RESTRICTED THE MATADOR PLAN INTRODUCTION “Unfortunately, it has come to this, that either Japan must stop her

expansion, or England must willingly give up some of what she has or hopes to have. Therein lies a cause for war.” Lt Cdr Tota Ishimaru, Imperial Japanese Navy 1. The fall of Malaya and Singapore to the hand of the Japanese is a

tremendous sign that showed the failure of Operation Matador. In this battle study, there are chronology of events that will guide us very closely in knowing and understanding the reason why this operation failed to meet its objectives. In doing the research on the background of the battle of Malaya and the relativity to the Operation Matador, our syndicate members came across a reference to a plan of action for the defence of Singapore codenamed “Matador”. In fact there were two plans, so totally different, that in the end they contributed to the downfall of Singapore. Both had their weaknesses and one of the major ones was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army, Navy and Air Force. The other and more serious was a clash of ideals. The drawn-up plan was Land based Matador and Sea Based Matador. 2. From the research done, Operation Matador is not the sole reason for the

fall of Malaya or even Singapore, besides there is some other reasons that had been identified as a contributing factor as well. This has been discussed in detail under the column of Battle Analysis. An examine on the lesson learned from this battle study would benefit the most as it focuses more on principles of war that will teaches us how, why, when and where it is applicable for an action plan taken at one time. 1 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED AIM 3. This paper will examine two main part of the whole study on Matador Plan.

The first part is to analyse the incidents that occur prior and upon the operation called The Matador Plan. Secondly, it is fundamentals to determine the lessons learnt and the effects on both forces.

OBJECTIVE 4. The main objective of this battle study is to meet the requirement of the

EOBC serial 28/2006 and secondly is to learn and adapt the knowledge of the war history generally on the Malayan Campaign and specifically the Matador Plan. In this way the young officers would be able to use battle study as a comparison between previous and present state of battle warfare in order to meet any circumstances and decision makings in the near future.

SCOPE 5. Scopes of discussions are as follow: a. Background. 1) 2) 3) b. 1) 2) Pre-war examination. Forces involved. The Attack. Matador Plan. Land Based Matador Sea Based Matador


BATTLE BACKGROUND PRE-WAR EXAMINATION 6. even though few could be spared from the defence of Britain and her offensive in the Middle East. 7. Chronology of events. h. Indian. Australian and Malayan units. 3 RESTRICTED . g. and the Imperial Japanese Army from December 8. 1942 during the Second World War. The battle in Malaya was a conflict between British Commonwealth forces. both to defend Britain's Far Eastern possessions and the route to Australia. Prior the attack by the Japanese forces. it was decided by the Air Ministry in London that was a right time to provide a fighter force for the area. Analysis on factors and effects. Tactical aspects applied. the fundamental or the main causes that inflict the war in Malaya should be given a consideration as it may be very useful in understanding the battle study. Lesson Learnt. The Japanese make use of this as an opportunity with the increase on aggression over the region as well. Before we look further into the Matador Plan. Upon the completion of the Singapore Naval Base and airfields on Singapore Island with other constructions on the Malayan Peninsula was underway. e. the British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing of a strong fleet at the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility. Conclusion. 1941 until January 31. d.RESTRICTED c. At this time tension mounted in the region following the outbreak of the European war and the French in Indo-China clashed with the Thais. comprised of British.

as revealed in a letter from Prime Minister Churchill to US President Roosevelt. and thus get a far better position for a full-scale attack on Singapore later on. Also just as important. 1940.H. and the G. and for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of these territories. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the operational control and direction of training of British land and air forces in Malaya. and had no control over any naval forces. Burma and Hong Kong. which had already sent all their best. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed Commander-in-Chief Far East. In October 1940. he had no authority over the Civilian population in case of an impending war. The only recourse Brook-Popham had to any control of the forces was directly to the Chiefs of Staff in London.Q. This came under the direct control of Shenton–Thomas the Governor of Singapore. not administrative. 8. and to all intents and purposes he had absolute control. a threat to British and American possessions in the area was not considered to be imminent. They would also raid Australian and New Zealand ports and coasts. His headquarters was an operational one. 4 RESTRICTED . trained fighting men to the Far East”. It also includes the control and training of British air forces in Ceylon and of reconnaissance squadrons in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. Far East opened at Singapore on the 18th November.RESTRICTED However. So Brook-Popham the man in charge on the spot had little control over the immediate military situation. causing deep anxiety in those Dominions. The Japanese would no doubt occupy whatever strategic points and oilfields in the Dutch East Indies and thereabouts that they covet. dated 15 February 1941: “I do not myself think that the Japanese would likely to send the large military expedition necessary to lay siege to Singapore.

and with it a motley collection of 85 000 British. the potential danger to Malaya and Burma increased. 5 RESTRICTED . and 5 battalions of Indian States forces. with 7 field regiments 1 mountain regiment. 4 coast defence regiments and five anti-aircraft regiments of artillery and 10 field and 3 fortress companies of engineers . Almost one quarter of them were British. In November 1940. of which only 48 could be counted as modern. with 88 in reserve. however. information accumulated which showed that an early Japanese attack was likely. and the remainder local forces. 1941. Malaya Command. the Japanese spread into southern Indo-China. In May 1941. and a small armoured car unit. Reliance for the defence of the Far East was to be placed on air power until the fleet was available but it was the Governments policy to avoid war with Japan. was only 88 first-line aircraft. nearly one-half Indian Army.E. The previous month. despite the negotiations in progress in Washington. the eve of the Japanese attack. The strength of the air forces in Malaya in November 1940. with 1 mountain regiment of artillery. Percival had been appointed General Officer Commanding. By the latter part of November. Australian.a total strength of close on 85. Both land and air reinforcements had been reaching Malaya. about one-sixth Australians.RESTRICTED FORCES INVOLVED 9. plus the equivalent of 10 volunteer battalions with some artillery. and far beyond the bounds of practical possibility. the land forces counted 31 infantry battalions. the army strength in Malaya was 17 battalions. 10. engineers. as the move gave them a naval base within 750 miles of Singapore and airfields only 300 miles from Kota Bharu. the nearest point in Malaya. there were 158 first-line aircraft available. and by 7th December. 2 anti-tank regiments. the Singapore Conference had recommended a strength of 582 aircraft for the Far East but it was admitted that this was an ideal.000 men. Lieutenant-General A. When in July 1941. Indian and Malayan troops.

naval support and artillery support from the mainland.RESTRICTED 11. Far East Command was not in a position to fulfil its responsibility of being the primary means of resisting Japanese aggression. The Japanese had slightly fewer aircraft. it was still believed by British military and civilian leaders in the Far East that Japan was committed to concentrating forces against the Soviet Union. Now the Japanese has really been on an invasion plan to attack the Malayan Peninsula and take over Singapore with a well planned tactics and operation. plus 100 tanks. no tanks and few armoured cars. their fighter aircraft were generally superior and achieved air superiority. so it was argued. Earlier the British had plans in place to forestall Japanese landings in Southern Thailand but Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. the Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command refused permission to launch Operation Matador and Operation Krohcol in advance of the Japanese attack. There were only two-thirds the number of infantry required. the R. tactics and experience. Even then. Even though the Japanese soldiers were not as many compared the British forces they were significantly superior in close air support. the United States and the Netherlands. The Japanese decided otherwise. armour. Incredibly.A. The Japanese Order of Battle remains unchanged throughout the course of the Champaign. that she would at the same time take on Britain. co-ordination. with the Japanese units having fought in China. while the Army strength was far short of what was required to compensate for the deficiency in aircraft. 13. and it was therefore improbable. and the lack of mobile anti-aircraft guns was serious.F. not wishing to run any risk of provoking the coming war. 6 RESTRICTED . By mid-November 1941 the official assessment was that war would not come until March 1942. as late as 29 September 1941.000 men plus air power. The Japanese 25th Army consisted of 36. THE ATTAC K 12.

'Operation Matador' was not fully launched. the only Royal Navy capital ships in the Far East. on the first day of the attack Japan obtained total air supremacy over Northern Malaya. an invaluable twenty four hours was lost during which time the Japanese forces landed and the British lost a most valuable opportunity. have been immediately ordered. and should. If they had held The Ledge.RESTRICTED 14. Despite this clear act of war by Japan. the invasion could have been delayed even though the landings could not have been prevented. 16. Two days later. The naval Force Z. the advance to The Ledge could. Later the Japanese came to realised the presence of the battleships and its marching to the Northern Malaya. on 10 December. a British Hudson reconnaissance aircraft spotted Japanese naval vessels 100 miles/160 Km north-east of Singora with others steaming towards Pattani. were sunk by Japanese torpedo-bombers off Kuantan. together with four destroyers. the rest being destroyed. Those still operational were immediately ordered back to Singapore. Thus. As a result. On 8 December the Japanese attacked the British air bases in Malaya with the devastating result that by the end of the day a mere 50 British aircraft were operational. the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. consisting of the battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. War had come to Malaya. 7 RESTRICTED . Even so. 15. By this single stroke Japan gained complete naval command of the South China and Java Seas and a large part of the Indian Ocean by leaving the east coast of Malaya exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their landings. This was not done. with a concomitant boost to Japanese morale. On the next day it was reported that Japanese troops were attempting to land at Kota Bharu and at the same time Singapore suffered its first air raid. On 7 December 1941. and commanded by Admiral Tom Phillips had arrived right before the outbreak of hostilities. The negative effect of the sinking of the Prince of Wales on British morale throughout the world was serious.

in August 1941 and he submitted his plan to London for approval. the other a Land based plan by Brook-Popham. 8 RESTRICTED . It was drawn up by Brook-Popham. Land Based Matador relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Thailand at two points that of Songkhla and Pattani. His plan was a land based Matador. that in the end they contributed to the downfall of Singapore. One of the major ones was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army. Both had their weaknesses. The first one a Naval plan by Churchill. This was a plan of action that envisaged an attack by the Japanese from the North of Malaya via Thailand and the Kara Isthmus. 19. it possibly could have delayed the Japanese long enough to allow the British forces stationed in Malaya and Singapore to mount a delaying action until reinforcements arrived. What is Matador Plan? What is the relativity of the drawn up plan is all about to this study? Matador Plan is a plan of action for the defence of Singapore. It is believed that if the plan was implemented at the right time. The other and more serious is the clash of ideals. The two plans were totally different. The next would be advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. Navy and Air Force. History of Malaya War shows that Brook-Popham was the man on the spot who could evaluate a more accurate assessment of the needs. MATADOR PLAN 17. The Land Based Matador 18. Now I will outline both plans for a thorough understanding.RESTRICTED The drift to war by the Japanese met its objectives by the invasion of the Malayan Peninsula subsequently the Singapore Island.

The main obstacle was one of them being Churchill. "Fortress Singapore" and its armaments. There was only one problem. he was First Lord of the Admiralty as such was fighting for his part in any forthcoming action. In Duff Coopers report of the Defence of Singapore in 1939 it was stated that no less than 8 war ships would be needed to defend Fortress Singapore. Churchill was not in the business of land forces at the time. The Sea Based Matador referred on the need of resources especially the battle ships to defend the Singapore Island. The Sea Based Matador 20. Requests by BrookPopham to London for additional resources to cover this Plan were made around January 1941. It is known that Churchill had distrust of it lay in the political aspects and at the same time he also favoured being a naval man with a naval solution wherein the plan was mainly a Land Based Matador. if the British were to implement this without the Japanese being at war with Thailand first. but not enough in the way of Navy”. This plan was considered a good plan and consequently it also had its problem due to unavoidable consequences. Churchill had been told of the situation of what he later proclaimed in Parliament as. To complicate matters further Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam the previous year 1940 had signed a non-aggression pact with Pibul the President of Thailand. He proclaimed that “It had several big guns and there were a lot of troops on an island that he had never seen. it would be seen as an attack by the British on a neutral country. but remained unfulfilled. thus allowing long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. 9 RESTRICTED .RESTRICTED It was envisaged in Matador that two forces could intercept them just over the boarder in Thailand.

In year 1937. 10 RESTRICTED . The chronology of events that involved along the path of Matador Plan implementations are as follows. Sir Earl Page. he reported that during the monsoon season from October to March landings could be made by an enemy on the east coast and bases could be established in Siam. He predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani in Siam. Sir Shenton Thomas. looked at Malaya's defences. Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr. was a cobbled result. Major-General William Dobbie Officer Commanding Malaya (1935 .1939). It was a disaster for the British upon the sinking of the two main battle ships. Once Churchill became the Prime Minister he held the final decision. a. Thailand and Kota Bharu in Malaya. At Duff Coopers conference of the 29th September 1941 in Singapore. Those attended the meeting were Sir Robert Brook-Popham. had signed a nonaggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam. In January 1941. His predictions turned out to be correct but his recommendations were ignored. it was stated that at the least Two Battleships would be needed as a minimum.RESTRICTED 21. 'The Prince of Wales' and 'Repulse' that turned up with escorts called "Force Z". But what Churchill sent and eventually happened. A request for additional resources remained unfulfilled which the plan intended to use and the previous year in 1940 Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 22. He recommended large reinforcements to be sent immediately. Governor of Singapore and Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton. b.

it was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent. The plan relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at Songkhla and Pattani. 1941. On November 30. g. 1941. long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. Siam. d. The plan was that if an enemy attacked. Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita. the plan was modified to use the forces available. The Commander-in-Chief (Cin C) of British Far East Command Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham submitted a plan code named Matador to London for approval. When the threat of Japanese invasion became more likely. then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. receives orders to proceed with the invasion of Singapore. In August 1941. At the same time 21 Squadron RAAF is based at Sungei Patani. HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse arrive at Singapore Harbour escorted by a number of ships including HMAS Vampire. h. or were invited into. The Japanese fleet leaves Samah Harbour at dawn. It was envisaged that two forces could intercept them just over the border in Thailand. On November 29. Air Headquarters at Singapore is warned to be ready to support Operation Matador at 12 hours notice. The Commanding Officer of the Japanese 25th Division. f. 1941. On December 2.RESTRICTED c. troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea borne attack. 1941. 11 RESTRICTED . On December 4. e. 1941. On December 5.

It had reworked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment.RESTRICTED This job was allocated to Major-General Murray-Lyon's Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra. 1941. However. They would use the Bangkok airport and the airfields of Southern Siam to enable air cover to be established. 1941. The chief strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptive move before the Japanese landings took place. London gave permission for C in C Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. There were a lot of differences between British prediction and actual location of the Japanese landings in Malaya Peninsula. The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of Operation Matador. 23. i. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was ordered to launch Operation Matador. TACTICAL ASPECTS APPLIED 24. On December 6. if Matador had been implemented the Japanese had a counter worked out. For detail. On December 5. Which is what General Officer Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended that evening in meeting with the Governor Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C BrookePopham decided it is premature to launch the operation which included the pre-emptive move into Siam. this over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to do. refer to figure 1 and figure 2 in appendix. j. 12 RESTRICTED . With hind sight this was the wrong decision. and then invade from the Kra Isthmus.

30am by British RAF spotter planes. In the event if Matador was implemented. Nakhon 3 craft. Beside.RESTRICTED The 'Red' dot on the map is where the last sighting of the approaching Japanese armada was on the 6th December at approx 12. In the event the Japanese landed at. The real Japanese meeting place was just 200 miles from Songkhla. Chumphon 2 craft. The Matador plan can be analysed from several factors which concluded to its failure. double the distance and of course double the time. the Japanese were under the orders to occupy the airfield of Bangkok and the airfields of Southern Thailand to enable air cover to be established. Songkla and Pattani 18 craft and Kota Bharu 3 craft. The Japanese had forestalled the effect of Matador by having a secondary plan. thus paving the way for the invasion from the Kara Isthmus and the inevitable fall of Singapore. It was the combination of confused action and wildly differing approaches to what was perceived as the enemies’ tactics that eventually lead to the fiasco of Malaya and Fortress Singapore. BATTLE ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ON FACTORS AND EFFECTS 26. the Japanese also use ‘blitzkrieg’ tactics that was used by the Germans during Europe Campaign. And the 'Orange' dot on the map the "presumed British" and "actual Japanese" meeting place of the Japanese fleet on the 7th December 1941. 25. Bandon 2 craft. Prachoup 1 craft. It shows the invader is truly tactical enough to apply the secondary plan if the primary met with failure. the assumed meeting place by Brook-Popham was some 400 miles. Pattani and Kota Bharu. The factors identified are as follows: 13 RESTRICTED .

Non-strategic defence position. Because of the key role allotted to the air force it was decided that the primary task of the army was to defend the airfields from which the RAF operated. British forces could intercept them just over the border in Thailand. These airfields had been built without reference to the military but rather to suit civilian requirements. long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. c. most of which were obsolescent. Lack of Resources. The lack of resources and the assign of multiple tasks at one time by the British made them facing more difficulties in defending its position against the Japanese. But the plan was modified to use the forces available and it was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent. For Operation Matador to succeed. b.RESTRICTED a. Beside. troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea borne attack. time was of the absolute essence. At the outbreak of hostilities it had a mere 158. If an enemy attacked. From a military viewpoint they were located too close to the coast and too close to the border of Siam to be effectively defended. Matador was approved late for the plan to succeed. The Matador plan relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at Songkhla and Pattani. this has over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to do. RAF was fully responsible to carry out its task effectively in defence. 14 RESTRICTED . This job was allocated to Major-General Murray-Lyon's of Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra. Time Window. in the absence of the main fleets. The decision to defend the Singapore base by holding the whole of Malaya meant that in the absence of the fleet the task fell primarily on the RAF. then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. it was estimated that it required a minimum of 336 modern aircraft including a long range striking force. or were invited into Siam.

Earlier on December 5. d. Political Aspects. Operation Matador should have been abandoned. The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of Operation Matador and on December 6. With such a constraint. 15 RESTRICTED . e. In the year 1940 Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam. British do not want to be the first nation to trespass the non alliance of Thailand in the war and will not approved matador planned until there is solid evidence that shows that the Japanese is up to move to Thailand territory. This plan required crossing the international frontier into Siam thus making Britain guilty of violating official Siamese neutrality. London gave permission for Cin C the Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. as Britain attempted to the very end to avoid war with Japan. 1941 it had reworked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment. To forestall the anticipated Japanese invasion the British High Command evolved a plan to seize the Siamese port of Singora which is 'Operation Matador' and to delay the anticipated Japanese advance from Patani by holding a position called 'The Ledge'.RESTRICTED British forces had to be in Singgora before the Japanese landed. 1941. the military were forbidden to violate Siamese territory until an actual outbreak of war. General Officer Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended in meeting with the Governor of Singapore Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C Brooke-Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation which included the pre-emptive move into Siam. However. The strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptive move before the Japanese landings took place. had signed a non-aggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam. and time being of the essence. Command and Control.

the British Army in Malaya did not have a single one. g. He also diverted an entire division. especially in jungle warfare. who wanted the scarce resources of aeroplanes. Indian and Malayan troops. the war in the Middle East. 16 RESTRICTED . so the desired air force strength of 300 to 500 aircraft was never reached whereas the Japanese invaded with over two hundred tanks. which was bound for Singapore. The Wrong Assessment. the 7th Australian Division. Operation Theatre Priorities. Australian. However some of the problems associated with this force included poor quality officers. poor training. h. At the same time. Churchill delivered 440 aircraft to Russia. Britain's defence.RESTRICTED f. The blame of Matador Plan failure cannot only be pointed to General Percival because the launch of the plan must be approved from Churchill in London. Churchill’s distrust of it lay in the political aspects. Japan will not enter the war unless the Germans had invaded Britain successfully. the world's oil pipeline and gateway to India. a naval solution thus the sea based matador were developed. was not going well. there were some 85000 British. Lack of Importance. In 1941. Under the command of Jen AE Percival. to the Middle East and one brigade of the 9th Indian Division to Iraq. Russian vulnerability added to the complexities of the situation. he also favoured being First Lord of the Admiralty a naval man. Other than that. The Blame. such as the Middle East and Russia. troops and other equipment diverted to his other priority areas. He must have disliked it so much and there weren’t any reference to it in Churchill's memoirs as well. The Matador Plan was stalled repeatedly by Churchill. lack of civilian labour to construct defences and lack of homogeny. i. the Middle East and the Soviet Union had all received higher priorities in the allocation of men and material. Churchill estimate. He seems to have conveniently forgotten all about it.

Japanese intentions are as follows: 1) Japan maybe to conquer Singora and Patani as habour to seize the important air field at Kedah and then move to North West of Malaya. a. LESSON LEARNT 27. As a result the British had failed to provide an adequate force and resources to meet the Japanese thrust. On the other hand. Landed at Kuantan and move to west over the Kuantan- Raub road or Mersing road for Singapore assault through North of Malaya. Lack of Intelligence. British intelligence had failed in providing the real assessment of Japanese assault on Malaya. Selection and The Maintenance Of The Aim. British has made the wrong decision making on the aspects of strategic defence plan of Malaya rather than knowing and understanding the Japanese strategic plan to conquer Malaya and Singapore. it was a British failure to adhere to the principles of war in the implementation of the Matador Plan and the Japanese vision and motivation that led to the defeat of the British in the Malayan Campaign. Percival was unaware of these intentions and put the little sources to defence the other different area. In the final analysis. the British thought that Japan will assault Malaya through Singapore. 2) 3) Landed at Kota Bharu to take over the air field.RESTRICTED j. 17 RESTRICTED .

Economy of Effort. e. Japan launched amphibious assault in north beach Malaya at Kota Bahru to move down into East beach of Malaya. Maintenance Of Morale. Surprise. This is not just gave the smooth movement but also reduce man power from jungle tracking and walk. Japan has attack Malayan from North where the British defence was very weak at the enemy aimed position. The British didn’t forestalled a large number of forces at the planned or strategic location in order to resist any Japanese landing from the North wherein this was an advantages to the Japanese forces. Offensive Action. d. Concentration of Force. c. They attack Malaya in raining season when British not expected the Japan will attack on that time. Jen Yamashita gave their order to throw the unnecessary equipment from their soldier and planning to remain a smooth movement from combination of expensive British roads and cheap Japan bicycle. Japan had all the factors that guaranteed the success with having good war equipment.RESTRICTED b. f. The Japan inner strength was very high. efficiency and encouragement. That situation was entirely a surprise and a piece of well planned action. The highest Japan Royal Company gave 100 days to conquer Malaya and Singapore. All the Japan soldiers had their ideology which is “east for east” where in their psychology they had to rise with the morale in order to face war difficulties. 18 RESTRICTED . Thinking about the mission. He ordered his soldier that didn’t have any vehicle to ride bicycle.

Far East Armada was supposed to have 1 carrier. and it was British Far East Armada and American Pacific Armada. 11 cruiser and 24 destroyer was not to send because the strategic situation at Europe and Mediterranean and the effect from France failure. sea and air in giving the maximum fire power Commander. The implication from this. whereas they move to South through road land to cross Malayan-Thailand borders to attack from west of Malaya. g.RESTRICTED This movement is done by landed at Patani and Singora in Thailand. including concertina wire. Beach defence built at Malaya in order to face the Japanese landings. The British had no option rather than to deliver 2 battleships that are Repulse and Prince of Wales. while America Pacific Armada was destroyed at Pearl Harbour. h. Southern Squadron (Sea) Commander with all (Land) Army Chief’s a success to destroyed the British defence position. Security. the British suffered 19 RESTRICTED . The cooperation between 3rd div (Air) asset including land. It was a fail of cooperation that British had no choices to support while Japan easily landed at Malaya. 25th Army Commander Lt Jen Yamashita had given his authority to coordinate the sea and air asset in order to achieve ‘mui’ in conquering Malaya and Singapore. under water obstacles and machine gun placement were not good enough to give a supreme security and protection for the British. Cooperation can be analysed by comparing the both forces and there are: 1) Original defence planning on Malaya and Singapore depend on two factors. 2) and While the Japanese had successfully integrated their entire manoeuvre. Cooperation. 7 battleship.

after the twenty years of preparation to avoid such an eventuality. To launch the Matador Plan Percival needed permission from British government in London. The Matador plan can be analysed from several factors which conclude to its failure. British government refused to launch this plan until they have proofs that the Japanese has landed in Thailand. 20 RESTRICTED . Thus. That situation shows that matador plan does not have the flexibility for an execution purposes. i. In the words of Major General Woodburn Kirby. and with it any real chance for British troops to delay the Japanese advance until relief came. Another disaster. CONCLUSION 28. The delays in mobilization meant that the troops did not receive the order to launch 'Operation Matador' effect. Matador was approved late for the plan to succeed.RESTRICTED a lot of casualties. The intention of the British had been to hold it for approximately three months. and with it Singapore. was sealed in the first four days of the campaign. Japanese also suffered a lot of casualties and this has shown that the British weakness in order to make sure the safety of their soldier itself. paid insufficient attention to the training of their troops and delayed taking urgent decisions even after the Japanese had landed on Malayan soil. Flexibility. For Operation Matador to succeed. occurred on 12 December 1941 when the strategically-located and well-prepared Jitra position was abandoned within twenty four hours of being attacked.6 km short of its objective when on 10 December 1941 Japanese troops overran the leading battalions. The factor involves all aspects from the column of battle analysis. They underrated the enemy. and morale suffered. time was of the absolute essence. 'One can sum up by saying that those responsible for the conduct of the land campaign in Malaya committed every conceivable blunder. the fate of Malaya. 29. An attempt by British troops to advance to The Ledge fell six miles 9.

Prime Minister of Britain. 21 RESTRICTED . Churchill and all his decision made during the Malayan Campaign was also considered as a worst decision making in the war campaign ever in the history. Appendix 1 Figure 1: This shows what Brook-Popham had assumed happened from the intelligence he had received.RESTRICTED Singapore and the naval base were lost between 8 and 12 December'.

RESTRICTED Figure 2: This is what actually happened from the records of the Japanese BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 22 RESTRICTED . Grub Street. Percival and The Tragedy of Singapore. 5. London 2003.C. 4. Lt Gen AE Percival. HTML. 2. Cull Brian. The British Battalion In The Malayan Campaign 1941- 1942. Chye Kooi Loong. Buffaloes Over Singapore. 1987. Wikipedia. Sir John Smyth V. The War in Malaya. 2002. 3. Battle of Malaya.