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Iran's Tortuous Path toward "Islamic Liberalism" Author(s): Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi Reviewed work(s): Source

: International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Winter, 2001), pp. 237-256 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020113 . Accessed: 19/01/2012 12:37
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International

Journal

of Politics,

Culture

and Society,

Vol.

15, No.

2, Winter

2001

(?2001)

I. Intellectuals

in Post-Revolutionary

Iran

Iran's Tortuous Path Toward "Islamic Liberalism"
Ahmad Ashraf13 and Ali Banuazizi2

roots This article provides an overview of the intellectual and sociopolitical of Iran's tortuous path toward "Islamic liberalism" and reform. It analyzes orientation of a major faction within the polit the shift in the ideological ical elite from a radical to a relatively moderate and liberal interpretation of Islam. The authors trace the roots of this ideological shift to a series of since the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 1979, political developments to fulfill its populist various failures of the revolutionary regime including a considerable and egalitarian erosion in the legitimacy of the promises; ruling clerics; the successful (though largely silent) resistance of the youth and women against the culturally restrictive policies of the Islamic Republic; the rise of a distinctly anti-fundamentalist, liberal-reformist interpretation of Islam by a number of Iranian theologians and religious intellectuals; and the precipitous decline in the popularity of revolutionary ideas in the 1990s. In spite of the increasing appeal of liberal-democratic ideas of individual and political in the new reform movement tolerance freedom, pluralism, and the overwhelming endorsement of these ideas in four recent national elections, including two presidential polls, the authors argue that the move ment has had but a limited and, for the most part symbolic, influence on Iran's objective, and still repressive, political conditions.
KEY WORDS: fundamentalism; Iran; Islamic revolution; Shi'ism; intelligentsia; Islamic Republic; student movements; radical Islam; liberal women's rights. Islam; Islamic

Iran's and outside elite,

Islamic Revolution

of 1979 came the country's

observers, the great powers

including and their intelligence

as a surprise to both inside intellectuals and the political services, journalists, scholars,

for Iranian Studies, Columbia New York, NY 10027-6821. Centre University, of Psychology, Boston Chestnut e-mail: Hill, MA 02467, 617-552-4124; College, department ali.banuazizi@bc.edu. 3 to: Ahmad should be address Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia Ashraf, Correspondence 450 Riverside Drive E-mail: #4, New York, NY 10027-6821. aa398@columbia.edu; University, ashraf@Drinceton.edu.

237
0891-4486/01/1200-0237$19.50/0? 2001Human Sciences Press, Inc.

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and above all, the leaders of the revolution itself. The same groups were to be stunned and baffled once more, nearly two decades after the triumph of the revolution, when an overwhelming of the country's voters majority cast their ballots in the 1997 presidential in favor of a reformist election a liberal Islamic democracy and an end to many candidate who promised that the new Islamic order had imposed on the of the repressive constraints the Utopian goal cultural and political life since the revolution. While of God on had been the creation of a "government of the Islamic Revolution of the new reform movement was, in the words earth," the popular mandate nation's the establishment of its chief champion, President Mohammad Khatami, and a civil society?the of the rule of law, political toleration, very ideas elites of both radical that had been cast aside by the entrenched power in the first two decades of the and fundamentalist (osulgara) persuasions
revolution.

did not, of course, arise in a political or ide The new reform movement vacuum. Itwas, rather, a product of certain developments within the ological that has ruled the country since fractious postrevolutionary regime highly erosion in the legitimacy of the ruling clerics; the rise of 1979: a considerable of Islam by a liberal-reformist interpretations distinctly anti-fundamentalist, the successful mo and religious intellectuals; of younger theologians group within the efforts of a group of reformed radicals and moderates itself with access to the vast resources of the public sector; the resis regime tance of millions of young men and women against the culturally restrictive of the Islamic regime; and the increasing appeal, throughout much policies ideals of individual freedom, pluralism, of the world, of liberal-democratic bilizational
and tolerance.

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION AND FACTIONALISM
the origin of the for understanding Perhaps the best point of departure in Iran is to recall that, even in the course of recent ideological polarization "Islamic Ideology" that united the revolution itself, there was no monolithic alliance. There were the many diverse groups that formed the revolutionary of Islam as a political ideology, each having several competing interpretations an elective affinity for particular social classes and groups.1 Two significant advocated variants were radical Islam (Islamic socialism), by Ali Shari'ati a French-educated sociologist and orator, and theocratic Islam, (1933-1977), Both made bold innovations Khomeini. Rouhollah by Ayatollah expounded as they applied to the of Shi'ite doctrines, particularly in the interpretation both supported the use between religion and politics. Moreover, relationship to transform society into an Islamic utopia. Shari'ati's version of of violence

Iran's "Islamic

Liberalism"

239

such a utopia was an Islamic state ruled by enlightened thinkers, with no room for the clergy in positions of political leadership. Khomeini's utopia was an state ruled by the clergy as vicegerents of the "Hidden Imam." The Islamic for Khomeini it was a political agenda for Shari'ati was a social revolution; revolution, aiming at the establishment rule of the supreme jurist), as foreseen Islamic Government."2 The followers of a theocracy (yelayat-e faqih, the in his 1970 seminary lectures on "The

of Shari'ati's ideas came from the ranks of the young who, in the 1970s, had formed several guerilla organizations, intelligentsia, the largest and most active of which was the Islamic-socialist Mojahedin-e The fundamentalist included Khalq Organization. supporters of Khomeini some of the same social elements, as well as a small segment of the clergy, students, and segments of the bazaar (merchants, were generally suspicious of the fundamentalists shopkeepers, modern ideas and resistant tomodern lifestyles, the Islamic radicals were re to many aspects of modernity and willing to collaborate with secular ceptive theology etc.).3 While intellectuals and political activists. In the course of the revolution and in the months after its immediately charismatic that made the alliance triumph, it was Khomeini's leadership between the groups with widely different visions of Islam possible. He was if a temporary keenly aware of the significance of such an alliance?even between the clergy and the radical intelligentsia. To that one?particularly the radical students and intellectuals to join hands end, he often exhorted with the clergy by promising them an active role in the Islamic revolution. For example, in a critical speech that may be considered as one of his first calls to rebellion against the Pahlavi regime in the spring of 1977, he addressed the intelligentsia in the following words:
should not push aside the clergy who are backed They [the intelligentsia] by the masses... and say "We want an Islam without clerics." It is like saying that we want an Islam without reason. Islam without clerics is totally politics. This goes against is influential in his own quarter, but you do not have such impossible. Every mullah a cleric is not sufficiently influence_If versed in political matters... give him infor ... so that he can act, and mation follow his lead, and things would people would get done [emphasis added]4.

several

thousand

The

vast majority of the intelligentsia and various radical elements, both and secular, heeded Khomeini's his leadership, words, accepted religious and struggled alongside the clergy against the ancien r?gime until well after a large number of religious intellectuals its collapse. Subsequently, served in the leadership or the rank and file of the new Islamic government. A

third ideological variant was liberal Islam, contending for political means nonviolent and seeking to accommodate Islam to power through the modern world. The modern some merchants, the modern bourgeoisie,

240 middle

Ashraf

and Banuazizi

class, a small segment of the clergy, and some students and teachers this liberal orientation. The organizational network of this variety of Islamic ideology was Mehdi Bazargan's Iran Liberation Movement. Al he headed the "provisional for a nine-month government" though period followed

the victory of revolution, Bazargan's liberal Islamic movement following was marginalized the increasingly dominant radical and fundamentalist by factions and remained eclipsed until the advent of the reform movement in the mid-1990s.5 As in the course of the 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution nearly a the concept of justice was at the center of the ideological de century earlier, bates among the followers of the three Islamic orientations during and after to the tradi the revolution. The conservatives adhered (fundamentalists) tional notion o? Islamic justice, one which, much like the Aristotelian idea of justice, states that "equals should be treated alike, but unequals proportion and all with impartiality."6 The radicals, ately to their relevant differences, on the other hand, gave a messianic to the concept, one that interpretation of societal resources to all?including the "un distribution promised equal to Islam understood the And finally, those with a liberal orientation equals." of ?galit?, i.e., notion of justice in terms of the French revolutionary slogan the equality of all before law. there were two apo In addition to the above three political ideologies, and traditionalist Islam of the re litical Islamic orientations: the orthodox Shi'ism of the rural and urban scholars (ulama) and the devotional for the most part, to the traditionalist The first appealed, clergy and their faithful followers who yearned for a past in which the dictates of their faith were carried out strictly, when they enjoyed greater respect and influ taxes. ence in their local communities, and when they paid only religious was the popular Shi'ism of the masses, which was The second orientation as the commemoration of the martyr marked by such religious practices dom, in the seventh century, of the third Shi'ite Imam (Hosein), an occasion ligious masses. in urban communities, that is observed annually by the faithful, especially and intensely emotional passion with religious processions, self-flagellation, and watched, the high-ranking clergy often patronized plays. Traditionally, in such popular practices. The followers of the latter but did not participate, two apolitical forms of Islam remained deeply skeptical of the politicized Islam of the revolutionaries, and, after the revolution, they often looked of Islam for at the new Islamic regime for its exploitation disapprovingly political gains. in February the triumph of the revolution After 1979, and the sub of the liberal and secular-leftist groups, two principal sequent liquidation in Iranian politics, the "conservatives" became dominant camps ideological and the "radicals." The radicals' following of Khomeini (fundamentalists)

Iran's "Islamic

Liberalism"

241

was due more

to their acceptance of his charismatic authority as the leader of the revolution rather than his incumbency of the office of the Supreme Ju rist ?Vali-e Faqih) or his theocratic vision of the "Islamic Government." Thus, line" of Imam Khomeini's the "followers themselves they called For his part, Khomeini Khatt-e Emam). gave Peyrov-e (Daneshjouyan-e in their efforts these young Islamic radicals his support and encouragement the difficult years of the Iran to mobilize the masses, during particularly the traditional Islamic following Iraq war in the 1980s. The conservatives,

jurisprudence (feqh-e sonnati), upheld the sanctity of private property and a limited role for the state in the economy. The radicals, basing advocated and dynamic jurispru their position on what they described as progressive of greater the achievement considered dence (feqh-e moteraqqi vapouyd), of the lot of the impoverished masses and the improvement social justice as the fundamental Islamic state. (mostazafan) duty of the revolutionary on agricultural limits landholding, They advocated economic self-sufficiency, state controls over major sectors of the economy (banking, heavy industries, labor and social-welfare legislation. foreign trade, etc.), and progressive on foreign policy and cultural is The two factions differed, moreover, sues. The radicals adamantly opposed any rapprochement with the United States and, to a lesser extent, other Western countries, while seeking to ex pand Iran's relations with the socialist bloc countries. They advocated active support for Islamic and liberation movements ("export of the revolution") the world. The conservatives favored a more cautious approach throughout to foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of normalizing Iran's economic rela tions with the rest of the world, so long as the West's political and cultural
influence on the country could be curbed. In the cultural realm, the conser

to Islamic laws and traditions, including vatives advocated close adherence strict codes of dress and public conduct for women, limits on certain forms of entertainment and artistic expression, and the like; the radicals either or adopted a more lenient attitude shunned such cultural issues altogether with respect to them. The two camps appealed to, or claimed to speak on behalf of, different constituencies in society. The conservatives' support came from the tradi and certain other segments of the social base was the younger, more militant of the Islamic associations in the universities, and clerics, members others associated with the large network of "revolutionary organizations" that had come into being in the course of or shortly after the revolution.7 as the lexicon of the secular left, the radicals viewed themselves Adopting advocates of the poor, the industrial workers, and the peasantry.8 In the years immediately following the revolution, several circumstances to an atmosphere contributed of terror, a resort to brutal repression, violent tionalist clergy, the bazaar merchants, traditional middle class. The radicals'

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to the regime, and, more gener confrontations with the armed opponents These of politics in the Islamic Republic. ally, a move toward radicalization in November of 1979 and included the take-over of the American Embassy the ensuing hostage crisis, which led to the collapse of the liberal provisional and helped mobilize the radical of Prime Minister government Bazargan,9 front against forces of the secular and Islamic left in a new anti-imperialist in general;10 Iraq's invasion of the Iranian States and the West of 1980 and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, which in September territory of nearly every segment of the Iranian so required a massive mobilization for support of the war effort; the fall of Bani Sadr, the first president ciety of the Republic, who, due to his critical stance toward the clerical estab the United such lishment received support from radical, urban-guerilla organizations as the Mojahedin-e and several Maoist groups, Khalq, Khalq, Fadaiyan-e in spring of 1981; and the clerical leaders' alarm at the ubiquitous presence influence of the secular left among the youth, particularly and increasing in the universities, schools, and, to a lesser extent, in factories secondary the On the other side, the leftist forces?notably, and other workplaces.11 in part to their own Islamic-socialist Khalq Organization?due Mojahedin-e to disarm all guer determination and the government's radical orientation to the repressive wave of intimidation and in response rilla organizations, used against them by the regime chose a strategy of armed and violence resistance and confrontation. They initiated a violent campaign against the officials of scores of government that involved the assassination government and leaders of the revolution, clerics; the in including several high-ranking head of the judiciary; Majles cumbent president, prime minister, deputies; of between the members and others. In the many armed confrontations of their young adherents these groups and the security forces, thousands carried out a massive were brutally killed.12 Concurrently, the government and various other academic and cultural purge of universities, high schools, under the banner of a "cultural revolution," against the same organizations, or independent and other members leftist, "un-Islamic," faculty, students, and flight into that led to the arrest, imprisonment, of the intelligentsia some 8,000 academics exile of tens of thousands of individuals (including All po or nearly one-half of the total teaching staff of the universities). women labor litical organizations, associations, organizations, professional and journals, unions, and several dozen independent (secular) newspapers which had flourished during the first year of the revolution, were closed to note that nearly It is worthy committees. down by the revolutionary here had played an active part in the of the groups mentioned everyone
revolution.

factions

and radical the conservative between controversies In the mid-1980s, intensified around several key issues. One highly charged political

Iran's "Islamic

Liberalism"

243

labor law by the Parliament the passage of a relatively progressive which was dominated by the radicals, and the subsequent vetoing (Majles), of this legislation by the Guardian Council. The latter is a twelve-person which possesses conservatives since its establishment, dominated by body, a constitutionally-granted veto power over all laws passed by the Majles issue was that it considers to be inconsistent with Islamic principles. In the case of the rejection was on the grounds that it newly ratified labor law, the Council's and labor of a free market in which commodities violated Islam's protection for that matter, slaves) can be freely traded. Other, equally contentious (and, the role of the Islamic state in enforcing the norms governing in public and in movies, women's and behavior of women and access to certain fields in higher education employment opportunities that had been limited traditionally tomen; the wearing of neckties and short issues, involved the appearance of music; playing of chess, shirts in sports fields by men; performance the conservatives took a rigid stance on these cultural issues, the radicals' position was more flexible and permissive. At the height of these ideological clashes between the main two factions, in favor of the radical camp, expressing Khomeini intervened his binding sleeve etc. While opinions in several widely fluence of the conservative publicized Guardian speeches. Council Furthermore, to limit the in (a clerically-dominated body and vets candidates for elections), a "Discretionary established Coun

that reviews laws passed by the Majles he issued, in 1987, a historic edict which of resolving potential conflicts between cil," charged with the responsibility the Majles and the Guardian Council. He appointed his long-time prot?g?, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (the then-powerful speaker of the Majles) maneuvers to head the new Council. Through such constitutional and with overt support, the radical camp effectively Khomeini's seized control of the the legislative, and the judicial branches of the government, the executive, the intelligence and security forces, powerful "revolutionary organizations," and the broadcast and print media. This left the conservative (fundamental with greatly dimin ist) camp, including the then President, Ali Khamenei, ished influence in the regime. on the country as a result of The mood of gloom that had descended the decade-long extremism and the eight-year war with Iraq? revolutionary perhaps the bloodiest reginonal conflict since the Second World War?was evident on the tenth anniversary of the Islamic revolution on 11 February 1989. Of the numerous major religious and political figures in the country who expressed their hopes, concerns, and anxieties on this important occa candid than the Grand Ayatollah Hosein-Ali sion, none was more Montazeri?the then officially-designated heir to Khomeini, who had fallen out of favor with him and no longer enjoyed that designation?in his assess ment of the revolution in its first decade:

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we succeeded in accomplishing its goal and in keeping up the revolution we have given see what happened to the promises Let's in fulfilling the people? at the beginning of the and devotion that we enjoyed all the unity, coordination we did a good job during see whether the war or rather the Let's revolution? count how many victorious_Let's the war on us emerged enemies who imposed towns how many did we lose, how many splendid young men were martyred, people were destroyed_and that we made then repent after realizing these mistakes_To a sin is remorse and it is incumbent upon us to notify each other of our mis us so Let's see what slogans we gave [over the past ten years] that made towards us_On in the world and turned the people isolated many oc pessimistic and frightened the world_The shouted casions, we shouted obscenities, slogans fill the pris of the world thought our only task here in Iran was to kill_To people must be emptied_When ons would not heal any wounds_Prisons my statements are censored to the revolution as a humble let student of theology and a sympathizer free press is essential alone others whose voices can be more easily suppressed_A admit takes? nearly four million we care for Islam, should pave the way for the return of to return to Iran but are scared_If and the country and want the ideals of the revolu the revolution, we must create unity, optimism, the and confidence tion to be safeguarded, among forces must be mobilized for of the revolution_All just like the beginning people, in the real sense of the to create an open society reconstruction? We must work humane Iran_The authorities who Iranians abroad intend for a more

word.13

THE POST-KHOMEINI ERA
The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini a year later in June of 1989, and, in very short order in the same year, the elec Hashemi Rafsanjani, tion of the powerful speaker of the Majles, Ali-Akbar of a new, centrist, and more set the stage for the emergence to presidency Under Rafsanjani's faction in the Islamic Republic. moderate leadership, the increasingly pragmatic concerns of the new the new faction represented of the bureaucracy in their de and members middle classes, professionals, after a decade of revolutionary sire to rebuild the country and its economy as they came turmoli and a devastating eight-year war. The "pragmatists," reforms aimed at reducing state to be known, initiated a series of economic control over the economy, encouraging greater private investment and initia of certain industries, reforming currency-exchange tive through privatization rates, introducing a five-year economic plan, and the like. In the foreign pol of Iran's relations with other countries, icy arena, they sought a normalization adventur those in the region, by playing down the once-popular particularly to other Muslim lands. Closer ist fantasy of exporting the Islamic revolution to home politically, in an attempt to break the radicals' hold on the Majles, and his aides devised a transparently partisan strategy in the run Rafsanjani elections, which, with the aid of the conservative up to the 1992 parliamentary removed a number of and subsequently Guardian Council, "disqualified" from the officially approved election rosters radical candidates well-known

Iran's "Islamic

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on the ground that their "actual commitment to Islam" (ta'ahhod-e amali beh This strategy, which had the tacit approval of the Eslam) was questionable. the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, effectively wrested from the radicals and gave the con control of the new Majles (1992-1996) forced servatives a commanding majority. The conservatives, furthermore, out many of the radicals from the judiciary, the revolutionary organizations, the intelligence services, the media, etc. to rally be The newly-elected however, was no more willing Majles, hind President Rafsanjani's reform programs than the previous, radical one. It successfully blocked some of his choices for the cabinet dominated and discredited others among his aides. Later, following his lackluster elec tion victory to a second term in June of 1993, the conservatives continued to torpedo many of his reform initiatives. In short, Rafsanjani's strategy of and elsewhere the reducing the radicals' influence in the Majles produced effect of depriving him of a significant shield against potentially opposite more powerful forces of the right. The outcome was a shift in the balance of hardliners. power from the Islamic left to the conservative Once again, the new politics of factionalism, this time pitting a more was reflected in the coun moderate faction against the so-called hardliners, tracks, each with a dif try's foreign relations. Two somewhat independent ferent set of goals and diplomatic could be identified. The orientations, first of continued consisted by the hardliners, support for a Islamic groups such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, stand on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relentless "rejectionist" railings against the United States as the chief perpetrator of all evil in the world, and,
occasion, assassination of prominent opponents of the regime abroad.

track, favored the fundamentalist

on

second track, representing the more realistic perspective of the new Iran's need to re-connect with the interna moderate factions, emphasized tional community, particulary in view of its critical need for foreign credit and investment, and to pursue its national interests beyond ideological and A substantial in Iran's relations with religious differences. improvement such conservative and other Persian Gulf states, regimes as Saudi Arabia Egypt, the newly independent Muslim republics in Central Asia, and other or Asian in various international countries, as well as active participation are all example of the more moderate second foreign policy ganizations, The
track.14

it came to relations with the West, When the differences between the and the conservative moderates hardliners were somewhat more complex. The former, while not rejecting economic ties to the West, remained stead to any attempt to normalize political and cultural relations fastly opposed with Western countries the United (and in particular States), based on the fear that such an opening could increase the influence of Westernized

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technocrats and experts in various spheres of national life. They devised the to characterize this threat to slogan of the "cultural onslaught of the West" the revolution, and used it as an ideological for attacking writ justification artists and others as perpetrators of ers, journalists, intellectuals, women, and politically subversive Western ideas and tendencies. culturally corrupt At a deeper could never re-establish the level, the Islamic Republic legitimacy that it once enjoyed as the inheritor of a popular revolution un From der the leadership of its first charismatic Khomeini. leader, Ayatollah in the constitution the beginning, there was a fundamental contradiction of on between a modern, of government, the Republic republican conception of a state that grants supreme the one hand, and the theocratic conception to a ruling jurist, who, in principle, is above all secular laws and the powers will of the people. This historically unprecedented provision was written into status as in recognition of Khomeini's the 1980 constitution, extraordinary as in Shi'ite Islam ("source of emulation"), the highest religious authority and as the founder of the Islamic leader of the revolution, the time of Khomeini's death a decade later in 1989, it had Republic.15 By successor could become clear to the ruling clerical elite that no possible of a be found that could combine the extraordinary religious qualifications source of emulation with the ability to lead the country politically. Hence, in to of Khomeini's life and with his consent, an amendment the final months the charismatic
the constitution, separating the two positions of the "source of emulation"

and the supreme jurist or "Leader" (Rahbar), was drafted and later ratified. death and a hastily arranged election by the When, following Khomeini's of Experts, Khameni was chosen as the new Supreme Leader, a Assembly of the clergy as well as many radicals were number of high-ranking members less than pleased with the choice.16 there issues and their political ramifications, such constitutional Beyond are other, more palpable reasons for the erosion of the regime's legitimacy in the in the eyes of the people. With the political clergy's direct involvement affairs of the state, it was inevitable that, when things did not go day-to-day right, they would be blamed for all the ills of society and failings of the gov ernment. Along with these routine recriminations, the Islamic clerics' once considerable moral authority as pious "men of sacred knowledge" (ulama) has been severely undermined by by their abuses of power (accompanied suffo of the economy, other high government officials), mismanagement above cating controls over the cultural life of the country, and, perhaps in association with in massive schemes all, involvement corruption (again to note it is important state officials and other powerholders). However, some dis of the clergy have maintained that many high-ranking members tance Such from, and indeed have been openly critical of, the Islamic the highest ranks of the clergy have from within criticisms regime. further

Iran's "Islamic

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247 basis of the Islamic as having been

undermined

the religious

government

"divinely-ordained."

NONVIOLENT SOCIETAL RESISTANCE
after the turbulent decade of the 1980s, some of the most Especially or to the Islamic regime have been nonviolent effective forms of resistance even "silent," coming primarily from the youth and women.17 Even after two and much to the consternation and propaganda decades of indoctrination of Iranian the current generation of the Islamic Republic, be described aptly as the "children of the revolution"? may youth?which to the regime's Islamization has shown little commitment project. Young students in particular) had served as one of the main people (and university onto the In the late 1990s, they re-emerged pillars of the 1979 Revolution. time energized by the prospects of a of Iranian politics?this center-stage of the leaders intellec democratic change in the country and led by dissident religious resources of old networks the and tuals and reformists. They reactivated as the Office for the Consolidation of Unity such organizations (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat) and used these to organize protest marches, boycotts, and forms of oppositional activities.18 sense of alienation to and their opposition young people's are closely linked to the economic pressures, establishment social anxieties, and psychological frustrations that they face as an inherently for the huge idealistic and change-oriented group. Employment prospects waves of secondary-school graduates that enter the job market each year are and underemploy generally quite poor, leading to rates of unemployment ment for the 15- to 24-year-olds that are at least twice the national average for all age groups. For those who want to continue their studies beyond a the prospects are no less bleak, with less than one-tenth high-school degree, of over one-and-a-half students who take part in the highly compet million Moreover, the conservative to the universities itive examinations into the higher educa being accepted tional system. In the meantime, the restrictive social regulations and codes a time when they are increasingly of behavior that are imposed on them?at and luring messages of the world broadcast media exposed to the ubiquitous to their further discontent and the internet?contribute and restiveness.19 to the youth, Next Iranian women to have struggled continuously men in all spheres of public life since the very estab achieve equality with lishment of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that no other arena in the state-society and in the fash relationship as the social status ioning of the new Islamic order has been as contentious of women and the rules governing their appearance and conduct in public. other

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in challenging By the same token, no other group has been as resourceful the various obstacles that have been placed in its way as have women in the course of the past two decades of struggle. In spite of numerous repressive and discriminatory the workplace, in schools and universities, policies?in
in sports and recreation, in courts of law, etc.?Iranian women have main

an unprecedented tained a significant presence in public life. Furthermore, of literature by and about women since the revolution has turned flourishing women's issues into a dominant national discourse.20 In asserting their fun damental rights as citizens and in defying discriminatory legislation, religious edicts, court rulings, and arbitrary decisions by state officials, Iranian femi nists have placed emphasis on Islam's egalitarian ideals rather than attacking its patriarchal values. In these struggles, they have often received significant support from reformist and radical elements within the regime who have ac cess to vast political resources, as well as prominent journalists, intellectuals, lawyers, theologians, lawyers, and others both in Iran and abroad.21 While they have had to face economic hardships, official censorship, the intelligentsia of both religious and secular and political intimidation, orientations of the clergy, teachers, some members (including journalists, and university students) have shown great writers, poets, artists, film-makers, to sustain and promote Iran's remarkably resilience and have managed and artistic life. Thus, despite the enormous vibrant intellectual political the clampdown and financial obstacles, there was?until that began in the summer of 1999?a dramatic increase in the number, quality, and editorial of newspapers, magazines, journals, and books.22 Indeed, as independence a leading quarterly with Morad Saghafi, the editor of Gof-o-Gu [Dialogue], a wide readership has suggested among secular intellectuals, recently, the restrictions on intellectual life may have actu various government-imposed further into the public domain and enhanced their ally pushed intellectuals status in the eyes of their audiences. Borrowing Russell Jacoby's concept of "public intellectuals," Saghafi concludes:

out of universities, them from participating in intellectuals By chasing by preventing and finally by avoiding them for events and the debates important they generated, more into becoming than a decade, the Islamic Republic Iranian intellectuals pushed it the public turned against the State, the more intellectuals. Thus, the more public to seemed who in the absence of political looked toward intellectuals, organizations, discourse. loss of legiti be the only group capable of having a socio-political Every seems the only social group that, despite all difficulties, macy for the State benefited to the first two bleak decades of intellectual to have crossed the desert [a reference at this stage is whether life in postrevolutionary is unknown they will be Iran]. What this new challenge.23 able to handle

The most largely terventions

common apolitical masses in matters

to the regime has come from form of resistance in that are often resentful of the government's a distinction of religion, making between "official

Iran's "Islamic

Liberalism"

249

Their (din-e dowlati) and "our own religion" (din-e khodemoun). forms of religiosity affirms the tradi of the government-imposed rejection this case, an Islamic state? tional Shi'ite suspicion of temporal authority?in of maintaining one's religious independence and a belief in the desirability is reflected, not so much in open forms of from the state. Their resistance religion" to the government, but rather in expressions of political apathy opposition in regime-sponsored and cynicism and in the refusal to participate activities official visits, etc.). celebrations, (Friday prayers, anniversary

LIBERALIZING TRENDS AND THE 1997REFORM MOVEMENT
of the revolution toward utopianism ideas took place in the early 1990s. For the most of a change in the collective consciousness of the the radical religious intellectuals, many of whom increasingly adopted of the Western social science in their language and theoretical orientation of Iranian society and politics. This was a far cry from the strong analyses A drastic shift from the radical

Islamic and secular liberal part, this was a reflection

both religious and secular-leftist, that most Iranian intellectuals, antipathy had developed toward the Western liberal tradition during the 1960s and after the revolution. Two dominant fig 1970s, and in the years immediately ures in the ideological pantheon of Iran's religious intellectuals before the revolution were Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shari'ati. It was Al-e (1923-1969) as the notion of "West-struckness" Ahmad, who popularized (gharbzadegi), a form of disease on the psyche and cultural consciousness of Third World one that makes their own authentic to them devalue traditions, peoples, the cultural products of the West, and to perpetuate the accept uncritically of theWest and its exploitative hold on their societies. His existing hegemony of the blame for these and many other ills of the country on itsWest placing ernized intellectuals?particularly those who, as he put it, had "sold their an atmosphere to the regime?created of acerbic anti-intellectualism pen" for well over a generation.24 among the Iranian intelligentsia Shari'ati's influence was different. He claimed to have constructed a new of dialectics, critical so theory of man and society based on the foundations cial science, and a radical interpretation of Islam. His use of metaphors bor from the Qor'an and Shi'ite-Islamic traditions to valorize those who for justice and human dignity through radical, and if necessary vio struggle to an increasingly politicized of practicing lent, action appealed generation Muslim to be involved in a similarly students, many of whom saw themselves heroic struggle against the Pahlavi regime. His radical Islamic vision was a or liberal theories of the secular far more compelling toMarxist alternative West for tens-of-thousands of university and secondary-school students and rowed

250 others who

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and Banuazizi

sermons (or their widely distributed listened to his electrifying or read his clandestinely and books. The rad published pamphlets cassettes) ideas not only a found in Shari'ati's ical religious intelligentsia, therefore, more authentic and powerful revolutionary ideology than those offered by the and changing secular theorists, but also a new way of understanding world cultural mores, and their own religious Weltanschauung, more simply, values. For them, without exception, Dr. Shari'ati?or, political of the revolution.25 the ideologue and theoretician "the doctor"?was of religious intellectuals with the au With the increasing disillusionment that affirmed thoritarian

and repressive character of the postrevolutionary government, movements in the of democratization the world-wide spread paralleling and secular intel there was a distinct shift among many 1990s, religious and political analysis. discourse of theological lectuals toward new modes of these new approaches may be found in The most eloquent expression and the writings of Abdalkarim Shabestari, Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed a number of formerly radical intel Mohsen Kadivar.26 At a different level, lectuals, with a more direct interest in policy-oriented analyses, established the Center for Strategic Studies, affiliated with the Office of the President, in and around to provide an institutional base for the reformist elements the individuals who have been affiliated with the the government. Among Mousavi Kho'einiha, Center in leadership positions have been Mohammad Em the premises of the American the leader of the students who occupied of revolutionary in 1979 and a former prosecutor-general tribunals, and bassy a founder of the Ministry and its first deputy of Intelligence Said Hajjarian, The minister and, later, the chief strategist for the 1990s reform movement. social science theories, the Center has become a major promoter of modern same stock of knowledge that many of its present affiliates would have con social science a decade earlier. In sidered to be "bourgeois" or "American" social of the late 1990s, contemporary Western and critical various brands of post-modernism theories, including of society fundamentalist conceptions theory, have been used to debunk and Islamic democracy.27 ideas of modernity and politics, and to promote election ushered in a new era in postrevolutionary The 1997 presidential the rule of law, Iranian politics. Khatami's campaign platform emphasized the reformist environment science of civil foreign policy, and the protection building a civil society, a moderate the liberties guaranteed by the Islamic constitution. His election represented in national politics in re most significant example of popular participation of the late 1970s. cent times?second only to the revolutionary mobilization of the the victory was as much amanifestation to most observers, According voters' rejection of the extremist politics of the left in the 1980s and the right in the 1990s as itwas an endorsement and liberal campaign statements. His of Khatami's moderate, well-reasoned, 1997 electoral victory over his powerful

Iran's "Islamic

Liberalism"

251

the not have been possible, furthermore, without resources that were contributed to his campaign of the pragmatist camp of the incumbent president, Rafsanjani, by members as well as the many formerly radical elements within the regime. Of partic to the Khatami ular significance campaign were the vast resources of the of Tehran and its daily newspaper, Hamshahri (with a circu Municipality lation of over one million). The city's then powerful mayor, Gholamhosein a reformed radical, served as Khatami's and, Karbaschi, campaign manager, conservative rival would vast human and financial the support of millions in that capacity, he played a critical role inmobilizing of people for Khatami in Tehran and other major cities.28 term (1997-2001), his sup first presidential During much of Khatami's porters rallied behind the slogans of civil society and the rule of law, but they were besieged by the conservative hardliners, who had gained effective con trol over key positions within the Islamic state.29 These included positions in and Discretionary the judiciary, the para-legislative Guardian the Councils, armed forces and the militia, the intelligence services and vigilante groups in tandem with them, the broadcast media, and the para-statal foun working for the Impoverished dations, e.g., the Foundation (Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan) and the Martyr Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid), Imam Reza's and several others. The lat (Bonyad-e Qods-e Razavi), ter, putatively philanthropic foundations, which are beyond the reach of the fiscal and regulatory agencies of the state, form amassive network of patron that effectively age and corruption, and, "an economy within the economy" controls as much as one-third of the country's domestic production (GDP).30 Khatami's election victory in 1997 was followed by two other sweeping in the municipal wins by reformist candidates elections of 1999 and the Majles elections of 2000. In the latter election, the reformists won some 200 of the 290 seats, thus giving the pro-Khatami in candidates a decisive majority the legislative body. Such unmistakably at the pro-reform popular mandate for polls, however, did not translate into legislative power and effectiveness the reformists. The conservatives (fundamentalists), clearly on the defensive of the people, decided to resort to tactics against a formidable majority of intimidation, terror against their political and rivals. They vigilantism, started a systematic crackdown against the press, the intellectuals, and other critics of the regime. outspoken In July of 1999, Salam, a popular pro-reform newspaper was closed by the order of the Press Court. Following peaceful demonstrations against the closure on the campus of Tehran University, militia forces entered the stu dent dormitories and brutally attacked the students, killing at least four in the assault ignited assault, and injuring and arresting hundreds. The dormitory a series of protest demonstrations over the next several days in Tehran and other cities, which escalated into full-scale riots when the demonstrators were Shrine Foundation

252

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attacked by vigilante Partisans of the Party of God (Ansar-e Hezbollah). The civil unrest resulting from the student protest was the most serious since the revolution and unprecedented in the participants' blatant use of anti-regime as active partici and the involvement of thousands of non-students slogans were harshly suppressed by the police, the militia, and vigilante pants. They groups. Less than a year later, starting dominated judiciary began a campaign More than forty pro-reform newspapers because of 2000, the conservative of intimidation against the press. and magazines were forcibly closed of Islam and the religious elements of "denigration Over the next several months, journalists and edi in April

of their alleged the Islamic revolution." tors were the primary targets of the conservatives' repressive attacks against the print media. Iran's best-known investigative journalist and the editor of to ten-years in prison (later re Path newspaer, Akbar Ganji, was sentenced duced to six years) for his writings that implicated several senior officials in the 1998 murders of five intellectuals and political activists. These and other actions to muzzle the press, including the imprisonment of over two dozen well-known
sans

journalists, have won "the largest prison for journalists
Frontiers.31

Iran the dubious in the world"

distinction

by the Paris-based

of being called Reporters

Since the late 1990s, religious intellectuals and pro-reform political ac tivists have been targeted by the conservative establishment. For exam in April 2000, several prominent Iranian intellectuals, ple, journalists, pub to attend an inter lishers, and women's rights activists traveled to Berlin on the future of reform in Iran. The conference national conference had been organized by Germany's Green Party with financial support from sev eral German foundations. their return to Iran and over the next Upon several months, many of the participants were brought to trial before the to overthrow Court in Tehran on charges of conspiring the Revolutionary Islamic Republic. Several of them, including the journalist Akbar Ganji, Kar and Shahla Lahidji, the reformist the women's rights activists Mehrangiz and the independent cleric Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, politician Ezzatollah severe sentences of imprisonment and fines. In March received Sahabi, Iran of 2001, the judiciary ordered the closure of the religious-nationalist tolerated opposition in the country Freedom Movement group (the only on charges of attempting to overthrow since the revolution) the Islamic the arrest and detention of twenty-one of its leading following Republic,
members.

failure in implementing his promised political reforms and Khatami's in Iran's faltering economy during the lack of any significant improvement his first four-year term, did not prevent him from scoring another impres sive victory in the June 2001 presidential elections, garnering seventy seven of the votes cast. However, in spite of percent (over twenty-one million)

Iran's "Islamic

Liberalism"

253

two clear mandates for change that he has been given by an overwhelming are in and even though pro-reform candidates of his countrymen, majority as well, the embattled president still faces the same control of the Majles dential constitutional term. constraints and political obstacles that stymied his first presi has had its

In all, it appears that Iran's democratic impact mainly on intellectual debates over the for a genuinely liberal, civil, and democratic movements impact on the objective, and still

reform movement

of the country has been quite limited and spite of the fact that the reformists have received overwhelming popular in two presidential elections in 1997 and 2001, as well as two endorsements other nationwide polls. The prospects for a peaceful and sustained process of in Iran, just as in other nations that have traversed the path democratization to democracy, depend ultimately on the ability of the from authoritarianism their opposition in the form of civil-societal and their nonviolent to the and to continue political organizations challenges entrenched conservative elites. The willingness of the conservative forces to heed the popular mandate for greater political and cultural freedoms, economic reform, respect for law, and, above all, refrain from the use of violence will determine whether a gradualist course of reform will be given reformists
a chance.

and possibilities requirements the society. So far, however, condition repressive, political this in largely symbolic?and

to institutionalize

ENDNOTES
1. For different in the revolution, orientations see, e.g., Hamid Dabashi, ideological Theology The Ideological in Iran (New York, Foundation of Discontent: of the Islamic Revolution Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "The State, Classes and Modes of Mobi 1993); and Ahmad lization in the Iranian Revolution," in State, Culture, 1 (Spring 1985), and Society, Vol. pp. 3-40. 2. The text of Khomeini's and edited by his students, was published in lectures, collected the mid- 1970s and distributed in Iran as: Emam Mousavi Kashef al-Qeta', clandestinely Eslami and Velayat-e See also Islam and Revolution: and Faqih. Writings and annotated translated of Imam Khomeini, by Hamid Algar, (Berkeley: see Baqer and insightful biography of Khomeini, 1981). For a well-informed I. B. Tauris, 1999). Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (London: as "fundamentalists" 3. Describing Khomeini's followers Fun requires a brief explanation. as it appeared in all major world damentalism, Judaism, Christianity, religions (including and Hinduism) in the closing decades of the twentieth Islam, Buddhism, century, displays several core ideological and organizational characteristics. with the discontented Deeply in the modern world, forces the fundamentalists' ultimate goal is "to bring God secularizing a divinely ordered back in" and establish to of and disdainful society. They are suspicious as the secular state, the civil society (with its attitude ward such manifestations of modernity of acceptance of non-orthodox and tolerance toward other religions), religious practices secular worldviews, and apolitical their own faith. For a concise analysis leadership within as a universal see Gabriel A. Almond, of fundamentalism Emmanuel Sivan, phenomenon, and R. Scott Appleby, "Fundamentalism: Genus and Species," in Martin E. Marty and Hokoumat-e Declarations Mizan Press,

254

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movement in Iran was started by a young charismatic in the early 1940s, when he founded the clandestine and student, Navvab Safavi, religious militant of Islam (Feda'iyan-e Devotees His organization had a hostile attitude Eslam). toward the then secular Iranian state and the highest leader and "source of ranking Shi'ite on the grounds of the latter's the Grand Ayatollah emulation," Sayyed Hosein Boroujerdi, stance. At the time, Ayatollah was among a tiny group of high-ranking Khomeini apolitical in Iran who showed sympathy for the Devotees of Islam. Nearly two decades later, in the early 1960s, a number of veterans and sympathizers of this group founded the Coalition of Islamic Groups and accepted the charismatic and (Jam'iyatha-ye Mo'talefe-ye Eslami) as their source of emulation militant a key leadership Khomeini and played increasingly role in the 1963 urban riots, the revolutionary movement of 1977-79, and ultimately formed the core of the "fundamentalist" faction in the new Islamic regime. account For a concise of the foundation and development of Fada'iyan-e Islam, their relation with the religious see and their legacy in the Islamic revolution, hierarchy Farhad Kazemi, "Fedaian-e in Encyclopaedia vol. X: 470-74. For two Eslam," Iranica, insiders' accounts of the formation and subsequent of the Devotees of Islam development see Mehdi and the Coalition of Islamic Groups and leaders, by their founders Eraqi, Khaterat-e Shahid Hajj Mehdi Eraqi of the Martyr Hajj Nagoftaha: [The Untold: Memoirs Mehdi Islami Badamchian, (Tehran, 1978); and Asadollah Heyatha-ye Eraqi] Motalefe-ye of Islamic Groups] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Mowj, 1992). [Coalition 4. The text of the speech was first published in a pamphlet Shahidi az entitled, Digar from the Clergy] Rouhaniyat [Another Martyr (Najaf, Iraq: November, 1977), pp. 25-58. treatment of Bazargan's For a comprehensive Freedom Movement of Iran, (=Liberation) see H. E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement Press, 1990). The of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University the liberal followers of Bazargan's reform move between group and Khatami's relationship ment is presented of the group, the theologian Hasan Yousefi Eshke by a clerical member vari (currently in the April 2000 in prison for his liberal views on Islam and his participation in Yad-e Ayyam'.Rouykardha-ye Berlin Conference), Siasi dar Jonbesh-e Eslahat [Memory in the Reform Movement] of Those Days: Political Events (Tehran, 2000). For an excellent see Charles Kurzman, of writings modern Muslim selection liberal thinkers, ed., Liberal by Islam: A Sourcebook Press, 1998). (New York: Oxford University in The Encyclopedia 6. From Aristotle's Vols. 3 and 4 (New York: Politics, of Philosophy, Collier-Macmillan, 1967), p. 299. 7. For an analysis of the social bases of the radical and conservative factions, (fundamentalist) see Ahmad Ashraf, and Men of Power in Postrevolutionary "Charisma, Theocracy, Iran," in inAfghanistan, and Ali Banuazizi, eds., The Politics of Social Transformation Myron Weiner Iran, and Pakistan Press, 1994), pp. 101-51. Syracuse University (Syracuse: use of the leftist and populist see Ervand Abrahamian, "Fun 8. For Khomeini's language, on the Islamic Republic or Populism?" in Khomeinism: damentalism Essays (Berkeley: 5. 9. of California Press, 1993), pp. 13-38. University account of the 1977-79 revolution For a first-hand and the political crises of the first year see Mehdi Iran dar Dow Harekat of the Islamic Republic, Bazargan, Enqelab-e [Iran's va Masael-e in Two Moves] Avvalin Revolution Sal-e (Tehran, 1982); and Idem, Moshkelat of the First Year of the Revolution] and Problems Enqelab (Tehran, 1980). [The Difficulties Iran and the Islamic Revolution The Reign of theAyatollahs: See, also, Shaul Bakhash, (New M. Milani, The Making York: Basic Books, of Iran's Islamic Revolution, 1984); and Mohsen 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). and the subsequent mobilization of "anti-imperialist The taking of American hostages the regime caused a deep split in the secular-leftist forces" by the radical forces within with one side advocating with the regime on the ground that organizations, cooperation that the regime is it is engaged in an anti-imperialist struggle and the other side arguing and, as such, should be rejected and denied any cooperation fundamentally reactionary by clerics

R. Scott Appleby, eds., Accounting Press, 1994), pp. 403-424. The Shi'ite fundamentalist

for Fundamentalisms

(Chicago:

University

of Chicago

10.

Iran's

"Islamic

Liberalism"

255

them these groups and made forces. The ensuing internal conflicts weakened to the final, crushing in the early 1980s. For an strikes by the Islamic regime see Maziar Rebels with a the demise of the secular left in this period, Behrooz, I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 95-134. Failure of the Left in Iran (London: the supporters of the regime and 11. Bani-Sadr began with the clashes between on the campus of and Fada'iyan during a speech by Bani-Sadr Mojahedin organizations 1981. This incident led to a serious dispute between Bani Sadr Tehran University inMarch, and Ayatollah which led finally to Bani-Sadr's fall from grace and removal from Khomeni, see Gha'ele-ye in June of 1981. For a detailed, official account of the episode, presidency va Soqout-e Zedd-e Enqelab Chahardahom-e 1359: Zohour of Esfand-e [The Dissension progressive vulnerable analysis of Cause: The The fall of the Fourth 12. See Ervand of March of 1981: The Rise and Fall of Counter-Revolution]

of Justice, 1981 [?]).

(Tehran: Ministey

CT: Yale University The Iranian Mojahedin Abrahamian, Press, (New Haven, and biographical sketches of the leaders of the Islamic Re 1989). For an official account see Islamic Propaganda Crimes public who were assassinated by Mojahedin, Organization, in Iran: A Study of the Use of Terrorism, Force, Threats and Torture of theM KO Terrorists by theMKO Hypocrites (Tehran, 1983). Tehran Times, 13 Feb. 1989 [English translation by the newspaper]. see For a sympathetic of Iran's foreign policy in the post-Khomeini appraisal period, on Iran's Foreign R. K. Ramazani, "Reflections the 'national Interests," Policy: Defining in John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani, eds., Iran at the Crossroads (New York: Palgrave, since 1989 is presented in analysis of Iran's foreign policy 2001); a more comprehensive David in Iran: Religion, Politics Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Society and Power (London: Frak Cass, 2001), Chs. 6-8. Khomeini's the creation of the position of supreme Despite personal qualifications, jurist was a matter of considerable within the constituent that was charged controversy assembly to draft a new charter for the Islamic Republic in 1979. It was ultimately pushed through after intense maneuvering clerical allies in the assembly and over by Khomeini's powerful the strenuous of those who were mindful of the authoritarian of such objections potentials an arrangement. see Asghar For an insightful of the dynamics of this process, analysis and the State in the Islamic Republic Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997). see Ali Banuazizi, to the regime's On the circumstances of legitimacy, erosion leading The Ruling Clerics and Civil Society in Contemporary Iran," Inter "Faltering Legitimacy: national Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 8 (1995), pp. 563-578. The resistance and activism of the poor, the rural migrants, and squatters during a period from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s in the large urban have been chronicled stretching and analyzed in Asef Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People's Movement in Iran (New York: Columbia Press, 1997). University See Mehrdad of the Student Movement "The Revival in Post-Revolutionary Mashayekhi's Iran" in this issue. Ibid. See Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran NJ: Princeton of the situation of Press, (Princeton, University 1999). For an overview women see Nikki R. Keddie, since the revolution, "Women in Iran since 1979," Social Vol. 67 (Summer 2000), pp. 405^38. Research, See Farideh Farhi's the 'Woman Question' and the Struggle for Intellectuals, "Religious the Creation of a Democratic Public Sphere in Iran" in this issue. See Elaine Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran (New York: Free Press, Sciolino, 2000), pp. 249-260. Morad the Deserts: Iranian Intellectuals After the Islamic Revolution," Saghafi, Crossing East, No. 18 (Spring 2001), p. 44-45. Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of theMiddle Jalal Al-e Ahmad, translated Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi), by Paul Sprachman recent essay on "The Changing Con Books, (New York: Caravan 1982). Negin Nabavi's in Iran of the 1960's," Iranian Studies, Vol. 32 (Summer cept of the 'Intellectual' 1999),

13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

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and Banuazizi

25. 26.

con locates Al-e Ahmad's brand of intellectualism in the changing pp. 333-350, political text of the 1960s Iran. See, also, Mehrzad Iranian Intellectuals and the West: Boroujerdi, The Tormented NY: Syracuse University Press, Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse, 1996), pp. 52-76. a political see Ali Rahnema, For and intellectual of Shari'ati, An Islamic Utopian: biography I. B. Tauris, 2000). A Political Biography (London: of Ali Shari'ati See Mahmoud Shabestari, Reconciling theMiddle a selection Sadri's "Sacred Defense of Secularism: and Kadivar" in this issue. Also noteworthy The Political Theologies of Soroush, are the essays by Farzin Vahdat, Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar: Mojtahed

of Mohammad Discourses "Post-Revolutionary the Terms of Mediated Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of Subjectivity," East, No. 16 (Spring 2000), pp. 31-54, and No. 17 (Fall 2000), pp. 135-157. For see Reason, and Democracy of Soroush's in Islam: Freedom, essays in English,

27.

translated and edited by Mahmoud Sadri and Essential Writings Soroush., of Abdolkarim Ahmad Sadri (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). see of the reformed radical religious For an analysis of the contributions intellectuals, of Religious Public in Iran" in this Sadri's "The Varieties Reform: Ahmad Intelligentsia issue. see Ebrahim Ansari account of the 1997 presidential For a carefully documented elections, Riasat-e Entakhab-e Rouzshemar-e Lari, ed., Entekhab-e Haftomin Dowre-ye Haftom: 1376 [The Seventh Iran: Khordad-e 1375 ta Khordad-e Election: Eslami-ye Jomhouri-ye of Iran, June Presidential Elections of the Islamic Republic of the Seventh Daily Diary 1996-June Publications, 1997). 1997] (Tehran: Hamshahri of factionalism, Sussan Siavoshi, "Authoritar For an analysis of the post-1997 politics of Iran," Iranian Future 32 (Summer The Uncertain ian or Democratic: Studies, Vol. theoretician in the present For views of an influential conservative 1999), pp. 313-331. va Tarikh az see Ayatollah Jame-eh Mohammad factional Yazdi, debate, Taqi Mesbah from the Perspective of the Qur'an] and History Qo'ran (Tehran: Didgah-e [Society Sazman-e Eslami, 1989). Tablighat-e see in the Islamic Republic, roles of these foundations For an analysis of the political Foundations and Post and Social Justice: Parastatal Suzanne Maloney, Politics, Patronage, Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplo Iran (Unpublished Revolutionary macy, Tufts University, 2000). 20 July 2001, p. 1. For an account of the various recent violations Iran Times [Washington], see Human measures of human by the Iranian government, rights and other repressive The Human Struggle Rights Consequences of Inter-Factional Stifling Dissent: Rights Watch, in Iran (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2001).

28.

29.

30.

31.