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SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 Davide, Jr., J. Facts: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs. Issue: whether petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth Held: Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
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the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 Bellosillo, J. Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus. Issues: whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting; whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
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constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per share and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose. Tañada v. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997 Panganiban, J. Facts: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
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4 Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits. the treaty is in harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the amity with all nations. PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION Santiago v. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. freedom. Such as when Philippines joined the UN it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. J. 10. sec. 2.R. the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. In its Declaration of Principles and state policies. The deliberation and voting of the senate. in newspapers of general and local circulation. by People’s Initiative” (hereafter. voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO agreement. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country. No. the people be allowed. whether or not sovereignty is absolute Held: The principles in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution. which are considered automatically part of our own laws. stagnation if not economic self-destruction. They are not sources for causes of action. thereby making it a part of the law of the land. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guidelines in the exercise of its power of judicial review. COMELEC G. Furthermore. Thus. cooperation and amity. Jr. make their free choice. and adheres to the policy of peace. justice. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order 1.. Its alternative is isolation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. through their duly elected officers. the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law. equality. XII. it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. 127325 March 19. and Art. Jesus S. Facts: Private respondent Atty. 1997 Davide. Also. with all nations. and by the legislature in its enactments of laws.” By the doctrine of incorporation. 19. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue: whether or not the WTO agreement is in conflict with Art. II sec. As to determine whether such exercise is wise. restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Section 4 of Article VII. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. be published in newspapers of general and local circulation. The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI. it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. signature stations shall be established all over the country. is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments. (2) It is true that R. a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power. No such law has been passed. as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed. under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People’s Initiative. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law. in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. unlike in the other modes of initiative. it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC. on statutes. as required in COMELEC Resolution No. Attached to the petition is a copy of a “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution” embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limit. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People’s Initiative.A. The petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago. 2300. which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995. Alexander Padilla. initiative on the Constitution. and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved. According to Delfin. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative. it is likewise necessary that the said order. that. who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people. Senate Bill No. with the assistance of municipal election registrars. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: “There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2. in fact. 7. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. namely. No. that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures. and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. (3) Republic Act No. and on local legislation. that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. to assist Petitioners and volunteers. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines. Article XVII of the Constitution. However.5 3. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

No. 2.6 (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 332). in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. or (b) by a constitutional convention. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is. or (c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. (5) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution. Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative. therefore. 1. That section reads as follows: Sec. Thus. this Constitution may be proposed: (a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . 7 (Proposed Resolution No. Any amendment to. 2300. This provision is not self-executory. Issue: Is R. of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. (6) Finally. 6735 adequate to cover the system on initiative on amendments to the Constitution? Held: No. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters. Indeed. adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern “the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws. since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. not to revision thereof. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. or office has realigned funds for the purpose. or revision of. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: Sec. agency. the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.A. neither the COMELEC nor any other government department. outside the power of the people’s initiative.

No. as the case may be. c. the Constitution” through the system of initiative. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose. as among the contents of the petition. paragraph (c) requires. approve. excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. They can only do so with respect to “laws. 6735. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows: (c) The petition shall state the following: c. approved or rejected. The use of the clause “proposed laws sought to be enacted. Third. enact. statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. amended or repealed” only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2. 2. First. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III). which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws. (Emphasis supplied).4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein. c. Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. ordinances. c. in whole or in part. initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. As pointed out earlier. ordinances. or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed. the Constitution. in whole or in part. approved or rejected. No. laws. amended or repealed. c.2 the proposition.” Second. among other things. recognized and guaranteed. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. No. or reject. It does not include. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to “provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?” A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. as the case may be.A. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative. quoted earlier. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. If Congress intended R.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.7 Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative point to R. But is R. and c. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section. considering that in the order of Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. approved or rejected. the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended.A. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose. and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. The said section reads: Sec. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative. amended or repealed. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. approve or reject. or resolutions. Section 5.3 the reason or reasons therefor. Statement and Policy.A.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters. no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. ordinances. in the case of initiative on the Constitution. it could have provided for a subtitle therefor. the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. enact. and resolutions. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC.

(c) The effect of the legislative body’s failure to favorably act thereon. provincial. (b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned. city. the primacy of interest. a.A. rather intentionally.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation. resolution or ordinance. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. or barangay law. (Emphasis supplied). Definition of terms — xxx xxx xxx There are three (3) systems of initiative. (d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition. the Act provides for the following: (a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition. As regards local initiative. 3. the Act provides for the following: (a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition. or hierarchy of values. (c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional. municipal. and a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. and (f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. Anent the initiative on national legislation. (e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. (d) The formulation of the proposition. to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . namely: a. Hence. No. to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Sec.8 things. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention. it failed. While R. and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof. (b) The conduct and date of the initiative.

and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. Delegation to local governments. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R. No. R. and (b) fixes a Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. (k) The limitations on local initiative. to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. No.A. Empowering the COMELEC. Upon the other hand. carried out. in all of its twenty-three sections. inadequate. 6735 is incomplete. (g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained. 5 above. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. or implemented by the delegate. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. the word “Constitution” in Section 2.9 (e) The period within which to gather the signatures. registered voters for their approval. 6735. therefore. and (l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition. (h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the (i) The issuance of a certification of the result. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . (b) defines “initiative on the Constitution” and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3. RA.A. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution. However. No. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself. an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions. There was. (c) speaks of “plebiscite” as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people. (j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition. and Delegation to administrative bodies. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the (2) (3) (4) (5) Constitution. setting forth therein the policy to be executed. The rule is that what has been delegated. in every case of permissible delegation. which must be within the period specified therein. cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. Delegation to the people at large. merely (a) mentions. (f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed.

R.10 standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 2300. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. No. for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. No. the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 6735. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper. the hearing on 12 December 1996. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters.A. or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and the “sufficient standard” tests. Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R. the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. the said petition was merely entered as UND. Without the required signatures. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced.A. for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. undocketed. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. Issue: Did the COMELEC act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition Held: Yes. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Rosario G. and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it. The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. Issue: Is COMELEC Resolution No. No.A. Hence. maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. void? Held: Yes. 1994 Quiason. meaning. R. It does not have that power under R. marks its limits. 6735. No. Facts: Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. 2300. 2300. No. J. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996. it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC.A. insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 101949 December 1. IS VATICAN A STATE? Holy See v.

which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity. a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. Issue: whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity is concerned Held: Yes. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. in a receiving state. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. each widely held and firmly established. but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. Later. or an incident thereof. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade. surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business. petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. the Holy See sold the property on condition that it will evict the squatters therein. The restrictive theory. In the case at bench. According to the newer or restrictive theory. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. In Article 31(a) of the Convention. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity. a sovereign cannot. the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii. the Holy See was sued. with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself. The purpose was to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy. necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity. the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. 1965. It Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state. The donation was made not for commercial purpose. especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. then it is an act jure imperii. For failure to comply with the condition. However. 20-22). According to the classical or absolute theory. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. has created problems of its own. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. Certainly. which in this case is the Holy See. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido .11 A piece of real property was acquired by the Holy See by way of donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. real or personal. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property. without its consent. is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. It moved to dismiss on the ground of state immunity.

the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD. The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. however. No. Sulu. it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s foreign relations. the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights. The MOA-AD included. the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The BJE is then granted the power to build. Facts: On 8 August 2008. Basilan. as well as to hold a public consultation thereon. Issue: whether or not the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments Held: Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty.” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. and maintain its own institutions. privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country. as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. J. develop. Maguindanao. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . 183591 October 14. CONCEPT OF AN ASSOCIATED STATE Province of North Cotabato v. a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. invoking its right to information on matters of public concern.R. Malaysia. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines’ foreign relations. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative. among others. directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008.12 merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. 2008 Carpio-Morales. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP). Tawi-Tawi. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact. Gov’t of the RP Peace Panel G. to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur. Before the signing. and Marawi City. The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts.

In fact. arbitrary. Sec. is implemented therein. 3. c) RA No. oppressive. b) RA No. and amounts to a whimsical. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority. which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP. 7160. and RA No. and. III. among other things. in the course of conducting peace negotiations. However. which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. 3. Issue: whether or not the MOA-AD is unconstitutional Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP). The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process. Art. or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain. may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution. capricious. is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. including public consultation under RA No. the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments. II. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda: a) EO No. Issue: whether or not the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Held: Yes. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution. comments. she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress.13 Yes. 8371. which entails. and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) Held: Yes. Sec. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people. Art. 28). Issue: whether or not there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. advice. it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information. RA No. as mandated by EO No. and despotic exercise thereof. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality.

it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. or the people themselves through the process of initiative. Issue: whether or not the GRP can invoke executive privilege Held: No. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. under carefully defined circumstances. but the very concept underlying them. however. 7. a Constitutional Convention. for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. the same does not cure its defect. even then. 28. for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.14 Held: Yes. delegates certain responsibilities to the other. the associate. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information. while maintaining its international status as a state. social. while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. Art. economic. only to preserve and defend the Constitution. extend to allowing her Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. In the basic model. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to selfdetermination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political. itself. Not only its specific provisions. one state. Such presidential power does not. An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and. as stated in her oath of office. The President has authority. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. as the clause is worded. The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. Art. are unconstitutional. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is. for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. the principal. the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE. The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. Moreover. a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government peace panel. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. namely. II of the Constitution.

Petitioners. Issue: whether or not R. in their capacities as “citizens. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision. taxpayers or legislators” assail the constitutionality of R. Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community. J. 3 WHAT COMPRISES THE NATIONAL TERRITORY? Magallona v. an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines. 1984.A. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . Petitioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. IS SOVEREIGNTY ABSOLUTE? Tañada v. which the Philippines ratified on February 27. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters Held: No. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. Angara see p.A. 2011 Carpio. Ermita G. thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III.15 to change the Constitution. the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements. regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 9522 with one of their arguments contending that the law unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into archipelagic waters. Such compliance shortened one baseline. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.A. including overflight. 187167 August 16. but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision.R No.A. 9522 is constitutional and consistent with the Philippine’s national interest. unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances. Plainly. The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III. and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Facts: R. R. the law also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

J. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise. If the Philippines or any country shall invoke its sovereignty to forbid innocent passage. and Such other officers as may be determined by the President. the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Drilon. is automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. bed and subsoil and the resources therein. 9522. GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. the compliance to UNCLOS III through the R. Gudani and Col.A. it shall risk retaliatory measures from the international community. the Congress has avoided such conflict. Brig. 169777 April 20. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Such disaster was avoided through the R. With compliance to UNCLOS III and the enactment of R. As a matter of fact. the Philippines has no choice but to comply with the international law norms. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . Subsequently. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. the senate president.R. 9522. Facts: In 2005. the right of innocent passage. from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval. 2006 Carpio-Morales. Furthermore. Gen. No. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege. scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. 9522 will not expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.16 will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space.A. Ermita G. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. being a customary international law. due to the absence of its own legislation regarding routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. thus. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. if the Philippines did not comply with the baselines law. Balutan were Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. it will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured and which will produce two-fronted disaster: (1) open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around the archipelago and (2) it shall weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. CHARACTERISTICS OF A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE Senate v. which grants innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters.A. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS III. Despite EO 464.

while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour. may be summoned and if he refuses. In other words. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 464. Sections 21 and 22. enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation. the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. therefore. hence. while closely related and complementary to each other. very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also. the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Ultimately. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch. such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. valid and constitutional? Held: EO 464 is unconstitutional in part. the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power. Issue: Is Section 3 of E. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. he can be held in contempt of the House. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. is valid on its face. and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. under which anybody for that matter. which requires all the public officials. For under Section 22.17 relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry. in aid of legislation. beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. Section 1 cannot. whereas. the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature. it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.O. the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. in effect. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464. it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. however. be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. Article VI of the Constitution. should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.

in keeping with the separation of powers. Issue: whether the case must be dismissed on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America. 1990 Cruz.S. then known as the NCO club concession. Section 22. They further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only by the end of June and the private respondents would be notified. Okinawa Area Exchange. In such instances. which was not included in the invitation to bid. Shaw. Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America. 1986 to August 31. as Chief Executive. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. through its representatives. The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon.S. 76607 February 26. Valencia. The individual defendants. unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made. as official employees of the U. 1986. del Pilar for 12 years. when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21. DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY USA v.R. and Tanglao for 50 years. petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Air Force. were also immune from suit. which had not waived its non-suability. James F. Air Force. The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . No. which had not waived its non-suability Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty.S. 1986 solicitation. solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer. Nonetheless. Guinto G. either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. the Western Pacific Contracting Office. Dizon was already operating this concession. Emerenciana C. del Pilar. and Pablo C. the appearance is mandatory. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued. and the expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30. including the Civil Engineering Area. J. such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation. The latter. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon. On February 24. over the objection of the private respondents.18 head to appear in such inquiry. its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom. who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities. U. states that Congress may only request their appearance. Tanglao. Smouse explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24. 1986. Facts: The private respondents are suing several officers of the U.

Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability. such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.19 Held: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent. as accepted by the majority of states.” When the government enters into a contract. Even without such affirmation. Section 2. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states. non habet imperium. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same. 3083. in the language of a celebrated case. A contrary disposition would. The doctrine is sometimes derisively called “the royal prerogative of dishonesty” because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. of the 1987 Constitution. Upon its admission to such society. Under this doctrine. Section 3. “unduly vex the peace of nations. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that “there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. As for the filing of a complaint by the government. thus opening itself to a counterclaim. The above rules are subject to qualification. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint. which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them. is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II. the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. under which the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract. we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. express or implied. As applied to the local state. it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.” While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent. now expressed in Article XVI. In such a situation. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem. it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts.” There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.

operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights. the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated. No less important. if it can. the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and. it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution. like any other state. Article III thereof provides as follows: It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights. will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. The said article establishes a rule of liability. It cannot be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable. possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. The United States of America. hence. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued. use. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity. Gov’t of the RP Peace Panel see p. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air space adjacent to. liability on the applicable law and the established facts. that the defendant is liable. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. 3 RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES Province of North Cotabato v. on the other hand. not suability. as in the case at bar. the bases which are necessary to provide access to them or appropriate for their control. power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment. it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. or in the vicinity of. Angara see p. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . The individually-named petitioners in this case were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. Moreover. which has not given its consent to be sued. they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal. 10 Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. PACTA SUNT SERVANDA Tañada v.20 In the case of the United States of America.

he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law. 18. VII of the Constitution. otherwise. and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. No. 2000 Kapunan. both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms. Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec.R. 141284 August 15. Art. there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. Art. as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. until such time when the situation shall have improved.21 YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES CIVILIAN SUPREMACY CLAUSE IBP v. Under Sec. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines. However. J. 18. 3. VII of the Constitution. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only. Issues: whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review. then President Estrada directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden. Art. the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. II of the Constitution. invasion or rebellion. the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. Zamora G. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

and one was not allowed to attend her graduation.R. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution. Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee to inform them that there are letters of complaint filed against them by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student that had been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation and required them submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date of hearing. No.” and devoid of all moral values. They instead requested Dr. The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. In response. received a letter signed by Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers.22 civilian law enforcement. and not with the military. At the same time. Hence. Facts: Miriam college has found its school paper (Chi-Rho).” Following the publication of the paper and the magazine. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP. expelled. Dr. we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Inc. Thereafter. and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) contents of the September-October 1994 issue “Obscene. the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Issue: whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the complaints against the students Held: Yes. but none of the students submitted their respective answers. Factoran see p. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . Culture and Sports (DECS). we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. v. the Discipline Board. all students of Miriam College. the members of the editorial board. after a review of the Discipline Committee’s report. Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school’s right to discipline its students.” “injurious to young readers. Consistent with jurisprudence. that had jurisdiction over the case. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times.” “gross. the lawyer for the students submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients’ position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover. The students were suspended. Aleli Sevilla. imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students. which they contested.” “sexually explicit. 1 ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING Miriam College Foundation. RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY Oposa v.” “vulgar. CA G. the PNP. 2000 Kapunan. the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. however. author.” “indecent. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education. dismissed. J. 127930 December 15.

is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them.P. to command petitioner USA to re-admit them. Elaine Magante. That power. Rhodora Azucena. and to continue their course up to graduation. Thus. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. CA G. they filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . Ma. Ma. since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties. and what shall be the subjects of study and research. 1994 Nocon. Roy D. no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Michael Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience). including Nursing 104. Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and finish a college degree and worse. Sancho. are allowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. J. except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations. No. Submitting a joint answer to the petition. Facts: The present case involves third year Nursing students who failed to meet the retention policy of the school. 100588 March 7. To buttress petitioner’s stance. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula. Dean Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda. Inc. they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. University of San Agustin. who may teach. that is. petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom. and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to study. except when such articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. the school refused to re-admit them. and two minor subjects. Mary Espino. minimum grade of 80% in any major Nursing subject and in two minor subjects. Additionally.23 or she has written. Blg. petitioner USA and the other petitioners. Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in pursuance of the school’s policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject. like the power to suspend or expel.R. v. As a consequence.

In this capacity. The petitioner claims that the real reason why PHCR has voided his enrollment as a senior graduating student had been because of his active participation in opposing PHCR’s application for tuition fee increase with the DECS. On even date. Facts: Manuelito Isabelo. No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course. Perpetual Help College of Rizal. 80. No. among other things. is a BS Criminology student at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal (“PHCR”) He was elected Public Relations Officer (“PRO”) of the Supreme Student Council. informing him that PHCR was voiding his enrollment for the first semester of 1991-1992 because of the following deficiencies: • • • • Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. PHCR did not comply with the directive. its aims and objectives. 12. instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow officers.. Beginning 05 September 1991. Inc. Official Admission Credential not yet submitted. No. Director Rosas of the DECS issued an order addressed to the President of PHCR. that pending the resolution of his case the above named student be readmitted to classes and be allowed to take all examinations that they have missed pending final resolution of this case/issue. 1991. The school administration circulated a memorandum to the effect that Manuelito had been dropped from PHCR’s list of students. v. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. He forthwith sent a letter to the DECS informing the latter of the matter. Jr. But. Dr. a letter from Registrar Necy Buen was received by Manuelito.R. That would be to frustrate its purposes and nullify its intent. Manuelito was no longer allowed to enter the school premises. 105 that would implement. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. Manuelito refused to sign the resolution. Until September 1991. 21 and 22) which are docketed in the registration card. It has the right to judge the fitness of students. to sign Resolution No. Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself. he was the hold-over PRO and the acting Secretary of the student council. 103142 November 8. Jr. 891-007. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . he was asked by the Vice President for Academic Affairs. Isabelo. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. and how best to attain them — free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo.The court however. Article XIV. a 20% tuition fee increase for the school year 1991-1992. Every school has a right to determine the students it should accept for enrolment. G.24 Issue: course Held: whether or not the students can compel the school to allow them to complete their No. Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution instructs that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. issued a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering and directing PHCR to re-admit the petitioner for enrollment. Grace De Leon. 9. On October 15. S. Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11. 1993 Vitug. J.

he filed the instant petition for mandamus praying for his re-admission as a senior grad student. i. give everyone his due. and there should be. must remand this matter to the DECS for its own evaluation and final determination. act with justice. have a clear legal right to the thing demanded.e. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. however. The Supreme Court. the issuance of a writ of mandamus at this time would not be warranted. as the respondent school counters. however. an administrative determination. as it is. on the other hand. Admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege. not being a trier of facts. In this instance. He took special training during the semestral break (which was the most reasonable time to comply). The contract between the school and the student. Issue: Held: Yes. He was unceremoniously dropped from the roll when the semester was about to end some time in October. It argues that the petitioner has only been allowed to enroll “conditionally” during the first semester of school year 1991-92 pending the completion of his remedial classes in CMT. The punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate. insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR. The private respondent. but PHCR still refused to give him that accreditation. and he was able to pass it. an imperative duty of respondent to perform the act sought to be mandated. what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught. Hence. . or has a number of school deficiencies to overcome. a petitioner should.25 and the same was interdicted by PHCR’s motion for clarification that indeed would require factual assessments that have yet to be conclusively passed upon.” We have thus sanctioned its valid invocation by a school in rejecting students who are academically delinquent. In Ateneo de Manila University vs. on the part of the student. Hence. that every “person must. Indeed the DECS itself is conceding to the grant of the instant petition. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. rather than a right. . on academic grounds who may teach. A writ of mandamus to issue. and that the school may not be compelled to renew the contract) has already been abandoned by recognizing instead the right of a student to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. imbued. . The circumstances lend truth to the petitioner’s claim that the private respondent has strongly been influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCR’s application for tuition fee increase. There remains. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. the Supreme Court cited with approval the formulation made by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom” encompassing not only “the freedom to determine . on the one hand. PSBA (that enrollment of a student is a semester-to-semester contract. upon the other hand.” The earlier ruling of the SC in Alcuaz vs. or a laywoman seeking admission to a seminary. Capulong. invoke “academic freedom” in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students. or students violating “School Rules on Discipline. so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code. is not an ordinary contract.” Like any other right. . whether the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class. it would seem that the principal reason forwarded by the private respondent in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students was his failure to complete some remaining units in the CMT course. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido whether or not PHCR’s act of voiding his enrollment is valid..” but likewise “who may be admitted to study. as he claims. to be yet resolved with finality by the DECS. in which he failed. with public interest. and observe honesty and good faith.

It has the power confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. Faculty Admission Committee. it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that “[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. UP board found that she committed fraud in her dissertation and decided to withdraw the degree given to her to which. If follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud. Sometime in April 1988. she asked for a reinvestigation of her case.. to Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. Chairman of the Board of Regents.” If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it. Faculty Admission Committee. CA G. it is a freedom granted to “institutions of higher learning” which is thus given “a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of the students. she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman. What U. Quezon City. 134625 August 31. seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud. subject to the observance of due process. for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning.P. Loyola School of Theology. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido .” Under the U. Charter. Facts: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitor’s visa. which request was denied by President Javier. “is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. Private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoñez. Loyola School of Theology. 1999 Mendoza. a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or. the Board of Regents is also empowered.R.P. Upon investigation. Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning.” This is nothing new. through the Board of Regents.P. She also sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U. President. No. Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Garcia vs. to quote again from Garcia v. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud. asking the commission’s intervention.P. She graduated in the said university despite her non compliance in her dissertations in her oral defense and unacknowledgement of sources in her dissertation.26 UP Board of Regents v. Issue: whether recalling the doctoral degree given respondent by U. Art. violates academic freedom Held: No. more precisely. In a letter to Secretary Ricardo Gloria. for the constitutional grant of academic freedom. it sent a letter to private respondent Celine. XIV. J.

night shift differential pay. the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. and overtime pay. the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.27 withdraw what it has granted without violating a student’s rights. nonpayment of 13th month pay. The Board of Regents’ decision to withdraw private respondent’s doctorate was based on documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. this claim was not proven. While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education. However. Thereafter. units. to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. It should be empowered. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards.R. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s concern. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Her only claim is that her responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it rendered its decision. several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. uniform allowances. that private respondent committed no less than 90 instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. 1993 Vitug.P. the Board of Regents determined. J. Pursuant to their arrangements. the decision became final and executory. after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U. No. holiday pay. NLRC G. Issue: Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter. 104269 November 11. Thus. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case . private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT DA v. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. In the case at bar. as an act of self-defense. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university’s highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. On the other hand.

Pursuant. But. as amended by PD 1145. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract. petitioner Lansang. Act No. on the other hand. a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks. the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract. which could not prosper without the State’s consent Held: No. Implied consent. But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability. express or implied. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. or when it enters into a contract. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. be that as it may. the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Lansang v.28 The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. in fact. The State may at times be sued. is conceded when the State itself commences litigation. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. Inc. In this situation. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. the new Chairman of the NPDC. performed any act proprietary in character. GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner. J. In the case. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . Facts: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. CA G. Issue: whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the State. to Commonwealth Act 327. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). nor that it could have. thus opening itself to a counterclaim. the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. sought to clean up Rizal Park. 2000 Quisumbing. 102667 February 23. however. On the day of the supposed eviction.R. No. After the EDSA Revolution.

29 The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. In effect. from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Facts: The heirs of the deceased journalists who died during the Mendiola massacre brought a suit against the Republic. A. if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. Sandoval G.O. J. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an “investigation of the disorder. Firstly. the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. and the public endangered. although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. It is important to note that A.” In the exercise of its functions. and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately. It is also evident the petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. 11 provides guidelines the pertinent portion of which reads: Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court. the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. Issue: Held: No. Public officials are not exempt. in their personal capacity. such recommendation not having become final and. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity. Jr. Section 3. the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. whatever may be the findings of the Commission. No. This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Republic v. 1993 Campos. Secondly. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body. whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said. In the case. Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty. 84607 March 19. The Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. the Commission is merely a preliminary venue.R. Therefore. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit . The Commission is not the end in itself. executory. deaths and casualties that took place. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered.O..

much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.P.R. EPG Construction Co. and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. 131544 March 16. even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B. when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity. Vigilar G. constructed 145 housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the said contracts was only for 2/3 of each housing unit. Moreover. they undertook additional constructions for the completion of the project. 2001 Buena. suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. Moreover. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent. were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred. Facts: The petitioners-contractors. Instead. While the Republic in this case is sued by name. under contracts with DPWH. the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency. Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly. J. Based on the Commission findings. there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. petitioners rely on President Aquino’s speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. as in this case. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name. still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. By this alone. the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court.30 President’s act of joining the marchers. No. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply. v. Thirdly. The State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability. (3) When the. Blg. then party defendants. Through the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas. In fact it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people. Although the military officers and personnel. days after the incident. their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. the case does not qualify as a suit against the State. but said additional constructions were not issued payment by DPWH.

Considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. the state’s immunity from suit. the petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary. this petition. Digest in Political Law Review 1 under Atty. Among others. Hence. respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and hide under the state’s cloak of invincibility against suit. for construction done on the public works housing project. Sandoval Prepared by Rafael Pangilinan and Ivy Rioflorido . on the basis of quantum meruit. Secretary for Legal Affairs. in this instance. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt. It is just as important that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law is to be maintained. The ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold. Through the request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus. the DBM released the amount for payment but (1996) respondent DPWH Secretary Vigilar denied the money claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC which said trial court denied. The rule is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.31 With a favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Justice and equity sternly demand that the state’s cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated. Under the circumstances. and allow itself to be an instrument of perpetration thereof. respondent-secretary argues that the state may not be sued invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State also known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty. The Court cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face. Issue: whether or not the Principle of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar Held: No.