Ang Bagong Bayani v COMELEC (GR No.

147589, June 26, 2001) Facts: Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the COMELEC.Petitioner seeks the disqualification ofcertain major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections arguing that the party-list system wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties,the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Issues: (1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections (2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors andorganizations Held: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major political parties cannot be disqualified from the partylist elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. But while even major political partiesare expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they mustcomply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they arenot disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that theyrepresent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.

Bengzon v Drilon FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the LowerCourts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Courtproviding for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for theincrease of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well asmembers of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill isconstitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them inaccordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision ofthe Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgatedby her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since thepower of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant theauthority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapprovalof a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any billrepresented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become alaw.This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages longafter he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. When is it allowed? The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President powerto veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shallnot affect the item or items to which he does not object. 3 ways how a bill becomes a law. 1. When the President signs it2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of eachHouse; and3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presentedto him.

Another ! FACTS: The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currentlyreceiving monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 1797. Section 3-A, whichauthorizes said pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by President Marcos. The legislature saw theneed to re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and privilege. President Aquino,however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of theSpecial Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992). ISSUES: 1.1.Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act; and 2. 2. Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary RULING: 1. 1. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of aconstitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provideslimitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is,therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is forthis reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item veto power to avoidinexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenuemeasure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item. 2. 3. 2. Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of theJudiciary. The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to theJudiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Thefreedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated forthe expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item tocover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to theConstitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It knows its priorities just as itis aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VIof the Constitution. BRILLANTES vs. YORAC 192 SCRA 358, 1990 Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commissionon Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the factfindingcommission to investigate the December 1989 coup d etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of thePresident as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission onElections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that (I)n no case shall anyMember (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or actingcapacity. Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections isan internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of thePresident of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made bythe President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of administrativeexpediency, to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absenceof the regular Chairman. Held: NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent.They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respectivefunctions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and itsown rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only toreview on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairmanin the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercisedfor it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of thePhilippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. Thesituation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves withoutthe participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likelyhave been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, thatchoice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make. Another ! FACTS: The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of Associate Commissioner Yorac as ActingChairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chariman Davide. The petitioner argues that the choice of theActing Chairman is an internal matter to the COMELEC. It is also averred that the designation done bythe President of the Philippines violates the independence of the COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates Article IX-A, Section 1 of theConstitution. RULING: Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions asindependent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of thePresident of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Its decisions, orders andrulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice of temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes underthat discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President. Thedesignation by the President of respondent Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is declaredunconstitutional. David v Arroyo FACTS:These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency)and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending,President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist,thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact lawsand decrees If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional HELD:Take-Care PowerThis refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec.17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments,

bureaus and offices. Heshall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is toenforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that alllaws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he isrequired to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, amongothers, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ thepowers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government.The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the lawsand to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyosordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issuedecrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by thePresident in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973Constitution.This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo theauthority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither MartialLaw nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislativepower by issuing decrees.But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that thesedecrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the militaryto enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and propertyrelations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017,to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Another ! David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo This case involves Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency (issued on 24February 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I). PP 1017reads:NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines andCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powersvested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: ThePresident. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent orsuppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command theArmed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent orsuppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power]and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by mepersonally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of theConstitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. (Phrases in brackets added)The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, as noted in thebrackets above.1. Calling-out powerThe validity of this power is already settled in Sanlakas. However, there is a distinction between thePresidents authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the

authority to proclaim a stateof national emergency. In declaring a state of national emergency under PP 1017, President Arroyo didnot only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, aprovision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and businessaffected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously,such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in Sanlakas.2. Take Care PowerPP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by mepersonally or upon my direction. The first part is valid. As the Executive in whom the executive power isvested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to beembodied in existing laws. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:SEC.17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shallensure that the laws be faithfully executed.However, the President cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former President FerdinandMarcos under PP 1081 (declaring martial law). Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the samecategory and binding force as statutes. PP 1017 is, therefore, unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.3. Power to Take OverPP 1017 authorizes the President to call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and toall decrees, but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII:Sec.17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during theemergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operationof any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?According to the Supreme Court, the answer is simple - during the existence of the state of nationalemergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress,to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with publicinterest.However, Section 17 must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. When Section17 speaks of the State, it refers to Congress, not the President. The exercise of emergency powers,such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,requires a delegation from Congress in accordance with Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution, therequirements of which are:(1) There must be a war or other emergency.(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state ofnational emergency and to exercise emergency powers. The President is authorized to declare a stateof national emergency. However, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-ownedpublic utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptionalcircumstances exist warranting the takeover of privately-owned public utility or business affected withpublic interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with publicinterest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all thepowers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed byCongress. De Castro v JBC and Arroyo FACTS Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno had his compulsory retirement on May 17, 2010, seven days after thecoming Presidential Elections on May 10, 2010.Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII,that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least

threenominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy."The provision above is in conflictwith Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), which provides that Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, aPresident or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments toexecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger publicsafety. All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbentPresident can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. The JBC, in its en bancmeeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position ofChief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief JusticeHonorable Reynato S. Puno. The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the PhilippineDaily Inquirer and The Philippine Star. On February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next stepof announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint,written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio,Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro,Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the PhilippineDaily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13, 2010. Issue: Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the Judiciary. Ruling: No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in theSupreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. The Constitutional Commission confined theprohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend theprohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjectingthe nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate priorprocess of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Courtwithin 90days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, inthe case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBCshould start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before theoccurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President toappoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has nodiscretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90dayperiod allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do sowill be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive thePresident of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of thenominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment Estrada v Desierto; Estrada v Arroyo Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however,petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos SurGovernor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family andfriends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions

ofrage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope whichallegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account underthe name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets ofthe metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estradagovernment. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefsresigned from their posts.On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondentArroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he wasleaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation.It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declarationthat he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and theConstitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to SpeakerFuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several casespreviously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as PresidentHeld: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resignand the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governedby any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can beimplied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the factsshow that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace.Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior factsand circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritativewindow on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serializedin the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, thetopic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner wasimplied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as agiven fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the partiesduring and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot bedoubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement,(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with thereservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency,for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he wasleaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soonas the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to servethem; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the sameservice of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructivenational spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to performthe powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim iscontained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and SpeakerFuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives

passed a resolution supporting theassumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming thenomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyoas the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estradais no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannotpass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. Thequestion is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issuewhich cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Another ! FACTS: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged thathe had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as JoseVelarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across thenation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estradaon November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. Theimpeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with ChiefJustice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayanand Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joinedin the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrewtheir support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests andmaintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressingthat only a guilty verdict will remove him from office. At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be heldconcurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run inthis election. OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estradaconstructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath ofoffice in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality andconstitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid beingan obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition forprohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondentOmbudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term aspresident ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbentPresident of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in anacting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or notpetitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign. 2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits. HELD: The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decidedby the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has beendelegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issuesdependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Courtsaid that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of thepeople in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyogovernment on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, whereinonly the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previouspresident (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issueis legal and not political. For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intentmust be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events thatstruck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from theAngara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issuedregarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of itslegality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held thatpetitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posteriorfacts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held thatpetitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent ofthe 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, asa nonsitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed whilea sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of thepresident from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actuallyholds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, andfixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

Francisco v House of Representative Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Thejusticiable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of asecond complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitutionand whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all theissues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance,that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legallypermissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departurefrom, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of theessential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive orjudicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by eachof that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated bythe Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect withoutdestroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention thatthe exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks andbalances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed todefeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence andinterdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by theConstitution. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must bedirect and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, butalso that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of itsenforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that theperson complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfullyentitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or actcomplained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact thathe is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegallydisbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastageof public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke thepower of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventingthe illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a generalinterest common to all members of the public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should beentertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that anyimpending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the ChiefJustice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claimsinfringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standingto maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposalreached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall benecessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on theground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of acomplaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachmentproceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power toinitiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principleof reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of theimpeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of themembers of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning ofSection 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, anotherimpeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the mainissue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed theconstitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdictionwhere it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two greatbranches of the government. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizesequality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents tosecure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch orinstrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the SupremeCourt which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous casesespecially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the lawand neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rightsirrespective of his station in life. Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House ofRepresentatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachmentcomplaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI ofthe Constitution. IBP v Zamora Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, thePresident directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the properdeployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal orlawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign aremerely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shallhave improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines nulland void and unconstitutional.Issues:(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces issubject to judicial review(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates theconstitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNPHeld: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion orrebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art.VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basisthereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of thePresidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a differentcategory from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powersand provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers

highlights the intent to grant thePresident the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it isconsidered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment andsuppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards byCongress and review by the Court.In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine thenecessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that thePresidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavyburden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling outthe armed forces.The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of lawenforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of theMarines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are theones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNPMoreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character ofthe police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, thePNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members ofthe PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of theMarines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA Facts: Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunctionwith a prayer for a TRO& preliminary injunction against theimplementation of the Contract of Lease between PCSO &PGMC inconnection to an online lotto system. Petitionersaresuing in their capacity as members of Congress and astaxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 theContract of Lease wasexecuted and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20,1993. Petitioner claimsthat the respondents & the OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount toalack of authority by entering into the contract, because:1.Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibitsthePCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation withanyentity2.RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresionalfranchise before a telecom system (publicutility) can beestablished3.Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibitscompanies with less than60% Filipino Ownership fromoperating a public system4.PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA7042(Foreign Investment Act) to install an online Lottosystema.The contract shows that PGMC is theactualoperatior while it is a 75% foreign-ownedcompany. RA 7042 puts all forms of gamblingon thenegative listRespondents answered the allegations by contending:1.PGMC is only an independentcontractor. There is noshared franchise2.PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecomsystemis an indispensable requirement of an onlinelottery system. Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 of RA1169 too narrow.3.There are no violations of laws4.The issue of morality is a political one and shouldnot beresolved in a legal forum5.Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated inValmonte vs.PCSOa.The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds of contracts to achieveobjectives.Arguing that PCSO will operate a public utility,it is still exempted under Section of Act3846,where legislative franchisees are notnecessary for radio stations Issues: 1.Whether or not petitioners have standing2.Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA1169 Held:

1.Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only aprocedural technicality that can be set asidedependingon the importance of an issue. As taxpayers andcitizens to be affected by the reach of thelotto system,petitioners have standing.2.No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in thenegativearguing that whatever is not unequivocallygranted is withheld. PCSO cannot share the franchisein anyway. The contracts nature can be understood toform the intent of the parties as evident in theprovisionsof the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides thattheintent of contracting parties are determined in partthrough their acts. The only contribution PCSOwill begiving is the authority to operate. All risks are to betaken by the lessor; operationwill be taken by thePCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are:a.Payment of investment acts in the evenof contract suspension / breachb.Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reducedgiven that all risks are borneby the lessor c.Prohibition against PGMC involvement incompetitor games; strange if gaming is PGMC;businessd.Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years,which is unreasonable for a leasecontract. Itindicates that PGMC is the operator and thecondition an attempt to increase publicbenefitthrough public involvement.e.Escrow deposit may be used asperformancebond.f.PGMC operation evident in personnelmanagement, procedural and coordinatingrules set by the lessor.g.PCSO authority to terminate contact uponPGMC insolvencyThe contract indicatesthat PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to operate given the indivisible communitybetweenthem.Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO madepermanent Marcos v Manglapus (177 SCRA 668) Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent peoplepower revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return tothe Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation ofhis return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and theeconomy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the returnof Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events: 1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders 2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists 3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer.This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar 4. Honasans failed coup 5. Communist insurgency movements 6. secessionist movements in Mindanao 7. devastated economy because of 1. accumulated foreign debt 2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them theirtravel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos fromreturning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. Healso questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of nationalsecurity, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside herjurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without dueprocess and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travelwhich according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. Issue: 1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President mayprohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. 2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to thePhilippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar theirreturn. Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed. Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, ArticleVII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of thePhilippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the samearticle it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over allexecutive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power togrant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlinestasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers notstated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She isobliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of theConstitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can doanything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vestdiscretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has tomaintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances. Therequest of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the lightsolely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject tocertain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar tothe present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residualunstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing inthat office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand shouldsubmit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it mustbe granted or denied. For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basisfor the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in thePhilippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events thathappened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution. Marcos v Manglapus (178 SCRA 760) Facts: In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition,after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determiningthat the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest

and welfareand in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu,Hawaii. President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who willtake the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and orderof the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments: 1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country ofbirth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos. 2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercisedit arbitrarily. 3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippinesbe granted. Decision: No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack ofmerit. Ratio: 1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. 2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to thegovernment, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino illegalclaiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president. 3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerationsare merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow fromgeneral grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution(Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship.Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitutiongranted Aquino with implied powers. 4. It is within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound tocomply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily Monsanto v Factoran FACTS: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafathrough Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She washowever granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to bereinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. TheMinister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantosrequest averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate herformer position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelledto answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post. HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affordsno relief for what has beensuffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government

anyobligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established byjudicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to havebeen rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explainwhy petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstandingservice of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation ofsentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the CivilCode, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor anddebtor, compensation and novation.

FACTS: In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime ofestafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly andseverally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amountdefrauded and to pay the costs proportionately. Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to thisCourt which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while saidmotion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolutepardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote theCalbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurersince the same was still vacant. Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance. In its4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated toher position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended theabsolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which theSandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of thelitigation, be satisfied. Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry onApril 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies thather service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatementshould correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitledto backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay theproportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. ISSUE:The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who hasbeen granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her formerposition without need of a new appointment. RULING: Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of thelaws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for acrime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to theindividual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is adeed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her notguilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, we find this strongobservation: "To assume that all or even a major number of pardons are issued because of innocence ofthe recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that which

we all knowto be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by the most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from thedisability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of badcharacter, which has been definitely fixed. In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point:While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminalindictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should notbe circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots outthe guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. Forwhatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can producesuch "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who hasconstantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen. Pardon granted after conviction frees theindividual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unlessexpressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation forhonesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the truecharacter and purpose of the privilege. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language ofthe Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipsofacto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of theconviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safetyand benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist onautomatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from theoffense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude theappointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moralrisk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. For petitioner Monsanto, this is thebottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishmentprescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear fromthe authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, thisparticular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to theoffice which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications andsuitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated andtaken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification fromholding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant citytreasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. Finally,petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by thesentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised PenalCode. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served bypardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by thesame causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt,merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. The assailed resolution offormer Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. Nocosts.

NERI v SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FACTS:A petition for certiorari1 was filed by petitioner Neri assailing the show cause letter dated November22, 2007 and a subsequent order to cite petitioner in contempt more than a month later, January 30,2008. Both documents were filed by the Senate Committees headed by the Senate Committee onAccountability of Public Officers and Investigations otherwise known as the Blue Ribbon Committee.The antecedent events occurred previous to the issuance of the order and facts that have been culled upduring the investigation are as follows:The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing XingTelecommunications Equipment (ZTE) on April 21, 2007 for the purpose of supplying equipment andservices of a National Broadband Network (NBN) Project.The full consideration amount of US$329,481,290 (Php 16 Billion) is to be financed by the PeoplesRepublic of China.In conjunction with the investigation, several resolutions to fill in legislative deficiencies were filed inProcurement law and executive-diplomatic treatises and agreements.Simultaneously, this investigation resulted into the proposal of three pending bills in the Senate. SenateBill No, 1793 was filed to subject treaties or executive agreements involving funding of projects to thescope of RA 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act.Another bill was filed to impose safeguards in contracting loans classified as Official DevelopmentAssistance (ODA), and finally, a bill requiring concurrence to international and executive agreements.The Senate Committees initiated the investigation by inviting officials and persons involved in thespecified project. Secretary Romulo L. Neri was one of those invited to the hearings. On three occasionsthe Petitioner was invited, he only appeared once.On another occasion the Respondent Committees invited Jose De Venecia, III who revealed that therewere high officials pushing for the project. The project was originally to be realized manifested on aBuild-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis but soon, the witness found out it was converted into a government-to-government project. The aforesaid project involved the Republic of the Philippines and PeoplesRepublic of China and is to be financed by a grant of loan by the latter.Petitioner Neri who testified on September 26, 2007 disclosed that Commission on Elections (COMELEC)Commissioner Benjamin Abalos offered him a P200 million bribe to prioritize the project. That particularhearing lasted eleven hours. Neri, according to his testimony, immediately informed President Arroyo of the attempt him but he was instructed by her not to accept it.However, when Neri was probed to elaborate on the matters pertaining to the NBN deal with thePresident, he refused to answer the question on the ground of executive privilege.He refused to answer the following questions:Whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project.Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it.Whether or not she directed him to approve.Adamant as they could be, the respondent summoned the petitioner once again on November 20, 2007.However, Executive Secretary Ermita wrote on November 15, 2007 to dispense with Neris testimony asthis was covered by executive privilege.On the appointed date of the inquiry, petitioner did not appear in the proceedings. As a consequence,the Senate issued a show cause letter demanding that Neri to explain why he failed to appear beforethem and why he should not be cited in contempt.The Petitioner replied that it was not his intention to snub the hearings and that he thought he wasgoing to be asked the three remaining questions covered by executive privilege.Moreover, with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, the Petitioner claimed that his non-appearance was upon order of the President and his conversation with her involved delicate nationalsecurity and matters contingent to the impact of high ranking officials embroiled in bribery whichprobably results to loss of investor confidence in the country.The Petitioner also requested that he be furnished with other questions in advance so he mayadequately prepare himself.When Senates inquiry was in recess, Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari berating the show causeletter.Meanwhile, Respondents found Neris explanation unsatisfactory and moved to cite him in contemptand to order the sergeant-at-arms to arrest and detain him at the Senate until such time he speaks upon the matter.

Neri moved for the reconsideration of the above order. He alleged that he did not displaya demeanor worthy of contempt and arrest. He reiterated that he was willing to accommodate anyendeavor to shed light into the issue, provided he be furnished with questions in advance, a requestwhich respondents did not heed.On February 5, 2008 the Supreme Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order 2(a) enjoining respondentsfrom implementing their contempt order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailingprior to the issuance of the contempt order and (c) requiring respondents to file their comment3. Petitioner asserts that both the show cause letter and contempt order were issued with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Again, petitioner underscores that anyconversation or correspondence between cabinet members and the President are confidential sincediscussions involved the impact of exploring options in making policy decisions.While Petitioner claims that the parameters have been laid down in Senate vs. Ermita, respondentsinsist the contrary. They argue that Neris testimony is substantial in the investigation in aid oflegislation, that there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege, that there wasno abuse in discretion when respondent ordered the arrest of petitioner and that petitioner has notcome to court with clean hands.It was further ventilated by the respondent that the claim of executive privilege in this case willprejudice the right to public information clause, that the President ensure that he faithfully executelaws, that public office is a public trust, full public disclosure of all transaction of public interest, dueprocess clause and the principle of separation of powers.ISSUES:Are the communications elicited by the subject three questions covered by executive privilege?Did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order?DISCUSSION:The court used Senate vs. Ermita as a sort of a yardstick in deciding this case. Senate makes a distinctionbetween legislative and oversight powers of Congress quoting Sections 214 and 225 of Article VI of theConstitution.The Senate describes that Section 21 relates that the power to inquire in aid of legislation is to gatherinformation and improve lapses in legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power of Congress to callfor a question hour as it exercises its oversight power. The purported power is to ascertain that theexecutive branch does not arbitrarily exercise abuse of power.In circumspect, the above distinctions as the court ruled gives birth to the interpretation of these twoprovisions. As respondents invoked Section 22, Article VI Congress cannot compel the appearance ofexecutive officials. The court quoted Senate vs. Ermita on this matter.The following are further elucidated by the court:That the three questions are covered by executive privilege.The power to investigate in the light of question hour may be broad but possesses limitations. To bevalid it must be done in accordance to published rules of procedure of either houses and that rights ofpersons appearing be respected. That in spite of the revocation of E.O 464, the executive privilege remains to due to its constitutionaljuncture.The court makes distinction between the case at bar and the Nixon case. The latter involves a criminalprosecution and the former a congressional inquiry. The judicial department has to the power to compelpersons to unveil confidential information in the administration of justice while the legislative has noteven if it is a search for truth. An investigation in aid of legislation is not a judicial process to prosecuteofficials. Therefore, the privilege was properly invoked.Petitioner did not act worthy of any contempt as he even subjected himself to an eleven-hourquestioning.The issue on the right to public information is subject to limitation as provided by law6.The Senate failed to furnish petitioner his request of providing him questions in advance and include apublication its revised rules thus invalidating the contempt order.The court further ruled that the right of the citizen of information is not equated with Senates power tosummon officials or persons to an inquiry, vice versa.Claim of

executive privilege is properly invoked because the formal requisites mandate that it is thehead of the department that initiates it and that it should be done in writing. It should also involvehighly confidential information such as military secrets and diplomatic treatises to qualify for theprivilege.The Senate committed a grave abuse of discretion because besides a valid claim of executive privilege,they curtly disregarded petitioners reasons for abstaining from the inquiry. The responded still wentahead with the contempt order thus denying the petitioner due process of law.With regard to the respondents allegation that the court abandoned its sacred duty to maintain thedoctrine of separation of powers and check and balances in government, it simply proposed anegotiation as an alternate venue for settling controversies and avoid the cumbersome process ofjudicial review. It simply tried to avert a constitutional crisis looming in the horizon.Respondent committee should have exercised the same restraint, after all, the petitioner is not even anordinary witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of government. This is concomitant withthe doctrine of separation of powers and the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch ofgovernment.RULING:WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Ordered January 30, 2008, citing Romulo L.Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.1 An extraordinary writ issued by a superior court (as the Supreme Court) to call up the records of aparticular case from an inferior judicial body. The Supreme Court may also use certiorari to review adecision by the highest court when there is a question as to validity of any treaty or statute onconstitutional grounds.2 An order directing parties to rescind or annul any contract or act and restore parties as if there was noact at all. 3 An expression of an opinion about a remark to a judge or prosecutor about evidence.4 The Senate or House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries inaid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of personsappearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.5 The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or uponthe request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard bysuch House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to thePresident of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before theirscheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover mattersrelated thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires and the President sostates in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.6 Section 17, Article III The right of information on matter of public concern shall be recognized. Accessto official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, aswell as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Osmena, Jr. vs. Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960 Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, madeserious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 memberswas created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against thePresident. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate suchimputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof,Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for seriousdisorderly behavior.Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speechHeld: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate inCongress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in anyother place.The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in everylegislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete

freedom ofexpression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or anyother forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before thelegislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly orunbecoming a member thereof.On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct forwhich Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge ofwhat constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction uponit, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows bestbut which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituteddisorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution neverintended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government. Osmena v. Pendatun, et al. FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition withpreliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of theSpecial Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment ofthe resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member ofthe Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring thepetitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech entitled AMessage to Garcia wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the Presidents administrationselling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspendedfor 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior. ISSUES:1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.2. Whether or not petitioners words constitute disorderly conduct.3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speechand words of Osmena.4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members. HELD:1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative bodyitself as stated in the provision that xxx shall not be questioned in any other place . 2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not thejudiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the Houseknows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power. 3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to thesuspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done byunanimous consent. 4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committedto prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. Sarmiento v Mison Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office ofCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budgetfrom disbursing payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on the ground that Misonsappointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not havingbeen confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintainthe constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint.

(1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of thearmed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments arevested in him in the Constitution, (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and (4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups are thepresent bone of contention. Issue: Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the president with orwithout the consent/confirmation of the CA Held: The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of theframers of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will thus construe the applicableconstitutional provisions not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative may want themconstrued, but in accordance with what they say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requiresconfirmation by the CA of all presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similarmalpractices. Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of appointment withhardly any check on the legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to thePresident without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressedintent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments fromconfirmation on the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customsby the CA is not required. The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the constitutionalauthority of the President. Another ! Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law,seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of theBureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effectingdisbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misonsappointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not havingbeen confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain theconstitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of theBureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments forconfirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive allthe salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition andthe petition in intervention, without costs. Issue: Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. in unconstitutional? Held: No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups ofofficers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whoseappointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whoseappointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorizedby law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest inthe President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission

onAppointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination isconfirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups ofofficers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission onAppointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. Itis an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjectsexcludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments topositions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission onAppointments. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in thelight and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound topresume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws uponthe subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion inits adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission wasfrequently transformed into a venue of horsetrading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded bysuccessive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly anycheck on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution andthe other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving tothe President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the secondand third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The word also could mean in addition; aswell; besides, too besides in like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in saidsecond sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of theCommission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint(without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to theinterpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in thesame manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area ofconsideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of said secondsentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks ofnomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission onAppointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, thisuse of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in messageconveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. The power toappoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of suchpower should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order tobe recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointmentsby the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission onAppointments. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, theCourt found the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16,Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, theclear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation bythe Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the firstsentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the

word alone after theword President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officersin the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appointofficers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without needof confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in thethird sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannotprevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidentialappointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by theCommission on Appointments. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head)is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission onAppointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads ofbureaus from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau ofCustoms (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, underwhich the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with theresult that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolveson the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, nolonger needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties aswell as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VATsystem and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There arevarious suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as requiredby Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinctbills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings asrequired by the Constitution.Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the ConstitutionHeld: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives asrequired by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law butthe revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House ofRepresentatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislativeprocess culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill wouldbe to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, billsauthorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from theHouse of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of theHouse can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.The next argument of the petitioners was

that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days asrequired by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. Butthis was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certificationdispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days andof printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Villena v Secretary of Interior FACTS: Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of Interiorrecommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. TheSecretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction overthe matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power ofsupervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised inaccordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges againstelective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. Inother words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he hasthat power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, asthe latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective localofficials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the speciallaw. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation. HELD: There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of amunicipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincialgovernor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shallreceive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment ofany crime involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expresslygranted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grantis necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. Forinstance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippinesmay himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, asamended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, inthe manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were tobe devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed ofthe power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), thePresident were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend amunicipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartialinvestigation.

Another ! Facts: Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommendedthe suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary thensuspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. Thepower or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of theAdministrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervisionover local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in

accordance withthe provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipalofficials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, theSecretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that powerunder existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latterprovisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials whilesec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation. HELD: There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of amunicipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincialgovernor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shallreceive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment ofany crime involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expresslygranted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grantis necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. Forinstance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippinesmay himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, asamended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, inthe manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were tobe devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed ofthe power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), thePresident were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend amunicipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartialinvestigation.

CASCO Philippines vs Gimenez G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.

on January 9, 2012

Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum

establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: xxx xxx xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without

jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Senate v. Ermita FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. -------------------------------------Facts: In 2005,scandalsinvolving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to

certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due topressingmatters that needimmediateattention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent asimilarletter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464basicallyprohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE:Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. HELD:The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it mayexerciseits legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the QuestionHour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in theapplicationof check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under

Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may onlyrequesttheir appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition Date: July 16. 2008 Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J. Facts: Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition formandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI)Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the JapanPhilippinesEconomic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted duringthe negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by thePhilippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range oftopics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade inservices, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of naturalpersons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions. Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violatestheir right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure ofthe same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels ofsocial, political and economic decision making. Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter soughtinvolves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right

toinformation and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA thatdiplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. Issues: Procedural Issues: 1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizensof the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress?2. Whether the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequentevent that occurred.Substantive Issues: 1. Whether the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.2. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from thegeneral rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justifiedin denying access thereto (whether they are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege). 3. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of thenegotiation process.4. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege.5. Whether the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege on time. Dispositive: Petition dismissed. Held/Ratio: (Procedural) 1. YES. The right of people to information on matters of public concern is a public right by its very natureso petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result. It is enough thatthey are part of the general public who possess the right. Since in the present position is anchored onthe right of information and the petitioners are suing in their capacity as citizens, citizengroups,petitioner-members of the House of Rep, their standing to file the present suit is grounded onjurisprudence. 2. NOT ENTIRELY. The Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief petitioners are praying for is thedisclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties, publicdisclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the presentpetition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of the JPEPA having then been madeaccessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks thedisclosure of the full text thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitionersseek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in thecourse of the negotiations. (Substantive) 1. YES. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the thresholdrequirement that it be a matter of public concern. In determining whether or not a particularinformation is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern and publicinterest both embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either becausethese directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of anordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether thematter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine andJapanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of publicconcern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by

the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and thepolicy of full public disclosure.Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right toinformation, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, butonly whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimedexecutive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then theparty demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, notsimply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate insocial, political, and economic decision-making. 2. YES. The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged inthis jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that suchprivilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information asprivileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a considerationof the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls forthe disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, wherein petitioners were seekinginformation from the Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of theRP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court held that applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the finaltext of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunityfor discussion before *a treaty+ is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during thenegotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to concludethat the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historicconfidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippinesto deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. The Court alsostressed that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutionalprovisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations woulddiscourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo,where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtainmore favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. The Court also addressed the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by saying: We are aware thatbehind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our peoples right to informationagainst any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in itsendeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards theopposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercisethereof. 3. NO. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information onon-going negotiations before a final contract. However, the information must constitute definitepropositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privilegedinformation, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and publicorder. 4. NO. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficientshowing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. *E+achtime *the deliberative process privilege+ is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancingof the competing interests, taking into account factors such as the relevance of the

evidence, theavailability of other evidence, the seriousness of the litigation, the role of the government, and thepossibility of future timidity by government employees.In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and sufficient showing of need.The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of thisstandard stated in the decided cases.There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court hasearlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown bypetitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement.Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Courtthat they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unlessthe initial offers are also published. 5. NO. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to thepresent petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited.Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however,be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from the HouseCommittee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. The HouseCommittee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account ofthen Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to holdthe same in abeyance.While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executiveofficials out of respect for their office until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains thatsuch requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for anassertion of executive privilege. Basco v. PAGCOR GRN 91649, 14 May 1991)FACTS:On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of thegovernment, to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chanceauthorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to be beneficial notjust to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenuefor the cash-strapped Government.Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary tomorals, public policy and public order, among others.ISSUES:Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that theexemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy; 3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCORwhile most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and cronyeconomy and toward free enterprise and privatization.HELD:1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition ofgambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in the exercise of its police power,wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty orproperty in order to promote the general welfare.2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Itscharter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have nopower to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. 3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who may beaccorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clausedoes not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which differentrules shall operate.4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches ofgovernment and the people themselves as the repository of all state

power.Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised bypetitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Another: On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate andcentralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and fourothers (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds amongothers particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional provision on localautonomy. Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxesand legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holderfrom paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies ofwhatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle. ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy. HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistentwith the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the localgovernment. A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) asit was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation asCongress may provide. Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes.The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipalcorporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipalcorporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control overLocal governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it canalso provide for exemptions or even take back the power. Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of itsshares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened,impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments CALALANG, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940 G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondentsFacts:The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to theDirector of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawnvehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca toDasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along RizalAvenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. TheChairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of PublicWorks the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions

ofCommonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of theSecretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate andcontrol the use of and traffic on national roads.On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Worksand Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by theChairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue totraffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing atAntipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved therecommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawnvehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date ofthe opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police ofManila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted.Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before theSupreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the NationalTraffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary ofPublic Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and JuanDominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.Issues:1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon theconstitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economicsecurity of all the people?2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power?Ruling:1) The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any givengroup. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice inits rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means thepromotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated toinsure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a propereconomic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, throughthe exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored principle ofsalus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of thenecessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection thatshould be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."2) There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislativepowers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which theypromulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policydemands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, towit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as nationalroads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and toclose them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the trafficmakes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merelythe ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to bepredicated.To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how longa national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the

traffic thereon andthe requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot bedirectly discharged by the National Assembly.It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty ofdetermining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that theexercise of such discretion is the making of the law. Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan KehFacts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refusedto continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidatedand nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of thedefunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).The court resolved three issues:1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remainedvalid even after the American occupation;2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws,regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are nulland void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated alljudgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearingthe cases pending before them.Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good andvalid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation maybe considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror.Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen thebonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were notvalid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other governmentand whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanesemilitary occupation.IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are validand remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthursintention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations ifany other possible construction remains.Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, suchconstruction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers ofthe law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate internationallaw, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in thephrase processes of any other governments.In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, theybecome his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by beingcontinued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by somecompetent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, thenew sovereign by legislative act creates a change.Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts ofthe Philippines had become courts of Japan,

as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction uponthem have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdictionover cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the lawscreating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to takecognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.Summary of ratio:1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupationunless repealed.2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings becausesuch a construction would violate the law of nations.3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through forceor the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy inthe course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise ininsurrection against the parent state) Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 131FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered tocontinue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of thePhilippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the proclamation issuedby Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings andjudgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the lower courts have nojurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunctrepublic in the absence of enabling law.ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de factogovernment.Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the PhilippineExecutive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippinesby the US Forces.HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicialdepartment of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under itscontrol, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance andcontrol of said government remain good.All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid beforeand remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true andoriginal sovereign. Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue theproceedings.

Ichong vs. Hernandez 101 PHIL 155 FACTS: The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business,Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, prohibiting aliens in general toengage in retail trade in our country.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations andpartnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicialdeclaration that said Act is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration ofHuman Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity. HELD: The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of theirsubjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, ora common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guaranteesequality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the same terms as the nationals of any othercountry. But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all othercountries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject toqualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scopeof the police power of the State. Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations andpartnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtaina judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and allother persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it denies to alienresidents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without dueprocess of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and itsprovisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, andthose requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retailbusiness, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes theretail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens ofthe Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are notwholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) anexception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15,1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordancewith the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years afterthe approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exceptiontherefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeitureof licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economiccontrol weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) aprohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business ofadditional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in theretail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerningtheir businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities andtheir offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens nowengaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposesof liquidation.Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has been said thatpolice power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As itderives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does

not need to be expressed ordefined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is themost positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nationshave multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has becomealmost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needsand demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so wecannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the Stateseeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The mostimportant of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well ashostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which islimited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does notdemand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Theequal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within aspecified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists formaking a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of thepolice power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonablynecessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary oroppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has therenot been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the meansused, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions thatwe ask when the due process test is applied.The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protectionof the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed tocoexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment oflegitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it,for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license andanarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process oflaw; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equalprotection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must befirmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposesand means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis forsaid distinction.The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed byalien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominanceand control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thruwhich and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law doesnot violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for thedistinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process oflaw clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens alreadyengaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of thelaw to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a

matter of fact it seems not onlyappropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may notinterfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from noduplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannotbe said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually beenentered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty orany other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and theRepublic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that thetreaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as thenationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against becausenationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by theConstitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the lawinfringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by asubsequent law , and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary The Facts: Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases. The Plebiscite Case On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended byResolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendmentsto the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24,1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held onNovember 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1,1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of thePhilippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued PresidentialDecree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of theRepublic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating fundstherefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitutionon January 15, 1973. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer ofthe Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementingPresidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, interalia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of suchplebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to beused and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for thepurpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submissionto the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom

of speech,press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects ofProclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification orrejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in themeantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Courtdeemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the datenor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then,again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does nothave the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congressunquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by thePresident reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commissionon Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. "In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgentmotion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,1973." The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring therespondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not laterthan Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, thepetitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining orderand inclusion of additional respondents," praying: "... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, aswell as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department ofAgrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification CoordinatingCommittee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and allother officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcingand reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assembliesreferendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the periodcomprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 ofthis Supplemental Urgent Motion." On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said caseG.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16,1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was beingheard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of thisopinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering tohim (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No.L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there presentthat the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed saidProclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor: ____________________________ "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES "PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 "ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. "WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Conventionis subject to ratification by the Filipino people; "WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards inchartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of allpersons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age orover, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept bythe barrio, district or ward secretary; "WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizenparticipation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express theirviews on important national issues; "WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, datedJanuary 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Doyou approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the newConstitution? "WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution,as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for itsrejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be calledto ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundredfourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of theBarangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite; "WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the membersof the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng MgaBarangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified bythe Filipino people; "NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers inme vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by thenineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by anoverwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of thePhilippines to be affixed. "Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred andseventy-three. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines "By the President: "ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary" _________________________________ The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and theSecretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and theirsubordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not foundin the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a"Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of allcitizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting insubstance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the Presidenthad announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondentsincluding," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the saidproposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-inChief of the ArmedForces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "arewithout power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power toproclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the electionheld to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." The Issue: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question? 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (withsubstantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutoryprovisions? 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) bythe people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement bykeeping quiet or by not making objections.) 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? The Resolution: Summary: The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucialquestion of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal,Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, togetherJustices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the1973 Constitution. Details: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question? On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity ofProclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castrodid not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question.Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by thepeople, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such anapproval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will,but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XVof the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3)members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (withsubstantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutoryprovisions? On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held inaccordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has beenvalidly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regardingthe meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in themanner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually therewas voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitutionwithout the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained tohold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to havecast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV,hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article hasbeen substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionallyratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their viewthere has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for validratification. 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) bythe people? On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposedConstitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the peoplehave already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no freeexpression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over thePhilippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. JusticeFernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to theeffect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiescedin by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state thatsuch doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty ofascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is aconcomitant feature of martial law." 88 Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on thequestion. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Undera regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted,(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have acceptedthe Constitution." 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro sovoted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, isthe basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other thanjudicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91 Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted todeny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it isin force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast novote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state withjudicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposedby the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes todeclare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and JusticesZaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being thevote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered inforce and effect. It is so ordered.

Laurel vs Misa Facts: the Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ ofhabeas corpus filed bypetitioner anastacio laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy givingthe latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime oftreason definedand penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that 1) that thesovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently, the correlative allegianceof Filipino citizens therto was then suspended;and 2) that there was a change of sovereignty over theseislands upon the proclamation of the Philippine republic. Issues:Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspendedand that therewas a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands. Held:No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanentallegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. Theabsolute and permanent allegiance of theinhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to theirlegitimate governmentor sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because thesovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby theoccupier.Just astreason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt, in the same waytreason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US aswell as against the sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt fromcommonwealthto republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged

with the crime of treasoncommitted during the commonwealth, bec it is an offense against the samegovt and the same sovereignpeople.

MACARIOLA V. ASUNCIONAdm. Case No. 133-J; May 31, 1982FACTS:Respondent Jundge Elias Asuncion was the judge of a complaint for partition filed against hereincomplainant Bernandita Macariola. Judge Asuncion rendered a decision and pronounced judgments withrespect to the properties at issue. The decision because of the lack of appeal of either party, becamefinal. One of the properties was then sold to a certain Dr. Arcadio Galapon, who later on sold it to theRespondent Judge. The said lot was then transfered to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,inc., where Respondent judge was the president. Complainant Macariola then filed an instant complaintagainst the respondent under four causes of action, 2 of which stating that the latter violated Art. 14 ofthe Code of Commerce. The court of first instance of leyte dismissed the said complaint. Complainantmacariola moved the case to the court of appeals, affirming the lower court's decision.ISSUE:Whether or not Art. 14 of Code of Commerce is political in nature.W/N Art. 14 of CC is still in force considering the change of sovereignty.RULING:The Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. CA, on its decision, noted that though the CCforms part of the commercial laws of the phil, in nature it is political. The reason is that it regulates therelationship between the government and its public officer, which is a judge in the case at bar. Becauseof its political nature, it is important to note that the CC is actually the Spanish CC. The general rule inpublic law is that change of sovereignty renders the law abrogated. From Spanish colonization toamerican rule then phil sovereignty, Art.14 of CC no longer has binding effect. As a result such provisioncannot be applied to the Respondent judge. Thus, Judge Asuncion was only reprimanded as to his privateand business activities. Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-General (1965) This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction instituted by EmmanuelPelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds inimplementation of the EOs issued by the President creating 33 municipalities and/or any disbursementby said municipalities. FACTS: In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code issued ExecutiveOrders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the ground that said Section 68 hasbeen impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislativepower. When RA 2370 (The Barrio Charter) provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundariesaltered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board"upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the councilof the municipality or municipalities. Section 68 of RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the President may define or divide theboundary or boundaries of any province, sub-province, municipality, municipal district XXX as the publicwelfare may require provided, that the authorization of the Congress of the Philippines shall first beobtained.

Petitioner argues that the President under the new law cannot create a barrio, how much more of amunicipality which is composed of several barrios. Respondent answered that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, byplacing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This answer however overlooks on themain import of the petitioners argument, which questions the Presidents authority to createmunicipalities. Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does notamount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs.Municipality of Binagonan. ISSUE: WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOs creating municipalities. DECISION: The Court declared the EOs null and void. The Auditor General permanently restrained from passing inaudit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said EOs or any disbursement by the createdmunicipalities. RATIO: The Court said that the respondents argument based on Cardona vs. Binangonan is untenable becausethe case do not involve a creation of municipality but a transfer of municipality. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. It is strictly a legislativefunction. The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdictionbetween adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature in the adoption of means andways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details inthe execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of theprinciple of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out orimplemented by the delegate. (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which thedelegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonablecertainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he couldthereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but worse, to adopt measuresinconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle ofseparation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the veryfoundation of our Republican system. The Court said that Section 68 of the RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for a validdelegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policyto be carried out or implemented by the President. It can be noted that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for thecreation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the factthat the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardlybe given. PNB vs. PABALAN Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari & Mandamus w/ Preliminary Injunction FACTS:

 Dec. 17, 1970 writ of execution was issued w/ a notice of garnishment for the sum of P12,724.66. Saidamount belongs to the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration &deposited with PNBs La Unionbranch. Execution of writ & garnishment was delayed since PNB objected to the garnishment &questioned WONPhil. Virginia Tobacco Administration really had funds deposited w/PNB La Union. Jan. 25, 1971 execution of writs & garnishment. It ordered that Philippine VirginiaTobaccoAdministration Funds deposited w/ PNB shall be garnished & delivered to plaintiff immediately to satisfyWrit of Execution for of the amount awarded in thedecision of Nov. 16, 1970. PNB claims that since funds are public in character, a prohibition must be issued againstPabalans ordersbased on the doctrine of the non-suability of the state. ISSUE: WON funds of public corporations w/c can sue & be sued are exempt fromgarnishment. HELD: No. Petition dismissed. RATIO: 1.When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereigncapacity & is to betreated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States vs.Planters Bank) By engagingin a particular business thru the instrumentality of acorporation, the government divests itself pro hacvice of its sovereign character so as torender the corporation subject to the rules governing privatecorporations (Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company). Thus, the doctrine ofnonsuabilitycannot bar or impede a notice of garnishment.2.There was no grave abuse of discretion onthe part of the judge. Several cases have ruledthat funds of government-owned entities are not exemptfrom garnishment

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL. G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor ofrespondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation andagainst petitioner confirming the arbitration award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for thesatisfactionof a judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent HonorableGuillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffsof RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizalserved Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.Thefunds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are publicfunds duly appropriated and allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances ofmilitary and civilian personneland for maintenance and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari,filed prohibition proceedings against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction withgrave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of Executionagainst the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment arenull and void.Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of theConstitution.Itisa fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of sovereignty that thestateas well as its government is immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt fromsuit,not because of any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the logical

and practical groundthat therecan beno legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the rightdepends.The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicandsoundsense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of agarnishment proceedingeven if theconsent to be sued had been previously granted andthe state liability adjudged.The universalrule that wherethe State gives its consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law, itmay limitclaimants actiononly up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of executionand thatthepower of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government fundsandproperties maynot be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy suchjudgments, is basedon obviousconsiderations of public policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by thecorrespondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions and public services rendered by the Statecannot be allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate andspecific objects,asappropriated by law

Rodriguez vs Gella Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriatingthe sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum ofP11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note thatprior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the samewas vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as afact. ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be renderedineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the lastworld war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the presidentcannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. Forit would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simplemajority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easierfor Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not tobe the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of theagent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same waythat the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neithercan it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreauwas thecommanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizenwith permanent residence inthe Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the specialservicesdepartment of the NAVSTA.On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that theiremployment had been converted from permanentfull-time to permanent part-time.They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S.Department of Defense.The

hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.However, in aletter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. Thelettercontained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;"b) "Messrs. Rossi andWyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficultemployees to supervise;" and c) "eventhough the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case withanyone, (they) placed the records in public placeswhere others not involved in the case couldhear."Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chiefof Naval Personnelexplaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, privaterespondent filed for damages allegingthat the letters contained libelous imputations and that theprejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietaryrights.However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in thedischarge of their official dutiesand that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them underthe doctrine of state immunity. However, the motionwas denied on the main ground that thepetitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties? RULING: Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervisionover itspersonnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, thepetitioners were being sued asofficers of the United States government because they have acted onbehalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and notthe petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.It is stressed at the outset that the mereallegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacitywill not automaticallyremove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine ofstateimmunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability andliability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or inexcess of his authority. These well-settledprinciples are applicable not only to the officers of the localstate but also where the person sued in its courts pertains tothe government of a foreign state, as in thepresent case.Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to thepayment of damages, suchaward will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personalcapacities but by the United States government astheir principal. This will require that governmentto perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, theappropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suitagainst thatgovernment without its consent. The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legalright againstthe authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the ruleisderived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept isformally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where wereiterate from our previous charters that thePhilippines "adopts the generally accepted principles ofinternational law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, thepetition is GRANTED.

United States of America vs. Guinto 182 SCRA 644 FACTS: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. InGR No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in ClarkAir Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in thesaid base. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa,Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John HayAir Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa,Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetablesserved to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred thecase to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the centerand its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genovesreaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O Donnell, an extension ofClark Air Bas, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners whoare officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. On thebasis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwiseknown as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testifiedagainst him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint againstthe individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the hereinpetitioners (except the US), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of thedefendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendantsbeat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of theirbodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs werearrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In amotion to dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually named defendants argued that the suit wasin effect a suit against the US, which had not given its consent to be sued. ISSUE: Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts doneby them in the performance of their official duties. HELD: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally acceptedprinciples of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without suchaffirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under thedoctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principlesare deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of itsmembership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction overone another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is alsoapplicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in thedischarge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itselfto perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the statealthough it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the othercontracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. In the case oUS, the customary law of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in

theRP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to haveimpliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity. Itis only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may beimplied. It is clear from a study of the records of GR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein were acting in theexercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operations against thecomplainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties asagents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has notgiven its consent to be sued. As for GR No. 80018, the record is too meager to indicate what really happened. The needed inquiry firstbe made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basisof evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639Facts:Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night ofOctober 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City wherethey were signed as laborers.A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted thewrit, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.Issue:Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.Held:The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice wascommendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicilefrom manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were stillfilipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. Theright to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could consideredtantamount to slavery.The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode."Ours is a government of laws and not of men."

YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987] Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from oneprovince to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionalityof Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in theexercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonablynecessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting thetransfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining thecarabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef,after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either. Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate CourtGR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987 FACTS:In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders thatnocarabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shallbesubject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitableinstitutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat InspectionCommission may see fit forthe carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal Industry may see fit inthe case ofthe carabaos.On January 13, 1984, Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police

stationcommander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626-A.He issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained theconfiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validityof the law on the ground that it lackedauthority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner. ISSUE:Whether or not police power is properly enforced HELD: NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power whichboth restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined asthe power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of thegeneralwelfare. As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare,its regulationunder the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the samelawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase) but NOT the same lawfulmethod. The reasonable connection between the means employedand the purpose sought to beachieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challengedmeasure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve thecarabaos is not reasonably necessary to thepurpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Santiago v. COMELEC
CASE DIGEST: G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997 Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political Law FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative?

HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]

Monday, January 19, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners

(Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an

initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the presentbicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied

the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to

with Section 2,

the Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2)Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiagodeclaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposalsto amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic

requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The

Initiative

Petition

Does

Not

Comply

with Section 2,

Article

XVII

of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the ConstitutionDisallowing Revision through Initiatives

The

framers

of

the constitution intended

clear

distinction

between

amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Holy See vs. Rosario Jr.

238 SCRA 524

FACTS: A piece of real property was acquired by the Holy See by way of donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The purpose was to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. Later, the Holy See sold the property on condition that it will evict the squatters therein. For failure to comply with the condition, the Holy See was sued. It moved to dismiss on the ground of state immunity.

ISSUE: Whether respondent trial court has jurisdiction over petitioner being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status if a foreign sovereign, the Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine Government since 1957. The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum and certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The DFA has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a

diplomatic mission or embassy in this country. The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts.

Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the countrys foreign relations.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners. Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents. GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond. The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities. Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government

functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. We find the petition to be meritorious. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions. From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations

for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) . Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957). The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court.

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN

FACTS: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest. They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi. Held: Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard. The SC decided in the affirmative. Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that:

The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Bottom line: These minors have fought for our rights up to the highest level of legal remedy. These minors thought of our interest and right. These minors battled for our sons and daughters and those yet to come. These minors were concern for us to live in a balanced and healthful ecology. Sadly, we, who are learned and with discernment, are oblivious. Until when do we learn our lesson? Remember, we have an "INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" to our future generations.

Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino

20 August 1979

FACTS:

Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and 2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure. RULING:

1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office. 2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."

United States vs Ang Tang Ho

on December 18, 2011

Condo Rental

Legal English Vacation Spots Exercise Machines Used car dealers

Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of thegovernment and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.