. it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. it is well to note. 7 On January 26. it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power: xxx xxx xxx But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September. 549. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations. 57 L. 1122. of the Labor Code. 1920. who. 569. 38 Phil. The decrees in question. Hence. The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute . as the accused's adversary and his accuser. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers: (b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or nonholder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. not being a judge. establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. 2 it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents. 534. 960. without having been licensed or authorized to do so. Section 2. giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well: (c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 6 On May 1. 2002. 2018. 16 Phil.

communications/ recording equipment. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang. 1920 and Executive Order No. Bidin. Medialdea and Regalado. 104 Phil. assuming. the petition is GRANTED. directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code." In Stanford v. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant. it is only judges. is clearly in the nature of a general warrant: Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press. ink. leaflets. photo equipment. colored white with Plate No. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise: 1) All printing equipment. Supreme Court for being too general. In the Stanford case. pick-up colored white with Plate No. books. and therefore invalid. the search and seizure order in question. more particularly. JJ. No costs. 14 For the guidance of the bench and the bar. the search warrant which authorized the search for "books. of the l987 Constitution. cards. Fernan. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. obviously. recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas. Article 38. tape recorders. 4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW. paraphernalia. and 3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda. NKA 892. who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. following a final order of deportation." was declared void by the U. otherwise. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history. PBP 665. pamphlets. SO ORDERED. records. it is null and void. 956). 2) Subversive documents. 3) A delivery truck with Plate No.and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Cruz. tables. Under the Constitution. 1022. whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested. Mandaluyong. 1205. that it was validly issued. 12 The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. pictures. WHEREFORE. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI. 615 R. Jr. like the one at bar. and the operations of the Community Party in Texas. Narvasa. paper. In like manner. when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan. it having verified that you have — (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment. I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. thus: xxx xxx xxx Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. Paras. Gutierrez. and 5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux.S. Padilla. Cortes. lists. typewriters. receipts.J. dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications.. and no other. the U. letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper. Under Article III. NBS 542. Santos St. pamphlets. Feliciano. 1) Toyota-Corolla. 13 We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized. we reaffirm the following principles: 1. and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines. concur. 2) DATSUN.O. C. . 949. Moreover. cabinets.. Gancayco. colored yellow with Plate No. exceptional.. paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. Griño-Aquino. Section 2.. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. Melencio-Herrera. it is the sole domain of the courts.S. State of Texas. pick-up truck with Plate No. memoranda. for the purpose of deportation. NKV 969. ex gratia argumenti. Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment.

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