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JUDICIARY CONSTI LAW 1 CASE DIGEST Atty.

. Lozano, et al vs Nograles, et al, Facts The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations. Issue Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109. Held No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury. The petitions were dismissed.

Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority Facts

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

Issue Whether or not the transfer is valid.

Held/Ruling No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered bycertificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas ofManila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits thealienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. Dante Liban vs Gordon FACTS Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility,

Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution: Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Respondent contested that the petitioners citation of a constitutional provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service to which is neither an office nor an employment. Issue Whether or not Gordon forfeited his Senate seat by accepting the PNRC Chair. Held/Ruling No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI, Section 13 could not apply to Gordons case, in accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit.

Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Facts In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In

March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

Held/Ruling The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president. Daza vs. Singson Facts The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original . Daza was chosen to be part of the

Commission of Appointments and was listed as representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganized and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Because of this, the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance to proportional representation.

ISSUE Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

De la Llana vs. Alba Facts

In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Issue Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). Held The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be

distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore

from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

Demetria vs. Alba G.R. NO. 71977, Feb. 27, 1987 Facts Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

Issue Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

Held/Ruling Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not

the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here. Dumlao vs. COMELEC Facts Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. ISSUE Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.NO. 148560 Nov. 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge.

Ruling On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.NO. 148560 Nov. 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law

that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. Gonzales vs. Narvasa Facts Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of thepositions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

Issue Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

Held In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by thePresident by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the

Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power totransfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.

Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council Facts The Hacienda Luisita is a 6,443 hectare parcel of land originally owned bythe Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the Spanish owners of Tabacalera decided to sell this land and its sugar mill, CentralAzucarera de Tarlac. Jose Cojuangco, Sr. took interest and requestedassistance from the Philippine government in raising the necessary fundsthrough: (a) the Central Bank, to obtain a dollar loan from the ManufacturersTrust Company (MTC) in New York for the purchase of the sugar mill; and (b) the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), to obtain a peso loan for the purchase of the Hacienda. The Central Bank used a portion of the countrysdollar reserves as security for Cojuangcos loan with the MTC on the condition that Cojuangco would acquire Hacienda Luisita for distribution to farmers within10 years from its acquisition. Issue Whether the PARC has jurisdiction to recall or revoke the HLIs SDP that it earlier approved. Held/Ruling The PARC has the power and authority to approve the SDP under Section31 of the CARL includes, by implication, the power to revoke this approval. The PARC was created via Executive Order (EO) No. 229.The PARCs authority to approve the SDP is expressed in Section 10 of EO No. 229The CARL preserved the PARCs authority to approve the SDP in its Section 31.As the PARC has the power and authority to approve the SDP, it also has, by implication, the power to revoke the approval of the plan unless this implied power is expressly, or by a contrary implication, withheld from it by law. The petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc.s petition is denied and AFFIRM public respondent PARCs Resolution No. 2005-32-01 revoking the SDP, as wellas its Resolution No. 2006-34-01 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.The decision to subject the land to compulsory agrarian reform coverage should be AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that while the acquired lands were included by the public respondent Department of Agrarian Reform in its Notice of Compulsory Coverage, the purchase by the petitioners-intervenors, aswell as the portion of land acquired for the SCTEX complex, should berecognized as valid and effective. No conclusion with respect to the

transfer of 200 hectares to Luisita Realty, Inc., but it recognize that the validity of thetransfer can still be proven, if Luisita Realty, Inc. so desires, before the DAR. Otherwise, the 200 hectares should be subject to compulsory CARP coverage. SUPREME COURT EN BANC RULING The instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of HLIs SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.Of the 6,296 FWBs, he or she who wishes to continue as an HLIstockholder is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. DAR and LBP are ordered to determine thecompensation due to HLI.DAR shall submit a compliance report after six (6) months from finality of this judgment. It shall also submit, after submission of the compliance report, quarterly reports on the execution of this judgment to be submitted within the first15 days at the end of each quarter, until fully implemented. Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) vs. Zamora Facts Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed apetition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marinesnull and void and unconstitutional. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review 2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP Held When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarilyexercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writof habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents

action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, theframers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powershighlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The presentpetition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of theMarines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of theMarines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be noappointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. Joya vs PCGG Facts Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th Century Silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank. Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instantpetition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and Antique Silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" and which must be protected by the state; (c) whether such properties are of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress; (d) whether the PCGG

has the jurisdiction; (e) whether the PCGG has complied wit the due process clause; (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic. Issues 1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition. 2. Whether the instant petition involves actual case or controversy. Held/Ruling 1. No,this is premised on Section 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real partyin-interest. "Legal Standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest. It must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. 2. No, there is no actual case or controversy involved nor is there an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial interpretation.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition.

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona Facts This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto. Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42. Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the

executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

Issues 1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition. 2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

Held/Ruling As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities. As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid. Kilosbayan vs. Morato FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding ofcontracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional lawbecause some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Laurel vs. Garcia Facts These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, and is part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first Whereas clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at $225 million. Issues 1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and 2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and

jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property? Held/Ruling The petition is granted. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective

needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the governments own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property . A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi propertys original purpose. Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an authority to sell, does not have a provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. Rep Act No. 6657, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Moreover, President Aquinos approval of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitioner Ojeda. Manila Electric Co. Vs Pasay Transportation Co. Facts The Manila Electric company filed a petition before the court requesting the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO. MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act No. 1446, section 11 which states: Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or

corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the SC sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a mahority of whom shall be final. For every franchise granted, terms as to the usage and compensation to be paid to the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority vote is required and this is final. Copies were sent to the affected transportation company once of which is the Pasay Transportation and to Atty. Gen which disclaimed any interest. Frameworks of the statute: SC sitting as board of arbitrators and as an entity; Decision is final; Franchise granted to Meralco although only a contract bet parties to it is now affecting rights of persons not signatories to it. The parties to an arbitration may not oust the courts of jurisdication of the matters submitted to an arbitration. It has been held that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case. HELD: Meralco is banking on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg Co vs Commissioners Court where it was held that a state legislature authorizing the commissioners court of a certain country to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the question is not one whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. Dilemma of the court: 1. SC sitting as a board of arbitrator exercising judicial functions

Case I would not fall within the jurisdiction granted the SC = if it does, it would mean that the courts would be ousted of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. If the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the SC, sitting as board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the SC, where the SC would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. 2. Members of the SC sitting as arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi judicial functions. Case 2 would mean that the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the members of theSC could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.

It is judicial power only which is exercised by the SC. Just as the SC as the guardian on constitutional rights should not sanction usurpation by any other departments of the government. Its power should be confined strictly within the granted by the Organic Act.

Exercise of jurisdiction by the SC cannot mean exercise of jurisdiction by the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators. North Cotabato vs Republic Facts: A long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) took place before the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) come into existence. The GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities and the General Framework of Agreement of Intent in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The parties in said MOA-AD are the GRP and the MILF. Its Terms of Reference (TOR) includes not only earlier agreements between the GRP and the MILF, but also agreements between the GRP and the MNLF. It also identifies as TOR two local statutes the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). Furthermore, it includes as a final TOR the generic category of compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ulmuahada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device. Moreover, the MOA-AD binds the parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact, which embodies the details for the effective enforcement and the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of the MOA-AD. The relationship between the Central Government and BJE is described as associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility, under the MOA-AD. The BJE under the MOA-AD is also granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions. However, several petitions have been filed by different interested parties praying that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the GRP from signing the same. Issue: 1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialled the MOA-AD? 2. Held: Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

1.

YES. Respondents violate the constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initalled the MOA-AD. Access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy; the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern for it involves the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community 2. YES. The contents of the MOA-AD are unconstitutional.

The MOA-AD explicitly alludes the concept of association, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution for no province, city or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

Therefore the MOA-AD is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. Pimentel vs Ermita Facts While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in acting capacities only. Pimentel together w/ 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. During pendency, Congress adjourned and GMA re-issued ad interim appointments reappointing those previously appointed in acting capacity. Pimentel argues that GMA should not have appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary. Pimentel further asserts that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the CoA, without first having obtained its consent; GMA cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does not give the President such power.

Issue Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

Held Ermita, in behalf of the other respondents, argued that GMA is allowed under Sec. 16, Art 7 of the Constitution to make such appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution, the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Ermita also pointed out EO 292 which allows such an appointment with the exception that such temporary designation shall not exceed one year. Sec 17, Chap 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Also, Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An

alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

Bernas says that ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim

appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim

appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The SC finds no abuse in what GMA did. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from GMAs issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

PACU vs. Sec. of Education Facts The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A.) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard . . . Also, the textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable. Issue Whether or not the petitioners have presented actual case that affected them and their operation.

Held/Ruling Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail neither the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. No justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

Salazar vs. Achacoso Facts Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegramdirecting him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegalrecruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. Issue Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code Held/Ruling Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination

under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search andseizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

Tan vs. Macapagal Facts Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals whichseek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form nowoutlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein."

Issues 1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi 2. WON the court has jurisdiction over the case

Held 1. No, in the language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal andsubstantial interest in the

case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement . In Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works it states that validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." 2. No, at the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfil its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness

Umali vs. Guingona, G.R. NO. 131124, March 21, 1999 Facts Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), andPersonal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. Issues

Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision. Held/Ruling Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on thecriminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.