Mariano vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No.

118627 7 March 1995

FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. ISSUES: 1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions 2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution 3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself. Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not

be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. 3. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano [GR 59524, 18 February 1985] Facts: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On 6 September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. On 12 September 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons. On 20 September 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, on 25 September 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for sometime. On the night of 4 October 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. On 19 October 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. On 21 October 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, Salonga's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until the Supreme Court in the case of Ordoñez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (GR 55345, 28 October 1980) issued an order directing that Salonga's right to be visited by counsel be respected. On 2 November 1980, Salonga was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. Salonga stated that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority. Subsequently, on 27 November 1980, Salonga was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges. On 10 December 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent Salonga a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included Salonga as a co-accused). Up to the time martial law was lifted on 17 January 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, Salonga has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. On 9 February 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of Justice. On 24 February 1981, the City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing Salonga, among others of having violated RA

1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for 17 March 1981. On 6 March 1981, Salonga was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised AntiSubversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today. Issue: Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner Salonga. Held: The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN FACTS: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest. They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi. Held: Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard. The SC decided in the affirmative. Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Bottom line: These minors have fought for our rights up to the highest level of legal remedy. These minors thought of our interest and right. These minors battled for our sons and daughters and those yet to come. These minors were concern for us to live in a balanced and healthful ecology. Sadly, we, who are learned and with discernment, are oblivious. Until when do we learn our lesson? Remember, we have an "INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" to our future generations.

Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC G.R. No. 113375

FACTS: The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through. ISSUES: Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. RULING: The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.

KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994. On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion reads: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board after considering the arguments of the parties, hereby DISMISSES FOR LACK OF MERIT the petition filed in the above-entitled case. This petition in this case was resolved with dispatch at the request of petitioner to enable it to immediately avail of the legal remedies or options it is entitled under existing laws. SO ORDERED.6 Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order. The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs. Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the issues raised by the petitioner, questions the wisdom and the manner by which the instant petition was filed. It asserts that the petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for. Issue: WON the petitioner, KMU, has the standing to sue Held:YE S Rationale: The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides: xxx xxx xxx Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. In Lamb v. Phipps,7 we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf.8 In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or

orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. Assuming argu end o that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party. In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al.,9 we ruled in the same lines and enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was adopted,viz: . . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v. Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368 (1949)], this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L- 2621)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 [1972]) or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)]. xxx xxx xxx In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of Congress (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]); (b) Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]); (c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations Act (Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 [1991]; (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections (Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 750 [1991]); (e) P.D. No. 1869 (the charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary to morals, public policy, and order (Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 52 [1991]); and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 [1992]). Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No. 3452 (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976 (Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, supra); (c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA

797 [1990]); (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments of the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374 [1989]; Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 [1990]); (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties (Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 [1991]); (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the petitioner substantial cross-examination; (Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 199 SCRA 454 [1991]); (g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported oil products (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 [1992]); (h) resolutions of the Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of Sanggunians (De Guia vs. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992]); and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City (Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 [1980]). In the 1975 case of Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), this Court, despite its unequivocal ruling that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless to pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did no less in De Guia v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed aside the procedural infirmity "considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent."

IBP vs. Zamora Facts: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The President directed the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved A special civil action filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to sue. Held: The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition.Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution. The IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case

Lim vs. Executive Secretary FACTS: On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.2 They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus standi citing the unprecedented importance of the issue involved. ISSUE: 1.Whetheror not petitioners have legal standing 2. Whether or not issue is of Transcendental importance HELD: In his Comment, the Solicitor General points to infirmities in the petitions regarding, inter alia, Lim and Ersando's standing to file suit, the prematurity of the action, as well as the impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact. Anent their locus standi, the Solicitor General argues that first, they may not file suit in their capacities as, taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1 " involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers. Second, their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, citing our ruling in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora.5 Third, Lim and Ersando have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury. We agree. It is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this point, we must concur with the Solicitor General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari. We have held in too many instances that questions of fact are not entertained in such a remedy. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion: The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.

MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) 8 Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. ISSUES(S): (1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? (2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

SANLAKAS VS. Executive Secretary GR No. 159085 FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG

Umali vs. Guingona C. Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity Facts: At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1997, which set aside the Amended Decision dated December 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 94-3079, and dismissed the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner against the respondents. Petitioner was a Regional Director of the BIR which was charged for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director. Former President Ramos then authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and referred the complaint to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). PCAGC found evidence to support 6 of 12 charges against Umali. Then Pres. Ramos issued Administrative Order 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. Petitioner filed a civil case with the RTC of Makati saying that his constitutional right to due process of law and his right to security of tenure were denied by respondents. The RTC judge handed down an Amended decision granting the petition. Also, respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals where the Amended Decision was reversed. Issue: Whether or not petitioner¶s contention on the constitutionality of PCAGC, as a validly constituted constituted government agency is raised at the earliest possible opportunity Held: The Court ruled that it was too late to raise the issue of Constitutionality of PCAGC at such a late stage of the proceeding. the petition is dismissable on the ground that the issues posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.

Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy Facts: On July 19, 1948, the spouses Tijam commenced a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover from the spouses Sibonghanoy the sum of P1908 with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid plus costs. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the defendants properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc on the 31st day of the same month. After trial, court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Suretys bond against which the Surety filed a written opposition. The court however denied the opposition. Upon the plaintiffs second motion for execution against the bond, the suretys counsel was granted a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure, the court granted the motion for execution. Barely a month before such case, RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 became effective. This law changed the jurisdiction of the court of first instance. The highlight of the case is on the undesirable practice of the surety submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. Issue: Whether or not the issue may be raised any time or at the earliest possible opportunity. Held: The Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action commenced. The rule that jurisdiction over the matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by the law. The lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case allowing objections be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hover, the surety is has been deemed barred by laches from invoking such plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done. The surety has been estopped by laches. The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is applicable to the case since the suretys invocation attack sound public policy required for the peace of society. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such a relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The surety is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as adjudication but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy. Laches, in general, is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitle to assert is either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders appealed with costs against Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc

City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta Date: June 24, 1983 Petitioners: City Government of Quezon City and City Council of Quezon City Respondents: Hon. Judge Vicente Ericta and Himlayang Pilipino Inc Ponente: Gutierrez Jr Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial. For several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space for pauper burial. Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunctionseeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power Held: No Ratio: An examination of the Charter of Quezon Citydoes not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City.The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery. There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order

and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. Received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.

Binay vs Domingo Date: September 11, 1991 Petitioners: Jejomar Binay and Municipality of Makati Respondents: Eufemio Domingo and commission on Audit Ponente: Paras Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 (A resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program extending P500to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the implementation of the program. However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners’ reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used for public purposes. Issue: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause\ Held: Yes Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal

government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers assubject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

Agustin vs Edu facts Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires. ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid. HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) „blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,‟ 2) „batterypowered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,‟ 3) „builtin reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,‟ or 4) „well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of highways or the world, who sees a reflectorized expressways, will conclude, without rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power

with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus „be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as „the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.‟ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as „that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.‟ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, „the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,‟ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out „to all the great public needs.‟ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: „Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.‟ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.” It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

Lozano vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986 Test of the Police Power: Facts: Petitioners, charged with BP 22 assail the law's constitutionality. For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented here, we do not find it necessary to delve into the specifics of the informations involved in the cases which are the subject of the petitions. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions. Issue: Whether or not BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for non-payment of debt. Held:No. The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. Ratio: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties

directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal. VELASCO v. VILLEGAS

Facts: The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional Held:NO Ratio: It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause because it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989 Facts:Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times.When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and equal protection. Held: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Ratio: While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times.While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits