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On the Use and Abuse of Deconstruction Author(s): Marjorie Grene Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, No. 11, Seventy-Fourth Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Nov., 1977), p. 682 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025770 . Accessed: 03/09/2012 00:21
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF DECONSTRUCTION
ERRIDA, accordingto both speakers,has nothing to say.
Garver deplores this; Rorty applauds it. Both arguments need modification, in differing degrees. Given Derrida's view of Western philosophy, Garver's paper can itself be deconstructed to yield its own refutation. Rorty, understanding Derrida's aims, both understates (in section I) and (in III) overstates their import. The stress on archi-ecriture does, in my view, add a significant dimension to the philosophy of language. Moreover, although the end run around Heidegger (Rorty's II) issues unquestionably in the techniques described in III, it is doubtful whether this outcome is as irreversible as he makes out.
University of California at Davis
KANT, HUSSERL, AND THE NONEMPIRICAL EGO *
HAT sense can we make of the distinction between the
empirical and the nonempirical (pure, transcendental) ego? My purpose here is to examine some possible interpretations of this distinction, rejecting some and trying to find an acceptable one, while exploring some of the difficulties involved. I shall concentrate on two philosophers: Kant, who seems to have originated the distinction, and Husserl, who, among Kant's many successors, seems to have accorded it the most importance. First let us look at some passages in Kant. Early in the Transcendental Deduction (B), Kant introduces the notion of "pure" or "original apperception," which he wishes to distinguish, he says, from empirical apperception, "because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation 'I think' (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation." 1 Thus apper* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on The Philosophy of Jacques Derrida, December 30, 1977, commenting on papers by Newton Garver and Richard Rorty, this JOURNAL, this issue, 663-673 and 673-681, respectively. * To be presented in an APA Symposium of the same title, December 29, 1977. Gary M. Hochberg will comment; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 692-703. 1 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, trans., (London: Macmillan, 1963), B 132.