BANCO ESPANOL vs PALANCA 37 Phil 921 Judicial Due Process Requisites Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio‘s property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it‘d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio‘s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed. HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are; There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. IMELDA MARCOS vs SANDIGANBAYAN October 6, 1998 Facts: 1. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years; 2. On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez; 3. After petitioner‘s husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan; 4. After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them; 5. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario; 6. On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario; 7. On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019; 8. On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS; 9. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated: a. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sublease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation; and b. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they


agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations. Held: The petitioner is hereby acquitted. 1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt. 2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said number of questions could no longer be described as ―clarificatory questions‖. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court. (NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa, Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan ―to allow the corrections of the perceived ‗irregularities‘ in the proceedings below.) DELGADO vs CA November 10, 1986 Due Process Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the frustration of one medical student. Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as Delgado‘s waiver of her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and the CA sustained the lower court‘s rule. Delgado later found out that Yco is not a member of the IBP. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. CONSULTA vs PEOPLE February 12, 2009 Due Process Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower court. Consulta raised before the CA the issue that he was not properly arraigned and that he was represented by a non lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process. HELD: The SC ruled that Consulta‘s claim of being misrepresented cannot be given due course. He was assisted by two lawyers during the proceeding. In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the defect as he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO.


PEOPLE vs OPIDA June 13, 1986 [The SupremeCourt held that the right of the accused to due processof law and impartial trial were violated when it was the judge who conducted the cross-examination of theaccused and his witness instead of the Prosecutor coupled with his sarcastic and insulting remarks andended with the question, ―Do you want me to dictatethe decision now‖? The judge likewise required theaccused to remove his shirt and described for therecord all the tattoos found on his body. Clearly, the judge had allied himself with the prosecution] PEOPLE vs MORTERA GR No. 188104 April 23, 2010 FACTS: This is an appeal from the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in criminal case which found accused Benancio Mortera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of one Robelyn Rojas. Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio testified that one afternoon, he together with other men were drinking tuba. They have just started drinking when Benancio Mortera, Jr. arrived. He wanted to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto Rojas ran away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while the group of Ramil Gregorio were singing accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of Alberto Diaz, arrived. Mortera said, "Here comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told Jomer Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the latter was not hit. Mortera left but he said that he will return. After a few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran, Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer. Mortera met Robelyn at a distance of about seven meters from the place where the group were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn discussed with each other and later shook hands. Robelyn turned his face and Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at the back. After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up but he fell down mortally wounded. He was brought to the hospital by his brother but he was pronounced DOA at the hospital. Jovel Veñales who was drinking together with Ramil Gregorio and others, corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony. Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during the trial, he admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By his account he passed by a corner and saw a group of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and Tonying. Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then immediately fled. On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder. In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief as it was belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The accused appealed to the CA raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense. In its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil liabilities. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially clarificatory." Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the SC. ISSUE: WON the accused were denied of his right to have an impartial trial. HELD: As correctly pointed out by the CA, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense. The invocation of Opida did not persuade the SC. In Opida, SC did not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of


2 The Facts Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by Alen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. vs. Regional Trial Court. The petition likewise seeks to prohibit Judge Blancaflor from implementing the said decision. On June 29.000. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. seeking to annul and set aside the October 13. In the same decision. a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case. Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52. 2011 should they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence. 2009. 2009 Decision1 of respondent Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor). and the dismissal of the arson case. and Regidor Tulali (Tulali). a warrant for their arrest will be issued. 2009. 2009. 22240 for arson (arson case). including their defense witness. On July 30. Palawan (RTC). Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor‘s continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated. entitled People of the Philippines v. Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan. Teksan Ami. Therefore. and hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine of P100. In Opida. in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson. and they will not be released unless they comply with the order of this Court. Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan. Petitioners. ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI. he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali‘s filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan. Rolly Ami (Ami). 190171 March 14. No. G. and so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution. Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez. Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for appropriate action. SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. Respondents. In his October 13. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation of their oath of office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court. Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above grave offenses and 4 . IT IS SO ORDERED. DECISION MENDOZA. the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan. The Hon. and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez). to assure the acquittal of the accused. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior. Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. premises considered. 2009. Branch 52.R. J. judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. During the pendency of the case. the accused never admitted the commission of the crime. 2009 Decision. On August 7. Rodriguez. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR. before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. among others. Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan).00. On June 30.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein.

It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative. including disrespect toward the court.00 each were imposed upon them. In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. (B) RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE RULES ON CONTEMPT. or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same. The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in 5 . to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence. A WRIT OF PROHIBITION MUST BE ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT. 2009 Order. Judge Blancaflor‘s disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.3 Hence. and on the corrective.000. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulali‘s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. not the retaliatory. According to petitioners. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in the assailed November 6. the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt.4 Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due process of law. after the submission of petitioners‘ respective position papers. the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor‘s order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis of Tulali‘s Ex-Parte Manifestation. As earlier recited.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 In an order dated August 13. 2009. (C) SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID. However.7 In this case.6 Such power. and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court. Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13. with utmost restraint. Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of Tulali‘s Ex-Parte Manifestation. judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly. not the vindictive principle.8 Based on the foregoing definition. the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court anchored on the following GROUNDS (A) RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the "direct contempt" proceeding is clearly oppressive and without basis. or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. offensive personalities toward others. and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. being drastic and extraordinary in its nature.5 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding petitioners guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was not based on law and evidence. The petition is impressed with merit. should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100. idea of punishment.

the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. For indirect contempt citation to prosper. x x x. Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for nonobservance of due process in conducting the contempt proceedings. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days. it may constitute indirect contempt. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 the pending criminal case. Hence. requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. to impede. Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing. heard and decided separately. a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxx (d) any improper conduct tending. In fact. that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court. Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied. The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor. Rule 71 of the Rules. and not with the RTC. or both. The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses‘ testimonies had already been completed. did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2. on the other hand. Judge Blancaflor‘s conclusion.000. unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100. 6 . In all other cases. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. obstruct. In the same vein. he should not be held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice. Apparently. In the present case. Sec. the requirements under Sections 3 and 4. or degrade the administration of justice. Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners. hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary. Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30. and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel. Under Section 1.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest. is unfounded and without basis. however. Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.000. only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan. excessive and outside the bounds of the law. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court. – After a charge in writing has been filed. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt. Tulali. as correctly concluded by the OSG. At most. Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. the petitioners‘ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. is evidently unreasonable. 4. or participation in. to wit: Sec. it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged. How proceedings commenced. Accordingly. and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. 3. charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein. 2009 Order. directly or indirectly.

Branch 52. He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the questions propounded in his July 30. They have different objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established. any other evidentiary basis for your conclusion that Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a bag man and facilitator. i. and if so what was the official action thereon. As a public servant. Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto. 2009 was he allowed to answer the charges against him. Your [petitioner Rodriguez‘s] participation. 2009 Order on the contempt charge as the notice required in the disciplinary 7 . pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer. calling him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto Fernandez. prejudice. What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the City Jail without permission from the Court on June 29.11 thus: A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court. on the vindictive principle.e. Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Regional Trial Court. Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 2009 with the Clerk of Court. As held in the case of People v. x x x. as follows: a. Joel T. considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Godoy. a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. passion. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law. to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was made to sign affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29. why? What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10. Reyes. Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 In the course of his investigation. Judge Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings. 2009 at 2:00 0‘clock in the afternoon and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Rolly Ami interviewed? d. 2009. Thus. 2009 Order. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride. it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30. calling him "extortionist. the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office. if any. Palawan. your loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty and obligation?9 Indeed. because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not. if you know. b. 2009 at 2:00 o‘clock in the afternoon. Joel T. whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a magistrate. 2009 filed on June 29. or pettiness in the performance of his duties.. are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.10 Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal. a close associate of yours. c. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who. and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch and ring). why? e. in the filing of the ex-parte manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali together with the attachment of your letter to Gov. as much as judges. Reyes dated May 8. on the other hand." Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30.

Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves. produce witnesses in his own behalf. having violated their right to due process. probity or good demeanor. His guilt. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition. within a specified period from receipt thereof. honesty. SO ORDERED. Accordingly. JOSE T. having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation. Judge Blancaflor. . as well as the motivation thereof. the petition is GRANTED. and to be heard by himself or counsel. to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.12 In the case at bench. (4) grossly immoral conduct. It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done.13 WHEREFORE. Section 27. a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him. This Court is not unmindful of a judge‘s power to suspend an attorney from practice for just cause pursuant to Section 28. and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be complied with. 2009 Decision and November 6. (2) malpractice. until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him. TUBOLA.. (6) violation of the lawyer's oath. to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 30. DECISION 8 . – No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void. however. viz: Sec. Likewise. to produce witnesses in his own behalf.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of law. Judge Blancaflor‘s suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. Indeed. In fine. but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. PETITIONER. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition. JR. Undoubtedly. (3) gross misconduct in office. The contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. and to be heard by himself and counsel. an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides: SEC. there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them. The October 13. RESPONDENTS. Furthermore. cannot be presumed. Remedy therefrom. (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2. Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney. to wit: (1) deceit. the suspension of petitioners must still fail.The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom. the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. however. This injunctive order is immediately executory. as mandated under Section 30. Rule 138 of the same Rules which specifically provides. VS.1avvphi1 Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and suspension proceedings is permitted. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds. 2. a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined from implementing the said decision and order. 2009 Order are hereby annulled and set aside. (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

He is likewise ordered to indemnify the Republic of the Philippines the amount of Ninety Three Thousand Fifty One Pesos and Eighty Eight Centavos (P93. 1982 to petitioner directing him to account for the shortage."[6] By the account of Gotera.000 field employees in the NIA Jalaur Project. and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.46 prior to June 25. 1982 totaled P285. 1982. who claimed that he was assigned as cashier since 1978 and was also in charge of payment of salaries of more than 2. that from June 25 to November 8. and the accessory penalties provided for by law.88 as of November 8.051.[9] for he (petitioner) was also handling the payroll of around 2.[11] And he identified "chits" and "vales" dated 1975 to 1981 inclusive representing loans extended prior to the audit period.044. On November 8. JOSE TUBOLA. declared that his task of keeping the collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to Editha Valeria (Valeria) upon instruction of his superior. Jr. 1982. without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same. his cash collections totaled P347.105. the guilt of the accused. the lone witness for the prosecution.88 to the damage and prejudice of the government. Petitioner further declared that no accounting of the collected fees was undertaken since he trusted Valeria.162. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the Court hereby CONVICTS him of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[7] Still by Gotera's account. committed as follows: That within the period from June 25. Iloilo City and as such was an accountable public officer for public funds that were in his official custody by reason of his official position. CONTRARY TO LAW. after he signed the statement of collection without reading the contents thereof. having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. JR. to SEVENTEEN (17) years. FOUR (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum. the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) years and ONE (1) day of Prision Mayor as Minimum. 2000. Barbara River Irrigation System in Iloilo City.[3] Gotera and Cajita thus sent a letter of demand dated November 23. 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. to pay a fine in the same amount. 1982 up to November 8.: Jose Tubola.EIGHT CENTAVOS P93. and for sometime prior thereto. 1982. however. Sta. in Iloilo City.661.051. wilfully.995.000 employees.66 representing loans extended by Valeria to certain NIA employees and even COA auditors. unlawfully and feloniously. 12015 which found him guilty of Malversation of Public Funds penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. 1982.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 CARPIO MORALES. which is the amount of money malversed Petitioner was the cashier of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)-Aganan.[5] Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan to which he pleaded "not guilty. (petitioner) appeals the December 7. who directly remitted them to the bank.[4] Petitioner refused to receive the letter. 2000 Decision[1] and June 10. the said accused who was a duly appointed cashier/collecting officer of the National Irrigation System. hence. Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditing Examiners Yvonne Gotera (Gotera) and Theresita Cajita (Cajita) conducted an audit examination of petitioner's account which indicated a shortage of P93.41.[2] underscoring supplied) (emphasis and collections less total remittances amounted to P93.051.88. J. Gotera and Cajita sent it by registered mail. and that the total 9 . did then and there. with grave abuse of confidence misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of NINE THREE THOUSAND FIFTY ONE PESOS AND EIGHTY. the date petitioner's account was audited.[8] Petitioner.[13] the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner as charged. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE.[12] By Decision of December 7. the audit team found in petitioner's drawer "vales/chits" or promissory notes or receivables signed by NIA employees involving the total amount of P79.64. that his remittances from June 25 to November 8. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender..51. 1982.051.88). Regional Director Manuel Hicao. [10] Petitioner presented "vales" and "chits" involving the total amount of P115. petitioner had an account balance of P30.

he cannot be faulted for negligence. petitioner's self-serving testimony failed to controvert the legal presumption of misappropriation.[17] According to petitioner. To the People. . In fine. II . absent criminal intent. he should not be convicted with the full harshness of the law. Petitioner even posits that the Sandiganbayan was unsure whether he was guilty of malversation intentionally or through negligence. SO ORDERED.[18] which ruled that a head of office is not required to examine every single detail of any transaction from its inception until it is finally approved. Malversation of public funds or property. he argues. . RENDERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT [HE] IS NOT AN ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL WRONGDOER. imputing error on the Sandiganbayan for I . .[14] (Capitalization. or to at least present a certification from then Regional Director Manuel Hicao. and finally to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold public office. to deem it no longer necessary for him to examine all the details each time a remittance of the fees was made. petitioner posits that he was neither an actual or potential wrongdoer and."[24] Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art.[20] Finally.[15] petitioner lodged the present appeal. "incontrovertible fact that [he] ha[d] not received any single centavo in the form of irrigation fees" since the collections were actually received by Valeria. . he being the superior of Valeria. the evidence adduced at the trial had overcome the legal presumption that he put the missing funds to his personal use. .[22] The People goes on to contend that petitioner may still be convicted of malversation by negligence even if the Information alleged the commission of intentional malversation since the "dolo or culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. the People underscores that it is the duty of a trial judge to examine a witness "to secure a full and clear understanding of the facts or to test to his satisfaction the credibility of the witness.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 and the costs of suit. shall appropriate the same. he had to rely on her honesty and competence in the performance of her duties. CONCLUD[ING] THAT [HE] FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 217 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE . shall permit any other person to take 10 . . Sandiganbayan.. VIOLAT[ING] [HIS] BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT ACTIVELY TOOK PART IN THE QUESTIONING OF THE ACCUSED WHEN HE WAS PRESENTED AS A WITNESS. .. III .[16] To petitioner. the Justices of the Sandiganbayan having actively participated in the criminal proceedings by "tak[ing] into their own hands in proving the case against [him]. or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent. . petitioner points out that his right to due process was violated. He cites Arias v."[21] The People. . or through abandonment or negligence.Any public officer who. CONCLUDING THAT [HE] HAS COMMITTED INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN DELEGATING THE CUSTODY OF THE ACCOUNT TO [AN]OTHER PERSON. There is. through the Special Prosecutor. . . 217. IV . Presumption of malversation. petitioner insists that as the primary task of collecting the irrigation fees was the responsibility of Valeria. is accountable for public funds or property. who allegedly ordered Valeria to take over from petitioner the duty of collecting irrigation fees."[23] Respecting the supposed violation of petitioner's right to due process in light of the alleged "active" participation of the Sandiganbayan Justices in questioning him during the hearing of the case.[19] Further. by reason of the duties of his office. draws attention to the failure of petitioner to present Valeria to shed light on her actual duties. italics and emphasis in the original) His motion for reconsideration having been denied.

that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable. your Honor. if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. upon demand by any duly authorized officer. or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. so that even if the Court were to credit petitioner's allegation that Valeria had actually taken over his function of collecting the irrigation fees. he was tasked to regularly handle irrigation fees. Who keeps the irrigation fees being collected? A: Edita Valeria. shall suffer: 1. shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. 1983[27] inclusive. 2. and 4. through abandonment or negligence. persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos. 3.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 such public funds or property. if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. By reason of his position. Petitioner was a public officer[26] ? he occupied the position of cashier at the NIA. that he appropriated. your Honor. sir. 2. If the amount exceeds the latter. 15th. if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. in fact by his admission. your Honor. the collections were still. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. 3. took. and to remit them to the depositary bank. PJ GARCHITORENA Confine your answer to the question. petitioner was the one who remitted irrigation fees collected from June 25. x x x x. (italics in the original. Q: After Edita Valeria receives the money representing the irrigation fees of farmers. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.[25] All the above-mentioned elements are here present. Q: Whose function is it to keep the irrigation fees? A: My function. Edita Valeria is the one in charge. sir.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In fact. who keeps the money being paid for irrigation fees? A: She is the one holding the money turned over to her by the farmers who paid their irrigation fees. that the offender is a public officer. the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable. 4. which are indubitably public funds pertaining to the NIA. does she turn over the collections to you? A: Yes. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. permitted another person to take them. WITNESS A: 11 . I am just reporting in my office every 7th. Q: How about the money after this payment for irrigation fees are entered in the Collection Book for which Ms. turned over to him. misappropriated or consented or. 1982 to October 31. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In all cases. petitioner's admission that his signature was required before remitting the irrigation fees to the depositary bank reinforces the fact that he had complete control and custody thereof. emphasis and underscoring supplied) The elements of malversation of public funds are thus: 1. wholly or partially. PJ GARCHITORENA Q: Is that part of her functions? WITNESS A: No. As established by the prosecution.

the circumstances obtaining in Arias and the present case are entirely different.[29] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) As to the element of misappropriation. whom petitioner had pointed to as having full responsibility for the collections. So. the Irrigation Superintendent. x x x x. 12 .[31] Aside then from the lack of a superior-subordinate relationship with Valeria. indeed. I just asked her.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 Everytime she reported to me. did you attempt to collect this from the payees? A: No. 1982 to November 8. indeed petitioner failed to rebut the legal presumption that he had misappropriated the fees to his personal use. I have two disbursement books and my collection book is handled by Mrs. Valeria get the cash to extend vales. as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan: PROS GALINDEZ Q: Mr. she herself extended vales from her collections.044.. including their deposit to the bank. A: Yes. 1982. sir.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioner's assertion. Valeria. sir? Because my collection book is balance as found by the examiners. Valeria including the payments and . "Is this accounting okay?" and she said "Yes". Witness. was never presented to corroborate his claim dents his defense as does his failure to present the Regional Director or a certification from him for the same purpose. that he was the superior of Valeria was later belied by him: Q: But she [referring to Valeria] is under your direct supervision? A: Under the Chief of Office. this is okay and you can just sign this statement of collection. vis-à-vis his citation of the ruling in Arias. On petitioner's assertion that the Sandiganbayan erred in concluding that he committed malversation through inexcusable negligence when the Information alleges intentional malversation. Arias involved the culpability of a final approving authority on the basis of criminal conspiracy. your Honor. Q: So that these chits and vales which were merely listed by the Auditing Examiners as they were found inside your safe are irrelevant to the accusation? WITNESS A: Where can Mrs. petitioner could have at least promptly collected them. you could not have possibly used the money collected by you in your capacity as Cashier for the period from June 25. she just fold [sic] the page of the collection book and he [sic] tells [sic] me. Valeria is the one handling my collections.51. I am just concentrating on my disbursements. If this claim were true. they are immaterial. Witness. as the same were admittedly incurred before the period of audit. 1982 to November 8. PROS GALINDEZ Q: This inventory of cash and cash items which is from 1975 to 1981. You have covered that point already. since these chits and vales were incurred before the period [covered by the ] audit. it fails. I have told you before that Mrs. it does not impress.. whereas the present case involves petitioner's culpability on the basis of his being the accountable public officer. sir. As for petitioner's explanation that the unaccounted fees were extended as loans to employees as evidenced by "vales" and "chits" found in his drawer which involved a total of P79. Q: Mr. covered by the audit period. his disclaimer being self-serving. and/or offered the testimonies of the employees-obligors to prove good faith on his part. we are speaking about the chits and vales which you extended. 1982 and that Exhibit "1" series refers to accounts prior to that period of audit so that you have a point. PJ GARCHITORENA It is clear that the accused is being charged for shortage covered by the period June 25. Why. PJ GARCHITORENA Q: So you are being made to sign a statement of collection without looking at the supporting documents to validate the correctness of the figures nor even to determine whether the figures there and the ones remitted to the Philippine National Bank? A: Yes. As for the "vales" and "chits" that he offered in evidence.

shows that the embezzlement. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. CATACUTAN. PETITIONER. or the expenditures. That a magistrate may propound clarificatory questions to secure a full and clear understanding of the facts in the case is not proscribed. the petition is DENIED. RESPONDENT. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. emphasis and underscoring supplied) Finally. in Cabello v. Nor does the record reflect any move to inhibit the Justices if petitioner perceived that they were biased against him.[34] (italics in the original. as posited by him. 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.[32] Nonetheless. even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. The record does not reflect any question or objection raised by petitioner's counsel during the trial to the Justices' questions or the tenor or manner they were propounded. Catacutan seeking to set aside and reverse the Decision[1] dated December 7. JOSE R. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved. VS. From the contention of either party. A possible exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the charge against him. Surigao City convicting him of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No.[33] the Court ratiocinated that: On the other hand. Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Jose R. 12015 are AFFIRMED. Besides. 2000 Decision and June 10. Branch 30. the misappropriation was intentional and not through negligence. 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16.: It is well within the Court's discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. were not only unauthorized but intentionally and voluntarily made.[3] 13 . the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner for intentional malversation on the basis of his failure to refute the presumption that he converted the money to his personal use. the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. unreimbursed or uncollected amounts. petitioner's claim of violation of his right to due process vis-à-vis the Sandiganbayan Justices' active "participation" during the trial fails too. Factual Antecedents The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed. or cited what questions adversely affected him. Under no stretch of legal hermeneutics can it be contended that these funds were lost through abandonment or negligence without petitioner's knowledge as to put the loss within a merely culpable category. For he has not specified any instance of supposed bias of the Justices. Sandiganbayan. The December 7.[35] WHEREFORE. petitioner contends that the bulk of said amount represented "vales" he granted to the postal employees and the minor portion consisted of unremitted. J. SO ORDERED. That no such prejudice was occasioned on petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the records of this case. DECISION DEL CASTILLO. as claimed by the prosecution. under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. His very own explanation. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. therefore. both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT). Petitioner misreads the assailed Decision since the discussion about his culpability for malversation through inexcusable negligence was merely academic in light of the postulation that a subordinate (Valeria) was at fault. 2006 of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed the Decision[2] dated July 25.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 To be sure.

DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 On June 2. Pages 1-16) instead of only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs. The trial court ruled that petitioner's refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants had caused undue injury to them. with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith. CATACUTAN. appointed and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT. the private complainants were not able to assume their new position since petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not implement them despite written orders from CHED[7] and the CSC. the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region. He likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to the usual procedure where the original appointment papers and other supporting documents are returned to his office. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. to wit: That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter.[9] In an Information dated February 27.[4] These promotional appointments were duly approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 3. the approved appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6. while in the performance of his official duties. 1997.[5] Being then the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT. the accused JOSE R. private complainants lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. refuse to implement the promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. however. the RTC rendered its Decision[14] holding that the act of the petitioner in defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the subject promotional appointments despite the rejection of his opposition. petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the private complainants because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers. were formally brought to the attention of the CHED Regional Director on June 20.[8] Thus. 1997[12] who. Despite receipt of the appointment letter. Caraga Regional Office. he asserted that the transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority and despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil Service Commission in the region. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors [III]. on August 2. thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to receive a higher compensation for their promotion. petitioner sought the intercession of CHED Chairman Angel C. Finally. 14 . Still not satisfied. he contended. Surigao City. OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT). demonstrates his palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. For his defense. thus committing the act in relation to his office. 1997. According to him. 2005. These alleged infirmities. 1997. petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended. as well as [to] the school and the students who were deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. it held petitioner guilty of the crime charged and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month and perpetual disqualification from public office.[10] During arraignment on September petitioner pleaded "not guilty.[6] copy furnished the concerned appointees. 1998. willfully. Crispin Noguera. with salary grade below 27. feloniously and unlawfully did then and there. using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional Office who made the appointments." 22. informed him that the subject appointments were regular and valid and directed him to implement the same. Thus. in Surigao City. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the preparation of appointment papers. the appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT Administrative Officer. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative problem[13] but the latter did not respond. committed in the following manner. 1997. CONTRARY TO LAW. He also averred that the appointment papers cited the entire plantilla[11] (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSBVOCIS3-19. 1998. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On July 25.

"[26] Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements.R. The aforementioned accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainants Georgito Posesano and Magdalena Divinagracia the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50. finding the accused JOSE R. 3019.00) each.[15] Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16] but it was denied in an Order[17] dated October 13. Hence. there is no denial of procedural due process. 2007. he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process."[24] "Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.A. 15 . petitioner's conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan. et al. Our Ruling The petition lacks of merit.R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of R. 2008. There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked: petitioner. respondents. 2007 while the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the Comment[21] for respondent People of the Philippines on February 22.000. Ruling of the Sandiganbayan On appeal. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case. SO ORDERED. petitioner can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due process.R. Catacutan. SP No."[22] Invoking the constitutional provision on due process. "Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. SP No. SP No.[18] The appellate court ruled that the Decision of the trial court. To reiterate. He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals' (CA's) Decision in CA-G. 51795 which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent. argue his case vigorously. for moral damages. is correct."[25] "Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against him. 51795. as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course. being supported by evidence and firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence. 51795 entitled "Jose R. It held that petitioner failed to show that the trial court committed any reversible error in judgment. concerns an administrative matter. this petition. and explain the merits of his defense. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Issue The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is: Whether the [petitioner's] constitutional right[s] to due process x x x and x x x equal protection of [the] law x x x were violated x x x [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court of Appeals'] Decision dated April 18. 2005. 2001 x x x in CA-G.. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file its Comment. In the Court's Resolution[19] dated February 26. Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process. It is well within the court's discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment [of] SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE. The OSG filed its Comment[20] on June 5. versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 The RTC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE.[23] petitioner argues that the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. and to pay the costs.

thus it has no probative weight.R. One thing is administrative liability. 16 . an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution."[30] At any rate.[29] the Court or incompetent evidence.If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court. provides: Section 3. the party producing it should ask the court's permission to have the exhibit attached to the record. the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. the dismissal of an administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject matter. x x x In Nicolas reiterated: v. 51795 (Jose R.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. x x x[27] This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not without legal precedent. xxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party. As observed by the appellate court. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40. is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA Decision. It is not an error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes. Office of the Ombudsman). he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. In Paredes v. The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case. the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful. "Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant. x x x On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents. . If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected. In the same way. evident bad This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. Notably. xxxx Thus. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality. Corrupt practices of public officers. Thus. the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CA's Decision for whatever it may be worth.[28] this Court ruled: It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not formally offered. Tender of excluded evidence. Section 3(e) of RA 3019. petitioner is not left without legal recourse. the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. Sandiganbayan. SP No. Court of Appeals. immaterial. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides: Section 40. If the evidence excluded is oral. Catacutan vs. the Court has no option but to declare that the courts below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA Decision. as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings. The dismissal of a criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all respects. considering the difference in the quantum of evidence. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official. as amended. or vice versa.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter. As things stand. . or testimony of an incompetent witness. including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal.

Catacutan deliberately ignored the memorandum and even challenged the private complainants to file a case against him. sleepless nights. evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. evidence does. x x x xxxx In the August 1. Accused-appellant failed to implement the subject promotions. Likewise established is that as a result of petitioner's unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors. petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of private complainants. the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their valid appointments."[34] Third. the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation. the same are binding on this 17 . 1997. that is. x x x In light of the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court that Catacutan's reason for not implementing the appointments was a personal dislike or ill feelings towards Posesano. to cease and desist from further questioning what has been lawfully acted upon by competent authorities. advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. this Court believes that Catacutan's refusal was impelled by an ill motive or dishonest purpose characteristic of bad faith. three essential elements must thus be satisfied. 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director. petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time material to this case were it not for his being a public officer. private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary corresponding to their newly appointed positions.[31] All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution. judicial or official functions. including the government or gave any private party unwarranted benefits. they were able to assume their new positions only on November 19.[33] While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private complainants' valid appointments. as well as implementing instruction as far as appointment of teachers. Under said provision of law. Catacutan was once again directed. the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by the Sandiganbayan. This stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated directive of competent authorities established the evident bad faith of Catacutan and belies any of his claims to the contrary. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked: The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion was no longer anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14. and His action caused any undue injury to any party. which include the exercise of administrative supervision over the school such as taking charge of personnel management and finances. As such public officer. First. Such arrogance is indicative of the bad faith of the accused-appellant. clarifying with finality the validity of the appointment. Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 1997 letter of the CHED Regional Director addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in the latter's protest letter. the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5. the private complainants suffered mental anguish. As borne out by the records. undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral certainty. "It is well to remember that good intentions do not win cases. At this point.[32] Second. He must have acted with manifest partiality. as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. So in the interregnum from June to November 1997. he exercised official duties and functions. Yet again. Here. Still. viz: The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative. 1997. in strong words. serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damages under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.

The Facts Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. bank accounts and other properties presently under the respective names of Jesse Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by the spouse whose name appears as the registered/account owner or holder in the corporate records/stock transfer books. apart from these factual findings of the lower courts. including the dividends/fruits thereof. and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling.[10] In 2001. Inc. ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter‘s name. 1387 Quezon Avenue. The property covered by TCT No. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out of her own funds/assets whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid amounts on said lots mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof directly with Megaworld Properties. 2006 is AFFIRMED. who was born in Canada in 1990 and Russel. Jesse Tan shall execute any and all documents 18 . Otherwise stated. In its 15 February 2005 Resolution. The shares of stocks. Quezon City shall be exclusively owned by Jesse Tan to the exclusion of Susie Tan. in Civil Case No. Quezon City and more particularly described in the Contract to Sell. this Court in its own assessment and review of the records considers the findings in order. Inc. 167139 The Case This is a petition for review[1] of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution[2] amending the 30 March 2004 Decision[3] and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. transact. The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement. all shares. passbooks and/or the one in possession thereof. in connection with the Contract to Sell marked as Annexes ―A‖ and ―B‖ hereof. twelve years into the marriage. Incorporated as part of the decision was the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment[5] approving the Compromise Agreement[6] of the parties. as to the family corporations of Susie Tan. 1990 and Russel Tan born on November 28. Quezon City shall be placed in co-ownership under the name of Susie Tan (1/3). 2. The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at Corinthian Hills. to the exclusion of Susie Tan. SO ORDERED. the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on December 7. In its 17 May 2004 Resolution. Manila. the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan void under Article 36 of the Family Code. 1993. petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[8] which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution. Justin Tan born on October 12. pay and deal with the seller/developer Megaworld Properties. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and located at View Master Town Homes.. which we quote in full: 1. until the whole purchase or contract amounts are fully paid. the trial court granted to respondent custody of the children. Justin Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse Tan. In its 30 March 2004 Decision.[9] They were blessed with two sons: Justin. Q-01-45743. However. to the exclusion of the other spouse. In any event... Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate. Copies of the Contract to Sell are hereto attached as Annexes ―A‖ and ―B‖ and made integral parts hereof. bank accounts and properties registered and under the name and/or in the possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively owned by him only and all shares. Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St. the trial court denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution[7] denying petitioner‘s motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. marked in open court as Exhibits ―H‖ to ―H-3‖ shall be considered as part of the presumptive legitimes of their two (2) minor children namely. who was born in the Philippines in 1993.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 Court. accounts and properties registered and/or in the possession and under the name of Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by her only. Branch 107. The property covered by CCT No. TAN vs TAN GR No. Jesse Tan shall exclusively own blvd. WHEREFORE. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and located at Unit O.

provided that the same will not impede or disrupt their academic schedule in Xavier School. the existing property regime of the spouses shall be dissolved and shall now be governed by ―Complete Separation of Property‖. shoes and similar expenses like summer workshops which are taken in Xavier School. if necessary. Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the family of Jesse Tan e. During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein parties will agree on such dates as when the children can stay with their father. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and bind themselves to execute and sign any and all documents to give effect to this Compromise Agreement. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Court. papers.[11] On 31 July 2003. Quezon City on or before 9:00 PM of every Sunday of each month. Parties expressly represent that there are no known creditors that will be prejudiced by the present compromise agreement. Susie Tan at 12-B Mariposa St. contracts registered in the name of the other spouse that are in their respective possessions and/or safekeeping. the Husband shall shoulder the tuition and other miscellaneous fees. Provided that if the same is not possible. the parties shall as far as practicable have one celebration.. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch effective on the 15th of each month. Provided that if the children stay with their father on Christmas Day from December 24th to December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will stay with their mother on December 31 until January 1. Father's Day d. the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the children on the following additional dates. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and utilized for their High School and College education. if said visit or birthday coincides with the school day. directly to the tutor concerned.000. shall have the right to bring out the two (2) children every Sunday of each month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother. the dates are as follows: a. which will be paid directly by Jesse Tan to the children's school when the same fall due. shall pay tutorial expenses. A copy of the list of the corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is hereto attached as Annex ―C‖ and made an integral part hereof. uniform. malign or commit discourteous acts against each other and shall endeavor to cause their other relatives to act similarly. nor shall they do anything to estrange any of them from the other. the two (2) minor children shall stay with their mother. or vice versa. The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children and shall see to it that he will exert his best effort to attend the same. or otherwise. The husband further undertake to pay P10. 5. customs. The parties agreed to observe civility. 6. 19 . The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the other spouse any and all original documents. The husband. The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor children in school/or in the house every Thursday of each month. During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of the children. the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall have the right to see and bring out the children for at least four (4) hours during the day or the day immediately following/or after the birthday. 7. The husband shall ensure that the children be home by 8:00 PM of said Thursdays. The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. the parties shall discuss the proper arrangement to be made regarding the stay of the children with Jesse Tan. school bags. public order and good morals. Jesse Tan. The minor children shall be returned to 12-B Mariposa Street. public policy. or in the way of a reasonable and proper companionship between them. Birthday of Jesse Tan b. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law. Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the love and affection between the children and the other party. in the event that the Educational Plans are insufficient to cover their tuition. titles. Quezon City. In addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to his two (2) sons every Sunday. the amount needed and necessary for the purpose of the daily meals of the two (2) children in school. costs of books and educational materials. first cousins and uncles and aunties c.00/monthly support pendente lite to be deposited in the ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with account no. 1:00 PM.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 transferring the shares of stocks registered in his name in favor of Susie Tan. However. Likewise. 4. the trial court issued a partial judgment[12] approving the compromise agreement. or Justin Tan/Russel Tan. 3. courteousness and politeness in dealing with each other and shall not insult. Jesse Tan. either by influencing the children against the other.

and (c) P533. The trial court reasoned that since petitioner took it upon herself to enroll the children in another school without respondent‘s knowledge. Block 2 of Corinthian Hills to other interested buyers. She prayed for an increase in respondent‘s monthly support obligation in the amount of P150. to offer Lot 12.992. Quezon City. together with her children.297.000. mistake. if forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children.[19] The trial court then issued a Certificate of Finality[20] of the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution.968. Block 2. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 resolution.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 On 30 March 2004. Unconvinced.783.250. It held that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. It also appears from the records that petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.420. and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa.[15] denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. She claimed she was forced to leave the country.000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property which. to allocate the amount of P11. In its 28 December 2004 Resolution. Block 2.[13] Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. On 4 November 2004. The trial court also denied petitioner‘s prayer for increase in monthly support. in its 12 October 2004 Resolution. she should therefore defray the resulting increase in their expenses. The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court. ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter‘s name.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the other lot in Corinthian Hills on Lot 11. to cover the marketing and administrative costs of Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12. the trial court. She alleged she was not able to present evidence because of the negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her life and the future of the children. It incorporated the 31 July 20 . The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the parties on the issues of support. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit. petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. in its 17 May 2004 resolution.656. Meanwhile.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld Corp. petitioner failed to pay the P8.32 so far paid on the said lot in the following manner: (a) P3. Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration[14] alleging denial of due process on account of accident. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. Thus. or excusable negligence. Block 2.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the contract price in Unit 9H of the 8 Wack Wack Road Condominium project. the trial court. Undeterred. custody. 12.000. which the trial court denied in its 15 February 2005 resolution. She authorized Megaworld Corp. and property relations. due to the alleged beating she received from respondent and the pernicious effects of the latter‘s supposed gambling and womanizing ways. awarded to respondent custody of the children. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss[16] and a motion for reconsideration[17] of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. and petitioner failed to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter‘s name.[18] the trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. visitation of the children. The Trial Court‘s Rulings The 30 March 2004 Decision[21] declared the marriage between the parties void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. (b) P7. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the children.

the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private respondent. We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final and executory when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary period. she cannot say she was denied her day in court. the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent‘s omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the children and the properties in her possession. as may be gleaned from her counsel‘s manifestation dated 3 May 2004: 21 . The 17 May 2004 Resolution[24] amended the earlier partial judgment in granting to respondent custody of the children. actively participated in the proceedings below. was clearly filed out of time. or vacated. Records show petitioner. through counsel. There. The Court‘s Ruling The petition has no merit. Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court are now final and executory and could no longer be reviewed. Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.[28] In Tuason. We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter‘s right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is applicable. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent. filing motion after motion. The 15 February 2005 Resolution[25] denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution[26] denying petitioner‘s motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioner‘s motion to dismiss. Respondent alleges petitioner is making a mockery of our justice system in disregarding our lawful processes. the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of the marriage and awarding custody of the children to private respondent therein. No timely appeal was taken from the trial court‘s judgment. He argued he was denied due process when.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 2003 Partial Judgment[22] approving the Compromise Agreement[23] between the parties.[30] Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution. petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process.[27] which in turn denied for late filing petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. Quezon City. and allowing respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa.[29] In the present case. modified. which the trial court received on 28 June 2004. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason. after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings. The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v. The Issue Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process. ordering petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter‘s name. private respondent therein filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage on the ground of her husband‘s psychological incapacity. Contrary to petitioner‘s allegation of negligence of her counsel. Further. the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner‘s loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial court‘s judgments. we have reason to believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioner‘s end. the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family. Court of Appeals. While she may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of respondent.

The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides: SEC. In this connection. Only a respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. x x x (Emphasis supplied) However. the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and executory. (Emphasis supplied) The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an answer. however. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable. Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent. a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff‘s instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. not a petitioner. who appeared for petitioner. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the plaintiff. Motion to dismiss. Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her. The trial court was correct in denying petitioner‘s motion to dismiss. instead of a mere motion to dismiss. despite her counsel‘s efforts to reach her. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. – A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. in the nullity proceedings.[32] Further. at the risk of occasional error. x x x Section 2.[33] The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that. so that judgment may be made on the merits.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 Undersigned Counsel. The only logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory. Attempts to call petitioner have failed. respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not heard from petitioner since Holy Week.[34] 22 . it becomes immutable and unalterable. 7. The same may no longer be modified in any respect. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004. the issues there should be laid to rest. Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage. – No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties. the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. provided. Upon such notice being filed. that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer. petitioner‘s claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family is without basis. among others. As for the applicability to petitioner‘s motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. petitioner is correct. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process. custody of the children. In construing a statute. – Except as provided in the preceding section. the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision applies only to a respondent.[31] Clearly. even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. the purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be considered. to wit: Section 1. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. petitioner showed utter disinterest in the hearings on respondent‘s omnibus motion seeking.

Branch 107. Branch 4. issued by the MTCC Baguio City. since complainant is a resident of Quezon City and not of Baguio City. Baguio City. 2006. It is true that the return on the court's Order dated August 8. vs. She was detained at the Quezon City Hall Complex Police Office and had to post bail of P1. 0310. Quezon City" directing complainant to appear on October 10. This notwithstanding.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 WHEREFORE. Q-01-45743. of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. 10 & 12. a preliminary investigation was conducted by the provincial prosecutor resulting in the Resolution dated July 11. However.00 before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for her temporary release. 1104. J. hence. 22. in relation to Sec. as accused therein. The warrant of arrest she issued was meant to implement this provision. for the arraignment and preliminary conference in Criminal Case No. Respondent. 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure be made for the guidance of the bench and bar. SO ORDERED.4 The OCA. It was sent by mail to PNP Quezon City for service to her. If her interpretation was erroneous. Tan (complainant) filed a Complaint dated April 2. in its agenda report dated September 28. 2006 at 8:30 a. It was only then that she learned for the first time that a criminal case was filed against her before the court. 118628 for alleged violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. Prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Municipal Trial Court in Cities. relative to Criminal Case No.1 In her Comment2 dated July 5. 2006 for arraignment. She issued the warrant in the honest belief that her act was in compliance with the rules.m. Costs against petitioner. and (b) Sec. RESOLUTION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. she issued the warrant of arrest in good faith and upon the following grounds: (a) under Sec. Nonetheless. 2006 recommending the filing of the case. 118628. Petitioner. failed to appear. she learned that respondent issued on August 8. 2006. 2006 addressed to complainant "through the Chief of Police. 3 of Rule 1313 of the Rules of Court. Baguio City for denial of due process relative to Criminal Case No. which was not repealed by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. 12 of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases provides that bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. TAN. recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of merit. JUDGE MARIA CLARITA CASUGA-TABIN.: Noryn S. PNP. 2006 an Order directing her to appear before the court on October 10. Upon verification. It held: Prior to the filing of the information. the complainant. we DENY the petition for review. she did not receive any copy of the Order and up to the present has not seen the same. the court was entitled to presume that on October 10. Branch 4. She also found out that there was no proof of service of the Order or any notice to her of the arraignment. Complainant avers: On November 9. Branch 4. 2006. Complainant alleges that she was deeply aggrieved and embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant for her arrest despite the fact that she was never notified of her arraignment. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May 2004 Resolution amending the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. as proven by Registry Receipt No. Complainant prayed that the appropriate investigation be conducted as to the undue issuance of a warrant for her arrest. she (respondent) believes that an administrative sanction for such error would be harsh and unsympathetic. She prays that the case against her be dismissed and that a ruling on the interpretation of Secs. after the lapse of a little over two months. official duty had been regularly performed and a letter duly directed and mailed had been received in the regular course of mail.000. 2007. 2006. She has nothing personal against complainant and did not want to embarrass or humiliate her. respondent answered: She issued the warrant of arrest because when the case was called for appearance. 2007. 2006 had not yet been made by the QC Police on or before October 10. her staff sent by registered mail the court's Order dated August 8. it was incredulous for complainant to claim that she came to learn for the first time of the filing of the criminal case when the warrant of 23 . presided by respondent. the Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City Police District (QCPD) served her a warrant of arrest dated October 13. 2007 against Judge Maria Clarita CasugaTabin (respondent) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). NORYN S. in Civil Case No. she was not able to attend her arraignment. respondent issued a warrant for her arrest. 118628.

16. the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused. Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure. (Emphasis supplied) In this case. her explanation of good faith was therefore unjustifiable. there was already a complete service of notice as contemplated in Sec.6 Adopting the recommendation of the OCA. arraignments could not proceed and trials could not go on. it was reasonable to follow as a rule that once a pleading or any other official document was received in the ordinary course of sending them. complainant was not aware of and therefore did not attend the preliminary investigation of her case. 2008 alleging: The issue in this case was not whether complainant was aware of the criminal complaint against her. complainant failed to rebut the presumption that she was notified of the scheduled arraignment. she was not able to attend the same. PNP. was sent to complainant "through the Chief of Police. but allegedly to receive the subpoena in almost two months.8 In a Resolution dated April 16. the effect would be to paralyze the operation of courts in the provinces that had to inevitably rely on the police resources of Metro Manila. one of which is that official duty has been regularly performed. showed that it pertained to the one sent to the prosecutor's office. Release of the person arrested shall either be in bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court. 2007 admitted that since she did not usually wear eyeglasses during hearings. what complainant propounded was a mere self-serving denial that she never received the subpoena intended for her. to believe otherwise would be to delay justice for those residing outside Metro Manila. she thought that the acknowledgment receipt at the back of the Order referred to the copy sent to complainant. 2007 Resolution. when such notice was not 24 . furthermore. there was no explanation why she would be able to receive a warrant of arrest.9 Complainant filed a Comment stating: Complainant's motion did not raise any new issue or ground that would merit the reconsideration of the Court's November 12. complainant was never notified of the arraignment. since complainant failed to appear during the arraignment in spite of an order requiring her to do so. neither was it served by ordinary mail or by registered mail. in a little less than a month. the date respondent ordered the warrant to be issued. . respondent claims that the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of complainant was justified. no proof can be shown that she was ever notified of the said preliminary investigation.7 Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 8. Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 arrest was served on her. the Court required respondent to Comment on complainant's Motion for Reconsideration. such presumption should not be the sole basis of a magistrate in concluding that a person called to court has failed to appear as required. the rule on completeness of service had not been satisfied. since the complainant did not actually receive any notice. thus. that a copy of the Order dated August 8. there was no personal service. but whether the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her despite the absence of notice should be administratively dealt with. 2006 and the completion of the service thereof. later scrutiny. there was no actual delivery of the Order to the complainant. unless the accused fails to appear whenever required. the Order was addressed and sent to PNP Quezon City. hence. hence the requirement of notice was fully satisfied by the service of the Order dated August 8. respondent admitted in her Comment that no return had yet been made on or before October 10. if complainant's assertion was to be believed. Respondent admits. assuming that the Order was properly served on the PNP. it was not equivalent to a service on complainant. the Court on November 12.11 This is clearly provided in Section 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which states: Sec. 10. 2006. Section 10. it must be presumed that others of the same nature were also delivered to the named addressees. which in turn justifies the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. however. which was coursed in the same manner as the subpoena. neither could respondent invoke the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Quezon City. 2006.10 The Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration to be impressed with merit. 1104. 2007 issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit. 2008. respondent in an Order dated March 14." While it is true that the Rules of Court provides for presumptions.The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Arrest of accused. much less of the filing of the same. thus. Rule 13 of the Rules of Court did not apply to the instant case. however.

the Court verified from the staff if the Accused was notified to which said staff answered in the affirmative. 2007 that when she proceeded with the arraignment on October 10. showing to the Court a copy of the Order dated August 8. Respondent further admitted in her Comment dated July 5. and that the Order had been received in the regular course of mail. Section 12 talks of instances when bails are required. actually served the same on complainant whose address was not even specified. shall cause the issuance of a warrant for his arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses. arguing that she did so on the presumption that regular duty had been performed.12 Nevertheless. or to require further proceedings to be taken.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 actually addressed to her residence but to the police in her city. during the hearing on October 10. one of which is when the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. At the back of the Order was an attached Acknowledgment Receipt. x x x14 (Emphasis supplied) 25 . 2006. or (e) has no known residence. that Sections 10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases were not repealed by the 1991 Revised Rules.No bail shall be required except when a warrant of arrest is issued in accordance with Section 10 hereon or where the accused (a) is a recidivist. made this Court believed that indeed. 2006 as scheduled. Bail not required. directing the defendant(s) to appear and submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later than ten (10) days from receipt thereof. If he pleads not guilty. the warrant of arrest she issued was justified since complainant is a resident of Quezon City and not of Baguio City. (d) does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. 2006. Respondent's interpretation ascribes to the rules those which were not expressly stated therein and unduly expands their meaning. --. . still it does not justify the warrant of arrest issued in this case. 2006. setting this case for Appearance of the Accused on October 10. may render judgment forthwith. The attention of the Court was called upon receipt of the Accused's Motion for Clarification and a closer look on the Acknowledgment Receipt shows that the same was for the City Prosecutor's Office. It does not state. and if he pleads guilty. In the latter case. the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of an accused under custody. when the case was called and the accused failed to appear. respondent admitted that: As a point of clarification.On the basis of the complaint of information and the affidavits accompanying the same. the court shall issue an order. Granting. she issued the warrant of arrest. however. The Court disagrees. Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever required. as she does not usually wear one during Court sessions. a copy of which was attached by complainant to her Motion for Reconsideration. the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit. arguendo. that was the Acknowledgment Receipt proving that the Accused was served with a copy of the said Order. (b) is fugitive from justice. A quick glance of the said receipt. 12. no return had yet been made by the Quezon City Police. and since Sec. (Emphasis supplied) xxxx Sec. So basic and fundamental is a person's right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed aside with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent. and without eyeglasses of the Presiding Judge. Duty of the Court. Sections 10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases (As Amended) state: Sec. Section 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure was not reproduced in the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure provides that bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. Exception. 10. that a warrant of arrest shall immediately issue even without actual notice to the accused. and in all other cases. 2007. (c) is charged with physical injuries. The Court also notes that in an Order dated March 14. accompanied by copies of all the affidavits submitted by the complainant. while Section 10 was revised and portions thereof reproduced in Sections 1213 and 16 of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure.

S. a judge owes it to her office to know and simply apply it.15 While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision they render. The Court has held that a judge commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of the summary procedure rule that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence.16 While there appears to be no malicious intent on the part of respondent. A closer scrutiny of the records however showed that the Acknowledgment Receipt pertained to the copy of the City Prosecutor's Office and not that of complainant's. 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U. Issues: 26 . country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US 2. it can be inferred that respondent issued the warrant of arrest on the mistaken belief that complainant was actually notified of the arraignment. At that point in time. and prohibition. that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent.000. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. Judge Maria Clarita Casuga-Tabin. radio. Attempt to evade or defeat tax 3. Branch 4. abusive and arbitrary in their prerogatives.18 Considering that this is respondent's first administrative infraction in her more than 8 years of service in the judiciary. through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. the Court holds the imposition of a fine in the amount of P10. Baguio City is hereby found guilty of abuse of authority for which she is fined in the sum of P10. LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)] Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC Facts: On June 18. the warrant for his arrest. Municipal Trial Court in Cities. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. The U.17 When the law is sufficiently basic. Respondent. 3.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 From this.S.00 to be proper in this case. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.19 which serves to mitigate her liability. cannot completely free her from liability. or television 4. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. or the presumption that the police had served a copy of the order on complainant or that the rules allow immediate issuance of warrants of arrests whenever the accused does not reside in the locality where the crime was committed -. however. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus. grounds: 1.20 WHEREFORE. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. SO ORDERED. certiorari. as well as conducting further proceedings. there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.the fact is. and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: 1. Whatever the real reasons behind respondent's issuance of complainant's warrant of arrest -whether from the mistaken belief that complainant was actually notified. Finally. respondent failed to uphold the rules. The Grand Jury Indictment. such lack of intent. 2. Fraud by wire. for which she should be held administratively liable. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers. Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice (DOJ). False statement or entries 5.000.00.

civil & administrative proceedings. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No. 27 . the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent.‖ Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion. Thus. The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. there‘s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee‘s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. & upon notice. the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding. the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. similar to a preliminary investigation. In essence. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing Yes.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 1. padlocking filthy restaurants. as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. cancellation of passport). & to the deprivation of his liberty. can possibly lead to his arrest. therefore. Because of such consequences. may claim the right to appear therein & present their side. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life. the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. Doctrine of incorporation under international law. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges.S. having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. but are not superior to national legislative acts. Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. WON there‘s any conflict between private respondent‘s basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty No. or property. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a. The administrative investigation doesn‘t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. In the case at bar. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country. The U. replacement of an appointee) c. as applied in most countries. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. No conflict. b. liberty. Clearly. the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2). Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. Twin rights have been offered. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as ―the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Request should impose veil at any stage. 3. 2. & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. & the respondent isn‘t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer. decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with.

he‘s also a witness. The cross examination was reset to August 24-26. Both parties. on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing. 1999 Due Process – Opportunity to be Heard In 1968 and 1969. dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage. Puno. the RTC ordered that due to the foregoing the case is deemed submitted for decision. nay an obligation.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 Kapunan. For this reason. His rights of abode. In November 1985. To determine CCCs indebtedness to DBP/APT. After several months. the RTC designated JC Laya (former BSP Gov and DepEd Sec) as chair of a fact finding commission. In June 1992. APT filed for a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the petition and has instead allowed APT to join the proceeding pursuant to PP 502 as amended. he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. A person ordered extradited is arrested. CCC‘s computation is at P43. separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases. APT‖s counsel was not able to do so raising the issue that he just took over the case and needs time to prepare. forcibly taken from his house. DBP filed a petition to dismiss the pending case as it CCC could no longer deal with DBP but rather with APT. rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel. Long ingrained in jurisprudence is the principle that there can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so. ISSUE: Whether or not APT was denied of due process. Mere demands are not sufficient. CCC and DBP/APT. The CA sustained the RTC‘s decision.6M while DBP/APT‘s calculation is at P2. CCC entered into a MOA with DBP restructuring its loans. entered into a loan contract with DBP. the Commissioner‘s computation is at P61. liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. he was able to come up with the report. One of those transferred was CCCs account. In December 1986. The withdrawal of APT‘s previous counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. He was given 60 days to come up with a report and he was given a lot of extensions thereafter. were given opportunity to submit their 28 . such reason necessitates a duty. PP 502 was issued transferring nonperforming assets of the gov‘t to Asset Privatization Trust. APT appealed before the CA averring that it was denied due process when it was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses of CCC nor was it allowed to present further witnesses. they were ordered to submit their position papers as to their calculation of the amount of indebtedness. However. 3 of CCC‘s witnesses were scheduled to be cross examined by APT‘s counsel as DBP‘s counsel had already done so. In 1979. HELD: The SC sustained the CA‘s ruling. After cross examination. A TRO was issued in favor of CCC. 1992 but counsel for APT failed to appear due to Dengue. Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client. CCC averred that by the failure of APT‘s counsel to appear APT has waived such right. as in this case. shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. On Aug 25th. It was denied and the RTC ruled that the indebtedness to be paid by CCC is the calculation came up with by the Commissioner. Continental Cement Corp. In December 1985. DBP filed for a foreclosure against the assets of CCC. Jaime Cruz.6B. The excuse that it was due to the former counsel‘s failure to turn over the records of the case to APT. The other counsel. to privacy. separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. The due process requirement is satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. DBP vs CA January 29. for DBP was likewise absent.6M. Panganiban. The parties then filed their reactions to the report and during the trial they were given a chance to cross examine each other‘s witnesses. CCC petitioned before RTC Bulacan to enjoin DBP and the Sheriff of Bulacan from foreclosing its assets and praying further that its loan terms with DBP be restructured and that the interest rate terms in the promissory note be declared null and void. dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our government‘s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction.

The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. Pursuant to the finding. MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. hence. COMELEC G. the parties were also given the chance to cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. a gross violation of MIWPI‘s constitutional rights under the due process clause. That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without any factual or legal basis. Until the issuance of the Order of execution. No. license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR‘s letter requesting for the Order. Later.R. During pendency. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretary‘s expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same.68379-812. MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCOR‘s timber concession. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered his report. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. The Minister then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984. The same was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued – a separate entity). ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI‘s right to due process has been violated. like in APT‘s case. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI.04 m3 worth of timbers. Furthermore. hence. however. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCOR‘s timber concession. (1996 Oct 24) PEOPLE VS CA 262 SCRA 452 JAVIER VS. September 22. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Contained in their position papers were their respective comments and objections to the said report. In the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352. 1986 FACTS: 1. Pending approval of MLE‘s petition. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to support any evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In fact. it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR‘s letter requesting for the Execution of the Minister‘s decision against it. they were deemed to have waived their right. as previously discussed. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. MATUGUINA VS CA 263 SCRA 490 Due Process – Not Being Party to a Case In 1973. 29 . MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders.L. They were likewise granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI.

The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. There is a difference between ―contests‖ and ―cases‖ and also a difference between ―pre-proclamation controversies‖ and ―election protests‖. which provide: ―Section 2.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 2. 1984 the Second Division itself proclaimed Pacificador the elected assemblyman of Antique. all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision. On May 18. All election casesa may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa. should be – filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions. and even if Javier had already died in the meantime. though gone. the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matter related thereto. the Second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. Unless otherwise provided by law. Javier went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival. 6. The preproclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at the time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on elections. The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. 1984. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions.C. 1984. all other cases can be – in fact. On June 7. held on the main issue that in making the COMELEC the sole judge of all contests involving the election. the proclamation made by the Board of Canvasser was set aside as premature. it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. 2 and 3. which the petitioner seasonably made. returns and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. including those arising before the proclamation of the winners. returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. which shall be heard and decided en banc. 3. then. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang Pambansa had already been abolished by the Aquino government. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. consonant with Sec. The S. HELD: a. but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. The S. the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC. 4. Respondents: Only ―contests‖ need to be heard and decided en banc. On certiorari with the S. The two are not always the same.C. having been made before the lapse of the 5 – day period of appeal. authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23. 3.‖ CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES: 30 . But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared. not only for the vindication of the outraged right. This was because of its desire for this case to serve as a guidance for the future.C. XII-C. On July 23.‖ b. 1984 proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ? APPLICABLE CONSITUTION: PROVISIONS OF THE Petitioner: The proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc.‖ ―Section 3. The issue at that stage was still administrative and could be resolved by a division. as in this case. ISSUE: Was the Second Division of the COMELEC. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns. 5. Thus it said: ―The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. Justice demands that we act. secs. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to law.

It may be argued that when the Azul‘s counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day extension from April 11. d. She filed a petition for collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento. The case should have been decided en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process. Pre-proclamation controversies became known and designated as such only because of Sec. Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss averring that Azul‘s 5 day extension has already lapsed. On May 2nd Azul. on the contrary. Azul received the copy of the complaint. J Castro. The lower court denied the same on the 20th of the same month. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento retired and was temporarily substituted by J Aňover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. it was imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first extension would be granted. unaware that J Castro already decided the case appealed to remove his default status. e. To finance it he entered a loan agreement with Tecson in the amount of P391k. P141k thus leaving about P250k as a balance. The 1973 Constitution could not have therefore been intended to have divided contests between pre and post proclamation when that Constitution was written in 1973. but most peremptorily courts of justice. whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was therefore set aside as violative of the Constitution. Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The constitutional provision on due process commands all who wield public authority. On May 7th Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr 27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th). HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due process. The Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded ―the cold neutrality of an impartial judge‖ as the indispensable imperative of due process. made before or after the proclamation of the winner. 1979 to file his answer. These sections do not distinguish between ―preproclamation‖ and ―post-proclamation‖ contests nor between ―cases‖ and ―contests‖. On 27 Mar ‘79. However. the records show that Atty. c. Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd but was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on the 27th but surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the 30th. 175 of the 1978 Election Code. it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. AZUL VS CASTRO 133 SCRA 271 Due Process – Impartial and Competent Court Azul owns and operates a construction shop. On Aug 1st.‖ Since the sala was vacant and pairing All election contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc under Secs. On April 27th. There was also a denial of due process. Finally. XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. to strictly maintain standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are observed at all stages of a proceeding. To bolster that requirement we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive pleading. J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th. FELICIANO concurring: and MELENCIO-HERRERA. One of the members of the Second Division. the permanent judge to replace J Sarmiento took office and he ordered Azul to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day extension. 2 and 3 of Art. On the 17th of April. Camaya personally went to the session hall of the court with his motion for postponement only to be informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion would be considered ―submitted for resolution. As employed in the 1973 Constitution. On the 18th of the same month. Commissioner Jose Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. But Azul only received the notice granting such on the 23rd of the same month way passed the 5 day period. the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office. On 10 Apr ‘79. J Castro proceeded with the reception of evidence the next day and of course without Azul‘s evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default. He denied the motion to disqualify him from hearing the case. J Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of September. Tecson was only able to collect 31 . The word ―contests‖ should not be given a restrictive meaning.

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind. oppressive and is abusive in his power. L0RENZANA VS CAYETANO 78 SCRA 485 Due Process – Hearing Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). that J Azura is bias. DAVID VS AQUILLIZAN 94 SCRA 707 Hearing David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed. the petitioner was declared in default. Cotabato. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 5050. 1979. Before the much publicized Project Mercury of the Bureau of Posts. ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal. the order was sent by mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the five-day period. In legal contemplation. The decision is null and void for want of due process.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. She later purchased the land (San Lazaro 32 . this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. David averred he was denied due process. Meanwhile. HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax. . The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. No copy was furnished the petitioner. at the very least. a court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a matter of days should not be sent by mail. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. the very first day in office of J Castro in Quezon City. counsel may be excused for assuming that. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people‘s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial. The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge . J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. PADERANGA VS AZURA 136 SCRA 266 Due Process – Hostility Between the Judge and the Parties – Inhibition Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City. David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go back there. It was acted upon on April 18. Misamis Oriental. who had not permanently taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge. 1979. The motion to declare defendant in default is dated April 17. In 1973. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160). . . it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all. ―All the foregoing notwithstanding. he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they have lost confidence in him. should suddenly rule that only a five-day extension would be allowed. . He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. And to compound the Azul‘s problems. he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J Añover.

It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzana‘s land. The CA denied both petition. 55. she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. On the other hand. HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 Estate). The lower court granted Lorenzana‘s ejectment cases. Zambales. that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification. Due to nonpayment of rents. And Natural Resources. Rule 137. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS CA 94 SCRA 261 Administrative Due Process ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. She had the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions. ANZALDO VS CLAVE 119 SCRA 353 Due Process – Administrative Due Process Dr Anzaldo. Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment. inevitably. Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court that her property be not touched. 1. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. favored Cayetano. Gozon. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce. Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri. with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases as she already brought herself to the Court‘s jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal. The CFI affirmed the decision of 33 . The CA reversed Gozon‘s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view. During pendency. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. that there is no provision in the Mining Law. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA. It held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. it would be the same view since being human. Cruz. there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. she filed 12 ejectment cases against her tenant. which does not bind her. disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal. Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of Lands. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. Hence. ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process. ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetano‘s right to due process has been violated. nor can its writ of execution be informed against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases. and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias. The lower court denied Cayetano‘s petition. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she included to eject Cayetano‘s property. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. animosity or hostility to ZCM. he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. upon appeal. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA. otherwise. ZCM wants the CA‘s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon‘s finding be reinstated. Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies. prejudice.

a Japanese national alleged that Singson extorted money from her ($200. or on January 5. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was ―inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission‖. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete‘s house who was then the mayor of Biňan. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment. as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. and that to settle the issue she needs to pay said amount to him. ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process. should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. PAL appealed to the NLRC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. in reviewing PAL‘s appeal. litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review. NLRC reversed the decision of Aquino. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PAL‘s side insufficient to dismiss Singson. On 7 Jun 1991. While the change of venue was 34 . HELD: The SC ruled that Singson was denied due process. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage. each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC. The denial of Singson‘s right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. this time only Calaycay & Rayala voted.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 Dr Venzon to his position. 1980. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave‘s recommendation: he was concurring with himself. MAYOR ALONTE VS JUDGE SAVELLANO 287 SCRA 245 Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Moreover. It negated his right to due process. composed of Calaycay. Thus. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case. Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The SC held that Singson was denied due process when Aquino participated. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. The 2nd Division. as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Aquino. atty‘s fees and damages. averred that Anzaldo‘s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable. Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Under Rule VII. Rayala former Arbiter Raul Aquino. Singson moved for reconsideration which was denied by NLRC. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution. Laguna. Singson was later investigated and the investigating committee found him guilty. respectively. the one who appointed Anzaldo. Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. SINGSON VS NLRC 273 SCRA 258 Due Process – Dismissal of Employees Singson was an employee of PAL. ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar. of the NLRC took cognizance of the case.

Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance. but must be knowing. the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere.DUE PROCESS (CASES) Consti2 pending. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. Thereafter. 35 . and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.‖ Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. intelligent. HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. The standard of waiver requires that it ―not only must be voluntary. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified. Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance.

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