2.0 Introduction................................................................................................................... 2.

1
2.1 Objectives...................................................................................................................... 2.1
2.2 “SuccessfulVersusUnsuccessful”Go/NoGoDecisions.............................................. 2.1
2.2.1 AnIn-servicePerspectiveOnGo/NoGoDecisions................................................. 2.2
2.2.2 “Successful”Go/NoGoDecisions........................................................................... 2.3
2.2.3 RTOOverrunAccidentsandIncidents..................................................................... 2.4
2.2.4 Statistics.................................................................................................................... 2.5
2.2.5 LessonsLearned....................................................................................................... 2.6
2.3 DecisionsandProcedures—What Every Pilot Should Know....................................... 2.7
2.3.1 TheTakeoffRules —The Source of the Data........................................................... 2.8
2.3.1.1 The“FAR”TakeoffFieldLength........................................................................ 2.8
2.3.1.2 V
1
Speed Defned.................................................................................................... 2.10
2.3.1.3 Balanced Field Defned..................................................................................... 2.11
2.3.1.4 (NotUsed)......................................................................................................... 2.12
2.3.2 Transition to the Stopping Confguration............................................................... 2.12
2.3.2.1 FlightTestTransitions....................................................................................... 2.12
2.3.2.2 AirplaneFlightManualTransitionTimes......................................................... 2.12
2.3.3 Comparingthe“Stop”and“Go”Margins.............................................................. 2.14
2.3.3.1 The“Stop”Margins........................................................................................... 2.15
2.3.3.2 The“Go”Option............................................................................................... 2.16
2.3.4 OperationalTakeoffCalculations........................................................................... 2.18
2.3.4.1 TheFieldLengthLimitWeight......................................................................... 2.18
2.3.4.2 ActualWeightLessThanLimitWeight............................................................ 2.19
2.3.5 FactorsthatAffectTakeoffandRTOPerformance................................................. 2.19
2.3.5.1 RunwaySurfaceCondition............................................................................... 2.20
2.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning............................................................................................... 2.21
2.3.5.1.2 TheFinalStop.............................................................................................. 2.22
2.3.5.2 AtmosphericConditions.................................................................................... 2.22
2.3.5.3 Airplane Confguration...................................................................................... 2.23
2.3.5.3.1 Flaps.............................................................................................................. 2.23
2.3.5.3.2 EngineBleedAir.......................................................................................... 2.23
2.3.5.3.3 MissingorInoperativeEquipment.............................................................. 2.23
Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety
Table of Contents
Section Page
SECTION 2
2
2.i
2.3.5.3.4 Wheels,Tires,andBrakes............................................................................ 2.25
2.3.5.3.5 WornBrakes................................................................................................. 2.27
2.3.5.3.6 ResidualBrakeEnergy................................................................................. 2.28
2.3.5.3.7 SpeedbrakeEffectonWheelBraking........................................................... 2.28
2.3.5.3.8 CarbonandSteelBrakeDifferences............................................................ 2.30
2.3.5.3.9 HighBrakeEnergyRTOs............................................................................. 2.31
2.3.5.4 ReverseThrustEffects...................................................................................... 2.32
2.3.5.5 RunwayParameters........................................................................................... 2.33
2.3.5.6 (NotUsed)......................................................................................................... 2.34
2.3.5.7 TakeoffsUsingReducedThrust........................................................................ 2.34
2.3.5.8 TheTakeoffDatathePilotSees........................................................................ 2.34
2.3.6 IncreasingtheRTOSafetyMargins........................................................................ 2.35
2.3.6.1 RunwaySurfaceCondition............................................................................... 2.35
2.3.6.2 FlapSelection.................................................................................................... 2.35
2.3.6.3 RunwayLineup................................................................................................. 2.36
2.3.6.4 SettingTakeoffThrust....................................................................................... 2.36
2.3.6.5 ManualBrakingTechniques.............................................................................. 2.37
2.3.6.6 AntiskidInoperativeBrakingTechniques......................................................... 2.38
2.3.6.7 RTOAutobrakes................................................................................................ 2.38
2.3.6.8 (NotUsed)......................................................................................................... 2.39
2.3.6.9 TheV
1
Call........................................................................................................ 2.39
2.3.6.10 CrewPreparedness............................................................................................ 2.40
2.4 CrewResourceManagement...................................................................................... 2.40
2.4.1 CRMandtheRTO................................................................................................. 2.40
2.4.2 The Takeoff Briefng............................................................................................... 2.40
2.4.3 Callouts................................................................................................................... 2.41
2.4.4 TheUseofAllCrewMembers............................................................................... 2.41
2.4.5 Summary................................................................................................................. 2.42
Section Page
2.ii
SECTION 2
2.0 Introduction
The Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety is one
partoftheTakeoff Safety Training Aid.Theother
partsincludetheTakeoffSafetyOverviewfor
Management (Section 1), Example Takeoff
SafetyTrainingProgram(Section3),Takeoff
Safety Background Data (Section 4), and an
optionalvideo.Thesubsectionnumberingused
in Sections 2 and 4 are identical to facilitate
crossreferencing.Thosesubsectionsnotused
inSection2arenoted“notused”.
The goal of the training aid is to reduce the
numberofRTOrelatedaccidentsbyimproving
the pilot’s decision making and associated
proceduralaccomplishmentthroughincreased
knowledge and awareness of the factors
affectingthesuccessfuloutcomeofthe“Go/No
Go”decision.
The educat i onal mat er i al and t he
recommendations provided in the Takeoff
Safety Training Aidweredevelopedthroughan
extensivereviewprocesstoachieveconsensus
oftheairtransportindustry.
2 .1 Objectives
The objective of the Pilot Guide to Takeoff
Safetyistosummarizeandcommunicatekey
RTO related information relevant to fight
crews. It is intended to be provided to pilots
during academic training and to be retained
forfutureuse.
2.2 “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” Go/
No Go Decisions
Any Go/No Go decision can be considered
“successful” if it does not result in injury or
airplanedamage.However,justbecauseitwas
“successful” by this defnition, it does not mean
theactionwasthe“best”thatcouldhavebeen
taken.Thepurposeofthissectionistopoint
outsomeofthelessonsthathavebeenlearned
throughtheRTOexperiencesofotherairline
crewssincethe1950s,andtorecommendways
ofavoidingsimilarexperiencesbythepilotsof
today’s airline feet.
Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety
Takeoffs, RTOs, and Overruns
Through 2003 Typical Recent Year
Takeoffs 430,000,000 18,000,000
RTOs (est.)
RTO Overrun
Accidents/Incidents
143,000 6,000
97 4*
• 1 RTO per 3,000 takeoffs
• 1 RTO overrun accident/incident per 4,500,000 takeoffs
*Accidents/incidents that would occur if historical rates continue.
Figure 1
Takeoffs, RTOs,
and Overrun
Statistics
2.1
SECTION 2
2
2.2.1 An In-service Perspective On Go/No Go
Decisions
Modern jet transport services began in the
early 1950s and signifcantly increased later
that decade after introduction of the Boeing
707 and the Douglas DC-8. As shown in
Figure 1, the western built jet transport feet
has accumulated approximately 430 million
takeoffsbytheendof2003.Recentlytherehave
beennearly18milliontakeoffsinatypicalyear.
That’sapproximately34takeoffseveryminute,
everyday!
Since no comprehensive feet-wide records
are available, it is diffcult to identify the total
numberofRTOsthathaveoccurredthroughout
the jet era. However, based on those events
whichhavebeendocumented,ourbestestimate
isthatonein3,000takeoffattemptsendswith
anRTO.Atthisrate,therewillbenearly6000
RTOsduringatypicalyear.Thatmeansthat
every day, 16 fight crews will perform an RTO.
Statistically,attherateofoneRTOper3000
takeoffs, a pilot who fies short haul routes and
makes80departurespermonth,willexperience
one RTO every three years. At the opposite
extreme,thelonghaulpilotmakingonlyeight
departurespermonthwillbefacedwithonly
oneRTOevery30years.
Theprobabilitythatapilotwilleverberequired
to perform an RTO from high speed is even
less,asisshowninFigure2.
Available data indicates that over 75% of all
RTOsareinitiatedatspeedsof80knotsorless.
TheseRTOsalmostneverresultinanaccident.
Inherently,lowspeedRTOsaresaferandless
demandingthanhighspeedRTOs.Attheother
extreme, about2% ofthe RTOs areinitiated
atspeedsabove120knots.Overrunaccidents
andincidentsthatoccurprincipallystemfrom
thesehighspeedevents.
What should all these statistics tell a pilot?
First,RTOsarenotaverycommonevent.This
speaks well of equipment reliability and the
preparationthatgoesintooperatingjettransport
airplanes.Bothare,nodoubt,dueinlargepart
to the certifcation and operational standards
developedbytheaviationcommunityovermany
yearsofoperation.Second,andmoreimportant,
the infrequency of RTO events may lead to
complacencyaboutmaintainingsharpdecision
makingskillsandproceduraleffectiveness.In
spiteoftheequipment reliability, every pilot
must be prepared to make the correct Go/No
Go decision on every takeoff-just in case.
SECTION 2
2.2
Figure 2
Distribution of
RTO Initiation
Speeds
0
20
40
60
80
80 knots
or less
80 to
100 knots
100 to
120 knots
Above
120 knots
Percent
of total
76%
18%
4%
2%
RTO overrun
accidents
principally come
from the 2% of the
RTOs that are
high speed
2.2.2 “Successful” Go/No Go Decisions
AswasmentionedatthebeginningofSection
2.2,thereismoretoa“good”Go/NoGodecision
thanthefactthatitmaynothaveresultedin
any apparent injury or aircraft damage. The
following examples illustrate a variety of
situations that have been encountered in the
past, some of which would ft the description
ofa“good”decision,andsomewhichare,at
least,“questionable”.
Listedatthebeginningofeachofthefollowing
examples is the primary cause or cue which
promptedthecrewtorejectthetakeoff:
1. TakeoffWarningHorn:Thetakeoff
warninghornsoundedasthetakeoffroll
commenced.Thetakeoffwasrejected
at5knots.Theaircraftwastaxiedoff
theactiverunwaywherethecaptain
discoveredthestabilizertrimwasset
attheaftendofthegreenband.The
stabilizerwasresetandasecondtakeoff
was completed without further diffculty.
2. TakeoffWarningHorn:Thetakeoffwas
rejectedat90knotswhenthetakeoff
warninghornsounded.Thecrewfound
thespeedbrakeleverslightlyoutof
thedetent.Anormaltakeoffwasmade
followingadelayforbrakecooling.
3. EnginePowerSetting:Thethrottleswere
advancedandN
1
increasedtoslightly
over95%.N
1
eventuallystabilized
at94.8%N
1
.ThetargetN
1
fromthe
FMCTakeoffPagewas96.8%N
1
.The
throttles were then moved to the frewall
buttheN
1
stayedat94.8%.Thetakeoff
wasrejectedduetolowN
1
at80knots.
4. CompressorStall:Thetakeoffwas
rejectedfrom155knotsduetoabird
strikeandsubsequentcompressorstall
onthenumberthreeengine.Mostofthe
tires subsequently defated due to melted
fuseplugs.
5. NoseGearShimmy:Thecrewrejected
thetakeoffafterexperiencinganose
landinggearshimmy.Airspeedatthe
timewasapproximatelyV
l
-10knots.All
fourmaingeartiressubsequentlyblew
during the stop, and fres at the number 3
and 4 tires were extinguished by the fre
department.
6. BlownTire:Thetakeoffwasrejectedat
140knotsduetoablownnumber3main
geartire.Number4tireblewturning
ontothetaxiwaycausingthelossofboth
AandBhydraulicsystemsaswellas
major damage to faps, spar, and spoilers.
Theseexamplesdemonstratethediversityof
rejectedtakeoffcauses.AlloftheseRTOswere
“successful”, but some situations came very
close to ending differently. By contrast, the
largenumberoftakeoffsthataresuccessfully
continuedwithindicationsofairplanesystem
problemssuchascautionlightsthatilluminate
at high speed or tires that fail near V
1
, are
rarely ever reported outside the airline’s
own information system. They may result
indiversionsanddelaysbutthelandingsare
normally uneventful, and can be completed
usingstandardprocedures.
This should not be construed as a blanket
recommendationto“Go,nomatterwhat.”The
goal of this training aid is to eliminate RTO
accidentsbyreducingthenumberofimproper
decisionsthataremade,andtoensurethatthe
correct procedures are accomplished when
anRTOisnecessary.Itisrecognizedthatthe
kindofsituationsthatoccurinlineoperations
are not always the simple problem that the
pilot was exposed to in training. Inevitably,
the resolution of some situations will only
be possible through the good judgment and
discretion of the pilot, as is exemplifed in the
followingtakeoffevent:
After selecting EPR mode to set takeoff
thrust, the right thrust lever stuck at 1.21
EPR,whiletheleftthrustlevermovedto
SECTION 2
2.3
thetargetEPRof1.34.Thecaptaintriedto
rejectthetakeoffbuttherightthrustlever
could not be moved to idle. Because the
lightweightaircraftwasacceleratingvery
rapidly,theCaptainadvancedthethruston
theleftengineandcontinuedthetakeoff.
The right engine was subsequently shut
down during the approach, and the fight
was concluded with an uneventful single
enginelanding.
Thefailurethatthiscrewexperiencedwasnot
astandardtrainingscenario.Norisitincluded
heretoencouragepilotstochangetheirmind
inthemiddleofanRTOprocedure.Itissimply
anacknowledgmentofthekindofrealworld
decisionmakingsituationsthatpilotsface.Itis
perhapsmoretypicalofthegoodjudgements
thatairlinecrewsregularlymake,buttheworld
rarelyhearsabout.
2.2.3 RTO Overrun Accidents and Incidents
The one-in-one-thousand RTOs that became
accidents or serious incidents are the ones
that we must strive to prevent. As shown in
Figure3,attheendof2003,recordsshow57in-
serviceRTOoverrunaccidentsforthewestern
built jet transport feet. These 57 accidents
causedmorethan400fatalities.Anadditional
40 serious incidents have been identifed which
likelywouldhavebeenaccidentsiftherunway
overrun areas had been less forgiving. The
following are brief accounts of four actual
accidents.Theyarerealevents.Hopefully,they
willnotberepeated.
ACCIDENT: At 154 knots, four knots after
V
1
,thecopilot’ssidewindowopened,andthe
takeoff was rejected. The aircraft overran,
hittingablastfence,tearingopentheleftwing
and catching fre.
ACCIDENT:Thetakeoffwasrejectedbythe
captain when the frst offcer had diffculty
maintainingrunwaytrackingalongthe7,000
footwetrunway.Initialreportsindicatethatthe
airplanehadslowlyacceleratedatthestartof
thetakeoffrollduetoadelayinsettingtakeoff
thrust. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR)
readoutindicatestherewerenospeedcallouts
made during the takeoff attempt. The reject
speedwas5knotsaboveV
1
.Thetransitionto
stoppingwasslowerthanexpected.Thiswas
to have been the last fight in a long day for the
crew.Bothpilotswererelativelyinexperienced
intheirrespectivepositions.Thecaptainhad
about140 hoursasacaptain inthisairplane
type and the frst offcer was conducting
0
5
10
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Year
1985 1990 1995 2000
Number
of events
per year
Figure 3
97 RTO overrun
accidents/incidents
1959-2003
SECTION 2
2.4
his frst non-supervised line takeoff in this
airplanetype.Theairplanewasdestroyedwhen
it overran the end of the runway and broke
apart against piers which extend off the end
oftherunwayintotheriver.Thereweretwo
fatalities. Subsequent investigation revealed
thattherudderwastrimmedfullleftpriorto
thetakeoffattempt.
ACCIDENT: A f lock of sea gulls was
encountered “very near V
1
.” The airplane
reportedly had begun to rotate. The number
one engine surged and famed out, and the
takeoff was rejected. The airplane overran
theendofthewet6,000footrunwaydespitea
goodRTOeffort.
ACCIDENT: At 120 knots, the fight crew noted
the onset of a vibration. When the vibration
increased, the captain elected to reject and
assumedcontrol.Fourtoeightsecondselapsed
between the point where the vibration was frst
noted and when the RTO was initiated (just
afterV
1
).Subsequentinvestigationshowedtwo
tireshadfailed.Themaximumspeedreached
was158knots.Theairplaneoverrantheendof
the runway at a speed of 35 knots and fnally
stoppedwiththenoseinaswamp.Theairplane
wasdestroyed.
Thesefourcasesaretypicalofthe97reported
accidentsandincidents.
2.2.4 Statistics
Studies of the previously mentioned 97
accidents/incidents have revealed some
interestingstatistics,asshowninFigure4:
• Fifty-fve percent were initiated at speeds
inexcessofV
1
.
• Approximatelyonethirdwerereportedas
havingoccurredonrunwaysthatwerewet
orcontaminatedwithsnoworice.
Both of these issues will be thoroughly
discussedinsubsequentsections.
An additional, vitally interesting statistic
that was obser ved when the accident
records involving Go/No Go decisions were
reviewed, was that virtually no revenue
flight was found where a “Go” decision
was made and the airplane was incapable
of continuing the takeoff. Regardless of the
abilitytosafelycontinuethetakeoff,aswillbe
seeninSection2.3,virtuallyanytakeoffcanbe
“successfully”rejected,iftherejectisinitiated
earlyenoughandisconductedproperly.There
ismoretotheGo/NoGodecisionthan“Stop
beforeV
1
”and“GoafterV
1
.”Thestatisticsof
thepastthreedecadesshowthatanumberof
jettransportshaveexperiencedcircumstances
nearV
1
thatrenderedtheairplaneincapableof
beingstoppedontherunwayremaining.Italso Figure 4
Major factors
in previous RTO
incidents and
accidents
lce/snow
87
Dr]
887
hot reported
807
wet
247
0reater than V
1
557
hot
reported
217
less than/
equal to V
1
257
RT0 lnitiation 8peed
Runwa] Condition
SECTION 2
2.5
mustberecognizedthatcatastrophicsituations
couldoccurwhichrendertheairplaneincapable
of fight.
Reasons why the 97 “unsuccessful” RTOs
were initiated are also of interest. As shown
in Figure 5, approximately one-ffth were
initiatedbecauseofenginefailuresorengine
indicationwarnings.Theremainingseventy-
nine percent were initiated for a variety of
reasonswhichincludedtirefailures,procedural
error,malfunctionindicationorlights,noises
and vibrations, directional control diffculties
and unbalanced loading situations where the
airplane failed to rotate. Some of the events
containedmultiplefactorssuchasanRTOon
a contaminated runway following an engine
failureataspeedinexcessofV
1
.Thefactthat
the majority of the accidents and incidents
occurred on airplanes that had full thrust
available should fgure heavily in future Go/No
Gotraining.
2.2.5 Lessons Learned
Several lessons can be learned from these
RTO accidents. First, the crew must always
be prepared to make the Go/No Go decision
prior to the airplane reaching V
1
speed. As
will be shown in subsequent sections, there
maynotbeenoughrunwaylefttosuccessfully
stoptheairplaneiftherejectisinitiatedafter
V
1
.Second,inordertoeliminateunnecessary
RTOs, the crew must differentiate between
situationsthataredetrimentaltoasafetakeoff,
andthosethatarenot.Third,thecrewmustbe
preparedtoactasawellcoordinatedteam.A
goodsummarizingstatementoftheselessons
is, as speed approaches V
1
, the successful
completion of an RTO becomes increasingly
more diffcult.
A fourth and fnal lesson learned from past
RTOhistoryisillustratedinFigure6.Analysis
of the available data suggests that of the 97
Figure 5
Reasons for
initiating the RTO
(97 accidents/
incident events)
0ther and
not reported
Bird strike
Crew coordination
lndicator/light
Configuration
wheel/tire
Engine
Percent of total (97 eventsj
* lncluding events
"hot reported"
217
227
127
147
1O7
77
117
O 5 1O 15 2O 25 8O
27
ATC
hon-Engine*
797
Engine
217
SECTION 2
2.6
RTO accidents and incidents, approximately
82% were potentially avoidable through
appropriate operational practices. These
potentiallyavoidableaccidentscanbedivided
intothreecategories.Roughly15%oftheRTO
accidentsofthepastweretheresultofimproper
prefight planning. Some of these instances
were caused by loading errorsand others by
incorrect prefight procedures. About 15% of
theaccidentsandincidentscouldbeattributed
toincorrectpilottechniquesorproceduresin
thestoppingeffort.Delayedapplicationofthe
brakes,failuretodeploythespeedbrakes,and
thefailuretomakeamaximumeffortstopuntil
lateintheRTOwerethechiefcharacteristics
ofthiscategory.
Reviewofthedatafromthe97RTOaccidents
and incidents suggests that in approximately
52%oftheevents,theairplanewascapableof
continuingthetakeoffandeitherlandingatthe
departureairportordivertingtoanalternate.In
otherwords,thedecisiontorejectthetakeoff
appears to have been “improper.” It is not
possible,however,topredictwithtotalcertainty
whatwouldhavehappenedineveryeventifthe
takeoffhadbeencontinued.Norisitpossible
fortheanalystoftheaccidentdatatovisualize
theeventsleadinguptoaparticularaccident
“throughtheeyesofthecrew”,includingallthe
otherfactorsthatwerevyingfortheirattention
at the moment when the “proper” decision
could have been made. It is not very diffcult
to imagine a set of circumstances where the
onlylogicalthingforthepilottodoistoreject
the takeoff. Encountering a large fock of birds
atrotationspeed,whichthenproduceslossof
thrustonbothenginesofatwoengineairplane,
isaclearexample.
Although these are all valid points, debating
them here will not move us any closer to
the goal of reducing the number of RTO
accidents.Severalindustrygroupshaverecently
studied this problem. Their conclusions and
recommendationsagreesurprisinglywell.The
areas identifed as most in need of attention are
decision making and profciency in correctly
performingtheappropriateprocedures.These
are the same areas highlighted in Figure 6.
It would appear then, that an opportunity
exists to signifcantly reduce the number of
RTOaccidentsinthefuturebyattemptingto
improvethepilots’decisionmakingcapability
andprocedureaccomplishmentthroughbetter
training.
2.3 Decisions and Procedures—
What Every Pilot Should Know
Therearemanythingsthatmayultimatelyaffect
theoutcomeofaGo/NoGodecision.Thegoalof
theTakeoffSafetyTrainingAidistoreducethe
numberofRTOrelatedaccidentsandincidents
byimprovingthepilot’sdecisionmakingand
associatedprocedureaccomplishmentthrough
increased knowledge and awareness of the
related factors. This section discusses the
rules that defne takeoff performance limit
weights and the margins that exist when the
actual takeoff weight of the airplane is less
Figure 6
82% of the RTO
accidents and
incidents were
avoidable
157
B] oetter preflight
planning
187
Unavoidaole
B] continuing the takeoff
527
157
B] correct stop
techniques
SECTION 2
2.7
than the limit weight. The effects of runway
surfacecondition,atmosphericconditions,and
airplane confguration variables on Go/No Go
performancearediscussed,aswellaswhatthe
pilotcandotomakethebestuseofanyexcess
availablerunway.
Although the information contained in this
section has been reviewed by many major
airframe manufacturers and airlines, the
incorporationofanyoftherecommendations
madeinthissectionissubjecttotheapproval
ofeachoperator’smanagement.
2.3.1 The Takeoff Rules —
The Source of the Data
It is important that all pilots understand the
takeoff feld length/weight limit rules and the
marginstheserulesprovide.Misunderstanding
therulesandtheirapplicationtotheoperational
situation could contribute to an incorrect
Go/NoGodecision.
TheU.S.FederalAviationRegulations(FARs)
have continually been refned so that the details
of the rules that are applied to one airplane
model may differ from another. However,
thesedifferencesareminorandhavenoeffect
on the basic actions required of the fight
crewduringthetakeoff.Ingeneral,itismore
importantforthecrewtounderstandthebasic
principlesratherthanthetechnicalvariations
in certifcation policies.
2.3.1.1 The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length
The“FAR”TakeoffFieldLengthdetermined
from the FAA Approved Airplane Flight
Manual(AFM)considersthemostlimitingof
eachofthefollowingthreecriteria:
1)All-EngineGoDistance:115%ofthe
actualdistancerequiredtoaccelerate,
liftoffandreachapoint35feetabove
therunwaywithallenginesoperating
(Figure7).
2)Engine-OutAccelerate-GoDistance:
Thedistancerequiredtoacceleratewith
allenginesoperating,haveoneengine
failatV
EF
atleastonesecondbeforeV
1
,
continuethetakeoff,liftoffandreacha
point35feetabovetherunwaysurface
atV
2
speed(Figure8).
3)Accelerate-StopDistance:Thedistance
requiredtoacceleratewithallengines
operating,haveanenginefailureor
othereventatV
EVENT
atleastone
secondbeforeV
1
,recognizetheevent,
reconfgure for stopping and bring
theairplanetoastopusingmaximum
wheelbrakingwiththespeedbrakes
extended.Reversethrustisnotused
todeterminetheFARaccelerate-stop
distance(Figure9),exceptforthewet
runway case for airplanes certifed under
FARAmendment25-92.
FAR criteria provide accountability for
wind, runway slope, clearway and stopway.
FAA approved takeoff data are based on the
performance demonstrated on a smooth, dry
runway. Recent models certifed according to
FARAmendment25-92alsohaveapproveddata
basedonwet,andwetskid-resistantrunways.
Separateadvisorydataforwet,ifrequired,or
contaminatedrunwayconditionsarepublished
inthemanufacturer’soperationaldocuments.
Thesedocumentsareusedbymanyoperators
toderivewetorcontaminatedrunwaytakeoff
adjustments..
Other criteria defne the performance weight
limitsfortakeoffclimb,obstacleclearance,tire
speedsandmaximumbrakeenergycapability.
Anyoftheseothercriteriacanbethelimiting
factorwhichdeterminesthemaximumdispatch
weight.However,theFieldLengthLimitWeight
andtheamountofrunwayremainingatV
1
will
be the primary focus of our discussion here
since they more directly relate to preventing
RTOoverruns.
SECTION 2
2.8

Actual Distance
1.15 times the actual distance
º 85 feet
º V
2
+ 1O to 25 knots
º 85 feet
º V
2
1 second minimum
V
EF
V
R
V
l0F
V
1
RT0 transition
complete (AFNj V
EVEhT
V
1
Transition
8top 1 second minimum
Runwa] used to accelerate to V1
(t]picall] OO7j
Runwa] availaole to 0o/ho 0o
(t]picall] 4O7j
SECTION 2
2.9
Figure 7
All-engine go
distance
Figure 8
Engine-out
accelerate-go
distance
Figure 9
Accelerate-stop
distance
RT0 transition
complete (AFNj
V
EVEhT
V
1
Transition
8top
º 85 feet
º V
2
1 second minimum
1 second minimum
V
EF
V
R
V
l0F
V
1
Actual Distance
1.15 times the actual distance
º 85 feet
º V
2
+ 10 to 25 knots
Runwa] used to accelerate to V
1

(t]picall] O07j
Runwa] availaole to 0o/ho 0o
(t]picall] 407j
2.3.1.2 V
1
Speed Defned
V
1
Whatistheproperoperationalmeaningofthe
keyparameter“V
1
speed”withregardtothe
Go/No Go criteria? This is not such an easy
questionsincetheterm“V
1
speed”hasbeen
redefned several times since commercial jet
operationsbeganmorethan30yearsagoand
thereispossibleambiguityintheinterpretation
of the words used to defne V
1
.
Paragraph 25.107 of the FAA Regulations
defnes the relationship of the takeoff speeds
published in the Airplane Flight Manual, to
various speeds determined in the certifcation
testingoftheairplane.Forourpurposeshere,
the most important statement within this
“offcial” defnition is that V
1
isdeterminedfrom
“...the pilot’s initiation of the frst action to stop
the airplane during the accelerate-stop tests.”
Onecommonandmisleadingwaytothinkof
V
1
istosay“V
1
isthedecisionspeed.”Thisis
misleadingbecauseV
1
isnotthepointtobegin
makingtheoperationalGo/NoGodecision.The
decision must have been made by the time the
airplane reaches V
1
orthepilotwillnothave
initiatedtheRTOprocedureatV
1
.Therefore,
by defnition, the airplane will be traveling at
aspeedhigherthanV
1
whenstoppingaction
is initiated, and if the airplane is at a Field
LengthLimitWeight,anoverrunisvirtually
assured.
Anothercommonlyheldmisconception:“V
1
is
theenginefailurerecognitionspeed”,suggests
thatthedecisiontorejectthetakeofffollowing
enginefailurerecognitionmaybeginaslateas
V
1
.Again,theairplanewillhaveacceleratedto
aspeedhigherthanV
I
beforestoppingaction
isinitiated.
The certifed accelerate-stop distance calculation
isbasedonanenginefailureatleastonesecond
prior to V
1
. This standard time allowance
1

has been established to allow the line pilot
to recognize an engine failure and begin the
subsequentsequenceofstoppingactions.
InanoperationalFieldLengthLimitedcontext,
the correct defnition of V
1
consists of two
separateconcepts:
First,withrespecttothe“NoGo”criteria,
V
1
is the maximum speed at which
the rejected takeoff maneuver can
be initiated and the airplane stopped
within the remaining feld length under
the conditions and procedures defned
1
ThetimeintervalbetweenV
EF
andV
l
is the longer of the fight test demonstrated time or one second. Therefore, in determining
thescheduledaccelerate-stopperformance,onesecondistheminimumtimethatwillexistbetweentheenginefailureandthe
frst pilot stopping action.
SECTION 2
2.10
in the FAR’s. It is the latest point in
the takeoff roll where a stop can be
initiated.
Second,withrespecttothe“Go”criteria,
V
1
is also the earliest point from which
an engine out takeoff can be continued
and the airplane attain a height of 35
feet at the end of the runway. Thisaspect
ofV
1
isdiscussedinalatersection.
TheGo/NoGodecisionmustbemadebefore
reachingV
1
.A “No Go” decision after passing
V
1
will not leave suffcient runway remaining
to stop if the takeoff weight is equal to the
Field Length Limit Weight.Whentheairplane
actual weight is less than the Field Length
Limit Weight, it is possible to calculate the
actualmaximumspeedfromwhichthetakeoff
couldbesuccessfullyrejected.However,few
operatorsusesuchtakeoffdatapresentations.
Itisthereforerecommendedthatpilotsconsider
V
1
tobealimitspeed:DonotattemptanRTO
once the airplane has passed V
1
unless the
pilot has reason to conclude the airplane is
unsafe or unable to fy. This recommendation
should prevail no matter what runway length
appears to remain after V
1
.
2.3.1.3 Balanced Field Defned
The previous two sections established the
general relationship between the takeoff
performance regulations and V
1
speed. This
sectionprovidesacloserexaminationofhow
the choice of V
1
actually affects the takeoff
performance in specifc situations.
Sinceitisgenerallyeasiertochangetheweight
ofanairplanethanitistochangethelength
ofarunway,thediscussionherewillconsider
theeffectofV
1
ontheallowabletakeoffweight
from a fxed runway length.
The Continued Takeoff—After an engine
failure during the takeoff roll, the airplane
mustcontinuetoaccelerateontheremaining
engine(s),liftoffandreachV
2
speedat35feet.
The later in the takeoff roll that the engine
fails,theheaviertheairplanecanbeandstill
gainenoughspeedtomeetthisrequirement.
Fortheenginefailureoccurringapproximately
onesecondpriortoV
1
,therelationshipofthe
allowableengine-outgotakeoffweighttoV
1

wouldbeasshownbythe“ContinuedTakeoff”
lineinFigure10.ThehighertheV
1
,theheavier
thetakeoffweightallowed.
TheRejectedTakeoff— Onthestopsideofthe
equation,theV
1
/weighttradehastheopposite
trend. The lower the V
1
, or the earlier in the
takeoffrollthestopisinitiated,theheavierthe
airplanecanbe,asindicatedbythe“Rejected
Takeoff”lineinFigure10.
Thepointatwhichthe“ContinuedandRejected
Takeoff”linesintersectisofspecialinterest.It
defnes what is called a “Balanced Field Limit”
Figure 10
Effect of V
1
speed
on takeoff weight
(from a fxed
runway length)
Continued
takeoff
Rejected
takeoff
Airplane
weight
V speed
1
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
Increasing
Field limit weight
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d

f
i
e
l
d
L
i
m
i
t

V


s
p
e
e
d
1
SECTION 2
2.11
takeoff.Thename“BalancedField”refersto
the fact that the accelerate-go performance
required is exactly equal to (or “balances”)
the accelerate-stop performance required.
FromFigure10itcanalsobeseenthatatthe
“Balanced Field” point, the allowable Field
LimitTakeoffWeightforthegivenrunwayis
themaximum.Theresultinguniquevalueof
V
1
isreferredtoasthe“BalancedFieldLimit
V
1
Speed” and the associated takeoff weight
is called the “Balanced Field Weight Limit.”
This is the speed that is typically given to fight
crewsinhandbooksorcharts,bytheonboard
computersystems,orbydispatch.
2.3.1.4 (Not Used)
2.3.2 Transition to the Stopping Confguration
In establishing the certifed accelerate-stop
distance, the time required to reconfgure the
airplane from the “Go” to the “Stop” mode
is referred to as the “transition” segment.
This action and the associated time of
accomplishmentincludesapplyingmaximum
braking simultaneously moving the thrust
levers to idle and raising the speedbrakes.
The transition time demonstrated by fight
test pilots during the accelerate-stop testing
isusedtoderivethetransitionsegmenttimes
usedintheAFMcalculations.Therelationship
between the fight test demonstrated transition
times and those fnally used in the AFM is
anotherfrequentlymisunderstoodareaofRTO
performance.
2.3.2.1 Flight Test Transitions
Several methods of certifcation testing that
producecomparableresultshavebeenfoundto
beacceptable.Thefollowingexampleillustrates
theintentofthesemethods.
During certifcation testing the airplane is
acceleratedtoapre-selectedspeed,oneengine
is “failed” by selecting fuel cut off, and the
pilot fying rejects the takeoff. In human
factors circles, this is defned as a “simple task”
becausethetestpilotknowsinadvancethatan
RTOwillbeperformed.Exactmeasurements
of the time taken by the pilot to apply the
brakes,retardthethrustleverstoidle,andto
deploythespeedbrakesarerecorded.Detailed
measurements of engine parameters during
spooldown are also made so that the thrust
actuallybeinggeneratedcanbeaccountedfor
inthecalculation.
The manufacturer’s test pilots, and pilots
from the regulatory agency, each perform
severalrejectedtakeofftestruns.Anaverage
of the recorded data from at least six of
these RTOs is then used to determine the
“demonstrated” transition times. The total fight
test“demonstrated”transitiontime,initialbrake
applicationtospeedbrakesup,istypicallyone
second or less. However this is not the total
transition time used to establish the certifed
accelerate-stop distances. The certifcation
regulationsrequirethatadditionaltimedelays,
sometimesreferredtoas“pads”,beincludedin
the calculation of certifed takeoff distances.
2.3.2.2 Airplane Flight Manual Transition
Times
Although the line pilot must be prepared for
anRTOduringeverytakeoff,itisfairlylikely
thattheeventorfailurepromptingtheGo/No
Godecisionwillbemuch lessclear-cut than
anoutrightenginefailure.Itmaythereforebe
unrealistictoexpecttheaveragelinepilotto
performthetransitioninaslittleasonesecond
inanoperationalenvironment.Humanfactors
literature describes the line pilot’s job as a
“complextask”sincethepilotdoesnotknow
whenanRTOwilloccur.Inconsiderationof
this “complex task”, the fight test transition
times are increased to calculate the certifed
accelerate-stop distances specifed in the AFM.
These additional time increments are not
SECTION 2
2.12
intended to allow extra time for making the
“Go/No Go” decision after passing V
1
.Their
purpose is to allow suffcient time (and distance)
for“theaveragepilot”totransitionfromthe
takeoffmodetothestoppingmode.
The frst adjustment is made to the time required
torecognizetheneedtostop.DuringtheRTO
certifcation fight testing, the pilot knows
thathewillbedoinganRTO.Therefore,his
reaction is predictably quick. To account for
this,aneventrecognitiontimeofatleastone
second has been set as a standard for all jet
transport certifcations since the late 1960s.
V
1
is therefore, at least one second after the
event.Duringthisrecognitiontimesegment,
the airplane continues to accelerate with the
operatingengine(s)continuingtoprovidefull
forward thrust. If the event was an engine
failure,the“failed”enginehasbeguntospool
down, but it is still providing some forward
thrust,addingtotheairplane’sacceleration.
Overtheyears,thedetailsofestablishingthe
transitiontimesegmentsafterV
1
havevaried
slightlybuttheoverallconceptandtheresulting
transitiondistanceshaveremainedessentially
the same. For early jet transport models, an
additionalonesecondwasaddedtoboththe
fight test demonstrated throttles-to-idle time
and the speedbrakes-up time, as illustrated
in Figure 11. The net result is that the fight
test demonstrated recognition and transition
time of approximately one second has been
increased for the purpose of calculating the
AFMtransitiondistance.
In more recent certifcation programs, the AFM
calculation procedure was slightly different.
An allowance equal to the distance traveled
duringtwosecondsatthespeedbrakes-upspeed
was added to the actual total transition time
demonstrated in the fight test to apply brakes,
bringthethrustleverstoidleanddeploythe
speedbrakes,asshowninFigure12.Toinsure
“consistentandrepeatableresults”,retardation
forces resulting from brake application and
speed brake deployment are not applied
duringthistwosecondallowancetime,i.e.no
decelerationcreditistaken.Thistwosecond
distance allowance simplifes the transition
distancecalculationandaccomplishesthesame
goalastheindividualonesecond“pads”used
Figure 11
Early method of
establishing AFM
transition time
AFN transition
complete
Flight test
%NGINE
&AILURE
AFN expansion
Flight test demonstrated transition time
AFN transition time
AFN 1.O
second
minimum
1.O sec 1.O sec
Recognition
V
1
"
R
A
K
E
S

O
N
4
H
R
O
T
T
L
E
S

T
O

I
D
L
E
3
P
E
E
D
B
R
A
K
E
S
SECTION 2
2.13
foroldermodels.
Evenmorerecently,FARAmendments25-42
and25-92haverevisedthewayinwhichthe
twoseconddistanceallowanceiscalculated.
Regardlessofthemethodused,theaccelerate-
stopdistancecalculatedforeverytakeofffrom
theAFMistypically400to600feetlongerthan
the fight test accelerate-stop distance.
Thesedifferencesbetweenthepastandpresent
methodology are not signifcant in so far as
the operational accelerate-stop distance is
concerned.The keypoint is that the time/distance
“pads” used in the AFM transition distance
calculation are not intended to allow extra time
to make the “No Go” decision. Rather,the“pads”
provideanallowancethatassuresthepilothas
adequatedistancetogettheairplaneintothe
full stopping confguration.
Regardlessoftheairplanemodel,thetransition,
or reconfguring of the airplane for a rejected
takeoff,demandsquickactionbythecrewto
simultaneously initiate maximum braking,
retardthethrustleverstoidleandthenquickly
raisethespeedbrakes.
2.3.3 Comparing the “Stop” and “Go”
Margins
WhenperformingatakeoffataFieldLength
LimitWeightdeterminedfromtheAFM,the
pilotisassuredthattheairplaneperformance
will, at the minimum, conform to the
requirementsoftheFARsiftheassumptions
of the calculations are met. This means that
followinganenginefailureoreventatV
EVENT
,
thetakeoffcanberejectedatV
1
andtheairplane
stoppedattheendoftherunway,orifthetakeoff
iscontinued,aminimumheightof35feetwill
bereachedovertheendoftherunway.
Thissectiondiscussestheinherentconservatism
of these certifed calculations, and the margins
they provide beyond the required minimum
performance.
Figure 12
More recent
method of
establishing AFM
transition time
AFN transition
complete
Flight test
AFN expansion
Flight test demonstrated transition time
AFN transition time
AFN 1.O
second
minimum
F/T
demo
2.O sec
Recognition
V
1
"
R
A
K
E
S

O
N
4
H
R
O
T
T
L
E
S

T
O

I
D
L
E
3
P
E
E
D
B
R
A
K
E
S
3
E
R
V
IC
E
A
LLO
W
A
N
C
E
%VENT
SECTION 2
2.14
2.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins
From the preceding discussion of the
certifcation rules, it has been shown that at
a Field Length Limit Weight condition, an
RTOinitiatedatV
1
willresultintheairplane
comingtoastopattheendoftherunway.This
accelerate-stop distance calculation specifes an
enginefailureoreventatV
EVENT
,thepilot’s
initiationoftheRTOatV
1
,andthecompletion
ofthetransitionwithinthetimeallottedinthe
AFM.Ifanyofthesebasicassumptionsarenot
satisfed, the actual accelerate-stop distance
mayexceedtheAFMcalculateddistance,and
anoverrunwillresult.
The most signifcant factor in these assumptions
is the initiation of the RTO no later than V
1
.
Yetaswasnotedpreviously,inapproximately
55%oftheRTOaccidentsthestopwasinitiated
afterV
1
.AtheavyweightsnearV
1
,theairplane
is typically traveling at 200 to 300 feet per
second, and accelerating at 3 to 6 knots per
second. This means that a delay of only a
secondortwoininitiatingtheRTOwillrequire
several hundred feet of additional runway to
successfullycompletethestop.Ifthetakeoff
was at a Field Limit Weight, and there is no
excessrunwayavailable,theairplanewillreach
the end of the runway at a signifcant speed, as
showninFigure13.
The horizontal axis of Figure 13 is the
incrementalspeedinknotsaboveV
1
atwhich
amaximum effortstopisinitiated.Thevertical
axisshowstheminimum speedinknotsatwhich
theairplanewouldcrosstheendoftherunway,
assuming the pilot used all of the transition
time allowed in the AFM to reconfgure the
airplane to the stop confguration, and that a
maximumstoppingeffortwasmaintained.The
datainFigure13assumesanenginefailurenot
lessthanonesecondpriortoV
1
anddoesnot
includetheuseofreversethrust.Therefore,if
thepilotperformsthetransitionmorequickly
thantheAFMallottedtime,and/orusesreverse
thrust,thelinelabeled“MAXIMUMEFFORT
STOP”wouldbeshiftedslightlytotheright.
However,basedontheRTOaccidentsofthe
past,theshadedareaabovethelineshowswhat
ismorelikelytooccurifahighspeedRTOis
initiatedatorjustafterV
1
.Thisisespeciallytrue
iftheRTOwasduetosomethingotherthanan
enginefailure,orifthestoppingcapabilityof
theairplaneisotherwisedegradedbyrunway
surface contamination, tire failures, or poor
technique.ThedatainFigure13aretypicalofa
large,heavyjettransportandwouldberotated
slightlytotherightforthesameairplaneata
lighterweight.
In the fnal analysis, although the certifed
accelerate-stop distance calculations provide
Figure 13
Overrun Speed for
an RTO initiated
after V
1
O
O
4O
8O
12O
4
Aoort initiation speed aoove scheduled V
1
(knotsj
N
a
x
im
u
m
e
ffo
r
t s
to
p
8peed off end of
runwa] (knotsj
3HADEDAREAINDICATESDEGRADED
STOPPINGPERFORMANCE
s#ONTAMINATEDRUNWAY
s0ILOTTECHNIQUE
s3YSTEMFAILURES
8 12
SECTION 2
2.15
suffcient runway for a properly performed
RTO, the available margins are fairly small.
Most importantly, there are no margins to
account for initiation of the RTO after V
1
or
extenuating circumstances such as runway
contamination.
2.3.3.2 The “Go” Option
FARrulesalsoprescribeminimumperformance
standardsforthe“Go”situation.Withanengine
failedatthemostcriticalpointalongthetakeoff
path,theFAR“Go”criteriarequiresthatthe
airplanebeabletocontinuetoaccelerate,rotate,
liftoffandreachV
2
speedatapoint35feetabove
theendoftherunway.Theairplanemustremain
controllablethroughoutthismaneuverandmust
meet certain minimum climb requirements.
These handling characteristics and climb
requirements are demonstrated many times
throughout the certifcation fight test program.
Whileagreatdealofattentionisfocusedon
theenginefailurecase,itisimportanttokeep
inmind,thatin over three quarters of all RTO
accident cases, full takeoff power was available.
Itislikelythateachcrewmemberhashada
good deal of practice in engine inoperative
takeoffsinpriorsimulatororairplanetraining.
However,itmayhavebeendoneatrelatively
lighttrainingweights.Asaresult,thecrewmay
conclude that large control inputs and rapid
responsetypicalofconditionsnearminimum
controlspeeds(Vmcg)arealwaysrequiredin
ordertomaintaindirectionalcontrol.However,
at the V
1
speeds associated with a typical
FieldLengthLimitWeight,thecontrolinput
requirementsarenoticeablylessthantheyare
atlighterweights.
Also, at light gross weights, the airplane’s
rate of climb capability with one-engine
inoperativecouldnearlyequaltheall-engine
climb performance at typical in-service
weights, leading the crew to expect higher
performancethantheairplanewillhaveifthe
actualairplaneweightisatornearthetakeoff
ClimbLimitWeight.Engine-outrateofclimb
and acceleration capability at a Climb Limit
Weightmayappeartobesubstantiallylessthan
thecrewanticipatesorisfamiliarwith.
Theminimumsecondsegmentclimbgradients
required in the regulations vary from 2.4%
to3.0%dependingonthenumberofengines
installed. These minimum climb gradients
translateintoaclimbrateofonly350to500
feetperminuteatactualclimblimitweights
and their associated V
2
speeds, as shown in
Figure 14. The takeoff weight computations
performed prior to takeoff are required to
account for all obstacles in the takeoff fight
path. All that is required to achieve the
anticipated fight path is adherence by the fight
crewtotheplannedheadingsandspeedsper
their pre-departure briefng.
Consider a one-engine-inoperative case
where the engine failure occurs earlier than
the minimum time before V
1
specifed in
therules.Becauseengine-outaccelerationis
less than all-engine acceleration, additional
distance is needed to accelerate to V
R
and,
as a consequence, the liftoff point will be
movedfurtherdowntherunway.Thealtitude
(or“screenheight”)achievedattheendofthe
runway is somewhat reduced depending on
howmuchmorethanonesecondbeforeV
1
the
engine failure occurs. On a feld length limit
runway, the height at the end of the runway
may be less than the 35 feet specifed in the
regulations.
Figure 15 graphically summarizes this
discussion of “Go” margins. First, let V
EF

be the speed at which the Airplane Flight
Manualcalculationassumestheenginetofail,
(a minimum of one second before reaching
V
1
). The horizontal axis of Figure 15 shows
the number of knots prior to V
EF
that the
SECTION 2
2.16
engineactuallyfailsinsteadofthetime,and
the vertical axis gives the “screen height”
achievedattheendoftherunway.Atypical
rangeofaccelerationforjettransportsis3to6
knotspersecond,sotheshadedareashowsthe
rangeinscreenheightthatmightoccurifthe
engine actually failed “onesecond early”, or
approximatelytwosecondspriortoV
1
.Inother
words,a“Go”decisionmadewiththeengine
failureoccurringtwosecondspriortoV
1
will
resultinascreenheightof15to30feetfora
FieldLengthLimitWeighttakeoff.
Figure15alsoshowsthatthe“Go”performance
margins are strongly infuenced by the number
ofengines.Thisisagaintheresultofthelarger
proportionofthrustlosswhenoneenginefails
on the two-engine airplane compared to a
-20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0
0
10
20
30
40
(35)
(150)
One-engine inoperative
All engines
2
-
e
n
g
i
n
e

a
i
r
p
l
a
n
e

Height at end
of runway, ft
Speed at actual engine failure
relative to V
EF
, knots
V
2
+ 10 to 25 knots
V
2
+8 +4
Typical
V
1
range
One second
minimum
4-engine airplane
3
-
e
n
g
in
e
a
ir
p
la
n
e

520 FPN at V
2
~ 170 knots
440 FPN at V
2
~ 1O0 knots
8O0 FPN at V
2
~ 150 knots
Ninimum
gradient
required
87
4-engine
8-engine
2.77
2-engine
2.47
T]pical rate of climo
15-degree oank turn will reduce these
climo rates o] approximatel] 100 FPN
Figure 14
“GO” perfomance
at climb limit
weights
Figure 15
Effect of engine
failure before V
EF

on screen height
SECTION 2
2.17
threeorfour-engineairplane.Ontwo-engine
airplanes,therearestillmargins,buttheyare
notaslarge,afactthatanoperatorofseveral
airplane types must be sure to emphasize in
trainingandtransitionprograms.
It should also be kept in mind that the 15
to 30 foot screen heights in the preceding
discussion were based on the complete loss
of thrust from one engine. If all engines are
operating, as was the case in most of the
RTO accident cases, the height over the end
of the Field Length Limit runway will be
approximately 150 feet and speed will be
V
2
+10 to 25 knots, depending on airplane
type.Thisisduetothehigheraccelerationand
climbgradientprovidedwhenallenginesare
operatingandbecausetherequiredallengine
takeoffdistanceismultipliedby115%.Ifthe
“failed” engine is developing partial power,
the performance is somewhere in between,
but defnitely above the required engine-out
limits.
2.3.4 Operational Takeoff Calculations
As we have seen, the certifcation fight testing,
inaccordancewiththeappropriategovernment
regulations, determines the relationship
between the takeoff gross weight and the
requiredrunwaylengthwhichispublishedinthe
AFM.ByusingthedataintheAFMitisthen
possibletodetermine,foragivencombination
ofambientconditionsandairplaneweight,the
required runway length which will comply
with the regulations. Operational takeoff
calculations,however,haveanadditionaland
obviously different limitation. The length of
therunwayistheLimitFieldLengthanditis
fxed, not variable.
2.3.4.1 The Field Length Limit Weight
Instead of solving for the required runway
length, the frst step in an operational takeoff
calculation is to determine the maximum
airplane weight which meets the rules for
the fxed runway length available. In other
words, what is the limit weight at which the
airplane:
1)Willachieve35-ftaltitudewithall
enginesoperatingandamarginof15%
oftheactualdistanceusedremaining;
2)Willachieve35-ftaltitudewiththe
criticalenginefailedonesecondprior
toV
1
;
3)Willstopwithanenginefailureorother
eventpriortoV
1
andtherejectinitiated
atV
1
;
…all within the existing runway length
available.
Theresultofthiscalculationisthreeallowable
weights.Thesethreeweightsmayormaynotbe
thesame,butthelowestofthethreebecomesthe
FieldLengthLimitWeightforthattakeoff.
Aninterestingobservationcanbemadeatthis
point as to which of these three criteria will
typically determine the Takeoff Field Limit
Weightforagivenairplanetype.Two-engine
airplanesloseone-halftheirtotalthrustwhen
anenginefails.Asaresult,theFieldLength
LimitWeightfortwo-engineairplanesisusually
determinedbyoneoftheengine-outdistance
criteria.Ifitislimitedbytheaccelerate-stop
distance, there will be some margin in both
theall-engineandaccelerate-godistances.If
the limit is the accelerate-go distance, some
margin would be available for the all-engine
goandaccelerate-stopcases.
By comparison, four-engine airplanes only
loseone-fourthoftheirtakeoffthrustwhenan
enginefailssotheyarerarelylimitedbyengine-
out go performance. The Field Length Limit
SECTION 2
2.18
Weightforafour-engineairplaneistypically
limitedbythe115%all-enginedistancecriteria
oroccasionallybytheaccelerate-stopcase.As
aresult,aslightmarginfrequentlyexistsinthe
engine-outgoandaccelerate-stopdistanceson
four-engineairplanes.
Three-engine airplanes may be limited by
engine-outperformance,orforsomemodels,by
amorecomplexcriterionwhereintherotation
speed V
R
becomes the limiting factor. Since
the regulations prohibit V
1
from exceeding
V
R,
sometri-jetsfrequentlyhaveV
1
=V
R
,and
a small margin may therefore exist in the
accelerate-stopdistance.Two-engineairplanes
may occasionally be limited by this V
1
=V
R

criterionalso.
Thepossiblecombinationsofairportpressure
altitude, temperature, wind, runway slope,
clearway,andstopwayareendless.Regardless
of airplane type, they can easily combine to
makeanyoneofthethreepreviouslydiscussed
takeoff feld length limits apply. Flight crews
havenoconvenientmethodtodeterminewhich
ofthethreecriteriaislimitingforaparticular
takeoff,andfromapracticalpointofview,it
really doesn’t matter. The slight differences
that may exist are rarely signifcant. Most RTO
overrunaccidentshaveoccurredonrunways
wheretheairplanewasnotatalimittakeoff
weight. That is, the accidents occurred on
runwaysthatwerelongerthanrequiredforthe
actualtakeoffweight.Combiningthishistorical
evidencewiththedemandingnatureofthehigh
speedrejectedtakeoff,itwouldseemprudent
thatthecrewshouldalwaysassumethetakeoff
islimitedbytheaccelerate-stopcriteriawhen
thetakeoffweightisFieldLengthLimited.
2.3.4.2 Actual Weight Less Than Limit
Weight
Returningtotheoperationaltakeoffcalculation,
thesecondstepistothencomparetheactual
airplane weight to the Field Length Limit
Weight.Thereareonlytwopossibleoutcomes
ofthischeck.
1)Theactualairplaneweightcouldequalor
exceedtheFieldLengthLimitWeight,or
2)Theactualairplaneweightislessthanthe
FieldLengthLimitWeight.
The frst case is relatively straightforward,
theairplaneweightcannotbegreaterthanthe
limitweightandmustbereduced.Theresult
isatakeoffataFieldLengthLimitWeightas
wehavejustdiscussed.Thesecondcase,which
is typical of most jet transport operations, is
worthyoffurtherconsideration.
Byfar,themostlikelytakeoffscenarioforthe
linepilotisthecasewheretheactualairplane
weightislessthananylimitweight,especially
theFieldLengthLimitWeight.Italsoispossibly
themosteasilymisunderstoodareaoftakeoff
performancesincethefactthattheairplaneis
not at a limit weight is about all the fight crew
candeterminefromthedatausuallyavailableon
the fight deck. Currently, few operators provide
anyinformationthatwillletthecrewdetermine
howmuchexcessrunwayisavailable;whatit
meansintermsoftheV
1
speedtheyareusing;
orhowtobestmaximizethepotentialsafety
marginsrepresentedbytheexcessrunway.
2.3.5 Factors that Affect Takeoff and RTO
Performance
Both the continued and the rejected takeoff
performancearedirectlyaffectedbyatmospheric
conditions, airplane confguration, runway
characteristics, engine thrust available, and
byhumanperformancefactors.Thefollowing
sectionsreviewtheeffectsofthesevariables
onairplaneperformance.Thepurposeisnot
to make this a complete treatise on airplane
performance. Rather, it is to emphasize that
changes in these variables can have a signifcant
impactonasuccessfulGo/NoGodecision.In
many instances, the fight crew has a degree of
directcontroloverthesechanges.
SECTION 2
2.19
2.3.5.1 Runway Surface Condition
Theconditionoftherunwaysurfacecanhave
a signifcant effect on takeoff performance,
since it can affect both the acceleration and
deceleration capability of the airplane. The
actualsurfaceconditioncanvaryfromperfectly
drytoadamp,wet,heavyrain,snow,orslush
coveredrunwayinaveryshorttime.Theentire
lengthoftherunwaymaynothavethesame
stoppingpotentialduetoavarietyoffactors.
Obviously, a 10,000-ft runway with the frst
7,000feetbareanddry,butthelast3,000feet
a sheet of ice, does not present a very good
situationforahighspeedRTO.Ontheother
hand, there are also specially constructed
runways with a grooved or Porous Friction
Coat(PFC)surfacewhichcanofferimproved
brakingunderadverseconditions.Thecrews
cannot control the weather like they can the
airplane’s confguration or thrust. Therefore, to
maximizeboththe“Go”and“Stop”margins,
they must rely on judiciously applying their
company’swetorcontaminatedrunwaypolicies
aswellastheirownunderstandingofhowthe
performanceoftheirairplanemaybeaffected
byaparticularrunwaysurfacecondition.
The certifcation testing is performed on a
smooth,ungrooved,dryrunway.Forairplanes
certifed under FAR Amendment 25-92, testing
isalsoperformedonsmoothandgroovedwet
runways.Anycontaminationnotcoveredinthe
certifcation data which reduces the available
frictionbetweenthetireandtherunwaysurface
willincreasetherequiredstoppingdistancefor
anRTO.Runwaycontaminantssuchasslush
orstandingwatercanalsoaffectthecontinued
takeoff performance due to “displacement
and impingement drag” associated with the
spray from the tires striking the airplane.
Somemanufacturersprovideadvisorydatafor
adjustmentoftakeoffweightand/orV
1
when
the runway is wet or contaminated. Many
operators use this data to provide fight crews
withamethodofdeterminingthelimitweights
forslipperyrunways.
Factorsthatmakearunwayslipperyandhow
theyaffectthestoppingmaneuverarediscussed
inthefollowingsections.
SECTION 2
2.20
2.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning
Hydroplaning is an interesting subject since
mostpilotshaveeitherheardoforexperienced
instancesofextremelypoorbrakingactionon
wetrunwaysduringlanding.Thephenomenon
ishighlysensitivetospeedwhichmakesitan
especially important consideration for RTO
situations.
As a tire rolls on a wet runway, its forward
motiontendstodisplacewaterfromthetread
contact area. While this isn’tany problem at
lowspeeds,athighspeedsthisdisplacement
action can generate water pressures suffcient
toliftandseparatepartofthetirecontactarea
fromtherunwaysurface.Theresultingtire-to-
groundfrictioncanbeverylowathighspeeds
butfortunatelyimprovesasspeeddecreases.
Dynamic hydroplaning is the term used to
describe the reduction of tire tread contact
area due to induced water pressure. At high
speeds on runways with signifcant water,
the forward motion of the wheel generates a
wedge of high pressure water at the leading
edgeof the contact area,asshown in Figure
16A.Dependingonthespeed,depthofwater,
andcertaintireparameters,theportionofthe
tire tread that can maintain contact with the
runway varies signifcantly. As the tread contact
areaisreduced,theavailablebrakingfriction
isalsoreduced.Thisisthepredominantfactor
leading to reduced friction on runways that
have either slush, standing water or signifcant
waterdepthduetoheavyrainactivity.Inthe
extremecase,totaldynamichydroplaningcan
occur where the tire to runway contact area
vanishes,thetireliftsofftherunwayandrides
onthewedgeofwaterlikeawaterski.Since
theconditionsrequiredtoinitiateandsustain
total dynamic hydroplaning are unusual, it
is rarely encountered. When it does occur,
suchasduringanextremelyheavyrainstorm,
it virtually eliminates any tire braking or
corneringcapabilityathighspeeds.
Another form of hydroplaning can occur
where there is some tread contact with the
runwaysurfacebutthewheeliseitherlocked
or rotating slowly (compared to the actual
airplane speed). The friction produced by
theskiddingtirecausesthetreadmaterialto
becomeextremelyhot.AsindicatedinFigure
16B,theresultingheatgeneratessteaminthe
contactareawhichtendstoprovideadditional
upwardpressureonthetire.Thehotsteamalso
startsreversingthevulcanizingprocessused
in manufacturing the rubber tread material.
The affected surface tread rubber becomes
irregularinappearance,somewhatgummyin
nature,andusuallyhasalightgraycolor.This
“reverted”rubberhydroplaningresultsinvery
lowfrictionlevels,approximatelyequaltoicy
runwayfrictionwhenthetemperatureisnear
themeltingpoint.Anoccurrenceofreverted
rubberhydroplaningisrareandusuallyresults
from some kind of antiskid system or brake
malfunctionwhichpreventedthewheelfrom
rotatingattheproperspeed.
Figure 16A
Dynamic Hydroplaning
Figure 16B
Reverted Rubber Hydroplaning
&LOODEDRUNWAY
,OCKEDTIRE
3TREAMPRESSURE
SECTION 2
2.21
In the last several years, many runways
throughout the world have been grooved,
thereby greatly improving the potential wet
runway friction capability. As a result, the
numberofhydroplaningincidentshasdecreased
considerably.Flighttestsofonemanufacturer’s
airplane on a well maintained grooved
runway,whichwasthoroughlydrenchedwith
water, showed that the stopping forces were
approximately90%oftheforcesthatcouldbe
developedonadryrunway.Continuedefforts
togrooveadditionalrunwaysortheuseofother
equivalenttreatmentssuchasporousfriction
overlays, will signifcantly enhance the overall
safetyoftakeoffoperations.
The important thing to remember about wet
orcontaminatedrunwayconditionsisthatfor
smoothrunwaysurfacesthereisapronounced
effect of forward ground speed on friction
capability, aggravated by the depth of water.
Forproperlymaintainedgroovedorspecially
treated surfaces, the friction capability is
markedlyimproved.
2.3.5.1.2 The Final Stop
Areviewofoverrunaccidentsindicatesthat,in
manycases,thestoppingcapabilityavailable
was not used to the maximum during the
initialandmidportionsofthestopmaneuver,
becausethereappearedtobe“plentyofrunway
available”.Insomecases,lessthanfullreverse
thrustwasusedandthebrakeswerereleasedfor
aperiodoftime,lettingtheairplanerollonthe
portionoftherunwaythatwouldhaveproduced
goodbrakingaction.Whentheairplanemoved
onto the fnal portion of the runway, the crew
discoveredthatthepresenceofmoistureonthe
top of rubber deposits in the touchdown and
turnoff areas resulted in very poor braking
capability,andtheairplanecouldnotbestopped
ontherunway.WhenanRTOisinitiatedonwet
orslipperyrunways,itisespeciallyimportant
tousefullstoppingcapabilityuntiltheairplane
iscompletelystopped.
2.3.5.2 Atmospheric Conditions
Ingeneral,theliftthewingsgenerateandthrust
theenginesproducearedirectlyrelatedtothe
airplane’sspeedthroughtheairandthedensity
of that air. The fight crew should anticipate
thattheairplane’stakeoffperformancewillbe
affectedbywindspeedanddirectionaswell
astheatmosphericconditionswhichdetermine
airdensity.Properlyaccountingforlastminute
changesinthesefactorsiscrucialtoasuccessful
Go/NoGodecision.
Theeffectofthewindspeedanddirectionon
takeoffdistanceisverystraightforward.Atany
givenairspeed,a10-knotheadwindcomponent
lowers the ground speed by 10 knots. Since
V
1
, rotation, and liftoff speeds are at lower
ground speeds, the required takeoff distance
is reduced. The opposite occurs if the wind
hasa10-knottailwindcomponent,producing
a 10-knot increase in the ground speed. The
requiredrunwaylengthisincreased,especially
thedistancerequiredtostoptheairplanefrom
V
1
. Typical takeoff data supplied to the fight
crew by their operations department will
eitherprovidetakeoffweightadjustmentstobe
appliedtoazerowindlimitweightorseparate
columns of limit weights for specifc values
of wind component. In either case, it is the
responsibility of the fight crew to verify that
lastminutechangesinthetowerreportedwinds
areincludedintheirtakeoffplanning.
Theeffectofairdensityontakeoffperformance
isalsostraightforwardinso farasthecrew
isnormallyprovidedthelatestmeteorological
informationpriortotakeoff.However,itisthe
responsibilityofthecrewtoverifythecorrect
pressurealtitudeandtemperaturevaluesused
in determining the fnal takeoff limit weight
andthrustsetting.
SECTION 2
2.22
2.3.5.3 Airplane Confguration
The planned confguration of the airplane at the
timeoftakeoffmustbetakenintoconsideration
by the fight crew during their takeoff planning.
This should include the usual things like fap
selection, and engine bleed confguration, as
well as the unusual things like inoperative
equipmentcoveredbytheMinimumEquipment
List (MEL) or missing items as covered by
the Confguration Deviation List (CDL). This
sectionwilldiscusstheeffectoftheairplane’s
confguration on takeoff performance capability
and/or the procedures the fight crew would use
tocompleteorrejectthetakeoff.
2.3.5.3.1 Flaps
The airplane’s takeoff feld length performance
is affected by fap setting in a fairly obvious way.
Foragivenrunwaylengthandairplaneweight,
thetakeoffspeedsarereducedbyselectinga
greater fap setting. This is because the lift
required for fight is produced at a lower V
2

speed with the greater fap defection. Since the
airplanewillreachtheassociatedlowerV
1
speed
earlierinthetakeoffroll,therewillbemore
runwayremainingforapossiblestopmaneuver.
On the “Go” side of the decision, increasing
the takeoff fap defection will increase the
airplane drag and the resulting lower climb
performancemaylimittheallowabletakeoff
weight.However,thetakeoffanalysisusedby
the fight crew will advise them if climb or
obstacle clearance is a limiting factor with a
greater fap setting.
2.3.5.3.2 Engine Bleed Air
Wheneverbleedairisextractedfromanengine,
andthevalueofthethrustsettingparameter
isappropriatelyreduced,theamountofthrust
theenginegeneratesisreduced.Therefore,the
use of engine bleed air for air conditioning/
pressurizationreducestheairplane’spotential
takeoffperformanceforagivensetofrunway
length,temperatureandaltitudeconditions.
When required, using engine and/or wing
anti-ice further decreases the performance
on some airplane models. This “lost” thrust
may be recoverable via increased takeoff
EPRorN
1
limitsasindicatedintheairplane
operatingmanual.Itdependsonenginetype,
airplane model, and the specifc atmospheric
conditions.
2.3.5.3.3 Missing or Inoperative Equipment
Inoperative or missing equipment can
sometimes affect the airplane’s acceleration
or deceleration capability. Items which
are allowed to be missing per the certifed
Confguration Deviation List (CDL), such
as access panels and aerodynamic seals, can
causeairplanedragtoincrease.Theresulting
decrements to the takeoff limit weights are,
when appropriate, published in the CDL.
Withthesedecrementsapplied,theairplane’s
takeoffperformancewillbewithintherequired
distancesandclimbrates.
Inoperativeequipmentordeactivatedsystems,
aspermittedundertheMinimumEquipment
List (MEL) can also affect the airplane’s
dispatched “Go” or “Stop” performance.
For instance, on some airplane models, an
inoperative in-fight wheel braking system may
require the landing gear to be left extended
during a large portion of the climbout to
allow the wheels to stop rotating. The ‘Go”
performancecalculationsfordispatchmustbe
made in accordance with certifed “Landing
GearDown”FlightManualdata.Theresulting
SECTION 2
2.23
new limit takeoff weight may be much less
thantheoriginallimitinordertomeetobstacle
clearance requirements, and there would be
some excess runway available for a rejected
takeoff.
AnMELitemthatwouldnotaffectthe“Go”
performance margins but would defnitely
degradethe“Stop”marginsisaninoperative
anti-skidsystem.Inthisinstance,notonlyisthe
limitweightreducedbytheamountdetermined
from the AFM data, but the fight crew may also
berequiredtouseadifferentrejectedtakeoff
procedure in which throttles are retarded frst,
the speedbrakes deployed second, and then
thebrakesareappliedinajudiciousmannerto
avoidlockingthewheelsandfailingthetires.
3

TheassociateddecrementintheFieldLength
LimitWeightisusuallysubstantial.
OtherMELitemssuchasadeactivatedbrake
may impact both the continued takeoff and
RTOperformancethroughdegradedbraking
capability and loss of in-fight braking of the
spinningtire.
The fight crew should bear in mind that
the performance of the airplane with these
typesofCDLorMELitemsintheairplane’s
maintenancelogatdispatchwillbewithinthe
certifed limits. However, it would be prudent
for the fight crew to accept fnal responsibility
to assure that the items are accounted for in
thedispatchprocess,andtoinsurethatthey,
asacrew,arepreparedtoproperlyexecuteany
revisedprocedures.
3
UKCAAprocedureadds“...applymaximumreversethrust.”
SECTION 2
2.24
2.3.5.3.4 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes
The airplane’s wheels, tires, and brakes are
anotherareathatshouldbeconsideredinlight
of the signifcant part they play in determining
theresultsofaGo/NoGodecision.
One design feature which involves all three
components is the wheel fuse plug. All jet
transportwheelsusedforbrakingincorporate
thermalfuseplugs.Thefunctionofthefuseplug
istopreventtireorwheelburstsbymeltingifthe
heattransferredtothewheelsfromthebrakes
becomes excessive. Melting temperatures of
fuseplugsareselectedsothatwithexcessive
brake heat, the infation gas (usually nitrogen)
is released before the structural integrity of
the tire or wheel is seriously impaired. Both
certification limitations and operational
recommendationstoavoidmeltingfuseplugs
areprovidedtooperatorsbythemanufacturer,
asisdiscussedinSection2.3.5.3.6underthe
heading,ResidualBrakeEnergy.
While fuse plugs provide protection from
excessive brake heat, it is also important to
recognizethatfuseplugscannotprotectagainst
all types of heat induced tire failures. The
locationofthefusepluginthewheelisselected
toensureproperresponsetobrakeheat.This
locationincombinationwiththeinherentlow
thermalconductivityoftirerubbermeansthat
thefuseplugscannotpreventtirefailuresfrom
therapidinternalheatbuildupassociatedwith
taxiing on an underinfated tire. This type of heat
buildupcancauseabreakdownoftherubber
compound,plyseparation,and/orruptureofthe
plies.Thisdamagemightnotcauseimmediate
tire failure and because it is internal, it may
notbeobviousbyvisualinspection.However,
theweakenedtireismorepronetofailureona
subsequent fight. Long taxi distances especially
athighspeedsandheavytakeoffweightscan
aggravatethisproblemandresultinablown
tire. While underinfation is a maintenance
issue, fight crews can at least minimize the
possibilityoftirefailuresduetooverheating
byusinglowtaxispeedsandminimizingtaxi
brakingwheneverpossible.
SECTION 2
2.25
Correct tire infation and fuse plug protection
are signifcant, but will never prevent all tire
failures. Foreign objects in parking areas,
taxiwaysandrunwayscancauseseverecutsin
tires.Theabrasionassociatedwithsustained
lockedorskiddingwheels,whichcanbecaused
byvariousantiskidorbrakeproblems,cangrind
throughthetirecordsuntilthetireisseverely
weakenedorablowoutoccurs.Occasionally,
wheel cracks develop which defate a tire and
generateanoverloadedconditionintheadjacent
tireonthesameaxle.Someoftheseproblemsare
inevitable.However,itcannotbeoverstressed
that proper maintenance and thorough walk
aroundinspectionsarekeyfactorsinpreventing
tirefailuresduringthetakeoffroll.
Tire failures may be diffcult to identify from the
fight deck and the related Go/No Go decision
isthereforenotasimpletask.Atireburstmay
beloudenoughtobeconfusedwithanengine
compressorstall,mayjustbealoudnoise,or
may not be heard. A tire failure may not be
feltatall,maycausetheairplanetopulltoone
side,orcancausetheentireairplanetoshake
andshuddertotheextentthatinstrumentsmay
become diffcult to read. Vibration arising out of
failureofanosewheeltirepotentiallypresents
anothercomplication.Duringtakeoffrotation,
vibrationmayactuallyincreaseatnosewheel
liftoffduetothelossofthedampeningeffect
ofhavingthewheelincontactwiththerunway.
Apilotmustbecautiousnottoinappropriately
conclude, under such circumstances, that
anotherproblemexists.
Although continuing a takeoff with a failed
tire will generally have no signifcant adverse
results,theremaybeadditionalcomplications
asaresultofatirefailure.Failedtiresdonot
inthemselvesusuallycreatedirectionalcontrol
problems. Degradation of control can occur,
however, as a result of heavy pieces of tire
materialbeingthrownatveryhighvelocities
andcausingdamagetotheexposedstructure
of the airplane and/or the loss of hydraulic
systems. On airplanes with aft mounted
engines,thepossibilityofpiecesofthefailed
tirebeingthrownintoanenginemustalsobe
considered.
An airplane’s climb gradient and obstacle
clearance performance with all engines
operatingandthelandinggeardownexceeds
the minimum certifed engine-out levels that
areusedtodeterminethetakeoffperformance
limits.Therefore,leavingthegeardownafter
asuspectedtirefailurewillnotjeopardizethe
aircraftifallenginesareoperating.However,if
theperceivedtirefailureisaccompaniedbyan
indicationofthrustloss,orifanengineproblem
shoulddeveloplaterinthetakeoffsequence,
the airplane’s climb gradient and/or obstacle
clearance capability may be significantly
reducedifthelandinggearisnotretracted.The
decision to retract the gear with a suspected
tireproblemshouldbeinaccordancewiththe
airline’s/manufacturer’srecommendations.
Ifatirefailureissuspectedatfairlylowspeeds,
it should be treated the same as any other
rejectable failure and the takeoff should be
rejectedpromptly.Whenrejectingthetakeoff
withablowntire,thecrewshouldanticipate
that additional tires may fail during the stop
attempt and that directional control may be
diffcult. They should also be prepared for the
possiblelossofhydraulicsystemswhichmay
causespeedbrakeorthrustreverserproblems.
Sincethestoppingcapabilityoftheairplanemay
be signifcantly compromised, the crew should
notrelaxfromamaximumeffortRTOuntilthe
airplaneisstoppedonthepavement.
Rejecting a takeoff from high speeds with
a failed tire is a much riskier proposition,
especiallyiftheweightisneartheFieldLimit
Weight.Thechancesofanoverrunareincreased
simply due to the loss of braking force from
onewheel.Ifadditionaltiresshouldfailduring
thestopattempt,theavailablebrakingforceis
evenfurtherreduced.Inthiscase,itisgenerally
bettertocontinuethetakeoff,ascanbeseen
inFigure17.Thesubsequentlandingmaytake
advantageofalowerweightandspeedifitis
possibletodumpfuel.Also,thecrewwillbe
SECTION 2
2.26
better prepared for possible vibration and/or
controlproblems.Mostimportant,however,is
thefactthattheentirerunwaywillbeavailable
for the stop maneuver instead of perhaps, as
littleas40%ofit.
As can be seen from this discussion, it is
not a straightforward issue to defne when a
takeoff should be continued or rejected after
a suspected tire failure. It is fairly obvious
however,thatanRTOinitiatedathighspeed
withasuspectedtirefailureisnotapreferred
situation. McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
inanAllOperatorLetter
4
,hasaddressedthis
dilemma by recommending a policy of not
rejectingatakeoffforasuspectedtirefailure
at speeds above V
1
−20 knots. The operators
of other model aircraft should contact the
manufacturer for specifc recommendations
regardingtirefailures.
2.3.5.3.5 Worn Brakes
TheinvestigationofonerecentRTOincident
whichwasinitiated“verynearV
1
”,revealed
thattheoverrunwastheresultof8ofthe10
wheel brakes failing during the RTO. The
failed brakes were later identifed to have been
atadvancedstatesofwearwhich,whilewithin
acceptedlimits,didnothavethecapacityfora
highenergyRTO.
This was the frst and only known accident in
thehistoryofcommercialjettransportoperation
thatcanbetracedtofailureofthebrakesduring
anattemptedRTO.TheNationalTransportation
SafetyBoard(NTSB)investigatedtheaccident
andmadeseveralrecommendationstotheFAA.
The recommendations included the need to
require airplane and brake manufacturers to
verify by test and analysis that their brakes,
whenworntotherecommendedlimits,meet
the certifcation requirements. Prior to 1991,
maximumbrakeenergylimitshadbeenderived
fromtestsdonewithnewbrakesinstalled.
Virtually all brakes in use today have wear
indicatorpinstoshowthedegreeofwearand
when the brake must be removed from the
!VAILABLE2UNWAY
• 8ame initial conditions
º Takeoff flaps
º Certified performance
º Dr] runwa]
º Field length limit weight
º landing flaps
º Certified performance
less olown tire effects
º Takeoff weight minus
ournoff and fuel dump (optj
5O ft
8top
zone
Reject
0o
V
1
Transition
complete
Transition
complete
V
R
V
EF
V
R
V
1
85 ft
Reject
0o
4O to
OO kts
8OO to 5OO ft
overrun
Engine
fail
Tire
fail
4O to OO7
Nargin
OO to 4O7
Approx
15O ft
Reduced oraking
capaoilit] plus all
engine reverse
Full stopping
no reverse
Figure 17
Margins associated
with continuing or
rejecting a takeoff
with a tire failure
4
McDonnellDouglasAllOperatorsLetterFO-AOL-8-003,-9-006,-10-004,-11-015,Reiteration of Procedures and Techniques
Regarding Wheels, Tires, and Brakes,dated19AUG1991
SECTION 2
2.27
airplane.Inmostcases,asthebrakewears,the
pinmovesclosertoareferencepoint,sothat
when the end of the pin is fush with the reference
(withfullpressureapplied),thebrakeis“worn
out”.Asoflate1991,testshavebeencompleted
whichshowthatbrakesattheallowablewear
limitcanmeetAFMbrakeenergylevels.As
a result, “wear pin length” is not signifcant
to the fight crew unless the pin indicates that
thebrakeiswornoutandshouldberemoved
from service. There are no changes to fight
crewordispatchproceduresbasedonbrake
wearpinlength.
2.3.5.3.6 Residual Brake Energy
Afterabrakeapplication,theenergywhichthe
brakehasabsorbedisreleasedasheatanduntil
thisheatisdissipated,theamountofadditional
energy which the brake can absorb without
failureisreduced.Therefore,takeoffplanning
must consider the effects of residual brake
energy(orbraketemperature)iftheprevious
landing involved signifcant braking and/or the
airplaneturnaroundisrelativelyshort.There
are two primary sources of information on
thissubject.Thebraketemperaturelimitations
and/orcoolingchartsintheairplaneoperating
manualproviderecommendedinformationon
temperaturelimitationsand/orcoolingtimes
and the procedures necessary to dissipate
variousamountsofbrakeenergy.Inaddition,
the Maximum Quick Turnaround Weight
(MQTW) chart in the AFM is a regulatory
requirementthatmustbefollowed.Thischart
shows the gross weight at landing where the
energy absorbed by the brakes during the
landing could be high enough to cause the
wheel fuse plugs to melt and establishes a
minimumwaiting/coolingtimeforthesecases.
TheMQTWchartassumesthattheprevious
landingwasconductedwithmaximumbraking
fortheentirestopanddidnotusereversethrust,
soformanylandingswhereonlylightbraking
wasusedthereissubstantialconservatismbuilt
intothewaitrequirement.
2.3.5.3.7 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel
Braking
Whilejettransportpilotsgenerallyunderstand
the aerodynamic drag beneft of speedbrakes
andthecapabilityofwheelbrakestostopan
airplane, the effect of speedbrakes on wheel
brakeeffectivenessduringanRTOisnotalways
appreciated. The reason speedbrakes are so
criticalistheirpronouncedeffectonwinglift.
Depending on fap setting, the net wing lift
can be reduced, eliminated or reversed to a
downloadbyraisingthespeedbrakes,thereby
increasing the vertical load on the wheels
which in turn can greatly increase braking
capability.
Speedbrakes are important since for most
braking situations, especially any operation
onslipperyrunways,thetorqueoutputofthe
brake,andthereforetheamountofwheelbrake
retardingforcethatcanbedevelopedishighly
dependent on the vertical wheel load. As a
result,speedbrakesmustbedeployedearlyin
the stop to maximize the braking capability.
During RTO certifcation fight tests, the
stoppingperformanceisobtainedwithprompt
deploymentofthespeedbrakes.Failure to raise
the speedbrakes during an RTO or raising
them late will signifcantly increase the
stopping distance beyond the value shown
in the AFM.
Figures 18 and 19 summarize the effect of
speedbrakes during an RTO. For a typical
mid-sized two-engine transport, at a takeoff
weightof225,000lb,thetotalloadonthemain
wheelsatbrakereleasewouldbeapproximately
193,000lb.Astheairplaneacceleratesalongthe
runway,wingliftwilldecreasetheloadonthe
gear,andbythetimetheairplaneapproaches
V
1
speed,(137knotsforthisexample),themain
gearloadwillhavedecreasedbynearly63,000
lb.ThedatainFigure19graphicallydepicts
howtheforcesactingontheairplanevarywith
airspeedfromafewknotsbeforetheRTOis
initiateduntiltheairplaneisstopped.Whenthe
pilotbeginstheRTObyapplyingthebrakesand
SECTION 2
2.28
Total stopping force capaoilit]
847
increase
Drag
Brakes
Drag
load on
wheels
lift
Brakes
Forward motion
Rolling
Brake
torque Braking force
(Braking force = oraking friction x load on tirej*
* Brake torque not limiting
8peed-
orakes
down
8peed-
orakes
up
8peedorake position
Up Down
Difference
speedorake up
Drag
lift
het load on wheels
Nax. oraking force
Nax. stopping force
(orakes and dragj
8,5OO los
52,OOO los
141,OOO
75,9OO
84,4OO
14,7OO los
-1,2OO
194,8OO
98,OOO
112,7OO
+787
-1O27
+847
+887
+297
weight
on tire
Figure 18
Effect of
speedbrakes on the
stopping capability
of a typical mid-
size two-engine
transport
Figure 19
Summary of forces
during a typical
mid-size two-
engine airplane
RTO
12O,OOO
1OO,OOO
8O,OOO
OO,OOO
4O,OOO
2O,OOO
O
-2O,OOO
-4O,OOO
-OO,OOO
14O 12O 1OO 8O OO
8peed, KTA8
Retarding
force, lo
4O 2O O
"RAKINGFORCEWITHSPEEDBRAKESUP
"RAKINGFORCEWITHSPEEDBRAKESDOWN
4WOENGINEREVERSETHRUSTFORCE
!ERODRAGWITHSPEEDBRAKESUP
!ERODRAGWITHSPEEDBRAKESDOWN
SECTION 2
2.29
closingthethrustlevers,thebrakingforcerises
quicklytoavalueinexcessof70,000lb.The
nearlyverticallinemadebythebrakingforce
curveinFigure19alsoshowsthattheairplane
begantodeceleratealmostimmediately,with
virtuallynofurtherincreaseinspeed.
The next action in a typical RTO procedure
istodeploythespeedbrakes.Bythetimethis
action is completed, and the wheel brakes
havebecomefullyeffective,theairplanewill
haveslowedseveralknots.Inthisexampleof
an RTO initiated at 137 knots, the airspeed
would be about 124 knots at this point. The
weightonthemaingearat124knotswouldbe
approximately141,600lbwiththespeedbrakes
down,andwouldincreaseby53,200lbwhen
the speedbrakes are raised. The high speed
brakingcapabilityissubstantiallyimprovedby
this38%increaseinwheelloadfrom141,600to
194,800pounds,whichcanbeseenbynoting
theincreaseinbrakingforceto98,000pounds.
In addition, the speedbrakes have an effect
on aerodynamic drag, increasing it by 73%,
from 8,500 to 14,700 pounds. The combined
result,asindicatedbythetableinFigure18,
isthatduringthecritical,highspeedportion
oftheRTO,thetotalstoppingforceactingon
the airplane is increased by 34% when the
speedbrakesaredeployed.
Since both the force the brakes can produce
andtheaerodynamiceffectofthespeedbrakes
varywithspeed,thetotaleffectfortheRTO
stopismoreproperlyindicatedbyaveraging
the effect of the speedbrakes over the entire
stoppingdistance.Forthisexample,theoverall
effectofraisingthespeedbrakesisanincrease
of14%intheaveragetotalstoppingforceacting
throughouttheRTO.
One common misconception among pilots
is that the quick use of thrust reversers will
offsetanydelayoreventhecompletelackof
speedbrakedeploymentduringanRTO.This
issimplynottrue.Onadryrunway,delaying
the deployment of the speedbrakes by only
5secondsduringtheRTOwilladdover300
ft.tothestopdistanceofatypicalmid-sized
two-enginejettransport,includingtheeffects
ofengine-outreversethrust.Asaworstcase
illustration, if reverse thrust was not used
andthespeedbrakeswerenotdeployedatall,
stoppingdistancewouldbeincreasedbymore
than 700 ft. Although the exact fgures of this
example will vary with different fap settings
and from one airplane model to another, the
general effect will be the same, namely that
speedbrakeshaveaverypronouncedeffecton
stoppingperformance.
2.3.5.3.8 Carbon and Steel Brake Differences
Recentemphasisontheapparenttendencyfor
carbonbrakestowearoutinproportiontothe
totalnumberofbrakeapplications,asopposed
tosteelbrakeswhichwearoutinproportionto
energyabsorbedbythebrakes,hasgenerated
interest in other operational differences
between the two types of brakes. While the
emphasis on wear difference is necessary,
sincetheeconomicsofbrakemaintenanceisso
signifcant, for most other operational aspects
thetwobrakescanbeconsideredequivalent.
AsfarasRTOcapabilityisconcerned,thetype
ofbrakeinvolveddoesnotmattersinceeach
brake installation is certifed to its particular
takeoff energy capability. This means that
eithercarbonorsteelbrakes,evenfullyworn,
will be able to perform the maximum certifed
RTOconditionapplicabletothatinstallationin
asatisfactorymanner.
Onedifferencebetweensteelandcarbonbrakes
thatisoftenclaimedisanincreasedtolerance
to thermal overload. To understand this in
properperspective,recognizethatalthoughthe
friction elements in a carbon brake (rotating
and stationary disks) are made of carbon
material,whichhasgoodstrengthandfriction
characteristicsathightemperatures,thebrake
structure, brake hydraulics, the wheel, and
thetireareessentiallythesameasusedforan
equivalentsteelbrake.Withinthelimitations
SECTION 2
2.30
representedbythisnon-carbonequipmentthen,
an overheated carbon brake will continue to
function reasonably well in situations where
an equivalent steel brake with its metallic
disksmightnot.Anoverloadconditioncould
becausedbyexcessivetaxibraking,ridingthe
brakes,orinappropriateturnaroundprocedures
afterlanding.Inthistypeofsituation,carbon
brakeswillgenerallydemonstratebetterfriction
characteristics and therefore develop more
torqueandstoppingforcethanequivalentsteel
brakes.
The diffculty with this carbon brake thermal
advantageisthatitisnearlyimpossibletojudge
theextraamountofbrakingthatcouldbedone
beforeaffectingtheabilityofthenon-carbon
componentstoperforminanRTOsituation.This
isbecausethethermaleffectsonthelimiting
hardware are so highly time and ambient
conditiondependent.Forinstance,whetheran
airplanehascarbonbrakesorsteelbrakeswill
notmatterifenoughtimehaselapsedaftera
heavybrakeapplicationsuchthatthewheelfuse
plugsreleasebeforetheairplanecancomplete
thenexttakeofforasubsequentRTOattempt.
Pilots should concentrate on proper braking
proceduresratherthanattempttocapitalizeon
any extra carbon brake advantage. Attention
to the brake cooling chart recommendations
willavoidthesethermalproblemsandensure
thattheairplanestoppingperformancecanbe
achievedregardlessofwhethersteelorcarbon
brakesareinstalled.
Theincreasedthermaloverloadcapabilityof
carbonbrakesiscloselyrelatedtotheideathat
carbonbrakesdonot“fade”.Inotherwords,they
alwaysproducethesametorquethroughoutthe
stopevenasthebraketemperatureincreases.
Although many carbon brakes do develop
nearlyconstanttorque,somefadeconsiderably
incertainconditions.Ontheotherhand,some
steel brakes do not fade very much at all,
depending to a large extent on the degree of
conservatismbuiltintothebrake.Ineithercase,
brakefadeistakenintoaccountintheAFM
performance, for the specifc brake installed on
eachparticularairplane.Therefore,brakefade
doesnotneedtobeanoperationalconcernto
the fight crew.
Asecondfactorwithsteelbrakesisthepotential
loss of structural strength of the rotors and
statorsattheextremeoperatingtemperatures
associated with limiting energy values. This
couldcauseastructuralfailureofoneormore
brakestatorsneartheendofthestop.Inthis
case the brake will continue to function but
withreducedtorquecapability.Theremaining
components,whicharecommontocarbonand
steelbrakes,arelesslikelytobeaffected.
An RTO from at or near the brake energy
limits can also mean that after stopping on
therunway,thebrakesmaynotbecapableof
stoppingtheairplaneagain,evenfromlowtaxi
speeds.Thisisespeciallytrueforsteelbrakes
duetotheincreasedchanceofstructuralfailure.
Therefore,itisimportantthatthecrewconsider
theprobableconditionoftheairplanewheels,
brakes,andtiresaftercompletingahighspeed
RTO before attempting to move the airplane
fromtherunway.
Oneotherdifferencebetweencarbonandsteel
brakesthatmightbeevidentincertainRTOsis
brakewelding.Steelbrakes,whichusuallyhave
rotorsofsteelandstatorsofacopper-ironmix
(withanumberofspecialingredients)canweld
together,preventingfurtherwheelrotation.This
canevenhappenbeforetheairplanecomestoa
fullstop,particularlyinthelastseveralknots
wheretheantiskidsystemisnoteffective.
2.3.5.3.9 High Brake Energy RTOs
Brakerotorandstatortemperaturesassociated
with RTOs which involve brake energies
at or near certifed maximum values, reach
approximately 2000 °F for steel brakes, and
2500 °F for most carbon brakes. These high
temperatures may, in some situations, ignite
certain items in the wheel, tire, and brake
assembly.Whileconsiderabledesigneffortis
SECTION 2
2.31
made to preclude fres whenever possible, the
regulationsrecognizetherarityofsuchhigh
energy situations and allow brake fres after a
maximumenergycondition,providedthatany
fres that may occur are confned to the wheels,
tiresandbrakes,anddonotresultinprogressive
engulfmentoftheremainingairplaneduring
thetimeofpassengerandcrewevacuation.Itis
important then, for fight crews to understand
the nature of possible fres and the airplane
takeoff parameters that could involve these
veryhighbrakeenergies.
There are two primary combustibles in the
assembly, namely the tire, and brake grease.
Brake hydraulic fuid will also burn if there
is a hydraulic leak directed at a very hot
brake disk. Tire fres can occur if the rubber
compoundtemperatureexceedsapproximately
650 °F. Tire fres usually burn fairly slowly
for the frst several minutes when started by
brake heat. Grease fres are even less active,
typically involving a small, unsteady, fickering
fame, sometimes with considerable smoke.
Theprobabilityofacrewexperiencingabrake
fre at the conclusion of an RTO is very low,
consideringbrakedesignfactors,thedispatch
parameters,andservicehistory.
In terms of practical guidelines for fight
crews,takeoffsatornearV
MBE
arenormally
encountered at high altitude airports or at
veryhottemperatures.AnRTOfromcloseto
V
1
speedundertheseconditionswillrequire
the brakes to absorb a signifcant amount of
energyduringthestop.Flightcrewscanusethe
BrakeCoolingChartoftheairplaneoperating
manual to determine brake energy values if
thesituationwarrantssuchareview.Incases
whereanextremelyhighbrakeenergymight
be encountered, the possibility of a brake fre
should therefore be considered by the fight
crew during the pre-takeoff briefng. If a high
speed RTO is subsequently performed, the
towershouldimmediatelybeadvisedthatthe
airplaneisstillontherunway,thatahighbrake
energy stop was made, and that emergency
equipmentisrequestedtoobservethetiresand
brakes for possible fres.
2.3.5.4 Reverse Thrust Effects
Mostofthetakeoffsplannedintheworlddonot
includereversethrustcredit.Thisisbecause
the rejected takeoff certifcation testing under
FAArulesdoesnotincludetheuseofreverse
thrust, except for the wet runway case for
airplanes certifed under FAR Amendment 25-
92.Anadditionalstoppingmarginisproduced
byusingmaximumreversethrust.Westress
theword“maximum”inrelationtotheuseof
reverse thrust because of another commonly
held misconception. Some pilots are of the
opinion that idle reverse is “equally or even
more”effectivethanfullormaximumreverse
thrust for today’s high bypass ratio engines.
Thisissimplynottrue.ThemoreEPRorN1
that is applied in reverse, the more stopping
force the reverse thrust generates. The data
Figure 20
Effect of engine
RPM and airspeed
on reverse thrust
of a typical high
bypass engine
O
1,OOO
2,OOO
8,OOO
4,OOO
5,OOO
O,OOO
7,OOO
8,OOO
9,OOO
2O 8O 4O 5O OO 7O
15O
Knots TA8
1OO
5O
O
8O 9O
het reverse
thrust for a
t]pical 2O,OOO lo
thrust engine,
lo per engine
Percent h
1
SECTION 2
2.32
showninFigure20istypicalforallhighbypass
engines.
Onwetorslipperyrunways,thewheelbrakes
arenotcapableofgeneratingashigharetarding
forceastheyareonadrysurface.Therefore,the
retardingforceofthereversersgeneratesalarger
percentageofthetotalairplanedeceleration.
2.3.5.5 Runway Parameters
Runway characteristics which affect takeoff
performance include length, slope, clearway
and/or stopway. The effect of runway length
is straightforward, however, slope, clearway,
andstopwaydeservesomediscussion.
A single value of runway slope is typically
chosen by the operator to perform takeoff
analysis calculations. This single value is
usuallytakenfrominformationpublishedby
the navigation chart services or the airport
authorities.Oncloserinspectionhowever,many
runwaysareseentohavedistinctdifferences
in slope along the length of the runway.
The single published value may have been
determinedbyavarietyofmethods,ranging
from a simple mathematical average of the
thresholdelevations,tosomeweightedaverage
methods proposed by ICA0 in an advisory
publication
5
.
As a simple example, consider a runway
which has only one slope discontinuity. The
frst two thirds of the runway has an uphill
slopeof+2%andthelastthirdhasadownhill
slope of −2%. The equivalent single slope for
this runway, as determined from the ICAO
Circular methods, could vary from +1.3% to
−0.3%. When the takeoff analysis is made
forthisrunway,thelimitweightswillbethe
same as would be determined for an actual
singlesloperunway.However,astheairplane
commencesatakeoffonthe2%upsloperunway,
itwillacceleratemoreslowlythanitwouldon
any of the equivalent single slope runways,
which will result in its achieving V
1
speed
further along the runway than was planned.
Ifnoeventoccurswhichwouldprecipitatean
RTO, the fnal acceleration to V
R
and liftoff
will be higher than planned and the overall
performancewillprobablycomeoutcloseto
whatwasscheduled.
Ontheotherhand,ifaneventworthyofanRTO
shouldoccurjustpriortotheairplanereaching
V
1
,most,ifnotallofthestopmaneuverwill
havetobecarriedoutona2%downhillslope
surfaceinsteadoftheequivalentsingleslope
value, and the RTO will have been initiated
withlessrunwayremainingthanwasassumed
indeterminingthelimitweightforthattakeoff.
Thereislittlethecrewcandointhistypeof
situation,otherthanintheveinofsituational
awareness, emphasize in their briefng that
an RTO near V
1
for anything other than a
catastrophiceventisnotadvisable.
A clearway is an area at least 500 ft wide
centered about the extended centerline of
therunwaywithaslopeequaltoorlessthan
1.25%.Thisareaiscalledtheclearwayplane.
No obstructions, except threshold lights,
can protrude above this clearway plane. The
accelerationtoV
2
and35feetiscompletedover
theclearway.Theuseofclearwaytoincrease
takeoffweight“unbalancestherunway”and
results in a lower V
1
speed. The maximum
clearwayusedtocalculatetakeoffperformance
isrestrictedbytheregulationstoonehalfthe
demonstrateddistancefromliftoffto35ft.
A stopway is an area at least as wide as the
runway and centered about the extended
centerline. It must be capable of supporting
the weight of the airplane without causing
damage.Useofstopwayalso“unbalancesthe
runway”resultinginahighertakeoffweight
andincreasedV
1
speed.AnRTOinitiatedatthis
V
1
willcometoastoponthestopway.Forthe
sakeofcompleteness,itshouldbepointedout
thatnotallstopwayswillqualifyasclearways,
nor will a clearway necessarily qualify as a
stopway. The specifed criteria for each must
bemetindependentlybeforeitcanbeusedfor
5
ICAOCircular91-AN/75,The Effect of Variable Runway Slopes on Take-Off Runway Lengths for Transport Aeroplanes,
dated1968.
SECTION 2
2.33
takeoffperformancecalculations.
Theuseofclearwayand/orstopwaydoesnot
necessarilyofferanyadditionalmarginforRTO
stopping.Inbothcases,thetakeoffperformance
is“unbalanced”byadjustingV
1
speedtoplan
thatthestopwillbecompletedbytheendof
thepavedsurface.
2.3.5.6 (Not Used)
2.3.5.7 Takeoffs Using Reduced Thrust
Therearetwomethodsofperformingareduced
thrust takeoff. The frst is to use a fxed derate of
theenginetoalowerthrustrating.Forexample,
aJT9D-7FengineoperatedataJT9D-7rating,
oraCFM56-3C-1engineoperatedat20,000lb
ofthrust(-B1rating)insteadofthefull23,500
lb rating. When a fxed derate is used, the engine
EGTandRPMlimitsarereducedandthecrew
arenottoexceedthereducedlimitsinnormal
operation.Asaresultofthelowerlimitthrust
with a fxed derate, the minimum control speeds
Vmcg and Vmca are also reduced. Since the
choiceofderatethrustlevelsisusuallyrestricted
tooneortwopreselectedvalues,itisrarethat
thetakeoffperformanceatthederatedthrust
would be reduced to feld length limit levels.
Thesecondwayofreducingtakeoffthrustis
tousetheAssumedTemperatureMethod.The
fundamental difference between fxed derates
andtheAssumedTemperatureMethodisthat
theoperatinglimitsoftheenginearenotreduced
when using Assumed Temperature Method
reduced thrust. The fight crew may increase
thethrusttothefullengineratingatanytime
duringthetakeoffifitisdeemedappropriate.
For instance, British CAA Flight Manuals
include a recommendation to increase thrust
ontheoperatingenginestothefullratingin
theeventthatanenginefailsduringthetakeoff.
Asaresult,theVmcgandVmcaspeedsarenot
reducedbelowthefullratingvalueswhenusing
theAssumedTemperatureMethod.
FixedderatesandtheAssumedTemperature
Methodalsodifferintermsoftheperformance
marginsthatareinherenttotheiruse.Aswas
previouslymentioned,atlimitweights,atakeoff
performed using a fxed derate takeoff thrust
will conform to the minimum performance
levelsoftheregulations,justasalimitweight
takeoff would when using full rated takeoff
thrust. TheassociatedV
1
speedprovides the
standard certifcation “margins” of a 35 foot
screenheightorastopattheendoftherunway
intheeventofanenginefailure.
WhenusingtheAssumedTemperatureMethod,
additional “margins” are created in both the
“Go”and“Stop”cases.Asthenameimplies,
thetechniqueusedtocalculatetheperformance
withtheAssumedTemperatureMethodisto
assumethatthetemperatureishigherthanit
actuallyis,andtocalculatetakeoffthrustand
speedsatthehighertemperature.
TheprimaryreasonthattheuseoftheAssumed
Temperature Method results in performance
margins is that the true airspeed of the
airplaneislowerthanwouldbethecaseifthe
actualtemperaturewereequaltotheassumed
temperature.
2.3.5.8 The Takeoff Data the Pilot Sees
The typical takeoff data table (sometimes
referredtoasrunwayanalysisorgrossweight
tables) shows the limit takeoff weight for
a specifc runway over a range of ambient
temperatures.Theremayalsobecorrectionsfor
wind, pressure altitude, bleed confgurations,
and runway surface conditions. Each table
usually shows thelimit weights foronlyone
fap setting. Some airlines show the takeoff
speedsandthetakeoffthrustEPRorN
1
setting
alongwiththelimitweights.Thetablescan
displaylimitweightsforFieldLength,Climb,
Obstacle Clearance, Tire Speed and Brake
Energy,andtellwhichfactorislimitingforeach
windandtemperature.Thistabulardisplayof
thetakeoffdatahasbecomethestandardtool
SECTION 2
2.34
forusingtheassumedtemperaturemethodto
reducethetakeoffpowersettingandthereby
improveenginelife.
Thistakeoffdataissomeofthemostimportant
data used on any fight. It is essential that
fight crews know their actual takeoff weight
and that they use the proper takeoff speeds.
It is equally important that the fight crew be
awareoftheirproximitytothelimitweights
for that takeoff’s ambient conditions. These
limit weights and speeds are more than just
numbers. They represent the maximum certifed
takeoffperformanceoftheairplane.Iftheactual
takeoffweightisequaltoorneartherunway
limit weight, the crew should note that fact
andbeextraalertthatarejectfromnearorat
V
1
willrequirepromptapplicationofthefull
stopping capability of the airplane to assure
stoppingontherunway.
If the actual airplane weight is less than the
limitweight,thecrewshouldtreatthenormally
obtained V
1
speed as a “limit speed” unless
theiroperationsdepartmenthasprovidedthem
with a specifc method of unbalancing the V
1

speed to utilize the excess runway available.
The operator should assure that a suitable,
non-ambiguous method of presenting the V
1

speed is chosen, whether it is a balanced or
unbalancedspeed.
2.3.6 Increasing the RTO Safety Margins
Thereareanumberofchoicesandtechniques
thecrewcanmakeandpracticethatwillincrease
the RTO margins for takeoff. Some involve
airline policy and require the publication of
additional data (such as multiple fap setting
takeoffweightandspeeddata)andsomeare
justgoodpersonaltechnique.
2.3.6.1 Runway Surface Condition
The crew cannot control the weather like
they can the airplane’s configuration or
thrust. Therefore, to maximize both the
“Go”and“Stop”margins,theymustrelyon
judiciously applying their company’s wet or
contaminatedrunwaypoliciesaswellastheir
ownunderstandingofhowtheperformanceof
theirairplanemaybeaffectedbyaparticular
runwaysurfacecondition.
2.3.6.2 Flap Selection
OftentheRTOsafetymargincanbeincreased
by selection of an alternative takeoff fap setting.
Consider for example, the effect of takeoff fap
selectionontheperformancelimitweightsof
atypicallargetwoengineairplane,asshown
inFigure21.
8,700 ft runway
Sea Level
37° C
Flap setting
1 5 15 20
Runway limit weight,
lb (kg)
358,300
(162,494)
374,200
(169,705)
389,000
(176,417)
393,600
(178,503)
Climb/Obstacle limit
weight, lb (kg)
414,100
(187,800)
407,300
(184,717)
393,600
(178,503)
383,000
(173,696)
Figure 21
Typical large
two-engine jet
transport takeoff
performance
SECTION 2
2.35
If a fight requires the absolute maximum
takeoffweight,theaboveweightlimitswould
dictatechoosingFlaps15since389,000lbis
thehighestweightallowed.Flaps20isClimb/
ObstaclelimitedtoalowerweightandFlaps
1and5areRunwaylimitedtolowerweights.
If the actual takeoff weight desired is equal
to the maximum limit weight, there is no fap
selectionoption.Thetakeoffwillneedtouse
Flaps15.
Moretypically,however,theairplane’sactual
takeoff weight is well below the maximum.
There are then two viable ways to improve
RTO stopping distance margin: either by fap
selectionorbyreducedV
1
techniques.
If the fight’s actual takeoff weight was 374,200
pounds,investigatingtheabovetableindicates
Flaps5,Flaps15,orFlaps20areallacceptable.
Flaps 5 is runway limited so it offers no
additionalRTOmargin.However,Flaps15and
Flaps20bothofferanopportunityforadditional
stopping distance margin. These additional
stoppingmarginshavebeencalculatedforthis
exampleandareshowninFigure22.
Thus,iftherearenootherconstraintssuchas
obstaclesorcriticalnoiseabatementprocedures
that would prevent the selection of a greater fap
setting,thecrewcouldgivethemselves1000
feetofextrastoppingdistanceincaseanRTO
wasrequiredonthistakeoff.
Rememberthattherearesomedisadvantages
to selecting a higher flap setting. These
disadvantages include diminished climb
performanceandslightlymorefuelconsumed
due to the higher drag confguration and the
additional fap retraction cleanup time that will
berequired.
2.3.6.3 Runway Lineup
Positioning the aircraft on the runway in
preparationfortakeoffisanimportantelement
inmaximizingtheamountofpavementavailable
forapossibleRTOmaneuver.Correctiontothe
available runway length can be made to the
takeoff analysis on those runways where it
is not possible to position the airplane at the
beginningofthepublisheddistance.
Correctrunwaylineuptechniqueshouldalways
bepracticedregardlessofwhetherornotthere
isexcessrunwayavailable.Evenifanallowance
hasbeenmade,itisuptothecrewoperating
the fight to align the airplane on the runway
using the shortest possible distance. If they
candoitinashorterdistancethantakeninto
account by their company, then there is that
muchextramarginforthetakeoff.
2.3.6.4 Setting Takeoff Thrust
At takeoff thrust settings, gas turbine (jet)
enginesoperateatveryhighRPM.Ittypically
takesseveralsecondsfortheenginestospoolup
fromalowidleortaxithrusttotakeoffpower
after the thrust levers are advanced. During
this time, the aircraft is not accelerating at
fullpotentialbecausetheenginesarenotyet
developingfullpower.
Thedemonstratedtakeoffdistanceisachieved
whenthetakeoffthrustissetpriortoreleasing
the brakes, but this technique is often not
practical in line operations due to expedited
Flap setting 5 15 20
Stopping margin Zero 850 ft 1,000 ft
Figure 22
Effect of fap
selection on RTO
stopping margins
SECTION 2
2.36
takeoffclearances,engineFODhazards,and
passengercomfort.Asaresult,mosttakeoffsare
performedas“rollingtakeoffs”,withthethrust
beingsetastheairplanebeginsthetakeoffroll.
However,thistechniquemustbeaccomplished
promptly to avoid compromising the takeoff
performance.Adelayedapplicationoftakeoff
thrust will increase the time and distance to
reachV
1
speed.Consequently,lessrunwaywill
belefttostoptheairplaneshouldanRTObe
necessary.Thethrustshouldbesetpromptly,
according to the airframe manufacturer’s
recommendations. The non-fying pilot or
fight engineer then typically makes any fnal
adjustmentsandmonitorstheenginesforany
abnormalities.
Onairplanesequippedwithautothrottles,an
additional item to be aware of is that some
autothrottle systems incorporate “Thrust
Hold” features which will stop advancing
the thrust levers after the airplane reaches a
predetermined threshold airspeed value. A
delayinengagingtheautothrottlecanresultin
thethruststabilizingbelowthetakeofftarget
settingandtheinitialaccelerationbeingless
thanrequired.
Theengineinstrumentsshouldbemonitored
closely for any abnormal indications. Past
RTOaccidentshaveoccurredafteranengine
problem was identifed early in the takeoff roll,
but no action wasinitiated untilthe airplane
hadreachedorexceededV
1
.
Company operations manuals or training
manualscontaincorrectproceduresforsetting
takeoff thrust. Observing these procedures
assures effcient engine acceleration and, as
a consequence, proper aircraft acceleration
throughouttheentiretakeoffroll.
2.3.6.5 Manual Braking Techniques
Modulationofbrakepressureor“pumpingthe
brakes”wasthewaymostpeopleweretaught
to apply automobile brakes when braking
conditions were less than favorable. This
preventedsustainedskidsandthereforeafforded
both better braking and directional control.
Both benefts occur because a skidding tire
produceslessfrictionalforcethanatirewhich
continuestorotate.Flightdeckobservationand
simulatortesting,however,bothindicatethat
thistechniquehasattimesbeencarriedoverinto
thecockpitofjettransports.Withtheantiskid
controlsystemsinjettransportairplanesthis
technique is not only unnecessary, it results
indegradedstoppingcapabilityandtherefore
excessive stopping distance especially for
adverse runway conditions. Proper braking
technique in an RTO is to apply full brake
pedal force (“stand on it”) and maintain full
brake pedal force until the airplane comes
to a complete stop.
Thepilot’sfootpositionrelativetotherudder
pedalcanalsohaveaneffectontheachievement
of full brake pressure. It was noted during a
studyconductedbytheTrainingAidWorking
Group
6
thatfootpositionduringthetakeoffroll
tendstobeanindividualpreference.Somepilots
prefertohavetheirfeet“uponthepedals”to
bereadytoapplyfullbrakesifrequired.Pilots
whopreferthistechniquealsonotedthattheir
toesare“curledback”toavoidunwantedbrake
applicationswhenapplyingrudder.Theother
technique is to rest the heels on the foor during
thetakeoffroll,andthenraisethemtobeon
thepedaltoapplyfullbraking.Noproblems
werenotedwitheithertechnique.
One technique which did not work well was
alsonoted.Itisnotpossibletoapplymaximum
brake pedal defection, and hence full brake
pressure, if the heel of the foot is left on the
foor, unless the pilot has very big feet. In an
RTOstopmaneuver,thefeetshouldbeupon
therudderpedalsandsteady,heavypressure
applieduntiltheairplaneiscompletelystopped.
Pilotsshoulddevelopahabitofadjustingtheir
seatandtherudderpedalspriortoleavingthe
gate.Theabilitytoapplymaximumbrakepedal
forceaswellasfullruddershouldbechecked
bybothpilots.
6
TheTrainingAidWorkingGroupistheindustryandregulatoryteamthatdevelopedtheTakeoff Safety Training Aid.
SECTION 2
2.37
The importance of maintaining maximum
brakingandfullreversethrustduringanRTO
untiltheairplane“rockstoastop”cannotbe
over-stressed. During a reject from V
1
, the
goal is safety, not passenger comfort. The
amountofdistancerequiredtodeceleratefrom
a given speed at the high weights associated
with takeoff is signifcantly greater than from
thesamespeedatatypicallandingweight.If
thepilottriestojudgetheamountofrunway
remaining against the current speed of the
airplane,thevisualperceptionthattheairplane
willstopontherunway(“we’vegotitmade”),
willpromptadecreaseinthestoppingeffort.
ItispreciselyatthispointintheRTOthatthe
difference between a successful Go/No Go
decisionandanaccidentcanoccur.Thebrakes
maybenearingtheirenergyabsorptionlimits
andtheairplanemaybeenteringaportionof
therunwaycontaminatedwithrubberdeposits,
which can be very slick if wet. In several of
the RTO accidents and incidents of the past,
therewasexcessrunwayavailabletocomplete
the stop, but the premature relaxation of the
stoppingeffortcontributedtoanoverrun.
An additional consideration in completing a
successfulRTOisthatthecrewshouldassessthe
conditionoftheairplaneafteritcomestoastop.
If there is evidence of a fre or other signifcant
hazardtothepassengers,anevacuationonthe
runway is defnitely preferable to “clearing
theactive.”Everysecondcountsinanactual
emergency evacuation. In at least one RTO
accident,manyofthefatalitieswerecausedby
delayingtheevacuationuntiltheaircraftwas
clearoftherunway.
2.3.6.6 Antiskid Inoperative Braking
Techniques
Antiskid inoperative dispatches represent a
specialcaseforbrakeapplicationtechniques.
In this situation the pilot executing the RTO
shouldapplysteadymoderatepedalpressure
consistent, in his judgement, with runway
conditions, airplane dispatch weight and the
available runway length. Full brake pressure
shouldnotbeappliedwiththeantiskidsystem
inoperative due to the risk of tire failure. To
minimize the possibility of skidding a tire,
whichcanleadtoablowout,thespeedbrakes
shouldbedeployedbeforebrakesareapplied.
Thisprovidesthehighestpossiblewheelloads
tokeepthewheelsrotatingwiththeforward
motionoftheairplane.
2.3.6.7 RTO Autobrakes
Autobrakesystemfunctionsandcrewactionsto
initiatethesefunctionsvaryfromoneairplane
modeltoanother.Forexample,somesystems
includeautomaticspoilerextension,othersdo
not.Therefore,traininginuseofthesystemmust
betailoredtotheparticularsysteminstalled.
Thefollowingdiscussionillustratesthegeneral
intentofautobrakesystems.
Brakeapplicationisanimmediatepilotaction
wheninitiatinganRTO,andthisapplication
should be of maximum effort. An automatic
brake application system called “RTO
AUTOBRAKES”isbeinginstalledonmoreand
moreairplanestodaytoinsurethatthiscritical
stepisperformedasrapidlyaspossiblewhen
anRTOisinitiated.Thissystemisdesignedto
automaticallyapplymaximumbrakepressure
ifduringthetakeoffroll,allthethrustlevers
areretardedtoidle,andtheaircraftspeedis
above a specifed value (usually 85-90 knots).
RTOAutobrakestherefore,achievethesame
airplane stopping performance as a proper,
manualapplicationoffullfootpedalbraking.
NotimedelaysarebuiltintotheRTOautobrakes
such as are used in some landing autobrake
settings.
Theuseof“RTOAUTOBRAKES”eliminates
any delay in brake application and assures
that maximum effort braking is applied
promptly. Possible application delays arising
from distractions due to directional control
requirementsincrosswinds,orapplicationof
lessthanmaximumbrakeforce,arecompletely
SECTION 2
2.38
eliminated. The results of a simulator study
conducted by the Training Aid Working
Group also suggest that, on the average,
thoseRTOsperformedwithRTOautobrakes
ARMED resulted in more runway distance
remaining after the stop than did the RTOs
performed using manual braking only. This
result is more signifcant because few pilots
left the autobrakes engaged for more than
a few seconds before overriding them and
applyingfullmanualbraking.Thedifference
in stopping performance is attributed to the
frst few seconds of high deceleration with the
autobrakesatfullpressure.
When the RTO autobrakes are ARMED for
takeoff, the pilot not fying must monitor the
system and advise the pilot fying if a DISARM
condition occurs. The pilot fying should also
monitor the deceleration of the airplane for
acceptabilityandbepreparedtoapplymanual
braking if required or, the pilot performing
the reject procedure should apply maximum
manualbrakingduringtheRTO.Inthislatter
casearmingtheRTOautobrakefunctiononly
servesasabackupifforsomereasonmanual
brakingisnotapplied.
Thebrakepedalforcesrequiredtodisarmthe
autobrakes may vary signifcantly between
the landing autobrake settings and the RTO
autobrakesettingofanygivenairplane,between
one airplane model and another of the same
manufacturer,aswellasbetweenthevarious
manufacturers’airplanes.Itisnotsurprising
that this point is not fully understood in the
pilotcommunity.Itisimportantthatpilotsbe
madeawareofhowthedetailsofanyparticular
airplane’sautobrakesystemmightaffectRTO
performanceandthattheyobtainthenecessary
informationfromtheirtrainingdepartment.
2.3.6.8 (Not Used)
2.3.6.9 The V
1
Call
OneimportantfactorinavoidingRTOoverrun
accidentsisforthecrewtorecognizereaching
V
1
whentheairplanedoes,infact,reachV
1
—not
after. The airplane’s stopping performance
cannot match that specifed in the Airplane
FlightManualiftheassumptionsusedtoderive
that performance are violated, knowingly or
inadvertently.Operationally,carefulattention
to procedures and teamwork are required to
matchthehumanperformancerecognizedby
theAFM.
Basic operating procedures call for the pilot
fying the airplane to include airspeed in his
instrumentscanduringthetakeoffgroundroll.
Henceheisalwaysawareoftheapproximate
speed. The pilot not fying monitors airspeed
in more detail and calls out “Vee One” as a
confrmation of reaching this critical point in
theacceleration.
The pilot fying cannot react properly to V
1

unlesstheV
1
callismadeinatimely,crisp,and
audiblemanner.Onemethodofaccomplishing
thisbyamajorU.S.carrieristheiradoptionofa
policyof“completingtheV
1
calloutbythetime
theairplanereachesV
1
.”Thisisanexcellent
exampleofthewayairlinesareimplementing
procedurestoimproveRTOsafety.Itisagood
procedure and it should preclude a situation
where the “No Go”decisionisinadvertently
madeafterV
1
.However,thesuccessofsuch
a policy in reducing RTOs after V
1
, without
unduly compromising the continued takeoff
safety margins, hinges on the line pilot’s
understanding of the specifc airplane model’s
performancelimitationsandcapabilities.
AnotherproposalforcallingV
1
istouseacall
suchas“ApproachingV
1
”withtheV
1
portion
occurringastheairspeedreachesV1.Eitherof
theseproposalsaccomplishthetaskofadvising
the fying pilot that the airplane is close to the
speedwhereanRTOforallbutthemostserious
failuresisnotrecommended.
SECTION 2
2.39
AfrequentlycitedfactorinRTOaccidentsthat
occurred when the First Offcer was fying is the
lackofanyairspeedcallsbytheCaptainduring
thetakeoff.Thistypeofpoorcrewcoordination
may be overcome by the use of automated
“V
1
” and “Engine Failure” calls which will
eliminatemuchofthevariabilityexperienced
intoday’soperations.Evenwithanautomated
call system however, an “Approaching” call
by the non-fying pilot would still seem to be
an appropriate method of ensuring airspeed
situationalawarenessforbothpilots.
2.3.6.10 Crew Preparedness
Important crew factors directly related to
eliminating RTO overrun accidents and
incidentsare:
- Briefthosephysicalconditionswhich
mightaffectanRTOthatareuniqueto
each specifc takeoff.
- Bothpilotsmustbesuretopositionthe
seatandrudderpedalssothatmaximum
brakepressurecanbeapplied.
- Bothpilotsshouldmaintainsituational
awarenessoftheproximitytoV
1
.
- Usestandardcalloutsduringthetakeoff.
- Transitionquicklytostopping
confguration.
- Don’tchangeyourmind.Ifyouhave
begunanRTO,stop.Ifyouhavereached
V
1,
go,unlessthepilothasreasonto
concludethattheairplaneisunsafeor
unable to fy.
- Usemaximumeffortbrakeapplication.
- Assuredeploymentofspeedbrakes.
- Usemaximumreversethrustallowable.
Theaccidentrecordsfrequentlyshowthatslow
or incomplete crew action was the cause of,
orcontributedto,anRTOoverrunevent.The
crewmustbepreparedtomaketheGo/NoGo
decisiononeverytakeoff.Ifa“NoGo”decision
ismade,thecrewmustquicklyuseallofthe
stopping capability available. Too often, the
recordsshowuncertaintyinthedecisionprocess
andalackofcompletenessintheprocedures.
Bereadytodecideandbereadytoact.
2.4 Crew Resource Management
CrewResourceManagement(CRM)isaterm
thatcanmeanmanythings.Inthiscontextit
is simply intended to encompass the factors
associatedwithhavingthecrewmemberswork
effectively together to make optimal Go/No
Godecisionsandeffectivelyaccomplishrelated
procedures.Itisrecognizedthatthecontentof
aCRMdiscussiononGo/NoGodecisionsmust
refect the needs and culture of each individual
operator.Therefore,thematerialcontainedin
thissectionisprovidedonlyasanexampleof
thetypeofCRMinformationwhichcouldbe
providedtothelinepilot.
2.4.1 CRM and the RTO
EffectiveCRMcanimprovecrewperformance
and in particular, decision making during
takeoff.Often,Go/NoGodecisionsmustbe
made “instantaneously” and as a result, the
signifcance of CRM is not readily apparent.
However,thefactthatacriticaldecisionmustbe
madeandimplementedusingrapidlychanging,
often incomplete information in a dynamic
environment in which the time available
decreases as the criticality of the decision
increases,isreasonforeffectiveCRM.Some
aspectsofCRMareespeciallyimportantwith
respecttotheGo/NoGodecision.
2.4.2 The Takeoff Briefng
Crew members must know what is expected
of them and from others. For optimum crew
effectiveness, they should share a common
perception—a mental image —of what is
happeningandwhatisplanned.Thiscommon
perceptioninvolvesanumberofCRMareas:
SECTION 2
2.40
communications, situational awareness,
workload distribution, cross-checking, and
monitoring.
A variety of means are used to achieve this
commonperception.Thisbeginswithairline
standardoperatingpolicies(SOPs)thatclearly
defne captain and frst offcer as well as pilot
fying and pilot not fying responsibilities and
duties.Trainingreinforcesthecrew’sknowledge
and skill, while standardization insures
acceptable,consistentperformance,acrossall
feets and cultures within an airline.
A takeoff briefing is another means of
improvingthecrew’sawareness,knowledge,
and team effectiveness, especially when
special circumstances or conditions exist.
The briefng is not necessarily a one-way
process. In fact, asking for clarifcation or
confrmation is an excellent way to insure
mutualunderstandingwhenrequired.Asimple,
“standard procedures” takeoff briefng might
be improved by adding “I’m not perfect, so
back me up on the speedbrakes and my use
oftheRTOautobrakes”or,“ifwe’renotsure
of an engine failure 5 knots before V
1
, we’ll
continuethetakeoffandI’llstate‘CONTINUE
TAKEOFF”’. These briefngs can improve team
effectivenessandunderstandingoftheGo/No
Godecisionplanningandcommunicationsto
be used. Such additions might be especially
appropriate on the frst segment of a fight with
a relatively new frst offcer or a crew’s frst
fight of the month.
Areviewofactionsforablowntire,highspeed
confguration warning, or transfer of control
are examples of what might be appropriate
for before takeoff (or before engine start)
review. Such a briefng should address items
thatcouldaffectthistakeoff,suchasrunway
contamination, hazardous terrain or special
departure procedures. The briefng should not
beameaninglessrepetitionofknownfacts,but
ratheratoolforimprovingteamperformance,
that addresses the specifc factors appropriate
tothattakeoff.
2.4.3 Callouts
Meaningful communication, however brief,
regarding a non-normal situation during
takeoffandRTOcanoftenmeanthedifference
betweensuccessanddisaster.Forthisreason,
communications must be precise, effective,
and effcient. Standard callouts contribute to
improvedsituationalawareness.Thesecallouts,
coupled with all crewmembers being aware
of airspeed, maximize the opportunity for a
common understanding of what actions are
properintheeventofanon-normalsituation.
The crewmember noting a problem should
communicate clearly and precisely without
inferring things that may not be true. For
example, the loss of fuel fow indication alone
doesnotnecessarilymeananenginefailure.
Use of standard terms and phraseology to
describe the situation is essential. The pilot
taskedtomaketheRTOdecisionshouldclearly
announcethisdecision,whetheritbetocontinue
orreject.
2.4.4 The Use of All Crew Members
It’s important to understand that all crew
members on the fight deck play an important
role in the Go/No Go decision and RTO
maneuver. Company policies shape these
roles.However,howtheteamisorganizedfor
each takeoff can make a difference in team
performance.Knowingyourowncapabilities
andthatoftheothercrewmembersispartof
situational awareness and should be used in
planningforagiventakeoff.Althoughit’s“the
frst offcer’s leg”, it might not be an effective
plan to task an inexperienced frst offcer with
amarginalweathertakeoffwhenweightisalso
limited by feld length. Consider the possibility
ofanRTOwhenassigningtakeoffduties.
SECTION 2
2.41
2.4.5 Summary
Each airline approaches CRM in a slightly
different manner, but the goal of effective
teamworkremainsthesame.Thismaterialisan
exampleofthetypeofCRMinformationthat
couldbeusedtopromoteacommonperception
ofRTOproblemsandactions.
SECTION 2
2.42