BAUTISTA VS.

JUNIO GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law n of Equal Protection Clause)

Police Power, LOI, No Violatio

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (hea vy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for bein g allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respo ndents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, i s likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegat ion of legislative power. Respondents denied the above allegations. ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Cir cular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a proble m that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protectio n clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity. Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Tran sportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle. Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982] Facts: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation compos ed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon ac cessible to vehicular traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cab igao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular 7742 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi uni ts within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursu ant to the above BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BL T) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Region al Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, t o implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles t o be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case 80-7553), se eking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registrati on and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, p etitioners filed before the BOT a Manifestation and Urgent Motion , praying for an

early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 N ovember 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case be resolved or de cided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avai l of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their int erests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. Petitioner s, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but wa s later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 Decemb er 1981, the present Petition was instituted. The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the petition; withou t costs. 1. Rationale behind exercise of police power The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of i ts police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all thing s hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate proper ty rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Mirasol v. DPWH, 490 SCRA 318 (2006) Facts: Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of certain administrative i ssuances of the DPWH for being inconsistent with RA 2000, entitled Limited Access Highway Act. Among others, is AO1 which requires motorcycles shall have an engin e displacement of at least 400cc. Issue: Whether or not said administrative issuances are unconstitutional Held: Petition partly granted. It is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities. We find that AO1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines s everal precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities. The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject cise of the police power of the state. The police power and is the most essential, insistent and illimitable e tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use e standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness. to is of of regulation as an exer far-reaching in scope all government powers. Th police power. The sol

ANGLO-FIL TRADING CORPORATION VS. LAZARO, digested GR # L-54958 September 2, 1983 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Stevedoring) FACTS: Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) implemented a policy of integ rating contractors engaged in stevedoring services and have only one stevedoring contractor to engage in cargo-handling services in Manila South Harbor to insur e efficiency and economy in cargo-handling operation and provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of labor and the government as w ell. The evaluation of performance of existing contractors made by a special com mittee created by PPA resulted to an award in favor of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI). Petitioners with hold-over permits, contends that the award is invalid because c ontracts entered into with local and foreign clients or customers would be impai red.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA have the power and authority to award an exclusive ste vedoring contract in favor of respondent OTSI. HELD: Yes. Manila South Harbor is a public property owned by the State, wherein operations of the port including stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and interest of the general welfare. In addition , the contract clause cannot override the police power enacting public regulatio ns intended for the general welfare. Petition Denied. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING AND ARRASTRE INC., digested GR # 145742 July 14, 2010 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Stevedoring) FACTS: PPA AO No. 03-90 is an administrative order decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the ports around the country, which is within the province and discretion of the petitioner. Respondent with hold-over permits for the cont inuance of its stevedoring business, contends that the administrative order abov e violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract. ISSUE: Whether or not PPA AO No. 03-90 violated the non-impairment clause. HELD: Petition Granted. Stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the state s police power. In the legitimate exercise of the police pow er, all contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs and interest of t he general public as may be determined by the State. Note: Contract Clause cannot override Police Power doctrine. Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004A mere license is always revocable FACTS:This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residenc e in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as avio lation of his right to property. ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right HELD:Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a p roperty nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authoritygranting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a ve sted right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive actio n. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by thedue proces s clause of the Constitution. xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance o f PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rulesand Regulation s of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under suchconditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the Ame rican doctrine, it is indeedlogical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a p roperty right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, m ay be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but onlya personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereaft er be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subjectto such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of t his license is that it might be revoked by the selectmenat their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defenda nt of any property, immunity, or privilege withinthe meaning of these words in t he Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co , held: The correlative power torevoke or recall a permission is a necessary cons equence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.