I. Admissibility A. Rule 128, Sections 1 to 4 1. Reyes vs.

Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 25 GR No: 96492 Date: November 26, 1992 Rule: Rule 128 Sections 1-4 Petitioners: Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya Respondents: CA, Eufrocina de la Cruz and Violeta de los Reyes Facts: Juan Mendoza, father of Olympio Mendoza (petitioner in the CA1), is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 (23,000 sq. m.) and 106 (19,000 sq. m.)2 in Pampanga. Devoted to the production of palay, said lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband of private respondent, Eufrocina de la Cruz. Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots. However, Olympio conspired with other petitioners to prevent her daughter, Violeta, and her workers—through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth—from entering and working on the farm lots. Petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the lots, which prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Severino Aguinaldo (petitioner in the CA3) and petitioners Reyes, Parayao, Mananghaya, duly elected/appointed barangay officials of the locality (Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga), denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and Eufrocina, particularly in the cultivation of the farm lots. Olympio, for his part, raised as his defenses the grounds of abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and non-payment of rentals. The CA affirmed the agrarian court’s decision with modification, which ordered respondents to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area. Issues: 1) W/N defendants must restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. – YES. 2) Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits of plaintiff, even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination. – NO. Held: Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

1 2

Olympio did not appeal the case before the SC, so the CA Decision is final and executory as to him. In her Complaint, Euphrocina alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106. However, during Violeta's testimony, she clarified that, actually, only Lot No. 106 is not included in this controversy. The Court held that the inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the witness should not be pressed on because there was no showing that she intended to mislead on the subject matter of the suit. Lot 106 had been included in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's father. 3 Aguinaldo also did not appeal the case before the SC, so the CA Decision is final and executory as to him.

Rationale: 1) Petitioners are asking the Court re-examine all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the lower courts. However, absent any exception in this case, settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari. The SC concurs with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other appellants in the dispossession of Eufrocina. They not only knew Olympio personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio to help him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olympio, together with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land through "strong arm methods." 2) The judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not err when it favorable considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to crossexamination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the ―Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.‖ The same provision states that ―In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.‖ Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an application of the rule with regard the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that ―The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946) or these rules.‖

2. People vs. Turco, 337 SCRA 714 G.R. No. 137757 Date: 10/14/00 Rule 128, Admissibility, Rape Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Rogelio Turco, Jr. aka TOTONG Ponente: Melo Facts: Lea Tabado was a 12-year-old girl who lived in Basilan with her father and grandmother. On the evening of July 1995 as she was about to sleep, her neighbor and second cousin, Rogelio Turco Jr. alias TOTONG called her from outside the house. As she went out to meet him, she was forcibly seized by Totong and brought to the Tabado family’s pig pen wherein the former proceeded to rape her. After the deed was done, Totong told Tabando that he will kill her if she does not keep the incident a secret. However after ten days Tabando finally told her father, who then sought to have her medically examined. The Tabandos filed a case against Turco. The accused on the other hand denied the allegations and claimed that he and the victim were sweethearts. The court however ruled in favor of Tabando. Turco filed an appeal challenging the decision of the court. Issue:  Whether or not the court erred in finding the accused guilty based on the testimonies of the complainant and her witnesses  Whether or not the court erred in ruling that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime of rape, based on the affidavits and oral testimonies of the complainant and her witnesses.

Branch 106. 2005 ARNEL L. No. Court of Appeals. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE. as a harrowing experience. In the instant case. 162571 June 15. On the other hand. 2005 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G. petitioner. as rape. HON.Held: The appealed decision was affirmed. 162571. J. once admitted. A medical examination is not indispensible in the prosecution of rape. June 15. an affair of logic and law. respondents. it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Thus. Conversely.5 . Agustin. is usually not remembered in detail. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction is proper. AGUSTIN. pe * Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. in issuing a decision2 and resolution3 upholding the resolution and order of the trial court.R. Rationale: The accused alleged that the testimonies of the complainant and her witnesses were unreliable as there were discrepancies in the details of their given statements. Turco erroneously argued that he cannot be convicted due based on the victim’s testimony without actual proof of the occurrence of the rape.R. G. gifts. DECISION CORONA. The sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing as he failed to introduce love letters. Agustin vs. 3. petitioner Arnel L.4 which denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss private respondents’ complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing. Rape. depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the court. admissibility is. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence. for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.: At issue in this petition for certiorari 1 is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion. the weight to be given to such evidence. and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. while evidence may be admissible. No. Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court. Court ruled in favor of Tabando. therefore. the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict. vs. Furthermore the court finds that the victim had no motive to testify falsely against accusedappellant. Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. since the medico-legal officer was not presented in court to attest to this fact. evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception. However it has been established that minor lapses in a witness’ testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall. REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE.

that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family…. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. 2002.13 He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. Later on. Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martin’s birth certificate were falsified. Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has. an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. since then. with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. long before Martin’s conception. Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. In July 2001.12 Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case. In May 2000. this petition."8 Exasperated. Nos. Martin. Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her."9 Finally. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover. under the law. on August 11. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel sped off in his van. Fe started calling Arnel’s wife and family. Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop"7 where she worked. petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. been undergoing chemotherapy. Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martin’s birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998. On March 5. 2002. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion.10 In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17.11 On July 23.S. . Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last intimacy was sometime in 1998. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. On January 19. On January 19. but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992. theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged. Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. after which they entered into an intimate relationship. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. 1999. 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10. he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body. Upon their return in June 2000. 2002. 2001. to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him. This incident was reported to the police. According to Arnel. 2001. In a nutshell.14 In his motion.In their complaint. Thus. As a result. a certain Jun. Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.15 The petition is without merit.6 In his amended answer. while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. What started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel). Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock.

which is supposedly proscribed by law. the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative. the trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant. we now tackle the main issues. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment.20 we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one’s inheritance: …In Paulino. by which the primary right and duty have been violated. may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. Briz. one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance. private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child. As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the child’s conception and birth. et al. Further. The petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Rule 10519 of the Rules of Court. In other words. as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. If it did. 763 [1922]) wherein we said: The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir. In Tayag v. then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. therefore. provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. that the two causes of action.16 In the complaint. there is . Certainly. as respondents have alleged. The ratio decidendi in Paulino. If not. but the prescription of the action. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. as an unrecognized child. we held that an illegitimate child. Court of Appeals. petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin. effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition. from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance. Martin. has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article 28317 in relation to Article 26518 of the Civil Code and Section 1. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support. petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support. Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the child’s birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar. (43 Phil. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. According to petitioner. He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court. such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his answer. Martin. is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint.First of all. to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent. Preliminaries aside.

Of course. Vallejo24 where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment. Teehankee21 where the appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court." In 2001. courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies. being a relatively new science. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented. These contentions have no merit. given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. however. In Pe Lim v. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage.nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. being a novel scientific technique. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. For it was said. verbal and written. we have held in numerous cases. To paraphrase Tayag. we stated as an obiter dictum that "while eyewitness identification is significant. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings. Eventually. The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. as enunciated in Tijing v. though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court. x x x The conclusion above stated. Court of Appeals:23 A final note. The DNA from the mother. was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. or mother x x x. (Underscoring supplied) Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance." . petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Court of Appeals. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts. and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father. Thus. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample." Our faith in DNA testing.22promulgated in 1997. and the doctrine must be considered well settled. we cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA. Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied). Fortunately. may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x. On the second issue. as in Tayag. (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. since to reject said result is to deny progress. but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged. as the appropriate case comes. one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for. In the 1995 case of People v. by the putative father. we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. however.

sweat. v. no two individuals have the same DNA. the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis. Dr. inter alia. Yatar. Judges. Merrell Dow (509 U. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence: Deoxyribonucleic Acid. in People v. Significantly. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19. Janson. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar. mucus. earwax. the possibility of contamination of the samples. xxx xxx xxx In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence. a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!" In 2004. Yes. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA. TH01 7/8. under Daubert. with the notable exception of identical twins. were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial. or DNA. as well as the testing itself. Specifically. bone. and vaginal and rectal cells. how they were handled. Fortunately. and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. Verily. whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests. In Tijing vs. In Daubert v. we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system.S. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime. DNA testing. violated his right . the procedure followed in analyzing the samples. evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.27 we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide. DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure.25 we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors.S. in Tecson. Most importantly. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In that case. this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing… Moreover. in our en banc decision in People v. Admittedly.. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing. the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. In the case at bar. a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial. de Ungria’s testimony. the root and shaft of hair. which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. et al. so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. the following factors: how the samples were collected. urine. COMELEC26 where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr. the prevailing doctrine in the U. DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11. has proven instructive. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Ed. the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva. Based on Dr. courts should consider. 125 L. Court of Appeals. we stated: In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain. 579 (1993).A year later. Under Philippine law. skin tissue.

we said: In no uncertain terms.. In Ople v. in an action for annulment filed by her husband.39 Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence. specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act.35 are now similarly acceptable. (b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either signator’s filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial . we see no reason why. DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. the Family Court examiner had the duty.33 In Jimenez v.34 we even authorized the examination of a woman’s genitalia. upon receipt of the challenge.30 We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery. Some of these procedures were. Acknowledgment of paternity. The Supreme Court of St. Nor does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. Torres. his argument that his right against selfincrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. to verify his claim that she was impotent. We addressed this as follows: The contention is untenable. rather invasive and involuntary. 308. where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. Historically. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. If. Over the years. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. DNA testing and its results. The case of Wilson v..31 expulsion of morphine from one’s mouth32 and the tracing of one’s foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. In the decade that followed. her orifice being too small for his penis.28 hair. to order DNA tests:41 § 516-a. New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment.36 where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. per our ruling in Yatar. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. but against testimonial compulsion. ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act.29 and other bodily substances. an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing. it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures. under the law. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. but all of them were constitutionally sound. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion. DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance. Petitioner’s case involves neither and. These include photographs. The Court pointed out that. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt.37 and the infringement of privacy of communication38 where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. in this civil case.against self-incrimination. Lawrence County. Lumb40 shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that. Cañizares. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. to be sure. in some instances. No further judicial or administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity. we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. in a criminal case. as already stated.

in the first instance. whether established through the parents’ acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process. in accordance with this article. with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. and shall establish. If the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost. admissibility of records or reports of test results. In addition. the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the mother with such services. her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. Neither signator’s legal obligations. duress. may be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. the admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity. or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. if practicable. duress. the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the child’s paternity and shall make a finding of paternity. a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any party. or if the court finds that an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud. Upon receiving a party’s challenge to an acknowledgment. For purposes of this section. the court may direct . if and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a party. or material mistake of fact. costs of tests. if appropriate. Genetic marker and DNA tests. shall order the mother. either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud. If the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity. If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child. the court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test. on the court’s own motion or the motion of any party. the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the child’s birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. (b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section. or material mistake of fact. the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this act. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely objections are not made. must be accorded full faith and credit. paid by the moving party. No such test shall be ordered. equitable estoppel. otherwise. (c) A determination of paternity made by any other state. upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata. if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social services law. if unrebutted. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment. a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests and. the "date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the petition. (emphasis supplied) DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:42 §532. including the obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment. however. (c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be. they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court.

’s father by default..C.E. allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal. at the time of conception. summary disposition. to determine whether the alleged father is likely to be.H. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests. with whom C.W. six years after G. burden of proof.M. in addition to any other remedies available. shall order that the mother. in fact.W.G. filing summary report.W. qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling.E. the father of the child. the court.W. Consequently. DNA tests were used to prove that H. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling. and alleged father. 6.G. In Greco v. result of typing or identification profiling.999999% accuracy). those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. ("In fact. the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement…(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99. proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support.W. Sec. sought an increase in his support obligation to her.H.. C. and C. the child's biological father. However. or DNA identification profiling. (b) If a trial is held. obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was. while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a child. The first reported results of modern DNApaternity testing did not occur until 1985. human leukocyte antigens. was actually the child of R. since its first reported results in 1985. even after six years. serum proteins. at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement.E. previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A. child. to have the said judgment vacated. however.E. presumption. or on its own motion. blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother. v. v. once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the child’s father. but are not limited to. maintained an adulterous relationship.M. It is worth noting that amendments to Michigan’s Paternity law have included the use of DNA testing:46 §722. objection. child. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of proof.. red cell isoenzymes.E. in every contested paternity action. who had been adjudicated as T. upon application made by or on behalf of either party.. G. which may include.G. establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Greg G. the court may do either of the following: (a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.716 Pretrial proceedings. and alleged father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations. In its order of disposition. In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M. admissibility.H.. Of course.payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district.’s father. refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling.45 the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary: As a result of DNA testing. Coleman. compensation of expert. had. court order. had been adjudicated as T.43 a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court. unless such party is financially unable to pay.44 the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division allowed G. when the settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980. determinations of red cell antigens. (1) In a proceeding under this act before trial. Thus. (emphasis supplied) In R. . In this case. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services. the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of paternity. or is not. but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man--the putative father. DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'").

F. unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have identical DNA.49 decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota. we discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by "grave abuse of discretion": .50 another case decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. the mother. through DNA testing. nor any plain. and there is no appeal. Amundson. the fact that a default judgment was entered. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. paternity is presumed. which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld. even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins..A.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing. (emphasis supplied) In Rafferty v. (6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5). Kohl. was able to have the default judgment against him vacated. The Court said "(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child.(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization." In M. established non-paternity. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.C.. In this case. child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing. Williams. and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as provided in subsection (4).47 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father. the remedy of certiorari is only available "when any tribunal. the Court of Appeals53 where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.W."52 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child. the contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated. v. including. the American association of blood banks. demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated father had. but subsequently vacated. first filed the case for paternity and support with the District Court. having excluded himself as the father of Amundson’s child through DNA testing.51 The foregoing considered. and J.F. The case of Kohl v. neither party requested genetic testing. v. Significantly. of Human Services. it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation. (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages.48 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals.S. xxx xxx xxx (5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%. when J. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In S. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7. R. we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing.C.F. even after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given. but not limited to. Perkins. board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules.J. Contrary to Amundson's position.C. Mississippi Dept.

1958. where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision—the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. Relevance 1. 1961 LOPEZ v. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. Hessen. and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. requiring hospital and surgical care.2d 448 (1961) Date: August 22. in other words. the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. the administration of justice would not survive. or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied) In the instant case. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction. As we have discussed. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion. being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence. the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness. negligently permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and concurrent negligence of both appellees. Lopez and Sears. sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to his chest. New Mexico. passion. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. in view of the foregoing. Costs against petitioner. Heesen. the decision of the respondent court. illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. also answered denying the allegations and raising additional affirmative defenses. was the sole . that the negligence of appellee. Heesen. the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. was correct. an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or. to-wit: That appellant's injuries were caused by an unavoidable accident. WHEREFORE. and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. Lopez vs. if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction. Appellee. every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. HEESEN Facts: On the afternoon of October 15. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. Sears. prejudice. appellant. answered denying the allegations of the third amended complaint. appealee. 2004 in CA-G. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. or personal hostility. On the other hand. however. Heesen. in Colfax County. Hence. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 365 P. Epilogue For too long. B. jointly and severally.000 against both appellees. In such a scenario. Appellant demanded damages in the amount of $55. The Court of Appeals’ decision dated January 28. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution.R. Appellee. SP No. prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. If it did.

but that the opinion of experts was not binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such testimony. alleged that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent manufacture. Frank Doyle. that the rifle involved was of a recognized quality and of proper design and functioned properly by all commercial sporting arms standards when used with reasonable care. testified as to the manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire" position without his knowledge. . Sears. The manufacturers of these guns are F. La Violette. There is also testimony of certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51 and the witness. Here is an issue.572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to appellee. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail as to the safety mechanism and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards. making the rifle dangerous. Ira Kessler. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. Nato and Weatherby. is not a safe piece. assembly or maintenance. The jury was instructed that expert testimony is intended only to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a technical nature. He qualified as an expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small arms design. objection." "unsafe. Marlin. Jr. without the telescopic sight.. Mauser. design. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and then fix the liability. and was not negligently or defectively designed. in the third amended complaint." and "defective. was suitable for hunting. Paul A. over appellee's. Appellant's witness. La Violette has two gun patents pending. The evidence also shows that since 1951. Appellant.cause thereof." and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Sears'. Another witness. in that the safety mechanism thereof moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position. expressed the opinion that the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight. in that the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. La Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. Sears." and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight. that the safety mechanism and its qualities were patent and obvious. Appellee. Robert Allen. the proper understanding of which by a jury composed of six men and six ladies." "unsafe. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail as to the safety mechanism and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards. High Standard Manufacturing Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism "dangerous. Issue: Whether or not the expert testimony can be admitted as evidence by the jury? YES Held: Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism "dangerous. was suitable for hunting.N. expressed the opinion that the safety device. 75. introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun designing. Appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off safety. Colt. This is an allegation of an ultimate issue of fact which the jury had to decide. and had been seen and inspected by Heesen prior to the accident. that rifles of this type had been manufactured by the millions and used by hunters generally and by the government of the United States and foreign countries. requires specialized knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. The witness." and "defective.

one short) entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store.W2d 783 (1960) 339 S. 2. recognized the two men as the ones who had been in the store earlier. After the two men left the store Krekeler called the police.02 and in all these circumstances. the two men went back to the store. about 5:50PM.e. While he stood there. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he ―drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my fact..02 found with Ball when he was arrested. the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry and cash from the cash register.W2d 783 Date: 14 November 1960 State v. the money confiscated is irrelevant. the mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of the money charged as taken. The proof of the money was on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the offense. it was simply a total of $140. Ball. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion. The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that reason judgment is reversed and the case remanded. On November 4. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register. because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike. Later in the day. However. 339 S.02) were relevant Held: The unexplained flight even thirty days after the commission of the robbery is a relevant circumstance. Rationale: Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball’s person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence. some of the pieces of evidence presented were the testimony of his flight from the police and the $258. 1958. who was in the store placing the rings and watches in the safe.and was not negligently or defectively designed. especially the taller man. The court found Ball guilty of first-degree robbery of the jewelry store. police officers in a squad car saw Ball walking and stopped him and arrested him after he attempted to flee. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and then fix the liability. Krekeler could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and ―jingle‖ in the cash register. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball’s possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence. 1958.‖ Krekeler was directed to the rest room in the rear of the store where he stood facing the wall and was told not to turn around. State vs. the testimony and $258. Later. Krekeler identified William Arthur Ball from the pictures. Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence presented (i. two colored men (one tall. about three weeks after the robbery. there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258. John Krekeler. Ball Petitioner: State of Missouri Respondent: William Arthur Ball Facts: About 2:30PM on October 15. the evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it . During the trial. and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable. Here 19 days had elapsed.

A. who is a lawyer. Statutory Rules of Exclusion (a) Section 201. Exclusionary Rules under the 1987 Constitution (a) Article III. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant. complainant Atty. That same morning.did not tend to prove the offense for which Ball was on trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. Laconico telephoned appellant.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.69809. Sections 2 and 3 (b) Article III. Since appellant listened to the . Atty. L. When complainant called up. C. Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits (c) R. appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. Competence 1. Section 3. the Anti-Wire Tapping Act i. Leon Gonzaga. insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. 1975. Section 17 3. Ganaan vs. to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary. 4200. Twenty minutes later. Rule 128 2. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. 1986 Facts: In the morning of October 22. 1405. IAC. Laconico answered 'Yes'. October 16. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. After they had decided on the proposed conditions. Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Tax Reform Act of 2007 (b) R. Section 12 (c) Article III. went on a business trip. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.000. GR No. IAC and People. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8. According to the request. 145 SCRA 112 GANAAN v. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.A. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Thus. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. therefore.  Penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. After trial on the merits. they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation. the mere act of listening. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Consequently. Act No. (Issue of interpretation of a penal statute. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. 4200. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. not a rule of evidence) Petition GRANTED. 4200. found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. in a decision dated November 22. 1982. through punishment. Act No. covered by Rep. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.  The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and. in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. Issues/Held: Whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion. that is. Rationale:  An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone. dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature. Thus. on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement".telephone conversation without complainant's consent. persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate. 4200 or others of similar nature. although not exclusive to that enumerated therein.  A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. the lower court.  It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage. the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in court. 4200. o Senator Tañada. intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. 4200. by their very nature. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because. in case of doubt as in the case at bar. they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping. complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant. An extension telephone is not one of the devices which fall under the law on Wire-Tapping. .  An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more.

4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing. To support her claim.000. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. 93833 Date: 09/28/1995 RAMIREZ vs. declaring that the allegations constituted an offense punishable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Garcia hurled invectives at Ramirez. 4200 or Anti-Wire Tapping Act [ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE: COMPETENCE] Petitioner: Socorro D. which was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation between the petitioner and respondent. COURT OF APPEALS R. not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality. Rationale: 1. Ramirez Respondent: Court of Appeals and Ester S. 235 SCRA 111 G. petitioner presented a verbatim transcript of the event.R.ii. . Garcia (the respondent) filed a criminal case against her on the ground that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal for being in violation of RA No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Act. 4200 clearly states that it is illegal for any person. Issue:  WON the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation is violative of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. No. Therefore. The CA ruled in favor of Garcia. The trial court ruled in favor Ramirez. even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under RA No. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. In the conversation. What RA No. Sec. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. 1 of RA No. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense. 2.A. Quezon City against Ester Garcia. alleging that Garcia vexed. Court of Appeals. No. 4200. calling her ―walang utak‖ and accusing her of the act of ―paglapastangan. Salcedo-Ortanez vs.00 in RTC. The legislative intent is clear from the language of the statute. Garcia Ponente: Kapunan Facts: Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in the amount of P610. intercepting. insulted. The act is illegal for being violative of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Held: Petition is denied. or recording private communication by means of devices enumerated in the law.‖ (See hardcopy for the actual transcript) As a result of the petitioner’s recording of the event .

the presence of defendants having previously been discovered. They built houses of second-class materials. Section 8 B. Cases 1. 1-4. Defendants Obaob and Garcia received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente. WILARICO RICAMATA. again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. this suit to recover possession. Secs. ESTEFANIA NEPACINA. 19 SCRA 413 G. Rule 10.) ALUNAN. MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN. MARCIAL LAZARO. Judicial Notice (a) City of Manila vs. 248 SCRA 590 II. JUAN ASPERAS. 1967 City of Manila vs. Rule 129. Hence. LAUREANO DIZO.1 ELENA RAMOS. MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO.  Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947. Manila's City Engineer. 49763. HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE. Defendants refused. LORENZO CARANDANG.  Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close to the property needed expand and build a new building. Court of Appeals. forming one compact area.  In 1947. bordering Kansas.R. Garcia Petitioner: CITY OF MANILA Respondent: GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA. pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property. IN 1948. JUAN PECAYO. -26053 February 21. Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate. defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent.  This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant for the payment of rentals. gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. No. some of the defendants were given by Mayor Valeriano E. There they lived thru the years to the present. AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ.3. Facts:  City of Manila is owner of parcels of land. The phrase ―private communication‖ in Sec.  For their occupancy. 1 of RA No.  In 1961. 4200 includes verbal or non-verbal. Garcia.‖ iii. JOSE BARRIENTOS. What Need Not be Proved A. 37082 and 37558.  The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none. Fugoso written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS. MODESTA SANCHEZ. ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP. MARCIANA ALANO. and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. written. . URBANO RAMOS. Ramirez vs. and without the necessary building permits from the city. FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO. BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS. or expressive communications of meanings or thoughts and can be interchangeably used with ―private conversations. Manila. defendants were charged nominal rentals. GLORIA VELASCO. BENEDICTO DIAZ.

And yet.  In the situation thus obtaining. the certification of the Chairman. Not having done so. if they wanted to. And this.  Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises. They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education. as evidence. located permanent premises for their abode. For. That document recites that the amount of P100.  The Trial Court ruled out that the Certification was admissible. to make it conformable to law and justice. would not profit defendants. Two decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. accordingly. YES  It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power. and the costs.  The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E. this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. they preferred to remain on city property. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. These constructions are illegal. Defendants appealed. for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. erroneously labeled "lease" contracts. the trial judge could well have taken — because the Court was duty bound to take — judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. and that the permits herein granted are null and void. and more. Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100.000. the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget. to "provide at least free public primary instruction". for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building. These permits. and to pay their monthly rentals until they vacate the said premises.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. usurpers that they are. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. elimination of the Certification.  They entered the land. . in reversing his stand. Defendants could have. rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits.000. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes.  The trial court found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land. The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566. built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. written or oral. to pay the amounts heretofore indicated opposite their respective names.  Defendants have not acquired the legal status of tenants. to defendants. were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. ISSUE/HELD: WON the CFI of Manila properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes by basing it on certification of the Chairman on Appropriations.3 Such was done here.  Anyway.6 And.//We. Exhibit E. Their homes were erected without city permits.

De Jalagat. April 28. Vda. 330 SCRA 507 (h) Calamba Steel Center. Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. CTA. Inc. 2005 2. 48 (b) Torres vs. 14 SCRA 549 (d) Yao-Kee vs. (b) Baguio vs. G. The public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves. Court of Appeals. even without the aid of the courts. 131 SCRA 24 . 250 SCRA 676 (g) BPI-Savings vs. No. Godoy. Court of Appeals. Calupitan. 42 SCRA 337 (c) Prieto vs. Judicial Admissions (a) Lucido vs. Sy-Gonzales. vs.R. 167 SCRA736 (e) Tabuena vs. Arroyo. 27 Phil. 151857. 196 SCRA 650 (f) People vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenu.

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