This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
L-32166 October 18, 1977 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for appellant. Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees. AQUINO, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£ This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429). Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: ñé+.£ªwph!1 SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS ñé+.£ªwph!1 OF THE PHILIPPINES. Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1 SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follows: (a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included. (b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current. (c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee. (d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times. SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court. SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked. SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its publication in the Office Gazette. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83. Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22, We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein). And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596). It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67). In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11. The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32). Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing. However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1 SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. — It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ... The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704). The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing. Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84. An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts. As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body. vs. This Court in its decision in the Lim case. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law. 527). the charge against Santos was dismiss. Hence. objectives. 1966. Santiago. a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. vs. Inc. promulgated on July 26. 119. Texas Co. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish. all rules. (Davis. 117 Phil." As noted by Justice Fernando. Supp. Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor. p. 558). In other words. the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter. loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island. regulates. vs. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. called the attention of technical men in the executive departments. 114 Phil. 124). Santos. without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department. and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. "Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have.S. Zayco." (Radio Communications of the Philippines. August 21." Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs. p. a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself. cited in Victories Milling Co. The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U. the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs." "department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law. 1091). 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order. 197. . except as expressly authorized by law. 729. 555. it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. L. and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. Jur. Administrative Law. 733." Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the power to promulgate. a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him. sec. It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature. In this sense. and other instructions.. 1125. Exconde 101 Phil. 73 F. under which the regulation was issued. whenever he may see fit do so. rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries. otherwise. 1974. not contrary to law. 29 Phil. vs. to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion. Tupasi Molina." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. Montgomery. Inc. it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power. May 30. orders. In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law. Inc. 194. Lim. supra. Augusto A. partake of the nature of a statute. Antique Sawmills. and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. vs. memorandums. 300. 496-8). This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms. remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. 17 SCRA 316). and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department. after expressing the policy. it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 1132). 63 Phil. but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof. because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. 127. This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources. L-29236. The instant case is similar to People vs. Social Security Commission. 58 SCRA 493. who draft rules and regulations. 108 Phil. purposes.20051. 1960. 2nd. forms instructions. 938.Section 4(h) of Republic Act No.
R. Costs de oficio. he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission. For that act. Ross. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game. Jr. 2nd 129130). 1958. amend and/or repeal. 206 Ga.. The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt. No. upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based. (State vs. regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. SO ORDERED. taking. promulgate. which have the effect of extending. Miles supra). SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION. "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings. the owner of a sporting goods store. pay or receive any reward. dated October 7. it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body. The Miles case is similar to this case. that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Jr. Wash. JJ. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. Barredo. the lower court's decision of June 9.A penal statute is strictly construed. Inc. 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. J.. prize or compensation for the hunting. 58 Second 2d 534. it could have readily said so. In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order.. Effective November 1. Duran for respondent-appellee. BARRERA. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. vs. "remuneration" and "wages". pursuing. Laguna in Criminal Case No. Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Miles. up to a maximum of P500 for any one month. the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. INC.. (Glustrom vs. State. and the order will be scrutinized with special care.1äwphï1. petitioner Victorias Milling Company. game bird or game fish or any part thereof. 105 Pac. as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. the indictment against Miles was quashed. 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. 2nd 51). was designated to sit in the Second Division..: On October 15. Santos and Guerrero. JJ. J. killing or displaying of any game animal. wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of . Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant. the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer. WHEREFORE. Miles. Concepcion. do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Guerrero. 1962 VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY." Beryl S.. or which conflict with the authority granting statute. 5429 is affirmed. all Employers in computing the premiums due the System. See 2 Am. 22 of the following tenor: . Upon receipt of a copy thereof. Under that statute. the rules of administrative officers and boards. 2nd 322. concur. took no part. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose. Hence.ñët Fernando and Antonio. 734. through counsel. and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted. petitioner-appellant. Cruz. their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation". and submitting. respondent-appellee. L-16704 March 17. 1958. It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay. 7.
(2) bonuses. Not satisfied with this ruling. Republic Act No. The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. although not legally required to do so. such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation. and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. objectives. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: (f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500. such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. 1161 which. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. allowances or overtime pay. 197. and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded. constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what. nevertheless. 1959) cited by appellant. in the light of the amendment of the law. 22 was. that Circular No. therefore. p. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. salary. does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. purposes. 194)." There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. Circular No. Circular No. On the other hand.00 received during the month. It is true that in previous cases.authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law. after the employer does. this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage.R. partake of the nature of a statute. Administrative Law. Overruling these objections.ñët The case of People v. p. in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. of all bonuses. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature. is correct. for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make. overtime pay. of the law as amended. it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations. but whether. promulgated on May 30. allowances. or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation". bonuses. The case of People v. It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment.. for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. op. op. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law. therefore. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms. cit. 22 is a rule or regulation. issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission. Que Po Lay (50 O. It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22. L-9553. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. In this sense. 1äwphï1. remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. before its amendment. give or pay bonus to his employees. p. Davis. while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy. but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute. administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory. or compensation of the employee. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular.. regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative. but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No.) . which the employer pays to his employees. petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.G. cit. and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. reads as follows: . (Davis. is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis. 195-197). 1161. (f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month. as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case. Administrative Law. a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law. 22. after expressing the policy. No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission. etc. it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker. Such is the case that is . because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus. in fact. Jolliffe (G. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act. We find. which it was its duty to enforce. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective. 194. such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law. when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law.
The Solicitor General for respondents. (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander. De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners. 626-A dated October 25. ET AL. and (3) three certificates of inspection. se comprenden tambien los reglamentos. Camarines Norte. ARNULFO V. one from the LIvestock inspector. Miranda. sex. In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates. The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70. Codigo Civil. providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another. carabao dealers. while passing at Basud. physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144). now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO. 533. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. Pesigan and Marcelo L. 7th Ed.) The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes. 1982. Concepcion. 626-A which provides "that henceforth. We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2. Zenarosa. 150. Reyes. Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L.R. ZENAROSA. 640.000 and damages of P92. the carabaos. stolen and questionable animals. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. Anselmo L. it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14.L. Bautista Angelo. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act".000. 573.. 1982. Instrucciones. Lim Hoa Ting vs. 1982 because. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES. Central Bank of the Phils. 146. a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. vs. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. Batangas.£ªwph!1 At issue in this case is the enforceability. 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot. 104 Phil. 5440. before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14. No. AQUINO. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Reales decretos. Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. (People vs. acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte.. PESIGAN. Caloocan City Branch 129. Paredes. of Presidential Executive Order No. the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed. respondents. who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City. dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Pesigan. C. p. 1980. They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur.B. Bengzon. MIRANDA. 94 Phil. 110 Phil. issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. Dizon and De Leon. 1984 ANSELMO L.. Regional Trial Court.. concur. Daet Branch 40. Padilla. one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. BELLA S. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed . J. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law.J.. The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. JJ. were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia. The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No.. whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law. regardless of age. petitioners. the town's police station commander. J. transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2. So ordered.:ñé+. no carabao. DRA. with costs against appellant. Quiazon. 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles. In his order of April 25. Labrador. and by Doctor Bella S.) . provincial veterinarian. L-64279 April 30.now before us. as the destination. Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud. as already noted. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan. and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1). to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit. Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. Secretary of Education... Que Po Lay. Balbuna vs.
.) In the instant case. De Castro. INC.000. the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. January 30. 124 Phil. Twin Rivers Plantation. for themselves and in behalf of other persons and entities similarly situated.. TWIN RIVERS PLANTATION. in the Que Po Lay case. 1982. 1972 to June 30. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. Bello. series of 1971. 1970 (Comment on Petition. P. vs. it provides as follows: . to the petitioners. the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. Concepcion.. The summary confiscation was not in order." approved and made effective on May 1.. 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. concur. 1971. J. the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette.Thus. convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. Rollo. WHEREFORE. No costs. INC. 6125 entitled "an act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. with the requisite documents. Jr. Commonwealth Act No. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. cited by the respondents. to eliminate the necessity for said circular and to stabilize the peso. collectively referred to herein as petitioners." Indeed. Davao Fruits Corporation. (Chairman).. PARAS. and (3) a refund of the amount collected as stabilization tax from the Central Bank. took no part. 1988 HIJO PLANTATION INC.. He was not bound by the circular. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated".R. Rollo. p. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. Social Security System. Among others. 18). 1015. JJ. However. do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation. It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. all of which are engaged in the production and exportation of bananas in and from Mindanao. Neither can they recover damages. Congress passed Republic Act No. That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. respondent. Cruz. who as owners are entitled to possess the same. 1995. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. (2) to prohibit the Central Bank from collecting the stabilization tax on banana exports shipped during the period January 1. Owing to the difficulty of determining the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar because of the floating rate and the promulgation of Central Bank Circular No. Inc. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos. No. Inc. Guerrero. The cases of Police Commission vs. L-29960. and Marsman Plantation (Manifestation. Camarines Sur. (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. a person. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1.1äwphï1. 32). 499. L-34526 August 9. as null and void. was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. 626-A. 122 Phil. and Escolin. and MARSMAN & CO.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition which seeks: (1) to declare Monetary Board Resolution No. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. petitioners. The facts of this case as culled from the records are as follows: Hijo Plantation. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute.. with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot. J. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. SO ORDERED. 289 which imposes an 80% retention scheme on all dollar earners.ñët Makasiar. DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION. are domestic corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
copra. nineteen hundred seventy one. Six per centum of the F. 1179. centrifugal sugar. based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of receipt of such proceeds. canned pineapples. unmanufactured abaca. Any export product the aggregate annual F. 24). 73) thus exceeding the aggregate F. nineteen hundred seventy-four. 1973. peso proceeds of exports received from July first. During the first nine (9) months of calendar year 1971.three. coconut oil. lumber. of any exportation of the following products in accordance with the following schedule: a. sought the authoritative pronouncement of the Central Bank (herein referred to as respondent). nineteen hundred seventy one to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy. 1972 to June 30. nineteen hundred seventy three to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy-four. 6125.O.O.B.B.two. 1972 to June 30. bringing it within the ambit of Republic Act No.1973.O. this petition. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation has been collecting from the petitioners who have been forced to pay under protest. nineteen hundred seventy-two.B. (Emphasis supplied). assessed and collected a stabilization tax on the gross F. Four per centum of the F. peso proceeds of exports shipped on or after the date of effectivity of this Act to June thirty. veneer core and sheets. peso proceeds of the exports shipped from July 1. and as an act in excess of its jurisdiction. 1971 (Rollo. Petitioners view respondent's act as a clear violation of the provision of Republic Act No. unmanufactured tobacco. 1971. In the case of molasses. Six per centum of the F.O. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. Eight per centum of the F.O. petitioners through their counsel.O. 1972. b.O. 1995. plywood (including plywood panels faced with plastics). There shall be imposed. respondent thru its agent Bank. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first. whether partial or total. Consequently.B. dessicated coconut. The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1972 to June 30.949. the banana industry was in a dilemma as to when the stabilization tax was to become due and collectible from it and under what schedule of Section 1 (b) of Republic Act 6125 should said tax be collected. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first. the total banana export amounted to an annual aggregate F. nineteen hundred seventy. Accordingly. Replying by letter dated December 17.B. p. by letter dated November 5. and bunker fuel oil.000. and 3) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1. 1995 was manifestly contrary to the legislative intent. such stabilization tax.O.SECTION 1. also by letter dated January 20. nineteen hundred seventy-three to June thirty. 1974.B.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching the said aggregate value. enacted pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. peso proceeds of exports received from July first. iron ore and concentrates.B. . nineteen hundred seventy-one. peso proceeds of exports received on or after the date of effectivity of this Act to June thirty. nineteen hundred seventy-one to June thirty.B. 2) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1.00 (Answer. nineteen hundred seventy two to June thirty. With the denial of petitioners' request for reconsideration. value of P8. therein advancing the opinion that the stabilization tax does not become due and collectible from the petitioners until July 1.B.1971 (Rollo. copra meal or cake. peso proceeds of exports received from July first. 1995 dated December 3. chromite ore and concentrates.B.O.O. 1971 which clarified that: 1) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1. 1973.O." Contending that said Board Resolution No. and Two per centum of the F. to June 30. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first. 11). p. Rollo. In the case of logs. and copper ore and concentrates: Ten per centum of the F. 1972 at the rate of 4% of the F. series of 1971 which in effect reaffirmed Central Bank Circular No.B. peso proceeds.O. p. p. 12) which request for reconsideration was denied by the respondent. hence. and Four per centum of the F. value of five million United States Dollar. 1972 (Rollo. 309. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. 6125. Eight per centum of the F. petitioners sought a reconsideration of said Board Resolution by letter dated December 27. nineteen hundred seventy-two to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy-three.B. the Central Bank called attention to Monetary Board Resolution No.O.
in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. in a most general way. as if the regulation had been written in the original law itself (29 Phil.B. It will be observed that while Monetary Board Resolution No. They further contend that respondent gave retroactive effect to the law (RA 6125) by ruling in Monetary Board Resolution No. In the very nature of things. the fiscal year following the calendar year during which the industry attained the $5 million mark.O.O. 1995 which impose a 6% stabilization tax for the calendar year January 1. should the regulation conflict with the law. 309. 1 971. values exceeding five (5) million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of said act. It was further argued that in directing its agent bank to collect the stabilization tax in accordance with Monetary Board Resolution No. 3-4). Vol. in charge of the management and control of such department (United States v. In its comment (Rollo. There is merit in this petition.B. Further. 6125. Their argument finds support in the very language of the law and upon congressional record where a clarification on the applicability of the law was categorically made by the then Senator Aytona who stated that the tax shall be applicable only after the $5 million aggregate value is reached. on the other hand. Rollo.O. 309. 119 [19141). August 24. value of US $5 million in August 1971. the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the case at bar. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the government.B. 7855 and in three newspapers of general circulation throughout the Philippines namely. 1995.B. Tupasi Molina. 40). is the manner of implementation of Republic Act No. it being the admission of both parties. p. 1972. as follows: All rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act shall be promulgated by the Central Bank of the Philippines and shall take effect fifteen days after publication in three newspapers of general circulation throughout the Philippines. when the stabilization tax shall begin to accrue on those aggregate annual F. The crux of the controversy. are just as binding upon all the parties.O. "provides that the stabilization tax shall begin to apply on January first following the calendar year during which such export products shall have reached the aggregate annual F. value of more than $5 million and the applicable tax rates shall be the rates prescribed in schedule (b) of Section 1 of RA No. No. peso proceeds of export shipped from July 1. which provided in its Section 6. that the Industry has indeed reached and for the first time in the calendar year 1971. 119." Petitioners contend that the stabilization tax to be collected from the banana industry does not become due and collectible until July 1. 1970 (duly published in the Official Gazette. p. 1995 cannot be said to be the product of grave abuse of discretion but rather the result of respondent's overzealous desire to carry into effect the provisions of RA 6125. 6125 for the fiscal year following the reaching of the said aggregate value. Muroz 23 SCRA 1183). pp. a total banana export exceeding the aggregate annual F. the Manila Times. pp. is proper. Ibid).O. it is evident that the Board acted beyond its authority under the law and the Constitution. the stabilization tax on banana should be imposed only on July 1. to authorize certain persons.A. whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law. 66.O. 97. 1971 to June 30. Upon the other hand.O.B. (Rollo. value of US $5 million. which obviously is in excess of its jurisdiction. to provide for the conduct. and management of the work of the particular department of the government. respondent in gross violation of the law. value of five million United States dollars.98).B. In petitioner's reply (Rollo. Manila Chronicle and Manila Daily Bulletin). Section 1 of R.O. one of which shall be in the national language. 77-78). at a tax rate of 4% of the F. the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 60). Hence. the validity of the regulation cannot be sustained (Director of Forestry vs.There is here no dispute that the banana industry is liable to pay the stabilization tax prescribed under Republic Act No. 1995. respondent argues that the request for authoritative pronouncement of petitioners was made because there was no express provision in Section 1 of RA 6125 which categorically states. p. control. that is. Clearly such clarification was indicative of the legislative intent. 1972 at the rate of 6% of the F. 34. Comment of Respondent. 29 Phil. Such regulations once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law. 1972 to June 30. they argue that respondent bank through the Monetary Board clearly overstepped RA 6125 which empowered it to promulgate rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of said act. Section 3 of Central Bank Circular No. 1179 which contained the rules and regulations for the implementation of said provision which Board resolution was subsequently embodied in Central Bank Circular No. by law.B. For which reason.1973. p. value of which shall exceed five million US dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of the act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal year following its reaching the said aggregate value. . 1972 (Rollo. 154) they argue that since the Banana Exports reached the aggregate annual F. 1972. 1940. the fiscal year July 1. 1972 at the rate of 4% of the F. 1995 herein assailed by petitioners for being null and void (Rollo.referring to the fiscal year (Annex 8. peso proceeds. dated August 10.O. Pursuant to the aforecited provision. contends that the aforecited provision of RA 6125 merely prescribes the rates that may be imposed but does not provide when the tax shall be collected and makes no reference to any definite fixed period when the tax shall begin to be collected (Rollo.B. pp. 1972 to June 30.B. the law itself authorized it under Section 7 to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of said law. Such is the case in RA 6125. 6125 clearly provides as follows: An export product the aggregate annual F. because while Section 1 of the law authorizes it to levy a stabilization tax on petitioners only in the fiscal year following their reaching the aggregate annual F. 1972 to June 30. 1995 dated December 3." Central Bank Circular No. however. that the export stabilization tax on banana industry would start to accrue on January 1. instead issued Resolution No. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law. p. it acted whimsically and capriciously. Respondent. making such tax prospective in application and for a period of one year. 309 was subsequently reaffirmed in Monetary Board Resolution No. 155). 1973. peso proceeds of the export shipped from July 1.
“the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson). PREMISES CONSIDERED. cited in Tayug Rural Bank v. Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9. D-357726 in the amount of P200. this petition is hereby GRANTED. No less than the Minister of Justice decreed that the date of the drawing or making and issuance of the bouncing check is the date to reckon with and not on the date of the maturity of the check. 1979 issue of the Official Gazette. 93 Phil. Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect. petitioner. 1979. Jr. 192. did then and there wilfully. petitioner submitting for review respondent judge’s dismissal of the criminal action against private respondent Go Bio. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code). Del Mar v. S. for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Relova. SO ORDERED.130). Lim. 1979. Phil. the above-named accused.146 SCRA 120. (Resolution No. the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs.50. Veterans Administration. this petition for review on certiorari. guaranteeing the authenticity and genuineness of the same and with intent to defraud one Filipinas Tan by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Island.00 Philippine Currency. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 penalizes is not the fact of the dishonor of the check but the act of making or drawing and issuing a check without sufficient funds or credit. 1979. Feb.000. respondent judge said: The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held liable for bouncing checks prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 although the check may have matured after the effectivity of the said law. the said law is applicable. Rollo) Hence. Jr. that the date of the dishonor of the check. Jr. said accused well knowing that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of the Philippine Island and upon presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment.: Private respondent Benito Go Bio. 1981. 49.000. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 51 SCRA 340). 108 Phil. the same was dishonored for the reason that the said accused has no sufficient funds with the said bank and despite repeated demands made by Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check or pay the amount of P200. 1974. October 12. 1982. the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for swindling (Estafa. the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the above entitled case. and that respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of release of the Gazette for circulation because Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the date of effectivity of a law that needed publication. to the damage and prejudice of said Filipinas Tan in the aforementioned amount of P200.. L-46158. Ricardo de Guia vs. 67. 58 SCRA 493. Anacleto T. Board of Tax Appeals.00. Hence. (pp. as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City.R. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Sto. Roque for respondents. or several days before respondent Go Bio. Rollo) Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio. pointing out that at the alleged commission of the offense. 1981. JR. considering that the offense was committed on September 26. S. In its order of August 23. REGINO VERIDIANO II. 376. v. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24. Agapito Miranda. 5396 in the then Court of First Instance of Zambales. said accused failed and continues to fail to redeem the said check or to pay the said amount. August 21. L-62243 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of the accused. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the information did not charge an offense.000. is the date of the commission of the offense. Tomas v. concur. Jr. and that assuming that the effectivity of the law – Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 – is on June 29. 1984 G. Eduardo N. People’s Car vs. respondents. 3. In his reply. HON. 23-24. 1981). presided by respondent judge. The Solicitor General for petitioner. November 28. Resolving the motion. March 20. Lacanilao and Carmelino M. in the City of Olongapo. 1979. which was about the second week of May 1979. Santiago L-29236. issued the questioned check around the second week of May 1979. among others. and BENITO GO BIO. private respondent Go Bio. Tan.1986. 1091). Jr.Moreover. No. Branch I. Central Bank. vs.00 Philippine Currency. (pp. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute (Radio Communications of the Philippines. The prosecution opposed the motion contending.. which is on September 26. Padilla and Sarmiento JJ.” . Resolution No. a public official must locate to the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. The information reads: That on or about and during the second week of May 1979. 1981. Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself. Philippines. J. unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Bank of Philippine Island Check No. there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law. Inc.
Copy Editor of the Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office. No. The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. 15. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions. then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time. L-59234 September 30. concur. 1979 issue of the Official Gazette was officially released for circulation on June 14. petitioners. certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14. that is. – The making. 129 SCRA 174). there was then no law penalizing such act. to make known to the people in general. there was no law to be violated and. then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22...: . vs. We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private respondent. 1979 and. the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in question. the same was released only on June 14. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 2. 1979 when the check was presented for encashment and was dishonored by the bank. Mangubat. 1982 TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA. 1979. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the Official Gazette issue of April 9. Differently stated. 1979 and not on the printed date April 9. complained of in the Information as criminal. and. 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED.” The term “publication” in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning. The title of the law itself states: AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds … . Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. it became effective only on June 29. Gutierrez. – Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value. then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated and. in May 1979. Checks without sufficient funds. Rollo) It is therefore. shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon. Jr. Jr. consequently. suffice it to say that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor. 1979. for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. if a statute had not been published before its violation. considering that the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979. consequently. The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that “This Act shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette. For.J. committed the act. With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on September 26. Jr. Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide: SECTION 1. 138.. in May 1979. Melencio-Herrera. Charito A. FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION. having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check. did not commit any violation thereof. Jr. 1979. When private respondent Go Bio. SO ORDERED. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION. Actg. the order of respondent judge dated August 23. TEEHANKEE. MELENCIO-HERRERA. the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties. C. 1979 was the date of publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. concurring: I concur on the ground that actual publication of the penal law is indispensable for its effectivity (Pesigan vs.Private respondent Go Bio. knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds … shall be punished … The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who. No costs. Plana. (Emphasis supplied) ACCORDINGLY. 1979. JJ. respondents. of the April 9. respondent Go Bio. Angeles. As a matter of fact. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. (p. stating This is to certify that Volume 75. and De la Fuente. June 14. INC. nevertheless. No.R. J. Following the special provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
. there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi. convenience. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. particularly in Metro-Manila. of the Board of Transportation. respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi. the latter believes that in six years of operation. do not require any further dropping order from the BOT. and safety. after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation. it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances. THEREFORE. each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. 1977. to implement said Circular. and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila. and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations: 1. 52. the rules herein shall immediately be effective in MetroManila. 1 Pursuant to the above BOT circular. taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. therefore. WHEREAS. WHEREAS. Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila. To quote said Circular: Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 1980. instructing the Regional Director. 77-42 which reads: SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis WHEREAS. All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission. 1977. time and again. respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. dated August 15. Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation. 1980. to wit: 1980 — Model 1974 1981 — Model 1975. a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted.Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. WHEREAS. dated October 10. who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned: Year Model Automatic Phase-Out Year 1980 . Inc. As of December 31. the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis. all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT. On October 10. pursuant to this policy. and condemned. only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation. but has made reasonable profit for his investments. and Memorandum Circular No. 1977. complained against. all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. 52. 2. of the Bureau of Land Transportation. Its implementation outside Metro. seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. dated August 15. has. NOW.This Petition for "Certiorari. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI. 77-42. In the registration of cars for 1979. a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978. only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation. the riding public. For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular. etc. taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. all within the National Capitol Region. 1978. As of December 31. in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort. 77-42. and every year thereafter. Henceforth. Inc.
1981 1982 1983 etc. seeking to nullify MC No. the Board. To fix just and reasonable standards. in 1980. they are roadworthy and fit for operation. 2 In accordance therewith. 2. On December 29. as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out. the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for consideration by this Court: A. provided that. Strict compliance here is desired. regulations. particularly the Highway Patrol Group. Granting. Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution. and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Presidential Decree No. On January 27. 101. and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. those of model 1973. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section. 1981. but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. Petitioners. that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. (2) Substantive due process. "Manifestation. 80-7553. The case was heard on February 20. plan or program in the implementation of this Decree. 1981. in its discretion. would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power 4.1974 1975 1976 1977 etc. observed. petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10. to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1. the Philippine Constabulary. docketed as Case No. those of model 1972. imposed. On February 16. in case of denial. and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. offered the same. 77-42 or to stop its implementation. Apart from its own investigation and studies. 1981 to enable them. arguendo. through its President. may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation. or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy. 1981." 3 On November 28. allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case. to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974. petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion". 1982. thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Said proofs were submitted on March 27. measurements. 1981. Transportation and Communications. 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled. . or service to be furnished. Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers: Sec. in 1981. (1) Equal protection of the law. classification. the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry. in 1979. practices. the support agencies within the Department of Public Works. and those of model 1974. 1981. Exercise of powers. praying for an early hearing of their petition. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence. cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978. 101. petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT. at the time of registration.
however. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. It is clear from the provision aforequoted. The State. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". therefore. unless the law provides otherwise. petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers. when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. 4 In fact. not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim. it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city. that they were deprived of procedural due process. On Equal Protection of the Law: Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. Cloribel and Banco Filipino. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular. safety and general welfare of the people. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. fairly. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. can prescribe regulations to promote the health. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. which make for real differences. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises. and justly. it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected. and. the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. peace. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction. . To repeat the pertinent portion: For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular. require the submission of position papers or other documents. compared to those of other places. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT. their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. or employ any other suitable means of inquiry. however. a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected. In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process. This is of common knowledge. are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights. that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy. As public contend. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort. the infringement of constitutional right must be clear. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly. are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities. which is given wide discretionary authority. As held in Central Bank vs. information. plan or program. and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 44 SCRA 307 (1972): Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process. in the exercise. No costs. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected. 77-42. 10 WHEREFORE. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree. morals. and even graft and corruption. generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. possible collusion. 5 It may also regulate property rights. Hon. 7 In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned. good order. safety and welfare of society.The Board may also can conferences. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular. the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. To declare a law unconstitutional. the requirement of due process has been met. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. therefore. this being only one of the options open to the Board. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. SO ORDERED. categorical and undeniable. their cost recovered. the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. of its police power. as well as of liberty. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness. and a fair return on investment obtained.
. as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry. — It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import. Jose Yulo for appellant. Abad Santos. Concepcion. further.: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent. JJ. nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding. . 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint. 2. concur. De Castro. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed. authorize the importation. however. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Barredo. Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee. the Governor-General. (1) that if Act No. prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces. the petitioner appealed to this court. Makasiar. known as the Administrative Code. and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed.Fernando. No. 3155. The appellee contends that even if Act No.. 3. respondent-appellee. however. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void. requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. 3052 would automatically become effective. 1762. JJ. That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation. 3052 reads as follows: SECTION 1. Vasquez. Teehankee and Aquino. valid. therefore. After March thirty-first. which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. . The Director of Agriculture may.. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided. may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands. 1931 MAURICIO CRUZ. SEC. L-34674 October 26. The demurrer was based on two reasons. with the approval of the head of the department. concur in the result. 1924. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature. Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. Approved. Jr. 3155 was constitutional and. is hereby amended to read as follows: "SEC. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven. STANTON YOUNGBERG. Jr. From that order of dismissal. while Act No. Act No. bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided. That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. Act No. bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act. bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. and (2) that Act No. Plana. with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses. Guerrero. the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No...R. it shall be strictly prohibited to import. Escolin. OSTRAND. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries. as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. with the approval of the head of the department first had. CJ. bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands. SEC.. This Act shall take effect on its approval.. shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture. petitioner-appellant. . That at any time after said date. still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that. it is asserted that "Act No. Stanton Youngberg. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Among other things in the allegation of the petition. Relova and Gutierrez." The Act in question reads as follows: SECTION 1. 3155 were declared unconstitutional. vs. namely. bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided. J. March 8.
that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power (12 C. Malcolm. 594. Romualdez. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle.J.. 568. citing McAllister vs. The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 249 U. 3052. 323.. is between the delegation of power to make the law... 82 N. this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions require it. Street.. PADILLA. The first cannot be done.. 626.. Alexander. Carr vs. 30 Phil. Aldanese and Trinidad. 3155 the former act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.. 169 Ind. petitioner. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law. 43 Phil. 1922.net In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 is entirely valid.. by executive order. Babcock. concur. 32 Pac.. 357. 6 R."At the time of the approval of this Act. 137. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication. So ordered.S.. 1902. March 14. the Governor-General shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. 927. p.S.')" The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. 204.S. 2. 455.A. JJ. 3155 to the GovernorGeneral to suspend or not. 214). whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. (I Lewis Sutherland. 3052 is not in issue. respondent. In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. J. Meris Law Office for petitioner. did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. Reid vs.)1awphil. 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs. 88) said in such case: The true distinction. It does not permit the importation of articles. Yeazel vs. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. No. and Imperial.C. 254). Orange Country vs. 58 Ill. vs.R..C. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. vs. being void. 187 U. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. etc. 95832 August 10. therefore.E. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. ed. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil. the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers. 97 Cal.. Avanceña. since.) This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. for distinction between `addition' and `amendment. Olsen & Co. Harris. 63 Law. Walter E.: . Colorado. Hamilton and Abreu..R. which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. it is not inconsistent with such former laws. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St." SEC.. 600.. That being so. at his discretion. 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional. Villamor. Johnson." We do not think that such is the case. 127 Ind. State. 3052 to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. we are of the opinion that Act No.. (See MacLeary vs. 458.. Hamlin. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.L. as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati. But aside from the provisions of Act No. Approved.. 563. a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine Government. 77. 147.L. and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution. the Legislature passed Act No. to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Governor-General also may. Tranquilino F. the petitioner would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. Statutory Construction 2nd ed. 11 L. 243 and decisions cited therein. 361. Villa-Real. 370.J. Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No.. U. 23 Pac. C. Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. 83 Cal. to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. but it will be noted that Act No. 152. suspend. PERALTA. 203-206 and decisions cited therein. 453. (6 R. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law.. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition. it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.. 1992 MAYNARD R..
Sunday. It also discourages the employees who have exhausted their leave credits from absenting themselves on a Friday or Monday in order to have a prolonged weekend. such Saturday. Amando T. Saturday and Sunday. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a memorandum dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5. October 1. petitioner received his initial salary. the above policy that for an employee on leave without pay to be entitled to salary on Saturdays. DTI deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his absences during the covered period. Sundays or Holidays (in the factual situation posed). 1965 of this Commission. 1989) is in order. a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Department of Agriculture. January 22. February 12. if the employee has no leave credits. as well as the old Civil Service Law (Republic Act No. That being the case. the respondent Commission denied said motion for lack of merit. 2 The CSC stated that: In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 12. inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays. the dates of said absences for which salary deductions were made. also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday. To rule otherwise would allow an employee who is on leave of absent (sic) without pay for a long period of time to be entitled to payment of his salary corresponding to Saturdays. The respondent Commission in explaining its action held: The Primer on the Civil Service dated February 21. 01 October 1989 — Sunday 4. (Emphasis supplied) The rationale for the above ruling which applies only to those employees who are being paid on monthly basis. respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. Hence. he was working at the Philippine Cotton Corporation. or Holiday shall also be without pay (CSC. covering the period from 25 September to 31 October 1989. Since he had no accumulated leave credits. it appearing that she was present on Friday. Tomas raising the following question: Is an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday. Sunday or Holiday. 20 October 1989 — Friday 5. 29 September 1989 — Friday 2. 2nd Ind. 30.Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September 1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 21 October 1989 — Saturday 6. 30 September 1989 — Saturday 3. rests on the assumption that having been absent on either Monday or Friday. 29 September 1989 and 20 October 1989. 90-797. 1978. On 8 December 1989. 1965. More specifically. Sunday or Holiday? 1 Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman argued that a reading of the General Leave Law as contained in the Revised Administrative Code. 21. 1965). 22 October 1989 — Sunday Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. a part thereof corresponding to six (6) days (September 29. 90-497.. the succeeding Monday. 1965 but was on leave without pay beginning January 25. could not be favorably credited with intervening days had the same been working days. and that the withholding (or deduction) of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. resulting in the prejudice of the government and the public in general. 807). reads: Mrs. namely. embodies the Civil Service Commission rulings to be observed whenever an employee of the government who has no more leave credits. Rosalinda Gonzales is not entitled to payment of salary corresponding to January 23 and 24. Before said appointment. one who has no leave credits. Alvis (Chief. Sunday or Holiday. are as follows: 1. What the Commission perceived to be without basis is the demand of Peralta for the payment of his salaries corresponding to Saturdays and Sundays when he was in fact on . 20. the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree No.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that "when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday. Sundays or holidays. 2260). is absent on a Friday and/or a Monday is enough basis for the deduction of his salaries corresponding to the intervening Saturdays and Sundays. 3 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and in Resolution No. respectively. Sundays or holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989 inquiring as to the law on salary deductions. ruling that the action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of petitioner. On 25 May 1990." Petitioner then sent a latter dated 20 February 1990 addressed to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia A. and the Civil Service Rules and Regulation fails to disclose a specific provision which supports the CSC rule at issue. 22. which embodies the policy on leave of absence without pay incurred on a Friday and Monday. the same must occur between the dates where the said employee actually renders service. Sto. Sundays or holidays. It is the view of this Office that an employee who has no more leave credit in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays. His appointment was classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent". the petitioner contented that he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the intervening Saturdays.
12. Moreover.(3) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from Saturday to Monday. xxx xxx xxx (k) To perform other functions that properly belong to a central personnel agency. in effect. the respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. regardless of whether he has leave credits or not. the Commission promulgated the herein challenged policy. which states the following: 27. But the issue of whether or not the policy that had been adopted and in force since 1965 is valid or not. Bureaus and Agencies in the national and local governments. When intervening Saturday. Sunday or holiday shall also be without pay. 16 Series of 1991 dated 26 April 1991. 2260 (sic) does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding Saturdays.leave of absence without pay on a Friday prior to the said days. subject of this petition for certiorari. have already been set aside and superseded. The respondent Commission ruled that an employee who has no leave credits in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays. Sundays and holidays in the computation of leave credits. petitioner filed the present petition. 6 Chapter Five on leave of absence provides that: 5. A reading of Republic Act No. Sunday or holiday considered as leave without pay — when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday.51. Thus. During the pendency of this petition.(2) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from Friday to Sunday. . applying the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Sundays or Holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. remains unresolved. to oversee the strict implementation of the circular. was also issued by CSC Chairman Sto. 2625) reveals that while the law excludes Saturdays. Said policy was embodied in a 2nd Indorsement dated 12 February 1965 of the respondent Commission involving the case of a Mrs. however. How is leave of an employee who has no more leave credits computed if: (1) he is absent on a Friday and the following Monday? (2) if he is absent on Friday but reports to work the following Monday? (3) if he is absent on a Monday but present the preceding Friday? . the respondent Commission resolved "to adopt the policy that when an employee. In said amendatory Resolution. No. Feb. 4 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied. Sunday or holiday. it does not. What is primarily questioned by the petitioner is the validity of the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary deductions corresponding to the intervening Saturdays. 16 (e) with the approval by the President to prescribe. Sunday or holiday. it is the duty of the Court to make a formal ruling on the validity or invalidity of such questioned policy. 1965). the claim of Peralta has no merit. Tomas adopting and promulgating the new policy and directing the Heads of Departments. instead of discouraging them from incurring further absence without pay. and the rules prescribed pursuant to the provisions of this law shall become effective thirty days after publication in the Official Gazette. Hence. 67 dated May 4. is absent without pay on day immediately preceding or succeeding Saturday." Memorandum Circular No. Because of these developments. 41 (Republic Act No. such Saturday. (CSC.(1) He is considered on leave without pay for 4 days covering Friday to Monday.. to take a different posture would be in effect giving more premium to employees who are frequently on leave of absence without pay. . Sunday or Holidays. Further. considering that employees paid on a monthly basis are not required to work on Saturdays. 90-497 and 90-797. 2260) conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service the following powers and duties: Sec. . Rosalinda Gonzales. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R. 91-540 dated 23 April 1991 amending the questioned policy. it would seem at first blush that this petition has become moot and academic since the very CSC policy being questioned has already been amended and. Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. include a case where the leave of absence is without pay. 5 Pursuant to the foregoing provisions.A. It is likewise illustrated in the Primer on the Civil Service 7 in the section referring to Questions and Answers on Leave of Absences. he shall not be considered absent on those days. for reasons of public interest and public policy. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Sundays or Holidays where an employee without leave credits was absent on the immediately preceding working day. 1960 of House Bill No. 2nd Ind. The same policy is reiterated in the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service. a reading of Senate Journal No. amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law. Resolutions No.
and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. 1. Administrative construction. 9 In promulgating as early as 12 February 1965 the questioned policy. the provincial government. the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. the President or proper head of department. whether permanent or temporary. Tolentino during the second reading of House Bill No. two hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof. Saturdays and Sundays. The purpose of the present bill is to exclude from the computation of the leave those days. the construction by the respondent Commission of R. injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. for each calendar year of service. other than those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight. exclusive of Saturdays. Sundays and Holidays in both cases. two hundred seventyone and two hundred seventy-four hereof. As held in Hidalgo vs. But under the present law. shall be entitled to fifteen days of sick leave for each year of service with full pay. Head of Department or independent office concerned. if we may repeat. of a municipality or municipal district in any regularly and specially organized province. The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned Resolution No. because actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days. in the computation of the leave the Saturday and Sunday will be included. or the chief of office in case of municipal employees. 2625). Sections two hundred eighty-four and two hundred eighty-five-A of the Administrative Code. Sec. as amended. whether or not they have accumulated leave credits. 284. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.A. And it is unfair and unjust to him that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves. 8 It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not be published. for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. The intention of the legislature in the enactment of R. the Civil Service Commission interpreted the provisions of Republic Act No. 285-A. In addition to the vacation leave provided in the two preceding sections each employee or laborer. the government of a chartered city. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days. as well as holidays.A. 2625 (which took effect on 17 June 1960) amending the Revised Administrative Code. so that he will be considered as having had a leave of Friday. are further amended to read as follows: Sec. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law. Sunday and holidays are included in the computation so that if an employee should become sick and absent himself on a Friday and then he reports for work on a Tuesday. or the chief of office in the case of municipal employees may. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday. fifteen days vacation leave of absence with full pay. The fact remains that government employees. Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. R. of the national government. they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to. 2625 as referring only to government employees who have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay. only on account of sickness on the part of the employee or laborer concerned or of any member of his immediate family. 12 With this in mind. or four days. exclusive of Saturdays. for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute. the sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo M. are not required by law to work on Saturdays. Saturday. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. in his discretion.A. Sundays and holidays: Provided. . 41 (which became R. . grant to an employee or laborer. . Sunday and Monday. 90-797 construed R. the government of a chartered city. of a municipal district or of government-owned or controlled corporations other than those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with full pay. of the national government. and which stated as follows: Sec. is not necessarily binding upon the courts.A.When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy. it merely interprets a pre-existing law.A. the provincial government. and satisfactory service. That such sick leave will be granted by the President. exclusive of Saturdays. Sundays and holidays. Saturday. whether permanent or temporary. .A. Thus. Hidalgo: 11 . 10 We find this petition to be impressed with merit. since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of R. among others. He said: The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave of 15 days each year of service to be with full pay. or after said non-working days. of a municipality. After at least six months' continues (sic) faithful. where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof. in computing these periods of leaves. Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days. as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with full pay. 2625 may be gleaned from.
in this connection. as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. however. It must be pointed out. efficient and effective personnel administration in the government. December 29. however. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. records and such other forms as may be required under this Decree. . it confers no rights.. 6 Published by the Personnel Officers Association of the Philippines. 114 Phil. Baxter State Bank: 14 . (POAP) and the Law Center of the University of the Philippines System. Cruz. 1978. and particular conduct. Sections 284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative Code applied to all government employee without any distinction. that after CSC Memorandum Circular No. Section 9. that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. pp. 807. SO ORDERED. 46-47. 146 SCRA 446. No. 7 February 21. Tuvera.. p. 37. 2625. Bidin. Inc. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations. before their amendment by R. No. whether or not they have accumulated leave credits. WHEREFORE. To allow all the affected government employees. These rules and regulations shall become effective thirty days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. and prescribe all forms for publications.Furthermore. It follows that the effect of the amendment similarly applies to all employees enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A. appointments. Will all government employees on a monthly salary basis. . Griño-Aquino. 16 Series of 1991 — amending the herein invalidated policy — was promulgated on 26 April 1991. examinations. . Revised Edition. specifically provides for the following powers and functions of the Civil Service Commission: Sec. would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. The Court. 36-37. 8 Victorias Milling Co. Medialdea. p. Romero. Social Security Commission. it imposes no duties. prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. No costs. 2 Rollo. Jr. 555 (1962). if necessary. Davide. to handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government employees. Sundays or legal holidays (as herein petitioner was so deprived) since 12 February 1965. 9 Tañada vs. The actual existence of a statute.. we are next confronted with the question of what effect such invalidity will have. Footnotes 1 Rollo. It is quite clear.. JJ. Jr.D. be entitled to recover the amounts corresponding to such non-working days? The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law. issued on 6 October 1975. it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. 5 P. Regalado. 9 (b) Prescribe. Narvasa. pp. deprived of their salaries corresponding to Saturdays.J. L-63915. CSC Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797 are declared NULL and VOID. As the questioned CSC policy is here declared invalid. 13 But. deductions from salaries made after said date in contravention of the new CSC policy must be restored to the government employees concerned. Inc. amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Decree. reports. the petition is GRANTED. 32. 4 Rollo. administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application. standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical. 1978. Also. similarly situated as petitioner herein. C. concur. individual and corporate. . vs. calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines. Gutierrez. (c) Promulgate policies. 3 Rollo. it creates no office. Feliciano. to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy. private and official.. Nocon and Bellosillo. in Article V. it affords no protection. 1986. The respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts previously but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary as above indicated.A.
Vol.R. ETC. L-15377 July 31. No. and SIA SENG.: These appeals. vs.. defendants-appellees. are here treated together in this single decision because they present but one identical question of law. the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 1969. Benito. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. MARDO. respondents-appellants. INC. No. 1961 VICENTE ROMERO. petitioner-appellee.R. petitioner-appellee. MARDO. 20-A. 1970. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. L-15138 July 31.S. ANGEL HERNANDO ETC. L-16781 July 31.R. L-44738. No. Benito. etc. 14 308 U. H. vs. 11 G. namely.R.R. and MARIANO PABILIARE. respondents-appellees. MELITON C. JORGE BENEDICTO. vs. No. 1961 BILL MILLER. J. G.. May 29. 1960. of Malabang vs. prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization . 162 SCRA 411.. PHHC.10 Sagun vs. BARRERA. No. No. C. SEN BEE TRADING COMPANY. 371 (1940) cited in Mun. 33 SCRA 105. G. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. 13 Municipality of Malabang. although originating from different Courts of First Instance. L. 1988. May 4. vs. 1961 FRED WILSON & CO.R. Paciano C. et al. supra. respondents-appellants.R. L-16660 July 31. and SERGIO TAN. plaintiff-appellant. June 22. No. petitioner-appellant. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.. x---------------------------------------------------------x G. petitioners-appellees. 1961 NUMERIANA RAGANAS. ATANACIO A. March 28. Shelby Count. 425 (1886). L-17056 July 31. ATANACIO A. PARDUCHO. 12 Senate Journal No. and LAO KANG SUY. and CRESENCIO ESTAÑO.S. Villavieja for respondents-appellants.. et al. 27 SCRA 533 citing Norton vs. R. Resurreccion for petitioner-appellee. L-28113.R. 1961 CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY. respondents-appellants. III. vs. No. 118 U. 67. MACARIO TAN.. L-25326. and MANUEL GONZALES. vs. 41. No.
as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof.R. did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from violations of labor standards. appellant Raganas appealed to the Court of Appeals. with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7. Acting on said motion. 1958. No. 1952 to January 11.A. 20-A. Upon receipt of said complaint. and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. 1241. Before trial of the case could be terminated. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. No. May 6. Sia Seng and Regional Labor Administrator Hernando appealed to us. Romero filed with the Court of First Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus (Case No. respondent Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion to dismiss. that Reorganization Plan No. filed their answer and. In G. Inc. a complaint (RO 3 Ls. authority. II-35) praying that an order be issued commanding respondent Regional Labor Administrator to immediately issue a writ of execution of the decision in Wage Case No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer. nor jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action. as implemented by Executive Order No. 1957. As prayed for. Chin Hua Trading. Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the validity of the rules and regulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. L-16660. 20-A. 20-A and on our resolution in the case of NASSCO v. Chin Hua Trading. 218. on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed. granted the writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously issued. As a consequence. of the Rules and Regulations No.R. on the ground that it states no cause of action. 26826)). Inc. improper venue. relying on the provision of Section 25. as amended by R.". under Reorganization Plan No. The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition. in relation to Republic Act No. 20A issued pursuant thereto. 997 and 1241. 1957 in National Shipyards Steel Corporation v.. claiming that she was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5. L-15377. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him. and praying. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. Whereupon. No. 1241. a decision was rendered by the Hearing Officer in favor of Romero. to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the disposition of the case. L-16781. 1956 to October 31. The court then required the Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and. for recovery of alleged unpaid wages. Thereafter.R.A. overtime and separation pay. Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong.. G. She prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. 196-W) against Sia Seng. 1958. Case No. 1947 to June 4. issued a writ of preliminary injunction. . Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer and the case was heard. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 20-A is null and void and therefore.. appellees filed a motion to dismiss.R. Arca. Romero was allowed to present his evidence. L-17056. the court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos.Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 3 of the Department of Labor. as enjoined by Section 48. 196-W. of May 6.R. a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1. sick and maternity leave pay filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co. it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. which certified the case to us. but action thereon was deferred until the case is decided on the merits. Hernando. 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in 1956' (Res. etc. inter alia. for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. Vicente Area. etc. From this decision of the Court of First Instance. plus attorney's fees. claiming to have been their driver from June 17. in spite of the fact that the decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered by a hearing officer who had no authority to render the same. appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. issues having been joined. Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. In G. on the ground that said regional office "being purely an administrative body. 1959.R. As prayed for. as prayed for. a preliminary injunction was issued by the court. 997. Appellant Sia Seng urges in his appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the petition. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court. No. a claim for separation vacation. 997. without being paid separation pay. 41954) to restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case. among others. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company. et al. as well as vacation and sick leave pay. 3 of the Department of Labor. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtime and separation pay. After hearing. Vicente B." Said motion to dismiss having been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho. series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. The question of venue was also dismissed for being moot..R. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case. He also claimed that during his employment he was not paid for overtime rendered by him. et al. Plan No. the court dismissed the case. De Veyra. as amended by Republic Act No. refused to issue the writ of execution and ordered a re-hearing. To said complaint. being the officer charged with the duty of issuing the same. 997. the court granted a writ of preliminary injunction.R. the court rendered a decision declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R. 1 of the Labor Standards Commission. respondents Hearing Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us. empowering them to adjudicate the complaint. Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. No. v. when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. Macario Tan and Sergio Tan. No. 997 and 1241. Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 20-A. be declared null and void and unconstitutional. the court rendered a decision ordering. Br. the claimant and the hearing officers appealed to the Court of Appeals. however. L-12249). filed an answer. for which service she was underpaid and was not given overtime. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. After due hearing the court rendered a decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. but said court certified the case to us. 218. 20-A and Executive Order No. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. 1957). is invalid or unconstitutional. In G. 20-A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional. believing that Sia Seng should be given a chance to present his evidence. 20-A is valid. It follows that the questioned reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor.. series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. series of 1956. has no power. in Manila. From this decision. Upon the latter's motion for execution. L-15138. alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic. on the ground that they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same. on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should. as amended by Republic Act No. insofar as it vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice) on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor. from October 1947 to February 19. No. overtime and separation pay. From this order. as it involves only questions of law. respondent Regional Labor Administrator to forthwith issue the corresponding writ of execution. Sia Seng. In G. L-14007 (Mardo. hearing thereof was started before Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. respectively. Thereafter. as well as Executive Order No. and in failing to hold that Reorganization Plan No. and there is pending before the regional office of the Department of Labor. regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. the same having been already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and prohibition previously filed with this Court in G. the records of the case were referred to Regional Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ of execution. Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. After hearing. etc. Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. petitioner Fred Wilson & Co. (G. L-12249. Upon his petition. To this petition. No. as Reorganization Plan No. et al. 218. At the date set for hearing the latter did not appear despite due notice to him and counsel. In G. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. Air conditioning Department. Answers were then filed and the case was heard. insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages. No. 1955. 1241.
No. Thus. except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law. however. (Emphasis supplied. L-14837 and companion cases..A.S. VII of the Constitution). Under this provision. overtime. . and unpaid wages. the only authority it had being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing. appealed directly to us from this decision. June 30.) (Emphasis supplied. It is true that in Republic Act No. or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service. an executive body. 1951. in one of the cases. (c) all cases for unpaid wages. as amended. which plainly did not include the creation of courts. Art. In case of refusal by a party to submit to such settlement. Shreveport.R. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers. and . activities. (b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions. only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. as amended. L-5692. It is. 1241). underpayment. vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. not judicial functions. argued that Reorganization Plan No. as incident to the performance of administrative functions. as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of the Government. 1. separation pay.Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co. underpayment. if they are to be valid. No. 77. 1954. The question thus presented by these cases is whether this is valid under our Constitution and applicable statutes. Inc. 3 If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions. 42 P.) But these "functions" which could thus be created. that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-judicial functions to the Regional offices. amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997. No. The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. (Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. . or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. And so we held in Corominas et al. to authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice. 1961). in effect. Jur 921-922. vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. invoked in favor of this argument reads as follows: . No. cited in 11 Am. the latter was empowered — (2) To abolish departments. Labor Standards Commission. v. obviously refer merely to administrative. 997. L-4465. March 5. San Diego. and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages. as amended by R. separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers. Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. but is in fact an act of Congress itself. ed 175. (G. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion.1 It is evident. The Legislature could not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission. vs. et al. as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited.A.(Sec. is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. agencies. 997. exercising its delegated powers. emanating from the lack of authority of the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the non-disapproval of Reorganization Plan No. therefore. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R. and Johnson vs. it was not the intention of Congress. the remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court. the Department of Labor. Collector of Internal Revenue G. 20-A. unpaid wages.) But it is urged. overtime. 20-A. in enacting Republic Act No. overtime. the regional offices have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law. which is hereunder quoted: 25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law. Surigao Consolidated vs. 287 U. judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. Price Stabilization Board. a regular statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the enabling act. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. G. that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings. offices. the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt. overtime. 1241. U. 249. or functions which may not be necessary. and functions. then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.R. 20-A is not merely the creation of the Reorganization Commission. had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above. . separation pay. The Commission was not authorized to create courts of justice. which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. No. 997. July 12.R.S. 2 But in so doing. vs. from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. 997. 77 L.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall. 20. which exercised quasi-judicial powers even before the reorganization of the Department of Labor. transmitted the same to Congress on February 14. but if not." In either case. and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. It is now contended that. and those of the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the Second Session.R. unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return. modification thereof. nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress. is hereby reversed.. which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. On the basis of the foregoing considerations. after such reconsideration. Under the first. To sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme four democracy. By specific provision of the Constitution — No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress). said plan. 7th ed. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way. unless between the date of transmittal and the expiration of such period. 20-A. 1957. either House by simple resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any.. 187). shall be deemed approved after the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following the date on which the plan is transmitted to it. as that word is commonly used and understood. WHEREFORE (a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G. and . because of weakness or indifference. L-12249. before it becomes a law. If he approves the same. directing the Regional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of the Regional Office No. be approved by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period. considering that the said case refers to a claim before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. for under it. Art. VI of the Constitution). be presented to the President. is invalid and of no effect. he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated.SEC. insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law. No. is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule-making power." (Cooley. It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No. In a sense. (d) In case G. is a member of Parliament). independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion). This ruling does not affect the resolution of this Court in the case of National Steel & Shipyards Corporation v. the procedure outlined in Section 6(a) herein before quoted. VI). without costs. 1956. the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by each House of Congress. and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other. as seems to be the impression expressed in one these cases. (c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed from in case G. L-16660. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. to eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who. p. in turn. without costs. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations. Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. (Sec. If. together with the objections.R. Even in the United States (in whose Federal Constitution there is no counterpart to the specific method of passaging laws prescribed in Section 21 of our Constitution) and in England (under whose parliamentary system the Prime Minister. 4 The procedure has ever been intended or utilized or interpreted as another mode of passing or enacting any law or measure by the legislature. would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the Constitution. he shall sign it. 2. without costs. L-15377 is set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. real head of the Government. L-15138 is hereby affirmed.R. to preserve the control of the legislature and its share in the responsibility for the adoption of proposed regulations. Furthermore. consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution. except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. if Congress is so disposed. we hold ad declare that Reorganization Plan No. Art. No. 21-[a]. The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may. and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter. . (b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G. the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by Congress. Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure. likewise. it shall be sent. and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. No. Arca et al. in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment. if given the effect suggested in counsel's argument. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session. the section. No. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him.R. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed. the same shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it. two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill. G. without costs.R. to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered. Constitutional Limitations. A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. and with the requirement presentation to the President. (Sec. pursuant to the above-quoted provision. under our Constitution. L-16781 is hereby affirmed. No. 20-A to the President who. dated May 6. is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state.
Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. 1959. 1960. J. G.. No. Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street. 81510 March 14. The facts are as follows: xxx xxx xxx 1. Dizon. June 30. June 29.(e) In case G. prohibiting illegal recruitment. — Horty Salazar — 615 R. De Leon and Natividad. Bengzon. Santos. took no part.. No.R. and FERDIE MARQUEZ. L-12745. Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner. La Union Labor Union v. 161 CA. April 24. L-17056. Bautista Angelo. S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Reyes. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay. No. 1959. on leave.. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. respondents. HON. Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation. 3. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC 3 4 G. Concepcion and Paredes JJ. J. dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before the Regional office No. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. 1987.R. 76.R. Padilla. Co. On October 21. J. L14087. in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar. Saulog. 06. is hereby reversed and the preliminary injunction at first issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs. 563. G.J. L-12300. took no part. C. Landis.. ACHACOSO. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo? S.L.. L-11777. 1959. Footnotes 1 Potente v. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari? S. SARMIENTO.: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code. No. v. the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First Instance of Manila. Pasay City. 770. Santos v Caparas. vs. in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. petitioner. concur. Labrador.B. SO ORDERED. Leveriza. TOMAS D. The Administrative Process (1938) p. 218 P.R.O. G. No. Saulog. JJ. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako.R. Figueroa v. G. 2 16 CJS 866. Industrial Accident Commission. 05. viz: 04. Mandaluyong. June 29.R. No. et seq. Mla. ay . 1990 HORTENCIA SALAZAR.
EDSA COR. III. the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R. papers.O." 3..000. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. and the entry.O. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Mrs.. Santos St. However. together with grave abuse of the color of authority. we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26. Inside the studio. 615 R. Estelita B. Done in the City of Manila. this 3th day of November. Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10. public respondent Administrator Tomas D. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Metro Manila. Metro Manila. having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko. the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing. hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. Art. when required to show credentials. Your acts also violate Sec. 615 R. 1988. the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside. 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. 1. houses. we shall feel free to take all legal action. 1205 which reads: HORTY SALAZAR No. 2. Flora Salazar. it having verified that you have — (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment. The premises invaded by your Mr. sent to the petitioner the following telegram: YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 2. 1987. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. On November 3. Horty Salazar of 615 R. Santos St. Mandaluyong. Mandaluyong. civil and criminal. Santos St. she was unable to produce any. public respondent Atty. 1022. search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. Among our reasons are the following: 1. 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. Santos. 4. POEA BLDG. 1205. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons. 1920 and Executive Order No. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. 1987. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned. On January 28. petitioner filed with POEA the following letter: Gentlemen: On behalf of Ms. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil. 1205 dated November 3. 6. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. to protect our client's interests. Marquez. Doing so. (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. 5. Mandaluyong. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Metro Manila Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. Atty.). 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec.O. Before entering the place. Art. .00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof. Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment. Mandaluyong. ORTIGAS AVE.hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. On January 26. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6. On the same day. 2.O. Jovencio Abara and Atty. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW. of the Philippine Constitution.
giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well: (c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. Mr. is to make him both judge and jury in his own right. might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. paraphernalia. 8 The above has now been etched as Article 38. 1988. 6 On May 1. and on that ground. unconstitutional." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth. on the basis thereof. warrants of arrest. Unlike a magistrate. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli. 5 Section 38. or was meant to exercise. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. promulgated Presidential Decree No. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos. on even date. Under the latter. 7 On January 26. may be validly exercised only by judges. . warrants of arrest or search warrants. much less issue orders of arrest. 4 Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body: We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises. it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. 2018. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused. we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution. 1984. aside from judges. Presidential Decree No. establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. paragraph (c). 1985. establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies. rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2. without having been licensed or authorized to do so. with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power: xxx xxx xxx But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September. he. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. of the Labor Code. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents. which states: . this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase. before POEA could answer the letter. 1988. 1987. thereby making prohibition too late. invariably. Section 2. as now written. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed. as the accused's adversary and his accuser. the function of determining probable cause and issuing. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. without having been licensed or authorized to do so.We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters. to our mind and to that extent. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations. 7." he stands. petitioner filed the instant petition. 1693. The Minister shall order the closure of companies. 1 On February 2. 3 In one case. 1986. . Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated. the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers: (c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. Marcos. Mr. . POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal. the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. 2 it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. who. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers: (b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or nonholder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. On February 2. the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Under the new Constitution. The law has since been altered. "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution. Section 143 of the Local Government Code. That makes. prosecutorial powers. 2002. when he is neither. to Presidential Decree No. in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. docketed as IS-88-836. 1920.
the search and seizure order in question.O. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. and 3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda. 1125)." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest. tables. 1920 and Executive Order No. letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI. NKA 892. dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications. 569. ink. assuming. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor. 949. Mandaluyong. 1122. 40 Phil. 10 It is valid. cabinets. because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs.The decrees in question. 534. paragraph (c).S. Moreover. To that extent. 1022. may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. it is null and void. "he may. it having verified that you have — (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment. 3) A delivery truck with Plate No. paraphernalia. The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. 41). 4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW. 549. exceptional. however.. Vivo involved a deportation case. ex gratia argumenti. In re McCulloch Dick. NBS 542. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. the authorities must go through the judicial process. leaflets. 2) DATSUN. typewriters. 57 L. it is well to note. in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. paper. obviously. and . an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield. Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment. 13 We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized. Forbes. 38 Phil. 16 Phil. even in the absence of express law. Under the Constitution. 228 U. stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise: 1) All printing equipment. we declare Article 38. 615 R. We have held: 11 xxx xxx xxx The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. 956). more particularly. 960. not being a judge. unconstitutional and of no force and effect. that it was validly issued. PBP 665. 1) Toyota-Corolla. (Forbes vs. That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. We have ruled that in deportation cases. Hence. communications/ recording equipment. otherwise. thus: xxx xxx xxx Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. pamphlets. and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines. 2) Subversive documents. of the Labor Code. books. 12 The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is. governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. NKV 969. pick-up colored white with Plate No. I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. Santos St. photo equipment. deport them". Ed. 568. 104 Phil. is clearly in the nature of a general warrant: Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. tape recorders. it is the sole domain of the courts. like the one at bar. colored yellow with Plate No. colored white with Plate No.
24 SCRA 155. the U. L-10280.R. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v.S. Griño-Aquino. art. 6 Pres. and no other. Vivo v. June 30. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang. Jr. we reaffirm the following principles: 1. No. memoranda. whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested. the search warrant which authorized the search for "books. Footnotes 1 Rollo. SO ORDERED. AFP No. pamphlets. records. JJ. 79 SCRA 17. Deportation Board. Under Article III. sec. who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. Feliciano. recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas. 14 Burgos. G. Padilla. v. Bidin. 83578. L-24576. In the Stanford case. 1977.J. 11 Go Tek v. supra. Melencio-Herrera. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. Medialdea and Regalado. pictures.5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux. cards. "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLES 38 AND 39 OF THE LABOR CODE BY MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE AND PUNISHABLE WITH IMPRISONMENT. 1967. 14 For the guidance of the bench and the bar. September 9. In like manner. L-22196. Narvasa. 2 CONST." was declared void by the U. Cruz. 814-816. Sr. lists. 1989." In Stanford v. December 26. Decree No. No. Supreme Court for being too general. 21. for the purpose of deportation. 133 SCRA 800. following a final order of deportation. Cortes. id. 1963. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant. 1205. C. 1984. 64261. concur. WHEREFORE. 2018. and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 21-22." 9 No. 662-663. 4 Ponsica. 2. No. receipts. of the l987 Constitution. No.S. pick-up truck with Plate No. Fernan. L-23846." 7 Supra.. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history. Gutierrez. paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. Paras.13 Rollo. July 31. 10 Qua Chee Gan v. the petition is GRANTED.. No. and the operations of the Community Party in Texas. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens. 1. and therefore invalid. III. 20 SCRA 562. 72301. Decree No.. 9 SCRA 27. State of Texas.. when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan. it is only judges. 1987. Article 38. Montesa. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press. emphases in the original. March 16. Gancayco. Ignalaga. directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general. September 30. sec. Chief of Staff. 3 See Ponsica v. 8 Pres." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. Deportation Board. Section 2. 15. 5 Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force. supra. Court of Appeals. 152 SCRA 647.. No costs. 12 Supra. 19-24. 1693. "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 38 OF THE LABOR CODE BY MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE. .
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.