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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee. Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant. J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee. FERNANDO, J.: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity. The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general

relationship. wherein the surname.000. keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel. or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4. coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner. the date of birth. (par. keeper or duly authorized representative. of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity. there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28. or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds. indefinite and uncertain. if any. 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. 1963. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. the nationality. whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels. there is once again a transgression of the due process clause. The lower court on July 6. runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable. to a proper purpose." (par. which is to curb immorality. with the name. It was then alleged that on June 13. in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments. with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law. or the Chief of Police. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner. that the provision in the same section which would require the owner. characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities. and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would. manager. given name and middle name. restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary. 2). 4760 from and after July 8. lodging houses. the length of stay and the number of companions in the room. not only for being arbitrary. 1964. its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition. 1963. a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room. motels. employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2. the address. unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague. which reads: . 4760. regularly paying taxes. manager. keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. with such registration forms and records kept and bound together. the occupation. who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels. unreasonable and oppressive. that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6."1 (par. approved on June 14. the sex. no reference is made to motels. that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels. with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels.500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million. a dining room or. a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation. motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor. 1963. that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room.00 for second class motels. arbitrary and oppressive character. Instead of evidence being offered by both parties.manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. manager. motel. respondent Mayor prayed for. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. In the a answer filed on August 3.500. cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party. on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law. 1). age and sex would be specified. and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against selfincrimination. if any. 3).

That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila. then the acting City Mayor of Manila." Hence this appeal. 5. would be unconstitutional and. both with offices in the City of Manila. 662. Inc. 3. while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc. 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections.904. The local legislative body. 1965. consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication. has in effect given . 4760. which was approved on June 14. 4. all having the capacity to sue and be sued. 1963. and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance. in both procedural and substantive aspects. As noted at the outset. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law.." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila. the parties. in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor. 668-a. the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question. amending sections 661. That on June 13. citing not only U. with the nod of the Court. 1963. v. After referring to the motels and hotels. dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels.1. 1963 (Annex B). therefore. copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C. by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. Salaveria. in the very nature of things. to submit the case for decision of the Court. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board. and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 1äwphï1. null and void. with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.S. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. agreed to file memoranda and thereafter. which are members of the petitioners association.ñët Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15. the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition. 4760 of the City of Manila. the judgment must be reversed. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101. The councilors must. 2. by enacting the ordinance. but likewise applicable American authorities. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City. 1965. 6. on February 4. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. Then barely two weeks later. and Hotel del Mar Inc. the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance.

unjust or unreasonable. a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious. police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort.12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays.9 prohibiting gambling. good order. to increase "the income of the city government.15 all of which are intended to protect public morals. almost shrill tone. the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time. the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form.10 prohibiting jueteng. peace. ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant.3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.11 and monte. insistent and the least limitable of powers. It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval. primarily rest the exercise of the police power. On the legislative organs of the government.notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x .6 Negatively put. adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels. whimsical. it cannot be too often emphasized. public safety and the genera welfare. and welfare of society. is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process. prepared for the purpose."5 It would be. the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable. argues eloquently for it. far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance. presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution.. equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however. whether national or local. to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health.8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls. the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts. and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.2 It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts. morals. public morals.7 There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. in a lobby open to public view at all times. unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life. in which the objection is raised to the question of due . The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v.14 and prohibiting any person from keeping. to paraphrase another leading decision. liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside." Moreover. conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential. We are thus led to considering the insistent. safety." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case. which.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels. but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is. A strong case must be found in the records.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate.25 As a matter of fact. generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee."19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. in certain particulars. Negatively put. place and circumstances. To be more specific. it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount. And surely. as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises. Only the other day. official action. To satisfy the due process requirement. obedience to the dictates of justice.000 annual fee and second-class motels. to paraphrase Cardozo. as a general rule. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It has been the settled law however. and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable." here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic.23 Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. or tyrannical. be valid. liberty or property. and. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life.21 It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter. first-class motels being required to pay a P6.500 yearly. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat. P4. and. its alleged vagueness. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may . in each appropriate case. oppressive. As was said in a case."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. the mere fact. or any governmental action for that matter."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time. In fact. even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue. the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . just and uniform. this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes. as has been set forth. courts have. of course. the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract. none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. declined to interfere with such discretion. arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies. insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner. Again.34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. are being devoted. No man can do exactly as he pleases. General Construction Co. Pomar.29 It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to contract. health. keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel. Florida. point to the requirement that a guest should give the name. but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Petitioners. tavern. to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. Moreover. but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property. and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty. the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium. Every man must renounce unbridled license. It may be asked. however. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline. relationship. there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him. lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law. As it stands. common inn or the like. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery. a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators. or of the public order and safety. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. From Connally v. lodging house. in order to secure the general comfort. according to the explanatory note. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens.result from the legal exercise of that power.33 toAdderley v. Far from it. with property.30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. is not license. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be. with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged. the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process? Lastly. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. and with business and occupations. motel. petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. call for a different conclusion. such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. Respect . The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health."35 That is all then that this case presents.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person."28 A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest. with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and determination."27 Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract. another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. it is 'liberty regulated by law. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. then. People v. the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting. which means peace and order and happiness for all. manager. and.

Salaveria (1918). Lapera v. Reyes. Espiritu-Santo.. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty.S. If Congress or legislature does not regulate. the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. has the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and how fragile in scientific proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment. Mayfair Hotel. Palo Alto Hotel. social consciousness quickens. Giner Cruz. at p. Flamingo Motel. Belderol. Wherefore. are on leave. (Hamilton. With costs. Castro and Angeles. (1938) 65 Phil. it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula. U. Rainbow Motel. its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel between liberty and the police power. 111. v. Instead.S. 412.S. Hotel Monte Carlo.L. (1915) 31 Phil.for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision. . in resolving cases. laissez faire — not the individual — must be the regulator. 102. 610. Hotel del Mar Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel. 12 U. Provincial Board. Pacis. V. it must not fall back upon sterile claims. it must meet the challenge of drastic social change. See also Sarmiento v. 759. It defies legal definition. Golden Gate Motel. C. Paradise Hotel. 1. 625.S. June 30. 1155. vs. (1957) 101 Phil. 1163.S. 524. Vicente. 1961. Hernandez. Siesta Court. L-18102. Holiday Motel. Sanchez. and Dizon. J. 39 Phil. 4 Cf. Zaldivar. 369. Concepcion. Ichong v. in the making of policy the fullest possible opportunity must be given for the play of the human mind.S. vs. 'society is more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests not represented by the items in a balance-sheet. vs. new attitudes appeal. J. Joson. (1918) 38 Phil. U. new interests emerge. Chan Hong. (1915) 31 Phil. Preview of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal.S. (1912) 23 Phil. (1918) 39 Phil. Daet. In a progressive society.S. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Eboña v. JJ. Social development is a process of trial and error.. in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale industry. (1915) 31 Phil. L-15719. Tamparong. 1931.S. 2 U. Miami Hotel. 5 Noble state Bank v.J. January 5. Palm Spring Hotel. 218. (1918) 38 Phil. 10 U.. 819). (1913) 26 Phil. Nor as yet. 1962. at p. Rodriguez. Also: "To Frankfurter the police power. v. J. People vs.. Sun Valley Hotel. Haskell. Bengzon. Rubi v. Makalintal. 6 7 8 9 U. 677. 321. vs. 3 282 US 251.B. 11 U. concur. 328. Springfield Hotel. May 31. New Palace Hotel. Gomez-Jesus. For him as for Holmes. The law must be sensitive to life. v.P. Footnotes 1 The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel. 219 U. (1950) 85 Phil. 660. as a response to the dynamic aspects of society. U. true to its etymology is the power to shape policy.

Provincial Board. 412. 36 Am. Medberry. v. Burnett 32 Ala. citing Hall v. 421. 627. L-19824. At least. Maryland. Shellbyville. Ann. Cruz (1914). 89 Wis.S. 1142. Williams v.13 U. American Supreme Court decisions 30 . 43 Ark. 81 L. 660. Tea Co. 4 Wheat 316. 4 L. 392. Goldsmith v. McGraw. Illinois. A general merchant. 14 15 16 There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy or the prohibition against self-incrimination. U. L-17252. 26 27 Co Kian & Lee Ban v.S. citing City of New Orleans v. Ten Yu. 1969. Town of Belmont. Bacolod Murcia Milling. Frankfurter. Uy Ha v. Long Branch Commissioner. Rep. The Philippines was then under American sovereignty. Ed. 1967. 68 Ga.S. 818. City of Chicago. At pp.J. the facilities. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court. 242 U.W. (1961) 367 U. 301 U. (1938) pp. 62 N. 417.L. Ex parte Burnett 30 Ala. 39 N. People ex rel. at 733-734. (1912) 24 Phil. 7. City of Wabash. 313.. Mr. Physical Therapy Organization v.S. v. City of Manila. 17 Misc. has no legitimate cause for complaint. not according to the case as it has been developed.. (1918) 39 Phil. 66. Ill Cal. Hannah v. (1957) 101 Phil. 121. City of Chicago. (1959) 359 U. v Grosjean. 429.. Owens. 46 Phil. July 9. 80 L.S. 109 Ill.. 17 Frankfurter. 1966. 440 (1924). 41 Ind. 19 Ind. Bartkus v. 621. 828. 112 Ill. 8 . 539. v.S. 1. L-24322. Ann. Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties to do so. 461. Larche. McElroy. Municipal Board. 189 Ala. 43 Pac. Rep. Cafeteria Workers v. 518.E.33. citing Great Atl & Pac. Salaveria. 29 Calalang v. Dennehy v.S. 148 (1955). 654.S. Municipal Board of Ormoc City. Stafford. (1960) 363 U. Grady. 46. (1939) 308 U. 18 19 20 21 22 23 Citing Swarth v. 728. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v.S. services and accommodations offered by petitioner-motels. 726. (1922) 42 Phil. Cu Unjieng v. 829-830. July 21. L-14149. Bennet. United States Distilling Co. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who has always taken advantage of as he exclusively relies on. U. Butler. 1230. 364. May 30. City Council of West Point. 24 98 Phil. Merced County v. 646. 25 La. 12 N. v. 297 US 1. doing business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila. Craig v. Fleming. People. Miranda v. 19: Drew County v. 70 Phil. 31 La. City of Manila. Ann. 1961. 207. 28 Rubi v. M'Culloch v. Pearson v. Ed 477. Sweet v. 42 N. 816. May 31. Cramer v. Geiger-Jones (1916). Postpone. 84. 27 L. 120 Ill. v. City of New Orleans. Cheny v.Y. 102. 364. 649. HardieTynes Manufacturing Co. vs. (1955) 96 Phil. Williams (1940). 25 Ormoc Sugar Co. Ed 579. and Muhlenbrinck v. at 487. Jones v. at 706. 32... (1919) 39 Phil. The City Mayor.S. McGuigan v. 420. Wiley y. 637. 227. 586. 39 Ind. 1193.

a public utility may well include. 337. 31 Antamok Goldfields Mining Co.having thus an obligatory effect. S. 32 Cf." (West Virginia State Bd. Parrish (1937). of Edu v.R. 33 269 U. 1966. 624. 14. The right of a State to regulate. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. at 360. ed. G. Court. for example. 17 L. so far as the due process test is concerned.S. Children's Hospital (1924). Court (1940). power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. 319 U. which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. 46496.S. Barnette. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibition of the First become its standard. 525. of assembly.Arellano Law Foundation . 340. 261 U. 2d 149. 70 Phil. No. and of worship may well be infringed on such slender grounds. Nov. at 639). (1942).S. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect. 279 U. quoting a concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. But freedoms of speech and of press. 385 (1926). 379. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment because it also collides with the principles of the First.S. 34 35 The Lawphil Project . No alternative was left to this Court except to follow the then controlling decision in Adkins v. Roschen v. v.339. Ward (1929). is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteen is involved. 300 U.