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The study has been undertaken to examine the migration of Afghan refugees into Pakistan as a result of the Marxist-Leninist Revolution of April, 1978 in Afghanistan. The Marxist regime in Afghanistan and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran jolted the entire region politically, and accelerated the process of political confrontation into ideological polarization. Both Revolution and Jehad opened the proverbial gates of hell, engulfing both men and movements in the North-West Frontier province of Pakistan. These revolutions posed a serious threat to the entire Asian region by encouraging and enabling various state and non-state actors, under the patronage of the then superpowers, to use the refugees for their own malicious political gains and designs in South Asia. The fallout of the Afghan imbroglio was the influx of three million refugees into different parts of Pakistan. Approximately 2.2 million were residing in 251 camps in the Frontier province and adjacent tribal areas of Pakistan. The study explores how Pakistan, in collaboration with the CIA, manipulated this political and humanitarian situation of the Afghan refugees, and converted it into an anti-Soviet resistance with an Islamic ideological orientation by pushing innocent Muslim Muhajireen (refugees) into the quagmire of militant religio-fundamentalism. This was achieved through using and establishing a chain of Masajid (Mosques), Madrasas (religious seminaries) and Maktabs (Schools) to raise mullahs, mujahideen, and lastly Taliban to counter Russians and Afghan Marxists. It further explains the shift in the behavior of local Mullahs and Maliks (Chiefs), and their unholy alliance against democratic nationalist elite in the region. The cry for Islam and Jehad was

2 raised; masjid, madrasas, maktabs and drug Mafia were used to produce a militant creed to challenge the state laws and authority in the province. Religious outfits like Tehreek-e- Nafaz-e -Shariate-Muhammadi (TNSM) rejected the Pakistani legal system and established their own courts, opposed female education, elections and democracy. Ziaul Haqs lust for power and legitimization of his dictatorial regime exploited Islamic card both internally and externally. Internally he started Islamization drive (1979-82) by gaining the support of Islamist parties like Jammat-e-Islami and externally the Jehad cry was raised for liberation of Afghanistan and Kashmir. To provide new recruits to the Jehad fronts and for religious indoctrination Pakistan ideology was reinterpreted by explaining the new role of Pakistan army: Armys role is not only limited to defend Pakistans geographical boundaries, but also to the defense ideological frontiers of the country. Islamabads political, economic and military involvement in the new Afghan gambit was so well planned, organized and institutionalized that almost all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan were trapped in this overt and covert snare. Although the official policy of Islamabad towards Afghanistan was based on the concept of Islamic brotherhood, neighborhood and humanitarianism, its role in the conflict was determined by its covet policy. The Islamic nature of the Afghan resistance highlighted the close relationship of religion and politics, and encouraged both local and refugees in the province to establish round about one thousand Islamic madrasas and Darul-Ulums with the aid of Middle Eastern countries to provide ideological base for the Afghan Jehad. The Afghan refugees Tanzimat (political parties) encouraged, trained, and financed religious elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They created, backed and propagated sectarianism, extremism and tribalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The net result was the political and economic conditions in Pakistan are in total disarray. Radicalism, extremism and Kalashnikov culture has proliferated

3 like wild-fire in the country. Regarding the negative fallouts of this, one could underline the growing tendencies of Mullahism, extremism, militancy, sectarianism, drug and other Mafias and above all the spreading culture of violence in the entire country. According, therefore, the focus of this work is not simply restricted to the findings of the research which went into it, but concerns itself with recommendations for the future as well.