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NASA SP-1:21








EVA-Extravehicular activity
GATV-Gemini-Agena target vehicle
GLV-Gemini launch vehicle
TLV-Target launch vehicle

THE COVER-Gemini VII as seen [rom Gemini VI-A

]ust prior to rendezvous





FEBRUARY 23-25, 1966

Scientific and Technical Information Division 1 9 6 6

Washington, D.C.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Olflce, Washington, D.C. - 20402 - Pdce $2.75
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 66-60089

The Gemini Midprogram Conference presented a summary of the Gemini

Program to date with emphasis on the first seven missions. This report con-
tains the papers presented at that conference. These papers discuss the pro-
gram development as it grew to meet the mission complexity and the stringent
requirements for long-duration and rendezvous flight.
The papers are divided into two major groups: The first concerns space-
craft and launch-vehicle description and developmelrt, mission operations, and
mission results; and the second reports results of experiments performed.


1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 3
By Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low

2. GEMINI PROGRXM FEATURES AND RESULTS ...................... 15

By Charles W. Mathews, Kenneth S. Kleinkneeht, and Richard C. Henry

A. Spacecraft

3. SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT ....................................... 15

By Duncan R. Collins, Homer W. Dotts, Wilburne F. Hoyler, and Kenneth
F. Hecht


By Richard R. Carley, Norman Schulze, Benjamin R. Drone, David W.
Camp, and John F. Hanaway
By Clifford M. Jackson, Andrew Hoboken, John W. Goad, Jr., and Meredith
W. Hamilton


By Percy Migliceo, Robert Cohen, and Jesse Deming
By R. M. Machell, J. C. Shows, J. V. Correale, L. D. Allen, and W. J.
8. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM .............................. 71
By Robert L. Frost, James W. Thompson, and Larry E. Bell

By Walter F. Burke
By William H. Douglas, Gregory P. MeIntosh, and Lemuel S. Menear

B. Launch Vehicle

11. LAUNCH VEHICLE MANAGEMENT .................................. 103

By Willis B. Mitchell and Jerome B. Hammack
12. GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT ........................ 107
By Walter D. Smith
13. PROPULSION SYSTEM ................................................ 125
By E. Douglas Ward
By Leon R. Bush
15. PRODUCT ASSURANCE ............................................... 141

By Robert J. Goebel
By Richard C. Dineen


C. Flight Operations
17. GEMINI MISSION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT ........................ 153

By Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., and Sigurd Sjoberg

18. MISSION PLANNING ................................................. 157

By Wyendell B. Evans, Howard W. Tindall, Jr., Helmut A. Kuehnel, and

Alfred A. Bishop

19. MISSION CONTROL CENTER AND NETWORK ...................... 169

By Henry E. Clements, Richard L. Holt, and Douglas W. Carmichael

20. FLIGHT CONTROL OPERATIONS ..................................... 179

By John D. Hodge and Jones W. Roach


TIONS ............................................................... 189

By Robert F. Thompson, Donald E. Stullken, Ph.D., and Peter J. Armitage

22. FLIGHT CREW PROCEDURES AND TRAINING ...................... 201

By Donald K. Slayton, Warren J. North, and C. tI. Woodling

23. SPACECRAFT LAUNCH PREPARATION .............................. 213

By Walter J. Kapryan and Wiley E. Williams

24. SPACECRAFT LAUNCH-SITE PROCESSING ........................... 221

By J. R. Atkins, J. F. Thompson, and R. J. Teti

D. Mission Results


SPACECRAFT ....................................................... 235

By Charles A. Berry, M.D., D. O. Coons, M.D., A. D. Catterson, M.D., and

G. Fred Kelly, M.D.

26. DATA ANALYSIS AND REPORTING .................................. 263

By Scott H. Simpkinson, Victor P. Neshyba, and J. Don St. Clair

27. ASTRONAUTS' REACTIONS TO FLIGHT .............................. 271

By Virgil I. Grissom, James A. McDivitt, L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., Walter M.

Schirra, and Frank Borman


By Edgar C. Lineberry

29. RENDEZVOUS OF GEMINI VII AND GEMINI VI-A .................. 283

By Thomas P. Stafford, Walter M. Schirra, and Dean F. Grimm

Concluding Remarks

30. CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................ 301

By James C. Elms


31. EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY ............................... 305

By R. O. Piland and P. R. Penrod

A. Physical Science Experiments

32. GEOASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS ................................ 315

By Franklin E. Roach, Ph.D., Lawrence Dunkelman, Joeelyn R. Gill, Ph.D.,

and Robert D. Mercer

33. DIM LIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY ......................................... 325

By Lawrence Dunkelman and Robert D. Mercer


BILITY ............................................................. 329
By Seibert Q. Duntley, Ph.D., Roswell W. Austin, John H. Taylor, and
James L. Harris


By Paul D. Lowman, Jr., Ph. D.
By Kenneth M. Nagler and Stanley D. Soules
By James R. Marbach and William D. Womaek


RADIOMETRY ...................................................... 365

By Burden Brentnall

B. Medical Science Experiments


By Lawrence F. Dietlein, M.D., and William V. Judy
By Lawrence F. Dietlein, M.D., and Rita M. Rapp


By Lawrence F. Dietlein, M.D., and Carlos Vallbona, M.D.

42. EXPERIMENT M-5, BIOASSAYS OF BODY FLUIDS .................. 403

By Lawrence F. Dietlein, M.D., and E. Harris, Ph. D.

43. EXPERIMENT M-6, BONE DEMINERALIZATION .................... 407

By Pauline Berry Mack, Ph.D., George P. Vose, Fred B. Vogt, M.D., and
Paul A. LaChanee, Ph. D.


By G. D. Whedon, M.D., Leo Lutwak, M.D., Ph. D., William F. Neuman,
Ph.D., and Paul A. LaChanee, Ph.D.

45. EXPERIMENT M-8, INFLIGHT SLEEP ANALYSIS ................... 423

By Peter Kelloway, Ph.D.
46. EXPERIMENT M-9, HUMAN OTOLITH FUNCTION .................. 431
By Earl Miller, M.D.


CIES ................................................................ 439



By ROBERT R. GILRUTH, Director, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center, and GEORGE M. Low, Deputy Director,
NASA Manned Spacecra# Center

In our first manned space-flight program, Space Systems Division's National Range Di-
Project Mercury, man's capability in space vision and the Navy Recovery Forces are well
was demonstrated. In the Gemini Program our known. All of the astronauts who have flown
aim has been to gain operational proficiency in to date in the Gemini Program have been trained
manned space flight. At the midpoint in the as test pilots by either the Air Force or the
Gemini flight program this aim has, in a large Navy. In addition, the Air Force has provided
measure, been achieved. the Gemini launch vehicle, which has performed
The Gemini Program has produced numerous with near perfection. There have been many
technical and management innovations through other contributions by the military services in
contributions of a large number of space- support of ejection-seat tests, centrifuge tests,
oriented organizations. At the peak of the and weightless trajectories utilizing the KC-135
Gemini activities more than 25 000 people in aircraft.
the aerospace industry were involved. This Within NASA, every center has participated
document will highlight the technical results in direct technical support and, in many in-
of the program at the midpoint, with the stances, in sponsorship of experiments. Of par-
management aspects to be reported more fully ticular note is the contribution of the Goddard
at a later opportunity. Space Flight Center in the implementation and
The papers presented are representative of operation of the worldwide network of track-
the contributions of the Gemini team. Par- ing stations. Many nations of the free world
ticipation by industry in the Gemini Program have augmented or otherwise supported these
has been led by McDonnell Aircraft Corp., stations, which are so vital to the manned space-
Martin-Marietta Corp., Lockheed Missiles & flight program. Sponsorship of experiments
Space Co., and all of their associates. This par- and consultation services have been provided by
ticipation has included more than 50 major universities and other institutions whenever and
contractors, more than 150 subcontractors, and, wherever they were needed. The Gemini Pro-
of course, a host of vendors and suppliers. The gram is truly a national enterprise with inter-
excellent performance of both the flight sys- national cooperation and support.
tems and the ground systems demonstrates The Gemini team has been led by one of
graphically the strong capabilities of American this country's outstanding engineers and pro-
industry in its support of these exploratory gram managers, Charles W. Mathews. Under
flights. Each of the companies involved de-
his direction, significant advances have been
serves special recognition and credit for these
made in this Nation's manned space-flight pro-
gram. Gemini achievements in 1965 include
Many Government agencies have also been
five manned flights, yielding more than 1300
deeply involved in Gemini. In addition to
hours of manned flight in space; long-duration
NASA, the program has received support from
the Department of Defense; the State Depart- flight in steps of 4, 8, and 14 days; extra-
ment; the Department of Health, Education, vehicular activity, including the use of a self-
and Welfare; the Department of Commerce; propelled maneuvering gun ; precise maneuvers
the Atomic Energy Commission; and many in space, culminating in rendezvous; and con-
others. The contributions of the Air Force trolled landing of a lifting spacecraft.

The results of the Gemini Program contribute sons which have been learned, and the knowledge
directly to the Apollo Program and to other gained, have been rewarding, and give us con-
manned space-flight programs, such as the Air fidence as we meet the problems and the
Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory. The les- programs of the future.

By CHARLES W. MATHEWS, Manager, Gemini Program, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; KENNETH S.
KLEINKNECHT, Deputy Manager, Gemini Program, IVASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; and RICHARD
C. HENRY, Manager, Office o] Program Control, Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra#

Summary developed and tested as a single unit. In this

manner the inherent reliability of a system is
This introductory paper has the objective of
not obscured by complex interacting elements.
highlighting some of the intrinsic features of
Advantages of this approach also exist in sys-
the Gemini Program and relating general re-
tems checkout and equipment changeout.
sults to these features, thereby furnishing a
A second factor in Gemini systems design is
background for the more detailed papers which
follow. the use of manual sequencing and systems man-
Introduction agement to a large extent. This feature affords
simplicity by utilizing man's capability to diag-
Less than 5 years ago, men ventured briefly nose failures and to take corrective action. It
into space and returned safely. These initial facilitates flexibility in the utilization of neces-
manned space flights were indeed tremendous sary redundancy or backup configurations of the
achievements which stirred the imagination of systems. For example, in the spacecraft elec-
people worldwide. They also served to provide trical-power system, the redundancy involved
a focus for the direction of future efforts. would make automatic failure sensing, inter-
Gemini is the first U.S. manned space-flight locking, and switching both complex and diffi-
program that has had the opportunity to take cult, if not impossible.
this early experience and carry out a develop- As already implied, the use of redundant or
ment, test, and flight program in an attempt to backup systems is an important facet of the
reflect the lessons learned. In addition, Gem- Gemini spacecraft design. An attempt has
ini has endeavored, from its conception, to con- been made to apply these concepts judiciously,
sider the requirements of future programs in es- and, as a result, a complete range of combina-
tablishing techniques and objectives. tions exists. For systems directly affecting
crew safety where failures are of a time-critical
Gemini Program Features nature, on-line parallel redundancy is often em-
ployed, such as in the launch-vehicle electrical
The purpose of the Gemini Program has usu-
system. In the pyrotechnics system, the com-
ally been stated in terms of specific flight objec-
plete parallel redundancy is carried to the extent
tives; however, somewhat more basic guidelines
of running separate wire bundles on opposite
also exist, and these are described in the follow-
sides of the spacecraft. In a few time-critical
ing paragraphs.
cases, off-line redundancy with automatic fail-
Reliable System Design ure sensing is required. The flight-control sys-
tem of the launch vehicle is an example of this
The first guideline, reliable system design, is type. In most crew-safety cases which are not
an objective of all programs, but in the Gemini time critical, crew-controlled off-line redun-
Program several aspects of the approach are dancy or backup is utilized. In the spacecraft
worth noting. One is the concept of independ- propulsion system, the backup attitude control
ence of systems in which, to the degree practical, is used solely for the reentry operation. This
systems are designed in modules than can be reentry propulsion in turn involves parallel re-

dundancy because of the critical nature of this the digital computer, the radar, and the flight-
mission phase. Many systems not required for director display drew heavily on previous de-
essential mission phases are basically single sys- velopments. Reliability, system operating life,
tems with internal _edundancy features com- and the sizing of consumables were also selected
mensurate with the requirements for overall to afford durations corresponding to the require-
mission success. The spacecraft g_idance sys- ments of oncoming programs.
tem is an example of this application. Certain These ground rules were applicable to many
systems have sufficient inherent reliability, once other systems. In the case of the Gemini launch
their operation has been demonstrated, that i_o vehicle, great benefit was obtained from the
special redundant features are required. The Titan II development program, even to the ex-
heat protection system is one of this type. tent of validating certain Gemini-peculiar modi-
fications in the test program prior to their use
Future Mission Applicability in Gemini.

In the selection of systems and types of op- Minimum Flight Qualification Tests

erations to be demonstrated, a strong effort was

Because flying all-up manned space vehicles is
made to consider the requirements of future pro- expensive, time consuming, and exceedingly sen-
grams, particularly the manned lunar landing. sitive to failures, the Gemini development was
It was not anticipated that Gemini systems nec- based on the premise that confidence could be
essarily would be directly used in other pro-
achieved through a properly configured pro-
grams; however, their operating .principles
gram of ground tests and that a very limited
would be sufficiently close that the concepts for
number of unmanned flights could serve to vali-
their use would be validated.
date the approach. With this in mind, a com-
Where possible and to minimize development, prehensive ground program was implemented
time, systems that already had some develop-
in the areas of development, qualification, and
ment status were selected; the spacecraft guid-
integrated systems tests. In addition, certain
ance and control system (a simplified block dia-
other measures were taken to further this ap-
gram is shown in fig. 2-1) typically represents
proach, such as the utilization of the external
this approach. The system is capable of carry-
geometric configuration and general heat pro-
ing out navigation, guidance, and the precise
tection approach of the Mercury spacecraft.
space maneuvers needed for such activities as
The Titan II applicability has already been
rendezvous, maneuvering, reentry, and launch mentioned.
guidance. At the same time, such major ele-
The ground-test program not only involved
ments of the system as the inertial platform,
rigorous component and subsystems qualifica-
tion and the usual structural testing, but also in-
cluded many special test articles for integrated
J Horizon J
testing. These test articles included an air-
[ inertial ]"_'_J , sca, ner J
borne systems functional test stand for the
Hand launch vehicle and production spacecraft ele-
ments for ejection-seat tests, electrical and elec-
oi ,,o,I I I Io,s ,oysI I tronic compatibility tests, landing-system drop
oommon IIJ tests, at-sea tests, zero-g tests, and also a com-
I At,,tu e
plete flight spacecraft for thermal-balance tests.
As indicated on figure 2-2, a high level of
ground test effort commenced at the outset of
the program and was sustained past the first
ime I I ro ols,oo
I reference I I system J
several flights. The ability to fly with some
[ system I I I qualification t_ting incomplete is related to the
differences between the early spacecraft config-
Fzova_. 2-1.--Example of Gemini systems applicable to
future programs and missions (guidance and con- urations and the long-duration and rendezvous
trol system shown). spacecraft configurations. It was hoped that

I 1962 I 1963 11964 I 1965 I 1966 I around the spacecraft and minimize damage
Development test
P AAUUE while testing or replacing equipment.
Although repetitive testing still exists, it has
Launch vehicte been possible to curtail it because of the preser-
vation of integrity features previously discussed
Qualification test
and because of the improvement in test flow, to
be discussed later. An outcome of the Gemini
Launch vehicle
Program experience is that system reliability is
Flight qualification
achieved as a result of the basic development,
GT GLV systems-SC structure 4
qualification, and reliability testing; conse-
Gn" SC systems validation .eb

quently, repetitive testing of the space vehicle
GITr Crew interface validation
need not be used for this purpose.
Operational demonstration Another important aspect of the program is
GtV" 4 days-EVA the delivery of flight-ready vehicles, including
GV 8 days-fuel cell-radar Government-furnished equipment, from the
GVI-A Rendezvous
manufacturer's plant. This objective dictates
G'oll" 14 days
complete integrated testing at the factory and
Operational demonstration 8, application includes crew participation in system tests, sim-
G _ through X I I rendezvous- docking - EVA - ulated flights, stowage reviews, and altitude-
chamber runs. Equally important, it means the
FIGURE 2-2.--Gemini test program. delivery of vehicles with essentially zero open
items. All elements of the Gemini team, both
launch vehicle and spacecraft, have worked ex-
the ground testing could be completed earlier,
tremely hard to achieve this end.
but the problems that were isolated and the re-
At Cape Kennedy the checkout plans have
quired corrective action prevented earlier ac-
not been inflexible. They are continuously un-
complishment. In spite of the great effort in-
der review and are changed when the knowledge
volved, it was better to utilize a ground-test
gained shows that a change is warranted. Some
program to ferret out problems than to encoun-
of the testing required for the first flights is no
ter them in flight.
longer required or, in some cases, even desirable.
The ability to minimize flight qualification
Improvements in test sequences have also been
tests is also indicated in figure 2-9. Two un-
achieved, and these avoid excessive cabling-up
manned flights were required prior to the first
or cabling-down, or other changes in the test
manned flight, and one manned flight test was
configuration. These alterations in test plans
required before proceeding into the operational
are carefully controlled and are implemented
program. No problems that significantly im-
only after detailed review by all parties
pacted following flights were encountered on
these early flights.
Buildup of Mission Complexity
Streamlined Launch Preparations

Although the Gemini flights have built up

Activities aimed at streamlining the launch
preparations and the other checkout activities rapidly in operational capability, the planning
commenced with the design. In the case of endeavors have been orderly in order to make

the spacecraft, the majority of equipment was this buildup possible. The progressive buildup
placed outside the pressure vessel, with large in mission duration is obvious from figure 2-2,
removable doors providing a high percentage of but this philosophy also applies to most cate-
equipment exposure during tests. Connectors gories of the flight operations and will be dis-
were designed integral with each piece of equip- cussed in more detail in subsequent papers. It
ment so that, when aerospace ground equipment can be stated that, from systems considerations
was required for tests, the flight wire bundles alone, the 14-day flight of Gemini VII might
need not be disconnected. These and similar not have been possible without the prior experi-
features allow multiple operations to take place ence of the 8-day flight of Gemini V.

218-556 0--66------2

Another aspect of the buildup idea is the con- adequate capability and flexibility of simulation
trol of configuration to avoid flight-to-flight facilities.
impact. The fuel cells and the cryogenic stow- Complex Mission Operations
age of their reactants are by far the newest de- The fundamentals of manned-mission opera-
velopments of all the Gemini systems. They
tions were demonstrated in the Mercury Pro-
were first flown "off-line" on Gemini II to ob-
gram where the flight-control functions of
tain information on prelaunch activation and
orbital insertion, orbit determination, systems
on their integrity in the launch and weightless
monitoring, retrofire time, orbital landing-point
environment. The next planned use was on
prediction, and recovery were developed. These
Gemini V, where a fuel-cell power system was
features also apply to Gemini flight control, but
a mission requirement. To permit concentra-
in a greatly expanded sense. There are many
tion on the basic flight objectives, the intermedi-
reasons for the increased requirements. On a
ate flights were planned with batteries as the
rendezvous mission, the Gemini space vehicle
source of electrical power. Similarly, the is launched on a variable azimuth that is set-in
Gemini VI-A spacecraft utilized battery power
just prior to launch, and the vehicle yaw-steers
so that possible results of the Gemini V flight
into orbit. These features affect both the flight-
would not impact on the first space rendezvous.
control function and the recovery operations for
This arrangement resulted in an excellent inte-
launch aborts. Also during rendezvous mis-
gration of these new systems into the flight pro-
sions, flight control must be exercised over two
gram. The good performance of the fuel-cell
vehicles in orbit at the same time, both of which
systems now warrants their use on all subse-
have maneuvering capability. The orbit ma-
quent flights.
neuvering further complicates the recovery
Flight Crew Exposure operation by requiring mobility of recovery
Gemini objectives require that complex forces. These factors, combined with the rela-
operational tasks be demonstrated in earth tively higher complexity of the Gemini space-
orbit, but it is also desired to provide the maxi- craft, require the rapid processing and display
mum number of astronauts with space-flight of data and a more centralized control of the
experience. As a result, no flight to date has operation. The maneuvering reentry is another
been made with crewmembers who have flown aspect of the Gemini Program that complicates
a previous Gemini mission. In fact, two sig- the flight control and recovery operations.
nificant flights, Gemini IV and VII, were made The long-duration missions have required
with crews who had not flown in space before. shift-type operations on the flight-control teams
In the other three flights, the command pilot and their support groups. This mode of opera-
had made a Mercury flight. The results tion increases the training task and introduces
achieved attest to the character and basic capa- additional considerations, such as proper phas-
bilities of these men and also reflect the impor- ing from one shift to the other.
tance of an adequate training program. Again, The Mission Control Center at Houston was
a more detailed discussion of the subject will designed to support these more complex func-
be presented in subsequent papers. tions, and these functions have been carried out
The flight crew require detailed familiarity with considerable success. It is felt th[tt the im-
with and confidence in their own space vehicle. plementation and demonstration of this part of
This is achieved through active participation in the Gemini capability will be one of the largest
the flight-vehicle test activities. The flight contributions in support of the Apollo Program.
crews require many hours of simulation time to
Flexible Flight Planning
gain proficiency in their specific mission tasks,
as well as in tasks common for all missions. Another facet of the Gemini flights is flexi-
With short intervals between missions, the bility in flight planning and control. Require-
availability of trained crews can easily become ments for flexibility have existed in both the
a constraint, and careful planning is necessary preflight activities and in the manner in which
to avoid this situation. Much of this planning the actual flight is carried out. The prime
is of an advanced nature in order to insure the example of preflight flexibility is the implemen-

tation of the Gemini VII/VI-A mission subse- period of approximately 2 weeks following each
quent to the aborted rendezvous attempt of the mission. All problems are not necessarily
original Gemini VI mission. Although stren- solved at the end of the 30-day period, but iso-
uous effort was required in all areas, these ac- lation of problems, evaluation of their impact,
tivities did take place essentially in accordance and initiation of corrective action have been
with the plan. possible.
During actual flights, the need has often In carrying out these activities, a formal task
arisen to alter the flight plans. These changes group is set up. Rather than having a perma-
have been implemented without affecting the nent evaluation team, personnel are assigned
primary objectives of the mission. They have who have been actively working in the specific
also been initiated in a manner to obtain a high areas of concern before the flight and during
degree of benefit from the mission in terms of the flight. This approach provides personnel
all the predetermined flight objectives. In already knowledgeable with the background of
some cases, new tasks have been incorporated the particular flight. Corrective action is in-
in the flight plan during the flight, as was the itiated as soon as a problem is isolated and de-
phantom rendezvous and ground transponder fined. At this point in the program, impact of
interrogation on Gemini V when difficulties one flight on another has not proved to be a
forced abandonment of the rendezvous-evalu- major constraint.
ation-pod exercise. While detailed premission
Personnel Motivation
flight planning is a requirement, the ability to
modify rapidly has been of great benefit to the Although good plans and procedures are
program. needed in a major program, well-motivated
people must be behind it. Teamwork comes
Postflight Analysis and Reporting
primarily from a common understanding
In a manned operation, it is necessary to iso- through good communications. In the Gemini
late and resolve problems of one flight before Pi'ogram, an effort has been made to facilitate
direct contact at all levels. Good documen-
proceeding with the next. In the Gemini Pro-
gram, an attempt has been made to establish an tation is necessary but should not constrain
analysis and reporting system which avoids this direct discussions. Individual people, right
potential constraint. The general plan is down to the production line, must fully realize
shown in figure 9-3. In targeting for 2-month their responsibility. This effort starts with
launch centers, the publication of the mission special selection and training, but it is necessary
evaluation report was set at 30 days. In turn, to sustain the effort. With this in mind, a
a major part of the data handling, reduction, number of features directly related to the indi-
and analyses activities takes place during a vidual have been included in the flight-safety
programs. The launch-vehicle program is an
Data reduction '_ outstanding example of this effort. People
Data analysis working on Gemini hardware are given a unique
Anomaly m badge, pin, and credentials. Special awards
are presented for outstanding work. Special
Failure analyses,/
programs are held to emphasize the need for
Crew debriefing Z_
zero defects. A frequent extra feature of such
Corrective action I programs is attendance and presentations by
Reports Z_ A Z_ the astronauts. Much interest has been ex-
Summary Quick Mission hibited in this feature, and it serves to empha-
look evaluation
I size the manned-flight safety implications of
Anomaly reviews ZX _ ZX the program.
Before leaving this subject, the effect of in-
End of FOM +50 days Start
mission next centive contracts should also be pointed out.
All major Gemini contracts, although differing
FZOtrSE 2-3.--Postflight analysis and evaluation. in detail, incorporate multiple incentives on

performance, cost, and schedule. The experi-

ence with these contracts has been very good in
providing motivation throughout the contractor
organization, and they have been structured to
provide this motivation in the desired direction.
The incentive features have served to enhance
program visibility, both for the Government
and for the contractors.

Gemini Flight Results

Gemini Objeetives
A t the outset of the Gemini Program, a series
of flight objectives was set forth. As stated
previously, these objectives were directed at the
demonstration and investigation of certain
operational features required for the conduct of
future missions, particularly the Apollo mis-
sions. These original objectives include : long-
duration flights in excess of the requirements of
the lunar-landing mission; rendezvous and
docking of two vehicles in earth orbit; the de-
velopment of operational proficiency of both
flight and ground crews; the conduct of experi-
ments in space ; and controlled land-landing.
Several objectives have been added to the pro-
gram, including extravehicular operations and
onboard orbital navigqtion. One objective,
controlled land-landing, has been deleted from
the program because of development-time con-
straints, but an important aspect of this
objective continues to be included-the active
control of the reentry flight path to achieve a
precise landing point. Initial demonstrations FIQURE
24.-Lift-off of Gemini space vehicle.
of most of these objectives have been made, but
effort in these areas will continue in order to I n orbital operations, all missions have taken
investigate the operational variations and ap- place with no significant crew physiological or
plications which are believed to be important. psychological difficulties (fig. 2-5). The proper
I n addition, the areas yet to be demonstrated, stowage, handling, and restowage of equipment
such as docking and ollboard orbital navigation, has been a major effort. There hns been a tend-
will be investigated on subsequent flights. ency to overload activities early in the mission.
This is undesirable because equipment dificul-
Mission Results ties are quite likely to become evident early in
the mission. It has always been possible to
The flight performance of the launch vehicle
develop alternate plans and to work around
has been almost entirely without anomalies (fig. these equipment difficulties in carrying out the
2 4 ) . There hare been no occasions to utilize basic flight plan. The cabin environment has
backup guidance or any of the abort modes. proved satisfactory, but pressure-suit comfort
On two occ:Isions, the Gemini I1 and VI-A and mobility considerations make doffing and
missions, the automatic-shutdo~~ll capability donning capabilities desirable. The perform-
was used successfully to prevent lift-off with ance of the spacecraft maneuvering and attitude
launch-vehicle hmdware discrepancies. control has been outstanding. Special orbital
~ ~~~


Frowe 24-Extravehicular activity during Gemini IV


FIGUBE VI1 flight crew onboard recovery

tasks, such as extravehicular activities, rendez-

vous, and experiments, have been conducted
very satisfactorily. During the extravehicular
investigation on Gemini I V (fig. 2-6), no dis-
orientation existed, and controlled maneuvering
capability was demonstrated. This capability
is felt to be a prerequisite to useful extravehicu-
lar operations. The straightforn-ard inanner Z7.-Rendezvous
FIQWE during Gemini VI-A and VI1
with which the rendezvous was accomplished missions.
(fig. 2-7) does indeed reflect the extremely
heavy effort in planning, analysis, and training
that went into it.
The Gemini experiments have been of a nature
that required or exploited man's capability to
discriminate for the collection of data, and then
retrieve the data for postflight evaluation.
During the flights, 54 experiments were con-
ducted (fig. 2-8). All of the experiment flight
objectives, except for about three, have been
All retrofire and reentry operations have been
performed satisfactorily, although only the last
two missioiis demonstrated precise controlled
maneuvering reentry (fig. 2-9). I n the Gemini - -
VI-A and VI1 landings, an accuracy of about FIGURE
2-8.-Typical experiment activity.

.*- -.

%%-View through spacecraft window during

6 miles was achieved, and this is approaching

the capabilities of the system being utilized.
Recovery has always been rapid, and the sup- FIQURE
'&lO.--Recovery operations.
port of recovery by the Department af Defense
has been excellent (fig. 2-10). culties, thereby achieving significant results
Concluding Remarks from each flight.
The flights, thus far, have served to provide
The Gemini design concepts and comprehen- an initial demonstration of most of the Gemini
sive ground test program have enabled the flight
ffight objectives. Future flights will expIore
program to be conducted at a rapid pace and to
remaining objectives as well as variations and
meet program objectives. Much credit in this
regard must be given to James A. Chamberlin, applications of those already demonstrated.
who spedieaded the conceptual effort on the The Gemini team has worked exceedingly
Gemini Program. hard to make the program a success, and the
Although flight operations have been rela- special effort in developing teamwork and in-
Lively complex, they have been carried out dividual motivations has been of considerable
smoothly and in a manner to circumvent diffi- benefit.

By DUNCANR. COLLINS,Manager, Ofice of Spacecraft Management, Gemini Program Ofice, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center; HOMERW. DOTTS,Deputy Manager, Ofice of Spacecraft Management,
Gemini Program Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; WILBURNE
F. HOYLER,Gemini Program
Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and KENNETHF. HECHT,Gemini Program Ofice, N A S A
Manned Spacecraft Center

The flight sequence of the two-man Gemini
spacecraft from lift-off through reentry and
landing is similar to that of the Mercury space-
craft ; however, additional capabilities are in-
corporated in its design for each phase of flight.
The Gemini spacecraft has the capability of
adjusting its own insertion velocity after sep-
arating from the launch vehicle. It also can
maneuver in space, as well as control its trajec-
tory during reentry. The Gemini spacecraft is
configured to facilitate assembly, testing, and
servicing. I t s two-man crew has provided the
capability to accomplish complicated mission
objectives. I t s built-in safety features cover all
phases of flight and have greatly increased the
confidence in the practicality of manned space
The Gemini spacecraft with its launch vehicle,
shown in figure 3-1, is the second generation of
manned space vehicles produced in the United
States. The Gemini launch vehicle is a modified
version of the Air Force Titan I1 ballistic
missile. The spacecraft incorporates many con-
cepts and designs that were proved during Proj-
ect Mercury, as well as new designs required by
the advanced Gemini mission objectives and
more operational approach.

Flight Sequence
3-l.-Gemini space vehicle at lift-off.
The combined length of the Gemini launch diameter of the spacecraft decreases forward of
vehicle and spacecraft is approximately 110 feet. the interface.
The maximum diameter of both vehicles is 10 The launch vehicle consists of two stages:
feet, which is constant from their common inter- the first stage separates approximately 155 sec-
face to the base of the launch vehicle. The onds after lift-off; the second-stage engine is


shut down approximately 335 seconds after lift- tion and the equipment-adapter section. The
off. These values vary somewhat depending retrorocket-adapter section contains the four
upon performa/_ce, atmospheric conditions, and retrorockets, and the equipment-a&tpter section
the insertion velocities required for a particular contains systems or parts of systems which are
mission. Separation of the spacecraft from the used only in orbit and are not required for
second stage is initiated by the crew approxi- reentry and recovery. The reentry vehicle con-
mately 20 seconds after second-stage engine tains the pressurized cabin, the crew, flight con-
shutdown. This time delay assures that the trols, displays, the life-support system, and the
thrust of the second-stage engine has decayed crew provisions. It also contains the reentry-
sufficiently to prevent recontact between the control-system section and rendezvous and re-
two vehicles during separation. Two 100- covery section. Other systems, some used only
pound thrusters, located at the base of the space- for reentry and some used during all flight
craft, are used to separate the two vehicles. phases, are installed in the reentry vehicle.
These thrusters are nominally fired for several The Gemini spacecraft has the capability to
seconds; however, this time may be extended, if maneuver in space with an orbital attitude and
necessary, for insertiou velocity adjustment. maneuver system, which is located in the
On two missions, this time was held to a mini- adapter section. Spacecraft attitude is con-
mum to permit launch-vehicle station-keeping trolled with eight 95-pound thrusters, and trans-
exercises. lation along any axis is accomplished with
six 100-pound thrusters and two 85-pound
In-Orbit Configuration and Capability
thrusters. This system has been used ex-
Figure 3-9 shows the in-orbit configuration tensively during all Gemini flights to make
of the spacecraft. The spacecraft is manufac- in-plane and out-of-plane maneuvers. The suc-
cessful rendezvous between the Gemini VI-A
tured in two major assemblies: the reentry
vehicle and the adapter. These assemblies are and VII spacecraft was accomplished with this
system and the associated guidance system.
held together by three structural straps spaced
approximately 190 ° apart at the interface. Reentry Sequence

Electrical cables and tubing cross this interface

In preparation for the reentry sequence, the
at these three points. The adapter serves not
spacecraft is placed in retrograde attitude using
only as the transition structure between the
the orbital attitude and maneuver system
reentry vehicle and the launch vehicle, but also
(fig. 3-3). The reentry control system, located
as the service module for the reentry vehicle
in the reentry vehicle, is then activated and
while in orbit. The adapter is separated into
provides attitude control through the rentry
two compartments: the retrorocket-adapter sec-
phase. The equipment-adapter section is then
separated wit'h a shaped-charge pyrotechnic,
followed by the sequential firing of the four
Reentry control --155.84" _1' 90.00" retrorockets. After retrograde, the retro-
rocket-adapter section, containing the spent
system section ........ .
Rendezvous and _ I retrorockets, is separated from the reentry
rec°very secti°n--'/ II I vehicle and is jettisoned by a spring which
exerts a force at the center line of the heat
" 3s86"2938'al I"1 I I 1,2o' The concept of jettisoning the spacecraft sec-
_0 _LCL._ .,,, . , ,d,o tion containing systems not required for reentry
was adopted for the following reasons :
(1) It reduced the size and weight of the
adapter section .... -_-,' :I: ,// reentry vehicle. As the reentry vehicle had to
Equipment I / I be provided with external heat-protection
adapter section .... I...... ' /
materials for reentry, it follows that its size
_Reenlry veh i cle ---.--I_----Ad a pte r ---- _
should be minimized to reduce overall space-
Fmu_ 3-2.--Configuration of Gemini spacecraft. craft weight.

"rR-50 see

Retrofire (TR) TR+45sec

FIGURE 3--3.--Retrograde sequence.

(2) The adapter skin and stringers provided 3-4) causes the vehicle to trim aerodynamically
a radiutor for the environmental control system at an angle of attack, thus providing a lift vec-
in orbit. The configuration of this structure, tor normal to the flight path. A controlled
which was designed for the launch and orbit trajectory to a desired touchdown point (fig.
environment, made it easily adaptable as a 3-5) is made by varying the bank angles to the
radiator. right or to the left. A maximum-lift trajec-
(3) Space and center-of-gravity constraints tory is obtained by holding a zero bank angle
do not exist in the adapter sections to the degree through reentry. A zero-lift ballistic trajec-
they do in the reentry vehicle; therefore, the tory is obtained by rolling the vehicle continu-
adapters are less sensitive to equipment loca- ously at a constant rate, which nullifies the lift
tion and design changes. vector. When making a controlled reentry,
(4) It provided a configuration with much bank angles greater than 90 ° are avoided (ex-
flexibility. The design of systems located in cept when flying a zero-lift trajectory) to pre-
the adapter has varied considerably with each clude excessive heating rates and loadings. A
mission. As an example, the Gemini III and controlled reentry may also be executed using
VI-A systems were designed to support a 2-day a combination of the zero-lift trajectory and
mission using battery power. Gemini IV de-
bank technique.
sign supported a 4-day mission using battery
power. Gemini V and VII were powered with
Fliqhl pa1'h .......
fuel-cell electrical systems which supported
0" Bank Lift vector ..... ,7
long-duration missions of up to 14 days.
Although the configuration of the systems
installed in the adapter varied to a great extent,
little change was required in the reentry vehicle.
Left Drag vector--,
The Gemini reentry vehicle is provided with
the capability to control the reentry trajectory
J C.g. offset ......
and to land at a predetermined touchdown
point. An asymmetric center of gravity (fig. FZOT.raZ 3-4.--Reentry vehicle trim.

.-----Sail Istlc ..... _ Footprtnf-_ .---Target

/" ", ,-_--_-._- * 40 n.mi.
diately releases the drogue, allowing it to ex-
tract the 18-foot-diameter pilot parachute. At
Control]ed reentry _, I _-40n.mL
-variable bank angle -A -200 n.rni. *200n. mi. 2.5 seconds after sequence initiation, pyrotech-
nics release the recovery section, to which the
r--Start effective aerodynamic lift pilot parachute is attached and in which the
i i i i
"J_.L Controlled reentry- main parachute is stowed. As the reentry ve-
500K i_Do4 ---variable bank angle_
,T-- ---Max lift hicle falls away, the main parachute, an 84-
"o zero bank foot-diameter ring-sail, deploys. The pilot
2 200K
parachute diameter is sized such that recontact
B altlisfic or zero lift---"i s,_::: lie _,%

lOOK ,_ngle between the recovery section and the main para-
-- - Continuous roll -- _ 6
-Constant rate I chute will not occur during descent. After the
I I t
-1200 -1000-800 -600 -400 -200 200 400 crew observes that the main parachute has de-
Range, n.mi. ployed and that the rate of descent is nominal,
repositioning of the spacecraft is initiated.
FIOURE 3-5.--Reentry control.
The spacecraft is rotated from a vertical posi-
tion to a 35 ° noseup position for landing. This
Landing Sequence
landing attitude reduces the acceleration forces
A single-parachute landing system is used on at touchdown on the water to values well below
Gemini spacecraft, with the ejection seats serv- the maximum which could be tolerated by the
ing as a backup. In the normal landing se- crew or by the spacecraft.
quence (fig. 3-6), an 8-foot-diameter drogue
parachute is deployed manually at approxi- Spacecraft Design
mately 50 000 feet altitude. Below 50 000 feet,
Reentry Vehicle
this drogue provides a backup to the reentry
control system for spacecraft stabilization. At The reentry vehicle (fig. 3-7) is manufac-
10 600 feet altitude, the crew initiates the main- tured in four major subassemblies: the ablative
parachute deployment sequence, which imme- heat shield, the section containing the pressur-

50,000 flalt

p!lot deploy
10,600 ft air

section separation,
main chute


FIGURE3-6.--Landing sequence.
The structure of the reentry vehicle is pre-
A_. shield
dominately titanium, and it is skinned inter-
nally to the framing. The vehicle is protected
from the heat of reentry by a silicone elastomer
ablative heat shield on the large blunt-end fore-
body of the vehicle, by thin Ran4 41 radiative
Reentry control _lJ'f4"_ shingles on the conical section, and by beryllium
shingles which provide a heat sink on the small
end of the vehicle. MIN-K insulation is used
as a conductive barrier between the shingles
and the structure, and Thermoflex blankets are
Side used as a radiative barrier. Flat, double-
access skinned shear panels form a slab-sided pressure
Rendezvous 8_ doors
recovery section vessel, within the conical section, for the crew.
Two large, hinged hatches provide access to the
FXOURE 3-7.--Reentry vehicle structure.
cabin. The reentry vehicle structure is de-
signed with an ultimate factor of safety of 1.36.
ized cabin, and the reentry control system and The highest reentry heating rates are attained
the rendezvous and recovery sections. The if the spacecraft aborts from a launch trajectory
vehicle was sized to house the pressurized cabin several thousand feet per second short of the
with two crewmembers and associated equip- orbital insertion velocity and reenters along a
ment, and other systems required to be located ballistic trajectory, whereas the highest total
in the reentry vehicle. The use of two crew- heat is sustained during reentry from orbit
members on Gemini flights, as opposed to the along a maximum-lift trajectory (fig. 3-8).
one-man crew in Project Mercury, has resulted The Gemini spacecraft was designed for a max-
in expanded flight accomplishments and flexi- imum stagnation-point heating rate of 70 Btu/
bility in flight planning and operation. For ex- ft2/sec and a maximum total heat of 13 138
ample, experiment activity would have been Btu/ft 2. Maximum total heat is the critical
sharply curtailed had only one crewmember design condition for the ablative heat shield and
been aboard. With only one crewmember, ex- for the beryllium shingles located on the small
travehicular activity would have been unlikely end of the vehicle, while maximum heating rate
as an added objective. Teamwork in prepara- is the critical design condition on the Ren_
tion for each flight is considered to be a major shingles on the conical section.
asset in the crew training programs. Further- The trajectory for the Geh_ini II mission was
more, the number of trained crew personnel is tailored to produce high heating rates as a test
expanded, and this will substantially assist the of the critical design condition on the Ren6
Apollo Program. Many major program ob-
jectives involving inflight control and crew 14 - 7Or-
.... Heating rote
management of spacecraft systems could not
12 - . 60 I-
have been accomplished had only one crew-
member been aboard. = I0 - _"-5o L Total

! Heating

161 n. mi. circular
from o
,_ =
The Mercury blunt-body concept was selected o 8 - "_ 40t- rate
",.. /i Maximum lift
for the Gemini spacecraft and provides a con- o
i ,.,,." ",<" Variation of heating
figuration which is compatible with the design 6- so - i/
i i'....
__ rate and total heat
during reentry
a mode .3 abort

requirements necessary to meet mission objec- "5 4- .E201- .',_ . s., ".
' : (zero lift)
tives. From a reliability, cost, and schedule
standpoint, the advantages of using this con-
2 -'r IOI- .'


\ "k I I
cept are obvious, as much of the experience and 0 - 0 L 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
technology gained on Project Mercury could be Time from 400,000 ft,
hundreds of seconds
directly applied to the development and de-
sign of the Gemini spacecraft. _IGURE 3-8.--Spacecraft reentry heating versus time.

shingles. Based on the Gemini I1 trajectory, corded as 1032O F, against a predicted value of
the stagnation heating rate reached a calculated 1109O F.
value of 71.8 Btu/ft2/sec, slightly in excess of With the exception of the suit-circuit module
that predicted. The R e d shingle temperatures in the environmental control system and that
mere generally as expected. However, in one equipment which must be accessible to the crew,
localized area-in the wake of a fairing located all other major system components in the re-
on the conical section near the heat shield on the entry vehicle are located in accessible areas
most windward side (fig. 3-9)-several small outside the cabin (fig. 3-10). This concept
holes were burned in the shingles. An addi- was used on the Gemini spacecraft t o reduce the
tional wind-tunnel test was conducted on a 10- size of the pressurized cabin and to provide
percent model, and results indicated that minor better access to the equipment during manufac-
changes in the fairing configuration would not turing assembly and during the entire test
decrease the heat intensity. The intensity was, phase up to launch. This arrangement also
however, a function of Reynolds number and allows manufacturing vork tasks and tests to
of the angle of attack. As a result of this test, be performed in parallel, thus shortening sched-
the trim angle on subsequent spacecraft was ules. It has the added advantage of "unclutter-
slightly reduced, and the thickness of two R e d ing" the cabin, which is the last area to be
shingles aft of the fairing was increased from checked out prior to launch.
0.016 to 0.025 inch. The suit-circuit module in the environmental
Heat-shield bond-line temperatures a n d control system is located in the cabin to circum-
beryllium shingle temperatures were lower than vent the possibility of oxygen leakage to am-
those predicted. The hottest area at the heat- bient. The module is installed in an area
shield bond line measured only 254' F at land- below the crew and, for servicing or replace-
ing, although i t was predicted to be 368" F. ment, it is accessible from the outside through
The peak temperature of the beryllium was re- a door located in t,he floor of the cabin. This
" v-__( " "*- - "-*"*-,"
results in a minimum of interference with other

The retrorockets are the only major compo-

nents located in the retrorocket-adapter section
(fig. 3-11). These critical units are isolated in
this section from other equipment in the space-
craft by the reentry-vehicle heat shield and by
the retrorocket blast shield located on the for-
ward face of the equipment-adapter section.

FIGURE of reentry heating on the Gemini FIGURE
3-lO.-Installation of equipment in the reentry
I1 spacecraft. vehicle.

/ Equipment adapter
/ section They perform a variety of operations including
/ _Retrograde adapter separation of structure, jettisoning of fairings,
cutting tubing and electrical cables at separa-
;i,ion tion planes, dead-facing electrical connectors,
functioning and sequencing the emergency es-
cape system, and initiating retrograde and re-
entry systems.
Because of the varied applications of the py-
rotechnics, the individual designs likewise vary.
However, all pyrotechnics have a common de-
sign philosophy : redundancy. All pyrotechnic
devices are powered redundantly or are redun-
dant in performing a given function, in which
\\Retrorocket case the redundant pyrotechnics are ignited
blast shield
separately. For example, in a drogue-
parachute cable cutter where it is not practicable
I_GUaE 3-11.--Spacecraft adapter assembly.
to use redundant cutters, two cartridges, each
ignited by separate circuitry, accomplish the
This isolation protects these units from shrap-
function (see fig. 3-13) ; whereas, for cutting a
nel in the event a tank ruptures in the equip-
wire bundle at a separation plane, two cutters,
ment-adapter section. In addition, when the
each containing a cartridge ignited by separate
retrorockets are fired in salvo in the event
circuitry, accomplish the function redundantly.
of an abort during launch, the blast shield pre-
vents the retrorocket blast from rupturing the Escape Modes
tanks located in the equipment-adapter section
and the launch-vehicle second-stage tank. Ejection seats, as shown in figure 3-14, pro-
Such an event could possibly damage the retro- vide a means of emergency escape for the flight
rocket cases before the firing was complete. crew in the event of a launch vehicle failure on
Systems not required for reentry and recovery the launch pad, or during the launch phase up
are located in the equipment-adapter section. to 15 000 feet. Above 15 000 feet, retrorocket
Most of this equipment is mounted on the aft salvo firing is used to separate the spacecraft
side of the retrorocket blast shield. The sys- from the launch vehicle, after which the para-
tems in this area are designed and assembled as chute is used to recover the spacecraft.. The
modules to reduce assembly and checkout time. seats, however, remain a backup to that escape
The adapter section is a conventional, ex- ]node up to approximately 50 000 feet, and were
ternally skinned, stringer-framed structure. designed and qualified for the higher altitudes
The skin stringers are magnesium, and the and for the condition of maximum dynamic
frames are aluminum alloy. The stringers in- pressure. In addition, the seats provide a back-
corporate passages for the environmental- up landing system in the event of a main para-
control-system coolant fluid and are intercon- chuts failure, and become the primary landing
nected at the ends. This structure provides the system if the reentry vehicle is descending over
radiator for the environmental control system, land during landing. The usual function of
and its external surface is striped to provide the seat, however, is to provide a contoured
temperature control within the adapter. The couch for the crewman and adequate restraint
retrorocket blast shield is a fiber-glass sand- for the forces attendant to launch, reentry, and
which honeycomb structure. The adapter struc- landing.
ture is designed with an ultimate factor of Extensive tests were conducted on the ejection
safety of 1.36. seat system early in the program before it was
qualified for flight. These tests included simu-
Pyrotechnic Applications lated off-the-pad ejections, sled runs at maxi-
As shown in figure 3-12, pyrotechnics are mum dynamic pressure, and ejection from an
used extensivel_ in the Gemini spacecraft. F-106 airplane at an altitude of 40 000 feet.

FIGURE 3-12.--Location of pyrotechnic devices in the spacecraft.

Ejection seats were selected for the Gemini

Program in lieu of other escape systems pri-
marily for two reasons:
(1) This escape method was independent of
Cutter blade. _l _''jne Cartridges all other systems in the spacecraft. A failure
of any other system would not prevent emer-
gency escape from the spacecraft.
Parachute apex line guillotine (2) Ejection seats provided an escape mode
for a land landing system which was planned
Relrorocket ...... Equipment for Gemini early in the program.
adapter section adopter section
The use of hypergolic propellants in the
Cartridge. launch vehicle also influenced tile decision to use
ejection seats. The reaction time to operate the
system was compatible with the usage of hyper-
golic propellants with regard to size of the fire-
/,,tube (2fyp)
ball and its development rate.
Anvil- - - -_
Safety Features
Tubing cutter and sealer
Redundancy is incorporated into all Gemini
FIeUaE 3-13.--Tyl)ical pyrotechnic devices used in the systems which affect the safety of the crew
spacecraft. should a failure occur. Redundancy is also
launch vehicle during the prelaunch and the
launch phases.
(3) Two secondary oxygen bottles are pro-
vided, either of which will support the crew for
one orbit and reentry in the event a loss of the
primary oxygen supply occurrs. All other
flight safety components in the environmental
control system are redundant.
(4) I n the event ,that a loss of reference of
the guidance platform should occur, the crew
has the capability of performing reentry control
using out-the-window visual aids.
(5) The reentry control system is completely
redundant. Two identical but completely in-
dependent systems are used, either of which has
the capability of controlling the reentry vehicle
through reentry. These systems are sealed with
zero-leakage valves until activated shortly
before retrograde.
(6) A drogue parachute, which is normally
deployed a t 50 000 feet altitude after reentry,
backs u p the reentry control system for stability
until the main parachute is deployed.
(7) Ejection seats provide an escape mode
if the recovery parachute fails to deploy or is
FIGUICE ejection seat. damaged such that the rate of descent is
incorporated into selected components in non- Conclusions
flight safety systems, with the objective of in-
creasing probability of mission success. Crew Although many advanced systems and con-
safety has been emphasized throughout the pro- cepts are used in Gemini, the capability to ma-
neuver in space is considered to be the most
gram, both in the design and in the operational
important and useful operational feature incor-
procedures. Some of the major spacecraft
porated in the vehicle. With this proved capa-
safety features are as follows: bility, many important mission objectives have
(1) The spacecraft inertial guidance system been met, and avenues are now open for more
serves as a backup to the launch-vehicle guid- advanced exercises in orbit. This basic tech-
ance system during the launch phase. nology obtained on the program provides a
(2) As described earlier, ejection seats and wealth of data for the planning and design of
retrorockets provide escape modes from the future space vehicles.

218-556 0 - 6 6 - 3

By RICHARD R. CARLEY, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; NORMAN SCHULZE,
Propulsion and Power Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; BENJAMIN R. DRONE, Gemini
Program 01rice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; DAVID W. CAMP, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center; and JOHN F. HAI_AWAY,Guidance and Control Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center

Summary the flight crew for control mode selection and

command of attitudes, as well as for detection
In accomplishing the Gemini Program objec- of malfunctions and selection of redundant sys-
tives, an onboard digital computer system, an tems, simplifies the system design and reduces
inertial platform reference system, a radar sys- the need for complicated protective interlocks.
tem, and control systems using hypergolic bi-
propellant propulsion have been developed and Guidance, Control, and Propulsion Systems
successfully demonstrated. Implementation

Introduction The features just discussed dictated the con-

figuration of the Gemini guidance, control, and
The program objectives of long-duration, propulsion equipment. Figure 4-1 is a block
rendezvous, and controlled-reentry missions
diagram of the systems.
have placed special requirements on the space- The guidance system consists of: (1) a digital
craft guidance and control systems• These ob- computer and an inertial measuring unit oper-
jectives required maximum reliability and flexi- ating toge]cher to provide an inertial guidance
bility in the equipment. This was accomplished system, and ('2) a radar system which provides
by utilization of simple design concepts, and by range, range rate, and line-of-sight angles to
careful selection and multiple application of the the computer and to the crew-station displays.
subsystems to be developed. The ground stations and the spacecraft are

Guidance and Control System Features equipped with a digital command system to
relay information to the spacecraft digital
In the development of an operational ren- computer.
dezvous capability, the geographical constraints The control system consists of: (1) redundant
on the mission are minimized by providing the horizon-sensor systems, ('2) an attitude con-
capability for onboard control of the terminal troller, (3) two translation-maneuver hand
rendezvous phase. To complete the rendezvous controllers, and (4) the attitude-control and
objectives, the spacecraft must be capable of maneuvering electronics which provide com-
• maneuvering, with respect to the target, so that mands to the reentry-control and to the orbit-
the target can be approached and a docking or attitude and maneuvering portions of the
mating operation can be accomplished.
propulsion system. The retrorocket propulsion
For failures in the launch vehicle, such as
engines are normally fired by a signal from the
engine hardover and launch vehicle overrates,
spacecraft time-reference system.
where effects are too fast for manual reaction,
Figure 4-'2 shows the arrangement of the
the automatic portion of the launch-vehicle
guidance, control, and propulsion equipment in
malfunction-detection system switches control
the spacecraft. The locations are shown for the
from the primary to tile secondary system. The
secondary system receives command signals thrust chamber assemblies, or engines, for the
from the spacecraft system for launch guidance. reentry control system, and for the orbital at-
To develop all operational guided reentry, on- titude and maneuver system. The attitude con-
board control has been provided. The use of troller is located between the two crewmembers,


Radio guidance _@ ......... _1 crew indicator

Spacecraft l Attitude Propellant
displays Ji
J station ,_
J Range J Hand

actuator _ i

-E_ -_
..... t
.... !
}_ Computer "_._t .
Gemini Launch _1 i = I Maneuver I OAMSII
' ,;l""itudeI'etsI',

r .....
__1 D, _pl_a_s'j "-I i[_'_J

J ' Rada' j_ H° !zo
L :

I Spacecraft 6
I i ocs J I Tran'°n_er
I L......................
Complex J Flashing
IJght I !

J Docking
light J Target

Spacecraft vn"

Fzeum_4-1.--Spacecraft guidance and control system.

CL .Flashing lights (2)

/00 i SYM 210°coverage

light cone
,......_ J

p ..... X. .___
_./t ronslation

LT,-_ , ___. __er

...... OAMS
_ranspond;r attitude

_I r°Retkre_s-- _ !_'__ _" __ )

Instrament/L.l_t..;_." "\\ I k _.,l'%'k_.3_ _"J,

lJ,/_/ II I

pone l.._._ _ _ k __'_--,_ J

Reentry !I_IL_'Z_I_III_ '\_, X _ " _J_llllJl_-_l_JlJ_

t'cr__ _ _r_ I 'OAMS translation thruster

_':,k_. _ _-lnertial platform

Radar-- II_
.:o:: .oo .o,o,,om
l_o'_irizon _""_&ttitude control

FZeURE4-2.--Arrangement of guidance and control system components in the spacecraft.


and a translation controller is located on each for launch guidance, rendezvous, reentry, and
side of the cabin. other calculations.
Two attitude display groups, located on the
Control System
instrument panel, use an eight-ball display for
attitude orientation, and are equipped with The control system (fig. 4-3) is basically a
three linear meter needles called flight director redundant rate-command system with the flight
indicators. During launch or reentry, these crew establishing an attitude reference and clos-
needles can be used to indicate steering errors ing the loop. Direct electrical commands to
or commands and permit the flight crew to the thrusters and a single-pulse-generation
monitor the primary system performance. The capability are also provided. The control sys-
needles can also be used to display attitude tem can be referenced to either of the two
errors and to provide spacecraft attitude- horizon-sensor systems to provide a redundant,
orientation commands. The radar range and low-power, pilot-relief mode. This mode con-
range-rate indicator used for the rendezvous trols the vehicle to the local vertical in pitch
missions is located on the left panel. and in roll. Either horizon sensor can also sup-
ply the reference for alining the platform in a
Gemini Guidance System
gyrocompassing-type automatic or manual
The inertial guidance system provides back- mode as selected by the crew. To achieve the
up guidance to the launch vehicle during ascent. desired degree of reliability, the spacecraft is
This system also determines the spacecraft orbit equipped with two separate reentry-control
insertion conditions which are used in comput- systems which include propellants, engines, and
ing the velocity increment required for achiev- electrical-control capability. Either reentry-
ing the targeted orbit apogee and perigee. control system is adequate for controlling space-
This computation is performed using the inser- craft attitude during the retrofire and reentry
tion velocity adjust routine. phases of the mission.
k low-gain antenna, interferometric, pulsed The control system was designed to operate
radar utilizing a transponder on the target ve- with on-off rather than proportional commands
hicle was selected to generate the information to the propulsion engine solenoids. This sim-
used 'by the computer to calculate the two im- plified operation reduced the design require-
pulse maneuvers required to achieve a rendez- ments on the system electronics, solenoids, and
vous with the target. valves, and on the dimensions and injector de-
The need to reference acceleration measure- sign of the thrust chamber assemblies, and also
ments and radar line-of-sight angles, as well as allowed the use of simple switch actuation for
to provide unrestricted attitude reference to the direct manual control. The engine thrust levels
crew, resulted in the selection of a four-gimbal selected were those which would provide trans-
stabilized platform containing three orthogo- lation and rotational acceleration capability
nally mounted accelerometers. It provides an adequate for the completion of all tasks even
inertial reference for launch and reentry, and a with any one engine failed, and which would
local vertical earth-oriented reference for orbit allow reasonable limit-cycle propellant-con-
attitude, using orbit-rate torquing. sumption rates for a long-period orbit operation.
The inertial guidance system also generates
Propulsion System
commands which, together with a cross-range
and down-range steering display, are used to The orbital attitude and maneuver system
reach a landing point from dispersed initial con- (fig. 4-4) uses a hypergolic propellant com-
ditions. Either an automatic mode, using the bination of monomethylhydrazine and nitrogen
displays for monitoring, or a man-in-the-loop tetroxide which is supplied to the engines by a
reentry-guidance technique can be flown. regulated pressurization system that uses helium
The digital computer utilizes a random-access gas stored at 2800 psi. The choice of these pro-
core memory with read-write, stored program, pellants, along with the on-off mode of opera-
and nondestruct features. This memory has a tion, minimized ignition requirements and per-
capacity of 4096 39-bit words. The computer mitted simplification of engine design. Con-
system provides the data processing necessary trolled heating units prevent freezing of the

Orbital attitude and -11

I maneuver system
I Astronaut _ and reticle I Maneuver

I [J Attitude
_1 display ' I P,opellant

Hand controllers i ^- _ d - I Attitude J ,I

..................... -AS-M--t .................... _ _1 TCAs !tl

l, [" Pulsemode b---, l _'-=--------=
IF- :1
I Pulse / I I / control
IIReentry system
I I=
I Pr . I I
I I e'_-'_Primaryelectl_ I_ Pr'mgry 4 _ l,
_._ / I I 1 _ I valve arJvers I I Iil _ II
-I.-. •_" am= O_f" i

• ----'1
D,rect I I S
Lec i Secondary _ Secondary i J J i! I----L--1 I
t I It_ e_ect I--1 --lvo'vedr_ve;sl-- I I! l_ II
/ I I / Direct 1 II I il -- I
• Prl

i: ; ' t ' '

I See
_ Rote gyros I _ l'l,i I Prop;llant l I
/ _ _ = _ i IiL _ I__ ji
_i _ ........................................ I ..................
r ....................

J Inertial e_.:
reference PI_,_J Horizon sensor J
I :/lOft

I Radar I_e : S_ Horizon sensor J

.............................. L ...................

FIGURE 4-3.--Control system.


storage ,

(He)_,, i ,h
/ Fuel tanks
J _
I Reserve
Relief valve ___ J tark (SC 7)
(typ)-. "_] I

Pressure _ I m @--Activation

_;rltp )°r_.... _ .--Activation Burst_'_ ._

Motor [_] 5_'//'_""" ° _ " '_"_

(typ) valve _ , *----- ,T_'2_._

_ "',,,,

Filter .... J__I

Ctypl-"u"c= I!.
., ,,_ /,// ",,\
,.,. il
(typ) _-- ,---,,_---J I: _
.-Crew [II-LI ' OAMS lines _\ -,_ 13

[7 ___1 heaters _, 12 \(,,

Operated by .... A solenoid
_T_ oxidizer _\ _"_...
pressure switch T E]--- lib lines
on,y _ "_,S
-Emergency ..... Act
voton r-Lr"
- - T'- _._. _,'_
" I

bypass of
regulator -Ivalve L,..P" 3 T 8
rPer;u_st roer""" "1_ (crew)

t (,yp)..J..._ ;a
/ Thruster no. Lb thrust
9 and I0 95
....... Fuel
II and 12 79
_Oxidizer Oxidizer
13 thru 16 95

FIGURE 4-4.--Orbital attitude and maneuver system.


propellants. A brazed, stainless-steel plumbing Flight units were delivered to the prime con-
system is used so that potential leakage points tractor with the flight computer program
and contamination are eliminated. Positive loaded, for installation in the spacecraft prior
expulsion bladders are installed in the propel- to spacecraft systems tests. During the devel-
lant tanks. Table 4-I shows the system char- opment of the guidance and control hardware,
acteristics for steady-state engine operation. it was established that temperature and random
The reentry-control system is of similar de- vibration environments were needed as part of
sign to .the orbital attitude and maneuver sys- the predelivery acceptance testson each flight
tem. _.blative-type engines to limit reentry unit to verify system capabilityand to establish
heating problems are used on the reentry vehi- and maintain effectivequality control. A two-
cle. To reduce hardware development require- sigma flightenvironment was used to uncover
ments and to permit a clean aerodynamic con- conditions not apparent in the normal testing
figuration, submerged engines, similar in design environment. Unsatisfactory conditions were
concept, are used in the orbital attitude and corrected, and the units ret_sted until proper
maneuver system. operation was obtained as a means for insuring
The separate retrograde propulsion system high reliability of the flight equipment.
consists of four spherical-case, polysulfide-am- For the Gemini guidance and control pro-
monium-perchlorate, solid-propellant motors. gram, many special tests were developed. As
The system is designed to assure safe reentry an example, a special inertial component run-in
after any three of the four motors have been test procedure (fig. 4-5) was used to determine
fired. The design also allows the system to be gyro normal-trend data and also to reject
.unstable gyros before installation in plat-
used for emergency separation of the spacecraft
from the launch vehicle after lift-off. forms. After a 40-hour run-in period, five
runup-to-runup drift measurements are ob-
Development Program tained, followed by subsequent sets of run-in
During tile development phase, each guidance and runup-to-runup measurements. The units
and control component underwent a compre- are rejected as having unstable characteristics
hensive series of ground tests, both individually if the drift trend is excessive, or if the effect of
and after integration with interfacing compo- the run-in and the storage-temperature-soak on
nents. These included engineering tests beyond the performance of the gyro creates an unusual
the qualification level; qualification tests; and spread within the sets of measurement bands
overstress, reliability, and complete systems tests or the amount of shift of the bands. Tests of

at the vendor's plant. The computer and in- this nature assure ade/quate selection of inertial
ertial-measurement-unit systems, engineering components and, along with 100 percent in-
models as well as flight hardware, were inte- spection of parts and similar techniques, have
grated at the computer manufacturer's plant. significantly improved system reliability.

TABLE 4-I.--Gemini Propulsion System Characteristics

Number of Thrust, Total Propellant Specific

Propulsion system engines lb, (i) impulse, weight, impulse,
lbFsec Ibm (b) lb,-sec/lbm

Orbital attitude and maneuver system ..... 8 23

2 79 710 27fi
180 000 25[
6 95 27_
16 23 18 500 72 28_
Reentry control system ..................
Retrorockets ........................... 4 2490 56 8O0 220 25_

• lb_=pounds of force.
b Ibm=pounds of mass.

Typical 40-hour run-in period l Contractors I

and J
i Basic band

! IT ypical run-upmeasurement J INASA organizations J

I I t

'l ', Trend Optional 3-day storage

, I -'1
_ll I I _ .'I I at 40°F
:dniC [q_--* INASA monthly ,ssuel
, , i i / _ting _ of Gemini

;---'-- I moth-flow reports |

,o--1 {
id C I To all users
L__ ce I
Proposed changes ,,
Time v/irA - ,..................
I Gemini
Gemini Chart(
e Control
Trend-Least square fit of means of last three
Approved changes
of TI TzTsT4

Mean band-Maximum spread of means of last four computer program

J NASA specification
Gemini onboard-
of T6TsT4T3T z

Average basic band-Algebraic overage of basic

bond values from lost four of T TsT4T3T 2 [MACsco I
FIGURE 4-5.--Gyro test procedure.
Onboard Computer Program Development
I oth flowsI
An extensive development program for the f
computer-stored program was established to
assure timely delivery, adequate verification,
and good reflection of mission requirements.
Figure 4-6 shows the basic organizational ar- I P0A I Lq Code
rangement that was established. A critical fea- T f
ture is the monthly issue of tile detailed system
I,Gs oecl I POA
description authorized and provided to all users
to assure common uuderstanding, and integrated
and coordinated implementation of supporting I IGS

requirements. The programs are subjected to [ LPRD spec J_ _ _J'--_pr°cedures_RD--'_

rigorous tests, including a mission verification
simulation program. These tests provide dy-
namic simulation of the flight computer, which ,r

has been loaded with the operational program; C¢ pe

all interfaces are exercised and all computer

logic and mode operation thoroughly demon-
strated. Figure 4-7 indicates a few of the de-
FIGURE 4-6.--Ma,th flow control procedures and re-
tailed steps and iterations required in the devel-
quired intermediate goals.
opment of a successful computer program.
Figure 4-8 shows the computer-program de- the orbital attitude and maneuver system engine
velopment schedule, and also indicates the re- operation reveals that engine life is a function
quired lead time and development background. of the firing history (fig. 4-9). A long engine
Propulsion System Preflight Background life results from low-percent duty cycles which,
however, decrease specific impulse. To meet
A similar, extensive ground-test l)rogram was
the duty-cycle requirements of the Gemini space-
conducted on the propulsion systems during re-
search, (tevelopment, qualifi(,ation, relial)ility_ craft, the mixture ratio of the l)ropelhmts was
and complete systems-test programs. A full- decreased so that the combustion gas tempera-
scale retrorocket abort test was ('onducted in an tures would be reduced. Major design changes
altitude choral)or which detetlnined the required also were instituted to provide greater engine
nozzle-assembly design. integrity by permitting fuel-fihn-cooled walls
An analysis of the reentry control system and and reorientation of the thrust-chamber-

NASA specification 5000


Analysis for understanding

t 4000

Develop system math flow

Simplifications and approximations for SDC
Analysis for efficient programing 3000
lb_ ................. .--iP 3
Write 7090 simulation program i
I !
Check 7090 simulation
m 2000

I 7090 simulation
runs heck
logic flow)

r "
'Revise system math flow

Check detail versus system math flow

Engine safe-operating region
I I [ I I I
Assemble operational program 0 20 40 60 80 I0 0
I Coding of detail math flow
t Percent firing time,_xlO0
on time

Assem b_y debug
Run operational program on 7090 FIOURE 4-9.--Engine firing capability.
SDC simulation program (compare check cases,
roundoff and truncation, scaling incompatibilities)

assembly ablative layers. Special hot-fire tests

Prepare IGS acceptance test spec of the injector assemblies provided a basis for
't rejection of undesirable injectors prior to en-
Program tapes for GeTS
gine assembly.
--1 {"..... "
Corrections NASA monthly
determined issue of Gemim Flight Performance
from tests moth-flow reports
Guidance System Performance
FIGURE 4-7.--Required intermediate goals in math flow
develo )ment. The accumulated hours that the guidance and
control system was in operation during the vari-
ous missions are shown in table 4-II. Of all
1962 I t963 1964 I
f low 1965 ]Mission I the missions, Gemini V required the maximum
I A o V Engr model for number of operating hours on the following sys-
SC engr tests
tems and components :
2 _ Engr evalua?ion
(1) Platform--39 hours
3 A Q V () GFI (2) Attitude control and maneuver electron-
ics--142 hours
4 _ Terminated
(3) Primary horizon sensor--38 hours
5 /_" Terminated (4) Secondary horizon sensor--45 hours
The maximum operating time required for the
A Start date 3mad I _ GTT_
IBM go ahead
computer was 20 hours during the Gemini VI-A
0 First system math- 3 mad 2 _ G1_7 mission.
flow release

Sell-off da'te 6 b _ GV Beginning with the Gemini IV mission_ the

( G3_I'-A systems were subjected to repeated power-up
0 Mission verification 6d _ Jand
simulation complete _ G'_] and power-down cycling. After a periodic up-
PzGuP_ 4-8.--Computer program development status date of the emergency-reentry quantities for
chart. the Gemini IV computer_ the flight crew was

TABLE 4-II.--Gemini Component Operating Hours

Component Gemini II Gemini Gemini Gemini V Gemini Gemini Total


_omputer ................... O.2 4.7 6.3 16. 0 20. 0 6 53. 2

nertial measurement unit
(platform) ................ .2 4.7 9.7 32.7 20. 0 14 81.3
Lttitude control and maneuver
electronics ................. .2 4.7 37. 0 142.0 25. 7 91.5 301.
Iorizon scanner (primary) .... .2 2.2 33. 0 38.4 25. 4 16. 0 115. 2
torizon scanner (secondary) _ _ .2 2.5 .1 45. 0 .3 0 48.

unable to power-down the computer system in stage II flight and ,assuming that no insertion
using normal procedures. Power was removed correction had been m,_te. A range of apogees
using an abnormal sequence which altered the from 130 to 191 nautical miles was targeted on
computer memory and, therefore, prevented its the flights. Comparison of the actual values
subsequent use on the mission. Subsequent in- with those in the IVAR column shows that,
flight cycling of the switch reestablished normal after the Gemini III mission, the insertion ve-
power operation. During postflight testing of locity adjust routine would have reduced the
t:he computer, 3000 normal cycles were demon- dispersion of the actual from nominal. The IGS
strated, both at the system level and with the column shows that, had the backup system been
system installed in the spacecraft. This testing selected, it would have given insertion condi-
was followed by a component disassembly pro- tions resulting in a safe orbit and a go-decision
gram which revealed no anomalies within the for all flights. Although the primary guidance
computer, auxiliary computer power unit, or the was adequate on all flights, the inertial guidance
static power supply. system, subsequent to the Gemini III mission,
The primary horizon sensor on the Gemini V would have provided guidance values closer to
spacecraft failed at the end of Che second day of nominal than the primary system. The use of
the mission. The mission was continued using the insertion velocity ,_ljust routine would have
the secondary system. The horizon-sensor head further reduced these dispersions.
is jettisoned prior to reentry, which makes post- Table 4-IV compares the nominal, actual, and
flight analysis difficult; however, the remaining inertial-guidance-system insertion values of
electronics which were recovered operated nor- total velocity and flight path angle. The actual
mally in postflight testing. value was computed postflight from a trajectory
During ascent, the steering-error monitoring, which included weighted consideration of all
along with selected navigation parameters which available data. The comparison indicates that,
are available as onboard computer readouts, has for missions after the Gemini III mission, the
given adequate information for onboard switch- interial-guidance-system performance has been
over and insertion go--no-go decisions. Table well within expectations.
4-III contains a comparison of the nominal pre- During the orbital phases of flight, the iner-
flight targeted apogee and perigee altitudes, tial guidance system was utilized for attitude
with the flight values actually achieved. The control and reference, for precise translation
table also shows, in the IVAR column, the values control, and for navigation and guidance in
which would have resulted from the use of the closed-loop rendezvous. Performance in all of
insertion veloci.ty adjust routine (IVAR) after these functions is dependent upon platform
insertion with the primary guidance system, alinement. The alinemen¢ technique has proved
and, in the IGS column, the values which would to be satisfactory, with the residual errors,
have been achieved had switchover to iuertial- caused by equipment, in all axes being on the
guidance-system (IGS) steering occurred early order of 0.5 ° or less.

TABLE 4-III.--Comparison of Orbital Parameters at Insertion _

Absolute value, nautical miles

Mission Nominal Actual IVAR b IGS °

Apogee i Perigee Apogee Perigee Apogee Perigee Apogee Perigee

Gemini IId ...................... 141 90 N/A N/A 111 87 N/A N/A

(--30) (--3)
Gemini III ...................... 130. 1 87. 1 121. 0 87. 0 121 90 128 78
(--9.1) (--0.1) (--9. 1) (2. 9) (--2. 1) (9. I)
Gemini IV ....................... 161. 0 87. 0 152.2 87. 6 164. 3 87. 0 163. 9 ! 87. 0
(-8.8) (0.6) (3. 3) (0) (2. 9) i (0)
Gemini V ........................ 191. 2 87. 0 188. 9 87. 4 189. 9 87. 0 192. 7 i 86. 9
(-2.3) (0.4) (--1.3) (0) (1.5) I (--0. 1)
Gemini VI-A .................... 146. 2 87. 1 14o. o 87. o 146. 5 87. 0 140. 5 87. 0
(--6. 2) (--0. i) i (0.3) (--0.1) (-5.7) (--0. 1)
Gemini VII ...................... 183. 1 87. 1 177. 1 87. 1 i 181.0 87. 0 180. o 87. 0
(-6. o) (0) (-3. i) (--0. 1)
(--2.1) (--0.1)

* Values in parentheses are differences from nominal.

b Insertion velocity adjust routine.
c Inertial guidance system.
d Values shown from Gemini II are those targeted to exercise the IVAR routine.

TABLE 4-IV.--Comparison oJ Insertion Conditions

Nominal Inertial
Mission Insertion condition (targeted) Actual guidance

Gemini II .................... Total velocity, fps ....................... 25 731 25 736 25 798

Flight path angle, deg .................... --2. 28 --2.23 --2.20
Time from lift-off, see .................... 356. 5 352. 2 351. 8
Gemini III ................... Total velocity, fps ....................... 25 697 25 682 25 697
Flight path angle, deg .................... +0. O1 +0. Ol +0.32
Time from lift-off, see .................... 358. 4 353. 8 353. 7
Gemini IV .................... Total velocity, fps ....................... 25 757 25 746 25 738
Flight path angle, deg .................... +0. O0 TO. 04 q-0. 06
Time from lift-off, see .................... 355. 8 353. 8 353. 8
Gemini V .................... Total velocity, fps ....................... 25 812 25 805 25 808
Flight path angle, deg .................... +0. 02 0. 00 --0.01
Time from lift-off, see .................... 356. 9 353. 2 353. 2
Gemini VI-A ................. Total velocity, flas ....................... 25 73O 25 718 25 720
Flight path angle, deg .................... 0. 00 +0. 03 +0. 03
Time from lift-off, sec .................... 356. 7 358. 7 358. 7
Gemini VII ................... Total velocity, fps ....................... 25 806 25 793 25 801
Flight path angle, deg .................... 0. 00 0. O3 0.03
Time from lift-off, see .................... 358. 6 357. 0 357. 0

Figure 4-10 contains a time history of the ments for an easy manual approach and dock-
radar digital range and computed range rates ing with the target vehicle. Solid lock-on was
during the rendezvous approach for the Gemini achieved at 232 nautical miles and was main-
VIA mission. Rendezvous-approach criteria tained until the spacecraft had closed with the
limit the permissible range rate as a function target and the radar was powered down.
of range for the closing maneuver. The figure The rendezvous performed on the Gemini
shows that, prior to the initial braking ma- VI-A/VII missions was nominal through-
neuver, the range was closing linearly at ap- out. A computer simulation has been completed
proximately 40 feet per second. If the effect of in which actual radar measurements were used
the braking thrust is ignored, an extrapolation to drive the onboard computer program. A rep-
of range and range rate to the nominal time resentative value of the computed total velocity
of interception indicates that a miss of less than to rendezvous is compared with the telemetered
300 feet would have occurred. A no-braking values and shown in table 4-V. The close agree-
miss of this order is well within the require- men't verifies onboard computer operation. A
trajectory simulation has verified total system
Sl operation. Using the state vectors obtained
from the available tracking of the Gemini VI-A
and VII spacecraft prior to the terminal phase,
and assuming no radar, platform, alinement, or
-°0 5 Radar \ \\ .Permissible range rate
50 0 range_--'_ _" from radar range- thrusting errors, the values of the total velocity
40 -_ ^_ \ rate indicator to rendezvous and the two vernier midcourse
corrections were computed. The simulated
o50 - _ 5 closure / \ _ ,o,.
velocity,' _.% "_ .o..-_. values and the actual values agree within the
_' 20 -- _ 2 Initial )4_, ,0.
uncertainties of the spacecraft ground track-
broking.'" _
o I0- I thrust _- ing for the conditions stated. The flyby miss
n- O-- 0 I
5:49 5:50
5:51 5:52
5:54 5:55 distance resulting from this simulation was 96.6
Ground elapsed time, hr:min feet.
The Gemini VI-A and VII spacecraft both
FIGURE 4-10.--Radar trajectory range comparison for
Gemini VI-A and VII rendezvous. demonstrated successful onboard-controlled re-

TABLE 4-V.--Rendezvous Velocity Comparisons

[Angle to rendezvous equals 130 °]

Computer simulation

Time from lift-off Radar, nautical miles Simulated AVt. = feet per Data acquisition /xV t."
second feet per second

5:15:20 36.20 70 69

Trajectory simulation

First midcoursc correction, incremental velocity indicators Second midcourse correction, incremental velocity indicator

Simulated, feet per second Actual, feet per second Simulated, feet per second Actual, feet per second

3 aft 7 forward 2 aft 4 forward

0 right/left 5 left 0 right/left 6 right

3 down 7 up 1 down 2 up

=AVt=total velocity to rendezvous.


entries. The cross-range and down-range error planned technique. The onboard computer
indications of the flight director indicator per- predicted this condition and gave the correct
mitted both flight crews to control the space- commands to permit the flight crew to achieve
craft landing point to well wi'thin the expected the correct landing point. The Gemini IV re-
tolerance of 1"2nautical miles. entry dispersion is that resulting from reentry
Table 4-VI is a summary of reentry naviga- from a circular orbit and being flown without
tion and guidance performance. The first line guidance. The Gemini V reentry miss was
on the figure shows the inertial-guidance-system caused by an incorrect quantity being sent from
navigation error after the completion of steer- the ground. This quantity was used to initial-
ing at 80 000 feet and is obtained from compari- ize the inertial guidance system prior to reentry,
sons with the best estimate trajectory. These and the incorrect quantity caused the inertial
values show that the system was navigating ac- guidance system to show the incorrect range to
curately. The next line shows the miss dis- the targeted landing area. The flight crew
tances as a difference between the planned determined that a discrepancy existed in the
and actual landing points. The Gemini II system and, at that time, started flying a con-
mission had an unguided reentry from a stant bank-angle reentry. The last two lines
low-altitude-insertive reentry condition which in table 4--VI indicate some of the factors caus-
tended to reduce dispersions. Gemini III ing shifts in the landing-area footprints for the
was planned and flown so that a fixed-bank Gemini missions. This table indicates gener-
angle, based on the postretrofire tracking as ally good system performance.
commanded from the ground, was held until
the cross-range error was brought to zero. Control and Propulsion System Performance
During this flight, however, the aerodynamic
The control system has been thoroughly exer-
characteristics and the velocity of the retro-
cised, and all design objectives have been dem-
grade maneuver performed with the orbital at-
titude and maneuver system differed from those onstrated. The platform mode has proved well
expected. This difference reduced the space- suited for in-plane translations, for platform
craft lifting capability to such an extent that, alinement, and for general pilot relief in busy
with the open-loop procedure flown, the targeted exercises such as station keeping. The rate-
landing area could not be reached using the command capability has been most useful for

TABLE 4-VI.--Gemini Reentry Navigation Summary

Flight Gemini Gemini

II III Geminiiv . Geminiv Geminivi_A _ Geminivii

Trajectory difference, nautical miles

Inertial guidance system--best estimate

trajectory difference at 80 000 feet ...... 1.2 0.8 (') 2.3
Planned--best estimate trajectory differ-
ence at touchdown .................... 18 64 47 6.6

Footprint shift, nautical miles

Retrofire 14 48 50 d 22 41

Aerodynamics .......................... (') 160 (') (') (') 4O

• Not determined.
b With corrected value for ground update.
Based on extrapolated radar data.
d Preretrofire and retrofire.

translations, such as retrofire and rendezvous TABLE 4-VII.ITypical Gemini Retrofire Ma-
maneuvers, and for damping aerodynamic os- neuver Velocity Comparison
cillations during reentry in order to ease the
[Values in parentheses are differences from nominal]
reentry guidance task. Pulse mode has pro-
vided the fine control necessary for manual _X, AY, 5Z,
platform alinements, for station keeping, and Flight feet per feet per feet per Total
second second second
for experiments and maneuvers requiring ac-
curate pointing. Reentry rate command has
been used on the Gemini II and IV missions for Gemini VI-A___ -- 308 0 117 329. 5
(i_ (--1) (. 6)
reentry control. The wide deadbands mecha- (-_)
Gemini VII .... -- 296 113 316. 8
nized in this mode conserve propellants while (3) (-1) (1.6)
retaining adequate control
The horizon mode has been utilized exten-
sively to provide pilot relief through automatic propulsion system maneuvering capability was
control of pitch and roll attitude based upon used for the rendezvous maneuvers during the
horizon-sensor outputs. Performance, in gen- Gemini VI-A mission.
eral, has been excellent, although several in- There have been two flights with known
stances of susceptibility to sun interference have anomalies which could definitely be attributed
been noted. On the Gemini VI-A mission, to the propulsion systems. The two yaw-left
this mode operated unattended for approxi- engines in the orbital attitude and maneuver
mately 5 hours while the flight crew slept. The system of the Gemini V spacecraft became in-
final or direct mode has been utilized effectively operative by the 76th revolution, and neither
by the crew when they wished to perform a engine recovered. Rate data also showed that
maneuver manually with the maximum possible other engines exhibited anomalous behavior but
control authority. subsequently recovered, and this suggested the
Typical retrofire maneuver performance is cause to be freezing of the oxidizer. During
shown in table 4-VII. l-hiring the first manned this flight the heater circuits had been cycled to
mission, the Gemini III spacecraft retro- conserve power. During the Gemini VII mis-
fire maneuver was performed with the roll sion, the two yaw-right engines in the orbital
channel in direct mode and with the pitch and attitude and maneuver system were reported
yaw channels in rate command. This method inoperative by the crew approximately 283
of operation provided additional yaw authority hours after lift-off. Postflight analysis of rate
in anticipation of possible high-disturbance data verified this condition. However, because
torques. Only nominal torques were experi- these engines are not recovered, failure analysis
enced, however, and the remaining missions is difficult, and inflight testing was insufficient
utilized rate-command mode in all axes. Atti- to identify the cause of the failure on Gemini
tude changes during retrofire have resulted in V and VII. Further studies are being con-
vel_ity errors well within the lifting capabil- ducted in an attempt to isolate the cause.
ity of the spacecraft and would not have con- On the Gemini IV spacecraft, one of the pitch
tributed to landing-point dispersions for a engines in the reentry control system was in-
closed-loop reentry. A night retrofire was operative; however, postflight examination re-
demonstrated during the Gemini VI-A and VII vealed a faulty electrical connector at the mating
missions. In summary, the performance of the of the reentry-control-system sectiou and the
attitude-control and maneuvering electronics cabin section.
has been exceptional during ground tests as The propellant quantity remaining in the
well as during all spacecraft flights. spacecraft during the flight is determined by
The Gemini III spacecraft demonstrated the calculating the expanded volume of the pres-
('apat)ility to provide orbital changes which in- surizing gas using pressure and temperature
cluded a retrograde maneuver that required a measurements. Flight experience has shown
Ill-second firing of the aft engines in that, due to inaccuracies in this quantity-gaging
the orbital attitude and maneuver system. The system, a significant quantity of propellants

must be reserved for contingencies. A reserve achieved. In addition, information obtained

propellant tank has been added to assure that from systems such as the inertial guidance sys-
a known quantity of propellant remains even tem and the radar system has significantly im-
though the main tanks have been depleted, thus proved the knowledge of the launch, orbital,
insuring the capability of extending the mis- and reentry phases of the mission and has made
sion to permit recovery in the planned primary a thorough analysis more practical.
landing area. For the guidance, control, and propulsion
Conclusions systems, the design, development, implementa-
tion, and operating procedures have been accom-
As a result of developing onboard capability, plished, and the operational capabilities to meet
greater flexibility in mission planning and the mission requirements have been successfully
greater assurance of mission success have been demonstrated.

By CLIFFORDM. JACKSON,Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; ANDREWHOBOKEN,

O_ce of Resident Manager, Gemini Program O_ce, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.; JOHN W. GOAD,JR.,
Gemini Program Oj_ce, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and MEREDITH W. HAMILTON, Instru-
mentation and Electronic Systems Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

Summary package which performs the function of an

audio-distribution system.
The Gemini spacecraft communications and The primary voice communications system
instrumentation system c_)nsists of subsystems for the Gemini spacecraft is the very-high-
for voice communications and tracking, a digital frequency system. The redundant transmitter-
command system, recovery aids, a data acquisi- receiver units transmit and receive on a fre-
tion system, and a data transmission system. quency of 296.8 megacycles with an output
Development and qualification testing were com- power of 3 watts. Conventional double-side-
pleted rapidly to meet launch schedules, and band amplitude modulation with speech clip-
the engineering problems encountered were ping is employed. The units are mounted in
solved in an expeditious manner. The first the unpressurized reentry-section equipment
seven missions have proved the overall ade- bay, and either may be selected.
quacy of the system design. The problems en- The very-high-frequency antenna system con-
countered have not prevented the fulfillment of sists of quarter-wave monopoles mounted in
mission objectives and have not interfered sig- selected locations (fig. 5-9) to provide the sat-
nificantly with mission operations. Although isfactory radiation patterns for each mission
some telemetry data have been lost, sufficient phase. Flight experience has shown that
data support has been provided for design circuit-margin calculations were adequate.
verification and operational purposes. Two antenna systems are used while in orbit,
Introduction one predominantly during stabilized flight and
one for drifting flight. Special tests conducted
The Gemini spacecraft communications sys- during the Gemini V mission verified the proper
tem consists of subsystems for voice communi- antenna selection for drifting and oriented
cations and tracking, a digital command system, modes of flight which had previously been de-
a telemetry transmission system, and various rived from radiation-pattern studies. The
recovery aids. The instrumentation system very-high-frequency ground-to-air voice qual-
consists of the data acquisition system and the ity has been excellent. Even during the launch
data transmission system. Experience with phase with the very high ambient noise level
Project Mercury was a valuable aid during in the cabin area, the flight crews have reported
system design and gave increased confidence in high intelligibility. Although operationally
design margin calculations which have since satisfactory, Vhe intelligibility of the air-to-
been borne out by successful flight experience. ground link has not been as good, especially
A communications-system block diagram is during the time of high launch-vehicle noise
shown in figure 5-1, and equipment locations following lift-off. There are instances of com-
are illustrated in figure 5-2. munication fades encountered during drifting
flight when regions of high attenuation are en-
Communications System countered in the antenna radiation patterns and
Voice communications in the Gemini space- when multipath interference is encountered at
craft employ an integrated system which has as low antenna look angles. Interference from
the central component a voice-control-center atmospheric effects, even storms, has been of

218-556 0--66----4

Equipment adopter section

Acquisition _ Delayed-time I
Diplexer _ Diplexer I
VHFwhip transmitter
aid beacon J " _ I telemetry
antenna J

Digital To co__m_puter-.i-l_ r I,- ToTR__S _-

system [J Relays 1.8 _" ._1.1
C-band _
[I Relays 9.16 I-i--{_._J-_iReceiver no.Zl I

Retro-adapter section

HF whip D

VHF whip
Cabin section
HF whip

antenna __ Stand_by _

C-band V
radiating_(R×) Vo ce I
elements kX )


stub [_
Quodriplexer t'i't

_reOInes_m';treyr C_s°wa "_


FIGURE 5-1.--Communications system.

Rotated 180 ° for clarity


-Delayed-time telemetry transmitter

i_,1__1. _ _,_--Discrete command relay panels / _,

ILl)"-1-;;;;:_:I --Acqu's'''on
o,dbeacon / \\
I¢-c3",,_,, ,,_::Itil--I --'_°°x'a'
-: ....... sw'tch
: ........ / I \Recovery
i light power supply

', ' _ "VHF diplexer - ....... / /.._-- ."'_._/Flashing recovery light

/ Digital command system (DCS) "''. / ../ / i i'_ ....... Recovery antenna

'dapter C- band radar beacon """ / / / j*7_

""-,/ I ,/ _'_ \L J "_ .... Recovery HF whip

h _ y / \/i/ _ -y'_._ ._..-'Voice COntrol center
\ \ Jk" l'_.. / r-_%,.:"X ,C°axia_
Detail 'A' "_i._'<<t_'_ _// Ah \ _ltd.__. ,.il_..._l ljl _,Cooxiol switch
C-band annular slot antenna" _""_:_,_._. _ .'_!_.,. ,,I"_ _/// I /" _ _¢ ___.
Real-time (low-frequency) VH_ ',,,,hln n._' .... "" _"'l_i(_"'.""- "t1_! \ _ J _ ]
telemetry transmitter VHF whip ontenne" _ _I..X "_ II_ C _-ll'_- _.

' °_'_-'_ Star_,bnYsmteltt:etry Orbit°' HFwh'_

,, , , , , _ "7 )/_,..._
inr-i _:_---::::.-v,_vo,ce _eedeta,,
,_,,,;,,,',;,,,, "_" [/_,
_--transmitter/receivers Coaxial switche_' ," ," ," ,i
"--Reentry C- bond radar beacon C- band antenna (5 place_'),,' ," / !
HF transmitter/receiver Power divider' ," 1' VHF front antenna
t_ecovery beacon Phase shifter" 15hose shifter power supply

FIGURE 5-2.--Location of Gemini spacecraft communications equipment.


very minor significance. All of these effects der is mounted in the adapter for orbital use,
combined have not significantly interfered with and the other in the reentry section for .use
mission operations. during launch and reentry (fig. 5-2). The
A high-frequency voice transmitter-receiver adapter transponder peak-power output is
is included in the spacecraft communications 600 watts to the slot antenna mounted on the
system to provide an emergency postlanding bottom of the adapter. The reentry transpon-
long-distance voice and direction-finding com- der peak-power output is 1000 watts to the helix
munications link for use if the landing position antenna system mounted on the reentry section.
of the spacecraft is unknown. It can also be The power is divided and fed to three helix
used for beyond-the-horizon transmissions in antennas mounted at approximately 120 ° inter-
orbit, and as a backup to the very-high- vals around the conical section of the reentry
frequency communications link. The high- assembly, forward of the hatches. Flight re-
frequency link operates on a frequency of sults have been very satisfactory. The ground-
15.016 megacycles with an output power of based C-band radar system is capable of beacon-
5 watts. Manmade electromagnetic interfer- tracking the spacecraft completely through the
ence is of primary concern to communication reentry-plasma blackout region, and has done
links utilizing the high-frequency range for so on more than one occasion.
long-range transmission. Many occurrences of A 250-milliwatt acquisition-aid beacon is
interference at the Gemini frequency are re- mounted in the adapter section. The beacon
ported during each mission. The need for the signal is used by the automatic antenna-
high-frequency communications link would oc- vectoring equipment at the ground stations to
cur with land-position uncertainties of several acquire and track the spacecraft prior to turn-
hundred miles or greater. However, the high- ing on the telemetry transmitters. This system
frequency direction-finding equipment is usu- has operated normally on all flights.
ally tested during the postlanding phase, and The digital command system aboard the
postlanding high-frequency voice communica- spacecraft consists of a dual-receiver single-
tions between Gemini VI-A and the Kennedy decoder unit and two relay packages mounted
Space Center were excellent. Transmissions in the equipment section of 'the adapter. The
from Gemini VI-A and VII were received with two receivers are fed from different antennas,
good quality at St. Louis, Mo. Many good thus taking advantage of complementary an-
direction-finding bearings were obtained on tenna patterns which result in fewer nulls. The
Gemini VI-A and VII. Figure 5-3 is an illus- receiver outputs are summed and fed to the de-
tration of bearings made on Gemini VI-A. coder, which verifies and decodes each com-
The spacecraft tracking system consists of mand, identifies it as being a real-time or stored-
two C-band radar transponders and one program command, and either commands a
acquisition-aid beacon. One radar transpon- relay operation or transfers the digital data,
as indicated by the message address. The de-
4O coder sends a message-acceptance pulse, via the
telemetry system, to the ground when the mes-
sage is accepted by the system to which it is
30 addressed. The probability of accepting an
invalid message is less than one in a million
_20 at any input signal level. The stored-program

Z commands are routed to the guidance computer

or to the time reference system for update of
the time-to-go-to-retrofire or equipment reset.
The digital command system has performed
80 70 60 50 40 50 20 I0 most satisfactorily in flight. The ground sta-
Longitude, deg West tions are programed to repeat each message
FIGURE 5-3.--HF-DF bearings to Gemini VI-A after
until a message-acceptance pulse is received;
landing. therefore, the occasional rejection of a com-

mand because of noise imerference or other The recovery beacon transmits a pulse plus
reasons has not caused a problem. Completion continuous-wave signal on the international dis-
of the transmission is an indication that all tress frequency. The signal was specifically de-
commands have been accepted at the spacecraft. signed to be compatible with the AN/ARA-25
The telemetry transmission system consists of and the search and rescue and homing
three transmitters: one for real-time telemetry, (SARAH) direction-finding systems but is also
one spare transmitter, and one for delayed-time compatible with almost all other direction-
recorder playback. Either the real-time or the finding equipment. The transmission range is
delayed-time signal can be switched to the spare limited to horizon distances and, therefore, lim-
transmitter by the digital command system or ited by the altitude of the recovery aircraft.
by manual switching. Recorder playback is also The Gemini recovery-beacon signal is received
accomplished by command or by manual switch- by all aircraft within line of sight and has been
ing. The transmitters are frequency-modulated received by aircraft at distances up to 200
with a minimum of 2 watts power output, and nautical miles.
solid-state components are used throughout. The flashing recovery light is used as a visual
Transmitter performance has been normal dur- location aid during the postlanding phase. It
ing all flights through Gemini VII. The de- is powered by a separate 12-hour battery pack
layed-time transmitter on Gemini III failed a composed of several mercury cells, and can be
short 'time before launch; however, the spare turned on and off by the crew. The flashing
transmitter functioned throughout the short rate is approximately 15 flashes per minute.
mission. The telemetry signal strengths re- The performance of all communications sys-
ceived at the network stations have been ade- tems has met or exceeded the design criteria.
quate. However, some data have been lost by Ground acquisition of both voice and telemetry
the ground stations losing acquisition and fail- signals has always occurred on the approach
ing to _rack the spacecraft. This was usually horizon and has been maintained with excellent
due to signal fades, which were sometimes circuit margins to the departing horizon. No
caused by localized manmade electromagnetic significant design objectives remain to be
interference or multipath signal cancellation. achieved.
A recovery beacon is energized when the
spacecraft goes to two-point suspension on the Instrumentation System

main parachute and transmits until the recov-

Three instrumentation systems (table 5-I)
ery is complete. A flashing light mounted on
have been flown. These were the PAM-FM-
the top of the spacecraft deploys after landing
FM instrumentation and telemetry system used
and can be turned on by the crew. Direction
only on spacecraft 1, the standard production
finding is sometimes employed using continuous-
wave transmission from the very-high-frequen- system supplemented by a special instrumenta-

cy voice transmitter, and, if necessary, a signal tion system on spacecraft 2, and the standard
is available from the high-frequency voice production system used on spacecraft 3 and
transmitter for long-range direction finding. subsequent spacecraft.

TABLE 5-I.--Ins_'umentation Systems

Spacecraft Equipment type Measurements

Gemini I ........... PAM-FM-FM Structural temperatures, structural vibrations, and

cabin acoustic noise
Gemini II .......... Special and standard pulse Structural temperatures, structural vibrations, and
code modulation crewman simulator functions
Analog tape recorder Structural vibrations
Cameras Instrument panel and window views
Gemini II to Gemini Standard pulse code modulation Operational and diagnostic measurements

The PAM-FM-FlY[ system was employed on recording system which require a constant input
spacecraft i to determine the Gemini spacecraft for operation. Pressure transducers_ tempera-
launch environment. This system measured the ture sensors, accelerometers, a carbon-dioxide
noise, vibration, and temperature characteristics partial-pressure sensing system, and synchro-
of the spacecraft during launch and orbital repeaters are provided to convert physical phe-
flight. Excellent data were obtained through- nomena into electrical signals for handling by
out the mission. the system.
To obtain launch and reentry environment Biomedical instrumentation sensors were at-
data in addition to flight performance data on tached to each astronaut's body, and signal con-
ditioners were contained within the astronaut's
spacecraft 2, it was necessary to use special in-
strumentation as well as the standard produc- undergarments. Physiological parameters were
tion instrumentation system. Data on crewman supplied by these sensors and signal conditioners
simulator functions, structural dynamics meas- to the biomedical tape recorders and to the data
urements, many of the temperature measure- transmission system for transmission.
ments, and photographic coverage of the The delayed-transmission recorder/repro-
instrument panels and of the view out of the ducer records data during the time the space-
left-hand window were obtained. These con- craft is out of range of the worldwide tracking
tributed materially to evaluation of other stations. When the spacecraft is within range
onboard systems. of a tracking station, the recorder/reproducer
The spacecraft instrumentation and record- will, upon receiving the proper signal, reverse
ing system also serves as a significant tool in the the tape direction and play back the recorded
checkout of the spacecraft during contractor data at 22 times the real-time data rate.
systems tests and Kennedy Space Center tests. The data transmission system is composed of
During flight, the standard instrumentation sys- the pulse-code-modulation (PCM) multiplexer-
tem provides operational data and facilitates encoder, the tape recorder/reproducer, and the
diagnostic functions on the ground. telemetry transmitters. The PCM multiplexer-
The instrumentation system (shown in fig. encoder includes the PCM programer, two
5-4) is composed of a data acquisition system low-level multiplexers, and two high-level
and a data transmission system. Instrumenta- multiplexers. The programer provides the
tion packages contain signal-conditioning mod- functions of data multiplexing, analog-to-
ules which convert inputs from various space- digital conversion, and d_gital data multiplex-
craft systems into signals which are compatible ing, while also providing the required timing
with the data transmission system. Redundant and sampling functions needed to support the
dc-to-dc converters provide controlled voltages high-level and low-level multiplexers. The two
for those portions of the instrumentation and high-level multiplexers function as high-level
analog commutators and on-off digital data
multiplexers_ providing for the sampling of
0-to-5-volt dc measurements and bilevel (on-off)
Signal events. The two low-level multiplexers func-
conditioners Multiplexers Programmer
tion as differential input analog commutators
and provide for the sampling of 0-to-20-milli-
volt signals.
The PCM multiplexer-encoder is made up
Recorder i
of plug-in multilayered motherboards. Each

l motherboard
which employ
the cordwood
tion techniqu% and each module performs spe-
transmitter cific logic functions. The data transmission sys-
tem contains approximately 25 000 parts, giving
Data transmission system
a component density of approximately 37 000
FIGURE 5-4.--Block diagram of the instrumentation parts per cubic foot, or over 90 parts within each
system. cubic inch.

The PCM system accepts 0-to-20-millivolt tion-isolation mount. After the Gemini II
signals, 0-to-5-volt dc signals, bilevel event sig- flight-vibration data were obtained, a vibration
nals, and digital words from the onboard com- specification was established for the operation
puter and time reference systems, as shown in of the PCM tape recorder and was met.
table 5-II. The total system capacity of 338 During spacecraft systems tests, switching
measurements has been more than adequate, functions caused inductive transients on the
since the manned missions have not required voltage supply buses, introducing spurious re-
more than 300 measurements. sets into the multiplexers which caused a loss of
To meet program objectives, three significant data. A simple modification which inserted
problems had to be overcome. These are shown diodes in the reset drive lines eliminated most
in table 5-III. of the problem. Unfortunately, this modifica-
The PCM tape recorder would not perform tion lowered the reset drive voltage to a level
properly at the specification vibration levels which made the multiplexers susceptible to
during the development tests. This problem "lockup," or not sending data out to the PCM
was one of the most difficult development prob- programer in the proper sequence. The reset
lems encountered. The final solution required drive and counterdrive circuitry in the pro-
over 10 major modifications, numerous minor gramer and the remote multiplexers were modi-
modifications, and a special ball-socket vibra- fied and flown in spacecraft 3 and subsequent
TABLE 5-II.--Instrumentation System Capacity _ During spacecraft 3 testing, it was found that
the combination of the Gemini PCM prime-
Number of Type of signal Sample rate, frame format with the bit jitter of the tape
signals samples/see recorder would not allow optimum recovery of
the recorded data. By changing the output of
6 the tape recorder from non-return-to-zero-
6 160
640 change to non-return-to-zero-space, recovery of
9 80
the dump data during high bit-jitter periods
16 0-20 mV dc
l 1.25
• 42 was enhanced by a factor of 15 to 1. The non-
3 return-to-zero-space code tends to give an out-
3 20 put which is optimum for the Gemini data
6 10
0-5 V dc format and also minimizes the sync adjustment
96 1.25
sensitivities of the PCM ground stations.
120 Bilevel 10
1 Digital 10 For all Gemini missions to date, the instru-
24 Digital • 416 mentation system has performed exceptionally
well. Out of the 1765 measurements made, only
• Available channels: 10 parameters were lost, or 0.57 percent. A
Analog .............................. 193 summary of the real-time telemetry data
Bilevel .............................. 120
actually received for Gemini missions II
Digital .............................. 25
through VII reveals that the usable data exceed
Total .............................. 338 97.53 percent.

TABLE 5-III.--Instrumentation Problem Areas

Equipment Hardware phase Difficulty Corrective action

Pulse-code-m odulation Spacecraft systems test Spurious resets Redesign circuitry

Tape recorder Development Failed in vibration Major modifications made

Tape recorder Spacecraft systems test "Bit jitter" Pulse-code-modulation output

code changed

Table 5-IV summarizes the delayed-time data This bearing seizure resulted from a design defi-
quality. During orbital flight, 416 data dumps ciency which allowed the bearing shield to cut
have been made. Of these, 135 data dumps have into an adjacent shoulder, generating metallic
been processed and evaluated. The results chips which entered the bearing itself. Modifi-
show that 96.57 percent of the evaluated data cations to correct this problem have been made
was completely acceptable. in the remaining flight recorders. The other
failures could not be verified because the failure
TABLE 5-IV.--Summary o/ Delayed-Time Pulse- modes could not be reproduced, or because the
Code-Modulation Data Dumps _ suspect components were jettisoned prior to
Dumps Percent of data retrieved The Gemini instrumentation system has met
from evaluated
dumps the mission requirements on all flights and has
Total Evaluated been of significant importance in preflight
checkout of spacecraft systems. The design
416 135 96. 57 criteria which established parameter capacity,
sampling rate, circuit margin, et cetera, proved
• Data for 5 missions. to be completely adequate throughout the
missions to date. The instrumentation system
The failures which occurred during Gemini accuracy of 3 percent has been more than ade-
flights are shown in table 5-V. The majority of quate to satisfy the program requirements.
the problems are associated with the playback The problems encountered to date have all been
tape recorder, the most significant of which was resolved, and no major objectives remain to be
due to a playback clutch ball-bearing seizure. achieved.

TABLE 5-V.--Instrumentation Flight Failures

Flight Failure Effect Corrective action

Gemini IV .......... Recorder stopped running Lost data after 2000 feet Cause undetermined
during descent and landing (possible bearing seizure)
Gemini V ........... Oxide flaked off tape Poor delayed-time data, Improved assembly pro-
revolutions 30 through 45 eedures
Gemini VI-A and Recorder bearing seized Lost delayed-time data Rework bearing clearances
Gemini VII
Gemini VI-A ....... Possible solid-state switch Lost 5 parameters, regained Cause undetermined (still
malfunction after retrofire under investigation)
Gemini VII ......... Transducer stuck at 910 After 170 hours lost data on None (failure analysis
psi reactant-supply-system impossible)
oxidizer supply pressure

By PERCY MIGLICCO, Gemini Program O_ice, Manned Spacecra# Center; ROBERT COHEN, Gemini Program
Office, Manned Spacecraft Center; and JESSE DEMING, Gemini Program Office, Manned Spacecraft

Summary later, are placed on the bus by relays powered

from a common control bus, and through diodes.
The electrical and sequential systems success- The diodes prevent a shorted battery or shorted
fully supported the Gemini spacecraft in meet- fuel-cell stack, or a short in the line to bus, from
ing the objectives of the first seven missions. being fed by all remaining po_3r sources.
The development of a fuel-cell electrical-power During the reentry and postlanding phases of
system was required to meet the 8-day and 14- the mission, the main bus power is supplied by
day objectives of the Gemini V and VII four 45-ampere-hour, silver-zinc batteries.
Each battery is first tested, then placed directly
on the bus by a switch. Systems that require
The development of an electrical system to alternating current or regulated direct current
support the Gemini spacecraft long-duration have special inverters or converters tailored to
missions required a significant advance in the their own requirements. Circuit protection in
state of the art. Conventional battery systems the spacecraft is provided mainly by magnetic
were used in some missions, but, for the more circuit breakers, although fuses are used in
branches of heater circuits and in the inertial
complex rendezvous and long-duration mis-
sions, a new power system was required. An guidance system. Fusistors are used in the
ion-exchange-membrane fuel cell was chosen as squib-firing circuits.
the new power source, and, to take advantage of The isolated bus system contains two com-
the available space in the spacecraft, fuel-cell pletely redundant squib-firing buses conne,:ted
consumables, oxygen and hydrogen, were stored through diodes to a third common-control bus,
at cryogenic temperatures in a supercritical and it is powered by special batteries capable of
state. The new fuel-cell power system has a 100-ampere discharge rate. This bus is sep-
flown on the Gemini V and VII missions, and arate from the main bus to prevent transient
has met all the spacecraft requirements. spikes from reflecting into systems on the main
A major step forward was taken in the design bus. Such transients, which might come from
of the sequential system of the spacecraft by in- thruster solenoids or squib firings, could damage
serting the man in the loop. The resulting the computer or other sensitive components of
sequential system is straightforward and more the spacecraft. The main and other buses can
reliable. It has performed successfully on all be linked together by the bus-tie switches, if
flights. necessary. This was done on spacecraft 7 to
conserve squib battery power.
Electrical System
Power Sources
The electrical power system of the Gemini
spacecraft, shown in figure 6-1, is a 29,- to 30- Batteries were used as the only source of
Vdc two-wire system with a single-point ground power on three of the five manned orbital Gem-
to the spacecraft structure. During the launch ini missions completed thus far (table 6-1).
and orbital phases of the mission the main bus The development of the fuel-cell system was
l)ower has been supplied by either silver-zinc completed in time to meet the electrical power
batteries or by a fuel-cell power system. The requirements of the 8-day mission of Gemini V
main bus power sources, which will be discussed and the 14-day mission of Gemini VII.


Main i .--o'X.o Inertial guidance system


source Environmental control system

Cam mon-'-'_'_
Communications system
control ..._
bus _ Main
• bus
Test Instrumentation system

4 Reentry 1_._2 ff

batteries I On

I I tie _/___ I

ooof, l,
_ I
I switch
: I Sooih
I " I
I Retrofire landing
and post landing

"""-i'_' l I I I I ? Io
' ' I I -.AAIE.aerimen Insert/abort

Retrofire landing and

Om i,ico, Ir----+-n post landing
° oOff ,_. ,_1 1 _ _ [ Sau,b _ or-I°l
2 On Io I o

control == _ _ _ I _.,_/__J_ Experiment °l

Attitude thrusters
Urnobilic°l "E _ _
beltery ._._._____o 0 f f Power sys control
3 On Auto retrofire

Agena control

FIeu_ 6-1.--Gemini electrical system.

TABLE 6-I.--Main Power Source.for Gemini the fuel cell has the advantage of low weight
Spacecraft and low volume over a silver-zinc battery
Estimated The fuel-cell power system (fig. 6-2) consists
Spacecraft Power source usage,
of two sections, plus an associated reactant sup-
ply system. Each section is approximately 25
inches long and 1'2.5 inches in diameter, and
3 .......... 3 silver-zinc batteries =___ 354. 3
4 .......... 6 silver-zinc batteries .... 2073. 0
weighs approximately 68 pounds inclu_ling ac-
5 .......... 4215• 8
cessories. The section contains 3 stacks of 32
Fuel-cell power system___
6 .......... 3 silver-zinc batteries .... 1080. 0 cells and can produce 1 kilowatt at 96.5 to 23.3
7 .......... 5583. 6
Fuel-cell power system___ volts. The .system is flexible in operation.
Each stack or section can be removed from the
• Each silver-zinc battery had a capacity of 400 bus at any time. A section can be replaced on
the bus after extended periods of open circuit.
Two stacks are required for powered-down
Table 6-II shows load sharing of the batteries
flight (17 amperes), and five stacks are needed
and gives the ampere-hours remaining in each
for maximum loads. To provide electrical
reentry and squib battery after completion of
power, each cell must interface with the hydro-
the mission. The highest usage of squib bat-
gen and oxygen supply system and with the
teries was 59.2 percent on spacecraft 5, whereas
the highest usage of reentry batteries was 29 water system.
percent on spacecraft 7. The oxygen and hydrogen reactants for the
The fuel-cell power system provided Gemini fuel cell are stored in a supercritical cryogenic
with a long-duration mission capability. For state in tanks located in the spacecraft adapter
missions requiring more than 800 ampere-hours, section. Each tank contains heaters for main-

TABLE 6-II.--Reentry and Squib Batteries Post flight Discharge Data "

[All data are in ampere-hours]

Silver-zinc batteries rated

35 35. 4 36. 67 41. 0 42. 5 32.

45 (reentry) ...........................
35 38. 9 41.67 42. 9 38. 8 32.
45 (reentry) ...........................
35 38. 9 40. 00 42. 3 36. 7 30. 5
45 (reentry) ...........................
35 35. 0 44. 83 40. 65 41. 3 32. 5
45 (reentry) ...........................
12 10. 27 10 7. 52 12 8._
15 (squib) .............................
12 10. 67 11 4. 86 12. 7 9.4
15 (squib) .............................
12 10. 67 8 6.0 12. 6 8. g
15 (squib) .............................

a Discharge at 5 amperes to 20 volts.

The dual pressure regulators supply hydro-

-_+ ,Catalytic gen at a nominal 1.7 psi above water pressure
and oxygen at 0.5 psi above hydrogen pressure.
One regulator is provided for each section, with
HZ.._._ ]1 l_}h_?"electr°des
? _,.Oz [ 1Relief _ _--'_-"_To oth
a crossover network that enables one of the regu-
I_ II II II [ "FS_Iid P°'yme r _. , ' fuel ceel:
lators to supply both sections in the event the
IIIIIHI •electr°lyte
MUU_H20 _ect ion*--i,-- other regulator should fail. Separate control
Cell _-'_A tank valves provide gaseous hydrogen to each stack.
Each stack is provided with a hydrogen purge
valve and an oxygen purge valve for removing
accumulated impurity gases. Should it be-
Fuel cell H20"" _ ves/ come necessary to shut down a section, a water
valve and separate hydrogen and oxygen valves
upstream of the regulators are provided.
The smallest active element of the fuel-cell

accumulator-_" -_ 02 section is the thin, individual fuel cell, which is

8 inches long and 7 inches wide. Each cell con-
7:1' sists of an electrolyte-electrode assembly with
associated components for gas distribution_ elec-
trical current collection, heat removal, and water
FIGURE 6-2.--Spacecraft 7 fuel-cell/RSS fluid sche-
matic. control. The cell is an ion-exchange type which
converts the energy of the chemical reaction of
taining the oxygen operating pressure between hydrogen and oxygen directly into electricity.
800 and 910 psia and hydrogen pressure be- The metallic-catalytic electrode structure of
tween 210 and 250 psia. Relief valves prevent the fuel cell contains an anode and a cathode
pressures ill excess of 1000 psia for oxygen and which are in contact with a thin, solid plastic
350 psia for hydrogen. electroly[e, or ion-exchange membrane, to stim-
Between the storage tanks and the main con- ulate the exchange of hydrogen ions between
trol vah'es, the reactants pass through heat ex- electrodes. In the presence of the metallic
changers which increase the temperature of the catalyst, hydrogen gives up electrons to the
reactants to near fuel-cell temperatures, thus electrical load, and releases hydrogen ions which
preventing a thermal shock on the cell. The migrate through the electrolyte to the cathode.
temperatures in the heat exchangers are con- At the cathode, the ions combine with oxygen
trolled by the primary and secondary coolant and electrons from the load circuit to produce
loops. water which is carried off by wicks to a collec-

tion point. Ribbed metal current carriers are regulators that control the flow of the oxygen
in contact with both sides of the electrodes to and hydrogen gases to the fuel-cell sections.
conduct the produced electricity. Another system which interfaces with the
The water formed in each cell during the con- fuel cell is the coolant system. The spacecraft
version of electricity is absorbed by wicks and has two coolant loops: the primary loop goes
transferred to a felt pad located on a porcelain through one fuel-cell section, and the secondary
gas-water separator at the bottom of each stack. loop goes through the second section. In each
Removal of the water through the separator is section the coolant is split into two parallel
accomplished by the differential pressure be- paths. For the coolant system, the stacks are
tween oxygen and water across the separator. in series, and the cells are in parallel. The
If this differential pressure becomes too high or coolant-flow inlet temperature is regulated to a
too low, a warning light on the cabin instrument nominal 75 ° F.
panel provides an indication to the flight crew.
Ground Test Program
The telemetry system also transmits this infor-
mation to the ground stations. A similar warn- To achieve the necessary confidence required
ing system is provided for the oxygen-to-hydro- before a completely new system is certified for
gen gas differential pressure so that the appro- flight, considerable ground testing of the fuel-
priate action may be taken if out-of-specification cell power system was necessary (table 6-III).
conditions occur. As part of the development program, two fuel-
The water produced by the fuel-cell system cell sections were operated at electrical load
exerts pressure on the Teflon bladders in water profiles simulating prelaunch and rendezvous,
tanks A and B. Water tank A also contains followed by powered-down flight. The first
drinking water for the flight crew, and the section lasted 1100 hours_ and the second
drinking-water pressure results from the differ- section lasted 822 hours. A third section
ential between the fuel-cell product-water pres- endured 10 repeated rendezvous missions. In
sure and cabin pressure. Tank B has been qualification, one _ction was subjected to ran-
precharged with a gas to 19 psia, and the fuel- dom vibration, and a month later it was placed
cell product water interfaces with this gas. in an altitude chamber at -40 ° F for 4 hours.
However, the 19-psia pressure changes with Still another section successfully experienced
drinking-water consumption, fuel-cell water acceleration, and a month later it was placed
production, and temperature. Should the pres- in an altitude chamber with chamber-wall tem-
sure exceed 20 psia, the overpressurization is peratures cycling each 24 hours from 40 ° to 160 °
relieved by two regulators. This gas pressure F. This section was supplying power to a simu-
provides a reference pressure to the two dual lated 14-day-mission electrical load.

TABLE 6-III.--Major Tests of Fuel-Cell Power System

Section Environments Electrical load profile Remarks


1516 ..... Ambient ..................... Prelaunch simulation rendez- 1100 hours' duration
vous powered-down
1519 ..... Ambient .................... Prelaunch simulation rendez- 822 hours' duration
vous powered-down
1524 ..... Ambient ..................... Repeated 2-day rendezvous ..... 10 cycles
1514 ..... Vibration (random) (7.0g RMS 30 amperes ................... Satisfactory
for 8 minutes per axis)
Altitude (1.47 X 10 -5 psia) ...... 7.5 amperes, 4 hours ........... Satisfactory
1527 ..... Acceleration linearly from 1 to 45 amperes ................... Satisfactory
7.25g in 326 seconds
Altitude (1.6410-6 psia) ; tem- 14-day mission profile .......... Monitored with cockpit instru-
perature cycled 40 ° to 160 ° F mentation; successfully com-
every 90 minutes pleted mission

An extensive development, qualification, and first day of flight. Continuing operation

reliability test program was conducted on the showed a gradual increase in performance until
reactant supply system. A total of 14 different the eighth day of flight, when the performance
environmental conditions, in addition to 7 sim- was approximately equal to that experienced at
ulated 14-day missions, was included in the the second activation. The performance of
tests. The environments included humidity, fuel-cell section 2 is shown in figure 6-4. At a
thermal shock, cycle fatigue, high and low load of 15 amperes; section 2 showed a decline
temperature and pressure, proof, bur_, and also of approximately 0.6 volt between the second
all expected dynamic environments. Subsequent activation on August 18, 1965, and the perform-
ground testing revealed that the thermal per- ance on August 21, 1965, the first day of flight.
formance of the hydrogen container degrades Over the 8 days of the mission, the section per-
with time at cryogenic temperatures. It was formance declined an additional 0.66 volt, most
found that the bosses in the inner shell allowed of which occurred during the three periods of
hydrogen to leak into the annulus, thus degrad- open circuit. During the flight, section 2 was
ing the annulus vacuum, even though this leak placed on open circuit, without coolant flow, for
rate was almost infinitesimal. A pinch-off tube three 19-hour periods. Open-circuit operation
cutter was added to allow venting the annulus was desirable to conserve the ampere-hours
overboard should the container degrade ex- drawn by the coolant pump. The voltage deg-
cessively during a mission. Also, as added radation, compared at 8 amperes for each of
protection for the Gemini VII spacecraft, a
regenerative line and insulation were added to 50
the outside of the hydrogen container to limit
the heat leak into the container. 29
- Pre-launch (second activation)
The evaluation of the complete fuel-cell power
system was successfully completed with a series >

of tests that checked out the integrated system.

Additional tests included a full-system, temper- 27

ature-altitude test, and finally a vibration test

_ 26
of the entire system module mounted in a space- a3

craft equipment adapter. 25

o Eighth day

Coolant inletabove 70°F

Fuel-Cell Flight Results 24 I I _ I I I I I I
6 8 I0 12 14 I_ 18 20 22 24
Gemini V Current, Amp

FmURE 6-3.--Fuel-cell _ction 1 performance for the

The fuel-cell power system was first used in
Gemini V mission.
the Gemini V mission. During the launch
phase, the fuel cells supplied approximately 86
percent of the overall main-bus load. During 50

the orbit phase, the fuel cells provided 100 per-

.. Pre-lounch
cent of the main-bus power. The maximum load 29
..-_ (second

supplied by the fuel cells was 47.2 amperes _t .....'" activation )

25.5 volts.
>2 B •_._l_'_ ./First day
Section, per/ormance.--The performance of
the fuel-cell section 1 is shown in figure 6-3.
Between the first launch attempt and the actual ==First day °

launch, the fuel-cell power system was operated oEighth day

on a 1-ampere-per-stack dummy load for 60 Coolant inlet above 70 ° F
t I I I I I I I I
hours. At a load of 15 amperes, approximately 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

a 0.4-volt decline was observed between the sec- Current, Amp

ond activation of the section on August 18, 1965, FIGURE 6-4.--Fuel-cell section 2 performance for the

and the performance on August 21, 1965, the Gemini V mission.


these three periods, was 0.27 volt. A compari- shown in table 6-IV. While the inflight per-
son of the performance following each open- formance of section 2 declined, the performance

circuit period shows a net rise of 0.15 volt in of section 1 impioved and resulted in a shift of
section 2 performance. 7.7 percent in load sharing between the two
The purge sensitivity exhibited during the
mission was found to be normal. An average Reactant-usage rate and water-production
rate.--Since the Gemini V mission was the first
recovery of 0.1 volt resulted from the oxygen
mission to use the fuel-cell power system, it was
and hydrogen purge sequences.
Three differential-pressure warning-light in- important to future mission planning that the
dications occurred: during launch, during the reactant-usage rates be determined and com-
first hydrogen purge of section 1, and during an pared with theoretical and ground-test experi-
attempt to purge section 1 without opening the ence (table 6-V). The reactant-usage rate and
crossover valve. These pressure excursions water-production rate agreed within 2 and 4
caused no apparent damage to the fuel-cell percent, respectively, with the theoretical, and
power system. within 5 percent in each case with ground-test
Load sharing of the six fuel-cell stacks is observations.

TABLE 6-IV.--Fuel-Cell Load Sharing

[Bus potential, 25.8 volts]

1st day of mission Change in 8th day of mission

percent of
Fuel-cell stack total load
Percent of between 1st Current, Percent of
total load and 8th days amperes total load

7.02 16.70 +3.69 8.25 20.3£

_tack 1A ............................
6.45 15.35 +1.82 6.95 17.17
_tack 1B .............................
7.65 18.20 +2.15 8.23 20.35
_tack 1C .............................

Section 1 ...................... 21.12 50.2 +7.7 23.43 57.9

_tack 2A ............................. 6.65 15.82 --2.45 5.42 13.37

_tack 2B ............................. 6.63 15.77 --1.92 5.62 13.8fi

_tack 2C ............................ 7.65 18.21 --3.34 6.02 14.87

Section 2 ...................... 20.93 49.8 --7.7 17.06 42.1

Total .......................... 42.05 100 .............. 40.49 100

ThBLE 6-V.--Fuel-Cell Cryogenic Usage Rates and Water-Production Rate

Water production, lb/amp-hr

Hydrogen usage, Oxygen usage,
lb/amp-hr lb/amp-hr
Method 1 Method 2

Theoretical ............ 0. 0027 0.0212 0.0238

Ground test ........... .0029 .0252 0.0253
0. 0244
Flight data "_ ..........
. 00275 .0220 0.0247 I

• These are averages of 4 caleulatedrates taken at 15,24, 30, and 34.5 hours afterlift-off.

The cryogenic-oxygen heater circuit failed in a zero-gravity environment and the internal
after about 26 minutes of flight. Therefore, the arrangement of the container. A more detailed
oxygen-usage rate was calculated from hydro- postflight analysis indicated that, at all times
gen data, applying the ratio of 8 to 1 for the during the mission, the extracted fluid, by
chemical combinations of oxygen and hydrogen. weight, was more than 60 percent low-energy
The water-generation rate of the fuel cell was liquid. The energy balance between extraction
determined by two different methods. In and ambient heat leak permitted a gradual pres-
method 1, hydrogen and oxygen usage rates sure increase to 960 psia at the end of the mis-
were combined, assuming that all of the gases sion. The mission was completed with an esti-
produced water. In method 2, the amount of mated 73 pounds of the oxygen remaining in the
drinking water consumed by the flight crew was tank. Postlandings tests of all associated cir-
added to the amount required to change the gas cuits and components in the reentry portion of
pressure in the water storage tank over a given the spacecraft did not uncover the problem. To
interval of time, and the ratio of this water prevent a similar occurrence on spacecraft 7, a
quantity to the associated ampere-hours resulted crossfeed valve was installed between the
in the production rate. environmental-control-system primary-oxygen
Prior to the Gemini V launch, the hydrogen tank and the fuel-cell reactant-supply-system
tank in the reactant supply system was filled oxygen tank.
with 23.1 pounds of hydrogen to satisfy the pre-
Gemini VII
dicted venting and the power requirements of
the planned mission. Prelaunch testing of the The 14-day Gemini VII flight was the second
hydrogen tank showed that it had an ambient mission to use a fuel-cell power system. This
heat leak greater than 9.65 Btu per hour, and mission would not have been possible without
this provided data for an accurate prediction the approximately 1000-pound weight saving
of inflight performance. The tank pressure provided by the fuel cell. In addition to the
increased to the vent level of 350 psia at 43 hours man-bus loads, during orbital flight, fuel-cell
after lift-off. Venting continued until 167 power was switched to the squib buses, and the
hours after lift-off, with a brief period of vent- squib batteries were shut down. During this
ing at approximately 177 hours. At the end mission the maximum load supplied by the fuel-
of the mission, 1.51 pounds of hydrogen re- cell power system was 45.2 amperes at 23.4 volts.
mained. The oxygen container in the reactant Section per/o_'mance.--Figure 6-5 shows the
supply system was serviced with 178.2 pounds performance of the fuel-cell section i during its
of oxygen and pressurized to 815 psia. Opera- second activitation and on the first and last,
tion was normal until 25 minutes 51 seconds days of the Gemini VII mission. During these
after lift-off when the heater circuitry failed. periods the voltage decay averaged 3 and 5
The pressure then declined gradually until
stabilization occurred at.approximately 70 psia,

around 4 hours 29 minutes after lift-off.
Although 70 psia was far below the 900 psia 28
specified minimum supply pressure, the gas reg- _,_. jPre-iaunch (second activation)

ulators worked perfectly. Analysis indicates

that the fluid state at the 70-psia point was coin- i 27 First d

cident with the saturated liquid line on the 261-

primary enthalpy curves for oxygen. Subse-

m 25
quent extraction from the tank resulted in pene- • First day

tration of the two-phase, or liquid and vapor, o Fourteenth day

region for operation during the remainder of

the flight. Analysis showed that the majority 25
6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
of fluid extracted from the container was low- Current, Amp

energy liquid instead of high-energy vapor. FIGURE 6-5.--Fuel-cell section 1 performance for the
This was a result of the characteristics of a fluid Gemini VII mission.

millivolts per hour at 10 and 24 amperes, re- hours after lift-off, a maximum storage fluctua-
spectively. These decay rates are within the tion of 8 pounds occurred around the gradual
range experienced in the laboratory section life storage reduction. The gradual storage reduc-
tests. Through the first 127 hours of the mis- tion, totaling 12 pounds at the end of the mis-
sion, the performance decay rate of the fuel-cell sion, is attributed to losses of water during
section 9 was also within the range experienced purges of oxygen and hydrogen or to a possible
in the laboratory section life tests. At that time, loss of nitrogen in the water-reference system.
the first of several rapid performance declines A significant observation is that, when periods
was observed, with each decline showing severe of maximum product-water storage occurred,
drops in stack 2C performance. At 259 hours the section current characteristics at a constant
after lift-off, the last rapid performance decline voltage show good fuel-cell performance.
in section 2 began and resulted in 'the removal When periods of minimum or decreasing prod-
of stacks 2A and 2C from the spacecraft uct-wa_er storage occurred, section .2 and, to a
electrical-power bus. lesser extent, section 1, had very low or degrad-
During all but 16 hours of the mission, the ing performance. The responses to the correc-
oxygen-to-water differential pressure warning tive actions were significant increases in stored
light of section 2 indicated an out-of-limit water (presumably from see. 2) and immediate
oxygen-to-water pressure across the water sep- return to normal performance.
arators. With an out-of-tolerance differential Photographs of the Gemini VII spacecraft,
pressure, the extraction rate of water from tlle taken by the Gemini VIA flight crew during
section would have been severely reduced. the rendezvous exercise, revealed an ice forma-
Therefore, when the performance of stack 2C, tion around the hydrogen-vent port on the
which was carrying 45 to 50 percent of the sec- equipment adapter (fig. 6-7). The presence of
tion load, started dropping, it was concluded this ice formation raised questions about the
that water was accumulating in section 2. Ex- ability to purge hydrogen from the fuel-cell
cessive water reduces the active membrane area sections. Purge effects were not discernible
in each cell by masking; consequently, section from the data. The Gemini VII flight crew
•2 was purged more often in order to move water did report water crystals going by the space-
out through the ports. In addition, this section craft window during hydrogen purges late in
was placed on open circuit to stop the produc- the mission. At these particular times, the vent
tion of water while permitting water removal to port was at least partially open. The hydro-
con'tinue. gen-to-oxygen differential-pressure light, nor-
Figures 6-6(a) and 6--6(b) show the devia- molly illuminated during hydrogen purging,
tions in product-water storage with the per- did not illuminate during this flight or the
formance of the fuel-cell sections as a function Gemini V mission. Freezing of the purge
of time from lift-off. Between 100 and .265 moisture at the vent port could cause restriction

__/_ Maximum storoge of product-

_. _"_ ." water in storage tanks

._ _-4
hl' % Ill '(9 ,h _ water loss - --
E _-8

of produc
,? _'_ 'LF+X]\n---- _ '_ _"_"_"water

,-g -12

I I [ ___±__ L 2 __l J___[ I I I 1 I I J I I I I I 1_ I [ _
20 40 60 80 IO0 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 500 520 540
Ground elopsed time, hr

(a) Fuel-cell product-water storage.

FIGURE 6-6._Comparison of fuel-cell performance wi_h fuel-cell product-water storage.


- Section I normal oxygen purge r-Approximate normal fuel-cell
with 56-sac hydrogen purge ..... -, / performance decay
_\ / characteristics

- "_----o. _.-----"---h-, --------- .__._._ '

_ _'_-'--e,_X', - -'_------ ._.._____
--" --'-o- ---c_-_"_b px_q_ - --'--'---_. - _..___

_8 characteristics
at I _ i _, _" _, I '_ /? X_', _
constant voltage (27 volts) k I _,_ _ X. ? _ i _ "%
Section I - _' _ ' -_ " _ I }:_ .... Open-circuit
c6 • _ q3 - _ _ _ i stacks 2 A
o Section ," o // _43 / i
• t / _ , L-lOpen _-_ _l and 2C
Purge event _ ] // _ reactant gas h_ihl -
4 Open-circuit stack 2C,or IO rain // /" _;_S2°lVh; _ Open circuit stack
and double purge section 2 ..... -" ' " _ ..... 2 C for 05hr

Open-circuit section 2 for 136 hr /'

and double purge section 2 ...... -'

0 20 40 60 80 I00 120 t40 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 500 520 340
(b) Ground elapsed time, hr

(b) Fuel-cell current supplied.

Fieul_ _6.--Concluded.

The oxygen container of the reactant supply

system was serviced to 181.8 pounds and pres-
surized to 230 psia. Container performance
was normal throughout the flight. The oxygen
quantity remaining at the end of the flight was
• \
60.95 pounds.

Sequential System

The sequential system consists of indicators,

relays, sensors, and timing devices which pro-
vide electrical control of the spacecraft. The
sequential system performs launch-vehicle-
spacecraft separation, fairing jettison, equip-
ment-adapter separation, retrofire, retroadapter
jettison, drogue-parachute deploy, main-para-
chute deploy, landing attitude, and main-para-
chate jettison. Generally, the flight crew re-
ceive their cue of the sequential events from the
electronic timer which lights a sequential tele-
light switch. When the switch is depressed
FIOURE 6-7.--Ice formation at hydrogen vent. and released, the sequence is initiated.
The major sequential functions are operated
through a minimum of two completely inde-
of flow and prevent illumination of the differ- pendent circuits, components, a n d power
ential-pressure light. sources. As an example, figure 6-8 shows the
Reavtant usage rate.--The hydrogen con- redundancy ill the launch-vehicle-spacecraft
tainer of the reactant supply system was serv- separation system; the flight crew depress and
iced to 23.58 pounds and pressurized to 188 release the SEP SPCFT tel elight switch. This
psia. Container performance was n o r m a 1 action supplies power to the redundant launch-
throughout the flight. At the end of the flight, vehicle-spacecraft wire guillotines, to the pyro-
8.55 pounds of hydrogen renlained. technic switch that open-circuits the interface

218-556 0--66----5

I i i

Relay SC
shapecherge 2

(GLV-SC) I "-""r'-"
120 /,' sec , ,,
time delay

i S Squib bus I
boost insert

elay pyro _ 50-70,u sec time delay

switch I _,

240 p sec
time delay

T _elay_yro _
/ * switch 2 __ 50-70 # sec time delay

Squib bus 2
boost insert

2 1
120 ,u sec _-_11,. Relay SC
Relay i_ I' [ _'I shapecharge 2
time delay
guillotine II

FIGURE 6-8.--Launch-vehicle-spacecraft separation circuitry.

wire bundles prior to severing, and to the initiators. Thus far in the program, all sequen-
shaped charges that break the structural bond tial timeotLts have been nominal.
between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft.
The sequential system is checked out fre- Concluding Remarks
quent|y before the spacecraft leaves the launch It can be concluded from Gemini flight ex-
pad. Each sequential function is performed perience that fuel cells and their associated
first with one circuit, then with the backup, and cryogenic reactant supply systems are suitable
finally with both. The timeout of all time and practical for manned space flight applica-
delays is checked and rechecked. High-energy tions. It can also be concluded that the man-
and low-energy squib simulators were fired to in-the-loop concept of manually performing
insure that the firing circuits were capable of non-time-critical sequential functions is a re-
handling the sure-fire current of the pyrotechnic liable mode of operation.

By R. M. MACHELL, Gemini Program 01_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; J. C. SHOWS, Flight Crew
Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; J. V. CORREALE, Crew Systems Division, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center; L. D. ALLEN, Flight Crew Operations Directorate, NASA Manned Space-
craft Center; and W. J. HUFFSTETLER, Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center

Summary lemetry transmitters. Manual backup is pro-

vided for all automatic and ground-control
The crew station provides a habitable location
functions. The flight crew has the key role in
for the flight crew and an integrated system of
the control of all spacecraft systems.
displays and controls for inflight management
To enable the flight crew to perform the nec-
of the spacecraft and its systems. The results
essary functions, the crew station provides an
of the first manned Gemini flights have shown
integrated system of displays and controls.
that the basic crew-station design, the displays
The displays provide sufficient information to
and controls, and the necessary crew equipment
determine the overall status of the spacecraft
are satisfactory for rendezvous and long-
and its systems at any time. The controls
duration missions. Space suits have been de-
enable the crew to carry out normal functions
veloped for both intravehicular and extra-
and corrective actions. In addition, the crew
vehicular use. These space suits have been
station provides a habitable location for the
satisfactory for flight use; however, the flight
crew, with a large amount of equipment to sup-
crews favor operation with suits removed for
port the crew's needs and activities.
long-duration intravehicular missions. The
initial extravehicular equipment and space suits Basic Design
were satisfactory in the first extravehicular
Cabin Arrangement
operation. This operation proved the feasibil-
ity of simple extravehicular activities, in- The flight crew is housed within the pressur-
cluding self-propelled maneuvering in the im- ized structural envelope shown in figure 7-1.
mediate vicinity of the spacecraft. Increased The total internal pressurized volume is 80 cubic
propellant duration is desirable for future feet. The net volume available for crew mo-
evaluations of extravehicular maneuvering bility after equipment and seat installation is
units. The Gemini crew station and equipment approximately 20 cubic feet per man. This
are satisfactory for continued flight use. volume was adequate for the Gemini missions
Introduction up to 14 days; however, it was less than opti-
mum for crew comfort and mobility. The in-
The experience gained in Project Mercury terior arrangement is shown in figure 7-2. The
proved and demonstrated the capability of the crewmembers are seated side by side, in typical
flight crew to participate effectively in the op- pilot and copilot fashion, facing the small end
eration of the spacecraft systems. This experi- of the reentry assembly. This seating arrange-
ence was carried over into the design of the ment provides forward v!sibility for both pilots
Gemini spacecraft. Manual control by the and permits either one to control the spacecraft
flight crew is a characteristic design feature of during orbit and reentry with minimum dupli-
every system in the spacecraft. Automatic cation of displays and controls.
control is used only for those functions requir-
Cabin Lighting
ing instantaneous response or monotonous repe-
tition. Ground control of the spacecraft is The basic lighting provisions in the crew
used only for updating onboard data and for compartment consist of three incandescent
on-off control of ground tracking aids and te- floodlight assemblies. Continuously variable


dimming controls and alternate selection of red The center stowage frame holds fiber-glass
or white light are provided. The cabin light- boxes containing fragile equipment. These
ing has been adequate for the missions to date; boxes are standardized, and the interiors are
however, during darkside operation, the crews filled with a plastic foam material molded to fit
have found it difficult to see the instruments the contours of the stowed items. This foam
without reducing their dark adaptation for ex- provides mechanical and thermal protection.
ternal visibility. Floodlighting is not well Figure 7-5 shows a typical center stowage box
suited to this requirement. with equipment installed. The concept of using
standardized containers with different interiors
Stowage Provisions
has made it possible to use the same basic stow-
The equipment stowage provisions consist of age arrangements for widely varying mission
fixed metal containers on the side and rear walls requirements.
of the cabin, and a large stowage frame in the
center of the cabin between the ejection seats, as
shown in figures 7 3 and 7-4. Food packages
and other equipment are stowed in the side and
a f t containers. All items in the aft containers
are normally stowed in pouches, with all the
pouches in a container tied together on a

/----' \c

# /

FIQUBE 7-3.4rew-station stowage arrangement : (11

right aft stowage container; ( 2 ) center stowage con-
tainer; (3)left aft stowage container; ( 4 ) left-side
stowage containers ; (5 j orbital utility pouch (under
right instrument panel) ; (6) rightside stowage con-
FIQUBE7-l.-Crew-station pressure vessel.

FIGURE 74.-Spacecraft center and right-aft stowage

FIOUBE7-2.4rew-station interior arrangement. containers (viewed from right side looking aft).
stowing for reentry were practiced i n the same
sequence as planned for flight. "he use of
authentic mockups for stowage exercises and
actual flight hardware for spacecraft fit checks
was essential for successful prelaunch stowage
The equipment stowage provisions proved
satisfactory for long-duration and rendezvous
missions. The mission results showed that with
adequate stowage preparations and practice,
the stowage activities in orbit were accom-
plished without difficulty.
Displays and Controls
' FIourm 74-Stowage of equipment in center stowage
box. General
The command pilot in the left seat has the
I n order to establish practical stowage plans overall control of the spacecraft. The pilot in
for each mission, formal stowage reviews and the right seat monitors the spacecraft systems
informal practice-stowage exercises were con- and assists the command pilot in control func-
ducted with each spacecraft and crew. The tions. This philosophy led to the following
tasks of unstuwing equipment in orbit and re- grouping of displays and controls (fig. 7-6) :

@ Water management pone1

FIQURE 7-6.-Spacecraft instrument panel: ( 1 ) secondary oxygen shut-off (1.h.) ; (2) abort handle; ( 3 ) left
s\\.itc.h/rircuit-breakerpanel ; ( 4 ) lower console ; ( 5 ) rommand pilot's panel ; ( A ) overhead switch/circuit-
breaker panel ; ( R ) right s\~itch/circuit-breker panel; ( C ) secondary oxygen shut-off (r.h.); ( D ) main
c.onsole ; ( E ) e n t e r cwnsole ; ( F ) pilot's panel ; ( G ) n-a ter management panel ; (I?) coninland encoder.

The left instrument panel (fig. 7-7) contains is also installed in the right instrument panel.
the flight command and situation displays and The right switch panel contains switches and
the launch-vehicle monitoring group. The ma- circuit breakers for the electrical power system
neuver control ]mndle is located under the left and experiments. Below the right switch panel
instrument panel. The left switch panel con- is the right-hand maneuver control handle.
tains the sequential bus and retrorocket arming These displays and controls are operated by the
switches, as well as circuit breakers for elec- pilot.
trical-sequential functions and communications The center instrument panel (fig. 7-9) con-
functions. The abort control handle is just be- tains the communications controls, the environ-
low the left switch panel. These displays and mental displays and controls, and the electrical-
controls are normally operated only by the com- sequential system controls. The pedestal panel
mand pilot. contains the guidance and navigation system
The right instrument panel (fig. 7-8) con- controls, the attitude and maneuvering system
tains displays and controls for the navigation controls, the landing and recovery system con-
system, the electrical power system, and experi- trols, and the space-suit ventilation flow con-
ments. A flight director and attitude indicator trols. The attitude control handle and the

Command pilot's panel ®

Left switch/circuit-
breaker panel


FIOURE 7-7.--Command pilot's displays and controls.


Pilaf's panel

Right switch/circuit.
breaker panel

FIe_Rz 7-8.--Pilot's displays and controls.

cabin and suit temperature controls are located The launch-vehicle monitoring group, or the
on the center console. The water management malfunction-detection-system display, consists
controls are located on a panel between the ejec- of launch-vehicle tank-pressure gages, thrust-
tion seats. The overhead switch panel contains chamber pressure lights, an attitude overrate
switches and circuit breakers for the attitude light, and a secondary guidance light.
contrc __and maneuvering systems, the environ- The primary-navigation-system display and
mental control system, and the cabin lighting. control unit is the manual data insertion unit
These controls and displays are accessible to located on the right instrument panel. Guid-
both pilots and may be operated by either one. ance computer values may be inserted or read
out with the manual data insertion unit.
The environmental and propulsion system
The primary flight displays consist of the displays and the electrical-power-system moni-
flight director and attitude indicator, the incre- tor display all utilize vertical scales on which
memal velocity indicator, and the radar indi- deviations from nominal are readily detected.
cator. The flight director and attitude indi- In the electrical power system, the current val-
cator is composed of an all-attitude sphere and ues for all six stacks of the fuel cell are dis-
flight director needles for roll, pitch, and yaw. played simultaneously. The concept of a single
The incremental velocity indicator provides the ammeter with a stack-selector switch did not
command pilot with either the command-ma- prove satisfactory, since frequent monitoring of
neuver velocities from the guidance computer the stack currents is required. For relatively
or the velocities resulting from translation ma- static parameters such as cryogenic tank pres-
neuvers. The radar indicator displays the ren- sures and quantities and propellant tempera-
dezvous-target range and range rate when the tures, the use of one display and a selector
radar is locked on. switch for several parameters was adequate.

Center panel

Center console



FIOURE 7-9.--Displays and controls used by both redes.

Controls mental-control-system levers and valve handles,

are oriented and sized for use by the crew in
The three-axis attitude control handle, shown
pressurized space suits. )kctuation forces are
ill figure 7-10, enables the flight crew to control
within crew requirements but are sufficient to
the spacecraft attitude in pitch, roll, and yaw.
prevent inadvertent actuation or change of posi-
This single control handle is located between
tion due to launch and reentry forces. All
the two pilots and can be used by either one.
critical switches are guarded by locks or bar
The three axes of motion correspond to the
spacecraft axes. The axes of the control handle guards.
Flight Results
are located to minimize undesirable control in-
puts caused by high accelerations in launch and The best indications of the adequacy of the
reentry, and to minimize cross-coupling or in- displays and controls have been the results of
teraction of individual commands. the flights to date and the ability of the crew
The primary translation-maneuver control to accomplish assigned or alternate functions as
handle (fig. 7-11) is located beneath the left required. In general, the displays and controls
instrument panel. The mot ion of this control have been entirely satisfactory.
corresponds to the direction of spacecraft During the first launch attempt for the
motion. Gemini VI-A mission, the flight crew was able
Special system controls, such as the environ- to assess correctly the launch-vehicle hold-kill

E Yaw axis //-_\
Stowed position --_, / \
, Yaw right
_/ ./Communications

Yaw lef_ p ._f."_" buttons

i Palm pivot

/./'( CE Pitch axis )

Pitch up Pitch down _/___

Operational position --./,'// v

Fiou_ 7-11.--Maneuver hand control.

be a significant simplification for all mission-

timing activities.
RolI I
An overlay concept is used to make maximum
use of the available display panel space. Since
the launch-vehicle display group is not used
E Roll axis
after reaching orbit, checklists and flight pro-
FmuR_. 7-10.--Attitude hand control. cedure cards are mounted in this area for ready
reference during orbital operations.
situation, initiate the proper action, and avoid The use of pressure-sealed switches in the at-
an unnecessary off-the-pad ejection. As a re- titude and maneuver controls, as well as other
sult, there was only a minor delay in the launch applications in the crew station, led to some
schedule, rather than the loss of an entire difficulty because of the sensitivity of these
mission. switches to pressure changes. In one altitude
Flight results have shown that the crews were chamber test, several of these sealed switches
able to determine the spacecraft attitude and failed to close because of the pressure trapped
rates and to control the spacecraft more ac- inside. Fabrication and test procedures were
curately than initially anticipated. Accord- established to screen out those pressure-sensitive
ingly, the markings on the attitude indicator switches. The pushbutton-lighted switches also
and flight director needles have been increased gave some difficul,ty in the development phase
to provide greater precision in reading pitch because of _he critical dimensional requirements
and roll attitudes and pitch and yaw rates. of small components and frequent mechanical
The only other significant change to the dis- failure. Sturdy toggle switches were used in-
plays and controls was the addition of a mis-
side all critical, pushbutton-lighted switches to
sion-elapsed-time clock to spacecraft 6 and sub-
obtain the desired reliability of operation. No
sequent spacecraft. Prior to the use of this
difficulties with the sturdier switches were en-
clock, there had been occasional confusion be-
countered in flight.
tween Greenwich mean time and mission elapsed
As a result of the experience of the early
time for timing the onboard functions. The in-
Gemini flights, the crew-station displays and
stallation of a mission-elapsed-time clock in the
spacecraft enabled the crew and the ground controls are now standardized for the remaining
control network to use a single, common time spacecraft. The only future changes planned
base for all onboard functions. The addition are those resulting from the differences in ex-
of this mission-elapsed-time clock was found to periments assigned to each mission.

r - Integrated vent
Space Suits and Accessories ,‘ poss through
G3C Space Suit ; bearing

The G3C space suit used in the first manned

Gemini flight is shown in figure 7-12. The
oulter layer is a high-temperature-resistant nylon
material. The next layer is a link-net material,
Vent outlet-
especially designed t o provide pressurized mo-
_ _ -Went
- inlet
bility and to control ballooning of the suit. The Integrated----.
pressure layer is a neoprene-warted nylon. An vent poss through
glove disconnect
inner layer of nylon is included to minimize wrist beoring
pressure points from various spacesuit com-
ponents. The spnce-suit vent system (fig.7-13)
provides ventilating flow to the entire body.
Sixty percent of the ventilation flow is ducted
by a manifold system to the boots and gloves.
This gas flows back over t.helegs, arms, and torso
to remove metabolic heat and to maintain
thermal comfort. The remaining 40 percent of
the inlet gas passes through an integral duct in 7-13.-Ventilation distribution system for the
the helmet neck ring and is direated across the G3C space suit.

visor to prevent fogging and to provide fresh

oxygen to the oral-nasal areas. Flight experi-
ence with the G3C space suit indicated that it,
restraint layer.. met all the applicable design requirements for
,,Outer cover HT- I
short-duration missions. There were no space-
suit component failures nor any significant
Comfort l a y e r - - problems encountered in flight.
retention G4C Space Suit

The G4C space suit, as shown in figure 7-14,

is a follow-on version of the G3C suit, with the
necessary modifications required to support
extravehicular operation. The outer-cover
disconnects” layer of the G4C suit incorporates added layers
of material for meteoroid and thermal protec-
tion. The inner layers of the space suit are the
.t- f* same as tlie basic G3C suit. The G4C helmet
incorporates a remorable extravehicular visor
which provides visual protection and protects
the inner visor from impact damage. h redun-
dant zipper was added to the pressure-sealing
closure of the suit to protect against catastrophic
failure and to reduce the stress on the pressure-
sealing closure during normal operation.
The G4C suits worn by the flight crews of the
Gemini IV, V, and VI-A missions were satis-
factory for both iiitraveliicular and extra-
vehicular operation. Some crew discomfort re-
FIGURE G3C space suit. sulted from long-term wear of the suits, and
ance to movement, and fewer pressure points
than previous space suits. It also was satisfac-
tory for do&g and donning in the crew sta-
,,- _ _ _ Pressure bladder tion. Donning time was about 16 to 17 min-
utes. I n summary, the G5C suit met all its
- - - Comfort layer design objectives.
The significant flight results were that the
- - - -Underwear
,- crewmembers felt more comfortable, perspired
less, and slept better when they removed the
Restraint layer suits entirely. Elimination of the pressure gar-
(Link net) ment resulted in a thermal environment more
nearly approximating the conditions of street
Bumper layers HT-I clothes on earth. With this comfort goal in
mind, the Gemini VI1 crew strongly recom-
mended removal of the space suits during
‘\--Aluminized thermal layer future long-duration manned space-flight
\ missions.
, Night-Crew Equipment
, \
\ \ - - - -
\ Outer layer HT-I
\ A substantial amount 6f operational equip-
\ ment was required in each spacecraft to enable

the crew t o carry out their mission tasks. This

\ \
equipment included flight data items, photo-
L---- Felt layer HT-I graphic and optical equipment, and a large
number of miscellaneous items such as small
dJ tools, handheld sensors, medical kits, wrist-
watches, pencils, and pens. A 16-mm sequence
camera and a 70-mm still camera were carried
BYGURE 7 - 1 4 . 4 m i n i extravehicular space suit. on all the flights. Good results were obtained
with these cameras.
this discomfort increased significantly with An optical sight was used for alining the
time. -4fter the Gemini I V and V missions, it spacecraft on specific ground objects or land-
was concluded that the characteristics of a space marks, and it was also effective in aiming a t the
suit designed for extravehicular operation were rendezvous target. The backup rendezvous
marginal for long-term intravehicular wear. techniques being developed depend on the aim-
ing and alinement capabilities of the optical
G5C Space Suit
sight. The extensive use of this sight for
The G5C space suit \t-as developed for intra- experiments and operational activities made i t
vehicular use only, and it was used on the a necessary item of equipment for all missions.
Gemini V I 1 mission. It mas designed t o pro- All of the flight-crew equipment served useful
vide maximum comfort and freedom of move- purposes in flight and contributed to the crew’s
ment, with the principal consideration being capability to live and work in the Spacecraft
reduction in bulk. As shown in figure 7-15, for short or long missions. The large number
the G5C suit is a lightweight suit with a soft of items required considerable attention to do-
fabric hood. The hood, which is a continua- tail to insure adequate flight preparation. The
tion of the torso, incorporates a polycarbonate most important lesson learned concerning
visor and a pressure-sealing zipper. The zip- flight-crew equipment was the need for early
per installation permits removal of the hood definition of requirements, and for timely delir-
for stowage behind the astronaut’s head. The ery of hardware on a schedule compatible with
G5C suit provided much less bulk, less resist- the spacecraft testing sequence.


7 - 1 5 . 4 m i n i G5C space suit.

Food, Water, Waste, and Personal sponding to their daily schedule. Occasional
Hygiene System leakage of the food bags occurred in use. Be-
cause of the hand pressure needed to squeeze the
Food System food out of the feeder spout, these leaks were
The Gemini food system consists of freeze- most prevalent in the chunky, rehydratable
dried rehydratable foods and beverages, and items. A design change has been made to in-
bite-sized foods. Each item is vacuum packed crease the spout width. The bite-sized foods
in a laminated plastic bag. The items are then were satisfactory for snacks but were undesir-
combined in units of one or two meals and able for a sustained diet. These items were
vacuum packed in a heavy aluminum-foil over- rich, dry, and, in some cases, slightly abrasive.
wrap. (Seefig. 7-16.) The rehydratable food I n addition, some of the bite-sized items tended
bag incorporates a cylindrical plastic valve to crumble. I n general, the flight crews pre-
which mates with the spacecraft water dis- ferred the rehydratable foods and beverages.
penser for injecting water into the bag. A t the Drinking-Water Dispenser
other end of the bag is a feeder spout which is
unrolled and inserted into the mouth for eating The drinking-water dispenser (fig. 7-17) is
or drinking the contents. a pistol configuration with a long tubular barrel
A typical meal consists of two rehydratable which is designed to mate with the drinking
foods, two bite-sized items, and a beverage. port on the space-suit helmet. The water shut-
The average menu provides between 2000 and off valve is located a t the exit end of the barrel
2500 calories per man per day. The crews fa- to minimize residual-water spillage. This dis-
vored menus with typical breakfast, lunch, and penser was used without difficulty on Gemini
dinner selections a t appropriate times corre- 111,IV, and V.

7-l6.-Gemini food pack.

F’IQURE7-17.-Original Gemini water dispenser. FIGURE7-18.-Gemini water-metering device.

I n order to measure the crew’s individual Urine Collection System

water consumption, a water-metering dispenser The Gemini urine system consists of a port-
(fig. 7-18) was used on Gemini VI-A and VII. able receiver with a Latex roll-on cuff receptacle
Similar to the basic dispenser, this design in-
and a rubberized fabric collection bag. After
corporates a bellows reservoir and a valve
arrangement for dispensing water in 1/,-ounce use, the receiver is attached to the urine-disposal
increments. A digital counter on the handle re- line, and the urine is dumped directly over-
cords each increment, dispensed. This dis- board. This system was used without difficulty
penser operated satisfactorily on both missions. on the Gemini V and VI-A missions.

On Gemini VII, a chemical urine-volume- Extravehicular Operation

measuring system was used to support medical
Extravehicular Equipment
experiments requiring urine sampling. Al-
though this system was similar to the Gemini V Early in 1965 the decision was made to con-
system, the increased size and complexity made duct self-propelled extravehicular operation on
its use more difficult, and some urine leakage oc- the Gemini IV mission. The extravehicular
curred. space suit was the G4C suit described previ-
Defecation System ously. The primary oxygen flow to the extra-
The defecation system consisted of individual vehicular space suit was supplied through a 25-
foot umbilical hose. This oxygen hose was con-
plastic bags with adhesive-lined circular tops.
nected to the spacecraft oxygen system in the
Hygiene tissues were provided in separate dis-
center cabin area, and the other end was con-
pensers. Each bag contained a disinfectant
nected to the space-suit inlet fitting. The um-
packet to eliminate bacteria growth. Use of the
bilical provided a normal open-loop oxygen
bags in flight required considerable care and ef-
flow of 8.2 pounds per hour. The umbilical also
fort. Adequate training and familiarization
contained communications and bioinstrumenta-
enabled the crews to use them without incident.
tion wiring.
Personal Hygiene System A small chest pack, called the ventilation con-

Personal hygiene items included hygiene tis- trol module, was developed for control of the
sues in fabric dispenser packs, fabric towels, wet space-suit pressurization and ventilation flow
cleaning pads, toothbrushes, and chewing gum (fig. 7-19). Existing Gemini environmental-
for oral hygiene. These items were satisfactory control-system components were used where pos-
in flight use. sible, since they were already qualified. The

Feed-port adapter_ _

emergency .-'"

.......... Shutoff


"Oxygen "''Pressure
bottle regulator


FIGURE 7-19.--Gemini IV extravehicular life-support system.


ventilation control module consisted of a Gem- a hatch-closing lanyard. These provisions and
ini demand regulator, a 3400-psi oxygen bottle, all the equipment were evaluated in mockup
and suitable valving and plumbing to complete exercises and zero-gravity aircraft flights.
the system. The ventilation control module was Flight-crew training was also accomplished as
attached to the space-suit exhaust fitting and a part of these tests and evaluations.
maintained the suit pressure a t 4.2 psia. The The extravehicular equipment for the Gemini
nominal value was 3.7 psia ; however, the pres- I V mission was subjected to the same rigorous
sure in the space suit ran slightly higher be- qualification test program as other spacecraft
cause of the pressure drop in the bleed line hardware. Prior to the mission, the flight and
which established the reference pressure. The backup equipment was tested in a series of
reserve-oxygen bottle in the ventilation control altitude-chamber tests, following the planned
module was connected by an orificed line to a mission profile and culminating in altitude runs
port on the helmet. When manually actuated, with the prime and backup pilots. These alti-
this reserve bottle supplied oxygen directly to tude-chamber tests, conducted in a boilerplate
the facial area of the extravehicular pilot. spacecraft a t the Manned Spacecraft Center,
The handheld maneuvering unit consisted of provided the final system validation prior t o
a system of manually operated cold-gas thrust- flight.
ers, a pair of high-pressure oxygen bottles, a Flight Results
regulator, a shutoff valve, and connecting The flight results of Gemini I V confirmed
plumbing (fig. 7-20). The two tractor thrust- the initial feasibility of extravehicular opera-
ers were 1 pound each, and the single pusher- tion. Ventilation and pressurization of the
thruster was 2 pounds. The flight crew re- space suit were adequate except for peak work-
ceived extensive training in the use of the hand- loads. During the initial egress activities and
held maneuvering unit on an air-bearing plat- during ingress, the cooling capacity of the
form, which provided multiple-degree-of- oxygen flow at 8.2 pounds per hour did not keep
freedom simulation. the extravehicular pilot cool, and overheating
The principal spacecraft provisions for extra- and visor fogging occurred at these times.
vehicular operation in the Gemini I V spacecraft During the remainder of the extravehicular
were the stowage provisions for the ventilation period, the pilot was comfortably cool.
control module and the handheld maneuvering The mobility of the G4C space suit was ade-
unit, the oxygen supply line in the cabin, and quate for all extravehicular tasks attempted

FIQWE7-2Ch-Handheld maneuvering unit.


during the Gemini IV mission. The extravehic- reference coordinate system. At no time did he
ular visor on the space-suit helmet was found become disoriented or lose control of his
to be essential for looking 'toward the sun. The movements.
extravehicular pilot used the visor throughout The ingress operation proceeded normally
the extravehicular period. until the pilot attempted to pull the hatch
The maneuvering capability of the handheld closed. At this time he experienced minor dif-
maneuvering unit provided the extravehicular ficulties in closing the hatch because one of the
pilot with a velocity increment of approxi- hatch-locking control levers failed to operate
mately 6 feet per second. He executed short freely. The two pil(_ts operated the hatch-clos-
translations and small angular maneuvers. Al- ing lanyard and the hatch-locking mechanism
though the limited propellant supply did not together and closed the hatch satisfactorily.
permit a detailed stability evaluation, the re- The cabin repressurization was normal.
sults indicated that the handheld device was The results of this first extravehicular opera-
suitable for controlled maneuvers within 25 feet tion showed the need for greater cooling capac-
of the spacecraft. The results also indicated the ity and grea'ter propellant duration for future
need for longer propellant duration for future extravehicular missions. The results also
extravehicular missions. After the maneuver- showed that extravehicular operation could be
ing propellant was depleted, the e_ctravehicular conducted on a routine basis with adequate
pilot evaluated techniques of tether handling preparation and crew training.
and self-positioning without propulsive con-
trol. His evaluation showed that he was unable Concluding Remarks
to establish a fixed position when he was free Evaluation of the crew station and the re-
of the spacecraft because of the tether reaction
lated crew equipment was somewhat subjective,
and the conservation of momentum. Any time
with varying reactions from different crews. In
he pushed away from the spacecraft, he reached
summary, the crew station, as configured for the
the end of the tether with a finite velocity, which
in turn was reversed and directed back toward Gemini VI-A and VII missions, met the crew's

'the spacecraft. Throughout these maneuvers needs adequately, and the flight results indicate
the extravehicular pilot maintained his orienta- that this configuration is satisfactory for
tion satisfactorily, using the spacecraft as his continued flight use.

By ROBERT L. FROST, Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; JAMES W. THOMPSON,
Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; and LARRYE. BELL, Crew Systems Divi-
sion, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center

Summary valve, the oxygen supply system, the cooling

circuits, and the coolant pumps in each cooling
The environmental control system provides circuit. The cabin pressure regulator and the
thermal and pressure control, oxygen, drinking cabin pressure relief valve are internally
water, and waste-water disposal for the crew, redundant.
and thermal control for spacecraft equipment. Suit Subsystem
An extensive test program was conducted by
the spacecraft prime contractor, the subcon- A schematic of the space-suit, the cabin, and
tractor, and the NASA Manned Spacecraft the oxygen-supply systems is shown in figure
Center to develop and qualify the system for 8-9. The space-suit module is shown in
the Gemini Program. Flight results to date figure 8-3.
have been good. A minimum number of
anomalies have occurred, thus confirming the Primary oxygen tank
value of the extensive ground test program. ," Water storage
ECS coolant module /" /" tank (SC 7)

Introduction Adapter waters/_torage _ //,-'/ Water storage tank

tanks(SC5 8_7) _'_._,"_-" /" (2 reqd SC 3)

The environmental control system maintains / ;/--x.._.,_v_ ,- (4 reqd SO 4)

/ .._ _"-_L ,Secondary and reentry

a livable 100-percent-oxygen atmosphere for
! _/t_ // _ ].._(_ oxygen supply
the crew; controls the temperature of the crew
and of spacecraft equipment; and provides a Waters\ " 4_-',__/i
torage(_ -_," VI ,_'"_
drinking water supply and a means for dispos-
ing of waste water. The environmental control Cabin water storage tank,' _ _"_--._,...,'
system may be subdivided into a suit subsystem,
Suit pockag_
a water management subsystem, and a coolant
subsystem. The suit subsystem may be fur- FIOURE 8-1.--Environmental control system.

ther divided into three systems: the suit, cabin,

and oxygen supply systems. The location of
these systems in the spacecraft is shown in
figure 8-1. All components are grouped into
modules where possible to facilitate installation,
checkout, and replacement.
The environmental control system design
incorporates several redundancies so that no
single failure could be catastrophic to the crew.
Additional redundancy is included in certain
areas to enhance the probability that the system
will satisfy requirements for the full duration
of the mission. Redundant units are provided
for the suit demand regulators, the suit com-
pressor and power supply, the cabin outflow FmURE 8--2.--Suit subsystem.

218-556 0--66-----6

level. Should the suit pressure drop t o a level

between 3.0 and 3.1 psia, the absolute-pressure
switch actuates, closing the dual secondary-
flow-rate and system-shutoff valve, thereby
changing to an open-loop configuration having
a flow of 0.08 to 0.1 pound of oxygen per minute
through each space suit. The recirculation
valve is normally open so that, when the suit
visors are open, cabin gas will be circulated
through the suit system for purification.
ii Cabin System
The cabin system includes a fan and heat
exchanger, a pressure regulator, a pressure-
relief valve, an inflow snorkel valve, an outflow
valve, and a repressurization valve. The cabin
&3.-Environmental control system suit sub-
FIQURE fan circulates gas through the heat exchanger
system module. to provide cooling for cabin equipment. The
cabin pressure regulator controls cabin pressure
Space-Suit System to a nominal 5.1 psia.
The space-suit system is a single, closed re- Oxygen-Supply System
circulating system, with the two space suits in
parallel. The system provides ventilation, The oxygen-supply system uses two sources
pressure and temperature control, and atmos- of oxygen. The primary source, located in the
pheric purification. Centrifugal compressors equipment-adapter section, is a tank containing
circulate oxygen through the system at approxi- liquid oxygen stored at supercritical pressures.
mately 11 cubic feet per minute through each The second supply is gaseous oxygen stored a t
5000 psi in two bottles located inside the cabin
space suit. The two compressors may be op-
erated individually or simultaneously. Carbon section. The secondary supply supplements the
primary supply in case of failure and becomes
dioxide and odors are removed from the oxygen
the primary supply during reentry. Each
by an absorber bed containing lithium hy-
droxide and activated charcoal. The amount secondary bottle contains enough oxygen for
of lithium hydroxide varies according to the one orbit at the normal consumption rate, plus
a normal reentry at the oxygen high rate of 0.08
requirements of the mission. The oxygen can
pound of oxygen per minute to each astronaut.
be cooled in the suit heat exchanger to as low
as 48" F; however, the actual temperature is a Water Management Subsystem
function of crew activity, coolant subsystem
operating mode, and system adjustments made Drinking Water Systems
by the crew. Adjustments can be made both The water management subsystem includes a
for coolant flow rate through the suit heat ex- 16-pound-capacity water tank, a water dis-
changer and for oxygen flow rate through the penser, and the necessary valves and controls,
space suit. all located in the cabin, plus a water storage sys-
Water given off by the crew as perspiration tem located in the adapter. The adapter water
and expiration is condensed in the suit heat ex- storage systems for the battery-powered space-
changer and routed to the launch-cooling heat craft consisted of one or more containers, each
exchanger. having a bladder with one side pressurized with
The two demand regultttors function to main- gas to force mater into the cabin tank.
tain a suit, pressure npproximately equal to The water storage systems on fuel-cell-
cabin pressure. The demand regulators also powered spacecraft is similar to the battery
maintain a minimum suit pressure of 3.5 psis configuration. Fuel-cell product water is stored
any time the cabin pressure drops below that on the gas side of the bladder in the drinking-

water storage tanks. Regulators were added to Coolant Subsystem

control the fuel-cell product water pressure as
required by the fuel cell. The initial design Tile coolant subsystem provides cooling for
concept called for the flight crew to drink the the crew and thermal control for spacecraft
fuel-cell product water; however, tests revealed components. Electronic equipment is mounted
that fuel-cell product water is not potable, and on cold plates. The system, shown schemat-

the present design was adopted. ically in figure 8-4, consists of two completely
redundant circuits or loops, each having re-
_'aste-Water Disposal System
dundant pumps. For clarity, the coolant lines
Waste-water disposal is accomplished by two for the secondary loop are omitted from the fig-
different methods. Condensate from the suit ure. All heat exchangers and cold plates, ex-
heat exchanger is routed to the launch-cooling cept for the regenerative heat exchangers and
heat exchanger for boiling, if additional cool- the fuel cells, have passages for each loop. On
ing is required, or is dumped overboard. Urine spacecraft 7, the secondary or B pump in each
is dumped directly overboard, or it can be coolant loop was equipped with a power supply
routed to the launch-cooling heat exchanger that reduced the coolant flow rate to approxi-
should the primary systems fail or additional mately half that of the primary or A pump.
cooling be required. To prevent freezing, the This change was made in order to reduce total
outlet of the direct overboard dump is warmed power consumption, to maintain higher adapter
by coolant lines and an electric heater. temperatures during periods of low power



75°F Fuel-cell ['_

Fuel-cet I
Coolant Coolant
section I heat
heat 1 pump pump
cold plates
J Adapter A B

Fuel-cell J_


Reentry Primary
module oxygen
section 2 heat
Fuel-cell l
plates exchanger

t ,
Cabin Regenerative
cold heat
plate exchanger

I . I . and relief . I
Cabin ()valve
heat heat Radiator
exchanger exchanger
Suit J
J i I i cooling '_ I
_'J Launch coolant
--Primary coolant loop exchanger

....... Secondary coolant loop I temperature

control valve

FIOURE 8-4.--Coolant subsystem.


usage, and also to allow greater flexibility in changer outlet temperature to a nominal 46 ° F.
maintaining optimum coolant temperatures for The spacecraft radiator (fig. 8-5) is an in-
the resultant variations in thermal loads. tegral part of the spacecraft adapter. The
Battery-powered spacecraft require the use coolant tubes are integral parts of the adapter
of only one coolant loop at a time, whereas the stringers, and the adapter skin acts as a fin.
fuel-cell-powered spacecraft require both loops, Alternate stringers carry coolant tubes from
as each fuel-cell section is on a different loop. each loop, and all tubes for one loop are in
By using both coolant pumps simultaneously, series. Coolant flows first around the retro-
one loop is capable of handling the maximum section and then around the equipment section
cooling requirements should the other loop fail. of the adapter. Strips of high-absorptivity
The coolant loops have two points of automatic tape are added to the outer surface of the
temperature control: radiator outlet tempera- adapter to optimize the effective radiator area
ture is controlled to 40 ° F, and fuel-cell inlet for the cooling requirements of each spacecraft.
temperature is controlled to 75 ° F. Prelaunch
cooling is provided through the ground-cooling Test Programs
heat exchanger. The launch-cooling heat ex-
changer provides cooling during powered flight The environmental-control-system program
and during the first few minutes of orbital flight consisted of development, qualification, and re-
until the radiator cools down and becomes ef- liability tests, covering 16 different environ-
fective. The heat exchanger also supplements ments, conducted by the vendor, and of systems
the radiator, if required, at any time during tests conducted by the spacecraft contractor and
flight by automatically controlling the heat-ex- by Manned Spacecraft Center organizations.

Primary inlet

Secondary inlet



'/" flow


"Adapter mold line

"'Primary outlet
Section A-A

Quarter panels ",, "Secondary outlet

(typ 4 places)
"Secondary outlet

8-5.--Spacecraft radiator.

During the development of the components chemical and the outer shell of the canister.
for the environmental control system, designs Also, the estimate of the metabolic rate was
were verified with production prototypes rather reevaluated and was reduced based on the re-
than with engineering models. For example, sults of previous flights. Test reruns then used
if a pressure regulator was to be produced as metabolic rate inputs of 370 and 450 Btu per
a casting, the test model was also produced as a hour per man. The new design successfully
casting. As a result, additional production met all mission requirements.
development was eliminated, and confidence Early in the Gemini Program, a boilerplate
with respect to flightworthiness was accumu- spacecraft was fabricated to simulate the cabin
lated from developmental tests as well as from portion of the reentry assembly, with adequate
later qualification and system reliability tests. safety provisions for manned testing under any
Development tests included manned altitude operating condition. Sixteen manned tests were
testing on a boilerplate spacecraft equipped conducted--four at sea level, six at altitude with
with the suit and cabin portion of the environ- a simulated coolant subsystem, and six at alti-
mental control system. tude with a complete system, except that the
Where possible, qualification of the environ- radiator was simulated only by pressure drop.
mental control system has been demonstrated at System cooling was provided through the
the system level, rather than at the component ground-cooling heat exchanger. After satisfac-
level, because of the close interrelationships of tory completion of the spacecraft contractor's
components, especially with respect to thermal test program, the boilerplate model was shipped
performance. Test environments included hu- to the Manned Spacecraft Center, where it was
midity, salt-water immersion, salt-solution, used in numerous manned tests.
thermal shock, high and low temperature The boilerplate proved a valuable test article,
and pressure, proof, burst, vibration, accelera- as it pointed out several potential problems
tion, and shock. which were corrected on the flight systems. The
System qualification tests were followed by most significant of these was the crew discom-
simulated mission reliability tests consisting of fort caused by inadequate cooling during levels
eight 2-day, three 7-day, and eight 14-day tests of high activity. The inadequate cooling was
of a single environmental control system. In determined to be a result of excessive heat gain
these tests, all the environmental-control-system in the coolant fluid between the temperature
components mounted in the cabin and space- control valve and the suit heat exchanger. In-
craft adapter section were exposed to simulated sulation was added to the coolant lines and to
altitude, temperature cycling, and temperature the heat exchanger. In addition, a flow-limit-
extremes in an altitude chamber. Moisture and ing orifice was added between the suit and cabin
carbon-dioxide atmospheric conditions were heat exchangers to assure adequate flow of cool-
provided by crewman simulators. After each of ant in the suit heat exchanger. Also, the capa-
these tests, the oxygen containers were serviced, bility to run both suit compressors was added to
and the lithium hydroxide canisters were re- cover any activity level. With these changes,
placed; otherwise, the same components were the environmental control system was demon-
used for all tests. strated to have adequate capability.
These tests revealed that heat transfer from During the boilerplate tests at the Manned
the lithium hydroxide canister to ambient was Spacecraft Center, no problems were en-
greater than expected. This increased heat countered with the environmental control sys-
transfer caused chilling of the gas stream near tem. The boilerplate played a valuable role in
the outer periphery of the chemical bed, suffi- qualification of the Gemini space suit, the
cient to cause condensation of water from the Gemini IV extravehicular equipment_ and the
gas stream. The condensation reduced the life extravehicular life-support systems for future
of the chemical bed by approximately 45 per- missions.
cent based on a metabolic input rate of 500 Btu Static article 5 was a production spacecraft
per hour per man. The canister was redesigned reentry assembly and was used in flotation and
to include a layer of insulation between the postlanding tests. The portions of the environ-

mental control system required for use after Spacecraft Center initiated the design and
landing were operated during manned tests in fabrication of a humidity-control device that
the Gulf of Mexico. This testing demonstrated could be installed in the cabin. In the interim,
satisfactory cooling and carbon-dioxide remov- the spacecraft contractor took immediate pre-
able for up to 19 hours of sea recovery time. cautions by applying a moisture-absorbent ma-
A series of three thermal qualifica_tion tests terial on the interior cabin walls of the Gemini
was conducted on spacecraft 3A, which was a IV spacecraft. During the Gemini IV mission,
complete flight-configuration spacecraft with humidity readings were taken, and no moisture
the exception of fuel cells. Fuel-cell heat loads was observed. Consequently, development of
were simulated with electric heaters. The en- the humidity-control device was terminated
tire spacecraft was placed in an altitude chamber after initial testing, as condensation did not ap-
equipped with heat lamps for solar simulation pear to be a problem during orbital operation.
and with liquid-nitrogen cold walls to enable The validity of the thermal qualification test
simulating an orbital day-and-night cycle. program has been demonstrated on the first five
During the first test, which lasted 12 hours, manned flights. The high degree, of accuracy
the adapter temperatures were colder than de- in preflight predictions of thermal performance
sired, indicating that the radiator was oversized and sizing of the radiator area is due, in large
for the thermal load being imposed by the space- part, to the spacecraft 3A test results.
craft systems. As a result, the drinking and
waste-water lines froze, and the oxidizer lines Flight Results
and components in the propulsion system be- Performance of the environmental control
came marginally cold. After the data from the
system has been good throughout all flights,
first test were analyzed, resistance heaters were with a minimum number of anomalies. Crew-
added to the adapter water lines, flow-limiting
man comfort has been generally good. A re-
valves were installed in tile fuel-cell tempera-
view of the data from all flights shows that an
ture-control-valve bypass line, and provisions
indicated suit inlet temperature of 52 ° to 54 °
were made to vary the effective radiator area.
F is best for maintaining crew comfort. Actual
The second test lasted 135 hours, and the
suit inlet temperatures are 10 ° to 20 ° F higher
spacecraft maintained thermal control. The re-
than indicated because of heat transfer from the
sistance heaters kept the water lines well above
cabin to the ducting downstream of the tempera-
freezing, but the propulsion-system oxidizer
ture sensor. Suit inlet temperatures were in
lines remained excessively cold, indicating the
need for similar heaters on these lines. or near the indicated range on all flights ex-
cept during the Gemini VI-A mission. During
The most significant gains were the successful
this flight, except for the sleep period, the tem-
raising of the adapter temperature and the im-
perature increased to over 60 ° F, causing the
proved e.nvironmental-control-system perform-
crew to be warm. Detailed postflight testing of
ance with the reduced effective area of the radi-
the environmental control system showed no
ator. By adding strips of high-absorptivity
failures. The discomfort is attributed to a high
tape, tile effective area of the radiator can be
crewman metabolic-heat rate resulting from the
optimized for each spacecraft, based on its spe-
heavy workload during the short flight. The
cific mission profile.
design level for the suit heat exchanger is 500
Excellent thermal control was maintained for
Btu per hour per man. Experience gained
the entire 190 hours of the third test, demon-
since the design requirements were established
strating the adequacy of the environmental con-
has shown that the average metabolic rate of
trol system with the corrective action taken after
the crew is around 500 Btu per hour per man on
the first and second tests. The only anomaly
short flights and between 330 and 395 Btu per
during the test was condensate forming in the hour per man on long-duration flights. (See
cabin. The spacecraft contractor and NASA fig. 8-6.)
both studied the possibility of condensate form- The most comfortable conditions proved to
ing during orbital flight, and two approaches to be during the suits-off operation of the Gemini
the problem were examined. The Manned VII flight. Preflight analysis had determined
again at 315 hours. Also, a buildup of conden-
sation was noted on the floor and on the center
pedestal at this time. The exact cause has not
been determined, but two possibilities are that
m 400
0 0 z_ some ducts experienced local chilling as a result
d o A 0
0 <> <> []
of spacecraft attitude and that a degradation
" 3OO or failure occurred in the condensate removal
Respiration quotient = 0.82
system. Circumstances both support and re-
2OO Gemini flights
ject these possibilities.
Vostok flights Cabin temperature has not increased during
i Mercury fUghts

Chamber test reentry as was originally expected. Initial cal-
culations showed an increase of 70 ° to 190 ° F
during reentry, whereas the actual increase has
0 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 been less than 10 a F. The thermal effectiveness
Mission duration, days
of the insulation and structural-heat flow paths
FiGui_ 8-6.--Crewman metabolic rate. is greater than could be determined analytically.
During the Gemini II mission, the pressure in
the cryogenic containers dropped approximately
that, because of insufficient gas flow over the
30 percent just after separation of the space-
body, the crew might not be as comfortable as
craft from the launch vehicle. Extensive post-
would be desired. However, the crew found that
flight testing determined that the pressure drop
relatively little air flow over the body was neces-
resulted from thermal stratification within the
sary. The suits-off operation had very little
effect on the cabin environment. Cabin air and cryogen. The separation maneuver caused
mixing, which reduced the stratification and
wall temperatures were between 75 ° and 80 ° F,
which was normal after stabilization on all resulted in a lower stabilized pressure. The

flights. Cabin relative humidity was between prelaunch procedures have been modified to
48 and 56 percent during suits-off operation, bring the container pressure up to operating
which was lower than the 50 to 72 percent ex- levels at a much slower rate, thus minimizing the
perienced on other flights. This was as expected stratification. A pressure drop has been ex-
because the sensible-to-latent cooling ratio was perienced on only one mission since Gemini II.
higher with the suits off than with the suits on.
Condensation has not been a problem during Concluding Remarks
flight, contrary to the indications during the
The excellent flight results to date, with a
spacecraft 3A testing. Spacecraft 3A testing
minimum number of anomalies, confirm the
assumed a fixed spacecraft attitude. This
value of the extensive ground test program con-
would cause greater temperature gradients in
ducted on the system. Condensation in the
the cabin than the drifting mode normally used
during the missions. Sig_dficant condensation cabin has not been a problem, as was originally
has occurred only once during the program. indicated. Also, it appears that the metabolic
During the Gemini VII mission, the crew re- heat load of the crew during periods of high
ported free moisture leaving the suit inlet hoses activity may be more than 500 Btu per hour
at approximately 267 hours after lift-off and per man.
By WALTERF. BURKE,Vice President and Genera2 Manager, Spacecraft and Missiles, McDonneU Aircraft

Introduction McDonnell Space Center. The latter includes

its self-contained Engineering Office Building,
The technology of space exploration is ex- in which the major portion of the Gemini
panding a t an extremely rapid rate. McDon- engineering activity is conducted.
ne11 Aircraft Corp. of St. Louis, as the prime
contractor to NASA for the design and manu- Corporate Organization
facture of the Gemini spacecraft, has been able
to meet this challenge with its highly integrated To support the Gemini Program a combina-
operations, covering all aspects of the technical tion of functional and project-line organizatians
disciplines required. Figure 9-1 shows the has been found necessary to provide a rapid re-
physical layout of their facilities. Of particu- sponse and to assure the maximum utilization of
lar interest to this presentation is the location knowledge, personnel, and equipment for the
of the Engineering Campus, the Fabrication diverse disciplines required. This dual break-
Building, the Laboratory Complex, and the down has been demonstrated to be a very satis-

FIQUBE Aircraft Corp., St. Louis, Mo.


factory arrangement for getting corporate-wide (3) Establishing process development re-
action at a very fast response rate. quirements.
The officers in charge of the functional sec- (4) Training of persolinel to productionize
tions are responsible for providing the required new manufacturing processes.
number of personnel to accomplish the various (5) Determination of facility requirements.
disciplines in all the programs, to evaluate the (6) Arrangement of spacecraft production
caliber of the individual’s effort, and to establish lines and associated facilities.
means of crossfeeding information between (7) Tool manufacture.
projects. (8) Production planning (preparation of
Project Organization individual operation sheets).
( 9 ) Production control.
Upon receipt of a specific contract, a project (10) Mockup construction.
organization is set up with its project manager (11) Final assembly.
reporting directly to the vice president and (12) Test participation.
general manager for that line of business. The (13) Preparation for the shipping of com-
nature of the Gemini Program made it desirable pleted vehicles.
for this to be one and the same person. The I n addition, the Gemini Program Technical
project organization, in a sense, is a company Director, Procurement Manager, Spacecraft
within a company. The project manager is re- Product Support Manager, and Program Sys-
sponsible for all decisions on that particular tems Manager have similar authority in the
project and has full authority over the personnel project organization.
assigned t o the task. It is this line organization
which has proven so successful, enabling man- Gemini Modular Concept
agement t o concentrate all necessary attention
From the very beginning, the Gemini space-
*toproblem areas as quickly as they arise, and craft was designed to be an operational vehicle
to carry out the necessary action at a very with capabilities for late mission changes and
rapid pace. I n the project organization, for rapid countdown on the launch pad. Based on
example, the manufacturing manager is experience with Project Mercury, this definitely
responsible for all of the following functions: dictated the use of a modular form of space-
(1) Establishment of the manufacturing craft in which complete systems could be
plan. added to, subtracted from, or replaced with
(2) Tool design. a. minimum impact on schedule. Figure 9-2

%.-Gemini spacecraft modular assembly.

shows how this was accomplished in the an aerospace-ground equipment test plug, bring-
Gemini spacecraft, where, reading from left to ing those necessary test parameters right to the
right, the individual sections are the-- surface of the box, and permitting the hooking-
(1) Rendezvous and recovery. up of the test cabling with no disruption of the
(2) Reentry control system. spacecraft wiring to the box. In this way,
(3) Reentry cabin. particularly during the development phase, it
(4) Retrograde-adapter a n d equipment- was possible to evaluate the performance of
adapter sections (adapter assembly). each component while it was connected directly
Each of these sections is fabricated and assem- into the spacecraft wiring and to minimize the
number of times connections had to be made or
bled in the manufacturing area of the Space
Center, and furnished with its equipment and
checked as a separate entity in the Gemini white
Gemini Manufacturing Work Plan
room before being mated with any of the other
sections. With this form of modular construc- With the modular concept established and
tion, it is possible to accomplish the work as a with the engineering progressing, manufactur-
series of parallel tasks, thus permitting a larger ing planners, under the manufacturing man-
number of personnel to be effectively working ager, began the layout of the manufacturing
on the total spacecraft on a noninterference work plan, as shown in figure 9-3. The bottom
basis, thereby greatly reducing the overall cost of figure 9-3 shows the work plan for the
of such a vehicle. In addition, during the test adapter, with subassemblies of the retrorocket
program, the effect of a variation in test results support structure, the panels of the space radi-
will affect only that section, and not slow down ator, the buildup of the basic adapter structural
the overall test program. In like manner, when assembly, and the time span allotted to installa-
a spacecraft has been mated, any module may tion. This workload was broken down into
be removed from a section and replaced by three units--A3, A2, and A1---each of which is
another with little or no impact on the launch a station for installation of .the equipment
schedule, as has been evidenced on several occa- spelled out in the attached blocks of the dia-
sions during the Gemini Program to date. gram. Upon completion of these installations,
Care was paid in design, particularly in the an engineering review was held prior to begin-
reentry section, so that no components are in- ning the sectional spacecraft system tests.
stalled in a layered or stacked condition. In In a similar manner, the rendezvous and re-
this way, any component can be removed or in- covery section and the reentry control system
stalled without disturbing any other. Another section have been displayed. The longest cycle
requirement was that each wire bundle be so time and, therefore, the critical path involve the
designed that it could be manufactured and reentry section. Because of the complexity of
electrically tested away from the spacecraft, this section, it is broken down into many more
and that its installation primarily be a lay-in subassemblies, beginning with hatch sills, main
operation. No soldering is planned to be done frames, left-side and right-side panels, cabin
on the spacecraft during the installation and structural weld assemblies, and the cabin inter-
assembly period. This provided for much mediate assembly. Upon completion of this
greater reliability of terminal attachments and portion of _the manufacturing, the assembly is
permitted the manufacture of many wire submitted to a detailed inspection and cleanup
bundles to proceed simultaneously without in- and transported to the white room. In the
terference. As a measure of its effectiveness in white room, the components which will be in-
providing a quality product, spacecraft 5 had stalled in the cabin are first put through a pre-
zero defects in the 6000 electrical check points installation acceptance test and then mounted in
monitored. It was also required that each the cabin as defined by the attached planning
component be attached in such a manner that sequences shown in figure 9-3. Upon comple-
access to it be possible by the technicians with- tion of these installations, an engineering re-
out the use of special tools. For ease of testing, view is again performed, and then the reentry
each black-box component was designed with section is subjected to a very detailed space-

i :

FZGURE 9-3.---Gemini spacecraft 4 manufacturing work plan.

craft systems test at the module level. At this stallation areas. The key for this breakdown
point in the manufacturing cycle, the three is shown in the lower left corner of figure 9-4
sections and the adapter assembly are assembled and is self-explanatory.
and the end-to-end spacecraft systems tests per- Manufacturing production control is respon-
formed. From this manufacturing work plan, sible for bringing the necessary parts to the jig
it can be seen that activities can be conducted or installation station in time to meet the
on many zones of the spacecraft simultaneously, schedule. As an aid in the performance of this
thus permitting significant reduction in the job, the status of the equipment for each zone
overall cycle time and minimizing the impact of was maintained in the form shown on the right
problems arising in the individual sections. side of figure 9-4, where zone 9 is typical.
Here, it can be seen that production control has
Control of Work Status determined the number of pieces of equipment
Manufacturing planners have the responsi- required, the number on hand, what additional
bility for determining the sequence in which in- pieces are still expected to arrive on the required
dividual installations are made. Obviously, schedule date, and, most significant, what
this requires an evaluation of the time to make pieces of equipment are at that particular time,
a particular installation and requires the as- to be late for installation. Each piece of late
signment of the tasks to prevent delays due to equipment is analyzed as to its point of normal
interference between the production personnel. installation and the amount of delay expected,
and then a decision is made as to its installation
To accomplish this, the spacecraft was divided
into work zones as shown in figure 9-4, which is at a point farther down the line. Along with
a typical work sheet. In each one of these this information, the time required to install
numbered areas is work that can be accom- the late pieces of equipment is tabulated so that
plished, either in the structural assembly or in- the production supervisor will be constantly


imA. mu ZOHE HO.___

REQUIRED _B ......
ONHM'D___ _

4vlo_.mz_lz# e_.cm__ ^ssy A.,I- -6 'c_'°zl; +1 4.

_l_z-m _,rn,.,_y._oWLV,_ _."'_!-7 ,,_*o_+_ 2..


L lmElqlms lain lumM EOO_[


_L FlmWMmdE& C0g(

L Lm UUmmz sfJ_ lay

t Ilpl I i;Eaa ICly

I. L/B EiPteEIn gAY

• 0pi Mitt BAT


It ErliltS0lt IdtU if UtlIGE PItE$$. 1IOLUEAli




14. Ill EXTE|B4L UAPT(| alEa



Fmum_9-4.---Gemini spacecraft 4 zone chart.

aware of any overload of work coming to his red-flag items; then management directives are
station, and therefore, making the necessary issued.
provisions, either of added manpower or In a similar manner, the technical staff con-
overtime. ducts a daily meeting, chaired by the Engineer-
ing Manager. Here, the design is coordinated
Management Control
in compliance with customer technical inputs,
While figures 9-3 and 9-4 have shown the study assignments are made, and test f_dback
formal nature in which the work is planned and is discussed as to its effect on engineering spec-
controlled, it still takes personal action on the
part of all levels of supervision to accomplish A configuration control board meets on a
the task. At McDonnell Aircraft Corp., this is bidaily interval, clmired by the Project Control
Mani_ger. Here, engineering change proposals
accomplished through the medium of three par-
are discussed, thus keeping up to date all ele-
ticular action centers, as shown on figure 9-5.
ments of the project regarding the spacecraft
A project management meeting is held daily,
configuration. Analyses of the schedule impact
chaired by the Project Manager. In this meet- of these changes are made, and a spacecraft
ing are discussed the manpower assignments, effectivity for the change incorporation is
comparison of the work accomplished versus established.
the man-hours expended, status of the space- As shown by the arrows on figure 9-5, there
craft to the schedule, and situations resulting in is a three-way distribution of this information

Project management
Doily chairman- project manager
communication by a direct hot line to an iden-
['7-'. _ /_ Manpower assigned
tical room at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
In addition to the phone communications there
_J.__ Work accomplished
is a Datafax transmission link because much of
_i-_ I manhour:Sxpended the information cannot be readily transmitted
• y/-_\ tl _ Schedule status verbally. With this form of communications

It \\ link,
the Manned
Center has ex-
of every facet of
the Gemini operation under the contractor's di-
rection, whether it be fiscal, engineering, manu-
facturing, developmental test, or subcontractor

Spacecraft Assembly
Doily Bi-doily

Technical staff Configuration control board The Gemini spacecraft uses titanium almost
Choirrnan- eng manager Chairman -project
exclusively for the basic structure. One of the
Control manager
Design interesting manufacturing processes involves
coordinator Engineering
change proposal the spot, seam, and fusion welding of this ma-
technical Schedule irnpoct terial. Of particular interest is the weld line
inputs Change where the titanium sheets, ranging from 0.010
S tudy i ncorporotion to 0.180 inch in thickness, are prepared for spot
assignment effectivity
and seam welding. In preparing sheets of the
Test feedback
0.010-inch-gage titanium for spot welding, it
FIGURE 9-5.--Management control. was found necessary to overlap and then cut
with a milling-type slitting saw to secure the
parallelism required to gain the quality type
as decisions in any one of these meetings have
welding needed. In addition, it was found
their effects on the others. Only with the
necessary to supply an argon atmosphere right
project-manager concept has it been found pos-
at the seam to prevent oxidation, and, by the
sible to keep this form of control in the hands
use of these two devices, it was possible to per-
of a sufficiently small group which can be
form this operation with the result that there
counted on for rapidity of response.
has been no inflight structural problem through-
out either the Mercury or the Gemini Program.
Management Control Communications
Typical of the care taken to obtain this result
Because of the short development time and is the assembly welding machine. Here the
the short elapsed time between launches, it is components are jig mounted and fed through
essential that almost an hour-by-hour status of the electrodes. To prevent spitting during this
the program be available to the Gemini Pro- welding with the consequent burn-throughs, the
gram Office at the Manned Spacecraft Center. weld fixtures are mounted on air pads, and air is
To assist in making this possible, the Project provided to lift the fixtures a few thousandths
Manager at McDonnell Aircraft Corp. and the of an inch off the ground surface plates over
Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft which they travel. This eliminates any pos-
Center are kept in close communication by sibility of a jerky or intermittent feeding of the
means of the establishment of two identical con- work through the electrodes. There are many
trol centers. At McDonnell Aircraft Corp. in instances where welding is required in places not
St. Louis, the project group keeps detailed track accessible with the welding machines. In these
of spacecraft manufacturing, assembly, test instances, fusion welding is employed, and the
status, schedule, and cost, primarily based on welds are made in a series of boxes as shown in
the action of the three activity centers described figure 9-6. These boxes are m,ade of Plexiglas.
in figure 9-5. A Gemini control room in which Argon is fed into the box to provide an inert gas
these results are under constant attention is in atmosphere. The rubber gloves seen in the fig-

be the goal. To comply with these require-

ments, extensive use is made of the white room
facilities i n the manufacture of wire harnesses,
preparation of functional systems, manufacture
of critical components, and conduct of space-
craft systems tests, including those conducted in
the space simulation chamber. There is a two-
fold benefit in this form of operation: (1) the
extreme attention focused on cleanliness in the
manufacturing area, and (2) the increased
awareness of the personnel engaged in the
operation. An area equivalent to 54 000 square
feet is utilized in the performance of the various
operations on the spacecraft. Figure 9-7 shows
a typical white room in the McDonnell Space
Center. The white room is the major installa-
9-6.-Plexiglas welding boxes. tion and test room for the Gemini spacecraft.
For individual systems of the spacecraft, en-
gineering specifications have established differ-
ure provide the access for the operator’s arms,
ent degrees of environmental cleanliness, and
and the complete work is done within the trans-
this has, brought about the creation of three
parent box. A variety of sizes and configura-
different classes of white rooms. This was done
tions is provided to permit the most efficient use
to make efficient use of facilities, to properly
of the device.
grade the requirements for air filtering and
Installation and Checkout, White Room thermal and humidity control, and to establish
personnel clothing and access standards in a
The operational environment of a spacecraft practical manner. A few of the specifications
is such that a life-support capability must be established for our maximum cleanliness white
carried along in onboard systems. Perfection room are as follows:
in functional operation of this equipment must (1) The area shall be completely enclosed.

9-7.-White room at the McDonnell Space Center.

(2) The area shall be supplied with clean fil- (7) Recessed or fiush-mounted light fixtures
tered air. The filters used in the circulating shall be used.
system shall be capable of removing 99.9 per- This is typical of the type area provided for
cent of all particles above 1 micron in size and
work on environmental control systems, and
90 percent of all particles 0.3 to 1 micron in size. those components such as valves which may
(3) A positive pressure shall be maintained
have extremely fine orifices.
in this area at all times. Pressure in the max-
imum cleanliness area shall be higher than the Spacecraft Systems Tests Flow Plan
pressure in adjacent areas.
The environment of space is one demanding
(4) The area shall be maintained at a tem-
near perfection of operation of the equipment
perature of not over 75 ° F and a relative hu-
in the spacecraft. The spacecraft systems tests
midity of not over 55 percent. flow plan of figure 9-8 describes in sequence
(5) Vinyl floor coverings shall be used. the actual tests performed on each of the space-
(6) The walls shall be painted with gloss craft. The reactant supply system module in
white or a light pastel color enamel. the adapter contains the tanks and valves sup-

RSS module
funct lanai equipment

0 acceptance

S validation (K386I)

olont test (K386TI}

InstalIRSS in adapter
f unctionol equipment
0 acceptance

MS vali_t (D393)

Install i_ adapter
Adapter I I
0 bcceptonce
VS_WR( K 342 )

OAMS (D 393)

Weigh (0417)

Coolanl pump ,_ Align retro rackets (H4t3)

,..__JAdapt instl te adapter to reentry (K 416)

r.__JCaolant (K3851) Align and adjust (H413)

,_._ GSO acceptance VSWR (K 342)

L._JPIA funcl equipment •o checks (H 420)

RondR Coalant (H 38,5)

funct equipment Coalant servicing ( K ,506 )

0 acceptance Systems assurance (H 434)

WR(K 342) ECS validation (H 381)

Sequential ( A 331 ) Simulated flight (H 431)

RCS H20 servicing (K506)

f unct ional equipment Phasing (H432)

0 acceptance Crya servicing (K 506)

L__WR(K :542) Altitude chamber- run I -unmanned (H 383)

L_JValidation (B 393) Run E-manned ambient stowage-prime crew(H583)

i___Reentry WeKJht and'balance (G417) Run 3-manned ambient stowage-backup crew (H 383)
Run 4-manned altitude-prime crew (H 383)
Heat shield L_JMate cabin , R and R ,RCS(K416)
t Run .5- manned altitude -backup crew (H 383)
ing and checkout De-service (K 506)

tr (K 321) I (K 323) for ship (K 418)

Install on ilcobin Spocecr aft acceptance

Cabin 1 I

I ,__Electricol (C311)
', _L_IEcs vo,da,= (C_,)
_r__ VSWR( K 342)

r____JGSO acceptance
L_JPIA fur_tianal equipment

FIGURE 9-_.--Space_raft systems tests flow plan.



plying the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen to under conditions simulating as closely as pos-
the fuel cells. The first step is to make a com- sible the space environment in which they must
plete functional test of each individual com- operate. As previously discussed, each com-
ponent before assigning it to the spacecraft for plete Gemini spacecraft undergoes the final
installation into the module or section. Fol- simulated flights at altitude. This capability
lowing this, the test data are reviewed by the has been made possible by the provision at
contractor and the customer, and the equipment McDonnell Aircraft Corp. of a sizable number
is then actually installed. When the submod- and variety of space simulation chambers.
ule has completed buildup, it is then subjected These vary in size from 32 inches to 30 feet in
to two systems-level tests, each defined by a de- diameter. The large altitude chamber (fig.
tailed, documented test plan which has had en- 9-9), in which the complete spacecraft is put
gineering review and concurrence by the CUS- through manned simulated flight test, is 30 feet
tomer. Each section follows this pattern, with in diameter by 36 feet in length. It has the
the number of tests obviously dependent upon
capability for emergency repressurization from
the amount of equipment installed. Upon
completion of the section-level tests, the space- vacuum t o 5 psia in 18 seconds. This latter
craft is erected into a vertical stand (fig. 9-7) capability permits access through a special lock
and a complete end-to-end series of tests con- for conduct of emergency operations should
ducted in the order shown in figure 9-8. Here such ever be required. The chamber also has
again each individual test is done in an 0x- numerous observation hatches.
tremely detailed manner, thoroughly docu-
mented and reviewed both by McDonnell Air- Spacecraft Delivery
craft Corp. and NASA engineering and quality A t the conclusion of the manned simulation
personnel before proceeding to the next step. run in the chamber, the spacecraft is delivered
All test discrepancies are submitted to a review
board jointly manned by NASA and McDonnell-
Aircraft Corp. for evaluation and resolution. /
.I complete log is maintained of all the test
results on each spacecraft and forwarded to the
launch site for ready reference during launch-
site tests. Among the numerous tests shown on
figure 9-8 is listed simulated flight. I n this
test the spacecraft, with the aotual selected
astronaut crew, is put into a flight condition
functionally, and the equipment is operated in
the manner planned for its mission from launch
through landing. This test includes not only
those functions which would occur in a com-

pletely successful flight, but also evaluates all
emergency or abort capabilities as well. When
the spacecraft lias successfully passed this t a t ,
it is then prepared for a simulated flight test in
the space simulation chamber, where altitude
conditions are provided, and both the prime
crew and the backup crew have an opportunity
to go through the complete, test.

Space Simulation Chamber


All of the components, modules, and even

sections of the Gemini spacecraft were qualified FIGURE9-9.--JIcDonnell altitude chamber.

218-556 0 - 6 6 7

via aircraft furnished through NASA direct to the early stage of loading into the aircraft, and
the Kennedy Space Center. Figure 9-10 shows is typical of the manner in which all spacecraft
have been delivered. The goal of delivering
vehicles in as near to flight-ready condition as
practical has been met for each of the seven
production spacecraft shipped to the launch site.

Concluding Remarks

I n this paper, only a selected few high points

have been treated. Although it is equally im-
possible to list all t.he many contributors to the
development of this program for NASA, Mc-
Donne11 Aircraft Gorp., and other Govern-
- ““p- .- .
-cT____ ment agencies, the writer wishes to point out
%lO.-Spacecraft being loaded into aircraft for
that teamwork was the key element in its
shipment to Cape Kennedy. accomplishment.

By WILLIAM H. DOUGLAS, Deputy Manager, O_ce o/ Test Operations, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA
Manned Spacecra]t Center; GREGORY P. MCINToSH, Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra]t
Center; and LEMUEL S. MENZAR, Gemini Program Adviser, Flight Sa/ety O_ice, NASA Manned
Spacecra]t Center

Summary liability tests, and was conducted under rigid

quality-control surveillance. This test pro-
The Gemini spacecraft reliability and quali- gram, coupled with two unmanned Gemini
fication program was based on conventional flights, qualified the spacecraft for manned
concepts. However, these concepts were modi- flights.
fied with unique features to obtain the reliabil- Introduction
ity required for manned space flight, and to
optimize the reliability and qualification effort. The level of reliability and crew safety
Emphasis was placed on establishing high attained in the Gemini spacecraft and demon-
inherent reliability and low crew-hazard char- strated during the seven Gemini missions is the
acteristics early in the design phases of the result of a concerted effort by contractor and
Gemini Program. Concurrently, an integrated customer engineers, technicians, and manage-
ground-test program was formulated and im- ment personnel working together as one team
plemented by the prime contractor and the within a management structure, which per-
major suppliers of flight hardware. All data mitted an unrestricted exchange of information
derived from all tests were correlated and used and promoted a rapid decisionmaking process.
to confirm the reliability attained. Stringent numerical design goals for Gemini
Mission-success and crew-safety design goals mission success and crew safety were placed on
were established contractually, and estimates the spacecraft contractor, who incorporated
were made for each of the Gemini missions these goals into each specification written for
without conducting classical reliability mean- flight hardware. To meet this specification re-
time-to-failure testing. quirement, the suppliers had to give prime con-
Design reviews were conducted by reliability sideration to the selection, integration, and
engineers skilled in the use of reliability anal- packaging of component parts into a reliable
ysis techniques. The reviews were conducted end item. Reliability analyses were required
independently of the designers to insure un- from the major equipment suppliers to assess
biased evaluations of the design for reliability the design for the inherent capability of meet-
and crew safety, and were completed prior to ing the established design goal.
specification approval and the release of produc-
The spacecraft contractor was required to
tion drawings.
integrate the subcontractor-supplied hardware,
An ambitious system to control quality was
and to effect the necessary redundancy in the
rigidly enforced to attain and maintain the
spacecraft to meet the overall reliability goal.
reliability inherent in the spacecraft design.
Examples of the spacecraft redundant fea-
A closed-loop failure-reporting and correc-
tures are :
tive-action system was adopted which required
the analysis, determination of the cause, and (1) Every function in the pyrotechnic sys-
corrective action for all failures, malfunctions, tem incorporates a redundant feature.
or anomalies. ('2) Two completely independent reentry-
The integrated ground-test program con- control propulsion systems are installed in the
sisted of development, qualification, and re- spacecraft.


(3) Redundant coolant subsystems are in- Mission Success and Crew Safety
corporated in the environmental control system.
A numerical design goal was established to
(4) Duplicate horizon sensors are incorpo-
represent the probability of the spacecraft per-
rated in the guidance system.
forming satisfactorily for the accomplishment
(5) Six fuel-cell stacks are incorporated in
of all primary mission objectives. The arbi-
the electrical system, although only three are
trary value of 0.95, which recognizes a risk of
required for any long-duration mission.
failing to meet 1 primary objective out of 90 on
Redundant systems or backup procedures
each mission, was selected. The 0.95 mission-
were provided where a single failure could be
success design goal was included in the prime
catastrophic to the crew or the spacecraft.
contract as a design goal rather than a firm
Concurrent with design and development, an
requirement, which would have required dem-
integrated ground-test program was estab-
lished. Data from all tests were collected and onstration by mean-time-to-failure testing.
The prime contractor calculated numerical ap-
analyzed to form a basis for declaring the
portionments for each of the spacecraft systems
Gemini spacecraft qualified for the various
and incorporated the apportioned values in
phases of the flight test program. The inte-
major system and subsystem contractor require-
grated ground-test program, shown in figure
merits. Reliability estimates, derived primarily
10-1, shows the density of the test effort with
from component failure-rate data and made
respect to the production of the flight
during the design phase, indicated that the de-
sign would support the established mission-
Development tests were initially performed
success design goal. The reliability estimates,
to prove the design concepts. Qualification
by major spacecraft system, for the Gemini III
tests were conducted to prove the flight-config-
spacecraft, are shown in table 10-I.
uration design and manufacturing techniques.
Crew safety design goals were also established
Tests were then extended beyond the specifica-
but for a much higher value of 0.995 for all
tion requirements to establish reasonable design
missions. Crew safety is defined as having the
margins of safety. The unmanned flight tests
flight crew survive all missions or all mission
were conducted to confirm the validity of design
assumptions, and to develop confidence in space-
Planned mission success, gross mission suc-
craft systems and launch-vehicle interfaces
cess, and crew safety estimates were also made
prior to manned flights.
prior to each manned mission, using the flight
Specific test-program reviews were held at
data and data generated by the integrated
the prime contractor's plant and at each major
ground-test program; each program reflected
subcontractor's facility to preclude duplication
assurance of conducting the mission successfully
of testing, and to insure that every participant
and safely.
in the Gemini Program was following the same
A detailed failure mode and effect analysis
basic guidelines.
was conducted on the complete spacecraft by
the prime contractor and on each subsystem by
1,962 1,963 1,964 1,965 1,966 t the cognizant subcontractor, to investigate each
failure mode and assess its effect on mission
Development tests
success and crew safety. The analysis included
Quolificetion tests an evaluation of--
(1) Mode of failure.
Integroted system tests
(2) Failure effect on system operation.
(3) Failure effect on the mission.
Reliobiltty tests
(4) Indications of failure.
Gemint I (5) Crew and ground action as a result of
t the failure.
Gemini "r[
Q (6) Probability of occurrence.
Corrective action was taken when it was de-
FIGrRE 10-1.--Gemini test Program. termined that the failure mode would grossly

TABLe. lO-I.--Spacecrafl 3 Reliability Estimates

Planned mission Gross mission

success • success b

Electrical power .................................. 0. 999 0. 999

Guidance and control:
Propulsion ................................... .952 .991
Orbital attitude and maneuver system ...... .9602 9992

Reentry control system .................... .9919 9919

Electronics .................................. .967 9998
Communications ................................. .999 999
Instrumentation .................................. .999 999
Environmental control ............................ .989 989
Landing ......................................... .985 985
Sequentials, rockets, and pyros ..................... .957 988

Total ..................................... • 856 • 951

Planned miss:'on success is having the spacecraft b Gross mission success is inserting the spacecraft
function as necessary and perform the objectives of into orbit, having the capability of completing the
the mission as established in the mission directive. prescribed orbital duration, and recovering the flight
crew and spacecraft.

affect mission success or jeopardize the safety regulator would have caused the loss of a fuel-
of the crew. cell section. Therefore_ it was necessary that
A single-point failure mode and effect anal- each of the two regulators which control the
ysis was conducted for all manned missions to reactant supply be capable of supplying re-
isolate single failures which could prevent re- actants to both fuel-cell sections. The cross-
covery of the spacecraft or a safe recovery of over provided this capability. Figure 10-3
the crew. The single-point failure modes were shows the electrical power system reliwbility
evaluated, and action was taken to eliminate the slightly increased for the 2-week mission. The
single-point failure or to minimize the probabil- reliability was increased from 0.988 to 0.993 for
ity of occurrence. an assumed failure rate of 10 .4 failures per

Design Reviews Hydrogen

Critical reliability-design reviews were con-
as soon as the interim
The reviews
and resulted
prove the reliability
in recommended
of the respective
were conducted
was estab-
by relia-
of the designer
systems or
to im-
subsystems. The reviews included the use of--
(1) Numerical analyses.
(2) Stress analyses.
(3) Analyses of failure modes.
(4) Tradeoff studies to evaluate the need for
redundant features.
A typical design change is shown schemat-
ically in figure 10-2. This change was incor-
porated because the 2-day Gemini rendezvous
flight requires four of the six fuel-cell stacks, Oxygen
three stacks to a section_ to meet mission objec-
tives. The failure of a single supply pressure FIOURE 10-2.--Fuel-cell reactant supply system.

With regulator crossover copability,

With regulator crossover capability
L 99 -
.Without regulator crossover capobility

98 -
c Without regulator ,,*' ?
crossover capobility a
I 97 -
Regulator failure rate. per hr

96 -
10-3.-Fuel-cell power system reliability for a

95 -
hour. Figure 1 0 4 shows the reliability p t l y
increased for the 2-day mission.
It cannot be overemphasized that reliability is 10-5
an inherent characteristic and must be realized Regulator failure rote per hr
as a result of design and development. In-
10-4.-Fuel-cell power system reliability for a
herent reliability cannot be inspected or tested
2-day mission.
into an item during production; at best, that
which is inherent can only be attained or main- electrical-electronic interface, radiofrequency
tained through a rigid quality control. These interference, and system-design compatibility.
reliability design reviews and the numerical When production prototype systems became
analyses were conducted as early as November available, a complete spacecraft compatibility
1962, prior to the fabrication of the first produc- test unit was assembled a t the prime contractor's
t ion prototypes. facility (fig. 10-5). During these tests, sys-
tem integration was accomplished by end-to-end
Development Tests
test methods. These tests permitted the reso-
Development tests using engineering models lution of problems involving mechanical inter-
were conducted to establish the feasibility of de- face, electrical-electronic interface, radiofre-
sign concepts. These tests explored various de- quency interference, spacecraft compatibility,
signs and demonstrated functional performance final-test-procedures compatibility, and com-
and structural integrity prior to committing patibility with aerospace ground equipment
production hardware to formal qualification (AGE), prior to assembly a.nd checkout of the
tests. In some cases, environmental tests were first flight vehicle.
conducted on these units to obtain information
prior to the formal qualification.

Integrated System Tests

Integrated system tests were conducted dur-
ing progressive stages of the development to
demonstrate the compatibility of system inter-
faces. Such systems as the inertial guidance
system, the propulsion system, and the environ-
mental control system were especially subjected
to such tests. Early prototype modules were
used in static articles or mockups, which repre-
sented complete or partial vehicles. They
served to acquaint operating personnel with the
equipment and to isolate problems involving E'IQURE105.-Geinini compatibility test unit.
One of the more significant integrated sys- varied requirements on equipment, depending
tems tests was the thermal qualification or the on the location of the equipment in the space-
spacecraft thermal-balance test. This was con- craft, the function t o be performed by the
ducted on a complete production spacecraft (fig. equipment, and the packaging of the equipment.
10-6). Tests were conducted in a cold-wall al- The environmental levels to which the equip-
titude chamber that simulated altitude and or- ment mas subjected were based on anticipated
bital heating characteristics with the spacecraft preflight, flight, and postflight conditions.
powered up. However, the environmental levels were revised
The test results demonstrated the need for whenever actual test or flight experience re-
heating devices on the propulsion system oxi- vealed that the original anticipated levels were
dizer lines, on thrust-chamber assembly valves, unrealistic. This is exemplified by-
and on water lines to prevent freezing condi- (1) The anticipated launch vibration re-
tions during the long-duration mission. quirement for the spacecraft was based on data
accumulated on Mercury-Atlas flights. The
System Qualification Test upper two-sigma limit of this data required a
Each item of spacecraft equipment was quali- power spectral density profile of approximately
fied prior to the mission on which the item was 12g rms random vibration. This level was re-
to be flown. The equipment mas considered vised because the Gemini I flight demonstrated
qualified when sufficient tests had been success- that the actual flight levels were less than ex-
fully conducted to demonstrate that a produc- pected. The new data permitted the power
tion unit, produced by production personnel spectral density to be changed, and by using
and with production tooling, complied with the the upper three-sigma limits the requirement
design requirements. These tests included at was reduced t o approximrttely 7g rms random
least one simulation of a long-duration flight vibration in the spacecraft adapter and to 8.8g
or one rendezvous mission, or both, if necessary, rms random vibration in the reentry assembly.
with the system operating to its expected duty (2) An aneroid device used in the personnel
cycle. parachute was expected t o experience a rela-
Qualification requirements mere established tively severe humidity ; therefore, the qualifica-
and incorporated in all spacecraft equipment tion test plan required the aneroid device to pass
specifications. The specifications imposed B 10-day 95-percent relative humidity test. The
original design of the aneroid could not survive
this requirement and was in the process of being
redesigned when the Gemini I V mission re-
vealed that the actual humidity in the space-
craft cabin was considerably lower than ex-
pected. The requirement was reduced to an 85-
percent relative humidity, and the new aneroid
device successfully completed qualification.
(3) The tank bladders of the propulsion sys-
tem did not pass the original qualification slosh
tests. Analysis of the failures concluded that
the slosh tests conducted a t one-g were overly
severe relative to actual slosh conditions in a
zero-genvironment. The slosh test was changed

1 to simulate zero-g conditions more accurately,

and the slosh rate was reduced to a realistic
value. The tests were then successfully re-
peated under the revised test conditions.
The development and timely execution of :t
realistic qualification program can be attrib-
. . uted, in part, to a vigorous effort by Govern-
FIGURE spacecraft 3A preparation for ment and contractor personnel conducting test-
thermal qualification test No. 1. program reviews at the major subcontractor

plants during the initial qualification phase of modes. The tests were designed to confirm the
the program. The objective of the reviews was design margins or to reveal marginal design
to aline the respective system test program to characteristics, and they included exposure to
conform to an integrated test philosophy. The environmental extremes such as-
original test reviews were followed with peri- (l) Temperature and vibration beyond the
odic status reviews to assure that the test pro- design envelope.
grams were modified to reflect the latest pro- (£) Applied voltage or pressure beyond the
gram requirements and to assure the timely normal mission condition.
completion of all testing which represented con- (3) Combined environments to produce more
straints for the various missions. severe equipment stress.
The qualification test environments required (4) Endurance beyond the normal mission
for Gemini equipment are shown on table 10- duty cycles.
II. This chart, which was extracted from the The reliability tests conducted on the digital
spacecraft qualification status report, shows the command system are shown in table 10-III.
qualification status of the digital command sys- These tests overstressed the digital command
tem and provides a typical example of a sup- system in acceleration, vibration, voltage, and
plier's qualification test requirements. All en- combinations of altitude, temperature, voltage,
vironmental requirements are not applicable, and time. These overstress tests confirm an
since the digital command system is located in adequate design margin inherent in the digital
the adapter and will not experience such en- command system.
vironments as oxygen atmosphere and salt- Typical reliability tests on other systems and
water immersion. Those environments which components included such environments as
were required are noted with a "C" or "S" in proof pressure cycling, repeated simulated mis-
the appropriate column. The "C" designates sions, and system operation with induced con-
that the equipment has successfully completed tamination. The contamination test was con-
the test, and the "S" designates that the equip- duoted on the reentry control system and the
ment has been qualified by similarity. A com- orbital attitude and maneuver system because
ponent or assembly is considered qualified by these systems were designed with filters and
similarity when it can be determined by a de- pressure regulators which contained small ori-
tailed engineering analysis that design changes rices susceptible to clogging.
have not adversely affected the qualification of Some reliability tests were eliminated when
the item. Gemini flight data revealed that in some in-
Reliability Testing stances qualification tests had actually been
overstress tests. This was particularly true
For programs such as Gemini, which involve
with respect to vibration qualification, where
small production quantities, the inherent relia-
the overall rms acceleration level of 12.6g
bility must be established early in the design
(fig. 10-7) exceeded the actual inflight vibra-
phase and realized through a strict quality con-
trol system. It was not feasible to conduct
classical reliability tests to demonstrate equip- 0.20 Permissible variation
due to fillers
ment reliability to a significant statistical level u
"- .16 -- 12.6g rms
of confidence. Consequently, no mean-time-to- 2.0g rms
failure testing was conducted. Confidence in 8.4g rrns
Gemini hardware was established by analyzing
the results of all test data derived from the o .08

g (0.05)
integrated ground and flight test program, and Q.
.04 (0.065) =_
by conducting additional reliability tests on (0.02)
selected components and systems whose func- Q._
--F---7 "1 I L J I I I l J
tions were considered critical to successful 0 200 400 600 800 IO00 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
l J
mission accomplishment. 20 500
Frequency, cps
Equipment was selected for reliability tests
after evaluating the more probable failure FIGURE lO-7.--Spacecraft random vibration test.

0i! o

sB_ F

o:loldmo 0

uo;_oldmoo potm_I_I : I

_,.m_s pou_i_ I : ',

•su'_J J_ '_H .o o'

on'i II II

•_uoo "duzo j_

•mooo(_ "dx_


•mini "._'8

o doJc_ .sos_ I I I I

_ _ .soJ,t ,_o,I I I 1 I

_ "so_v _o I I I I
_ _I r_ _ _ co

M "dx_ _ _ _ co
_ hi ol_snoov _ _ _ co

(do hi) plmuH _ _ _ co

I (ado) pImnH [ ] ] [
v*-4 Z "IoOov _ _ co m
"_IV "dtao,L _ _ co co

_0oqB _ _ co co

"qlA _ _ co co

•dtao_ o_I _ _ m co

._ "duIo_ IH _ 0 co co


I I I i

_ _'_,'_ _

_8 n # #

TABLE 10-III.--Dig/ta/Command System Reliability Tests

Environments Qualification tests Overstress tests

Acceleration ........................ 7.2g in 326 sec 9.0g in 326 sec

Random vibration ................... Overall rms acceleration level of Overall rms acceleration level of
12.6g for 15 min per axis 15.6g for 3 min per axis
Combined altitude, high temperature, No combined-environment quali- Pressure, 1.TX 10 -6 psia
high voltage fication tests required Temperature, 200 ° F
Voltage, 36 V dc
Combined low temperature, low No combined-environment quali- Temperature, --60 ° F
voltage fication tests required Voltage, 17 V dc
Applied high voltage .................. 30.5 to 33.0 V dc 36 Vdc
Applied low voltage ................... 18.0 to 20.0 V dc 17 Vdc

tion levels by a significant margin. Conse- For the most part, the reliability tests were
quently, the test level was reduced to an overall conducted as a continuation of the formal quali-
rms acceleration level of 7g for the adapter fication tests on the same test specimens used in
blast shield region and to 8.8g in the reentry the qualification tests after appropriate refur-
assembly region (figs. 10-8 and 10-9), respec- bishment and acceptance testing. When the
tively. Equipment which had been subjected previous testing expended the test specimen to
to the initial requirement, therefore, did not a state that precluded refurbishment, additional
require additional testing. new test units were used.
All failures which occurred during the relia- Quality Control
bility tests were analyzed to determine the cause
A rigid quality control system was developed
of failure and the required corrective action.
and implemented to attain and maintain the
Decisions to redesign, retest, or change proc-
reliability that was inherent in the spacecraft
esses in manufacturing were rendered after
design. This system required flight equipment
careful consideration of the probability of
to be produced as nearly as possible to the
occurrence, mission performance impact, sched-
qualified configuration.
ule, and cost.



(0.06) 05
% o5
oJ entry
.02 rms acceleration
.O2 level = 8.Sg
level aSpectrum_
= 7.0 g 8O0

.01 (o .oo8)
L (0.008)
mm--_-- T
cz iOr bit spectrum _.00_
c overall rms 13
"Orbit spectrum,
overall rms
level = 2.0g

t_ O02 .002 level= 2.0g


.001 I I l I
.001 J I i J I
20 50 I00 200 500 I000 2000 20 50 I00 200 500 Iooo 2000
Frequency, cps Frequency , cps

FIGURE 10-8.--Random vibration of test adapter blast- FIGURE 10-9.--Random vibr&tton test of reentry as-
shield region. sem_bly region.

The unique features of the quality control spection "buy-off" prior to making or breaking
system which contributed to the success of the any system interfaces.
Gemini flight program am: Formal spacecraft acceptance reviews are con-
(1) Configuration control. ducted _t strategic stages of the spacecraft as-
(2) Material control. sembly and test profile. The reviews are con-
(3) Quality workmanship. ducted with both the customer and the contrac-
(4) Rigid inspection. tor reviewing all test data and inspection records
(5) Spacecraft acceptance criteria. to isolate any condition which occurred during
Configuration control is necessary to maintain the preceding manufacturing and test activity
spacecraft quality; therefore, the contractor and and may adversely affect the performance of the
customer management developed and imple- equipment.
mented a rigid and rapid change-control system All failures, malfunctions, or out-of-tolerance
which permitted required changes to be docu- conditions that have not been resolved are
mented, approved, implemented, and verified by brought to the attention of the management re-
quality control, with the inspector being fully view board for resolution and corrective meas-
aware of the change before it is implemented on ures. The reviews are conducted prior to final
the spacecraft. When a change is considered spacecraft system tests at the contractor's plant,
necessary, and the program impact has been immediately prior to spacecraft, delivery, 'and
evaluated for design value, schedule, and cost, approximately 10 days preceding the flight.
the proposed change is formally presented to
Flight Equipment Tests
the management change board for approval and
implementation. All changes made to the space- A series of tests are conducted on all flight
craft are processed through the change board. articles to provide assurance that the reliability
Each article of flight equipment is identified potential of the design has not been degraded
by a unique part number. Components, such as in the fabrication and handling of the hard-
ware. The tests conducted on flight equipment
relay panels, tank assemblies, and higher orders
of electrical or electronic assemblies, are serial-
(1) Receiving inspection.
ized, and each serialized component is accounted
(9) In-line production tests.
and recorded in the spacecraft inventory at the
(3) Predelivery acceptance tests (PDA).
time it is installed in the spacecraft. (4) Preinstallation acceptance tests (PIA).
Exotic materials such as. titaniun_ Ren6 41, (5) Combined s p a c e c r a f t systems tests
and explosive materials used in pyrotechnics (SST).
are accounted for 'by lots to permit identifica- (6) Spacecraft-launch vehicle joint com-
tion of any suspect assembly when it is deter- bined system tests.
mined that a part is defective because of ma- (7) Countdown.
terial deficiency. In receiving inspection, critical parts are
Inspection personnel and fabrication techni- given a 100-percent inspection which may in-
cians who require a particular skill such as clude X-ray, chemical analysis, spectrographs,
and functional tests.
soldering, welding, and brazing are trained and
certified for the respective skill and r6tested While the equipment is being assembled, addi-
tional tests are performed to detect deficiencies
for proficiency at regular intervals to retain
early in manufacturing. Mandatory inspection
quality workmanship.
points are established at strategic in'tervals dur-
The very strict control of parts and fabri-
ing the production process. These were estab-
cated assemblies is maintained by rigid inspec-
lished at such points as prior to potting for
tion methods. All deficiencies, discrepancies, or potted modules and prior to closure for hermet-
test anomalies are recorded and resolved regard- ically sealed packages. As an example, certain
less of the significance that is apparent to the electronic modules of the onboard computer re-
inspector at the time of occurrence. All equip- ceive as many as 11 functional tests before they
ment installations and removals require an in- go into the final acceptance test.

A predelivery acceptance test to verify the craft is ready for flight. It should be pointed
functional performance of the equipment is per- out again that any abnormality, out-of-toler-
formed at the vendor's plant in the presence of ance condition, malfunction, or failure resulting
vendor and Government quality control repre- from any of these tests is recorded, reported,
sentatives. Many of these tests include and evaluated to determine the cause and the
environmental exposure to vibration and low effect on mission performance.
temperature whenever these environments are
considered to be prime contributors to the me- Failure Reporting, Failure Analysis, and
Corrective Action
chanics of failure. For complex or critical
equipment, spacecraft contractor engineering
Degradation in the inherent reliability of the
and quality control and Government engineer-
spacecraft systems is minimized through the
ing representatives were also present to witness
rigid quality control system and a closed-loop
the test for initial deliveries.
failure-reporting and corrective-action system.
Prior to installation in the spacecraft, the unit
All failures of flight-configured equipment that
is given a preinstallation acceptance test to ver-
occur during and after acceptance tests must be
ify that the functional characteristics or cali-
reported and analyzed. No failure, malfunc-
bration has not changed during shipment. This
tion, or anomaly is considered to be a random
test is conducted identically to the predelivery
failure. All possible effort is expended to deter-
acceptance test when feasible, unless a difference
mine the cause of the anomaly to permit imme-
in test equipment necessitates a change. When
diate corrective action.
differences in test equipment dictate a difference
Comprehensive failure-analysis laboratories
in the testing procedure, the test media (such
were established at the Kennedy Space Center
as fluids, applied voltages, and pressures) are
and at the spacecraft contractor's plant to pro-
identical, and test data are recorded in the same
vide rapid response concerning failures or mal-
units of measure in order to compare test results
functions which occur immediately prior to
with previous test data. This permits a
spacecraft delivery or launch.
rapid detection of the slightest change in _he
However, in cases where the electronic or
performance of the equipment.
electromechanical equipment is extremely com-
Spacecraft systems tests are performed on
plex, the failed part is usually returned to the
the system after installation in the spacecraft,
vendor when the failure analysis requires spe-
prior to delivery. They include individual
cial engineering knowledge, technical skills, and
systems tests prior to mating the spacecraft sec-
sophisticated test equipment.
tions, integrated systems tests, simulated flight
A tabulated, narrative summary of all fail-
tests, and altitude chamber tests after mating
ures which occur on the spacecraft and space-
all of the spacecraft sections. These tests use
craft equipment is kept current by the prime
special connectors built into the equipment to
contractor. This list is continuously reviewed
prevent equipment disconnection which would
by the customer and the contractor to assure
invalidate system interfaces.
acceptable and timely failure analyses and re-
Similar systems tests are repeated during
sulting corrective action. The contractor has
spacecraft premate verification at the launch-
established a priority system to expedite those
site checkout facility. After the spacecraft has
failure analyses which are most significant to
been electrically connected to the launch vehicle,
the pending missions.
a series of integrated systems functional tests is
A simplified flow diagram of the corrective
performed. Upon completion of these tests,
action system is shown in figure 10-10. A mate-
simulated flights, which exercise the abort mode
rial review board determines the disposition of
sequences, are conducted in combination witl3
the failed equipment, and an analysis of the
the launch vehicle, the Mission Control Center,
failure may be conducted at either the supplier's
the Manned Space Flight Network, and the plant, the prime contractor's plant, or at the
flight crew. Kennedy Space Center, depending on the
The countdown is the last in a series of sys- nature of the condition, the construction of the
tems functional tests to verify that the space- equipment, and the availability of the facilities
Failure or Analysis of action
evaluated to determine whether qualification
malfunction failure
responsibility status of the equipment has been affected. If
Supplier's Suppl ier's .
the equipment cannot be considered qualified by
plant q _--" plant"_ r ,_- Des,gn similarity, additional environmental tests are
• _ Material/ _ Materiel /_ ionufac- conducted to confirm the qualification status.
Prime _Revew /Prime , _ Rev ew _ turing
contractor's I | contractor s I t[
plant / Board _ plant [ Board __ Quality Unmanned Flight Tests
/ oation
\ / action\-- aontrol
Kennedy Kennedy
/,_w _
' y._/ L. Acc_p,o°ae The final tests conducted to support the
Center Center testing
manned missions were the unmanned flights of
Gemini I and II. Gemini I verified the struc-
Fiou_ 10--10.--Gemini corrective action flow schematic.
tural intergrity of the spacecraft and demon-
strated compatibility with the launch vehicle.
at each of the respective locations. If the anal-
Gemini II, a suborbital flight, consisted of a
ysis of a supplier's equipment is conducted at
production spacecraft with all appropriate on-
the prime contractor's plant or at the Kennedy
board systems operating during prelaunch,
Space Center, the respective supplier's repre-
sentative is expected to participate in the launch, reentry, postflight, and recovery. Each
analysis. system was monitored by special telemetry and
When the failure-analysis report is available, cameras that photographed the crew-station in-
the recommended corrective action is evaluated, strument panels throughout the flight. The
and a decision is rendered to implement the re- flight demonstrated the capability of the heat-
quired corrective action. This may require protection devices to withstand the maximum
management change board action to correct a heating rate and temperature of reentry. The
design deficiency, a change in manufacturing successful completion of the Gemini II mission,
processes, establishment of new quality control combined with ground qualification test results,
techniques, and/or changes to the acceptance- formed the basis for declaring the spacecraft
testing criteria. Each change must also be qualified for manned space flight.


By WILLIS B. MITCHELL, Manager, O_iee o Vehicles and Missions, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned
Spaeeera]t Center; and JEROME B. HAMMACK,Deputy Manager, O_ee o/ Vehicles and Missions,
Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center

Summary modifications will be covered in subsequent

The management of the Gemini launch ve- The Gemini launch vehicle was, therefore,
hicle program has been characterized by a suc- composed of the basic Titan II plus the changes
cessful blending of the management philoso- discussed in the preceding paragraph. In
phies of the NASA Gemini Program Office and January 1962, a purchase request was issued to
the Air Force Space Systems Division. The the Space Systems Division of the Air Force
management activity discussed in this paper Systems Command for the development and
represents those measures taken to achieve this procurement of a sufficient number of these ve-
degree of cooperation in order to maintain cog- hicles to satisfy the needs of the Gemini
nizance of the progress of the launch vehicle Program.
program, and to provide the necessary integra-
tion between the launch vehicle development Management Organization
activity and the rest of the Gemini Program.
The basic document underlying the relation-
Introduction ship between the Air Force and the NASA in
the management of the Gemini Program is the
A modified version of the Air Force Titan
"Operational and Management Plan for the
II was selected as the launch vehicle for the
Gemini Program," often referred to as the
Gemini flights earl:/in the proposal stage of the NASA-DOD agreement. This document was
Gemini Program, in the fall of 1961. The se- prepared in the fall of 1961 and agreed to by
lection was based on the payload capability of
appropriate representatives of the NASA and
the Titan II and on the fact that it promised to of the Department of Defense (DOD) in De-
be an inherently reliable vehicle because of the cember 1961. The document delineates the re-
use of hypergolic propellants and the simplified sponsibilities and the division of effort required
mechanical and electrical systems. Although for the conduct of the Gemini Program. In
the selection was made before the completion of general terms, the agreement assigns to the Air
the Titan II development program and a num-
Force the responsibility for development and
ber of months before the first flight, this early procurement of the launch vehicle and
technical evaluation was accurate.
launch complex, and for technical supervision
The selection early in the Titan II develop- of the launch operations under the overall man-
ment phase also offered the opportunity to agement and direction of the NASA Gemini
flight-test some of the changes which were de- Program Manager.
sirable to rate the vehicle for manned flight. The management of the integration of the
The purpose of the changes was to enhance fur-
launch vehicle development program into the
ther the basic reliability of the vehicle through overall Gemini system is a function of the
the use of redundant systems. Modifications NASA Gemini Program Office organization.
were made in the flight control and electrical Within the Gemini Program Office, the monitor-
systems. A malfunction detection system was ing of the technical development of the launch
incorporated to give the crew sufficient infor- vehicle is, primarily, the responsibility of the
mation to diagnose impending problems and to Office of Vehicles and Missions. This office
determine the proper action. Details of the serves as the major point of contact with the


Air Force management office and is responsible all Gemini launch vehicle program. The Aero-
for the launch vehicle coordination and integra- space Corp. also supplies the launch-vehicle
tion activities within the Manned Spacecraft guidance equations and predicted payload capa-
Center. The Test Operations Office in the bilities, and performs the postflight evaluation.
Gemini Program Office has the responsibility The airframe contractor is the Martin Co.,
for the integration of the launch vehicle into with 38 major subcontractors. The Aerojet-
the overall pl,an for preflight checkout, count- General Corp. and its five subcontractors sup-
down, and launch of the combined Gemini space ply the engine system. The General Electric
vehicle. In order to accomplish these tasks, the Co. produces the airborne guidance system com-
Test Operations Office works closely with Ken- ponents, and the Burroughs Co. supplies the
nedy Space Center organizations and with the ground computer and implements the guidance
Gemini Program Office Resident Manager at the equations. The Air Force 6555th Aerospace
Kennedy Space Center. Test Wing at Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., has
The magnitude of the management task is been assigned the responsibility for preflight
illustrated in figure 11-1, which shows the con- checkout of the launch vehicle at Cape Kennedy
tractor and Government organizations involved and for the launch operations. In the NASA
in the launch vehicle effort. For completeness, organization, this responsibility is supported by
the Manned Spacecraft Center organizations the Kennedy Space Center and by a Gemini
which are directly concerned are also shown. Program Office Resident Manager assigned
The figure shows that 2 major Government from the Manned Spacecraft Center.
agencies, 5 major industrial contractors, and 43 Within the Manned Spacecraft Center, or-
industrial subcontractors participate in the ganizations other than the Gemini Program
Gemini launch vehicle development program. Office involved in the progra m are the Flight
The major Government agencies involved in the Operations Directorate, which is responsible for
program are the two NASA centers (the Ken- operational mission planning and for the over-
nedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft all direction and management of flight control
Center) and the Air Force Systems Command and recovery activities; the Flight Crew Opera-
(AFSC). Within the Air Force, the Gemini tions Directorate, which is responsible for the
launch vehicle program is managed through the flight crew training and crew inputs to the
Space Systems Division Program Office, which launch vehicle systems; and the Engineering
is supported strongly by the Aerospace Corp. and Development Directorate, which is responsi-
The Aerospace Corp. is responsible to the Space ble for additional technical support as required
Systems Division Program Office for systems for the Gemini Program. The spacecraft con-
integration and technical direction on the over- tractor, the McDonnel Aircraft Corp., is ,also
shown on the figure because interface relation-
ships are maintained with this contractor, es-
pecially in the areas of the malfunction detec-
tion system and backup guidance.

Management Coordination Group

Obviously, with such a large, diverse, and far-

flung group of organizations participating in
I ol
I_I-- "--I I
the program, the two major management prob-
lems are (1) adequate and timely communica-
tions and (2) proper control and coordination
of the activities of the separate participants.
_ _ I I These problems occur in identifying and resolv-
38 sub- 5 sub- ing the difficulties which arise in the various
confroctors controc/ors elements of the program hardware and in de-

FIGURE ll-l.--Management structure (Gemini launch termining the ramifications of these solutions on
vehicle ). all interfacing hardware and procedures.

Communication and control are also problems in which is devoted to panel meetings. On the
the identification and transmittal of interface second day, reports from the panel chairmen
requirements among the groups involved. The are presented to the assembled committee, and
interfaces are not only physical but many times recommendations for courses of action are pro-
are philosophical or ideological in nature. posed. This is followed by a Government ses-
When these management problems were fur- sion devoted to discussions of action items and
ther considered in the light of the relatively financial matters. Meetings were originally
short time allowed for development and pro- held at intervals of 2 weeks, later increased to
curement of the launch vehicle, both the NASA 3 weeks, and then monthly. Presently, one
and the Air Force recognized early in the Gem- meeting is held before each mission. The pres-
ini Program that a system of cooperative pro- ent frequency of meetings indicates the ma-
gram direction and problem reporting would be turity of the program. The key results of the
beneficial. Time simply was not available for meetings are translated into action items which
the conventional chain-of-command operation. are put into a telegram format. After coordi-
Consequently, a launch vehicle coordinating nation with responsible groups within the
organization was formed, headed by a Chair- NASA Gemini Program Office, the action items
man from the NASA Gemini Program Office are approved by the NASA Gemini Progrum
and an Associate Chairman from the Space Sys- Manager and are implemented. Other study
tems Division Program Office. The group is items and records of discussions are put into
composed of representatives of all the Gov- abstract form and mailed to responsible agencies
ernment and industrial organizations which and participants.
participate directly in the launch vehicle pro- In operation, the coordination group provides
gram, plus representatives of all Govern- the status monitoring required to properly as-
ment or industrial groups which have an sess the progress of the launch vehicle program.
interface with the launch vehicle program. It also makes possible the rapid identification
The organization of this group went through a of problem areas in hardware development, and,
number of changes and eventually arrived at more importantly, it allows the talents of a large
the form shown in figure 11-2. This panel- group of knowledgeable people to be brought to
type organization has the advantage of group- bear on these problems. The effects of pro-
ing people of like specialties, and it results in posed solutions on other facets of the total pro-
smaller discussion groups which allow more gram are evaluated quickly, and knowledge of
detailed treatment of problems. A normal changes is disseminated rapidly. While a de-
coordination meeting lasts 2 days, the first of tailed discussion of the function of each of the

GLV coordination group

I I ml_
Interface Test
Abort Structures
panel panel
panel panel

Guidance Costs. 1
and Systems contracts, J
control panel and schedulesJ
pane I

Fioum_ ll-2.--Gemini launch-vehicle coordination group and reporting panels.


panels is not appropriate, the implications of Configuration Control Board exists, the NASA
the work of three of the groups is important be- Gemini Program Manager chose to delegate
cause of their interrelation with the other ele- the detail authority for launch vehicle change
ments of the Gemini Program : control to the Air Force Configuration Change
(1) The interface control, panel brings to- Board, which is operated by the Space Systems
Division in accordance with Air Force Manual
gether the appropriate members of the indus-
trial contractors representing the Gemini AFSCM-375-1. This manual specifies the con-
launch vehicle and the spacecraft for the inter- figuration management system for Department
change of information and requirements. The of Defense programs during the definition and
actions of this panel led to the preparation of development phases. To provide the necessary
the interface specification and the interface integration of launch vehicle changes into the
drawings. These drawings were the joint prod- general program development plan, ,a member
uct of the two engineering departments and of the NASA Gemini Program Office has been
are indicative of the cooperation which was appointed to sit with the Air Force Configura-
achieved. tion Change Board as an associate member. It
(2) The abort panel outlines the required is his function to provide the liaison between
studies of the flight-abort environment, makes the two boards. Generally, all Gemini launch
hazard analyses, and recommends abort pro- vehicle changes are well coordinated with the
cedures. Test programs to define the magni- NASA through the coordination group; conse-
tude and extent of a launch-vehicle fireball were
quently, the primary action of the NASA
conducted under the surveillance of the abort
Change Board, concerning Gemini launch ve-
panel. These activities were the basis of the
hicle changes, is to review the key actions of
crew-escape procedures.
the Air Force Change Board and to act on
(3) The guidance and control panel is con-
those changes referred to the NASA Change
cerned with the airborne and ground-based
Board. This latter group of changes are those
guidance equipment, as well as the interfacing
specifically requested by the NASA, those which
requirements of the launch vehicle flight-control
equipment with the redundant spacecraft iner- affect the interface with the spacecraft or affect
tial-guidance-system equipment. This panel is pilot safety, and those which materially affect,
concerned with both hardware and software launch schedules or funding.
Concluding Remarks
A coordination activity at the Air Force
Eastern Test Range has also proved to be a use- It is axiomatic that no organization will func-
ful tool. This group, the Gemini Launch tion well, no matter how carefully devised are
Operations Committee, brings together all ele- the organization charts nor how well docu-
ments that participate in the Gemini Program
mented are the authorities and responsibilities,
at the Air Force Eastern Test Range. The
unless it is manned with well-motivated and
main purpose of this group is to resolve all
dedicated people who work cooperatively
launch-complex-oriented problems and, where
toward the objective. On the Gemini launch
necessary, to submit action requests back
vehicle program, a spirit of cooperation has been
through the NASA Gemini Program Office.
developed between the two Government agencies
Configuration Management involved that has extended throughout the con-
tractor structure and has generally surmounted
Tile NASA-DOD agreement provides to the
NASA the authority to establish a configura- any differences that arose. This cooperation and
tion management system for the launch-vehicle excellent communication, together with the
program. This includes the establishment of competence of the Air Force Space Systems
a reference configuration, a configuration con- Division and its associated contractors, is the
trol board, and a change-status accounting key to the successflfl Gemini launch vehicle
system. Although an overall Gemini Program program.

By WALTER D. SMITH, Program Director, Gemini Program, Martin.Marietta Corp.

Summary Rendezvous guidance

recovery system ........ ]
This paper presents a brief description of the Spacecraft
Reentry capsule 19 ft
basic modifications made to the Titan II to
adapt it to a Gemini launch vehicle (GLV), the Adapter section ........ / 1

ground rules under which they were made, how Separation point ......... t
Oxidizer tank ........... /
the principal systems were initially baselined, GLV stage ]E
how they evolved, and how they have per- Equipment bay .......... 19 ft
formed to date.
Fuel tonk _

Stage ]E engine .._
thrust chamber _---_"
An original concept of the GLV program was
to make use of flight-proven hardware; spe- I0 ft_
cifically, the modified Titan II would be used
to insure a high level of crew safety and reli- GLV stage I
ability. This decision was based on the fact Oxidizer tank ........... 71 ft
that more than 30 Titan II vehicles were sched-
uled to be flown prior to the flight of the first
GLV, and, as a result of these flights, a high
level of confidence would be established in the Fuel tank

hardware unchanged for the GLV.

Modifications Required To Adapt the Titan

StageI engine
II to a Gemini Launch Vehicle thrust chambers .........

The fundamental modifications made to the

Fioum_ 12-1.--Gemini launch vehicle.
Titan II (fig. 12-1) to adapt it for use as the
GLV were-
(l) The Titan II inertial guidance system (3) A malfunction detection system (fig.
was replaced with a radio guidance system. 19-2), designed to sense critical failure condi-
(2) Provision was made for a redundant tions in the launch vehicle, was included. The
flight-control and guidance system which can action initiated by the malfunction detection
be automatically or manually commanded to system, in the case of flight-control or guidance
take over and safely complete the entire launch failures, is a command to switch over to the sec-
phase in the event of a primary system failure. ondary flight-control and guidance system.
This system addition was required because of For other failures, appropriate displays are
the extremely short time available for the crew presented to the crew.
to command abort and escape, in the event of (4) Redundancy was added in the electrical
critical flight-control failures during the high- system to the point of having two completely
dynamic-pressure region of stage I flight. independent power buses provided to critical
This redundant system was added primarily to components, and redundancy for all inflight
insure crew safety in case of a critical malfunc- sequencing.
tion ; however, it also significantly increases the (5) The Titan II retrorockets and vernier
probability of overall mission success. rockets were eliminated because no requirement


Gemini Launch Vehicle i Spacecraft


MDS sensed
I B TT engine
I B Tr propellant

Overrates (pitch,


roll )--7
I} " I
:i :1
II II instruments/

I siologico I

sw itFc_ogvHr/Cs°n:rc_lboc k /, / _-
Loss of pressure
i Hydraulic actuator
hordover I._._

circuits _..] i Abort _ _._.__1

tracking • Range safety officer I GLV engine Voice

I Telemetry
data link _ I • First command
motion / [ shutdown ] I communication I

........... i .......................................

FIGURE 12-2.--Malfunction detection system.

existed for them on the GLV. These deletions data-trend-monitoring program, and others
resulted in a valuable weight savings and an have been beneficial.
increase in mission reliability.
Pilot Safety
(6) A new stage II oxidizer-tank forward
skirt assembly was designed to mate the launch The pilot-safety problem was defined early in
vehicle to the spacecraft. the Gemini Program by predicting the failure
(7) The Titan II equipment-support truss modes of all critical launch-vehicle systems.
was modified to accommodate GLV equipment For the boost phase, the problem was managed
requirements. by developing an emergency operational concept
(8) Devices were added to the GLV stage ] which employed concerted efforts by the flight
propellant lines to attenuate the launch vehicle crew and ground monitors, and which employed
longitudinal oscillations, or POGO effect. automatic airborne circuits only where neces-
(9) The Titan II range-safety and ordnance sary. Detailed failure-mode analyses defined
systems were modified, by _he addition of cer- functional requirements for sensing, display,
tain logic circuitry and by changes to the communications, operator training, and emer-
destruct initiators, to increase crew safety. gency controls (fig. 12-3).
A modification not found in this listing but, During two periods of stage I flight, escape
from violent flight-control malfunctions in-
nevertheless fundamental to the GLV, .was the
application of special techniques which signi- duced by failure of the guidance, control, elec-
tric, or hydraulic power systems is not feasible;
ficantly increased vehicle reliability. Several
therefore, the GLV was designed to correct
of these techniques will be mentioned later, but
these failures automatically by switching over
no attempt will be made to detail all the facets
to tbe backup guidance and flight-control sys-
as they apply to the GLV. However, disci-
tems which include the guidance, control, elec-
plines such as the critical-component program, tric, and hydraulic power systems. Sensing
the personnel training-certification and motiva- parameters for the malfunction detection system
tion program, the component limited-life pro- and switchover mechanisms were established.
gram, the corrective-action and failure-analysis Component failure modes were introduced into
program, the procurement-control program, the breadboard control system, tied in with a

L). No wind nominal (stage I)
u .... T-5 nominal (winds biased)
o No wind nominal (stage TT)
o Gemini 1[ actual
Gemini 1T constraints

",,,Payload stage rr RGS

wo r ni n g



r \
/ T-5 winds
biased nominal



.380 ° F


angle warning/.

T-5 structural
.°° ,
Abort /
i40 (downrange)

Procedure includes; "craft abort

spacecraft insertion down- comtroints
range test objectives, \ T1 abort
35OK ret ro-section
GLV payload constraints, etc.'"

Power loss MCC"

350K retro-section jettison- ..... -_ .............. "!,

11 i I ; l i
0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0

Stage I--_ time critical--Vp, ft/sec (K)

t I I 1 J I i 1 J I
8.2 10.2 12.2 14.2 16.2 18.2 20.2 22.2 24.2 26.2. 28.2 30.2

Stage H--_ time critical -- Vp, ft/sec (K)

Fiou_ 12-3.--Detailed failure-mode analysis.

complete airborne-syatem functional test stand Throughout the entire abort operation, crew
and an analog simulation of vehicle behavior, safety required certain configuration changes
to verify the failure mode analysis of system to curb excessive escape environments. The
and vehicle effects and to optimize adjustments GLV strength envelope was adjusted to loads
of the malfunction-detection-system sensors. induced by malfunctions, so that structural fail-
Isolation and analyses of the other time-criti-
ures during attitude divergence would be
cal failure modes established engine chamber
isolated to the section between stages.
pressures, tank pressures, and vehicle overrate
Pilot safety has been actively pursued during
as malfunction-detection-system sensing param-
eters for direct spacecraft display and for the operational phase of the program in the
manual abort warning. form of astronaut training, development of a

real-time ground-monitoring capability, and (2) Structural loads

preflight integrity checks. (3) Structural temperature
A_ catalog of normal, high-tolerance, and (4) Controllability
typical malfunction events, describing the time (5) Hatch opening
variations of all booster parameters sensible to (6) Staging
the flight crew, was supplied to NASA and (7) Spacecraft abort boundary
maintained for astronaut moving-base simula- These constraints are developed for each
tion runs and abort 'training. In addition to launch vehicle and spacecraft prior to launch
valid malfunction cues, these data emphasized and are integrated with the prelaunch winds
the highest acceptable levels of noise, vibra- program to form the displays for the ground
tions, attitude divergence, and off-nominal se- monitoring operations. The results of failure
quences. The flight crews have demonstrated mode and constraint analysis for each flight
the effectiveness of this training during .the five have served to update or change mission rules,
manned flights to date. In particular, the flight and to provide new data for both crew and
crew correctly diagnosed the fact that no abort ground-monitoring training. The constraints
was required during the out-of-sequence shut- and flight results for each mission are updated
down even't which occurred during the Gemini prior to each launch. Gemini flight results have
VI-A launch attempt. confirmed the usefulness of the slow-malfunc-
Because a major structural failure in flight tion effort as part of the Mission Control Center
would not afford enough warning for a safe ground-monitoring operation, and have demon-
escape, a 25-percent margin of safety was pro- strafed the feasibility of real-time monitoring,
vided for the specification wind environment. diagnosis, and communication of decisions con-
To insure that the actual flight environment cerning guidance and control system per-
would not exceed the specification environment, formance.
wind soundings were taken before each launch System Description
and were fed into computer simulation pro-
grams which immediately predicted flight be-
havior, loads, and trajectory dispersions. These Tile basic structure of the GLV is, like Titan
results were used to verify structur,4_l margins II, a semimonocoque shell with integral fuel and
(preflight go--no-go) ; to adjust the switchover oxidizer tanks. Modifications include the ad-
constraints, abort constraints, and real-time dition of a 120-inch-diameter forward oxidizer
trajectory-dispersion displays; and to brief the skirt to accept the spacecraft adapter, and the
flight crew on predicted attitude perturbations. adaptation of lightweight equipment trusses.
Thus, a technique for rapid feedback of the Early in the GLV program, complete struc-
impact of measured weather data in time for tural loads, aerodynamic heating, and stress
prelaunch decisions and prediction of flight be- analyses were required because of the spacecraft
havior had been developed and demonstrated. configuration and boost trajectories. These
Slowly developing malfunctions of the launch analyses confirmed the adequacy of the struc-
vehicle are monitored by ground displays (fig. tural design of the launch vehicle. Additional
12-3) of selected telemetry and radar tracking confirmation of the structure was gained by
parameters. Through these displays, the guid- Titan II overall structural tests, and by tests of
ance monitor at the Mission Control Center in the peculiar structure of the GLV. A stage II
Houston is able to recommend to the crew either forward oxidizer skirt and spacecraf¢ adapter
to switch over to the secondary systems or to assembly was tested to a combination of design
switch back to the primary systems. In the toads and heating without failure. The light-
event the secondary system is no-go for switch- weight equipment trusses were vibration and
over, the monitor can advise the crew and the structurally tested without failure.
ground monitors of this situation. The switch- An extensive structural breakup analysis and
over or switchback decisions are based upon some structural testing to failure were per-
potential violation of such launch-vehicle and formed in support of the pilot-safety studies.
spacecraft constraints as- A result of these analytical studies was the in-
{ 1) Performance corporation of higher-strength bolts in the stage

I manufacturing splice. Strengthening of this levels of +__0.38g were recorded, was due to
splice minimizes the possibility of a between- improper preflight charging of the oxidizer
tanks breakup, with subsequent fireball, in the standpipe. Charging methods and recycle pro-
event of certain malfunctions. cedures were subsequently modified, and, on
Titan II operational storage in silos is both GLV-6 and GLV-7, POGO levels were within
temperature and humidity controlled. Weather the _0.95g requirements. The new oxidizer
protection of the GLV is provided only by the standpipe remote-charge system has eliminated
vehicle erector on launch complex 19. To pre- a difficult manual operation late in the count-
vent structural corrosion, the vehicle is selec- down, and has provided increased reliability
tively painted and is subjected to periodic cor- and a blockhouse monitoring capability.
rosion control inspections. Stringent corrosion Figure 19-4 shows the history of success in
control procedures were established after cor- eliminating POGO. With one exception, all
roded weld lands and skins were experienced Gemini results are below +__0.25g, and an order
on GLV-1 during its exposure to the Gape Ken- of magnitude less than the first Titan II
nedy environment. vehicles.


The GLV electrical system was modified to

Development.--The basic features of the add complete system redundancy, and to supply
propulsion system remain unchanged from 400-cycle power and 95-V dc power which the
Titan II; however, component changes, dele- Titan II does not require.
tions, and additions have occurred where The electrical system consists of two major
dictated by crew safety requirements. subsystems: power distribution and sequencing.
Launch vehicle longitudinal oscillations.-- & block diagram of the electricM power sub-
POGO is a limit-cycle oscillation in the longi-
system, illustrating how it is integrated with
tudinal direction of the launch vehicle, and in-
the launch vehicle systems, is shown in fig-
volves structure, engines, propellants, and feed-
uro 12-5. The power subsystem is fully re-
lines in a closed-loop system response.
dundant, with wiring routed along opposite
The occurrence of longitudinal oscillations, or
sides of the vehicle. Special fire protection is
the POGO effect, on the first Titan II flight, in
1962, caused concern for the Gemini Program. given to the stage I engine-area wiring by wrap-
The oscillations were about ___2.5g, and, al- ping the wire bundles with an insulating ma-
though this was not detrimental to an intercon- terial and also with aluminum-glass tape.
tinental ballistic missile, it could degrade the Spacecraft interface functions are provided
capability of an astronaut to perform inflight through two electrical connectors, with a com-
functions. The POGO problem was studied
and finally duplicated by an analytical model, 2.5 - N-6
which led to a hardware solution. The hard-
ware consists of a standpipe inserted into the
oxidizer feedline which uses a surge chamber to
damp the pressure oscillations. In the fuel
feedline, a spring-loaded accumulator accom-
plishes the same damping function.
These hardware devices were successfully
tested on three Titan II flights. Considerable
improvements in performance, checkout, and N-25
Max level

preparation for launch have been achieved , Noise level

through the first seven Gemini launches. Ma-

jor redesigns of the fuel accumulators have
helped to reduce POGO to well within the --v --------/_ "v
Titan I] R & D GLV
___0.95g criterion established for the Gemini
Program. The one exception, GLV-5, where FIGURE 12-4.--History of POGO reduction.

plate set of functions wired through each quencing subsystem is shown in figure 12--6. To
connector. insure that the critical stage II shutdown func-
The redundant electrical sequencing sub- tion will be implemented when commanded, a
system consists of relay and motor-driven backup power supply is provided.
switch logic to provide discrete signals to the The electrical system has performed as de-
vehicle systems. A block diagram of the se- signed on all GLV flights. The 400-cps power,

I system I

Secondary I ISeco dory I,_

L system j guidance _ fl Iht J

I spacecraft[ J co rol J

IPS [_

battery [

FIGURE 12-5.--Electrical power subsystem.


_1 Primary 8_ secondary
initiate control staging I I I gain changes
relay ! relay 1 switch
Separation nut-

Program Staging
Staging _ IPS
APS [ stages ]an
initiate cant rol staging
relay 2 relay 2 switch

engine J
J start J

1 Stage I

manual l
Ii Shutdown shutdown
shutdown Shutdown
Stage rl engine


(SECO) ._._

(SECO) _

H Guidance
relay 1
?and I
detection stage TI
Malfunction ,, t i shutdown-
squib valve

L Guidance
relay 2 /k
FIGURE12-_.--Sequencing subsystem.

which is required by the primary guidance there is partial redundancy during stage II
flight-control system for timing reference, has flight.
not deviated by more than -----0.5percent, al- (2) Switchover can be implemented auto-
though the specified frequency tolerance is ±1 matically or manually during either stage of
percent. The discrete timing functions of the powered flight.
sequencing subsystem have been well within the (3) Flight-proven hardware from Titan I
specified ___3seconds. Power system voltages, and Titan II is used wherever possible.
with auxiliary and instrumentation power sup- (4) There is complete electrical and physical
ply, have been within the specified 27- to isolation between the primary and secondary
31-V dc range. Thus, if switchover to the sec- systems.
ondary guidance and control systarn had oc,- (5) The relatively simple switchover cir-
curred, the instrumentation power supply cuitry is designed for the minimum possibility
would have performed satisfactorily for of a switchover-disabling-type failure or an
backup operations. inadvertent switchover failure.

Guidance and Control

Even though the GLV guidance and control
system is based upon Titan hardware, the sys-
The GLV redundant guidance and control tem is quite different. The major system
system (fig. 12-7) was designed to minimize the changes are the addition of the radio guidance
probability of a rapidly developing cata- system and the three-axis reference system in
strophic malfunction, such as a sustained engine the primary system to replace the Titan II in-
hardover during stage I flight, and to permit ertial guidance system, and the incorporation of
the use of a manual malfunction detection sys- new configuration tandem actuators in stage I.
tem. A second objective of the added redun- The selection of the radio guidance system and
dancy was to increase overall system reliability three-axis reference system required that an
and, consequently, to increase the probability adapter package be added to make the three-
of mission success. Some of the more impor- axis reference system outputs compatible with
tant system characteristics are: the Titan II autopilot control package.
(1) A mission can be completed after any Stage I hydraulic redundancy is achieved by
single malfunction during stage I flight, and using two complete Titan II power systems.

stage I
rate gyros

I GE 1 _ I'--"--'1 Primary
[ RGS ]_ autopilot Hydraulic pressure loss I

stage I I I Hardover I

system ll[i Few

L----1 Po er Stage
- hydraulic

valves J I amplifier J -L_ I system

I I II II Switchoverrelay

I Spacecraft I Secondary
system Switchback /
I I GS autopilot
I j

stage I
rate gyros

FIGURE 12-7.--Guidance and control subsystems.


The actuators are tandem units with a primary information sent by ground-monitoring per-
and secondary system section. Each section is sonnel, that a primary system malfunction has
a complete electrohydraulic serve, capable of occurred.

driving the common piston rod. The major Upon receipt of a switchover signal, the in-
components comprising each servoactuator are ertia] guidance system performs a fading opera-
the same as those used in Titan II actuators. tion which reduces the output to zero, and then
The tandem actuator (fig. 12-8) contains a restores the signal to the system according to
switchover valve, between the two servovalves an exponential law. This minimizes vehicle
and their respective cylinders, which deactivates loads during the switchover maneuver.
the secondary system while the primary system Flight per/o_w_nce.--All GLV flights have
is operating, and vice versa, following switch- been made on the primary system, and perform-
over to the secondary system. ance has been satisfactory, with no anomalies
Switchover.--There are four methods for ini- occurring. All flight transients and oscilla-
tiating a switchover to the secondary system, tions have been within preflight analytical
and all modes depend on the malfunction de- predictions.
tection system. Although there has not been a switchover to
(1) The tandem actuator switchover valve the secondary flight-control system, its per-
automatically effects a switchover to the stage I formance has been satisfactory on all flights.
secondary hydraulic system when primary sys- Postflight analysis indications are that this
tem pressure is lost, and initiates a signal to the system could have properly controlled the
malfunction detection system which completes launch vehicle if it had been necessary.
switchover to the secondary guidance and con- During the program, the capability of
trol system. variable-azimuth launch, using the three-axis
(2) The malfunction detection system rate- reference system variable-roll-program set-in
switch package automatically initiates switch- capability, has been demonstrated, as has the
over when the vehicle rates exceed preset limits. closed-loop guidance steering during stage II
(3) The tandem actuator preset limit flight.
switches detect and initiate a switchover in the Malfunction Detection System

event of a stage I engine hardover.

The malfunction detection system, a totally
(4) The crew may initiate a switchover sig-
new system, encompasses the. major inflight
nal to the malfunction detection system upon
launch-vehicle malfunction sensing and warn-
determining, from spacecraft displays or from
ing provisions available for crew safety. The
Flushing F_oshln_ performance parameters displayed to the flight
va,ve crew are:
Secondory return Primary return (1) Launch-vehicle pitch, yaw, and roll
,' connection connection,
(9) Stage I engine thrust-chamber under-
connection pressure (subassemblies 1 and 9, separately).

servovalve (3) Stage II engine fuel-injector under-

(4) Stage I and II propellant-tank pressures.
(5) Secondary guidance and control system
The crew has three manual switching func-
tiohs associated with the malfunction detection
switch .... system: switchover to the secondary guidance
•-Force and control system, switchback to the primary
guidance and control system, and launch-
vehicle shutdown.
Actuator Vent Actuator
The implementation of the malfunction de-
FIGUBl_12-8.--Tandem actuato_ tection system considers redundancy of sensors

and circuits and isolated installation of redun- engine-underpressure sensors are provided in
dant elements to minimize the possibility of a redundant pairs for each engine subassembly.
single or local failure disabling the system. The warning signal circuits for these are con-
Also, probable failure modes were considered nected to separate engine warning lights in the
in component design and selection and in cir- spacecraft. Upon decrease or loss of the thrust-
cuit connection in order to provide the malfunc- chamber pressure, the redundant sensor switches
tion detection system with a greater reliability close and initiate a warning signal.
than that of the systems being monitored. Except" for the pressure operating range, all
The total malfunction sensing and warning malfunction detection system propellant-tank
provisions, including the malfunction detection pressure sensors and signal circuits are identi-
system, and the interrelation of these are shown cal. A redundant pair of sensors is provided
in figure 12-2. for each propellant tank. Each sensor supplies
Monitoring techniques.--The malfunction an analog output signal, proportional to the
detection system is a composite of signal cir- sensed pressure, to the individual indicators on
cuits originating in monitoring sensors, routed the tank pressure meters in the spacecraft.
through the launch vehicle and the interface, Launch-vehicle turning rates, about all three
and terminating in the spacecraft warning- axes, are monitored by the malfunction detec-
abort system (fig. 12-9). tion system overrate sensor. In the event of ex-
Stages I and II malfunction detection system cessive vehicle turning, a red warning light in

Stage I 41 I_ Stage I1

24 Vdc 28 Vdc
APS/IPS bus APS/IPS buses

) 0 200 V, 400cps

APS bus

28Vdc IPS bus


t _T
ddize Fuel I 0 ddiz
MDS tank tank tank
Sensors essL I pl esst

iI I_:_L

Fv-- ----v--v-l
I Stage II tank I
I pressure I
t J

FIeURE 12-9.--Spacecraft monitoring of Gemini launch vehicle malfunction detection.


the spacecraft is energized. Simultaneously There have been several significant changes
and automatically, a signal is provided to ini- made to the malfunction detection system since
tiate switchover to the secondary flight-control the beginning of the program. These entailed
system. The overrate sensor is the malfunction addition of the switchback capability, a change
detection system rate-switch package, consisting to the stage I flight switch settings of the rate-
of six gyros as redundant pairs for each of the switch package, and deletion of the staging and
vehicle body axes (pitch, yaw, and roll). In stage-separation monitoring signals. Figure
the malfunction detection system circuits, the 12-10 shows the location of the malfunction
redundant rate switches are series connected, detection system components.
and simultaneous closure of both switches in the Flight performance.--All malfunction detec-
redundant pair is required to illuminate the tion system components have undergone a simi-
warning light in the spacecraft and to initiate lar design verification test program which
switchover. included testing at both the component and
The dual switchover power-amplifiers are system levels. At the component level, evalua-
self-latching solid-state switching modules used tion, qualification, and reliability tests were con-
to initiate a switchover from the primary to the ducted. System verification and integration
secondary guidance and control system. On the with other launch-vehicle systems were per-
input side, signals are supplied either from the formed in the airborne systems functional test
malfunction detection system overrate circuits;
set. In addition, flight performance verification
from the stage I hydraulic actuators, low pres-
was accomplished by means of the Titan II
sure or hardover; or from the flight crew in the
piggyback program. Table 12-I presents the
case of a malfunction. An unlatching capabil-
flight performance of the malfunction detection
ity is provided for the switchover power ampli-
system components. With the exception of two
tiers to permit switchback from the secondary
to the primary guidance and control system problems which were corrected (a minor oscil-
during the stage II flight. lation problem occurring