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The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review

The Siberian Intervention, 1918-1919 Author(s): George C. Guins Reviewed work(s): Source: Russian Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct., 1969), pp. 428-440 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/127162 . Accessed: 02/12/2012 13:39
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The Siberian 1918-1919 Intervention,


By George C. Guins Fiftyyears ago the Soviet government was weak and insecure: Finland and Poland had declared theirindependence,the Baltic provinces were occupied by the Germans, and Murmansk Archangel were blockaded, and Georgia had assertedher independenceand accepted the protection Great Britain,which was extendedto of Baku oil throughTranscaucasia. preventGermanyfromexporting The anti-communist In forceswere ready for an offensive. the cornerof European Russia the Don and Kuban Cossoutheastern sacks organized autonomousgovernments headed by the elected atamansand joinedtheVolunteer Army commanded GeneralA.I. by Denikin.Anti-communist forces Siberiaconsisted theOrenburg, in of Ural and SiberianCossacksand could be supplemented withdraftees. At the same timetherewas in Siberiathe CzechoslovakCorps (or and equipped by France and consisting Czechs of Legion), financed and Slovaks,former subjectsand soldiersof the Austrian-Hungarian in Empirewho had becomewar prisoners Russia and had voluntarily in enlisted thecorpswiththeconsent theRussiangovernment. of This well-armed a corpswas potentially veryimportant in participant the anti-communist details concerning activities its movement;further will be set forth below.' The wholeofSiberiaand theFar Easternregions, well as theteras ritories adjacent to the Urals, had been liberatedfromcommunist rule and were unitedon November18, 1918, under the leadership of AdmiralA.V. Kolchak, who was both Supreme MilitaryCommanderand Head of State. French General Pierre Maurice Janin, who arrivedin Siberia in November1918 with the special mission the from Frenchgovernment commandand protectthe interests to of theCzechoslovakCorps,declaredupon his arrival thatduringthe
1 Originally onlya druzhina, smallmilitary a unit,it was transformed an army into corpsthrough recruitment onlyofwarprisoners also of Czechsand Slovaks the not but who were employed Russianindustrial in plants.For detailssee G.F. Kennan,"The Czechoslovak Legion,"The RussianReview,vol. 16, no. 4.

428

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and forcedto nextfifteen days Soviet Russia would be surrounded assumed thatin the event of success of the antiIt surrender.2 was would be recognizedin communist campaign,Kolchak's authority and it would be possibleto elect a Constitueach liberated province, ent Assembly whichwould establisha new all-Russiangovernment. Janin's optimisitic appraisalof the chances forsuccesswas based on Rethe decisionof the "Big Five" to supportthe White movement. to in ferring that decision,WinstonChurchill, his workdevoted to observed: "Had they acted togethersimplyand "the aftermath," sincerely. . . they[the Allies] mighthave reached a good result."3 his However,duringthe postwaryearswhen Churchillwas writing voluminous work,it had become clear that such optimistic predicwere ill-fated. Justwhen plans were actuallybeing tionsas Janin's in formulated intervention Siberia,in November1918, Germany for and Austria-Hungary capitulated.No one had foreseenthe great as changeswhichfollowed a result thiscapitulation. of These changes could not,of course,transpire withoutinfluencing intervention the and effecting originalplans of the Allies. the 1. The OriginalPlan of Intervention As a resultof discussions takingplace at Versailles, the following telegramwas sent fromthereto Secretary State Lansing of the of U.S.A.: "In view of the littletimeremaining the preparation for of active operations Siberiabeforewinterand the possibleintrusion in of Germany intoRussia duringthattime,the SupremeWar Council Wilsonto approvethe recommended appeals to President policy,in orderto implement beforeit is too late."4 it However,rapid implementation the measuresmentioned the of in telegram not follow.Justafterthe surrender Germany Nodid of in vember1918,the Commander-in-Chief the Allied armies, of General (later Marshal) F. Foch, personally turnedto the Presidentof the Council of Ministers and to the War Ministry France with the of
2 G. Guins (Gins), SibirSouzniki Kolchak, i Peking, 1921, vol. I, p. 302. Hereafter referredto as S.S. i K. 3 W. Churchill, The Aftermath; World Crisis1919-1928,New York, 1929, p. the 244. See also G.F. Kennan, The Decisionto Intervene, Princeton,N.J., 1958, chapters XV, XVII, XIX and Epilogue. 4 Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny(A collection of documents relating to 1918-1919), Moscow, 1961, v. I, document no. 32, July 2, 1918.

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following proposalwhichhad been approvedby the Allied Military Council: Alliedoperations theEast must in first all be planned then of and implemented theshortest possible; in time In northern Russiathey basedon theuse oflocal groups miliare the of tary power which must we develop; In theCaucasustheBritish operations must continued; be In theUkraine canquickly we accomplish intervention simultaneously from Rumania theBlackSea inorder acquire regions and to the around
Kiev and Kharkov. .
..5

Thisplan showsthattheAllies,farfrom rejecting idea of interthe ventionafterthe endingof the war,even thought broadening of its scope.' They stillhad not changedtheirattitudes since the declarationof friendship the promises and whichwere made on August22, 1918, by Balfour,the BritishForeign Minister, and on September 21, by the FrenchdiplomatM. Regnault.7 The Allied plan of intervention outlinedabove was not,however, either European Russia or in Siberia.President in implemented, Wilson vacillatedfora long time,althoughhe was earnestly interested in theproblem. July 1918,he wroteto one ofhis aides: "I have On 8, been sweatingblood over the questionof what action is rightand feasiblein Russia."8Wilson'sSecretary State,Lansing,supported of the idea of intervention. emphasizedthat: He The longer they [theBolsheviks] continue power, more in the authorityinRussiawilldissipate: more the willthearmies disintegrate; and it theharder willbecome restore to order military and efficiency.... The hopeofa stableRussian government for present lies the [December 1917] in a military dictatorship backed by loyal,disciplined troops.... 9 For PresidentWilson, both intervention and dictatorship were difficult accept because ofhis own liberalconvictions the posto and of in sibility strong opposition Congress.Accordingto the informationgivenby Churchillin his above quoted work,GreatBritainneThe plan presented in the text representedan addition to the original one, which projected intervention of only in the territory the Russian Far East. 7 Guins, S.S. i K., v. 2, pp. 48-49. 8 Quoted in The Siberian Intervention, John Albert White, 1950, p. 230. by 9 The Lansing Papers, vol. II. p. :343, quoted by J. White in op. cit. pp. 227-28,
6

5 Ibid., v. I, documents no. 73 and 78, November 1918.

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the of gotiatedwithJapanconcerning possibility Japaneseinterventionin Siberia.The British to Wilplan was communicated President son on December 31, 1917,but he rejectedit. Nor did he agree to a jointAmerican-Japanese intervention.s It is clear thatthe capitulation the CentralPowers in Novemof ber 1918 complicatedthe question of intervention further. still As has alreadybeen shown,the WesternEuropean powersproposedto in organizea jointintervention the territory European Russia. The of plan of MarshalFoch was approved,and after endingof the war the France decided in accordancewiththe plan to land her troopsand a unit of Greeksin Odessa and to begin intervention Russia from in Rumania jointlywith Russian troopslocated there.This plan was agreed upon at Jassyby the Russian General Shcherbachev,who commandedthe Russian troopsoperatingagainst the Germanson the Rumanianfront. A steamshipwith French troops arrivedand landed in Odessa. However, when the French soldiers learned that they had been landed for participation military in operationsin Russia, they refusedto take partin thisintervention. Fearinga mutiny, French the commandhurriedto removeits military unitsfromOdessa, which was lateroccupied by Grigoriev, of the organizers the partione of san detachments. The intervention planned for the North of Russia was to be launchedfrom Murmansk Archangel. and British military unitswere landed there.Their immediatetaskwas to guard storesand unused war suppliesfurnished earlierby the Allies forthe Russian armies. The Alliesfearedtheirseizureby the Germansin Murmansk and the Bolsheviks Archangel. was also proposedthatan attackon Mosin It cow mightbe undertakenfromArchangel.This second aim was abandoned;itbecame clearthatenactment thisplan would require of significantly moreforcesthanhad been at first supposed." Thus an opportunity intervention European Russia was for in missed,conditions seemingly morefavorableforintervention developed onlyin Siberia.The CzechoslovakCorps mentioned the beat
10 Churchill, cit.,p. 82. op. 11A.I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, Berlin,1924,v. 3, p. 20; ColonelA. Zaitsov, 1918, Ocherkipo istorii grazhdanskoi voiny,Shanghai,1934, pp. 269-270; and G. Kennanop. cit.,Chapter XV.

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ginning thisarticleturnedout to be located therein the summer of of 1918. Priorto the war's end it had been proposedthatthiscorps of40,000soldiers removedthrough be to Archangel France whereit would participatein operationsfighting for simultaneously France and forthefuture Czechoslovakia. independent This plan was discardedafterthe October Revolution. The Bolshevikswere apprehensive about the movement the well-armed of corps close to Moscow. At the same time,the commanders the of corps,amongwhom were Russian officers, refusedto give up their armsand preferred leave from to Vladivostock.12During the movementof separateechelonsof the corpsacross Siberia,the command ofthe corpsenteredintoagreements withofficer in organizations Siberia.13Boththencoordinated theiractivities and overthrew Sothe in viet authorities all the large cities along the Trans-Siberian railroad. Afterthe overthrow the Soviets along the route of the corps, of anti-Bolshevik governments began to appear in Samara, "Komuch" (KomitetChlenovUchreditelnogo Sobraniia); in the Urals,theEkain terinburg govenrment; Omsk,the Siberian.14 At the timeof theformation the CzechoslovakCorps it had not of been foreseen thatit would operateon the Russianfront, least of all as a counter-revolutionary but thisbecame necessary selfforce; for defenseand to ensurefreedom movement the portfrom of to which the corpswas to be evacuated. The prospects a successful for interventionwere further reinforced the fact that already in April by 1918 a Japaneselandinghad been made at Vladivostok, under the pretenseof protecting lives and property Japanesesubjects. the of If coordination the operations the corpsand the military of of forces of the U.S.A. and Japanhad thenbeen effected, would have creit ated a gravedangerfortheSovietgovernment.
12 Russian officers the Czech Corps were all anti-Communist. of Some of them were in touch with undergroundRussian oppositionistgroups. See G. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene, 1958, p. 143. 13 Officer organizations began to spring up all over Russia beginning in June 1918, with the goal of self-defenseand in anticipation of expected future anti-Communist endeavors. 14 For a more detailed account, see the book by this author,S.S. i K., v. I and Zaitsov, op. cit., pp. 119-20.

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The SiberianIntervention, 1918-1919 2. Japaneseand American Landings

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The lead echelonof the CzechoslovakCorps,underthe command of Russian General M.K. Dieterichs,arrivedin Vladivostokin the middleof May. The remainder were stillen route and separatedby greatdistances, from banksof the Volga to Lake Baithe stretching kal. Havingbecomeacquaintedwiththehistory thecorps,and the of circumstances its Allied troops concerning objective of reinforcing on the Franco-German PresidentWilson acknowledgedthat front, the Americangovernment sufficient had groundsforlandingtroops at Vladivostok.Afterall, the Czechoslovak Corps was considered partof the Frencharmy, the and therefore Allies were,in the President's opinion,morallyobligated to provide security the corps for and aid in its evacuation.But the intervention, Wilson'sopinion, in shouldbe carriedout by all the Alliesin concert, onlyby Amernot ica and Japan. However,given the geographicalconsiderations, he acknowledgedthat the U.S.A. and Japan would have to play the primary rolesin intervening Siberia. in President Wilsonofficially his expressed agreement intervention to on July 1918,havingemphasizedthatit would be limitedto those 5, tasksgrowingout of the transfer the Czech military of forces.The goals of American intervention were summarized a special docuin mentcalled "Aide Memoire."'15 conformity In with the leading principles which were set forthin this document,General William S. Graves,who was appointedto head the U.S. forces,landed in the RussianFar East and receivedinstructions delimiting activities. his He was to safeguardthe rear of the Czechoslovaksoperatingin Siberia, avoid interfering Russian internalaffairs in and assure the people of Russia" . . . thatnone of the governments unitingin action,eitherin Siberiaor in Northern Russia,contemplates any interferenceof any kindwiththe politicalsovereignty Russia,any inof tervention herinternal in affairs, any impairment her territorial or of integrity eithernow or hereafter. "16 This document clearlyshowsthattheAmericans not intendto did give anykindof support the leadersof the struggle to againstSoviet rule nor to any of the governments whichhad arisenin the process
15

See J.White, cit.,appendix pp. 426-529. op. II,

16 WilliamS. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure, N.Y., 1931,p. 9.

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of thatstruggle. at the same timeAmericadid expressreadiness But to oppose theexpropriation anypartof Russianterritory. unof This had reference Japan,whom American to doubtedly, suspoliticians pected of territorial ambitions. Japanlanded a totalof57,000soldiers the RussianFar East; the in UnitedStatessentabout 8,000.This numerical correlation alone testifies a difference the taskscontemplated each of these two to in by powers.The conditions intervention of stipulated the U.S. Presby identdestinedthe American and Japanesetroopsto relative inaction in regardto the "Whites"in theirstruggle againstthe "Reds." The Japanesegovernment officially declaredits agreement parto ticipatein the intervention and showed in its answer that it "reits affirms policy of respecting the territorail of inviolability Russia" and that,"upon accomplishing objectivesof intervention the it will immediately remove all Japanese troops fromRussian territory."17

The restrictions the intervention on deprivedJapanof the opporto tunity dispatchhertroopsall the way up to the Urals as she initito ally had offered the Allies. There is no doubt that the Japanese would have occupied the Trans-Siberian railroadonlyon the conditionof certaincompensations, since it would requirelarge expendituresand possiblesacrifice lives.But fortheoutcomeof theWhite of movementthis could have been indispensablesupport.And even after Japan'sacceptanceof the Americanconditions intervention of she stillremainedreceptiveto negotiations concerning moresignificant aid, on the basis of agreementon certaineconomic arrangementsadvantageousforJapan. Duringtheresidencein Vladivostok the President the Siberof of ian government, Vologodsky, September 1918,a represenP.V. in of tativeof the Japanesegovernment, Count Matsudairavisitedhim. In the course of their conversation, Vologodskyasked the count whetherthe Siberian government could rely on Japan's support. The answerreceived, thepresenceoftheauthor thisessay,was: in of "Yes, if the Siberiangovernment requestthisin writing." will Later a representative the Siberiangovernment Vladivostok, of in Grevs, reportedthat he was conductingtalks with representatives the of Japanesegovernment regarding those economic advantages Japan
17

Guins, S.S. i K. v. II, pp. 46, 47.

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would expect in the event that she supportedthe Siberian government."8 The talkswere brokenoff owing to changes of government: the advent of a directory, thenits replacement the dictatorand by ship of AdmiralKolchak. It cannotbe doubted that Japanwas opposed to the reestablishmentof Russia withher former boundariesand power.Japanwould have preferred independent an Siberiaor at least an autonomous Siberiangovernment with which it would be easier to make arrangements.But neithercould Japanhave wanted the victory Bolsheof vism and a Soviet state headed by communists a neighbor.For as itspart,the relationship the U.S. government the Russian Revof to olutionand to Bolshevismwas vacillatingand temporizing.'9 Given the differences describedabove in the Japaneseand American economicinterests politicalevaluationsof the RussianRevand olution,it was difficult expect coordination implementing to in the intervention which these two powersbegan to carryout in Siberia. Moreover,each power in some ways supportedanti-White forces. AtamanSemenov(rulingin Chita), who was leader Japansupported ofthe Transbaikal, and AtamanKalmykov(in Khabarovsk),head of the Ussuriand AmurCossack forces. The rule oftheseatamansin the Far East was notoriousfor arbitrariness and cruelty.The U.S., in the person of the commanderof the Americantroopsstationedin the Far East, General Graves,protectedmovements which were in factdirectedby communist leadersor theirsupporters who had fled deep into the countryside when the Czechs and anti-communist forces captured the main cities along the Siberian railroad. The Americansconsidered these activitiesto be in supportof a just 20 cause. in Intervention Siberia thus assumed the formof protectionof varioussectionsof the populationand supportof variousleaders in
18

Ibid., p. 56.

19 An explicit and at the same time fully consistentexpression of the "democratic" understandingof the Russian civil war of 1919-20 was the following: "The U.S. did not consider 'Bolsheviks' . . . as enemies and had no intention to fightthem." W.S. Graves op. cit., p. 92. Quite opposite was the point of view of R.H. Lockhart, British Agent, London 1933, p. 308: " . . . the interventionwith inadequate forces . intensified the civil war and sent thousands of Russians to death. . Its direct effect was . . . to galvanize them [the Bolsheviks] into a strongand ruthlessorganism." 20 On the "atamanshchina" see Guins, S.S. i K. v. II, pp. 68, 133, 136; see also pp. 178-80.

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theinternal strife thecountry. therefore of It brought muchthatwas of harmful. it was necessary But and usefulfrom standpoint war the supplies.In thisrespectboth the United Statesand Japanrendered in a greatserviceto the White movement Siberia and beyond the Urals.

3. Extraterritorial Corps Privileges theCzechoslovak of


Assistanceto the White movement fromthe CzechoslovakCorps left much to be desired. It should be noted that the size of the At corps,whichwas oftencalled a legion,kept increasing. the time Siberiain 1920,it comprised ofits evacuationfrom 45,000men.This included some of those who earlierhad not respondedto the call to join. When all the advantages of enteringthe legion became clear,thosewho earlierdeclinedbegan to inquireabout enlistment. Their example was followed by Poles and Serbs, former AustroHungarian subjectswho had also been captured in Russia during World War L. The privilegedpositionof the corps was shownby its receiptof all kinds of supplies; free quarteringin railroad cars and station railroad. townsand cash paymentforguardingthe Trans-Siberian conversion intoSiberianmoneyof salariespaid in favorable Through the could buy up various valuable foreign currencies, legionnaires itemssold by membersof the "bourgeoisie"who had been ruined fromEuropean Russia. and by refugees Financial speculationbegan and later assumed significant pronoticeablein the corps.GenLawlessnesswas increasingly portions. in eral Denikinpresents his book excerpts from communications rethe seizureby the Czechs of trains ceived fromSiberia concerning with supplyitems,such as boots,intendedfortroopsat the front. In anotherinstance,involving purchaseof sheepskincoats, the the Czechs offered higher pricesto the dealersthanthe Russian governcould pay; and so the Czechs in the rear were mentcommissaries betterclothedthanthe soldiersat the front.21 The commercial operationsof the Czechs became an organized businessaftertheyfoundedthe "Bank of the Legionnaires." With
21 A.I. Denikin, op. cit., 93. Much data of this kind were gathered by the historian p. Melgunov in his multi-volumework, TragediiaadmiralaKolchaka (The Tragedy of Admiral Kolchak), Belgrade, The Russian Library, 1931. See part III, v. I, no. 25, pp. 79, 91.

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theirsavingsthe Czechs boughtsharesin the bank. The bank's capital grewand purchasedvariousraw materialsand valuable objects whichhad been sold at reduced prices by ruinedmerchants the or in bourgeoisie general. Abuse of power with impunity was also noticeablein the corps. were issued which nobody besides local For example,requisitions had the rightto issue. Representatives the Czech deof authorities and others, interfered the affairs the tachments, in Gloss,Richter of administration. Russian Richtereven asked the Admiral himself, his after electionas SupremeRuler,whyhe had not consultedwith the Czech representatives beforeacceptingthe election.22 The Czechs feltsecurein Siberia.Under the guardianship repof resentatives thegreatpowers,someofthemlostmilitary of discipline and morale. Demoralizingpropaganda and leftistideas, including those about world revolution, began to penetratetheir ranks. If such extremism rather was anti-Omsk exceptional, feelgovernment ings,inspired the SocialistRevolutionaries, by were rathercommon, and help from Czech Corps in the struggle the with the Soviet rule became increasingly problematic. When the representative the newly-created of independentgovernmentof Czechoslovakia,the War MinisterStefanek,a Czech in arrived Siberia,he was shocked.A proponent active Russophile, of participation the Czech Corps in the struggle by againstthe Soviet he forces, wanted to raise the morale of the Czech troops,but was disillusionedby the attitudeof the Siberian branch of the Czech NationalCommittee. disbandedit forbeing involvedin political He intrigues and urged the Czech Corps to remember that"onlyalong the road of honorwill the Czechs return theirbeloved freeand to happyhomeland."23 Stefanek'sappeal was not heeded. The ending of the war with the fall of the CentralPowers aroused the desire forpeace among all the peoples participating the war. French soldierswere no in longerwillingto takepartin the intervention. Czechs, fortheir The part, declared that they had to serve France only as long as the Frenchwere fighting that once the French stopped,theirobliand
22 23

Guins, S.S. i K. v. I, p. 302; v. II, pp. 92-93.

See also SAS. i K. v. I, pp. 236-41 about the arrest by the Czechs of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Gratsianov, and interference the activities of the Ministry. in

The Testimony Kolchakand otherSiberianMaterials. of Stanford, 1935, p. 187.

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the gationstoo had come to an end. In addition, Czechs were influwhich took place before enced by those changes of governments theireyes in Siberia.

in 4. Democracy Dictatorship Siberia and


The processof forming and governments duringtransitional revolutionaryperiods rarely correspondsto established democratic principles electionand continuity. of The government which arose in Omsk rightafterthe overthrow Soviet authority May 1918, in of and laterextendedits powerover all of Siberia,experienced several metamorphoses. Its origin was connectedwiththe SiberianRegionalDuma, which form brokeit up. was stillin its rudimentary when the Communists of Even less developed were the systems electionof the West Siberthe ian Commissariat, whichhad come to powerin Omskafter overthrowof the Soviets,and thatof the East Siberian,whichhad proin claimeditselfthe government Vladivostok afterthe overthrow of the Bolsheviks there.The Regional Duma expressedthe desiresof Siberia not for independencebut for decentralization, unlike the extremecentralization the pre-revolutionary of regime.This idea answeredthe needs and wishes of the Siberian intelligentsia, and the RegionalSiberiangovernment soon won recognition respect. and its Indeed, it createda fully satisfactory organforconducting affairs, the so-called Administrative Council, which outlived the Siberian itselfand later became, with some personnelchanges, government It the Council of Ministers the successorgovernment. should be of notedthattherewere so fewpeople in Siberiatrained ministerial for if thatit was verydifficult, at all possible,to replace some functions of the ministers. for decentralization, course of Despite Siberia's preference the out eventsbrought the necessity uniting Siberiangovernment of the withlocal governments whichhad sprung theSamara"Komuch"; up: (duringtheperiodbetweenthebeginning themarchoftheCzech of its Corps and the coups accompanying movement)the government of the Urals,withits residencein Ekaterinburg; Khirghizgovthe and the variousCossack governments. amalgamation ernment; The of all thesegovernments tookplace at a conference Ufa, wherea in was elected. Omskwas selectedas its capital. Directory

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The connection two leadingmembers the Directory of of withthe SocialistRevolutionary of partyand the armedconspiracy thisparty aimed at takingcontrol the government, of possiblywiththe help of Czech leaders,resultedin a coup whichwas engineered two Cosby sackofficers. was impossible reestablish Directory, memIt to the two bersofwhichwerearrested the during coup, and theCouncil ofMinits isters, following own rules,selectedthe Minister War,A.V. Kolof chak,as SupremeRuler.He subsequently replaced the Directory.24 There were manysupporters the SocialistRevolutionary of party amongthe Siberianintelligentsia. They receivedthe electionof Kolchak with disapprobation and regarded it as "a dreadfuldictatorship."As forthe Czechs, amongwhomtherehad been no inclination in towardparticipation the Russian counter-revolution even before it this development, servedas one further reason to avoid involvementin the anti-communist movement. The main reason,however, was that simultaneously with Kolchak's electionWorld War I had come to an end and the NationalCzech Committee receiveda telegramfrom Benes: "The fatherland does not demandfurther sacrifices of you." In accordance with these instructions Czechs left the the "road ofhonor"upon whichtheyhad been admonished remainby to theirnoble MinisterStefanek, who had since died in an airplane crash.25 The Czechs failed to give supportto the Russian anti-communist armiesfighting Siberia and beyondthe Urals. But can one blame in themforthis,when the Frenchrefusedto fight, and the American and Japaneseintervention takingsuch an unfavorable was turnfor the Whitemovement? The Czech NationalCommittee showedindifferencein regardto the Whites.In London PremierLloyd George consideredit no longernecessaryto help the anti-communist movementin Siberia,and in Washington SenatorsBorah, LaFollette and
24 Admiral Kolchak did not participate in the conspiracy. Like many others he was aware, however, of the growing inadequacy of the Directory. In the work of the competent author W.H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1960, v. II, p. 456, appears the assertion: "Kolchak ousted the Directory." To the best of my knowledge this was not true. Kolchak agreed to accept the election, but did not initiate the coup. This author proposes to devote a separate article to the storyof the election of Kolcbak, his activities and fate. intentions, 25 The details of the events which took place in Siberia in 1918-1919 are in the work of Melgunov, op. cit.; General N.N. Golovin, Russkaia kontr-revoljutsiia 1917-1918; and G. Guins, S.S. i K. v. II.

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othersattackedPresident Wilsonforhis interference supportof and AdmiralKolchak'sarmies.The mood of the Americanopposition to is in intervention reflected the followingwords addressed to the Presidentby SenatorBorah in a Congressional speech: Yet,whilewe are notat warwithRussia;whileCongress notdehas on clared the war,we are carrying warwith Russian people.We have in an army Russia;we are furnishing munitions supplies other and to
armedforcesin thatcountry.. constitutional authority....26
.

. Whateveris being done is without

Of those prominent statesmen whose names are connectedwith World War I and the eventsfollowing only WinstonChurchill it, seemsto have been able to foresee consequencesof the"peaceful the of disposition" his contemporary politicalleaders.At the timewhen the peacemakers, happy with the termination the war, were disof cussingat Versaillesthe problemsof the postwarperiod,Churchill to available conscripts a new Germanarmy vastlyexceedingthoseof France."He called forAlliedassistanceto theanti-communist movementand predicted:"If the Allies were to abandon Russia without some settlements, would thisnot be an open invitation Germany to there? Russiamustbecome a friend theAllied to becomesupreme of Churchill's powersor therewill be neither peace norvictory."27 preof dictioncame truein 1941,in the form WorldWar II.
said: " . . . looking ten or fifteen years into the future . . . I saw the

26 F.L. Sehuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917, New York, 1928, p. 163. 27 J. White, op. cit., p. 332, with the reference to The Peace Conference Papers, vol. II, p. 649.

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