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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. PAS-89, NO.

6, JULY/AUGUST 1970

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[66]

[67]

[68]
[69]

[70]

periodic updating is provided. References to circuit breakers and switching surges will be found in this bibliography. IEEE Committee Report, "Voltage surges in relay control circuits," Paper 31 PP 66-314, presented at the IEEE Summer Power Meeting, New Orleans, La., July 10-15, 1966. "Techniques for dielectric tests," ANSI Publ. C68.1, has a bibliography (by title only) listing 135 papers under the headings general, sphere gaps, other gaps, oscillography, other methods, surge generators, surge currents, techniques, and experience. H. A. Peterson, Transients in Power Systems. New York: Wiley, and London: Chapman and Hall, 1951. Page 303; 11 references by title only. E. Clarke, Circuit Analysis of A-C Power Systems, vol. 2. New York: Wiley, and London: Chapman and Hall. Pages 209, 264; 23 references by title only. R. Rudenberg, Transient Performance of Electric Power Systems. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950. Twenty pages of references by title only.

IX. RELATED EFFORTS OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS [71] A technical committee on computer environmental considerations is presently active under the sponsorship of the Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (BEMA/ DPG). A subcommittee has been organized to deal with problems associated with power interfaces. The effects on computers of overvoltages and other extraneous transients from ac power circuits have been investigated. [72] The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has formed a Technical Committee (IEC/TC61) for safety requirements for household electrical appliances. Underwriters' Laboratory has been designated as secretariat, and it is likely that problems associated with overvoltages will eventually be considered by this group. [73] The IEEE Power Systems Relaying Committee includes a subcommittee on surge phenomena in relay control circuits. Some overlap in the bibliography undoubtedly has occurred. Although the present working group concentrated on surge phenomena, there are many common areas with power circuits.

Local Backup

Relaying

Protection

IEEE COMMITTEE REPORT

Abstract-Results of a survey and symposium on local backup relaying protection is presented. The survey covers the responses of 121 relay engineers to questions pertaining to their present-day preferences on duplicate relays, dc and ac sources, control power, and breaker failure protection. The symposium offered the opportunity to present detailed philosophy, circuit configuration, and explanations to supplement the statistics compiled in the survey.

Paper 69 TP 602-PWR, recommended and approved by the Power System Relaying Committee of the IEEE Power Group for presentation at the IEEE Summer Power Meeting, Dallas, Tex., June 22-27, 1969. Manuscript submitted March 10, 1969; made available for printing March 25, 1969. Members of the IEEE Working Group on the Survey of Local Backup Practices of the IEEE Relaying Practices Subcommittee of the Power System Relaying Committee are: A. Paullow, Chairman; E. T. Gray, S. H. Horowitz, A. G. McConnell, W. H. Van Zee, and P. Zarakas. Members of the IEEE Working Group on the Symposium on Local Backup Practices of the IEEE Relaying Practices Subcommittee of the Power System Relaying Committee are: S. H. Horowitz, Chairman; C. L. Wagner and K. Winick.

INTRODUCTION IN JANUARY, 1966, a working group was formed to investigate the practices associated with local backup relaying protection. This working group made a survey of the preferred practices which was sent to 253 relay engineers in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. One hundred twenty-one pertinent responses were received, representing two large consulting firms, nine utilities with generating capacity more than 4500 MW, 30 utilities with generating capacities of 1500-4500 MW, and 80 utilities with capacities below 1500 MW. The survey covered relays, current and potential sources, control power, trip coils, and breaker failure protection. Table I is a summary of the results of this survey. Since the classification of responder (consultant versus utility and size of utility) did not reflect any change in practices, only the total results have been tabulated in Table I. It was the consensus of the Power Systems Relaying Committee that the subject of backup relaying warranted more

1062

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS,

JULY/AUGUST 1970

TABLE I PRESENT-DAY PREFERRED LOCAL BACKUP RELAYING PRACTICES SUMMARY


LINE PROTECTION
BUS PROTECTION

OF

ALL RESPONSES
GENERATOR PROTECTION
150 Ml
11

TRANSFORMER PROTECTION (N-V WINGING)

TOTAL RESPONSES

121

GO 7O 100 KV
31

100 TO > 300 EV 300 KY


2

> GO TO 105 ER 100 KV 300 KV #00 KV


38
1

GO TO 100 KR

TOO TO > 300 KV 300 KR


6 74

150 TO 450 MW
49

450 MR

>

CATEGORY NOT APPLICABLE


I. RELAY FAILURE PROTECTION

71

88

35

86
1

1.1 PHASE RELAYS

NOT USED 1.1.1 DUPLICATE PRIMARY 1.1.2 SEPARATE PRIMARY AND BACKC-UP 1.1.3 SINGLE SET 1.1.4 SINGLE RACK-UP FOR MUJLTiPLE LINES OH A BUS SECTION

(SEE NOTE A)

0f(
2 34 48 6
1 1 11

21
6 20

(2
1

28
28

87
2

19 ___

3 9 66 4

85
2

9 5 17
1

7 34 44 ___

12

65 36

14 27 6

11 ..Ji2

66 31

48
10

7.... 24 3

1.2 GROUND RELAYS (SEE NOTE A)


NOT USED

0
36
45 7

1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4

DUPLICATE PRIMARY SEPARATE PRIMARY AND RACK-UP SINGLE SET SINGLE BACK(-UP FOR MUILTIPLE LINE6 ON A BUJS SECTION

8 92 i5 3

1 20 28

26 3 9 39 6

37 3 23
44 7

12 2 7
11 1

23
4

19
38

34 8 40
32 1

13 7I
18

4)

6. 34

7-5 29 30
4

.9 ..7

17

1.3 CUJRRENT SOURCES (SEE NOTE RI


NOT USED

1.3.1

132SNGLE

DUJPLICATE

16
74
2 2 29

____2

62 57

47 3

10 72

22 90

18
2
1 2

i5

10

75
2 7

88
7

34

27 0
4 2

50 I
2 84
14 8

48 24
I 3

29

1.4 POTENTIAL SOURCES NOT USED 1.4.1 DUPLICATE


1.4.2 SINGLE PRIMARY -DOUB3LE SECONDARY 1 4 3 SING F PRIMRY - SINGLE

iS
80

SECODARY_S

53 Ss

14 -26 0

1 8

22

13 2

jio
6

J0

2. CONTROL. POWER FAILURE PROTECTION 2.1 DUPLICATE BATTERIES


NUM1WER
USED

2.1.1 COMMORN FUSE FOR ALL RREAKER TRIP COILS & PROTECTIVE RELAYS 2.1.2 SEPARATE FUSE FOR EACH SET OF BREAKER TRIP COILS & PROTECTIVE RELAYS

__________7___li
1 11 10 ..... ..j 10 --

li
11

91

10

2.2 SINGL.E BATTERIES NUM4BER USED


2.2.1 CDIv4O FUSE FOR ALL BREAKER TRIP CDILS-.& PROTECTIVE RELAYS 2.2.2 SEPARATE FUSE FOR EACHi SET OF BREAKER TRIP COILS & PROTECTIVE RELAYS 2.2.3 SEPARATE FUSES F9R BREAKER TRIP COILS, PRIMARY RELAYS AND RACK-UP RElAYS

85
18

109
14

40
2
11

78 1103 ...Lii ...is


43 44

26
...j

81
...z

104
..2.
49

36
i.
18

..o2
1

...i ....28
6

46

46
43

46

47

22

17

26

19

35

15

18

35

22.

36

29

16

2.3 BREAKER TRIP COILS IOLUANTIlY AND HOW OPERATED)

2___3__1 __DUPLICATE______TRIP____COILS___ 23.2. TIMGETRIPE BUIS


23.1. TIMERT PERCIRCUITG IRNBAKUS OIRCI BRAERiAHAFs
_CIRCUIT_ _IN_PRIMARY_ 2__3_5_DIODE __TRIPPING_

4
20

93
28

29

30
2 13

58

78

05 94

57

62

24

16 2B 9j 4
7

22 js

ij0 J50

58

i
...J

109

li

i3

7......2~
22

2.13WITAUXILIARY SWIPITCHESMRYCRUT(EENT )i2 WITHAK FAULTCITDETECTOR 23.2.2 C IIAY-RIPN


3.2.3AKEWAITHR PROTHCIO

2_
31 69

3
35

3
20

s
45

6
23

4
20
44

22

5 36..

3 32

2 2 22

3.1.BREAKER FAILURE TIMERSEEGZDB NOT USED 3.3.1 PRIMARYRELAYS ONLY P

47

28
62

59

54

58

54

2L
29

18
26

65
38

l
14
18

71
39

23,

il

7
19

3.132 TMROT PERIMARYEANDR BAKUPRLAS3 BCK-UP RELAYS 3.3.3 SIEPRATPEBRIMAKRY ANDP


NOT USED -80 .11TO BLCING CUILARRIE SWTRANSMISON1

CIL)

230

14

36

3.ACIO BYEKE LOAILUBREAEFANILUREI OTINRGOETEMPA

79
40

38
19

24 78 95 575 8 13 8624

494 7

37
'

98

61

30

7
a

4.2 TRANSFER TRIP


NOT USED 4.2.1 SINGLE P
4.2.2 USED FOR

E ONLY THAN BREAKER FAILURE TRIP IHAN 9REAK ER FA LURE

I
__________ _

70
1

. 3 17... L

76 1

28

1I2 1 2
5

71

-7

07
__ 10

517 81 8
F

8I 4 2 I21 L

161 6 4 _4

6 I

NOTES
A.
DUPLICATE RELAYS ARE COMPARABLE BUT NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL EXAMPLES (1 CARRIER AND PILOT WIRES 12) DIRECTIONAL AND PHASE COMARISON

S. AUXILIARY
C.

CT'S ARE NOT CONSIDERED A DUPLICATE CURRENT SOURCE

(D

TWO COMPANIES USE 3 LEIELS OF PROTECTION


ONE COMPANY USES LINEAR COUPLERS

0
@

ONE COMPANY ENERGIZES

AN AUXILIARY TRIPPING DEVICE IS AN EXTERNAL RELAY WHICH MAY BE EITHER MECHANICAL OR STATIC.TRIPPING BY MEANS OF A 5ECOND CONTACT ON THE PRIMARY RELAY IS CONSIDERED DIRECT TRIPPING

(I) TWO COMPANIES USE HIGH SPEED


ONE COMPANY USES BREAKER

SREAKEKR FAILURE TIMER

6ROUND SWITCHES 8AILURE TIMERS WITH BACK-UP

BY OACK-JJP RELAYS ONLY

RELAYS OF GENERATORS ONLY

IEEE COMMITTEE REPORT: LOCAL BACKUP RELAYING PROTECTION

1063

than merely a compilation of preferred practices. To investigate this matter further a symposium was held on June 26,1968, at the IEEE Summer Power Meeting in Chicago. This paper is a distillation of the survey data, prepared papers, and the ensuing floor discussion at the Summer Power Meeting.
DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL CONCEPTS

DUPLICATE CURRENT SOURCES


System Voltage (kV) 66-100 100-300 >300
Yes (percent) 18 52 94 No (percent) 82 48 6

TABLE II

The primary objective of a backup protective scheme is to open all sources to an uncleared fault on a system. To do this efficiently the backup scheme must accomplish the following conditions: 1) recognize the existence of all faults which occur within its prescribed zone of protection, 2) detect the failure of any element in the protection chain, including the circuit breakers, 3) initiate the tripping of the minimum number of breakers necessary to clear the fault, 4) operate fast enough to maintain system stability, prevent excessive equipment damage, and maintain a prescribed degree of service continuity. Historically, these backup requirements have been met by relays located at adjoining or remote stations. This type of protection has been defined as "remote backup protection." As system complexity increased, however, the remote backup scheme became increasingly difficult to apply. As the number of lines to a given station increased, the fault current contribution from each line, as a percentage of the total, decreased, requiring the remote relay reach settings to be increased. This seriously impaired the ability of these relays to carry heavy load. Conversely, if reach settings were adjusted to accommodate load, complete loss of backup protection could result. Even if relay operation would occur on sequential tripping, the resulting tripping time would be intolerable. In addition, the presence of tapped loads made tripping the remote end undesirable if the fault could be cleared locally. Finally, remote backup did not discriminate between a relay system failure which, if known, would allow the normal breaker to clear the fault, and a breaker failure which would require tripping additional breakers to clear the fault. As a result of these difficulties, in recent years a second type of backup protection, known as "local backup protection," has become increasingly popular. This concept is based on the philosophy that all failures in the primary protection system should be detected at the source of the failure and measures taken locally to correct the difficulty. Fig. 1 is a typical transmissionline local backup scheme that illustrates the various components of such a scheme. A breaker may not trip for a fault within its protection zone for many reasons. For example, failures may occur in the current or potential intelligence sources to the relays. Fig. 1 shows that in the local backup protection scheme, duplicate current and potential transformers can be used to protect against this contingency. Failures can occur in the relays themselves so again Fig. 1 shows two relay systems for this contingency. While not shown, failures can occur in the station battery so in some cases duplicate batteries are provided. Duplicate trip coils can be used to provide backup for this element of the system. Finally, for breaker difficulties such as interrupter or linkage failures, a scheme utilizing a timing relay and auxiliaries is used to trip selected breakers around the faulty breaker and thus clear the fault with a minimum disturbance to the system.

DUPLICATE POTENTIAL SOURCES

TABLE III

Voltage
(kV)

System

100-300
>300

66-100

Duplicate Device (percent) 2 9 28

Single Device Secondary Single Double (percent) (percent) 65 33 46 45 20 52

Table I shows the survey results concerning backup practices of the various elements of the protection system. The following sections will discuss the general conclusions that can be drawn from these results along with some special problems that can arise in the application process.

CURRENT AND POTENTIAL SOURCE BACKUP Failures in the current and potential intelligence sources can prevent the relays from detecting faults in their protective zones. To correct this difficulty Fig. 1 shows that duplicate current and potential transformers or potential devices can be used, each serving a separate relay or group of relays. While Table I shows the results of a detailed survey of practices, Tables II and III express these results in percentage form. As expected, duplication, and therefore sophistication, increases as the system voltage increases. As mentioned previously, there was no significant difference in the practices of the differentsized companies. As to duplication of potential sources, Table III shows three categories of responses. The first category consists of complete duplication of devices. The third category uses only a device with a single secondary, that is, no potential backup. The second category is a compromise with a single device having two secondaries, each secondary supplying separate relays. Note that at the higher voltages the single device with double secondary represents the predominant practice. The above percentages were taken from the line protection columns of Table I as this represents the most pertinent usage of this type backup.
RELAY BACKUP Table I separates relay backup into four categories: line protection, bus protection, transformer protection, and generator protection. Unfortunately, the questions asked and the replies received on the generator protection were not sufficiently clear to base any conclusions on the results. The other three categories will be discussed in the following sections.

1064

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS, JULY/AUGUST 1970

TABLE IV LINE PROTECTION PRACTICES


System Voltage (kV) 66-100 100-300 >300 Single Relay (percent) 60 18
0

Separate Primary and Backup Relays (percent) 38 73 57

Duplicate Primary Relays (percent) 2 9 43

TABLE V TRANSFORMER PROTECTION PRACTICES


System Voltage (kV) 66-100 100-300 >300 Single Relay (percent) 52 32 13 Separate Primary and Backup Relays (percent) 40 58 57

TRIPS ALL BREAKERS ON BUS

Duplicate Primary Relays (percent) 8


30
10

Fig. 1. Typical backup scheme for line connected to single bus.

Line Protection Fig- 1 illustrates a typical scheme for relay backup on a simple single-bus single-breaker substation layout. The primary relays could be directional distance carrier, pilot wire, phase comparison carrier, some form of microwave, step distance, or simple overcurrent. The backup relays could be identical with the primary relays, or they may be one of the other types. Ideally the primary and the backup relays are each fed from separate current and potential sources. 'For faults on the protected line both the primary and the backup will operate to trip the line breaker. The backup relays do not require any added time delay and hence may be just as fast as the front line relays. When either of these relays operates to trip the line breaker, a timer is also energized to start the breaker backup function. This will be discussed subsequently when breaker failure protection schemes are considered. Table IV summarizes the survey results on line protection. The single-relay category might include a stepped distance relay or a zone two distance relay used for carrier trip plus time-delay trip. In some respects this might not be considered "local backup." An example of the "separate primary and backup relays" category might be carrier relaying plus a separate stepped-distance relay. "Duplicate primary relays" are defined as comparable but not necessarily identical relays, for example, carrier and pilot wire relays or directional and phase comparison relays. As. would be expected, Table IV shows that this latter category is more prevalent at the higher voltages. The data of Table IV is based on the phase-relay results of Table I. Similar results are. obtained from the data on ground relays.

Bus PROTECTION PRACTICES

TABLE VI

100-300
>300

System Voltage (kV) 66-100

Single Relay (percent) 84 77 55

Primary and Backup Relays (percent) 12 18 16

Separate

Duplicate
Primary Relays (percent) 4 5 29

DUPLICATE BATTERIES

TABLE VII

System Voltage (kV)

Yes (percent)
6 8 20

100-300
>300

66-100

No (percent) 94 92 80

CONTROL CIRCUIT FUSING

TABLE VIII

System Voltage (kV)


66-100 100-300 > 300

Single Fuse (percent)


22 14

One Fuse

Transformer Protection Relay backup for transformer protection is similar to that discussed for line protection. Table V sumnmarizes the survey results for this protection element.

Coil Circuit (percent) 57 44 28

per Trip

One Fuse for Each Trip Coil, Primary Relay and Backup (percent)
21 42

67

IEEE COMMITTEE REPORT: LOCAL BACKUP RELAYING PROTECTION

106.5

The single-relay category indicates no relay backup. The "separate primary and backup relays" category might include a differential relay plus a fault pressure relay. The "duplicate primary relays" probably means two differential relays. It is not clear from the responses how the pressure relays were handled. For example, many of the users who use double-differential relays also use pressure relays for a third level of protection although this was not indicated in the survey. Table V shows quite a number of redundant relays of EHV systems, although not as many (30 percent) as Table IV indicates for line protection (43 percent).
Bus Protection Table VI shows the relay backup summary for bus protection from Table I. The category description is the same as Table V for transformer protection, except that the results for the second category are not clear. The authors of the questionnaire intended the "separate primary and backup relays"-category to mean, for example, the use of a differential relay as primary protection with an overcurrent relay as backup. How the responders interpreted this, however, is not clear. In any event Table VI shows very little usage of this category. For relay backup two separate relays with associated separation of current transformers are-required. Often however, the second set of current transformers is not available and so the second set of relays may not be justified. In a two-section bus station local bus backup protection can be provided by adding directional overcurrent or impedance relays on the bus tie, one

set tripping in each direction, with reach settings less than the shortest reach of any first zone relay on any line on that section, and a time setting of about 15 cycles. This relay would then trip for faults on the bus itself and also for faults on the lines near the station with a time delay that is concurrent with the breaker failure time.

The policy of using supervision lamps in profusion should be reviewed and consideration given to providing a push button which would manually insert the lamp in the circuit. Low-power neon lamps have a number of advantages and should be considered. Formulas for matching the charger size to the load should be treated with suspicion. The critical requirement is the ability to charge a discharged battery while an unusual amount of switching is taking place after an extensive outage. Under these conditions a normally adequate charger may overload or take perhaps as long as 36 hours to achieve floating conditions. Static chargers provide input regulation and current limiting. Fans, timers, switches, and other devices that reduce the reliability of chargers should be avoided. Magnetic amplifier diode chargers are the most reliable, with various forms of silicon-controlled rectifier (SCR) types and motor generators somewhat less reliable. Charger overload protection should not be so sensitive that it operates under momentary heavy loads or branch circuit faults. When the charger fails, the float voltage on a 125-volt system drops in a few minutes from 129 to 120 volts. A relay with a high dropout can therefore be used to detect the initial voltage drop and initiate an alarm. Chargers are efficient noise sources. This noise may be reduced by specifying filtering for ripple output of less than 2 percent of dc output. Control systems are operated without an intentional ground. This is intended to prevent operation of relays and trip devices by accidental grounds of the control circuits. Ground lamps or voltmeters are used to indicate the degree of ground. When an excessive ground is reported, the standard method of locating the ground is to pull fuses on one circuit at a time until the
defective circuit is located.

"Protection

is

connection it is of

impaired, but the loss is momentary. In this course essential that relays which are normally
upon

energized and thus become de-energized

the loss of the

dc

DC Source Backup The next link in the protection chain is the dc source or station battery. One obvious method of backup for this element is to use duplicate station batteries. As shown in Table VII, this practice is not widely followed although at EHV a fair number are being used. A second form of dc backup involves fusing of the various control circuits. The survey results in this regard are shown in Table VIII. The majority of the responders use the third category at the higher system voltages. Although the actions and details of the dc circuits may or may not involve relay engineers within a given company, there are many aspects of this subject which intimately involve the relay engineer and his special requirements and knowledge. Some of these problems were discussed during the backup symposium. For example, the 8-hour ampere-hour rating of the battery should be adequate to carry the regular, continuous, and intermittent loads without a charger for a period long enough to ensure that an alarm can be given and proper personnel dispatched to correct the situation. A time of 12 to 24 hours is not unreasonable. Ample reserve capacity should be included to cover not only future growth but also to consider operation during low temperatures (below 77F) and abnormal system conditions. The design practice should aim at reducing steady loads. Auxiliary relays may often be so used that they are normally de-energized.

do not cause tripping or other undesirable operation. Many systems operate with a minimum of fuses on the basis that fuses cause outages. These vary from a single negative fuse on the battery to coordinated distribution systems with selectivity obtained by fuses and breakers. Even a rough idea of the fault currents at different parts of the control system can involve a tedious analysis. Because of the low voltage, each wire terminal, fuse, switch, or contact contributes a drop, and for fast-acting fuses the inductive effects are important. A commonly held notion is that batteries will deliver perhaps 10 000 amperes on short circuit. A typical 11-plate battery has a 1-minute discharge rate of 295 amperes which will decrease its voltage from its operating point to 1.75 volts per cell. On a 1-second discharge, about seven times this current will be available which is only 2065 amperes. The charger may or may notinake a substantial contribution depending upon its size and current limiting action. In any event many points in a station will, as a result of the cable lengths involved, have fault currents of merely 200 or 300 amperes. The coordination of fuses and breakers must take
into account this
range

Breakers in general are limited in their selectivity and are much slower and have higher resistance. In one study using commercially available fuses and breakers a 60-ampere fuse in
series with a 30-ampere fuse would coordinate up to 2000 amperes. A 70- and 35-ampere breaker would not coordinate over 170 amperes. On a typical fault a breaker will clear in 1.5 seconds and a fuse in 0.1 second.

of current from 200 to

2000

amperes.

1066
TABLE IX DUPLICATE TRIP COILS

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS, JULY/AUGUST 1970

System Voltage (kV) 66-100 100-300 >300

Yes (percent) 6
22 60

No (percent) 94 78 40

BREAKER-FAILURE BACKUP

The final element in the protection system is the circuit breaker itself. The relay system can operate and call for the breaker to open, but difficulty in the breaker can prevent operation to clear the fault. For example, the breaker trip coil can be open or shorted. A solution to this possible trouble lies in the use of duplicate trip coils. Table IX indicates the industry practice in this regard. Duplicate trip coils and protective relays permit proper operation of the terminal even for failure of one-trip coil, one-trip lead, a trip fuse, etc. This operation of the second-trip coil prevents operation of the breaker-failure backup scheme described in the next paragraph. As will be discussed, operation of a breakerfailure backup scheme, though of great benefit to the system when a fault cannot be cleared otherwise, can also be very disrupting to a significant portion of the system load. This, of course, is dependent on the system configuration, how many loads are radial from that bus, and the importance of that bus to system stability. Herein, then, lies one important feature of the second-trip coil. It considerably reduces the probability of operating the breaker-failure backup scheme which is intended to be a "last ditch" attempt to clear the fault. Even with the use of duplicate trip coils, certain electrical or mechanical failures can occur within the breaker to prevent its operation on receipt of a trip signal from the relays. Some form of protection scheme is indicated that will trip the adjacent breakers for this condition and clear the fault with a minimum disturbance to the system. A typical protection scheme for a simple single-bus single-breaker bus layout is shown in Fig. 1. As shown in Fig. 1, both the primary and backup relays feed the trip circuit of breaker 1 directly; if the breaker is in operating condition, it will open with a minimum of delay. At the same time these relays, in conjunction with current detector relay 50-1, energize a breaker-failure timer to start the breaker backup function. If the breaker on the line fails to clear, these relays will remain picked up, permitting the breaker-failure timer to time out and trip the remaining breakers off the bus. It should be noted that the breaker-failure function requires that the primary or the backup relay contacts remain closed for the duration of the fault to ensure continuous energization of the breaker-failure timer. Thus if the primary or backup relays are distance relays, the associated second-zone trip contact of the distance relay timer must be maintained. The coverage provided by this scheme is as follows: If the primary relays (or current supply, etc.) fail, the backup relays will operate to clear the fault with no intentional time delay. If the backup relays fail, the primary relays continue to provide their relaying function. If the breaker fails, either or both sets of relays will operate the breaker-failure timer which isolates the fault by tripping all the necessary breakers.

ENDOFLINED

BREAKER 4 AND REMOTE

TRIPS

ENDOFLINEC ENDOFLINEC

TRIPS BREAKER 4 AND REMOTE

TRIPS BREAKER 3 AND REMOTE

TRIPS BREAKER 3 AND REMOTE END OF LINE B

Fig. 2. Typical backup scheme for line connected to ring bus.

Fig. 2 shows one type of arrangement that may be used when two breakers per line are connected as in a ring bus. The primary and backup relay functions may be the same as for the single-bus single-breaker scheme. The breaker-failure function for this particular scheme requires one current detector relay for each breaker. These components are used to establish which of the two breakers associated with the line failed to clear since the protective relays themselves cannot do this. In the scheme of Fig. 2, if one of the two breakers failed to clear, then one of the adjacent breakers and the remote breaker or breakers of the adjacent associated line must be tripped to clear the fault. The illustrated scheme accomplishes this required backup operation in very much the same way as in the case of the single-bus single-breaker arrangement. However, in this case, the remote end of the line adjacent to the failed breaker is tripped by some transfer trip means. With this type of scheme, the setting of second-zone time of the remote terminal must of course coordinate with the local breaker-failure time. To do this, the contribution through each breaker must be considered, as shown in Fig. 3. For a fault on the line, breaker 1 may see only a small fraction of the fault, and its breaker-failure current detector relay may not operate until after breaker 2 has tripped. This delays the start of the breaker 1 breaker-failure timer by a time equal to the interrupting time of breaker 2. The zone 2 time of the remote breakers should be correspondingly longer. Also, it is important to note that this sequential operation of current detectors (when it exists) and the resulting delay in clearing the fault should be considered in light of system stability requirements.

IEEE COMMITTEE REPORT: LOCAL BACKUP RELAYING PROTECTION

1067
TIME TU CLEAR FAULI BY BREAKER FAILURE PRlOTECION

bv no l^AoV nOATCnTfAtMi

TIME TO CLEAR FAULT

X
%

100% FAULT
AUX PILIARYPRTCIN

190%
U3
50-

PROTECTIVE

IRIITAYTE INITATE
TRIP

RAY tOIRY

PRIMARY BREAKER CLEARING TIME


/r%

CIRCUIT BREAKERS

TRIP

PRIMARY

PROTECTIVE

I a

RELAYS

50-

T
TIMER BKR2

I3
50

AND AUXILIARY RELAY

CORDINATING

TIMER BKRI

Fig. 3. Unequal fault current contribution.

DEPENDS ON CIRCUIT
E

.4-3I

KFRA FA11IIRF TIUFr

%I

Bus Y
TusRx
SYSTEMS
{}

~~FA ULT _
aTRANSFORMER
D IFE.

AUX IL I ARY RiELAY (S) TO


INITIATE BACK-UP TRIP

BACK-UiP

SYSTEM

BREAKER (S) CLEARING

Fig. 5. Local backup protection flow chart.

TRANSFORMER 1

DIfF.-

FAULT BACKUP
T

SYSTEM

AUX

TI MER
aa

TRIPS

BREAKERS

SWITCH

AaB

BKRAT
TRIPS
BUS X

SWITCH

TBKRB8

TRIPS BUSY

Fig. 4. Breaker backup protection for transformers.

In the case of transformer protection, two independent relay schemes with their own current sources and tripping relays are required to provide relay backup. To provide breaker backup, a scheme similar to that illustrated in Fig. 4 and could be used. Note in this case that breaker auxiliary switches are used instead of, or in addition to, the more conventional fault detectors. This is done because the magnitude of the fault current may not be sufficient to acutate current detectors for restricted transformer faults. By itself, the position of the breaker auxiliary switch is not a thoroughly reliable indication of a failed breaker. A breaker may operate but fail to clear the fault or, conversely, the switch operating linkage may not operate even though the main pole does clear the fault. In the first case the auxiliary switch would stop the timer, preventing a desired breaker-failure operation, and in the second case the auxiliary switch would not operate, which would result in an unnecessary breaker-failure operation. A precaution to note concerns a tapped transformer bank that constitutes a ground for line faults. If there is no breaker on the high side of the transformer but the current detector is connected there, then the breaker-failure relays for the low-side

breaker may operate incorrectly even though the breaker operates correctly. For this problem to exist it is only necessary that the remote end tripping of the faulted line be delayed for a time nearly equal to or greater than the breaker failure timer setting. The problem of choosing the proper failure time is extremely complex, involving the effect on system stability, the type of relays and circuit breakers, and the necessity of coordinating with other relays on the system. Fig. 5 shows a flow chart of all of these related factors. It is important to note that the nominal breaker operating times do not always apply for all operating conditions. When referring to Fig. 5 it should be recognized that the maximum breaker clearing times should be used. The effective maximum value can be longer than the nominal rating for the following normal conditions. 1) Minimum Fault Currents: Some breakers take longer to clear low-current faults than high-current faults. 2) Inserted Resistors: Some breakers use resistors that are inserted in the main current path to aid in the interruption of current. These resistors are switched out after the main poles open. Thus resistor current (when it exists) may be present for some number of cycles longer than the rated breaker interrupting time. If the breaker current-detector relays are sensitive enough to "see" this current they will remain picked up during this time. 3) Retrip Directly After a Close: Some breakers are slower on such a sequence. The coordinating margin factor requires very careful evaluation. In the squeeze between longer timer settings for security against false trips and shorter clearing times for system stability,

1068

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS,

JULY/AUGUST 1970

it is this factor which many feel represents an unnecessary and expendable delay. Nothing could be farther from the truth. All of the other factors, i.e., protective and auxiliary relay operating and reset times and breaker clearing times have a misleading aura of scientific exactitude. Actually these times are subject to wide variations. The breaker clearing time is discussed above. Relay operating and reset times are dependent on the following: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) calibration and maintenance, condition and voltage level of battery, repeatability of breaker-failure timer, effect of fault magnitude, output of current and potential transformers, weather.

Discussion
A. E. Kilgour (Allis-Chalmers, Milwaukee, Wis. 53201): The Working Group has done a commendable job of preparing this technical paper in the effort to update the relaying and backup protection practices. The paper was very ably presented by Mr. S. H. Horowitz. The question I would like to ask is a consideration that should be given to both reliability and probability factors. It is recognized that probability is becoming a very important factor in much of the EHV design equipment because of equipment costs. Conversely, backup relaying protection should be considered from similar aspects, but from the viewpoint that a false operation due to the complexity of many items may cause outages that are most costly rather than a piece of equipment. Each item added does create a maintenance problem and a possible false operating position. How would one go about determining some of these reliability and probability judgments in view of the committee's policies?

The coordinating margin is designed to insure security despite these unavoidable variations. It is recommended that this margin should never be less than 3.0 cycles.
CONCLUSIONS From the results of the local backup protection survey and the discussions presented at the local backup symposium, the following can be concluded. 1) Remote backup protection becomes more difficult to apply as. system complexity increases. 2) Local backup protection should consider relay operation and breaker operation as separate functions and protect against the failure of either. 3) Local backup relay should include the separation of protective relays, ac, and dc sources. 4) Local breaker backup should include breaker-failure timers actuated by all protective devices which trip the breaker, current detectors whenever possible and both local and remote tripping to properly clear the fault. 5) There is an irreducible backup clearing time below which a relay system cannot be expected to operate properly.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT In addition to the contributions of the members of the working groups on both the survey and the symposium, the Committee wishes to thank R. Zimmering, E. J. Emmerling, H. W. Sudhoff, and K. R. Gruesen for their prepared discussions during the symposium and to J. L. Koepfinger, W. A. Morgan, F. Hunt, G. Hampe, and R. Rahn for their participation during the floor discussion.

Manuscript received July 11, 1969.


IEEE Working Group on Survey of Local Backup Practices: Mr. Kilgour raises a valid point. The use of probability analysis in the design of transmission systems results in a balance of performance and cost. In this, and a wide variety of other areas, reliability engineering has reached a mature state. It has had, however, very little impact on relay application. This may be due, in part, to the fact that there are definite absolute values associated with protection that transcends economic analysis. For example, phase relays represent a substantial portion of the cost of a relay system even though faults not involving ground are less than 1 percent of the total. The ability to promptly remove a three-phase fault must be provided regardless of the probability of such a fault occurring. Beyond these absolute requirements, reliability, and probability factors may very well have a proper function. To fully evaluate these factors, however, one must remember that relay reliability consists of the ability to both trip properly and to avoid false tripping. These are generally mutually contradictory. In addition, as discussed in the paper, a protective system includes relays, circuit breakers, input sources, channeling equipment, and other auxiliary and associated equipment. This creates the problem of first determining, for every specific situation, the reliability criteria, i.e., whether to favor dependability or security, and then to evaluate the effect of each element of the protective system on the entire system. This evaluation must not only consider the additional maintenance as suggested by Mr. Kilgour but also the ability to provide adequate protection while a particular element of the system is being maintained.

Manuscript received August 20, 1969.