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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs. TODD A. BOULANGER,
) ) )
Count One: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy)
The United States of America, by and through the undersigned attorneys for the Public Integrity Section. Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, and Todd A. Boulanger (hereinafter referred to as the 'defendant") enter into the following agreement: Charges and Statutory Penalties The defendant agrees to plead guilty to Count One of the Information, conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. 2. The defendant understands that Count One has the following essential elements, each of which the United States would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial: a. First, an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offense against the United States, that is, devising and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud another of the intangible right to honest services, and, for the purpose of executing that scheme and artifice to defraud, transmitting and causing to transmit writings by means of interstate wire communications;
b. Second, that the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy described in paragraph a. above with the intent to commit honest services fraud; and c. Third, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 3. The defendant understands that pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, Count One carries a maximum sentence of 5 years of imprisonment, a fine of $250,000 or a fine of twice the pecuniary gain or loss pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), a $100 special assessment, and a three-year term of supervised release, an order of restitution, and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines or restitution not timely made. 4. lfthe Court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty and the defendant fulfills each of the terms and conditions of this agreement, the United States agrees that it will not further prosecute the defendant for any crimes described in the attached factual basis or for any conduct of the defendant now known to the Public Integrity Section and to the law enforcement agents working with the Public Integrity Section on the present investigation. Nothing in this agreement is intended to provide any limitation of liability arising out of any acts of violence. Factual Stipulations 5. The defendant agrees that the attached 'Factual Basis for Plea" fairly and accurately describes the defendant's actions and involvement in the offense to which the defendant is pleading guilty. The defendant knowingly, voluntarily and truthfully admits the facts set forth in the Factual Basis for Plea.
Sentencing 6. The defendant is aware that the sentence will be imposed by the Court after considering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G."). The defendant acknowledges and understands that the Court will compute an advisory sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines and that the applicable guidelines will be determined by the Court relying in part on the results of a Pre-Sentence Investigation by the Court's Probation Office, which investigation will commence after the guilty plea has been entered. The defendant is also aware that, under certain circumstances, the Court may depart from the advisory sentencing guideline range that it has computed, and may raise that advisory sentence up to and including the statutory maximum sentence or lower that advisory sentence. The defendant is further aware and understands that the Court is required to consider the advisory guideline range determined under the Sentencing Guidelines, but is not bound to impose that sentence; the Court is permitted to tailor the ultimate sentence in light of other statutory concerns, and such sentence may be either more severe or less severe than the Sentencing Guidelines' advisory sentence. Knowing these facts, the defendant understands and acknowledges that the Court has the authority to impose any sentence within and up to the statutory maximum authorized by law for the offense identified in paragraph I and that the defendant may not withdraw the plea solely as a result of the sentence imposed. 7. The United States reserves the right to inform the Court and the Probation Office of all facts pertinent to the sentencing process, including all relevant information concerning the offenses committed, whether charged or not, as well as concerning the defendant and the
defendant's background. Subject only to the express terms of any agreed-upon sentencing recommendations contained in this agreement, the United States further reserves the right to make any recommendation as to the quality and quantity of punishment. 8. The defendant is aware that any estimate of the probable sentence or the probable sentencing range relating to the defendant pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines that the defendant may have received from any source is only a prediction and not a promise, and is not binding on the United States, the Probation Office, or the Court, except as expressly provided in this plea agreement. Sentencing Guidelines Stipulations 9. The defendant understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the guidelines and policies promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 2003. The parties agree that the 2003 Edition of the Sentencing Guidelines is the edition that should apply to sentencing in this case. U,S.S.G. § 1 B 1 .11 (b)( I). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure ii (c)( I )(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties also agree to the following: a. Offense Level under the Guidelines The parties agree to recommend that the total offense level applicable to the defendant's offense conduct is level 18. This calculation is based upon U.S.S.G. § 2C1.7(a), which prescribes a base offense level of 10, and U.S.S.G. § 2C1,7(b)(1)(B), which provides for an 8-level upward adjustment where the offense involves an official holding a high-level decision-making or sensitive position. The parties agree that this adjustment applies because it is greater than or equal to any
adjustment which might otherwise have applied based on value under U.S.S.G. § 2C1 .7(b)(1)(A) and 2B1.I. b. Acceptance of Responsibility Provided that the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the United States, through the defendant's allocution and subsequent conduct prior to the imposition of sentence, the United States agrees that a 2-level reduction would be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(a). The United States, however, may oppose any adjustment for acceptance of responsibility if the defendant: i. fails to admit a complete factual basis for the plea at the time the defendant is sentenced or at any other time; ii. challenges the adequacy or sufficiency of the United States' offer of proof at any time after the plea is entered; iii. denies involvement in the offense; iv. gives conflicting statements about that involvement or is untruthful with the Court, the United States or the Probation Office; v. fails to give complete and accurate information about the defendant's financial status to the Probation Office; vi. obstructs or attempts to obstruct justice, prior to sentencing; vii. has engaged in conduct prior to signing this plea agreement which reasonably could be viewed as obstruction or an attempt to obstruct justice, and has
failed to fully disclose such conduct to the United States prior to signing this plea agreement; viii. fails to appear in court as required; ix. after signing this plea agreement, engages in additional criminal conduct; or x. attempts to withdraw the plea of guilty. If the defendant has accepted responsibility as described above, and the defendant's offense level is sixteen or greater, the United States agrees that an additional 1-level reduction would be appropriate, pursuant to § 3E1.1(b), U.S.S.G., because the defendant has assisted authorities by providing timely notice of the defendant's intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the United States to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to allocate its resources efficiently. In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level is 15 (after a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility). The United States agrees that no other Chapters Two or Three adjustments are warranted. c. Criminal History Category Based upon the information now available to the United States (including representations by the defense), it appears that the defendant has no prior criminal history. In accordance with the above, the defendant's Criminal History Category is I. d. Applicable Guideline Range Based upon the calculations set forth above, the defendant's applicable Sentencing Guidelines range is 18 to 24 months (the 'App1icab1e Guidelines Range"). In addition, the parties
agree should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 15, the applicable fine range is $4,000 to $40,000. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution 10. The parties further agree that a sentence within the Applicable Guidelines Range would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the lactors set forth in Title 1 8, United States Code, Section 3553(a). However, the United States also agrees that the defendant may seek a sentence lower than the Applicable Guidelines Range and suggest that the Court consider a sentence lower than the Applicable Guidelines Range, based upon the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to Title 1 8, United States Code, Section 3553(a). 11. If the defendant seeks a sentence lower than the Applicable Guidelines Range (to include any reduction that the United States may recommend pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 14 below), the United States reserves the right to oppose defendant's position. Additionally, if the defendant elects to seek such a sentence, the defendant agrees to provide to the United States reports, motions, memoranda of law and documentation of any kind on which the defendant intends to rely at sentencing not later than twenty-one days before sentencing. Any basis for sentencing with respect to which all expert reports, motions, memoranda of law and documentation have not been provided to the United States at least twenty-one days before sentencing shall be deemed waived.
Substantial Assistance 2. The defendant agrees to cooperate fully with the United States by: a. providing truthful and complete information and testimony, and producing documents, records and other evidence, when called upon by the United States, whether in interviews, before a grand jury, or at any trial or other court proceeding; b. appearing at such grand jury proceedings, hearings, trials, depositions, and other judicial proceedings, and at meetings, as may be required by the United States continuing through any period of probation or supervised release; c. if requested by the United States, working in an undercover role to contact and negotiate with others suspected and believed to be involved in criminal misconduct under the supervision of, and in compliance with, law enforcement officers and agents; and d. waiving any right to a prompt sentencing and joining in any requests by the United States to postpone the defendant's sentencing until the defendant's cooperation is complete. The defendant understands that the date of sentencing is within the sole discretion of the Court, and that this agreement may require the defendant to cooperate even after the defendant has been sentenced. The defendant's failure to cooperate pursuant to the terms of this agreement after sentence has been imposed shall constitute a breach of this agreement. 13. The United States reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of the defendant's cooperation and to make the defendant's cooperation, or lack thereof, known to the Court at the time of sentencing. If in the sole and unreviewable judgment of the United States the
defendant's cooperation is of such quality and significance to the investigation or prosecution of other criminal matters as to warrant the Court's downward departure from the advisory sentence calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines, the United States may at or before sentencing make a motion consistent with the intent of Section 5K1.l of the Sentencing Guidelines prior to sentencing, or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure subsequent to sentencing, reflecting that the defendant has provided substantial assistance and recommending that the defendant's sentence be reduced from the advisory sentence suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant acknowledges and agrees, however, that nothing in this agreement may be construed to require the United States to file any such motion(s) and that the United States' assessment of the nature, value, truthfulness, completeness, and accuracy of the defendant's cooperation shall be binding insofar as the appropriateness of the United States' filing of any such motion is concerned. 14. The defendant understands and acknowledges that the Court is under no obligation to grant the Section 5K 1.1 or Rule 35 motions referenced above should the government exercise its discretion to file any such motion. The defendant also understands and acknowledges that the Court is under no obligation to reduce the defendant's sentence because of the defendant's cooperation. 15. Pursuant to § IBL8(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, the United States agrees that self incriminating information provided by the defendant pursuant to this agreement to cooperate will not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, except as may be provided in this agreement and under § lB 1.8(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Court Not Bound by the Plea Agreement 16. It is understood that pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure I 1(c)(1)(B) and 11 (c)(3)(B) the Court is not bound by the above recommendations or stipulations, either as to questions of fact or as to the parties' determination of the Applicable Guidelines Range, or other sentencing issues. In the event that the Court considers any Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any recommendations or stipulations contained in this agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Applicable Guidelines Range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. Appeal Waiver 17. The defendant is aware that the defendant has the right to challenge the defendant's sentence and guilty plea on direct appeal. The defendant is also aware that the defendant may, in some circumstances, be able to argue that the defendant's guilty plea should be set aside, or sentence set aside or reduced, in a collateral challenge (such as pursuant to a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Knowing that, and in consideration of the concessions made by the United States in this agreement, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to appeal or collaterally challenge: (a) any defect in the criminal charge or the timing, manner, or venue in which the charge is brought by the United States; and (b) the defendant's sentence or the manner in which his sentence was determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3 742. Notwithstanding the waiver above, the defendant shall be able to appeal his sentence if(i) the Court sentences the defendant to a period of imprisonment longer than the statutory maximum, or (ii) the Court departs upward from the Applicable Guidelines Range
pursuant to the provisions of U.S.S.G. §SK.2 or the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18. The defendant further understands that nothing in this agreement shall affect Public Integrity's right and/or duty to appeal as set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742(b). However, if the United States appeals the defendant's sentence pursuant to Section 3742(b), the defendant shall be released from the above waiver of appellate rights. By signing this agreement, the defendant acknowledges that the defendant has discussed the appeal waiver set forth in this agreement with the defendant's attorney. The defendant further agrees, together with the United States, to request that the district court enter a specific finding that the waiver of the defendant's right to appeal the sentence to be imposed in this case was knowing and voluntary. 19. The defendant's waiver of rights to appeal and to bring collateral challenges shall not apply to appeals or challenges based on new legal principles set forth in the cases of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court, which are decided after the date of this agreement and which are held by the D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect. Release/Detention 20. The defendant acknowledges that while the United States will not seek to detain the defendant or otherwise change the defendant's release conditions pending sentencing, the final decision regarding the defendant's bond status or detention will be made by the Court at the time of the defendant's plea of guilty. Should the defendant engage in further criminal conduct or violate any conditions of release prior to sentencing, however, the United States
may move to change the defendant's conditions of release or move to revoke the defendant's release. Breach of Agreement 21. The defendant understands and agrees that if, after entering this plea agreement, the defendant fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of the defendant's obligations under this plea agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing, the defendant will have breached this plea agreement. In the event of such a breach: (a) the United States will be free from its obligations under the agreement; (b) the defendant will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; (c) the defendant shall be fully subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction of justice; and (d) the United States will be free to use against the defendant, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by the defendant and any of the information or materials provided by the defendant, including such statements, information and materials provided pursuant to this agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of this agreement, including the defendant's statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. 22. The defendant understands that Federal Rule ofCriminal Procedure I 1(0 and Federal Rule of Evidence 410 ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. The defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights which arise under these rules.
23. The defendant understands and agrees that the United States shall only be required to prove a breach of this plea agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant further understands and agrees that the United States need only prove a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this plea agreement. 24. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to permit the defendant to commit perjury, to make false statements or declarations, to obstruct justice, or to protect the defendant from prosecution for any crimes not included within this agreement or committed by the defendant after the execution of this agreement. The defendant understands and agrees that the United States reserves the right to prosecute the defendant for any such offenses. The defendant further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to the defendant's obligations under this agreement shall constitute a breach of this agreement. However, in the event of such a breach, the defendant will not be allowed to withdraw this guilty plea. Waiver of Statute of Limitations 25. It is further agreed that should any conviction following the defendant's plea of guilty pursuant to this agreement be vacated for any reason, then any prosecution that is not timebarred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this agreement (including any counts that the United States has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against the defendant, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the
intent of this agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution that is not time-barred on the date that this agreement is signed. Miscellaneous 26. Other than those contained in writing herein, no agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by the defendant, defense counsel, and a prosecutor for the Public Integrity Section. 27. The defendant understands that the United States will offer to enter into a non-prosecution agreement with defendant's spouse if defendant's spouse's cooperation is required in this investigation, in exchange for that individual's full and complete cooperation, pursuant to which the United States will agree not to charge that individual with any offenses arising from facts disclosed at her interview(s) with the United States, with the exception of perjury, false statements, obstruction, or any charge relating to an act of violence. 28. The defendant further understands that this agreement is binding only, upon the Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland. This agreement does not bind the Civil Division or any 'other United States Attorney's Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against the defendant.
29. If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, the defendant may so indicate by signing the agreement in the space indicated below and returning the original to me once it has been signed by the defendant and by you or other defense counsel. Respectfully submitted, WILLIAM M. WELCH II Chief Public Integrity Section
M. Kendall Day (3 Peter C. Sprung Trial Attorneys Public Integrity Section 1400 New York Ave. NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 514-1412
DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE I have read this agreement in its entirety and discussed it with my attorney. I hereby acknowledge that it fully sets forth my agreement with the United States. I further state that no ajditional promises or representations have been made to me by any official of the United States in connection with this matter. I understand the crime to which I have agreed to plead guilty, the maximum penalties for that offense and Sentencing Guideline penalties potentially applicable to it. I am satisfied with the legal representation provided to me by my attorney. We have had sufficient time to meet and discuss my case. We have discussed the charge against me, possible defenses I might have, the terms of this plea agreement and whether 1 should go to trial. I am entering into this agreement freely, voluntarily, and knowingly because I am guilty of the offense to which I am pleading guilty, and I believe this agreement is in my best interest.
ATTORNEY'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT I have read each of the pages constituting this plea agreement, reviewed them with my client, and discussed the provisions of the agreement with my client, fully. These pages accurately and completely sets forth the entire plea agreement. I concur in my client's desire to plead guilty as set forth in this agreement.
Date: T. Mark Flan4in, Jr., E McKenna Lg & Aldri Attorney f the Defend 16
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA OF TODD BOULANGER This statement is submitted to provide a factual basis for my plea of guilty to the conspiracy charge filed against me. All dates in this Factual Basis are "on or about" the specific date stated. 1. From 1999 to 2004, defendant TODD BOULANGER was a Washington, D.C. lobbyist. In 1999, defendant BOULANGER joined a law and lobbying firm ("Firm A") to work with other lobbyists, including Jack Abramoff. In January 2001, defendant BOULANGER left Firm A with Abramoff to take a lobbying job at Firm B, another law and lobbying firm in Washington, D.C. 2. From December 1999 to 2004, Kevin Ring was a Washington, D.C. lobbyist. From 1999 through March 2004, Ring worked with Abramoff, defendant BOULANGER, and other lobbyists, first at Firm A and later at Firm B. While working at Firms A and B and continuing until at least early 2004, defendant BOULANGER, together with Abramoff, Ring, and other lobbyists working at Firms A and B, established contacts with federal legislative branch and executive branch public officials who could use their influence and positions to perform official actions that would assist defendant BOULANGER and the other lobbyists to promote their clients' interests. Defendant BOULANGER and other lobbyists working at Firms A and B offered and provided a stream of things of value to certain of these public officials in an effort to reward those public officials for actions they had taken, to influence those public officials in their official actions, and to make those public officials more receptive to requests for official actions in the future.
The things of value defendant BOULANGER, Abramoff, Ring, and other lobbyists working at Firms A and B offered and provided to the public officials included, but were not limited to, all-expensespaid travel; tens of thousands of dollars worth of tickets to professional sporting events, music concerts, and other events; and frequent and expensive meals and drinks at Washington, D.C. area restaurants and bars. The official actions defendant BOULANGER and other lobbyists working at Firms A and B sought and obtained from the public officials included, but were not limited to, the insertion or protection of legislative appropriations; the insertion, protection, removal, or prevention of legislative amendments; and lobbying by the public officials of other legislative and executive branch officials to take or abstain from taking official action. Defendant BOULANGER and the other lobbyists attempted to conceal, and did conceal, their practice of providing things of value to certain public officials as a means of influencing and rewarding official action. For example, defendant BOULANGER filed expense reimbursement reports that attempted to conceal the identity of the public officials who received things of value in order to conceal these facts from the public. Defendant BOULANGER believed that if the public learned of the things of value given to certain of the public officials, the officials would be less willing to accept things of value in the future and to take action for the benefit of the clients of Firms A and B. Defendant BOULANGER also generally was aware that the public officials' conduct was governed by Congressional and Executive branch gift rules, some of which necessarily were violated by the public officials' receipt olthe travel, tickets, meals and drinks described above.
7. As part of the course of conduct described above, defendant BOULANGER and others committed acts involving multiple public officials, including, but not limited to, the following: Conduct Involving Staffer D and Person #1 In August 2003, defendant BOULANGER and James Hirni another lobbyist who then worked for a different lobbying firm - were hired by a construction equipment rental company (the "Equipment Rental Company") to lobby public officials in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate to take official action favorable to Equipment Rental Company. In 2003, Person #1 worked at Equipment Rental Company, and Person #1 was the main point of contact for defendant BOULANGER and Hirni. 10. Among other things, defendant BOULANGER, Hirni, and Person #1 sought a legislative amendment that would encourage state public works agencies to rent rather than purchase construction equipment (the "Equipment Rental Amendment"). Defendant BOULANGER, Hirni, and Person #1 also sought a legislative amendment that would encourage state public works agencies to contract only with those companies - such as Equipment Rental Company - which had large dollar amounts of liability insurance coverage (the "Liability Insurance Amendment"). Defendant BOULANGER, Hirni, and Person #1 sought to have these amendments inserted into legislation re-authorizing a federal highway funding bill which was pending before both chambers of Congress (the "Federal Highway Bill").
11. Defendant BOULANGER assisted in identifying two staffers as important to the efforts of him, Hirni, and Person #1 to insert these amendments into Federal Highway Bill. One of those staffers was Staffer D, who worked in the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, which had primary responsibility for the Federal Highway Bill in the House. The other was Trevor Blackann, who worked for a Senator on the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works (the "EPW Committee"), which had primary responsibility for the Federal Highway Bill in the Senate. 12. On October 18 and 19, 2003, Hirni and Person #1 of the Equipment Rental Company provided an all-expenses-paid trip to Game One of the Baseball World Series in New York City to Staffer D and Blackann, in part to influence Staffer D and Blackann to take official action favorable to the Equipment Rental Company in connection with the Federal I-lighway Bill. Although defendant BOULANGER did not go on the trip, it occurred with his knowledge and approval. The things of value provided to Staffer D and Blackann included round-trip airfare, use of a chauffeured vehicle, hotel accommodations at a New York City hotel, dinner at a restaurant, tickets to Game One of the Baseball World Series, souvenir baseball jerseys, and admission to and entertainment at a strip club. 13. On October 22, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed a draft of the two amendments to Blackann, Person #1, and Hirni, so that Blackann could use them as a place holder with the EPW Committee.
14. On October 22, 2003, Hirni emailed to Staffer D information about the two amendments Equipment Rental Company sought to insert in Federal Highway Bill, seeking Staffer D's assistance. 15. On October 27, 2003, Staffer D emailed Hirni that Equipment Rental Company's two amendments needed "more work for anyone to be able to help with progress." 16. On October 30, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed Hirni and Person #1 a copy of "the new amendment that was requested by the House authors" of the Federal Highway Bill, explaining that the amendment offered in the House "opens the entire highway and transit titles to construction equipment leasing." 17. In January 2004, defendant BOULANGER, Hirni, Blackann, Staffer D, and Person #1 took steps to protect the Equipment Rental Amendment, which by that time had been inserted into the Senate version of Federal Highway Bill, from a challenge small business owners and companies which sold and distributed - rather than rented - construction equipment (the "Equipment Distributors") were mounting to the Amendment. The steps taken to protect the Equipment Rental Amendment included, among other things, the following: a. On January 13, 2004, Person #1 forwarded to others at the Equipment Rental Company an email that a representative of the Equipment Distributors had sent to Blackann, alerting his colleagues to the Equipment Distributors' lobbying effort to remove the Equipment Rental Amendment from the Federal Highway Bill. Person #1 informed the others at Equipment Rental Company that, "Our guys
don't think it is going to be a problem. We have a much stronger relationship and we are already in the bill, and soon to be in the house bill too." b. On January 20, 2004, Blackann emailed defendant BOULANGER and Hirni about a meeting Blackann had held with the Equipment Distributors' representative referenced above. Blackann explained that he concealed from the Equipment Distributors' representative the reason Blackann had supported the Equipment Rental Amendment, and told defendant BOULANGER and Hirni: "HE HAS NO IDEA THAT WE DID THIS FOR YOU. I TOLD HIM [that the Senator for whom Blackann worked] CAME UP WITH IT HIMSELF. IN FACT, I MAY HAVE SPECIFiCALLY SAID THAT I DID NOT DO IT FOR [Equipment Rental Company]". c. In January 2004, Staffer D suggested to defendant BOULANGER that BOULANGER organize a letter writing campaign from the owners and operators of individual Equipment Rental Company facilities to Congressional members, in order to counter the Equipment Distributors' efforts to oppose the Equipment Rental Amendment. Conduct Involving a Legislative Assistant to a United States Senator 18. Defendant BOULANGER, Abramoff, Ring, and others in Firms A and B had as a lobbying client a Native American Tribe located in Mississippi ("Mississippi Tribe"). Defendant BOULANGER, together with Abramoff, Ring, and others, established contact with a legislative assistant who worked for a United States Senator from Mississippi
("Staffer E") and who could assist them in promoting Firm A's and B's interests in representing the Mississippi Tribe. 19. On March 11, 2002, Staffer E emailed Ring a request for tickets to a variety of concerts and sporting events, which read as follows: McCartney: 2 or 4 Ice: 2, 3, 4 or 5 And, any of the following: Floor tickets for the Circus any day except Saturday, March 23 at 7:30. 2, 4 or 6 tickets[.] I'm only interested in the floor for that event, if available. NSYNC - anything from 3 to 6 tickets Hockey: Saturday, March 30: 5 to 7 tickets -. any floor. Greenday [sic]: 3 to 6 tickets. Ring forwarded Staffer F's email to Abrarnoff and BOULANGER, telling them "Wow, We already told her she was fine on McCartney, ice skating, and Green Day - although we need to let her know how many tix she can have for each. Also, please review the other requests and let me know what we can do there." BOULANGER responded to Ring and Abrarnoft "[Staffer F] should get everything she wants," to which Abrarnoff replied, "She'll get everything she wants." 20. Thereafter, from March 2002 through early 2004, defendant BOULANGER, Ring, Abramoff, and others in Firm B provided to Staffer E a stream of things of value which included numerous tickets, meals and drinks - with the value of these things exceeding $25,000 - to influence Staffer E to take official action favorable to Firm B and Firm B's representation of the Mississippi Tribe, and Staffer E on repeated occasions during this same time period provided and agreed to provide such official actions. The things of value and official action included, for example, the following:
a. On September 11, 2002, Abramoffemailed defendant BOULANGER and Ring asking if he could switch Staffer E's Washington Redskins football tickets from the lower box suite to the upper suite (which was less desirable than the lower box suite). In recommending that Abramoff not switch Staffer F to the upper box suite, defendant BOULANGER responded to Ring and Abramoff, To be honest, she's more valuable to us than a rank and file house member." b. On December 9, 2002, defendant BOULANGER emailed Staffer E and one of her colleagues requesting that they ask a different staffer to facilitate, among other things, an additional $2 million to an existing appropriation for the Mississippi Tribe. c. On February 11,2003, Staffer E emailed defendant BOULANGER asking if she could have the entire box suite at Camden Yards in Baltimore for a baseball game in June. Defendant BOULANGER responded, 'I'll make it happen. BTW, did [another staffer] pull out the [Mississippi Tribe's] IHS language [from an appropriation's bill]?" Staffer E replied, [the other staffer] said this morning that he'd triple check. I saw the notes, and there was a defiant note to take care of it. On the other thing: you are awesome." d. On February 27, 2003, Staffer E emailed defendant BOULANGER that she was taking her special guests" to an upcoming Liza Mmdli concert and asking if the box suite would have refreshments. in response, defendant BOULANGER asked for Staffer E's thoughts on a Homeland Security appropriation which would
benefit a client who was seeking Congressional funding for a television network that would cater to emergency first responders. e. On May 4, 2003, Staffer E emailed defendant BOU LANCER that there was no food in the MCI Center box suite for an ice skating event, telling him, 'Hey. I've got no food and party of fourteen and no food. I'm freaking out here. Kevin [Ring] said I was all set. I [am] ordering and I guess I [w]ill pay[.] [H]elp if you can." Defendant BOULANGER responded in part, "[Staffer E], if you pay keep the receipt and I'll get you reimbursed." f. On June 10, 2003, Staffer E used the Camden Yards box suite to throw a party during an Orioles game. While at Camden Yards, Staffer E emailed defendant BOULANGER to complain about the suite's food, telling him, "Ackkk. Only beer and no hebrew national hot dogs." Conduct 1nvo1vin a Member of a Senator's Staff 21. On July 16, 2002, defendant BOLJLANGER first met a legislative director for a United States Senator ('Staffer F"). Thereafter, from July 2002 through February 2004, defendant BOULANGER provided to Staffer F numerous tickets, meals and drinks, with the value of these things exceeding $10,000, to influence Staffer F to take official action favorable to Firm B's lobbying clients, and Staffer F on repeated occasions during this same time provided and agreed to provide such official actions. The things of value and official action included, for example, the following: a. On September 27, 2002, defendant BOULANGER emailed Staffer F that it was good to see him the other night and seeking Staffer F's help in preserving a $3.5
million earmark that was favorable to one of BOULANGER's lobbying clients, which earmark had been included in the House version of a defense appropriations bill. b. On January 22, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed Staffer F seeking his help in defeating a proposed amendment to a defense appropriations bill which would have enabled an Alaskan entity to establish a gambling casino, thereby threatening the market share of Native American tribes represented by Firm B which already owned or operated gambling casinos. Staffer F responded to defendant BOULANGER that he would tell his Senator and that his office had the proposed amendment "flagged." c. On February 14, 2003, Staffer F emailed defendant BOULANGER asking if he could "score some hockey tickets." Defendant BOULANGER forwarded the email to one of Abramoff's assistants noting, "[Staffer F] is a priority," and requesting, "Ice seats if possible." Defendant BOULANGER then responded to Staffer F that Staffer F was getting front row hockey tickets, telling him, "This is without a doubt the most in demand game of the season.... You, my friend, are in debt to me for a while!" Several days later, Staffer F replied, "Thanks [BOULANGER] - You the man. I got something for you too...." d. On April 1, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed one of Abramoffs assistants, asking if he could get two baseball tickets to an upcoming Redsox/Orioles baseball game for Staffer F, along with a parking pass, noting, "[Staffer F] is important." On April 2, 2003, Staffer F emailed defendant
BOULANGER, "thanks for thinking of me for the sox. Let me know if! can return the favor..." e. On June 12, 2003, Staffer F emailed defendant BOULANGER requesting tickets to a July 6th baseball game in Camden Yards. When defendant BOULANGER responded that Staffer F would get four tickets in the box suite, Staffer F replied, "but could you make sure there's beer this time...? [l} mean, the red sox, crab cakes, and fillet mignon's were nice but ..... haha." f. On October 23, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed Abramoff that a potential client wanted to retain him to help with favorable action from the Senator for whom Staffer F worked. Defendant BOULANGER wrote, "easy money. [Staffer F] practically lives in our various suites. We are shady." g. On December 17, 2003, Staffer F emailed Hirni that he and another were going to be at Abramoffs restaurant, Signatures, the following day, "if you're around likewise to [BOULANGER]." After Hirni forwarded Staffer F's email to BOULANGER, BOULANGER responded to Hirni that Staffer F just should have written, "'buy me some drinks."
The preceding statement is a summary, made for the purpose of providing the Court with a factual basis for my guilty plea to the conspiracy charge against me. It does not include all of the facts known to me concerning criminal activity in which I and/or others engaged. I make this statement knowingly and voluntarily and because I am in fact guilty of the crime charged.
DATE: TODD A. BOIJLANG
T. Mark Flanan, Jr Counsel for Lefendai
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