UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

William M. Greene Karen M. Greene Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) COMPLAINT ) PURSUANT TO ) 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, ) 1001, 1031, 1341, ) 1344(2), 1346, ) 1581, 1621, 1622, ) 2113 & 3231, ) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 ) & 1343, ) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 ) & 1994

CASE NOS. 1: 08-cv-0280, & 08-03726-cv & now CASE NO. 08-6284-cv

Internal Revenue Service Defendant-Appellee

BRIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

Dated: February 20, 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Table of Contents .….………………………………………………….……………... i Table of Authorities .…………………………………………………………………. i Cases …....….………………………………………………….……………... i Statutes ….….………………………………………………….……………... ii Federal Rules of Civil Procedure …………………………………………….. ii Federal Rules of Evidence …………………………………………………… ii Federal Constitution ..………………………………………….……………... ii Exhibit Nos. Referenced From This Case .…………………….……………... ii Docket Nos. Referenced From This Case .…………………….……………... ii-iii Other References ……………………………………………………………... iii Background ………….….……...………………………………..…….……………... 1 Discussion ………….….……...……………………………….……………………... 4 Closing Argument .….………………………………………………….……...……... Certificate of Service/Plaintiffs’ Declaration ………………………….……………... iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 ………………………………………. Bates v. Long Island Railroad, 997 F.2d 1028, 2 A.D. Cases 1038 (2d Cir. 07/02/1993) ………………….... Blackmar v. Guere, 342 U.S. 512, Headnote: [3] (1952) ………………………….... Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 297 [ Footnote 23 ] (1979) …………..….. Commission v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 …………………………. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) ……………………….……………………. Holy Trinity Church v. U.S. 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 Feb. 29, 1892 ……………………………. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 …………………………………………………. McNeil v. United States , 78 Fed Cl. 211, 220-21 (Fed. Cl. 2007) ………………….. Nassar v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 1040, 1043 (D. Minn. 1992) ………………… New York v. United States, 5112 S. Ct. 2408, 144 (1992) ………………………….. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994 ………………..…………………….. Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 137 -139 ………………………. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 ………………………………………………………. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 …………………………... Scripps-Howard Radio v. Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4, 14 …………………………………. Shanklin v. Fernald, 539 F. Supp. 2d 878, 884 (W.D. Tex. 2008) …………………... United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546 …………………………. United States v. Robert L. Schulz, et al., Docket 07-3729-cv ……………………….. We the People, et al., v. United States, et al., (USDC Case No. 04-cv-01211) ………

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STATUTES PAGE 18 U.S.C. § 1581 …………………………………………………………………… 26 U.S.C…………………………………………………………………………...... 26 U.S.C. 7803…………………………………………………………………..….. 26 U.S.C. § 7621 …………………………………………………………………… 26 U.S.C. 7801(a)(1) ……………………………………………………………….. 26 U.S.C. 7806(b) .………………………………………………………………….. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) ………………………………………………………………….. 28 U.S.C. § 547 ……………………………………………………………………... 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) …………………………………………………………….... 42 USC § 1994………………………………………………………………………. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PAGE Rule 72(a) …………………………………………………………………………… FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE PAGE Rule 201 ……………………………………………………………………………… Rule 605 ……………………………………………………………………………… FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PAGE Article 1 § 2(3) ……………………………………………………………………… Article 1 § 8(1) …………………………………………………………………….... Article 1 § 9(4) ……………………………………………………………………… Guarantee Clause of Article IV, 4 …………………………………………………... Ninth Amendment …………………………………………………………………... Tenth Amendment .………………………………………………………………….. EXHIBIT NOS. REFERENCED FROM THIS CASE PAGE Exhibit No. 1 .….……………………………………………………………….…. Exhibit No. 3 .….……………………………………………………………….…….. Exhibit No. 4 .….……………………………………………………………….…..… Exhibit No. 67 .….…………………………………………………………….....…… Exhibit No. 44 .….…………………………………………………………….……… Exhibit No. 70 .….………………………………………………………..…...……… DOCKET NOS. REFERENCED FROM THIS CASE PAGE Docket Entry No. 1 …………………………………………………………….… Docket Entry No. 3 …………………………………………………………….……… Docket Entry No. 5 …………………………………………………………….……… Docket Entry No. 6 …………………………………………………………….… Docket Entry No. 10 …………………………..……………………………….……… Docket Entry No. 17 …………………………………..……………………….……… Docket Entry No. 20 ………………………………………………………..….……… Docket Entry No. 22 ……………………………………………………….….…… Docket Entry No. 23 ……………………………………………………..…….……. Docket Entry No. 24 …………………………………………………..……….…. . ii

Docket Entry No. 29 ……………………………………………..…………….……. Docket Entry No. 30 …………………………………………..……………….……… Docket Entry No. 31 ………………………………………..………………….……… OTHER REFERENCES PAGE Amendment I (Religion): Document 21, Isaac Backus, A History of New England 1774—75 ………… Book of Genesis ……………………………………………………………………… Journals of the Continental Congress. Journals 1:105-113 …………………………... The Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 ……………………………………….. Thomas Jefferson: Reply to Lord North, 1775. Papers 1:225 ………………………... Treasury Order 150-06 ……………………………………………………………….

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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1. This action was submitted in the nature of a Qui Tam (i.e., Latin for "he who sues in this matter for the king as for himself") which is in the public interest, in which it is stated in the complaint (Dockets No. 1 and 6 ¶ 2) that “Jurisdiction is conferred upon District courts by 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1001, 1341, 1344(2), 1346, 1621, 1622, & 2113 in terms of the major fraud upon the Plaintiffs as well as all other Americans and by 18 U.S.C. § 1031 upon the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 with respect to the violations of the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution, in terms of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Right to Petition for a Redress of Grievances and Due Process Rights, as well as by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to Plaintiffs’ Civil Rights, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of Plaintiff’s Religious beliefs wherein the loss of their Self-Evident God given Right of Liberty1, when defined in terms of freedom from all forms of slavery (i.e., political slavery, land slavery and tax slavery), is in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, because, as Christians, our Self-Evident Right To Freedom of Religion (i.e., as stated in 1 Corinthians 7:23: I was bought at a price; to not become a slave of men) includes the Right to be Free from Joseph's Sin of divination (i.e., Genesis 44:5) and the resulting Root Sin which is manifested as the ancient system of novation known as the Biblical Beast,2 which is definable in terms of slavery and/or peonage, and therefore, criminal in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1581 and 42 U.S.C. § 1994.”

STATEMENT OF THE BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW TO VACATE ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND REMAND CASE BACK TO THE USDC FOR NORTHERN NEW YORK, IN ALBANY NEW YORK

Plaintiffs use of the term Liberty, when defined apart from the limited subject of freedom chattel slavery, also includes freedom from peonage and freedom from all other forms of slavery as well. 2 …under the Constitution, the people get their sanction from God whereas persons under the law are contracted with the state for privileges of existence relative to the system of the Number of Man (i.e., 666). And, as I'm sure your aware, Yeshu's mission involved the process of overcoming that ancient system of novation which is set forth in the Book of Genesis (41:1-4; 41:17-21) as Pharaoh's dream of the beasts of the field which ate up everything and left the people without their money (Genesis 47:13-15), without the rights to their lands, and in a state of slavery (Genesis 47:18-22). Under that ancient system of novation (the Biblical Beast) even the church which has contracted with the state for privileges of existence is in fact a creature of the state (Genesis 47:23-27). All of which means, we are looking at a very impressive system whereby each and every member of that system would by an abstract "social" necessity view any-and-all adversaries to such a system of slavery as indeed very dangerous and monstrous, such that the danger and monstrosity would not be "only in the eyes of those who would want the model of `powers-that-be' perpetrated ad infinitum."

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2. Although qui tam Plaintiffs did ask for the statutory seal provisions associated with a Qui Tam Action for review and consideration by the US Attorneys and US Department of Justice we did NOT set forth any of the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., in that request statutory seal nor the complaint and did not attempt to maintain the action for anything like treble damages and therein-by claim that we are not subject to those provisions in this case. Maintaining further that, we had a right to a proper party in our suit against the IRS “… being the successor of the Trust listed at 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) and thereinafter called the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was not created by Congress, as required by Article I § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution of the United States …” (Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6, footnote 13 & ¶ 103), and that although properly served, the USDC dismissed our case even before that proper party had come forward in our action which had been brought in the “public interest” charging the Government Contractor (Internal Revenue Service) with varying degrees of performance related issues that go beyond their scope of duty, such that the IRS is not a proper party as an Agency of our Government, and as a first impression case, accordingly, qui tam Plaintiffs has set forth that the United States of America was created as a “Judeo3”-“Christian nation” (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 111-1404&5) and the historical reference (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 141-144) of the Talmud presents the fact that the council or Sanhedrin in fact tried the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) for commanding His followers to not pay taxes when those taxes go to pay for things which are not in compliance with the Laws of God,6 and as a preliminary statement, should this and/or another Court hold that the Plaintiffs do not have this first Amendment right, and act in accordance with a denial of Christ’s last command and therein-by “mystically crucify” the Plaintiffs with the Risen Christ, then so be it for that is what the Plaintiffs believe is meant by being a Christian (see 1 Corinthians 7:23) to the extent that Plaintiffs can not also help but recognize the fact that such actions actually constitute the essence of slavery itself:

In keeping with their belief systems with respect to the teachings of the monastic order of Pharisees (i.e., Nazarean) known as the Essenes, recognition is given to the fact that the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) was after all a Jewish Rabbi. 4 Also See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S. 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 Feb. 29, 1892. 5 “Is not all America now appealing to Heaven against the injustice of being taxed...We are persuaded that an entire freedom from being taxed by civil rulers...is not mere favor from any men in the world but a right and property granted us by God, who commands us to stand fast in it.” Amendment I (Religion): Document 21, Isaac Backus, A History of New England 1774—75, (http://presspubs.uchicago.edu:80/founders/documents/amendI_religions21.html). (Bolded Emphasis Added) 6 "…under the Constitution, the people get their sanction from God whereas persons under the law are contracted with the state for privileges of existence relative to the system of the Number of Man (i.e., 666). And, as I'm sure your aware, Yeshu's mission involved the process of overcoming that ancient system of novation which is set forth in the Book of Genesis (41:1-4; 41:17-21) as Pharaoh's dream of the beasts of the field which ate up everything and left the people without their money (Genesis 47:13-15), without the rights to their lands, and in a state of slavery (Genesis 47:18-22). Under that ancient system of novation (the Biblical Beast) even the church which has contracted with the state for privileges of existence is in fact a creature of the state (Genesis 47:23-27). All of which means, we are looking at a very impressive system whereby each and every member of that system would by an abstract "social" necessity view any-and-all adversaries to such a system of slavery as indeed very dangerous and monstrous, such that the danger and monstrosity would not be "only in the eyes of those who would want the model of `powers-that-be' perpetrated ad infinitum."

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"But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, … For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) 3. Even as a first impression case however, the fact that the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) commanded His followers to not pay taxes when those taxes go to pay for things which are not in compliance with the Laws of God and the Plaintiffs right to act accordingly is not a privilege; the IRS did substantively infringe the exercise of religion in this respect, simply because the IRS’ actions under Title 26 are merely prima facie (which is NOT Law, see 26 U.S.C. 7806(b)) and represent an attempt to regulate religious practices.7 4. Plaintiffs will discuss and will prove that there is and has been no evidence whatsoever in the District Court’s ruling(s)/determination(s) which have held this case from moving forward. Plaintiffs will prove that the burden of proof of this decision can be overcome to not only challenge this decision, but also place the burden of proof back on the Government,(8,9,10) for unless one could prove the recorded events presented in the Talmud itself to be fraudulent, it is a right, and completely in line with the fact that the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) commanded His followers to not pay taxes when those taxes go to pay for things which are not in compliance with the Laws of God. 5. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” and unless one is fully prepared to deny that a “redress of grievances” is plainly stated in the petition clause, the historic remedy for the act(s) of fraud involving only silence in the face of the People who act to peaceably procure relief as defined long ago in the Act passed unanimously by the Continental Congress and expounded upon by
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See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (noting that “[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred position” to economic interests); see also id. at 121 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“None of the provisions of our Constitution is more venerated by the people or respected by legislatures and the courts than those which proclaim for our country the freedom of religion and expression.”). 8 See 2002 Freedom Drive: Houses of Worship (http://www.givemeliberty.org/FreedomDrive/FDhow.htm); 9 WHY HAVE OUR CHURCHES BEEN SILENCED? (http://www.givemeliberty.org/FreedomDrive/FDmisc/WHYSILENCED.PDF); 10 DOES GOD BELONG IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT? (http://www.givemeliberty.org/FreedomDrive/FDmisc/DoesGodBelongInCivilGovernment.PDF);

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Thomas Jefferson as the People’s Right of “…intercession for redress of grievances and reestablishment of rights…” was to withhold money, as the question still remains as to whether Defendant (“the Internal Revenue Service”) is obligated under the Constitution to respond with specific, official answers to the questions put forth by We The People in their Petitions for Redress of Grievances; whether The People may retain their money without retaliation if their grievances are not redressed. 6. In the past, the courts have been asked to specifically review the historical context and purpose of the clause – the Framers’ intent which provides a declaration of the intended effect of the accountability clause – determining the Rights of the People and the obligations of the Government as guaranteed by the Clause, but given that the courts have thus far refused to provide any interpretation (See for instance, Judge Rogers concurring opinion in We The People Found. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir., 2007) in which the decision upon appeal was to “not resolve this debate”), with rehearing en banc denied (Aug. 3, 2007), certiorari denied (January 7, 2008), and certiorari denied without comment on February 25, 2008 as well, and as a result, the Plaintiffs founded Venue with this Honorable Court on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) to restrain and enjoin the IRS from the retaliatory acts of engaging in any and all IRS administrative actions taken against Plaintiffs under the Color of Law without regard for the Plaintiffs guaranteed First Amendment Right to Petition for a Redress of Grievances to hold the Government accountable to the Constitution, and specifically with regard to written communications to the government. 7. Because of the integrity of Judge Rogers in her concurring opinion in We The People Found. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir., 2007), qui tam Plaintiffs maintain that the First Amendment explicitly preserves for the people the right to petition government officials for the redress of grievances (We the People Found. v. United States, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 10849, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 2007), such that, decisions to prosecute based on an individual's exercise of rights under the First Amendment is considered unconstitutional selective prosecution (United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1980 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. McDonald, 553 F. Supp 1003, 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1983)), in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ claim even occurred in this District Court to violate the Plaintiffs Rights of Privacy and Free Association with the Plaintiffs’ participating organization (WTP Organization). 8. Keeping in mind that “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them” (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), qui tam Plaintiffs stand fast in their belief in the Second Circuit’s Original Opinion before the same Court thereinafter sought to soften the same, which reads, “The rule of due process upon which we relied in Schulz I, and upon which we rely now, can be stated thus: any legislative scheme that denies subjects an opportunity to seek judicial review of administrative orders except by refusing to comply, and so put themselves in immediate jeopardy of possible penalties ‘so heavy as to prohibit resort to that remedy,’ Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331, 333, 64 4

L. Ed. 596, 40 S. Ct. 338 (1920), runs afoul of the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This is so even if ‘in the proceedings for contempt the validity of the original order may be assailed.’ Id. at 335; see also Reisman, 375 U.S. at 446; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147-48, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908).” Schulz II (Schulz v IRS, 413 F. 3d 297, 303 (2d Circuit, 2005), and did in fact ask the USDC to interfere with this “Organized Crime” operating under arbitrary US Code which is clearly erroneous or contrary to law, in that “... No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn … nor shall any … matter relating to the contents of this title be given any legal effect…” (See 26 U.S.C. 7806(b), which flourishes without due process of law, and as such qui tam Plaintiffs ask the United States Court of Appeals For The Second Circuit to Vacate the District Court’s Order of Dismissal and Remand This Case Back to the USDC for Northern New York, in Albany New York, for it would be a very grave injustice to simply allow the Government Contractor (the IRS) to continue to violate the fundamental rights of the People for which there is protection in the Federal Constitution (see Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581582 (1937)). WHY DID THE USDC FOR NORTHERN NEW YORK MISSTATE THE NATURE OF THE CASE? 9. The question must be asked “Why Did The USDC For Northern New York Misstate The Nature Of The Case” and in this context the District Court entered "I. Background[:] On March12, 2008, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint styled as a qui tam action and sought preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 1; Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6). " (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 2 line 1). However, while it is true that “On March12, 2008, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint styled as a qui tam action” we, the qui tam Plaintiffs, first sought to have the Complaint sealed for sixty as requested (see Docket Entry No. 2). 10. The District Court further entered the "Plaintiffs’ prolix Complaint asks the Court to order the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to cease and desist from any collection activities against them, including releasing all notices of liens and levies, suspending all audit activity and administrative, civil and criminal proceedings against them. Am. Compl. At 15. " (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 2 at 2). “PROLIX”

11. With respect to the District Court’s statement that Plaintiffs’ Complaint was "prolix", qui tam Plaintiffs had every intension of downsizing the complaint following its review by the U.S. Attorney and Justice Department, and in this context Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6, Footnote No. 12 in part “As a Qui Tam Action, the information provided in the present text will allow the U.S. Attorney and the Justice Department to review the case and decided whether or not the U.S. Attorneys will investigate charges against the 5

Government Contractor (IRS), as well as to outline the fraud that has been perpetrated even upon this very Court. After review by the U.S. Attorney and Justice Department, permission will be sought from the Court to downsize the text presented within this suit such that most if not all the referencing footnotes will be removed.” But, after the Plaintiffs were informed that “that due consideration was not being considered/given and that the complaint had been simply forwarded to the Tax Division” (See Docket Entry No. 4 ¶ 5), under these conditions, there was simply no reason to be concerned with downsizing a complaint that was already in the possession of anyone other than the District Court and the US Attorney’s Office. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ASK THE COURT TO VIOLATE RULE 201 AND RULE 605 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 12. This action was submitted in the nature of a Qui Tam (i.e., Latin for "he who sues in this matter for the king as for himself") “action [which] is NOT brought against the US Government nor any Federal Government Employee who may or may not be appointed...” (See Docket Entry No. 22 ¶ 6) and where qui tam Plaintiffs have also submitted that the term “Government Contractor” is appropriate for the IRS per the pleadings in Diversified Metal Products, Inc., v. T-Bow Company Trust, Internal Revenue Service, and Steven Morgan (Civil No. 93-405-E-EJL, UNITED STATES’ ANSWER AND CLAIM) wherein both Betty Richardson, a United States Attorney, and Richard R. Ward, a United States Department of Justice Trial Attorney, Tax Division,“Denies that Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United States Government ...” (See Page #2 – Exhibit 1, 2 of 6, ¶ 4; Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6, Footnote No. 13). 13. Further it was explained “… that the IRS can not also be defined as an "instrumentality of the United States" in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 3002(C) because other court documents on the subject shows that “There was virtually no Washington bureaucracy created by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, the statute to which the present Internal Revenue Service can be traced.” (See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979)), and research on Title 31 of the US Code, as currently published by the US Government, reflecting the laws passed by Congress as of Jan. 2, 2006, for the codification and "classification" to corresponding US Code sections contained in SUBCHAPTER I—ORGANIZATION, from Jan. 2, 2006 to the most recent entry on Tuesday, February 19, 2008, shows that although 31 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2) is a reference authorizing the President to appoint an Assistant General Counsel in the U.S. Department of the Treasury to be the Chief Counsel for the IRS, the IRS itself is not even listed as an organization within meaning of TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE I > CHAPTER 3 > SUBCHAPTER which explicitly lists the organizational structure of the United States Department of the Treasury. Moreover, although 5 U.S.C. § 105 defines an "Executive agency" as an "Executive department", "Government corporation" or an "independent establishment", the provisions of which are covered by section 101 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, and Section 1 of Title 5, referred to in text, is section 1 of former Title 5, Executive Departments and Government Officers and 6

Employees, the provisions of which are covered by section 101 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, and the definitions of agency and department conform with such definitions in section 6 of revised title 18, U.S.C. (H.R. 3190, 80th Cong.), Treasury Order 150-06, July 9, 1953 is the only authoritative document under which the pure Trust listed at 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) and thereinafter called the Bureau of Internal Revenue was changed to the Internal Revenue Service, thereby creating the illusion of the IRS being an actual agency of the Department of the Treasury with all regulations, mimeographs, forms, and other Internal Revenue and Treasury documents amended to conform to Treasury Order 150-06” (See Page #2 – Exhibit 1, 2 of 6, ¶ 4; Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6, Footnote No. 13), and as a result, qui tam Plaintiffs maintain that the District Court violated Rule 605 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by engaging in activities that compromise the mandate of an independent judiciary to enter facts not in evidence and for issuing rulings based on alleged facts not in evidence. 14. As a preliminary matter, where there was arguably is no live dispute, the District Court acceded to the fraud and violated the Plaintiffs due process of law where the Court completely suppressed evidence which is applicable to our case in terms of the statements of the US Attorneys and the US Department of Justice used in another case and much much more as the qui tam Plaintiffs tried to bring the same before this court. Moreover, without presenting findings and conclusions as to why we were denied our due process the District Court also violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which reads: “No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; …” [Bolded Emphasis Added]. That is, qui tam Plaintiffs maintain that the District Court violated Rule 605 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by testifying as to alleged facts not in evidence, and for issuing rulings based on alleged facts not in evidence by citing Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 573-4 (2d Cir. 2002) to enter "When the preliminary injunctive relief sought would prohibit "government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme," the party seeking such injunctive relief must establish a likelihood of success on the merits" (Docket Entry No. 3 ¶ 2 line 3) as well as by entering "As this relief would prohibit government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory scheme, plaintiffs must establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim before such relief can be rewarded" (Docket Entry No. 3 ¶ 3 line 2) and biased our case by not honoring qui tam Plaintiffs’ request to have the Complaint sealed for sixty as requested (see Docket Entry No. 2). 15. Qui tam Plaintiffs would ask the Court of Appeals to consider the question of “Where does the evidence record show authenticated, properly admitted evidence that the IRS has US Government Agency credentials bestowed upon it by an Act of Congress?” 16. Since the record contained no such evidence, it was the duty of the District Court to therefore assume none exists and accept it as an adjudicative fact under rule 201 that the IRS does not have US Government Agency status, just as the US Attorney and the US Department of Justice stated under oath in the quote and case citation offered by the Plaintiffs.

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17. While the qui tam Plaintiffs may never be able to prove that the effect of the District Court was calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system, the fact remains that the District Court’s statements were inconsistent with the positions made under oath in a prior proceeding by the US Attorneys and the US Department of Justice, and further, the fact remains that when the Plaintiff William M. Greene contacted the US Attorney’s Office on April 4, 2008, we were informed by US Attorney William H. Pease, Esq., “that due consideration was not being considered/given and that the complaint had been simply forwarded to the Tax Division” (See Docket Entry No. 4 ¶ 5), and under these conditions, there was simply no reason to be concerned with downsizing a complaint that was already in the possession of anyone other than the District Court and the US Attorney’s Office. 18. Even after US Attorney William H. Pease, Esq., informed the Plaintiffs “that due consideration was not being considered/given and that the complaint had been simply forwarded to the Tax Division” (See Docket Entry No. 4 ¶ 5), and in connection with their request for information to properly comply with any-and-all laws governing their “public interest” suit, on April 17th, 2008 two copies of the Disclosure Statement (Exhibit No. 44) to the Syracuse Office were received at the Syracuse Office with the heading of United States of America, ex rel., William M. Greene, Karen M. Greene, Plaintiffs v. Internal Revenue Services, Defendant, Case No. 08-cv-0280 LEK/DRH, following which qui tam Plaintiffs respectfully requested that the Court accept three amended pages to the original submission, unseal the records in the above-captioned matter to allow for further dissemination to potentially allow for fully informed joiners, and provide Injunctive Relief to allow them to return to work so that they can begin to pay their bills again and feed themselves and their son as the case proceeds (Docket Entry No. 4). “CIVIL AND CRIMINAL” 19. And with respect to the District Court’s more fuller statement that "Plaintiffs’ prolix Complaint asks the Court to order the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to cease and desist from any collection activities against them, including releasing all notices of liens and levies, suspending all audit activity and administrative, civil and criminal proceedings against them. Am. Compl. At 15." (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 2 at 2), this matter also has been before Court from the very beginning (See Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 67,73) as well being an ongoing subject matter where qui tam Plaintiffs responded by saying “The American system of constitutional law simply is not supposed to allow for “bait and switch” trickery on the part of lawyers in our legal system, and when it is allowed to exist it gives lawyers and our legal system a bad name. There are no civil and/or criminal proceedings against the qui tam Plaintiffs at this time …” (Docket Entry No. 18 ¶ 5); Also see, Exhibit 16 which is a copy of Plaintiff William M. Greene’s search from the New York State Secretary of State's Website, UCC information on Filing Data Reports, reporting “No Debtors found”, Exhibit 27 which is a copy of Plaintiff Karen M. Greene’s search from the New York State Secretary of State's Website, UCC information on Filing Data Reports, reporting “No Debtors found”, and 8

Exhibit 17 which is a copy of letter signed by the Case Processing Clerk, United States District Court, Northern District of New York, documenting that there is no record for proceedings filed against neither William M. Greene nor Karen Greene. “THE IRS IS OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE” 20. Next, the District Court further entered that "Plaintiffs contend that the IRS is obstructing justice and violating their constitutional rights of freedom of association and religion by attempting to collect federal income taxes on their salaries, wages and compensation through the issuance of notices of levies on their banks and employers. Id." (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 2 at 3). 21. With respect to the statement that "the IRS is obstructing justice …", on April 24 qui tam Plaintiff underwent peripheral bypass surgery and by June 27, 2008 the Plaintiff was still subject to some cognitive complacency associated with the recovery process so if the Court will excuse Plaintiffs error with respect to the paragraph numbering within Docket Entry No. 18, the second paragraph number 4 reads “In the case before this Court, the Qui Tam Action filed as Case No. 08-cv-0280 which offered the Brief Description on the Civil Cover Sheet as “Constitutional Rights Violations including Peonage, Major Fraud, Mail & Bank Fraud", and the Suit has thirty-eight pages of Causes of Action, listing fifty-eight separate Causes of Action which have been developed against the IRS rather than the IRS Agents themselves. Causes of Action include the IRS Officials having been involved in the suppression of evidence submitted to the Senate Finance Committee …” (Docket Entry No. 18 ¶ 4), which included Exhibit No. 3 which is a copy of a letter from Senator Inouye’s office, dated June 26, 1989 that reads in part:
th

"…I am writing in further response to your inquiry regarding the precise provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRS [sic]) that render an individual liable for income taxes…Based on the research performed by the Congressional Research Service, there is no provision which specifically and unequivocally requires an individual to pay income taxes." 22. But again, with respect to the statement that "the IRS is obstructing justice …", qui tam Plaintiffs have submitted that “… the Government’s Contractor (the IRS) has admitted in public form, not once but twice, that IRS administrative enforcement actions are retaliatory acts essentially meant to overthrow the Constitution because their retaliation was/is in response to the Petitions of members of We The People Organization and in this respect their intent on suppressing the First Amendment Rights of "We The People" as a whole was expressed such that the IRS was also "after mailing lists." And a significant part of our complaint also deals with IRS falsification of damages (False Claims) which includes Fraud upon the Court in a § 6700 suit (Case No. 1:07-cv-0352) against our participating organization a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this claim occurred in this District Court therein-by violating the Plaintiffs Rights of Privacy and Free Association with the Plaintiffs’ participating organization, and this 9

case is written to potentially allow for fully informed joiners, who as a matter of the Named Accused Government Contractor’s (the IRS’) publically announced retaliation may or may not have civil and criminal proceedings against them.” (Docket Entry No. 18 ¶ 4). 23. Docket Entry No. 18 ¶ 6 continues, such that it is stated “In fact as stated in the Qui Tam Action (Dockets No. 1 and 6 ¶ 58), knowing that silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal and moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading and refusing to cave into psychological intimidation or deceptive tactics calculated to overcome the Plaintiffs’ "free will", Plaintiff William M. Greene had personally and repeatedly requested in all of his letters to the IRS that if the IRS provides Plaintiffs with the law requiring them to file and/or assume a liability in these matters he would do so (See Pages #14, 15, 18, 19, 20 & 23 Exhibit 6, pgs. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 & 10 of 12, Pages #26, 27 & 29 - Exhibit 7, pgs. 1, 2 & 4 of 4, Pages #30 & 31 - Exhibit 8, pgs. 2 & 3 of 3, Pages #34, 35 & 38 - Exhibit 9, pgs 2, 3 & 6 of 8, Page #41 - Exhibit 10, pg. 1 of 9), and following the Plaintiffs’ claim of a “notorious default” with respect to IRS’ failure to respond with an appropriate reference of law requiring them to file and/or assume a liability in these matters (See Pages #57, 58 & 61 - Exhibit 11, pgs. 7, 8 & 11 of 15), which itself was a response letter to the IRS having mailed the copy of the case against Plaintiffs’ participating organization in which damages were clearly falsified, Plaintiff Karen M. Greene also personally notified the IRS “If the court provides a ruling with respect to our guaranteed First Amendment Right of Petitioning in the matters and deems it appropriate, after I have requested and the court has reviewed a Bill of Particulars related to subjects already outlined in the petition for redress involving tax provisions of the Constitution and defining the specific offense statute that created the liability for me to pay income tax and file a 1040 Tax Return and the court finds I am actually required (liable) under the law to comply, I will ...” (See Page #71 - Exhibit 12, pg. 6 of 7), but the IRS has not respond accordingly in a lawful manner, and in the face of such fraud, IRS’ “enforcement actions” are, in effect, prohibited retaliatory actions, infringing on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Right to Petition the government for a Redress of Grievances.” 24. And Docket Entry No. 18 ¶ 7 goes on to read, “Moreover, … Plaintiffs are NOT taxpayers in the context of the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Congressional Record related to the same is a testimony to the fact” and the quote from the 44 Congressional Record, 1702 (1909) was presented thusly: "I have no hesitation in declaring that the tax on any useful occupation can not be defined in any form of conscience or of common sense. To tax a man for trying to make a living for his family is such a patent and gross injustice that it should deter any legislature from perpetrating it." 44 Congressional Record, 1702 (1909)

THE IRS IS VIOLATING THE PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION …

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BUT IS NOT THE COURT ALSO OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE BY NOT PROPERLY ENTERING EXHIBITS INTO EVIDENCE? 25. Moreover, with respect to the statement that "… the IRS is obstructing justice and violating their constitutional rights of freedom of association and religion by attempting to collect federal income taxes on their salaries, wages and compensation through the issuance of notices of levies on their banks and employers. Id." (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 2 at 3), qui tam Plaintiffs could refer to any number of references provided in this case but because our Amended Motion For Preliminary Injunctive Relief, which was submitted on May 30th 2008, appears to have caused enough problems that it and all subsequent Motions were thereinafter to have been referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Homer, and which Motion has subsequently never been heard, qui tam Plaintiffs would point out that it is not merely the IRS which has been obstructing justice in terms of this case and would therefore specifically incorporate by reference their “… Motion for the Court to provide Preliminary Injunctive Relief to allow the Plaintiffs to return to work so that they can begin to pay their bills again and feed themselves and their son as the case proceeds …” (Docket Entry No. 10 ¶ 26). 26. Of course, qui tam Plaintiffs feel a need to further outline their statement that it is not merely the IRS which has been obstructing justice in terms of this case by pointing to the fact that the Listing of Exhibits in connection with their “… Motion for the Court to accept the attached three amended pages to the original submission, to unseal the records in the above-captioned matter to allow for further dissemination to potentially allow for fully informed joiners, and to provide Injunctive Relief to allow the Plaintiffs to return to work so that they can begin to pay their bills again and feed themselves and their son as the case proceeds …” (Docket Entry No. 4) included Exhibit 44 which was a copy of the Disclosure Statement delivered to the US Attorney’s Syracuse Office on April 17, 2008, Exhibit 45 which was an Affidavit of Information – Copy of the Independent Internal Revenue Service Records Analyst’s Affidavits (IRSRAA) report on qui tam plaintiff William M. Greene’s Individual Master Files (IMF), Exhibit 46 which was a copy of FOIA Response Letter and one page of the qui tam plaintiff William M. Greene’s Individual Master Files (IMF) sent by the IRS, Exhibit 47 which was an Affidavit of Information – Copy of the Independent Internal Revenue Service Records Analyst’s Affidavits (IRSRAA) report on qui tam plaintiff Karen M. Greene’s Individual Master Files (IMF), and Exhibit 48 which was a Copy of FOIA Response Letter and one page of the qui tam plaintiff Karen M. Greene’s Individual Master Files (IMF) sent by the IRS. 27. In the attempt to actually get some of their Exhibits entered into evidence, qui tam Plaintiffs again submitted Exhibit 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48 together with their “… Motion for the Court to provide Preliminary Injunctive Relief to allow the Plaintiffs to return to work so that they can begin to pay their bills again and feed themselves and their son as the case proceeds …” (Docket Entry No. 10 ¶ 26), and this time all but their Disclosure Statement (Exhibit 44) was admitted into evidence. Then again the Plaintiffs submitted yet another copy of Exhibit 44 along with Docket Entry No. 19 and Exhibit 71

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which was a copy of case law: Lawrence v. Wardell, 273 F. 205, 408 (9th Cir. 1921), and were successful this in getting these two documents admitted into evidence. Thus, By July 1st 2008 alone, Exhibits 45 through 48, plus the Case Law Exhibits 49 through 65 submitted in connection with Docket Entry No. 10, along with Exhibit 71 submitted in connection with Docket Entry No. 19 provide sufficient reference to indicate that "the IRS is obstructing justice …by attempting to collect federal income taxes on their salaries, wages and compensation through the issuance of notices of levies on their banks and employers." 28. But again, to address the statement that "… the IRS is obstructing justice and violating their constitutional rights of freedom of association and religion by attempting to collect federal income taxes on their salaries, wages and compensation through the issuance of notices of levies on their banks and employers. Id." (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 2 at 3) more fully, the qui tam Plaintiffs were exercising their first amendment right of petitioning state government for a redress of grievances in the early 90s long before they had ever been introduced to Robert Schulz and We The People Organization, and it was only when they were well into the development of their first and only RICO suit over the subject that I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Schulz. In any event, both state government and later federal government through the interactions of the court violated their first amendment right to a redress of grievances and fifth amendment right to due process in the early to mid 1990s. 29. At first the Plaintiffs saw this in terms of the biblical prohibition which they printed on 100-ft. banners and stretched out along the governor’s steps (i.e. Exodus 20:13, Deuteronomy 5:17, and two of the five Books of Moses (also known as the Torah, Law, or Pentateuch); that is, in terms of a murder of a significant portion of the medically frail population who were otherwise becoming a financial strain to the system), fraud in employment practices and even taxation without representation (see Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 17; Exhibit 44 ¶¶ 82-84), but with time the Plaintiffs learned more about the meaning of the first amendment as well as the fact that there is no law requiring most of us to pay income taxes in the first place. Of course, this was a process and the Plaintiffs didn’t stop filing until the year 2000 for the tax year of 1999, and on April 9, 2001, WTP Organization invited any representative of the IRS and/or IRS Commissioner Rossotti, himself, to answer the questions and allegations raised by tax researchers or even respond to the simple statement of “show me the law!” 30. As members of WTP Organization, Plaintiffs have been a part of the effort to present our questions to elected representatives, and some of the questions presented include questions and reasons for questions regarding the ratification of the 16th Amendment and are included in said “Statement of [538] Facts and Beliefs Regarding the Individual Income Tax”11 under the “Sixth Belief”, paragraphs 1-119. Nowhere in American history or jurisprudence have said questions been answered except by Bill Benson in his two volume research report, “The Law That Never Was” and at the two11

See Statement of Facts and Beliefs Regarding the Individual Income Tax, (www.givemeliberty.org/NoRedress/STOP/StmtOfBeliefs3-09-03.PDF)

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day Citizens’ Truth in Taxation Hearing12 in Washington DC on February 27-28, 2002 by a panel of experts including constitutional attorney Lowell Becraft, former IRS Special Agent Joseph Banister and Bill Benson, and it is Plaintiffs’ understanding that American jurisprudence have never successfully refuted said facts. 31. Even though qui tam Plaintiffs are only two of the people who have signed onto the Petitions for Redress of Grievances, we believe that it was/is our government’s constitutional duty to respond, but further, we believe that a failure to respond to Petitions for Redress of Grievances involving Constitutional torts constitutes, among other things, is fraud. Add to that other civil rights violations on the part of government and/or the government’s contractors (the IRS), and we, the qui tam Plaintiffs, at least, also believe that we had a right to have the Exhibits submitted in connection with Docket Entry No. 1 on March 12th 2008 and Docket Entry No. 6 on May 21st 2008 were not able to have entered until July 3rd 2008. 32. As stated earlier, this was an action which was submitted in the nature of a Qui Tam (i.e., Latin for "he who sues in this matter for he king as for himself") “action [which] is NOT brought against the US Government nor any Federal Government Employee who may or may not be appointed...” (See Docket Entry No. 22 ¶ 6) and in that same spirit the qui tam Plaintiffs also offered their statement of “Notice To The Court Of Waver Of Liability” with respect to the actions of both the United States District Court Clerk concerning the failure to have entered the Exhibits number one through forty-three with respect to both Docket Entry No. 1 and Docket Entry No. 6 and the United States Attorney, Northern District of New York, advising the Plaintiffs that the United States Attorney’s Office is not involved in this action (see Docket Entry No. 21) but maintain just the same that they had a right to both have the Exhibits submitted in connection with the case submitted into the record in a timely fashion and with respect to the action of the United States Attorneys, after all, the U.S. Attorney’s and the Justice Department had a moral and legal duty intervene in this case. 33. Among the Exhibits which were not entered until July 3rd 2008 in connection with Docket Entry No. 1 and Docket Entry No. 6 was Exhibit No. 1 which was a copy of the sworn testimony of both a United States Attorney and a United States Department of Justice Trial Attorney, in evidence of the fact that the Internal Revenue Service is NOT an agency of the United States Government. 34. Among the Exhibits which were not entered until July 3rd 2008 in connection with Docket Entry No. 1 and Docket Entry No. 6 was Exhibit 3, which is a copy of a letter from Senator Inouye’s office, dated June 26, 1989, stating that “Based on the research performed by the Congressional Research Service, there is no provision which specifically and unequivocally requires an individual to pay income taxes." This Exhibit was originally submitted by Robert L. Schulz, Chairman, We The People Foundation For Constitutional Education, Inc., to the United States Senate Finance Committee, "Taxpayer Beware: Schemes, Scams and Fraud." April 5, 2001, along with nineteen other
12

See Truth-In Taxation-Hearing, Initial Questions, January 22, 2002 (http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/News/Historical/WTPQuestions-020122.pdf

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exhibits attached to the official record of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, first session on IRS oversight, April 5, 2001. Y 4.F 49:S.HRG. 107-77, Item Number: 1038-A, as pages 117-124, and is an exhibit which qui tam Plaintiffs have put forth in terms of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (i.e., Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees), and have outlined, for example, in the First Cause of Action in terms of the violation of the spirit and intent of the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1581 and 42 U.S.C. § 1994, and in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 241 involving the major fraud upon the Plaintiffs as well as all other Americans and by 18 U.S.C. § 1031 upon the United States, as outlined in paragraph #20 of their complaint and the first Cause of Action the suppression of evidence, as evidenced by its omission from the official record of the April 5, 2001 Senate Finance Committee hearing, the Government Contractor (the IRS), with knowledge and forethought, “actually not potentially” committed acts of retaliation against the People, thereby violating the federal constitutional rights of Plaintiffs as Americans and Christians, and as evidenced by the falsification of damages (which itself appears to constitute a crime in terms of 18 U.S.C. § 245 (i.e., whistleblowers against corruption in government)) to qualify for a complaint under Article III in the related § 6700 Suit against the Plaintiffs’ participating organization (as indicated in paragraph #4 of their complaint) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this claim even occurred within this District Court in the attempt to create a false presumption involving fraud to escape answering honest questions put forth regarding the Constitutional restriction against a direct un-apportioned tax on labor (which is definable in terms of slavery and/or peonage, and therefore, criminal in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1581 and 42 U.S.C. § 1994) in which the Government Contractor (IRS) has retaliated against Plaintiffs to deprive us of our natural Rights of Association, Privacy, Property, and our Right to Trial by Jury. 35. Among the other Exhibits which were not entered in connection with Docket Entry No. 1 and Docket Entry No. 6 was Exhibit 4, which is a copy of David Cay Johnston’s September 17, 2003 The New York Times article in which the IRS has admitted to in public form, not once but twice (as indicated in paragraphs #28 through #30 of their complaint), of engaging in retaliatory administrative actions taken against Plaintiffs under the Color of Law without regard for the Plaintiffs guaranteed First Amendment Right to Petition for a Redress of Grievances to hold the Government and the Named Accused Government Contractor (IRS) accountable to the Constitution. 36. Among the other Exhibits which were not entered in connection with Docket Entry No. 1 and Docket Entry No. 6 was Exhibit 37, which is a copy of IRS Forms 668A(ICS) Notice of Levy dated January 3, 2008, served upon the Plaintiffs’ Employer, along with attached a letter notifying the employer that “This will attach to all funds due Karen Greene. Once you are in receipt of this levy you can not issue Karen Greene an advance. The only funds allowed to be deducted are State fees.” Without the moneys that the qui tam Plaintiffs’ were contracted for, in terms of upfront operating expenses, the Plaintiffs’ were put out of work back in January of 2008.

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37. Among the Exhibits which were not entered in connection Docket Entry No. 1 and Docket Entry No. 6 was Exhibit 40, which was a copy of the Plaintiffs email response to the employers’ email, explaining that it is the Plaintiffs understanding that “IRS Forms 668-A, 668-A(c) and 668-W are the "Notices of Levy(s)" that do not comply with Due Process of Law and therefore carries no weight at all unless there is an actual levy from a court of law signed by a judge with a court stamp.” Also stating that “Even then, a Levy is ONLY lawfully effected by Form 668-B, which subjects the individual to Section 6331(a), and even that only pertains to those persons who are subject to the provisions of IRC Subtitle E, and certain officers, employees, and elected government officials and, of course, the government as their "employer."” THE IRS IS VIOLATING THE PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF … RELIGION …” 38. But again, to address the statement that "… the IRS is obstructing justice and violating their constitutional rights of … religion by attempting to collect federal income taxes on their salaries, wages and compensation through the issuance of notices of levies on their banks and employers. Id." (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 2 at 3), the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” and qui tam Plaintiffs have set forth that the United States of America was created as a “Judeo13”-“Christian nation” (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 91-14014&15) and the historical reference (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 141-144) of the Talmud presents the fact that the council or Sanhedrin in fact tried the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) for commanding His followers to not pay taxes when those taxes go to pay for things which are not in compliance with the Laws of God.16 In addition, qui tam Plaintiffs have set forth the historic remedy for the act(s) of
In keeping with their belief systems with respect to the teachings of the monastic order of Pharisees (i.e., Nazarean) known as the Essenes, recognition is given to the fact that the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) was after all a Jewish Rabbi. 14 Also See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S. 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 Feb. 29, 1892. 15 “Is not all America now appealing to Heaven against the injustice of being taxed...We are persuaded that an entire freedom from being taxed by civil rulers...is not mere favor from any men in the world but a right and property granted us by God, who commands us to stand fast in it.” Amendment I (Religion): Document 21, Isaac Backus, A History of New England 1774—75, (http://presspubs.uchicago.edu:80/founders/documents/amendI_religions21.html). (Bolded Emphasis Added) 16 "…under the Constitution, the people get their sanction from God whereas persons under the law are contracted with the state for privileges of existence relative to the system of the Number of Man (i.e., 666). And, as I'm sure your aware, Yeshu's mission involved the process of overcoming that ancient system of novation which is set forth in the Book of Genesis (41:1-4; 41:17-21) as Pharaoh's dream of the beasts of the field which ate up everything and left the people without their money (Genesis 47:13-15), without the rights to their lands, and in a state of slavery (Genesis 47:18-22). Under that ancient system of novation (the Biblical Beast) even the church which has contracted with the state for privileges of existence is in fact a creature of the state (Genesis 47:23-27). All of which means, we are looking at a very impressive system whereby each and every member of that system would by an abstract "social" necessity view any-and-all adversaries to such a system of slavery as indeed very dangerous and monstrous, such that the danger and
13

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fraud involving only silence in the face of the People who act to peaceably procure relief was defined long ago in the Act passed unanimously by the Continental Congress and expounded upon by Thomas Jefferson as the People’s Right of “…intercession for redress of grievances and reestablishment of rights…” was to withhold money. 39. In the past, the courts have been asked to specifically review the historical context and purpose of the clause – the Framers’ intent which provides a declaration of the intended effect of the accountability clause – determining the Rights of the People and the obligations of the Government as guaranteed by the Clause, but given that the courts have thus far refused to provide any interpretation (See for instance, Judge Rogers concurring opinion in We The People Found. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir., 2007) in which the decision upon appeal was to “not resolve this debate”), with rehearing en banc denied (Aug. 3, 2007), certiorari denied (January 7, 2008), and certiorari denied without comment on February 25, 2008 as well, it would be a very grave injustice to simply allow the Government Contractor (the IRS) to continue to violate the fundamental rights of the People for which there is protection in the Federal Constitution (see Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581-582 (1937)), and simply because of the basic honesty of Judge Rogers, the question still remains as to whether Defendant (“the Internal Revenue Service”) is obligated under the Constitution to respond with specific, official answers to the questions put forth by We The People in their Petitions for Redress of Grievances; whether The People may retain their money without retaliation if their grievances are not redressed. THE PLAINTIFFS ASKED FOR THE COMPLAINT TO BE SEALED BUT IRRESPECTIVE OF THAT, THE PLAINTIFFS HAD A RIGHT TO WORK WHICH WAS DENIED FIRST BY THE IRS AND THEREAFTER BY THE DISTRICT COURT 40. Moving right along, in Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 3, the Court entered that “The Court sealed the Complaint for sixty days and denied the preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiffs served the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of New York (“USAO”) with copy of the Complaint on March 17, 2008. On May 9, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend three pages of the Complaint and again seeking preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 4. On May 16, 2008, the Court granted the motion to amend and denied the motion for preliminary injunctive relief, finding that Plaintiffs had “not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim.” Dkt. No. 5. On May 30, 2008, Plaintiffs filed an amended Motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 10.” 41. With respect to the Court’s statement that “The Court sealed the Complaint for sixty days and denied the preliminary injunctive relief” (see Docket Entry No. 3), Plaintiffs had only applied to have the complaint be sealed at that time (see Docket Entry No. 2) and when the Plaintiffs were handed a copy of the Order they were only told that it
monstrosity would not be "only in the eyes of those who would want the model of `powers-that-be' perpetrated ad infinitum."

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was the Order sealing the complaint. Plaintiffs thereupon simply brought the Order and copy of the Complaint from the Court Clerk’s Office located on the fifth floor down to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of New York (“USAO”) located on the forth floor. Plaintiffs had no reason to not believed Court Clerk when they were simply told that it was the Order sealing the complaint, did not read the USAO’s copy prior to delivery, and Plaintiffs had no reason to believe that the District Court would do anything more than seal the Complaint for sixty as requested. 42. Plaintiffs explained in the Complaint that they would be applying to have the Complaint sealed for sixty days (see Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 12), which was further supported by Footnote No. 14 which reads as follows: “Plaintiffs are concerned about possible extensions. The reason Plaintiffs have a concern is that along with IRS Form 668-A(ICS), the IRS agent notified Plaintiffs’ employer in January that once they are in receipt of the levy they can not issue an advance, and the only funds allowed to be deducted are State fees. Yet the actual contract calls for Plaintiffs’ employer to advance the expense moneys to pay for fuel and tolls (which at current prices runs about 45-50 cents on every dollar they make) to complete the contracted job. Without these contracted funds from their employer, Plaintiffs are unable to work. In addition, on February 1, 2008 Plaintiffs employer notified them that he just received another form, Form 668W(ICS), which puts us out of work permanently unless and until this Honorable Court provides Injunctive Relief. Because Plaintiffs live in the truck they work out of (maintaining their PO Box as their legal address), without the ability to make truck payments Plaintiffs and their thirteen year old son will be homeless very soon.” 43. It is also very hard to believe that there could have been any misunderstandings in terms of the Plaintiffs right to return to work so that we can begin to pay our bills again and feed ourselves and our son as the case proceeds being at stake, as further shown by Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 15 reads “… interferences with Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Right of Contract (which has effectively put them out of work) …”, with Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 86 reading “… in the process Plaintiffs are out of work unless or until this Honorable Court grants Injunctive Relief…” and Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 91 reading “In addition, along with the last IRS Form 668-A(ICS) Notice of Levy dated January 3, 2008, served upon the Plaintiffs’ Employer, the IRS attached a letter notifying the employer that “This will attach to all funds due Karen Greene. Once you are in receipt of this levy you can not issue Karen Greene an advance. The only funds allowed to be deducted are State fees.” And finally, Plaintiffs employer notified them that they (the employer) received another form, IRS Form 668-W(ICS), dated January 28, 2008, which has served to put the Plaintiffs out of work all together, unless or until this Honorable Court provides Injunctive Relief…” and finally, the subject of the Plaintiffs right to work being at issue was also presented in Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 168, 174, 194 which reads “…including but not limited to the substantial financial difficulties of having been put out of work…” 44. However, because of the deprivation of many of their rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights and the onslaught of ongoing Felonies being committed against them by the IRS, Plaintiffs did not have an active bank account 17

at the time to access Court documents through PACER, and therefore did not know that the Court had denied the preliminary injunctive relief at the time that the Court sealed the Complaint. In any event, the District Court can not possibly say it did not know that the qui tam Plaintiffs were complaining about the ongoing process of constructive frauds, which are FELONIES, that the IRS committed against them, including haven taken what little money qui tam Plaintiffs had and actually interfered with the Plaintiffs’ employment contract to the extent that the Plaintiffs had been put out of work and/or were asking for injunctive relief throughout various documents to restore our Right to work, to keep our jobs, make our truck payments, keep a roof over our heads so that we would not be at risk of being homeless, and begin to pay our bills to afford to feed ourselves and our son as the case proceeds (Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 15,85,86,91,168,174,194; Docket Entry No. 4 ¶¶ 1,10,16,18,20; Docket Entry No. 10 ¶¶ 1,4,7,11,15,16,22,26; Docket Entry No.11 ¶ 1; Docket Entry No. 14 ¶¶ 3,4,23,25; Docket Entry No. 18 ¶¶ 10,11; Docket #19 ¶ 2; Docket Entry No. 21 ¶¶ 3,6,7,14; Docket #24 ¶ 26; Docket Entry 26 ¶ 1; Docket Entry No. 32 ¶ 1). ON THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 45. Next, the Court entered (Docket Entry No. 33, ¶ 21 line 3) “Based on this Court’s findings that, inter alia, the claim cannot survive under the False Claims Act and there is no jurisdiction, the Court need not address whether Plaintiffs’ rambling complaint warrants an application of the Tax Bar to the present case.” 46. In response, qui tam Plaintiffs put forth that they did in fact style their complaint in the nature of a Qui Tam (i.e., Latin for "he who sues in this matter for the king as for himself"), and in connection with any-and-all laws governing “public interest suits” asked for the complaint to be sealed and provided the US Attorney a copy of the complaint as well as supplying the US Attorney and US Department of Justice with a Disclosure Statement (Exhibit No. 44) with the heading of United States of America, ex rel., William M. Greene, Karen M. Greene, Plaintiffs v. Internal Revenue Services, Defendant, Case No. 08-cv-0280 LEK/DRH. 47. All of this was done without setting forth any of the provisions of the False Claims Act in their complaint, and although qui tam Plaintiffs did discuss the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., extensively, but far from exclusively, in their Disclosure Statement, the Plaintiffs also used the Disclosure Statement as a vehicle to explain that “The Qui Tam Action filed in the Case No. 08-cv-0280 offered the Brief Description on the Civil Cover Sheet as “Constitutional Rights Violations including Peonage, Major Fraud, Mail & Bank Fraud", and the Suit has thirty-eight pages of Causes of Action, listing fifty-eight separate Causes of Action which have been developed against the IRS rather than the IRS Agents themselves. Causes of Action include the IRS Officials having been involved in the suppression of evidence submitted to the Senate Finance Committee and IRS falsification of damages (False Claims) which includes Fraud upon the Court in a § 6700 suit (Case No. 1:07-cv-0352) against qui tam Plaintiffs’ participating organization (Robert Schulz/WTP Organization). Many of the Causes of Action also focus on the fact that EVERY IRS Notice of Lien is signed by a person other 18

than the one named in type, and with respect to the Levy or Notice of Levy, 26 USC § 6332(c) expressly states that a Levy can ONLY be made on a bank (as defined in section § 408 (n)) if an attachment or execution under judicial process is included with the Levy or Notice of Levy, and EVERY Notice of Levy is executed without that necessary Abstract Judgment (i.e., the necessary court order)!!!” (Exhibit No. 44 ¶ 91). All of which is offered in support of the Plaintiffs’ statement that their complaint does not list the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and they are not subject to the provisions of the False Claims Act. ON THE RAMBLING COMPLAINT 48. The next point Plaintiffs would seek to address is the size of their complaint, or what the District Court refers to as “Plaintiffs’ rambling complaint” by once again pointing out that Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 6 , footnote number 12 which reads “…As a Qui Tam Action, the information provided in the present text will allow the U.S. Attorney and the Justice Department to review the case and decided whether or not the U.S. Attorneys will investigate charges against the Government Contractor (IRS), as well as to outline the fraud that has been perpetrated even upon this very Court. After review by the U.S. Attorney and Justice Department, permission will be sought from the Court to downsize the text presented within this suit such that most if not all the referencing footnotes will be removed.” 49. However, after Plaintiff William M. Greene contacted the US Attorney’s Office on April 4, 2008, we were informed by US Attorney William H. Pease, Esq., “that due consideration was not being considered/given and that the complaint had been simply forwarded to the Tax Division” (See Docket Entry No. 4 ¶ 5), and under these conditions, there was simply no reason to be concerned with downsizing a complaint that was already in the possession of anyone other than the District Court and the US Attorney’s Office.17 ON THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 50. The question also remains if the District Court erred by ruling that the IRS is an agency of the U.S. Government with only prima facie evidence in a case where Plaintiffs have developed their Qui Tam Action in the spirit and intent that there is nothing so wrong with our government that what is right with our government can’t correct where “the action is NOT brought against the US Government nor any
17

Plaintiffs were not aware that yet another mockery of the judicial system had occurred, where the District Court’s Orders were inconsistent with the positions made under oath in a prior proceeding by the US Attorneys and the US Department of Justice, and the District Court had biased the action prior to the US Attorneys being provided with copy of the Action and prior to the US Attorneys and the US Department of Justice being provided with the Plaintiffs’ Disclosure Statement. 19

Federal Government Employee who may or may not be appointed...” (See Docket Entry No. 22 ¶ 6) and in a case where qui tam Plaintiffs have also submitted that the term “Government Contractor” is appropriate for the IRS per the pleadings in Diversified Metal Products, Inc., v. T-Bow Company Trust, Internal Revenue Service, and Steven Morgan (Civil No. 93-405-E-EJL, UNITED STATES’ ANSWER AND CLAIM) wherein both Betty Richardson, a United States Attorney, and Richard R. Ward, a United States Department of Justice Trial Attorney, Tax Division,“Denies that Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United States Government ...” (See Page #2 – Exhibit 1, 2 of 6, ¶ 4), and as set forth throughout the various documents before this court (Dockets No. 1 and 6, Footnote No. 30; Docket No. 17 ¶ 2), the United States Supreme Court has explained that “There was virtually no Washington bureaucracy created by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, the statute to which the present Internal Revenue Service can be traced” (Referencing, [ Footnote 23 ] in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 297 (1979), after they searched for such an Act all the way back to the Civil War, and as a result, qui tam Plaintiffs have argued that (Docket Entry No. 24 ¶ 18; Docket Entry No. 32 ¶ 8) “… the doctrine of "judicial estoppel" is applicable (See Bates v. Long Island Railroad, 997 F.2d 1028, 2 A.D. Cases 1038 (2d Cir. 07/02/1993).” 51. “In this circuit, however, the doctrine remains good law. See, e.g., Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the doctrine of judicial estoppel as a rule that allows enforcement in later proceedings of a litigant's earlier commitment).” In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. CV 06-0983 at 77 (E.D.N.Y. 03/15/2007). As recently stated by the Second Circuit, "judicial estoppel applies only when a tribunal in a prior separate proceeding has relied on a party's inconsistent factual representations and rendered a favorable decision." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 120 (2d Cir. 2005)(quoting and citing cases).” Sunnyside Development Co., LLC v. Bank of New York, No. 07 Civ. 8825 at 22 (S.D.N.Y. 02/19/2008). Courts are especially inclined to extend comity to foreign proceedings when a party in the subsequent proceeding in the United States makes "arguments [that] smack of inconsistencies seemingly designed to game the system." Rapture Shipping, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 373. As a result, "the concepts of estoppel, and in particular judicial estoppel, have developed." Id. The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from "asserting a factual position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken by him in a prior legal proceeding." Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1993). Judicial estoppel aims to "preserve the sanctity of the oath by demanding absolute truth and consistency in all sworn positions" and to "protect judicial integrity by avoiding the risk of inconsistent results in two proceedings." Id. at 1038; see also In Re Galerie de Monnaies of Geneva, Ltd., 62 B.R. 224, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Judicial estoppel is invoked in these circumstances to prevent the party from playing fast and loose with the courts, and to protect the essential integrity of the judicial process.") (internal quotation marks omitted). There are two elements of judicial estoppel. "First, the party against whom the estoppel is asserted must have argued an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding; and second, the prior inconsistent position must have been adopted by the court in some manner." Bates, 997 F.2d at 1038. Sea Trade Company Ltd. v. Fleetboston Financial Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10254 at 31 (S.D.N.Y. 09/04/2008)

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"First, the inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior proceeding by the US Attorneys and the US Department of Justice. Second, such inconsistencies must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system." Id. As a preliminary matter that there arguably is no live dispute as to whether the IRS is judicially estopped, otherwise the Plaintiffs would be left to believe that one Court can rely on the statements of the us Attorneys and the US Department of Justice but if we, the qui tam Plaintiffs, try to bring the same before this court. That’s a violation of my due process of law where I can’t rely on the law, especially when we argued that the IRS was therefore barred by estoppel which was never referred to by the magistrate nor district court judge. Asseeded to the fraud. Suppressed evidence that is applicable to our case. Findings and conclusions as to why we were denied our due process. Plain clear statement.

WE HAD A RIGHT TO A PROPER PARTY IN OUR SUIT AND THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT SIMPLY IGNORED USCA2 MANDATE AND/OR DID NOT ACTUALLY COMPLY WITH THE MANDATE

In this same context, qui tam Plaintiffs have maintained that we have the right to a proper party in our suit and in addition to having made a mockery of the judicial system, where the District Court’s Orders were inconsistent with the positions made under oath in a prior proceeding by the US Attorneys and the US Department of Justice, and where the District Court had biased the action prior to the US Attorneys being provided with copy of the Action and prior to the US Attorneys and the US Department of Justice being provided with the Plaintiffs’ Disclosure Statement, the question must also be asked how it is that a District Court has the right and authority to Order “… that Plaintiffs file and serve the Amended Complaint on the Government and on the Defendant” (Docket Entry No. 5 ¶ 10) which not only held this case from moving forward but with the District Court’s insistence that the IRS was an agency it dominated every aspect of our case leading up to and including the dismissal (e.g., see Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 10, Docket Entry No. 34). Motion for the Court to Refusal Of Notice of Appearance And To Strike All Pleadings of Glenn T. Suddaby, United States Attorney, and Lisa L. Bellamy, Trial Attorney, Tax Division, U.S. Department Of Justice, In The Name Of The United States Because The United States Is NOT A Named Defendant In The Above Captioned Case (Docket Entry No. 14) 5. In a suit where we, as qui tam Plaintiffs, were first moved to file our (Docket Entry No. 24 ¶ 23) “… Request for leave to file an Interlocutory Appeal … to Motion the 21

Court to certify the question of the Court’s Error, for the United States cannot be both plaintiff and defendant at the same time, and that since it is stated that the United States is a plaintiff first wherein-by Plaintiffs believe it to be an opportune time for the U.S. Attorney and Justice Department to intervene on behalf of We, The People, the United States cannot be the defendant second …” the question arises as to whether the District Court can use the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., to both substitute the United States from it’s position of Plaintiff to that of a Defendant and dismiss a case when the provisions of the False Claims Act are not set forth in the complaint Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1001, 1031, 1341, 1344(2), 1346, 1581, 1621, 1622, 2113 & 3231, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1994. , and therefore qui tam Plaintiffs not only believe the Magistrate Judge erred when he referenced (Docket No. 23 ¶ 1 line 2) a section of US Code related 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) but that the U.S. District Judge repeated the same mistake by applying the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶¶ 5-8, 19-22), especially given that according to the USCA Mandate (Docket Entry No. 29), this subject is to be construed in terms of the Plaintiffs’ objections to USMJ order (Docket Entry No. 23), such that “The district court, on remand, is to construe Appellant`s application for an interlocutory appeal as an objection …where it has been shown that the magistrate judge`s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law"); Fed R. Civ.P. 72(a).” In a suit where qui tam Plaintiffs reserved their rights as Private Attorneys General (de jure) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 (Docket Entry Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 13; Docket Entry No. 21 ¶ 21-22) and set forth the elements of slavery and/or peonage as being criminal in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1581 and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ (2, 6, 16, 32, 34, 39, 40, 55, 112, 113, 139, 140, 146, 152, 153, 157), and sought preliminary Injunctive Relief Due to the on-going nature and extent of the irreparable harm caused by the IRS’s intentional obstruction of justice and unlawful abridgement of certain Inalienable Rights, including the interferences with Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Right of Contract which has effectively “put them out of work” (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 15 & 85; Docket No. 21 ¶ 4, 7-8, 15) “unless or until this Honorable Court grants Injunctive Relief” (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 86), did the District Court err in ignoring slavery and/or peonage set forth in terms of causes of action which were comprised of both criminal and civil liabilities (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 160 (as 18 U.S.C. § 241 & 18 U.S.C. § 1031), 164 (as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343), 165 (as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983), 199, 201 (as 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 31 C.F.R. 0.208) and 209 (as 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2)) as well as by denying the Plaintiffs their right to work, in which the infringement to their right to work was set forth in terms of causes of action set forth comprised of both criminal (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 168 (as 18 U.S.C. § 241), 174 (as 18 U.S.C. § 1341) and civil liabilities (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 194 (as 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and dismissing the case without showing that the criminal elements of the complaint were frivolous. And finally, the question remains how the District Court can continue to maintain that “… Judge Homer correctly concluded that the United States was not a plaintiff in this action because it had never sought to intervene …” (see Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 5) when 22

the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., are not set forth in the complaint and qui tam Plaintiffs reserved their rights as Private Attorneys General (de jure) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 and guaranteed protection when stating in Docket Entry Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 13 that the Supreme Court held, “It would also be preferable to Plaintiffs if the U.S. Attorney and the Justice Department intervened in this Qui Tam Action, but in the event they should not, Plaintiffs point to the fact that the Supreme Court held that, “…This and other federal courts have repeatedly held that individual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as "representatives of the public interest." ScrippsHoward Radio v. Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4, 14. See also Commission v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477; Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694; Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994. Compare Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 137 -139. And see, on actions qui tam, Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 ; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546 . The various lines of authority are by no means free of difficulty, and certain of the cases may be explicable as involving a personal, if remote, economic interest…” See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968).”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Qui tam Plaintiffs have presented our suit as a “public interest suit” and have come before the United States District Court for Northern New York in the spirit and intent that there is nothing so wrong with our government that what is right with our government can’t correct, and have further submitted that the United States of America was created as a Judeo-Christian Nation18 and supported the same by presenting the historical context of the formation of our Nation as a “Christian nation” (Docket Entry Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 9114019&20), as well as to have presented other historical reference (Docket Entry Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 141-144) of the Talmud which supports their belief that the council or Sanhedrin in fact tried the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) for commanding His followers to not pay taxes when those taxes go to pay for things which are not in compliance with the Laws of God,21 are proponents of civic action with the emphasis on enforcement of the
In keeping with their belief systems with respect to the teachings of the monastic order of Pharisees (i.e., Nazarean) known as the Essenes, recognition is given to the fact that the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) was after all a Jewish Rabbi. 19 Also See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S. 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 Feb. 29, 1892. 20 “Is not all America now appealing to Heaven against the injustice of being taxed...We are persuaded that an entire freedom from being taxed by civil rulers...is not mere favor from any men in the world but a right and property granted us by God, who commands us to stand fast in it.” Amendment I (Religion): Document 21, Isaac Backus, A History of New England 1774—75, (http://presspubs.uchicago.edu:80/founders/documents/amendI_religions21.html). 21 "…under the Constitution, the people get their sanction from God whereas persons under the law are contracted with the state for privileges of existence relative to the system of the Number of Man (i.e., 666). And, as I'm sure your aware, Yeshu's mission involved the process of overcoming that ancient system of novation which is set forth in the Book of Genesis (41:1-4; 41:17-21) as Pharaoh's dream of the beasts of the field which ate up everything and left the people without their money (Genesis 47:13-15), without the
18

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People’s Rights and the Government’s obligations under the Constitution, especially the Petition Clause of the First Amendment,22 were also Plaintiffs signed onto WTP Foundation’s original historic Right-to-Petition Lawsuit (USDC Case No. 04-cv-01211), and have submitted many Exhibits, including one example of the documents submitted to the United States Senate Finance Committee Meeting which was later suppressed (Exhibit 323), following which it was publically announced that WTP Petitions were being responded to with enforcement actions (Exhibit 424), following which retaliatory enforcement acts essentially meant to overthrow the Constitution has even been perpetrated upon this same District Court25 in which falsified damages/evidence have been admitted to twice26&27 where the US Attorneys were used to involve others from the
rights to their lands, and in a state of slavery (Genesis 47:18-22). Under that ancient system of novation (the Biblical Beast) even the church which has contracted with the state for privileges of existence is in fact a creature of the state (Genesis 47:23-27). All of which means, we are looking at a very impressive system whereby each and every member of that system would by an abstract "social" necessity view any-and-all adversaries to such a system of slavery as indeed very dangerous and monstrous, such that the danger and monstrosity would not be "only in the eyes of those who would want the model of `powers-that-be' perpetrated ad infinitum." 22 “As a matter of litigation of WTP Foundation’s historic Right-to-Petition Lawsuit, We the People v. United States (USDC Case No. 04-cv-01211), the remedy for the act(s) of fraud involving only silence in the face of the People who act to peaceably procure relief is set forth as having been defined long ago in Act passed unanimously by the Continental Congress. (See Journals of the Continental Congress. Journals 1:105-113.), and expounded upon by Thomas Jefferson as the People’s Right of “…intercession for redress of grievances and reestablishment of rights…” (See Thomas Jefferson: Reply to Lord North, 1775. Papers 1:225.). 23 Exhibit No. 3 is a copy of a letter from Senator Inouye’s office, dated June 26, 1989, stating that “Based on the research performed by the Congressional Research Service, there is no provision which specifically and unequivocally requires an individual to pay income taxes." 24 Exhibit No. 4 is a copy of David Cay Johnston’s September 17, 2003 The New York Times article in which the IRS publically announced that they were responding to WTP Petitions with enforcement actions. 25 In its complaint, an IRS Agent who goes by the name of "David Gordon" claimed that as a consequence of WTP’s “Operation Stop Withholding” the IRS had to spend $1,600 to prepare a “substitute for return” for each of 997 people for each of three years (i.e., over $4,700,000). In other words, Gordon led the Court to believe that as part of Operation Stop Withholding, 997 workers had submitted the WTP withholding forms to their companies, the companies stopped withholding and the workers kept the money from the IRS. Worse yet, Gordon led the Court to believe that “while WTP sometimes gave the material away for free, WTP normally received $20 for each Blue Folder it distributed.” 26 The Government Contractor’s transparent motive was to use We The People's Speech related to the Blue Folder as a front, or pretext for its real objective -- to fully silence We The People and thereby shut down the Right to Petition program, and the Government Contractor (IRS) clearly knew or had reason to know that when they estimated cost to the U.S. Treasury, listing damages attributable to filing substitutes for the 2991 unfiled returns equaling $4,806,537 to the distribution of the “Tax Termination Package” as part of “Operation Stop Withholding,” for in order for the IRS to be able to associate and list said damages as being attributable to the said “Tax Termination Package” as part of “Operation Stop Withholding” they clearly would have had to have some idea of the names to which the Blue Folder had been distributed, and in this context evidence of the falsification of damages was provided to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on Sept 18, 2007 through the statement of the Government assigned Counsel in which she reveled that "it's not clear to me how either the Defendants or the Government could know whether those individuals used the materials … the IRS obviously can't investigate whether those individuals have been failing to pay tax returns until it has the list of individuals…" and this statement alone is evidence of the fact that the IRS’s claims to the effect that its efforts to develop alternate tax returns were as a result of We The People's "Blue Folder" and the Government Contractor’s claim of harm caused by the distribution of

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US Department of Justice to deprive us of our natural Rights, and although peonage is unconstitutional in the context of Article 1 § 2(3) and an Article 1 § 8(1) pursuant to Article 1 § 9(4) and criminal in the context of 18 USC § 1581 and 42 USC § 1994 we, the Plaintiffs, not once (Docket Entry No. 3) but twice (Docket Entry No. 5) have been denied Injunctive Relief to allow us to return to work so that we can begin to pay our bills again and feed ourselves and our son as the case proceeds (Also See Docket Entry No. 10), and on November 24th 2008 quit tam Plaintiffs Requested a Hearing Date Regarding the United States Court of Appeals September 29, 2008 Mandate and Our Right to a Proper Party in Our Suit (Docket Entry No. 30), which per the USCA Mandate (Docket Entry No. 29), is to be construed as objections to USMJ order (Docket Entry No. 23), such that “The district court, on remand, is to construe Appellant`s application for an interlocutory appeal as an objection …where it has been shown that the magistrate judge`s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law"); Fed R. Civ.P. 72(a).” The difference between unalienable and inalienable is important, simply because unalienable rights are subject to contract and inalienable rights are not: that is, servitude/peonage is a crime when defined in relation to a violation of one’s inalienable rights, and it does not matter whether or not the person knew or had reason to know, was willing or not or anything else; that is, peonage is a crime in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1581 and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 period, and without a clear understanding of the same qui tam Plaintiffs suspect it would be difficult at best for many to understand that Freedom from Tax-Slavery is a Fundamental First Amendment Right.28

as a preliminary matter that there arguably is no live dispute as to whether the IRS is judicially estopped. Your telling me that one court can rely on the statements of the us Attorneys and the US Department of Justice but if we, the qui tam Plaintiffs, try to bring
the “Blue Folder” is not only totally groundless but because it was used to falsify damages to qualify in terms of an Article III complaint it constitutes yet another serious crime. 27 In addition, although Arthur Catterall of the Justice Department refused to admit error in the District Court’s opinion within his Oral Argument Before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (United States v. Robert L. Schulz, et al., Docket 07-3729-cv) on February 4, 2008, he also provided much the same evidence of the falsification of damages by stating “Oh, because…I think…and again…I don’t know exactly what’s in the record. My understanding was the need to get the names of the people who received these material is, in part, to be able to contact them to find people who have been taken in by this plan and, uh, alert them, look you need to file your returns, pay your taxes, withhold from your employees or there is going to be…” 28 “Is not all America now appealing to Heaven against the injustice of being taxed...We are persuaded that an entire freedom from being taxed by civil rulers...is not mere favor from any men in the world but a right and property granted us by God, who commands us to stand fast in it.” Amendment I (Religion): Document 21, Isaac Backus, A History of New England 1774—75, (http://presspubs.uchicago.edu:80/founders/documents/amendI_religions21.html).

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the same before this court. That’s a violation of my due process of law where I can’t rely on the law, especially when we argued that the IRS was therefore barred by estoppel which was never referred to by the magistrate nor district court judge. Asseeded to the fraud. Suppressed evidence that is applicable to our case. Findings and conclusions as to why we were denied our due process. Plain clear statement. Of course, even though there is nothing stated within the Qui Tam Action which would in any way seek to interfere with a lawful government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn appears to have violated Rule 605 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by entering facts not in evidence and for issuing rulings based on alleged facts not in evidence.
judges for giving legal advice, for testifying as to alleged facts not in evidence, and for issuing rulings based on alleged facts not in evidence. FRE Rule 605. Competency of Judge as Witness The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point. I don't know why you did not make that part of your interlocutory appeal (objection). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: “No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; …” [Bolded Emphasis Added]

other "Where does the evidence record show authenticated, properly admitted evidence that the
IRS has US Government Agency credentials bestowed upon it by an Act of Congress? Since the record contains no such evidence, we must therefore assume none exists, and that the IRS does not have US Government Agency status. You must sustain my objection on this basis." Since the government attorney declared in that case you referenced that the IRS is not an agency, and since nobody presented evidence in the form of an Act of Congress to rebutt it, therefore this court must accept it as an adjudicative fact under rule 201. FRE Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts (a) Scope of rule.—This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. (b) Kinds of facts.—A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) Besides, in spite of how many times the judge or magistrate has wrongly operated on the assumption that the IRS has US Government Agency status, the jurist must have personal knowledge of any fact alleged:

FRE Rule 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal 26

knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW TO VACATE ORDER OF DISMISSAL W

This action has been brought in the public interest charging the Government Contractor (Internal Revenue Service) with varying degrees of performance related issues that go beyond their scope of duty, such that the IRS is not a proper party as an Agency of our Government, and accordingly, given that the United States of America was created as a “Judeo[3]”-“Christian nation” (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 91-140[4]&[5]) and the historical reference (Docket Nos. 1 and 6 ¶¶ 141-144) of the Talmud presents the fact that the council or Sanhedrin in fact tried the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) for commanding His followers to not pay taxes when those taxes go to pay for things which are not in compliance with the Laws of God,[6] and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” and the historic remedy for the act(s) of fraud involving only silence in the face of the People who act to peaceably procure relief as defined long ago in the Act passed unanimously by the Continental Congress and expounded upon by Thomas Jefferson as the People’s Right of “…intercession for redress of grievances and reestablishment of rights…” was to withhold money, as the question still remains as to whether Defendant (“the Internal Revenue Service”) is obligated under the Constitution to respond with specific, official answers to the questions put forth by We The People in their Petitions for Redress of Grievances; whether The People may retain their money without retaliation if their grievances are not redressed. In the past, the courts have been asked to specifically review the historical context and purpose of the clause – the Framers’ intent which provides a declaration of the intended effect of the accountability clause – determining the Rights of the People and the obligations of the Government as guaranteed by the Clause, but given that the courts have thus far refused to provide any interpretation (See for instance, Judge Rogers concurring opinion in We The People Found. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir., 2007) in which the decision upon appeal was to “not resolve this debate”), with rehearing en banc denied (Aug. 3, 2007), certiorari denied (January 7, 2008), and certiorari denied without comment on February 25, 2008 as well, it would be a very grave injustice to simply allow the Government Contractor (the IRS) to continue to violate the fundamental rights of the People for which there is protection in the Federal Constitution (see Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581-582 (1937)).

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The question remains how the District Court can rule that the IRS is an agency of the U.S. Government with only prima facie evidence in a case where Plaintiffs have developed their Qui Tam Action in the spirit and intent that there is nothing so wrong with our government that what is right with our government can’t correct where “the action is NOT brought against the US Government nor any Federal Government Employee who may or may not be appointed...” (See Docket Entry No. 22 ¶ 6) and in a case where qui tam Plaintiffs have also submitted that the term “Government Contractor” is appropriate for the IRS per the pleadings in Diversified Metal Products, Inc., v. T-Bow Company Trust, Internal Revenue Service, and Steven Morgan (Civil No. 93-405-E-EJL, UNITED STATES’ ANSWER AND CLAIM) wherein both Betty Richardson, a United States Attorney, and Richard R. Ward, a United States Department of Justice Trial Attorney, Tax Division,“Denies that Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United States Government ...” (See Page #2 – Exhibit 1, 2 of 6, ¶ 4), and as set forth throughout the various documents before this court (Dockets No. 1 and 6, Footnote No. 30; Docket No. 17 ¶ 2), the United States Supreme Court has explained that “There was virtually no Washington bureaucracy created by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, the statute to which the present Internal Revenue Service can be traced” (Referencing, [ Footnote 23 ] in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 297 (1979), after they searched for such an Act all the way back to the Civil War, and as a result, qui tam Plaintiffs have argued that (Docket Entry No. 24 ¶ 18; Docket Entry No. 32 ¶ 8) “… the doctrine of "judicial estoppel" is applicable (See Bates v. Long Island Railroad, 997 F.2d 1028, 2 A.D. Cases 1038 (2d Cir. 07/02/1993).” Your telling me that one court can rely on the statements of the us Attorneys and the US Department of Justice but if we, the qui tam Plaintiffs, try to bring the same before this court. That’s a violation of my due process of law where I can’t rely on the law. Brred by estople which was never referred to by the magistrate nor district court judge. Asseeded to the fraud. Surpressed evidence that is applicable to our case. Findings and conclusions as to why we were denied our due process. Plain clear statement.

4. In this same context, qui tam Plaintiffs have maintained that we have the right to a proper party in our suit and the question must also be asked how it is that a District Court has the right and authority to Order “… that Plaintiffs file and serve the Amended Complaint on the Government and on the Defendant” (Docket Entry No. 5 ¶ 10) which not only held this case from moving forward but with the District Court’s insistence that the IRS was an agency it dominated every aspect of our case leading up to and including the dismissal (e.g., see Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 10, Docket Entry No. 34). 5. In a suit where we, as qui tam Plaintiffs, were first moved to file our (Docket Entry No. 24 ¶ 23) “… Request for leave to file an Interlocutory Appeal … to Motion the Court to certify the question of the Court’s Error, for the United States cannot be both plaintiff and defendant at the same time, and that since it is stated that the United States is a plaintiff first wherein-by Plaintiffs believe it to be an opportune time for the U.S. 28

Attorney and Justice Department to intervene on behalf of We, The People, the United States cannot be the defendant second …” the question arises as to whether the District Court can use the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., to both substitute the United States from it’s position of Plaintiff to that of a Defendant and dismiss a case when the provisions of the False Claims Act are not set forth in the complaint Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1001, 1031, 1341, 1344(2), 1346, 1581, 1621, 1622, 2113 & 3231, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1994, and therefore qui tam Plaintiffs not only believe the Magistrate Judge errored when he referenced (Docket No. 23, Line No. 2 ¶ 1) a section of US Code related 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) and the U.S. District Judge repeated the same mistake by applying the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., (Docket Entry No. 33 ¶¶ 5-8, 19-22), especially given that according to the USCA Mandate (Docket Entry No. 29), this subject is to be construed in terms of the Plaintiffs’ objections to USMJ order (Docket Entry No. 23), such that “The district court, on remand, is to construe Appellant`s application for an interlocutory appeal as an objection …where it has been shown that the magistrate judge`s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law"); Fed R. Civ.P. 72(a).” 6. In a complaint that is comprised of both criminal and civil liabilities, the question must be asked how any court can dismiss the case without showing that the criminal elements of the complaint were frivolous. 7. And finally, the question remains how the District Court can continue to maintain that “… Judge Homer correctly concluded that the United States was not a plaintiff in this action because it had never sought to intervene …” (see Docket Entry No. 33 ¶ 5) when the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., are not se forth in the complaint and qui tam Plaintiffs reserved their rights as Private Attorneys General (de jure) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 and guaranteed protection when stating in Docket Entry Nos. 1 and 6 ¶ 13 that the Supreme Court held, “It would also be preferable to Plaintiffs if the U.S. Attorney and the Justice Department intervened in this Qui Tam Action, but in the event they should not, Plaintiffs point to the fact that the Supreme Court held that, “…This and other federal courts have repeatedly held that individual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as "representatives of the public interest." ScrippsHoward Radio v. Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4, 14. See also Commission v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477; Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694; Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994. Compare Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 137 -139. And see, on actions qui tam, Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 ; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546 . The various lines of authority are by no means free of difficulty, and certain of the cases may be explicable as involving a personal, if remote, economic interest…” See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968).”

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[1] Plaintiffs use of the term Liberty, when defined apart from the limited subject of freedom chattel slavery, also includes freedom from peonage and freedom from all other forms of slavery as well. [2] …under the Constitution, the people get their sanction from God whereas persons under the law are contracted with the state for privileges of existence relative to the system of the Number of Man (i.e., 666). And, as I'm sure your aware, Yeshu's mission involved the process of overcoming that ancient system of novation which is set forth in the Book of Genesis (41:1-4; 41:17-21) as Pharaoh's dream of the beasts of the field which ate up everything and left the people without their money (Genesis 47:13-15), without the rights to their lands, and in a state of slavery (Genesis 47:18-22). Under that ancient system of novation (the Biblical Beast) even the church which has contracted with the state for privileges of existence is in fact a creature of the state (Genesis 47:2327). All of which means, we are looking at a very impressive system whereby each and every member of that system would by an abstract "social" necessity view any-and-all adversaries to such a system of slavery as indeed very dangerous and monstrous, such that the danger and monstrosity would not be "only in the eyes of those who would want the model of `powers-that-be' perpetrated ad infinitum." [3] In keeping with their belief systems with respect to the teachings of the monastic order of Pharisees (i.e., Nazarean) known as the Essenes, recognition is given to the fact that the good Rabbi Yeshu Ben Yosef (Jesus) was after all a Jewish Rabbi. [4] Also See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S. 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 Feb. 29, 1892. [5] “Is not all America now appealing to Heaven against the injustice of being taxed...We are persuaded that an entire freedom from being taxed by civil rulers...is not mere favor from any men in the world but a right and property granted us by God, who commands us to stand fast in it.” Amendment I (Religion): Document 21, Isaac Backus, A History of New England 1774—75, (http://presspubs.uchicago.edu:80/founders/documents/amendI_religions21.html). (Bolded Emphasis Added) [6] "…under the Constitution, the people get their sanction from God whereas persons under the law are contracted with the state for privileges of existence relative to the system of the Number of Man (i.e., 666). And, as I'm sure your aware, Yeshu's mission involved the process of overcoming that ancient system of novation which is set forth in the Book of Genesis (41:1-4; 41:17-21) as Pharaoh's dream of the beasts of the field which ate up everything and left the people without their money (Genesis 47:13-15), without the rights to their lands, and in a state of slavery (Genesis 47:18-22). Under that ancient system of novation (the Biblical Beast) even the church which has contracted with the state for privileges of existence is in fact a creature of the state (Genesis 47:2327). All of which means, we are looking at a very impressive system whereby each and every member of that system would by an abstract "social" necessity view any-and-all adversaries to such a system of slavery as indeed very dangerous and monstrous, such that the danger and monstrosity would not be "only in the eyes of those who would want the model of `powers-that-be' perpetrated ad infinitum." 30

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