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Anurima Bhargava Zoe M. Savitsky (CA # 281616) U.S. Department of Justice 601 D Street, NW Suite 4300 Washington, DC 20004 Telephone: (202) 305-3223 Attorney for Plaintiff-Intervenor UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA ) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Intervenor, ) ) vs. ) ) ANITA LOHR, et al., ) Defendants, ) ) and ) ) SIDNEY L. SUTTON, et al., ) Defendants-Intervenors. ) ) ) MARIA MENDOZA, et al., ) Plaintiffs, ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Intervenor, ) ) vs. ) ) TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL ) DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al., ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________) ROY and JOSIE FISHER, et al., Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 74-90 TUC DCB (consolidated case)


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1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 The State of Arizona (“Arizona” or the “State”), though not a party to this case, has

3 submitted an amicus brief (“Nov. 28 Objections”) objecting to two provisions of the Joint 4 Proposed Unitary Status Plan Noting Areas of Disagreement filed by all of the Parties with this 5 court on December 10, 2012 (“Joint Proposed Plan”). The first of the two provisions broadens 6 the Tucson Unified School District’s (“TUSD” or the “District”) existing efforts to incorporate 7 multicultural themes throughout its K-12 curriculum. See Section (V)(D)(6)(a)(i) of the Joint 8 Proposed Plan. The second provision provides that culturally relevant courses of instruction 9 shall be available to students at all grade levels, and at the high school level for core Social 10 Studies or English credit. See Section (V)(D)(6)(a)(ii) of the Joint Proposed Plan. The District 11 also objected (“Nov. 9 Objections”) to the second provision, insofar as the courses are offered 12 for core credit, rather than as electives. See Joint Proposed Unitary Plan Noting Areas of 13 Disagreement filed on November 9, 2012 at 33 (“Nov. 9 USP”). 14 Both of these provisions (together, the “Curricular Provisions”) are key components of

15 the Joint Proposed Plan to eliminate the vestiges of segregation and to engage and improve the 16 quality of education for African-American and Latino students, the two plaintiff classes in this 17 longstanding desegregation case. Similar courses have been previously included in the 18 desegregation remedies ordered by the court in this case (see, e.g., December 18, 2009 Post19 Unitary Status Plan (“PUSP”) at 31-33), and have been demonstrably effective at increasing 20 student test scores and graduation rates and at exposing TUSD students of all racial backgrounds 21 to a diversity of perspectives, history and experiences. The proposed culturally relevant courses 22 of instruction (“Courses of Instruction”) will be available as part of the District’s broad selection 23 24 25 26 2

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1 of English and Social Studies courses offered for graduation credit, and will be open to all who 2 choose to take them. 3 The State asserts, without basis and before the Courses of Instruction have even been

4 developed, that they will be harmful and segregative, and not within the proper scope of a 5 remedy in a federal desegregation case. The District’s limited objection to the inclusion of the 6 Courses of Instruction for core credit is grounded in similar concerns as to whether such Courses 7 of Instruction can properly be included as a remedy in a desegregation case. 8 The United States submits the following response to these objections and urges this court

9 to approve the Curricular Provisions as included in the Joint Proposed Plan. The Curricular 10 Provisions are well within the scope of the authority of this court to remedy constitutional 11 violations in a desegregation case; are necessary and effective to eliminate the vestiges of 12 segregation and move TUSD towards being a racially nondiscriminatory and unitary school 13 system; and provide significant educational benefits to African American and Latino students, 14 among other students, in the District. 15 II. 16 The Curricular Provisions Are Well Within This Court’s Broad Remedial Authority The Curricular Provisions are part of a proposed unitary status plan jointly submitted by

17 all Parties in this case for review and adoption by this court. As the Supreme Court has long 18 recognized, this court has broad authority to fashion a remedy to address the vestiges of 19 segregation and eliminate racial discrimination “root and branch.” Green v. County Sch. Bd. of 20 New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). “Once a right and a violation have been shown, 21 the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and 22 flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 23 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 24 25 26 3

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The State and the District contend that the Curricular Provisions extend beyond the

2 scope of the constitutional violation in this case. Nov. 9 Objections at 17; Nov. 28 Objections at 3 2-4. After nearly forty years, however, TUSD has yet to meet its burden to achieve unitary status 4 in any aspect of its operations and the underlying constitutional violation – that the District has 5 and continues to operate a de jure segregated system – remains. Once, as here, a constitutional 6 violation has been found and persists, “school authorities are clearly charged with the affirmative 7 duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 8 discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (quoting Green, 9 391 U.S. at 437-38). 10 Rather than seeking to expressly limit the types of remedies which may be contemplated

11 in the “complex and multifaceted problem” of dismantling a “well-entrenched dual system,” the 12 Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]here is no universal answer to complex problems of 13 desegregation; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must 14 be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance.” 15 Green, 391 U.S. at 437, 439. From Brown v. Board of Education onwards, the Supreme Court 16 has consistently encouraged the adoption of desegregation remedies that take account of the 17 particular context and history of the school district and are effective and workable means to 18 address discrimination and segregation within its bounds. “In fashioning and effectuating 19 [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles . . . characterized by a 20 practical flexibility in shaping its remedies.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). 21 The remedial authority of the court is determined by the nature and scope of the violation.

22 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977). Here, the Curricular Provisions are a necessary 23 component of the Joint Proposed Plan to eliminate the vestiges of segregation (see infra Section 24 25 26 4

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1 V), and are, as such, related to and properly included as part of the remedy for the constitutional 2 violation in this case. Id. at 279-281 (rejecting school district efforts to narrow the scope of the 3 desegregation remedy, and noting “[t]he well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the 4 remedy are to be determined by the violation means simply that federal court decrees must 5 directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself”). 6 III. 7 Arizona State Law Does Not Limit the Remedial Authority of the Federal Court The State’s main challenge to the Curricular Provisions rests on its belief that it has a

8 “right to administer its laws,” May 10 Motion at 2, and “[a]s a sovereign state, [it] retains the 9 authority to set educational policy for its citizens.” Nov. 28 Objection at 15. Specifically, the 10 State asserts that the Courses of Instruction provided for by the Curricular Provisions are 11 automatically in violation of H.B. 2281, codified at A.R.S. § 15-112 et seq., 1 which broadly 12 purports to prohibit Arizona school districts from implementing ethnic studies courses. 2 The 13 State of Arizona is not the first state to attempt to limit the scope of a federal desegregation 14 order. Yet with routine consistency, state efforts to interfere with federal desegregation orders 15 have failed. 16 The Supreme Court has long held that state laws cannot be allowed to impede a

17 desegregation order. See, e.g., N.C. Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (if the State’s 18 law “operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
A.R.S. § 15-112 provides, in pertinent part, that school districts are prohibited from implementing a “program of instruction” that (1) “promotes the overthrow of the United States government,” (2) “promotes resentment toward a race or class of people,” (3) is “designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group,” or (4) “advocate[s] ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals.” A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(1)-(4). 2 Even if the state law was of import in this case, which it is not, the United States certainly disagrees with the State’s assumption that any course that reflects the history and experiences of particular racial and ethnic communities is automatically geared primarily to pupils of a particular ethnic group. Nov. 28 Objections at 2. As has been noted, the Courses of Instruction have yet to be developed; once they are in place, they will be open to all students who choose to take them. Indeed, the State’s interpretation represents an overbroad application of the statutory language. See Acosta v. Horne, CV 10-623 (D. Ariz.) (federal constitutional challenge to H.B. 2281 currently pending in this court).


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1 disestablishing of a dual school system, it must fall”); Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744 (“no state law is 2 above the Constitution . . . the present laws with respect to local control . . . are not sacrosanct 3 and if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe 4 appropriate remedies”); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57-58 (1990) (“where . . . a particular 5 remedy is required, the State cannot hinder the process by preventing a local government from 6 implementing that remedy”). A district court’s authority to shape and implement a remedial 7 decree in a desegregation case is simply not subject to the confines of state law. Rather, courts 8 have routinely issued orders enjoining states from giving force or effect to provisions of state 9 laws that would interfere with the desegregation obligations of a school district. See, e.g. United 10 States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (“the constitutional rights of children not 11 to be discriminated against on grounds of race, color or national origin can neither be nullified 12 openly and directly nor nullified indirectly . . . . every law or resolution of the legislature, every 13 act of the executive, and every decree of the state courts, which, no matter how innocent on its 14 face, seeks to subvert the enjoyment of a constitutional right is unconstitutional and null”); Cf. 15 Wright v. Council of Emporia , 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972) (if a “proposal would impede the 16 dismantling of the dual system, then a district court, in the exercise of its remedial discretion, 17 may enjoin it from being carried out.”); Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (“if it 18 cannot be shown that a [free transfer] plan will further rather than delay conversion to a unitary, 19 nonracial, nondiscriminatory school system, it must be held unacceptable”). 20 The Curricular Provisions are key components of the Joint Proposed Plan before this

21 court (see infra Section V), and once adopted, state law cannot impede the District’s efforts to 22 implement those provisions. 23 24 25 26 6

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1 IV. 2

Desegregation Plans Routinely Include Curricular Provisions The State and the District contend that the inclusion of the Curricular Provisions in the

3 Joint Proposed Plan is “unprecedented.” Nov. 28 Objections at 3. In fact, not only were similar 4 provisions included in previous consent decrees in this very case with no objection by the 5 District or the State (see PUSP at 31-33), such curricular provisions have been included in 6 desegregation plans for decades. See, e.g., Hoots v. PA, 118 F. Supp.2d 577, 592 (W.D. Pa. 7 2000) (“‘curriculum redesign is the framework upon which all other desegregation efforts rely’ . 8 . . . [The district was ordered] to undertake a broad and comprehensive review of course 9 structure, content, sequence, objectives, interdisciplinary relationships, multicultural focus, 10 instructional materials, and testing materials”) (internal citations omitted); Berry v. Sch. Dist. of 11 City of Benton Harbor, 515 F.Supp. 344, 373 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (“curriculum in desegregated 12 schools should encourage the equal status of black students and provide equal opportunities for 13 them to achieve and succeed. This aspect of the plan suggests innovations in curriculum content 14 and process to ensure that these goals are achieved within these three school districts”); Morgan 15 v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 259 (D. Mass. 1975) (including curricular development); Bradley 16 v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (“Multi-ethnic studies are essential 17 elements of the curriculum of any outstanding school system; desegregation serves only to 18 emphasize the need for inclusion of these studies . . . [the district shall] develop . . . [a] program 19 for comprehensive multi-ethnic instruction”); U.S. v. Texas, 330 F.Supp. 235, 247 (E.D. Tex. 20 1971) (“a well-defined plan in the area of curriculum . . . should be developed), aff'd in part, 21 modified in part by U.S. v. Texas, 447 F.2d. 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1971) (including a modified 22 curricular provision requiring the development of “[r]ecommendations of specific curricular 23 offerings and programs . . . includ[ing] specific educational programs designed to compensate 24 25 26 7

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1 minority group children for unequal educational opportunities resulting from past or present 2 racial and ethnic isolation”). 3 3 Against this precedential backdrop, the State and District rely heavily on two cases,

4 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975) and the various rulings in Coalition to 5 Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of Del., 90 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Save Our 6 Children”), to assert that courts have rejected the inclusion of curricular requirements in a 7 desegregation order. In Keyes, plaintiff-intervenors, the Congress of Hispanic Educators, hired 8 an expert, Dr. Jose Cardenas, to draft a plan (the “Cardenas Plan”) for the education of minority 9 students. 521 F.2d. at 480. The Cardenas Plan: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

require[d] an overhaul of the system’s entire approach to education of minorities; its proposals extend[ed] to matters of educational philosophy, governance, instructional scope and sequence, curriculum, student evaluation, staffing, non-instructional service and community involvement . . . These proposals, it must be emphasized, touch virtually every aspect of curriculum planning, methodology and philosophy presently the responsibility of local school authorities . . . [including] specific courses in the curriculum, adoption and publication of specific educational principles, provision of early childhood education (beginning at age three) and adult education for minorities, and provision of adequate clothing for poor minority school children.

Id. at 480-481. The Keyes court declined to order implementation of this plan, holding that “[i]nstead of merely removing obstacles to effective desegregation, the court’s order would

The State’s expert, Dr. Christine Rossell, states that “in the 40 years that I have spent reading thousands

20 of school desegregation cases, I have never come across a court decision that actually specified the content of 21 22 23 24 25 26
courses that students must take, as the draft USP does.” Nov. 28 Objections, Affidavit and Curriculum Vitae of Christine Rossell, Exhibit 1 at ¶ 3. Not only does Dr. Rossell misread the Curricular Provisions, which do not specify the content of courses that students must take, but instead allow the District to “develop and implement” Courses of Instruction that students have the choice to take, she does not recall those desegregation cases in which she served as an expert and where the court specifically provided for curriculum as part of the desegregation remedy. See, e.g., Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of Del , 901 F.Supp. 784, 796, 810812 (D. Del. 1995) (noting Dr. Rossell served as an expert, and listing myriad curricular changes made by the district to comply with court orders, including amending the social studies curriculum for K-6 and 7-12 to incorporate multicultural-multiethnic education, developing specific K-6 Black History curriculum, and developing African American studies courses).


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1 impose upon school authorities a pervasive and detailed system for the education of minority 2 children.” Id. at 482. 3 The Curricular Provisions here bear little resemblance to the sweeping program struck

4 down by the Keyes court. First, these Curricular Provisions provide for Courses of Instruction to 5 be made available for core (i.e., graduation) credit, but only for those students who choose to 6 take them; the Courses of Instruction would be added to the dozens of courses already offered by 7 the District for core English or Social Studies credit, including women’s literature, multicultural 8 literature, European History, geography, global studies, and economics. TUSD High School 9 Course Catalog 2012-2013, available at: 10 Second, the Curricular Provisions do not impose “a pervasive and detailed” curriculum upon 11 school authorities, but instead afford the District latitude to develop and implement the Courses 12 of Instruction. See Section (V)(D)(6)(a)(ii). Lastly, unlike in Keyes, where the Cardenas Plan 13 was proposed unilaterally and the provisions of the desegregation order were in significant 14 contention among the parties, the Curricular Provisions here, even with the District’s limited 15 objection to the implementation of culturally relevant courses of instruction as core rather than 16 elective classes, are part of the Joint Proposed Plan submitted by all of the Parties for adoption 17 by this court. 18 The District and State also cite to various rulings in a Delaware desegregation case, Save

19 Our Children 4, to support the following two propositions: first, curricular provisions can only be 20 included to remedy content that contains racial bias; and second, desegregation cases that include 21 curricular provisions “did not require that certain courses . . . be offered at particular grade 22 levels.” Nov. 9 Objections at 19. Yet the district court in Save Our Children required not only 23

24 v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of Del., 757 F.Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1991). 25 26 9

Originally Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F.Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1957), appealed sub nom Coalition to Save Our Children

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1 that “all instructional materials, texts, and other curriculum aids shall be free of racial bias” but 2 also required the inclusion of “curriculum offerings and programs which emphasize and reflect 3 the cultural pluralism of the students.” Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F.Supp. 982, 1016 (D. Del. 4 1978). And the issue in the case, and ultimately on appeal, was not whether curricular programs 5 were properly included in a desegregation order; in fact, the decision on appeal began by noting 6 that “there is no serious dispute as to the validity, and even the necessity, of such substantive 7 programs” including the curricular offerings. Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 767 (3rd Cir. 8 1978). 9 Furthermore, the Curricular Provisions included in the Joint Proposed Plan do not dictate

10 which specific courses will be taught at which grade levels; instead they allow the District 11 flexibility to develop the Courses of Instruction and to implement them at “all feasible grade 12 levels.” See Section (V)(D)(6)(a)(ii). 13 V. 14 15 the history, experiences, and culture of African American and Mexican American communities, 16 including TUSD students themselves, and a multicultural curriculum at all grade levels. The 17 courses will be open to all students who choose to take them. 18 The Curricular Provisions are necessary to the success of the Joint Proposed Plan. 19 Similar courses of instruction, namely the Mexican-American Studies (“MAS”) courses offered 20 by the District until their suspension on January 10, 2012, were demonstrably effective at 21 engaging the interest of District students and supporting their continued attendance in school, 22 thereby bolstering their academic success and graduation rates. As gaps in academic 23 achievement persist by race and ethnicity within the District (see Appendix B to Joint Proposed 24 25 26 10 The Curricular Provisions are Necessary to the Success of the Proposed Unitary Status Plan The Curricular Provisions require the design and implementation of courses that reflect

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1 Plan), programs of instruction that draw from and build upon courses that were successful in 2 addressing those gaps and providing a higher quality education to African American and Latino 3 students must be developed and implemented. 4 The State contends, without any valid basis, 5 that the MAS courses were academically

5 deficient and reached so few students that they “had no appreciable effect on the low average 6 achievement of [Mexican-American students].” Nov. 28 Objection at 14. A comprehensive 7 empirical analysis of the impact of student participation in the MAS classes tells a very different 8 story, one that underscores the testimony provided during the public comment period by students 9 who actually participated in those classes. 6 The 2012 study found that, controlling for numerous 10 demographic factors and other variables, the MAS classes provided significant educational 11 benefits to students, substantially improving their state test (“AIMS”) scores and their graduation 12 rates. Cabrera, Milem, & Marx, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF MEXICAN 13 AMERICAN STUDIES PARTICIPATION ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT WITHIN TUCSON UNIFIED 14 SCHOOL DISTRICT at 7, available at (“MAS Study”). After they 15 participated in the MAS courses, most cohorts of students who had previously failed state tests 16 on their first attempt were between 64 and 118 percent more likely to pass the AIMS test. Id. at 17 5. Similarly, students who took MAS courses were between 51 and 108 percent more likely to 18 graduate than their demographically similar peers who did not take MAS courses. Id. at 6. 19

The State relies heavily on the testimony of Dr. Sandra Stotsky to support this claim. By Dr. Stotsky’s own

20 admission, she never observed a MAS class nor has she reviewed the curricula for the classes. Transcript of the 21 22 23 24 25 26
Administrative Hearing In the Matter of the Hearings of an Appeal by Tucson Unified School District, No. 22F-002ADE (“Tr.”) 24:25-26:19, 30:22-31:4, Testimony of Dr. Sandra Stotsky, October 17, 2011. Her testimony appears to be based on a review of some of the student materials provided to her in preparation for her testimony. Id. at 18:18-25. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 804-06 (1st Cir. 1998) (declining to credit opinions of expert witness who never conducted a scientifically validated study but merely reviewed “statistics concerning teacher seniority, and anecdotal evidence about teacher attitudes supplied by school officials”). 6 The joint proposed plan, as submitted by the parties on November 9, 2012, was, by order of this court, open for public review and comment until November 28, 2012. References to testimony made during the public comment period are to the statements made at public hearings held on November 26-28, 2012 and to the hundreds of written comments received by the Special Master between November 9 and November 28, 2012.


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1 “These results suggest that there is a consistent, significant, positive relationship between MAS 2 participation and student academic performance.” Id. at 7. 3 In addition to the significant educational benefits that the Courses of Instruction can

4 provide to historically marginalized African American and Mexican American students, the 5 inclusion of these culturally relevant courses of instruction and the expansion of the multicultural 6 curriculum at all grade levels signals to all students that their stories and their backgrounds are 7 valued and are an important part of their educational experience. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 8 U.S. 306, 335 (2003) (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the 9 citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified 10 individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have 11 confidence in the openness and integrity of [our] educational institutions”). Culturally relevant 12 courses of instruction support and enhance learning by all students by creating a diverse 13 educational environment that reflects and promotes respect for the richness and pluralism within 14 the Tucson community. See id. at 333 (recognizing the “substantial” educational benefits of a 15 diverse educational environment in promoting ‘cross-racial understanding,” help[ing] to break 16 down racial stereotypes,’ ‘enabl[ing] [students] to better understand persons of different races,’ 17 and ‘better prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society’”); Evans, 447 18 F. Supp. at 1016 (requiring “curriculum offerings and programs which emphasize and reflect the 19 cultural pluralism of the students” in order to “preserve respect for the racial and ethnic 20 backgrounds of all students”). In doing so, these courses will help to end the legacy of 21 exclusion of African American and Mexican American students and eliminate the vestiges of 22 segregation within the District, which is the express goal of the desegregation effort and the 23 underlying constitutional violation that the Joint Proposed Plan seeks to remedy. 24 25 26 12

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1 VI. 2

CONCLUSION The Curricular Provisions seek to incorporate the history, experiences and perspectives of

3 the African-American and Mexican American communities in Tucson – the very communities 4 who have been at the core of this desegregation case for nearly four decades. As evidenced 5 during the public comment period, these Curricular Provisions are of vital importance to 6 students, parents, and community members within the District. The inclusion of Courses of 7 Instruction and curriculum that reflect and celebrate diversity, engender respect and 8 understanding among students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, and inspire and engage 9 students in the learning process, provides a foundation for this District and its students to move 10 onwards from a history of racial segregation and discrimination. The Curricular Provisions are 11 indeed necessary for TUSD to “convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would 12 be eliminated root and branch,” and should be adopted as part of the Joint Proposed Plan by this 13 court. 14 15 16 17 Dated: December 14, 2012 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 13 ANURIMA BHARGAVA, Chief ZOE M. SAVITSKY Educational Opportunities Section Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Patrick Henry Building, Suite 4300 Washington, D.C. 20530 Tel: (202) 305-3223 Fax: (202) 514-8337 /s/ Zoe M. Savitsky_________ THOMAS E. PEREZ Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division Respectfully Submitted,

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I hereby certify that on December 14, 2012, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice 3 of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Richard M. Yetwin, Esq. Heather K. Gaines, Esq. Sesaly O. Stamps, Esq. DeConcini, McDonald, Yetwin & Lacy 2525 E. Broadway Blvd., Suite 200 Tucson, Arizona 85716-5303 Nancy Hughes Wall Tucson Unified School District Legal Department 1010 E. Tenth Street Tucson, Arizona 85701-1119 Rubin Salter, Jr., Esq. 177 N. Church Ave., Suite 805 Tucson, Arizona 85701-1119 Lois D. Thompson Jennifer L. Roche Proskauer Rose LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200 Los Angeles, California 90067 Nancy Ramirez MALDEF 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90014 Samuel E. Brown, Esq. Tucson Unified School District Legal Department 1010 East Tenth Street Tucson, Arizona 85719 I hereby certify that on December 14, 2012, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the following, who is not a CM/ECF registrant: Dr. Willis Hawley 2138 Tawes Building University of Maryland 14

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College Park, MD 20742

Dated: December 14, 2012

/s/ Zoe M. Savitsky_________ THOMAS E. PEREZ Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division

ANURIMA BHARGAVA, Chief ZOE M. SAVITSKY Educational Opportunities Section Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Patrick Henry Building, Suite 4300 Washington, D.C. 20530 Tel: (202) 305-3223 Fax: (202) 514-8337