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Cang vs Court of Appeals Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three

children. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US. Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2) the parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality. Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. VDA DE JACOB VS. CA Facts: Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the

deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.. Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. CA affirmed trial court’s ruling. Issues: a.) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. Held The Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs. With regard to the contention the marriage was void ab initio because of the lack of a marriage license, it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. With regard to the loss of the marriage certificate, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage..

had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. and since this would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee. Par (1). Article 186. Art 185 provides: Art. February 9. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91. The spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt the minor niece and nephews of Lenita. The adoptive parents can only change thesurname of the adopted but not the first name save in cases where the first name falls under the causes allowed by the court forchanging first names. on the contrary. gave consent to the adoption. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife. Lenita. The law allows the adoptee. being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. 1996 GR No. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. in substance and purpose. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child. Private respondents. 117209. to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. Simultaneous with the adoption was the change of name of Kevin Earl to AaronJoseph Held : The proceeding for adoption and for change of name should be done separately. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes.Republic vs Court of Appeals James Hughes. Issue: Can the spouses adopt the minors? Held: While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding. RA8552 Sec13 allows adopters to change the full name of the adopted and no longer just the surname. can aptly find governance. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Republic v. with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. 603. who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. Held: No. Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption. a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name. Husband and wife must jointly adopt. to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. as well as their parents.) Republic vs. The minors. who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a . to bear the surname of the adopter. a Filipino Citizen. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. (NB: rule is no longer applicable. married Lenita Mabunay. Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph. Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. Art. can qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). a natural born citizen of the United States of America. as a matter of right. except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child. the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child. Presidential Decree No. arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. on the subject of parental authority. 185. Section 7 of the SC 2002 en banc resolution likewise requires the petition to “specifically state at the headingof the initiatory pleading when the petition contains an application for change of name. upon issuance of the decree of adoption. Hernandez Facts: The Munson spouses adopted Kevin Earl Moran. are different from and are not related to each other. a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted. admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which. Hernandez. or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. however. as a matter of right and obligation.

In fact. No. it allows. also known as the first or Christian name.” her mother’s surname. governed by its own set of rules. Catindig. it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name. in fact. will be before the surname of the mother. Last.grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court. What the law does not prohibit. that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia. Issue:May an illegitimate child. If a change in one’s name is desired. The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. if any. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. He alleged therein. even if not prayed for by petitioner. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia. However. strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. cannot properly be granted. such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption. that Stephanie was born on June 26. of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system. [G.” his surname. premised solely upon the adoption thus granted. The automatic change thereof. use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case. there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. Thus. the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First. Ruling: Stephanie should be permitted to use. herein petitioner. March 31. this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. petitioner. Facts: Honorato B. which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname. Second.” . to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future. the given or proper name. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding.R. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem. 148311. 1994. CATINDIG. it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code. filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. 2005] IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding. the Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name. and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. upon adoption by her natural father. A fortiori. as in this case. wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. as her middle name. she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. among others. her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. in and by itself. and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig.