Lack of British Resolution compensated by Indian Incompetence at Delhi 1857 | Indian Rebellion Of 1857 | British Army

Lack of British Resolution compensated by Indian Incompetence at Delhi 1857 Agha H Amin

Delhi Campaign By Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN

T

he capture of Delhi by the 3rd Light Cavalry on 11 May 1857

was the most serious blow suffered by the EEIC in particular and the British Empire in general since the rebellion of the North American Colonies in 1776. Thus it is an indisputable fact that till 1858 in the words of Sir J.W. Fortescue, the official historian of the British Army 'Never, I think, before 1858, had there been a British army of equal

strength in any one country....as in India during the Mutiny. Excluding the British troops in the East India Company's service, there were in India at the end of 1858 eight regiments of British Cavalry and sixty eight battalions of British infantry' 237. Never before was the British strength in India reinforced in such a manner from overseas as during 1857-58. Not even in the First Afghan war or in any of the Sikh wars238. We have already discussed how Delhi was captured by the 3rd Light Cavalry. Its manpower was predominantly Muslim as was true for Cavalry in general before 1857. However, bulk of the infantry which followed 3rd LC to Delhi ie 11 & 20 NI were Hindu. The same was true for 38, NI 54 NI and 74 NI who were stationed at Delhi. The same was true for the entire Bengal Army infantry239.

Excerpts from Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted by Agha H Amin 1998 Even after the arrival of the siege train Archdale Wilson was half hearted about launching the attack. He started having psychosomatic problems like headache, cramps in the legs and insomnia. Baird Smith from the Corps of Engineers was the man who was spurring Wilson; the sceptical artillery man

who saw a calamity in every action proposed to him. Wilson confessed that 'my head gets so confused that I at times almost despair321.'

Wilson did not want to mount an assault since he felt that an assault would not succeed. He, however, agreed to do so under great pressure from Baird Smith. The official historian of the British Army Sir John Fortescuee described Wilson's apprehensions about mounting an assault in the following words: 'Here was an oriental city more than two square miles in extent, with

narrow tortuous streets and endless buildings where a mutinous sepoy, from his local knowledge, might prove as good a man, as the British soldier. The precedents of Rosetta and Buenos Aires suggested a very good chance of failure, while that of Badajoz was a painful reminder that pillage and Liquor could reduce a British army to an ungovernable mob. Poor Wilson, ill and worn out by heat, anxiety and hard work had some excuse for hesitation. But Fortescue went further in describing Wilson's fears i.e. 'It should be seen that he dreaded not so much the damages of a repulse as the possible dissolution of his army in the event of success'322. In military history a military commander's belief in the success of his plan and his resolution to carry it out against all odds is a very important part of success in battle. Wilson was, however, an exception to this rule. Following note which Wilson wrote on the proposed plan of assault on Delhi forwarded to him by Baird Smith throws some light on Wilson's state of mind a few days before the assault on Delhi. Wilson thus wrote on Baird Smith's memorandum 'the results of the proposed operations will be thrown on the hazard of a die; but under the circumstances in which I am placed, I am willing to try this hazard - the more so as I cannot suggest any other plan to meet our difficulties. I cannot, however, help being of the opinion that the chances of success under such heavy fire as the working parties will be exposed to, are anything but favourable. I yield, however, to the judgement of the Chief Engineer'!323 The aim of quoting all this is to illustrate that the British at Delhi were being commanded by an indecisive man who was there just because he was the senior most . Had the sepoys possessed a really unified command and a reasonable command organisation Delhi may have gone down in history as a disastrous British defeat, just like New Orleans324. An Assault Force of 1,500 resolute Britishers who were heroes fighting for their home country and 4,660 natives330 who were inspired mercenaries in the hope of material gains in shape of land grants and loot was ready to attack the fortress city of Delhi! The British knew when to kick and when to reward the natives. Ancestors of most of the Muslim League leaders of 1947 were among those 5,000 collaborators waiting few hundred yards north of the city walls to assault Delhi. The real freedom fighters on the other side of the wall perished fighting or later on in the Terai !

Assault and Capture of Delhi

On the morning of 14 September the four assaulting columns were already in their positions around the Kudsia Bagh area. Heavy artillery fire was opened to further widen the breaches and to stun the defenders. Meanwhile the assaulting troops had been in position since three o'clock in the morning. The detailed account covering even individuals has been given by many historians. This work is more concerned with the analytical aspects of 1857,

therefore the following account of the actual assault of Delhi is not as detailed as in other works connected with 1857.

The main assault was plannned to start early in the morning. However it was delayed since during the preceeding night the sepoys had covered the breaches. Guns therefore had resumed fire in the morning to widen the breaches again331. Once this was done assault was commenced under the leadership of Brigadier Nicholson by the Ist and 2nd Columns who rushed towards the two main breaches, i.e. the Ist column towards the breach in the Kashmir Bastion and the 2nd colum towards the breach in the Water

Bastion wall. These columns suffered terrible casualties but Nicholson was a very brave man and he led the British troops and the loyal Indian troops onwards into the breaches. The only difference perhaps at this stage was that the British had only one Nicholson and the Sepoys had no Nilcholson !

Meanwhile the third column had to wait for the blowing up of the Kashmir Gate. This was successfully done by a breaching party of engineers who reached the Kashmir Gate under tremendous fire. The breaching party was commaned by Lieutenant Home and Salkeld of the Engineers. Their approach to the gate was covered by the 60th Rifles. They were accompanied by a bugler from 52 Foot who had to blow the bugle once the gate was successfully blown up in order to warn the assaulting column to commence its approach advance to the blown up gate. While placing the charge and while lighting the fire one sergeant and one officer were killed but the gate was successfully blown up. The assault party consisting of 150

men (50 Europeans for 52 foot, 50 Gurkhas from Kumaoon battalion and 50 Indians (Muslims + Sikhs) from Ist Punjab Infantry) rushed in followed by the main body of the third column. The third column immediately started moving towards Chandni Chowk but was soon forced to retire due to heavy sepoy fire to the Saint James Church332. The Ist 2nd and 3rd column succeeded in entering the city but were stopped from advancing due to heavy resistance333 Meanwhile Archdale Wilson rode into the city and established his forward tactical headquarters in the Saint James Church which was located near the Kashmir Gate. Meanwhile the 4th column was actually forced to retreat by the sepoys soon after it attacked Kishenganj334. The Kashmir contingent composed mostly of Dogras was severely mauled and routed by the sepoys once this force attacked the Eidgah. The sepoys taking advantage of the confusion and lack of success of the three columns in advancing further into the city launched a resolute counter attack on the Ridge from the Kishanganj area,sallying from the Lahore Gate and attempting to turn the British flank from the west. This however was repulsed by the cavalry Brigade under Brigadier Hope Grant 335. Brigadier Nicholson was the first man who entered the breach in the Kashmir Bastion336. Leading the First Column he turned right i.e. westwards and advanced on the inner side of the city wall towards Mori Bastion.

He successfully advanced till the Kabul Gate but determined sepoy resistance did not allow the Ist column to advance beyond the Kabul Gate337. Nicholson was mortally wounded by a musket ball at Burn Bastion and was carried back in a litter (Dolly) to the camp. After Nicholsons evacuation the first column retreated to the Kabul Gate. Nicholson died nine days later after being wounded in 14 September 1857338.

By the night of 14 September 1857 the British position was not encouraging. The Ist and the 2nd column were at the Kabul Gate and had failed to advance any further. The 3rd column was bogged down at Saint James Church. The fourth column had failed to capture Kishenganj and to enter Delhi via the Kabul Gate. The British casualties for 14 September only had been 66 Officers and 1104 men killed or wounded or a third of all the assaulting columns339. A very serious incident occured on the night of 14/15 September 1857. Had the sepoys possessed any resolute leader with 25 % of Nicholsons's resolution they could have destroyed the whole British force. The British soldiers started looting the shops near the Kashmir Gate. There were many liqour shops in this area and the British soldiers discovered large quantities of liquor in their cellars. By nightfall the greater part of the British troops around Saint James Church were dead drunk340. Had the sepoys counterattacked the British they could have easily destroyed the whole British Force.

On 15 September no progress was made in any direction and Wilson was seriously planning for withdrawal from the city. He was only restrained from doing so by the indomitable Baird Smith. (Unfortunately the post-1947 Indian and Pakistan armies on the average had more 'Wilsons' and few 'Nicholsons'! The British demoralisation can be judged from the fact that a stage came when both the 8th and 75th Foot refused orders to advance341. Wilson finally gave an order to destroy all the liquor and some order was restored on 16th September342. Baird Smith now employed his engineers in a masterly way to carry our demolitions. Once this was done the British were

able to make some headway from 16 Sept. on the 17th a Bank close to the old magazine was captured. On 18th however the British troops refused to obey an order to capture Lahore Gate343. On the 19th however, things started improving. On the night of 19th of September sepoys started abandoning the city across the bridge of boats and via the Muttra Road in larger numbers. On the 20th September at last the Burn Bastion was captured344 The Lahore Gate was also finally captured on 20th September. Also fell on the same day the Jamia Masjid and the Red Fort.

From the statistical record it appears that the British suffered heavy casualties on 14 September i.e. the first day of the assault i.e. some 66 officers and 1,104 men killed or wounded345. After this the slow progress of the British was more due to demoralization drunkenness and over caution. Loss of Nicholson who was no longer present to spur kick and bully the soldiers and officers into assault was the major factor in this slow progress. This phenomenon was well described by the great German Philosopher of War in the following words: 'The natural timidity and want of resolution in the human mind, a kind of inertia in the moral world, but which is produced not by attractive, but by repellent forces, that is to say by dread of danger and responsibility'. Clausewitz went further in explaining how such a situation could be countered. He thus said: 'The will of the commander by the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope must be kindled afresh in others346. This was not a typically British phenomena but one witnessed in many armies in the history of war347! So although the British loss on 14 September was 66 officers and 1,104 men, they lost in casualties between 15 September and 20 September 1857 only 6 officers and 170 men out of whom only 52 were killed348. Thus progess was slow but fighting was not severe! This further reinforces the theory that had the sepoys launched a vigorous counter-attack on 15 or 16 September or even till 18 Sept, once British troops were hesitant in advancing and were disobeying orders to advance, the Britishers may still have lost Delhi. Delhi had not been sacked for the first time. Many armies regardless of race or religion had sacked it. The sepoys and citizens of Delhi were collectively guilty in British eyes because they had murdered about 50 British women and children in cold blood in the Red Fort on 16th May. In addition many Europeans had been killed at random by mobs and individuals on 11 May 1857 when the city was seized by the sepoys. As they say truth is the first casualty in war. The British were thus behaving as the Pakistan Army was behaving in East Pakistan in March-April 1971. The victorious soldiers took the law in their own hands and a large number of sepoys and civilians were killed. No figures exist but estimates vary from 10,000 to 20,000. It must be noted however that the British killed much less than Ahmad Shah Abdali or Nadir Shah's army both of whom were Muslims! Nadir Shah sacked Delhi in 1739 and Ahmad Shah Abdali various times between 1748 and 1761 ! The Sikhs were the happiest lot and historically speaking they cannot be blamed. Many Sikhs were tortured and killed by the Mughals. Notorious among these was the execution of Banda Bahadur's son. This five year old boys' liver was ripped out after being killed and shoved by force into his father Banda's mouth. This happened on 19 June 1716349. The Sikhs were avenging their Gurus and other leaders like Banda and resorted to merciless slaughter and pillage with great religious jest. But in such situations all humans behave in the same way i.e. like animals when the coercive forces

of social organisation which restrain man are removed. The atrocities committed by the Sepoys and the civilian riff raff of the city against British women and children provided the British with a strong moral justification to commit similar atrocities. In such a situation no army of the world would have behaved any differently.

Moin ud Din who wrote an account of the siege and was present in the city during the assault thus wrote 'In the city no man's life was safe, all able bodied men who were seen were taken for rebels and shot'350. All the

population of Delhi was driven out of the city and thousands died of hunger and disease while helpless outside the city. The city was handed over to prize agents and systematically looted. This continued till December 1857. Officially much less people were killed. A special commission was set up which summarily tried 3,306 persons of whom 2,025 were convicted and 392 were executed while 57 were awarded life imprisonment351 Meanwhile the King alongwith some of his family had withdrawn to the tomb of Emperor Humayun south of the city. Subedar Bakht Khan asked the king to accompany him to Lucknow where Bakht Khan was withdrawing with some of his troops. The King was persuaded not to do so by the illustrious traitor Hakeem Ahsan Khan. Thus Bakht Khan left without the king 352. Mubarik Shah writes in his narrative that Bahadur Shah Zafar was urged by many people to place himself at the head of the troops after the British had assaulted the city and die an honourable death. Mubarik Shah states that some 70,000 people gathered outside the Red Fort when they came to know that the king will lead them. This was around 14 or 15 September. But again Hakim Ahsan Khan persuaded the kind not to do so saying 'how can I explain your conduct tomorrow to the British? What excuse can I advance for you after you have joined the mutineers in battle? Mubarik Shah says that on hearing these words the King left the procession and re-entered the Palace on the plea of going to evening prayers. Mubarik Shah says that on seeing this hesitation on part of the king 'the mass of the people and the troops now became confused, then alarmed, and eventually dispersed353.' A mention must be made by the treatment of Bahadur Shah by the British. Bahadur Shah along with his family gave himself up to Major Hodson on 21 September. On the way to the city Hodson without any provocation shot two of the princes dead. This was an unfortunate act though most of the Britishers of that time upheld it except a few men like Brigadier Hope Grant of the Cavalry who remarked. 'This sad act was most uncalled for'354. Another side of the coin however is the fact that two of these princes had some connection with the cold blooded murder of British women and children in Delhi. Hodsons vilest deed which has unfortunately been ignored or simply not known by many was his cold blooded of Risaldar Basharat at Rohtak355. There is no doubt that Delhi was the most decisive battle of the Great Rebellion of 1857. Had the British lost it other parts of India may have joined the rebellion. Afghanistan may have taken advantage and attacked British India like vultures attack the carcass of a dead animal! The Bombay and Madras Armies may also have rebelled! There is nothing inevitable in histroy and it is specific events and their outcome which constitute history. On 14th, 15th and till 18th September the battle for Delhi was still being fought. The British had been effectively checked, their military position was in a state of imbalance, their troops and their commander were demoralised, the sepoys were basically fighting only

1,200 resolute British soldiers, the other 5,000 Indians were a fiction. But the sepoys had not real leader, the King who could have been a real leader by virtue of his special position lacked the resolution or energy to be one due to old age and his defeatist advisors. Bakht Khan appears to have been a leader but he lacked the inherent royal credentials, more than this he lacked an organisation and a cadre of motivated, well trained and energetic young men like Nicholson Taylor and Roberts. Leadership was and remains the weakest and most serious drawback of the Indo-Pak scenario. (Mediocrity in higher ranks both civil and military was and even now essentially remains the hallmarks of both Indian and Pakistani leaders !)

Politically and psychologically speaking till the assault and capture of Delhi the British hold on Indo-Pak sub-continent was regarded as uncertain and doubtful. But capture of Delhi turned the scales 'Loyalty' 'docility' 'sycophancy' which even today are the hallmarks of the character of any Indo-Pak successful soldier politician or bureaucrat, now proved to be the best policy. The siege of Delhi was a costly affair. Percentage wise the British losses were heavier than the siege of Sevatopol in the Crimean war which till 1857

was the bloodiest siege in terms of percentage of losses, (see Appendix) in the history of the British Army.

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