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Mediterranean Historical Review Vol. 24, No.

1, June 2009, 116

The poverty of the Patriarchate of Grado and the Byzantine Venetian Treaty of 1082
John Mark Nicovich*
Department of History and Social Science, William Carey University, Box 157, Hattiesburg, MS 39401, USA The imperial chrysobull granted to the Venetian state in 1082 provided the Venetians with considerable economic advantages throughout the Byzantine Empire, and had a major impact on the political relationship of the two powers down to the Fourth Crusade. Yet the chrysobull also granted considerable monies to the metropolitan of Venice, the Patriarch of Grado. In the decades prior to 1082 Grado had suffered from systemic poverty, and various attempts by the Doge to solve this problem failed. The grant of large sums in gold in the chrysobull was aimed at solving this problem. Even this ultimately failed, and another proviso of the chrysobull, the grant of a merchant quarter in Constantinople to Venice, eventually became a funding tool for Grado and other Venetian ecclesiastical institutions. Keywords: Venice; Byzantium; Grado; chrysobull; patriarch; Gregory VII; Paschal II

Much scholarly work has been done by historians of Venice and Byzantium concerning the chrysobull of 1082, the treaty that established the basic economic and diplomatic relationship of the Byzantine Empire with the Venetian state down to the Fourth Crusade (1204).1 Venice had a history of close ties to Byzantium, rst as a frontier province, and later, as Byzantine power faded in the west, as a trading partner. In 992 Basil II had reduced the taxes owed by Venetians to the imperial government and modied their supervision, yet this limited grant paled in comparison to the extensive concessions of 1082. Alexius I Komnenoss desperate need for naval aid in 1082 allowed the Venetians to renegotiate the terms of their relationship from a position of strength. The resulting document vastly increased the power of Venetian merchants, allowing them access to virtually every port in the Empire, establishing a Venetian quarter within the walls of Constantinople, and relieving Venetian merchants of all kommerkion, or customs duties. It is the last of these, the exemption from kommerkion and all other customs imposts throughout the Empire that has most concerned modern historians. As Silvano Borsari has noted, the chrysobull of 1082 accelerated the process of the disintegration of imperial control of its economy and the Latin inltration of the Empire. The unintended consequence of the treaty was to place Venetian merchants in a better economic position, not only over other Italians, but also over native Greek merchants, who still had to pay the kommerkion.2 Venetian merchants, due to their lower overall costs, could easily undercut Greek trade and shipping, especially between outlying Aegean ports and Constantinople. This chrysobull acted as an exemplar to other Italian maritime states. By the mid-twelfth century the Genoese and the Pisans would seek and gain their own less

*Email: mnicovich@wmcarey.edu
ISSN 0951-8967 print/ISSN 1743-940X online q 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/09518960903000736 http://www.informaworld.com

J.M. Nicovich

extensive concessions from the Komnenoi emperors, further exacerbating the economic drain on Greek merchants. The arrival of the Genoese and Pisans also brought Italian maritime rivalries into the walls of Constantinople, leading to multiple incidents of violence between the respective communities in the 1160s and 1170s. It was just such an attack by the Venetians on the Genoese community, as well as a growing distance between Byzantine and Venetian political interests, that led to the mass arrest of all Venetians throughout the Empire in March 1171.3 Further anti-Latin sentiment among the Byzantine populace was tapped by Andronikos I during his usurpation of the imperial throne in April 1182, leading to the massacre of Genoese, Pisans, and other Latins within Constantinople. The tense atmosphere thus created between Byzantine and Latins deeply inuenced the subsequent conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade (1204). Not all the concessions within the chrysobull were economic, for it also devolved title and monies on the Doge of Venice and various ecclesiastical institutions within the lagoons. The Doge received the title of protosebastos,4 and an attached allowance, while 20 libre of gold was to be distributed each year to the overall Venetian church as the Doge saw t. San Marco, the ducal chapel, received the annual tax, diverted from the imperial treasury, of three hyperpyra levied upon each Amaltan workshop or warehouse within the Empire. The Venetians also received church buildings in Constantinople and Dyrrachium. The chrysobull reconrmed the pre-existing Venetian possession of St Akindynos, but in addition granted the church a bakery with an annual revenue of 20 nomismata.5 In Dyrrachium the church of San Andrea went to the Venetians, together with an imperial pension.6 Of primary concern here is the grant of title and monies to the metropolitan of Venice, the Patriarch of Grado. The Patriarch received the title of hypertimos, or most revered, with an allowance of 20 libre of gold per annum. Scholars have mentioned these terms of the chrysobull in detail, but have failed to elaborate on their signicance and implications.7 These terms are considered an afterthought to the primary economic concessions, a kind of sweetening for the overall negotiation. However, in the context of the poverty of the Patriarch of Grado, these terms take on a particular meaning. In the decades prior to 1082, the patriarchate suffered from endemic poverty, and it is our thesis that this particular clause was negotiated and included in the chrysobull specically to assuage this poverty. The poor patriarch In July 1073 Pope Gregory VII addressed a letter to Michael VII Doukas, Emperor of Byzantium. Michael had recently sent ambassadors to Gregory, seeking aid against the Empires numerous enemies, and offering discussions on the reunion of the churches in return. Gregory was eager to send his own representative to begin high-level discussion, and he proposed our brother Domenico [Marango], Patriarch of Venice and one most faithful to the Roman Church and to your Empire.8 The so-called Patriarch of Venice here was actually the Patriarch of Grado, Domenico Marango, an ideal candidate for such a legation. He was Metropolitan of Venice, a state with a long history of political, cultural, and economic ties to Byzantium, and would be well received by the imperial court. He was also ideologically acceptable to the papacy. Marango (c.1053 c.1073) had been an ardent supporter of the papal reform movement, travelling to numerous reform synods in Germany and Italy, acting as a papal legate to Benevento along with Humbert of SilvaCandida, and was a signatory to the Papal Election Decree of 1059, afxing his subscription second after Pope Nicholas II himself.9 Furthermore, Marango had acted previously as an intermediary with the Orthodox Church. During the Schism of 1054

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Marango had written in support of papal primacy to Peter, Patriarch of Antioch. Marango had received a stern rebuke from Peter and from Michael Keroularios, Patriarch of Constantinople, but this did not dissuade Gregory from sending Marango as an emissary two decades later.10 No further mention of this mission appears in the historical record, for it probably never took place. Marango disappears at this point, dying not long after Gregory VIIs letter, and was subsequently replaced as patriarch by Domenico Cerbano; yet Marangos death does not seem to have been the primary factor preventing a legation to Byzantium. Rather, poverty was the cause. In December 1074, Pope Gregory wrote to Domenico Silvio, Doge of Venice, and to the Venetian people. He began by reminding them that they had been blessed by the honour of a patriarchate . . . the very prerogative of its name and duty is so restricted and rare that not more than four may be found in the whole world. Yet despite such a considerable honour, the Venetian people had proven ungrateful:
Although this is so, amongst you what is so great a glory and the ornament of so exalted a high priesthood have by consequence of a dearth of temporal possessions and the diminution of its power become so contemptible and have fallen so far from the rightful standing of its honour, that so great a dearth of possessions would appear not to beseem the see of a simple bishopric or to be able to provide for its necessities.

As Gregory went on to explain, this poverty was not a new problem, but was seemingly endemic to the ofce:
For we recall that Dominico [Marango] of blessed memory, the predecessor of him who now is [Domenico Cerbano] had wished to abandon the place on the account of extreme destitution. And his successor declares himself to be constrained by a like necessity.11

It would seem that Marango had complained of Grados poverty not long before his death, and that his successor suffered from the same problem. Thus the papal legation Gregory VII proposed to Michael VII probably never took place owing to Grados systemic poverty, and it was probably the failure of the legation that prompted Gregorys letter to Venice. Poverty was an endemic condition for the Venetian church, a by-product of the geography of the lagoons.12 The lagoon dwellers were forced to turn to other means of production suitable to an aquatic environment where dry land was at a premium, including salt-works, sheries, and vineyards. The bishoprics, monasteries and parishes of the lagoons faced similar constraints, and thus lived off similar sources of income, ones often donated to them by pious laymen within the lagoons. One of the more prominent institutions, the Benedictine convent of San Zaccaria, possessed considerable property on the mainland, granted either by local nobles, prominent landowners, or in one notable case, by Emperor Conrad II.13 Yet San Zaccaria was an exception rather than the rule. Typically, a member of the Doges household, a daughter or sister, was the abbess, and numerous daughters of prominent Venetian families took their vows there.14 It comes as no surprise that the mainland nobility would patronize San Zaccaria, if only for political reasons. There is no evidence that other institutions within the lagoons possessed any such properties on the mainland, and they had little property within the lagoons. Grado seems to have possessed even less than its suffragans. Again, geography played a major role, exacerbating the situation. Grado was surprisingly remote from the political and economic centre of the lagoons, and located on a small island situated at the easternmost edge. In fact Grado was far closer to the rival Patriarchate of Aquileia than it was to the Rialto.15 On their small island the patriarch had little room for agriculture, and yet there may not have been enough residents to work what land they did hold.16 Unlike other ecclesiastical institutions in the lagoons, they enjoyed few alternative sources of income.

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Despite their own prominence, they could not expect donations from the mainland nobility. The mainland nobles were partisans of Aquileia, and in their eyes Grado was a suffragan bishop arrogating the patriarchal title. The situation was further exacerbated by the rise of the Reform papacy and its alliance with Grado. Domenico Marango and Domenico Cerbano, both partisans of reform, could expect no backing from the imperial nobility of the mainland, who were largely imperial supporters. More surprising is the lack of donations from within the lagoons. During the rst three quarters of the eleventh century, only two pious donations to the Patriarchate of Grado are recorded. The family of the late Doge Tribuno Memo made a donation in May 1012, and a chaplain of San Marco did the same in February 1058, in both cases of salt works.17 Even taking into account that many documents related to Grado have not survived, the lack of pious donations from those under Grados jurisdiction is striking. While noting the Pontiffs letter to the Venetians, Gregory VIIs most recent biographer H.E.J. Cowdrey cites tensions between the city and the patriarchate as the reason for their lack of support.18 To what tensions Cowdrey refers is not clear, and there is no evidence of any political or ideological disconnect between the patriarchate and the Venetian government, and subsequent events would demonstrate that the Doge and his councillors were quite active in assuaging Grados poverty.19 As far as the Venetian populace was concerned, again there is no evidence of any specic animus against Grado. However, as noted Grado was remote, sitting well apart from the Rialto, Torcello, Chioggia, and most of the other population centres of the lagoon. This may simply have been an issue of distance. Venetian citizens had bishops, parishes, and monasteries immediately within their own communities to which they could donate their property. Pious donations were motivated by the immediate concern for ones soul and those of ones kin, and it is only natural that individuals and families sought out familiar institutions with which they had generational connections to patronize with donations. Grado had no local population from which they could expect such pious donations. As a result of their foundation in such a remote corner of an already poor lagoon, the patriarchs were left to struggle for a livelihood. The Doge knew of Grados plight, and by the time Gregorys letter to Venice had arrived, the Venetian government had already acted to alleviate the poverty of Grado.20 Doge Domenico Silvio convened a meeting of the prelates of the lagoon in the ducal palace in September 1074. Present before Silvio were the bishops of Caorle, Castello, Cittanova, Jesolo, Malamacco, and Torcello, along with the abbots of San Ilario, ` San Giorgio Maggiore, Santa Trinita di Brondolo, and San Felice di Ammiana, four judges of the ducal court, and 27 other leading citizens of the city. Clearly it was an occasion of great importance to the Venetian state and to the church:
We, Domenico Silvio, by the grace of God, Doge of Venice and of Dalmatia, at one with the bishops, abbots, judges, and the greater part of our faithful citizens, among others who pertain to the advancement of our country, gather to deliberate concerning our Patriarch of Grado, who to all of Venice is the head of all our churches.21

The document does not deal with the actual deliberations of this gathering, nor does it mention the poverty of Grado directly; yet it immediately turns to a list of lands, goods, monies, and rights that various constituents agreed to give annually to Grado, beginning with the Doge himself, and proceeding through the bishops and abbots: All of this the mentioned bishops and abbots have given to pay, on the kalends of September, our patriarch for every year.22 The list of property, goods-in-kind, and specie given over is as follows: 1. The Doge: Silvio agreed to give over lands at Villa, near to Cittanova, as well as devolving the annual concession of the Caprensi of Istria, 100 amphorae of wine.

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

He also agreed to a one-time payment totalling 460 libre denariorum23 from several funds under the control of the Doge, including 100 libre denariorum from the treasury of San Marco, 200 libre denariorum from the roga, or the ducal treasury, and another 160 libre denariorum from the roga magistratus, or the revenues of the ducal council.24 The bishop of Castello: 20 libre denariorum. The bishop of Torcello: 20 libre denariorum. The bishop of Malamacco: half a shery at Favirago and ve modii of grain per annum. The bishop of Jesolo: seven modii of grain per annum. The bishop of Cittanova: six measures of land with vines at Mugla. The bishop of Caorle: a salt work. ` The abbot of SS. Trinita e Michelangelo: 12 modii of grain per annum. The abbot of SS. Ilario e Benedetto: 25 libre denariorum. The abbot of San Giorgio Maggiore: 10 libre denariorum. The abbot of San Felice di Ammiana: six modii of grain.25

This document represents the concession of considerable monies, land, and in-kind goods. The one-time donation of monies by the Doge amounted to 110,400 denari, an enormous sum, probably meant to act as a long-term endowment.26 The 75 libre conceded by the bishops and abbots amounted to a yearly provision of 18,000 denari for the patriarchs coffers. The donations of land and the in-kind payments are far more difcult to quantify, but the intended effect is clear. The Doge was attempting to deal with the problem of Grados poverty once and for all by endowing the patriarchate with public funds, donations of land, and annual concessions on the part of the ecclesiastical institutions of the lagoons. It appeared that the entire issue was solved three months before Gregorys stinging reprimand. There is much evidence to suggest that Grado remained poor despite Doge Silvios best efforts. The charter of September 1074 was not the rst time a Doge had tried to deal with the issue. The charter specically mentions that similar measures had been taken by Silvios immediate predecessor, Domenico Contarini (1043 1070), with the approval of the bishops, abbots, judges and certain other good men.27 In reality the charter of September 1074 was not a new concession but the reissuing of an old one. The implication is clear, for either the previous measures were not sufcient to offset Grados expenditures, or the concessions were simply not being paid. The latter is the obvious explanation, but why? In the absence of direct evidence, it is tempting to assume, as Cowdrey does, that there was a political reason behind this failure. Perhaps the Doge, bishops, and abbots disagreed with Patriarch Marangos reformist tendencies, and chose to express their displeasure by withholding funds. However, the evidence does not bear out Cowdreys assumption. There is no record of any disagreements between the Patriarchate of Grado and his immediate suffragans in the eleventh century, regarding reform or any other issue. Thus we are left with only two possibilities, that the suffragans of the lagoons either could not or would not hand over the conceded monies and in-kind items. The bishops and abbots of the lagoons were not overly rich, but they did possess property, far more than the tiny island of Grado. They also did not protest the tithes laid upon them under Doges Contarini or Silvio, so they seemed able to pay. Therefore, Grados suffragans within the lagoons could have supported their metropolitan, but they simply chose not to. They obviously had not done so under Contarini, and would probably not do so under Silvio. This was possibly due to political

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considerations, although not related to reform. The concerns of the bishops and abbots were more immediate. Marango and Cerbano had been active patriarchs outside of the lagoon, and the suffragan prelates were probably afraid that they would become active within the lagoons, asserting greater authority over them. The high clergy of the lagoons wished to keep their patriarch poor, thereby limiting his overall power as a metropolitan. A poor patriarch was less likely to concern himself with their business. Grado and the chrysobull of 1082 It is clear that by the middle of the eleventh century Grados poverty neared destitution, resulting in intercessory reprimands from the Pope and the repeated interventions of the Venetian government. In light of this systemic poverty and the governmental attempts to alleviate it, the economic concessions to the Venetian church within the chrysobull of 1082 appear to be aimed directly at the issue. As noted above, the chrysobull provided several concessions to Venetian ecclesiastical institutions, including monies to be distributed to the overall Venetian church and a specic concession for San Marco.28 However, the concession to Grado is the most signicant, in which the patriarch was to receive the ecclesiastical title of hypertimos, or most revered, and a respective donation of 20 libre of hyperpyra per annum. Was this sum, 20 libre of hyperpyra, enough to meet Grados needs, or was it merely a token sum? It is difcult to ascertain medieval exchange rates in any period, and no evidence contemporary to 1082 exists. However, data from the mid-twelfth century establishes a range of exchange rates for gold coinage in Venice, from 12 solidi veronensium to 20 solidi veronensium, depending on the type of coin.29 If we assume the lower rate of exchange for 1082, 12 solidi veronensium, or 144 denari per hyperpyra, then 20 libre of hyperpyra (1440 hyperpyra) would equal 864 libre veronensium. There is also the problem of the coinage itself. The monies conceded in 1074 were almost certainly of coinage minted in Venice, which was repeatedly devalued in the late eleventh century,30 and in all likelihood the exchange rate was even higher in terms of the local Venetian currency of 1082 than that of the Veronese currency of the mid-twelfth century. Despite the difculty in determining the exact exchange rate, it is obvious that the concession of gold coinage within the chrysobull was worth far more than the monies previously conceded to the patriarchate. In the 1074 charter the patriarch was to receive 535 libre, but only 75 libre were to be given per annum. The remainder was a one-time endowment. The chrysobull clearly conceded hundreds of libre denari every year. Regardless of the exact exchange rate, it is clear that the terms of the chrysobull would drastically increase the yearly income of the Patriarchate of Grado. It would seem as if the Venetian negotiators were using the chrysobull as an opportunity to solve the systemic poverty of the Venetian church. The very size of the gifts illustrates the poor economic condition of the bishops, abbots, and the rest of the Venetian church, as well as the inadequacies of previous attempts to x the problem. The failure of the chrysobull Over the long term, the chrysobull failed to yield the expected results. On 31 October 1109 Pope Paschal II sent a letter to the Venetian people concerning, once again, their patriarch:
Paschal II to the bishops and clerics, the Doge, the nobles and people of Venice: the metropolitan of Grado suffers much poverty in distress, yet should not a patriarch be able to safely and properly persist in himself and also should he not hold his diocese to some degree, which he is owed in order to remain in the manner of his dignity?31

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Once again the papacy addressed the continued poverty of the patriarchate; yet how could this poverty continue in the aftermath of 1082? While we do not have information regarding the expenses of the patriarchate, given the largesse inherent in 20 libre of gold per annum, Grado should have been wealthy, most probably with considerable surpluses of bullion in the coffers. How can the modern historian explain this seeming contradiction? The conceivable answer is that little, if any, of the gold promised in the chrysobull was ever paid out, at least over the long term. There can be little doubt that the Venetian negotiators in 1082 intended the terms of the chrysobull to deal with the ongoing problem of Grados poverty; but like Doge Silvios 1074 agreement with the local bishops and abbots, this agreement relied on good faith. Again, that good faith had failed. Why did the Venetians fail to demand fullment of these terms of the chrysobull? Those particular terms were not the crux of the agreement. Rather, the chrysobull of 1082 was primarily an economic agreement detailing the trading privileges granted by the Empire to Venice. The yearly payments to Grado and the other Venetian churches were merely added bonuses. Given the serious advantages that the chrysobull gave to Venetian merchants, it seems unlikely that the Doge would have complained much about a Byzantine failure to deliver the yearly donations to the Venetian church. Such complaints could have potentially soured the relationship between Byzantium and Venice. After all, a chrysobull was granted at the pleasure of the emperor, and could be abolished by him. It should also be remembered that the chrysobull was granted at a time of crisis for the Empire, when it was in urgent need of Venetian naval aid; yet later in the reign of Alexius I Komnenos (1081 1118) the circumstances changed dramatically. Alexius ultimately defeated a series of Norman attacks, successfully negotiated the chaos brought on by the First Crusade, and regained signicant territories in Anatolia from the Seljuk Turks.32 By 1100 Alexius was in a much stronger position and was no longer as reliant on foreign aid. Alexius could negotiate from a position of political and military strength, making it unlikely that the Venetian state would complain about the abrogation of non-essential portions of the chrysobull. As a result the patriarchs poverty persisted, but in the end the chrysobull would provide an indirect solution. The Doge had no control over the funds promised to the churches of Venice by the 1082 chrysobull, and either the Byzantines lived up to the bargain or they did not. However, the chrysobull did give the Venetian state direct control over one form of capital wealth in Constantinople, namely, the Venetian quarter itself. The chrysobull expressly devolved real estate upon the Venetians as a specic quarter. This quarter was located on the northern side of the city, bordering on the Golden Horn, in the Perama district between the Droungarious (or Viglae) gate and the Hebraica (Jewish) Gate. Within the walls of Constantinople the Venetians would possess a complex of houses, mansions, storefronts, warehouses, a bakery, and outside the walls they would hold three waterfront landing stages or scalae.33 It also provided the Venetians with the church of St Akindynos, along with a nearby bakery yielding a subsidy of 20 nomismata per annum.34 The Venetian quarter supplied the merchants of Venice with space to live, negotiate business deals, store products, worship according to the Latin rite, and conduct their life as temporary or permanent expatriates far from their homes. It also supplied Venice with a means to solve its continual problem of funding Grado and other ecclesiastical institutions. From rather early in their rst tenure in Constantinople (1082 1171) the Venetian government seems to have realized the value of their real estate as a means of funding. The rst record of land in the quarter being donated to an ecclesiastical foundation occurred in

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July 1090, when Doge Vitale Falier made a major concession to San Giorgio Maggiore, one of the chief monastic houses of the lagoons:
Therefore, we, Vitale Falier Dodoni, by the grace of God Doge of Venice and Dalmatia, and imperial protosebastos, one with our judges and other good men of our faith, with our successors and heirs, in knowledge of our sins . . . and of good and spontaneous will for the remedy of our souls we give, we donate, we concede and contract, we offer and transact with you, the venerable Carimann, abbot of San Giorgio [Maggiore] and your successors in perpetuity all of our property of land and of houses, roofed or unroofed, sited in the city of Constantinople, which we acquired from the Emperor Alexius in a chrysobull and praktikon.35

This concession was clearly a pious donation, as evidenced by the phrases in knowledge of our sins and for the good of our souls. This was the donation of property owned by the state, and the donation was made on behalf of the Doge, his judges, and other leading citizens of the city-state. The signatories included the Doge himself, ve of his judges, and 129 leading citizens of the city. This was not a private donation, but a public concession for the good of all Venetian souls. The properties conceded were quite substantial. The cartulary effectively awarded the lions share of land and houses, terrarum et casarum, whether made of stone or wood, aeditiis petrinis et ligneis, to San Giorgio. The charter also awarded the monastery a series of ergasterii, which were workshops or warehouses, critical real estate assets for any expatriate merchant quarter. The intent of this cartulary was clearly to endow San Giorgio with signicant rental properties in Constantinople as a ready source of annual income. Venetian merchants establishing permanent or semi-permanent trading businesses within Constantinople would be forced to do business with San Giorgio, assuming that they wished to reside within the bounds of the Venetian quarter. This was not only a pious donation, for as Silvano Borsari notes, it rendered more articulate the system of utilization of the quarter.36 By devolving much of its property in Constantinople upon an ecclesiastical institution, the Venetian government rid itself of the onerous administrative function of renting out real estate far across the waves. Thus, by working through an ecclesiastical institution the state could ensure the fair utilization of land in the Venetian quarter, without having to supply government administrators. The same document of July 1090 that delivered so much property into the hands of San Giorgio Maggiore also reveals that the latter was not the rst Venetian monastic house to receive land in Constantinople. The charter specically excludes all those lands we have ` given to the monastery of San Nicolo by a charter of conrmation.37 The document ` further reveals that San Giorgios property abutted that of San Nicolo di Lido.38 Obviously these statements were ancillary to the actual purpose of the document, simply stating that ` this charter did not include land previously conceded to San Nicolo.39 The charter ` devolving such lands on San Nicolo does not survive, so we are unable to know exactly what properties and goods were ceded to them, nor do we know the exact date of that transaction, although we must assume that the concession took place between the time of the chrysobull of 1082 and July 1090, the date of the San Giorgio charter. It follows that the Venetian state had a policy of devolving Constantinopolitan property on its ecclesiastical institutions well before Paschal II decried Grados poverty. However, as in December 1074 when Gregory VII had written to Venice, the Venetians had already acted to correct the problem. Doge Ordelafo Falier convened a meeting of leading Venetians and clergy in September 1107 once again to discuss the problem of Grado. The charter produced by the meeting was a kind of compromise for nding internal sources of funding as opposed to external sources. The beginning of

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the charter reafrmed several previous concessions explicitly mentioned in the 1074 document:
Because we, Ordelafo Falier, by the grace of God Doge of Venice and imperial protosebastos, with our successors ought to give and to render to our Patriarchate of Grado every year 160 pounds of denari out of our palace, as contained in the promissory charter which was made by Domenico Silvio, the deceased Doge, with the Bishops and Abbots and people of Venice, and another 100 pounds of denari which were of the treasury of San Marco, which were disbursed for Giovanni Saponario, the late Patriarch.40

The charter makes clear reference to the agreement of 1074, when Doge Silvio promised 100 libre denariorum from the palace treasury, 200 libre denariorum from the treasury of San Marco, and 160 libre denariorum from the roga magistratus,41 the same source for the 160 libre mentioned in the document of 1107. Although the Doge was now to pay a lower amount, signicantly it was to be a yearly sum, not a one-time grant as in 1074. At this point the charter diverges from that of 1074. The meeting of September 1074 had resulted in the bishops and abbots of the lagoon agreeing to make certain concessions, in specie and in kind, to Grado. Although present, this time the bishops and abbots were conspicuously silent. In fact, of the six bishoprics promising tithes to Grado in September 1074, ve were signatories in September 1107: Castello, Torcello, Malamacco, Cittanova, and Caorle. Only the bishop of Jesolo does not appear. Of the four monasteries represented ` in 1074, the abbots of three were signatories in 1107, including SS. Trinita e Michelangelo Arcangelo, SS. Ilario e Benedetto, and San Giorgio Maggiore. The abbot of San Felice di Ammiana was missing, but the abbot of San Giorgio di Pineto appears as a signatory. The concessions their predecessors had promised in 1074, themselves a re-statement of a previous agreement, were not repeated at this venue. There is no mention of any concessions at all. Rather, it seems that the ducal court and the patriarchate had given up on concessions from the suffragan churches of the lagoon. This time the Doge was taking care of the problem himself, rather than relying on the goodwill of the Venetian church for their patriarch; so the Doge relied on funds from sources he directly controlled, such as the ducal treasury and the treasury of San Marco, the ducal chapel. This was not new, yet in 1107 the Doge also controlled another source of revenue, Venetian property in Constantinople. Just as the state had provided land to support San ` Nicolo di Lido and San Giorgio Maggiore, it could do the same for Grado, and a substantial complex of buildings in the quarter remained to be given out:
For all that we, the aforementioned Ordelafo, by the grace of God Doge of Venice and imperial protosebastos, together with our bishops and judges and the people of Venice, with our successors and heirs, from this day give and concede to you, lord Giovanni Gradenigo, venerable Patriarch of Grado and to your successors in perpetuum, that church of St. Akindynos, sited in the regal city of Constantinople, with all its territory and beneces, which is of old by right of our palace according to conrmation by an imperial chrysobull.42

St Akindynos was an important structure within the Venetian quarter, for it represented a strong connection to the religious allegiance of the Venetians. Despite all their cultural connections to Byzantium, which included a predilection for Byzantine ecclesiastical architecture and art, the Venetians remained ardently tied to the western church, both in liturgical rite and in hierarchical matters. Therefore they required a church in Constantinople to conduct the cure of souls according to the Latin rite. This also made it an obvious choice to devolve upon Grado, the metropolitan of the Venetian church.43 The conrmation of St Akindynos included more than just the church building. As noted above, the chrysobull of 1082 also included a bakery with a yearly revenue of 20 nomismata as a benece for the church, and these are clearly conceded in the above

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passage: with all its territory and beneces. However, such a donation could do little actually to improve Grados nancial situation. The next clause of the charter was clearly intended to provide a considerable income for Grado:
Then, as such, the aforementioned and designated church with all its treasury and its vestments and its books, with all its possessions and pertinences, inside and outside . . . with all its warehouses and its bakery and with all its balances and weights together with all the measures for oil, as well as for wine, and all our taverns which in that previously noted city are considered under our authority.44

As one would expect from such a concession, the chattel of the church would remain with the church, from its monies to its vestments and books. Then the charter takes a different turn, granting the Patriarch of Grado control over decidedly non-ecclesiastical properties, including three major items of note. The bakery conceded in the chrysobull of 1082 was turned over to the patriarchate, thus insuring that those proceeds would go into the coffers of Grado. The next two concessions are of even greater import. Grado would also receive all the taverns within the quarter, probably intended as rental properties. The yearly proceeds from these two sets of properties alone must have been signicant. However, the most signicant concession was the authority over the weights and measures used in the Venetian quarter. St Akindynos appears to have possessed weights and measures even before the chrysobull of 1082, and this was apparently a continuation of Byzantine legal custom.45 Having possession of their own weights and measures was important to the Venetian merchant community. The Venetian presence in Constantinople was predicated on trade. The presence of Venetian clergy in the Byzantine capital was required to provide the cure of souls for Venetian merchants doing business there, and critical to that business was the fair and proper usage of weights and measures. In any culture without modern universal standards of measurement agreed upon, localized standards were absolutely necessary for the fair and free exercise of business, and placing this operation in the hands of clergy may have given the process a greater degree of legitimacy.46 Also, by placing the quarters weights and measures under the authority of Grado, the Venetian state disposed of the administering of the weights and measures. Grado, by holding St Akindynos as a suffragan church, would take over the administration of the weights and measures, provide personnel to oversee their usage, and ultimately reap the economic benets. The impetus behind the concession of the weights and measures to Grado was clearly economic. Each use of the weights and measures by merchants entailed the payment of a fee, either a set fee or a percentage of the goods being weighed, thus resulting in a sizeable revenue for the patriarchate. The exact amount charged for use of the weights and measures at Constantinople is unclear,47 but the overall income is obvious from a document of 1172, which reveals the lease of Grados revenues from its Constantinopolitan properties to Romano Mairono, a noted Venetian merchant, for 500 pounds of denarii veronensium per year. Hendy argues that the majority of this revenue was produced by the weights and measures.48 There was also the danger that Venetian merchants would attempt to use another set of weights and measures, either to gain a more favourable outcome in the measuring process or to lower fees. The donation of 1107 also addressed this issue:
And therefore no other balance or weight or measure, in Constantinople or in the quarter ought to be in the possession of anyone else, except the balances and weights and measures of the aforementioned church [of Grado].49

Furthermore the donation described the penalties for those who might attempt to circumvent the legitimately constituted system of weights and measures, a ne of 10 libre

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11

of gold, which was a substantial sum for a serious infraction.50 The proper respect for the weights and measures was absolutely necessary to protect honest Venetian merchants from fraud, but also to protect the patriarchate from a loss of revenue. It is notable that the ne against such circumvention was collected directly by Grado, not by the state, since it was Grados property rights that were being infringed in the rst place. The charter of 1107 was once again an attempt to assuage the continuous poverty of Grado. How then do we explain Paschall IIs letter of July 1109? The previous recorded attempts to solve the problem, Domenico Silvios charter of September 1074, and the clauses of the chrysobull of 1082 had failed because they relied on external parties not directly controlled by the Doge. The churchmen of the lagoon and Alexius I Komnenos had failed to meet their obligations. However, in September 1107 the momentum was rmly in the hands of Doge Ordelafo Falier. He controlled the promised funds, properties, and rights in Constantinople. Was Paschal addressing a failure of the Doge to make good his own promises? This is highly unlikely. The chrysobull of 1082, and to a lesser degree the charter of September 1074, were intended to be comprehensive solutions to Grados poverty. The chrysobull seems to have been a kind of economic overkill, enriching the patriarchate with yearly donations that would more than solve Grados problems. Ordelafo Faliers donation was tame in comparison. The yearly donations of denari were signicant, but were not a full solution. As for the properties and rights in Constantinople, they were a tangible, renewable source of income, but it was not an instant x. After September 1107 Patriarch Gradenigo would have assigned priests, deacons and lay representatives to St Akindynos, and they would sail to Constantinople. It would take time for the clergy or other representatives to establish themselves both as clergy and as administrators. They would busy themselves with recording the contents of St Akindynoss treasury, the stores, and properties, and to assess their value for rental purposes, as well as to establishing procedures for the operation of the weights and measures. Simply, it would have taken some time to get the personnel in place in Constantinople and for them properly to acclimatize themselves to their environment and new functions. By July 1109 only 22 months had elapsed since the original donation. There would have been little time to make the patriarchates properties in Constantinople protable. Moreover, it is likely that the patriarchate had lost money in the short term in setting up their operation overseas. Paschals complaints of July 1109 may thus have been made too soon after the initial donation. It is also possible that the papal chancery may well have had a backlog of work and had not yet issued Paschals letter for some time. In any case the Venetians were working to solve the problem on their own without papal exhortation. Conclusion: the rise of the patriarchate Notably, after 1109 there were no further papal letters to Venice decrying Grados poverty. This very silence is ample evidence that the problem had been solved, at least in part, by the donation of properties in Constantinople. Yet there is also later evidence of the longterm efcacy of this solution, namely the growing power of the patriarchate within the lagoons. Under the enterprising, zealous, and remarkably long-lived Patriarch Enrico Dandolo (c.1134 c.1184), the patriarchate gained considerable new authority. An ardent supporter of reform ideology as well as his own jurisdictional authority, Dandolo was responsible for bringing Cistercians to the lagoons, establishing several houses of canons regular, and asserting Grados status as Primate of Dalmatia, a further extension of metropolitan authority. As Madden and Rando have both noted, none of this was achieved

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without signicant conict, both with the ducal court and with the bishop of Castello, the diocesan head of the Rialto. In 1148 the Patriarch and his entire extended family were exiled from Venice and the family home razed to the ground by ducal order. Yet Dandolo ultimately triumphed, and in 1156 constructed a new patriarchal palace, not at Grado, but at San Silvestro in the very heart of Venice itself, a tangible sign of the patriarchates ascendancy.51 Dandolo, a forceful character, was clearly the driving force behind these achievements, but it is difcult to imagine the political success of the Patriarchate without the long-term solvency granted to the institution by its overseas properties. It may well be that those rental properties in Constantinople, outside the lagoons and far from ducal intervention, were what allowed Dandolo to survive his exile, while funding his other struggles with the Doge and the bishop. Such funding for the Patriarch went well beyond simple necessity. It was what allowed the Patriarch actively to assert authority over his metropolitan see.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professors Thomas F. Madden and Warren Treadgold for their comments on previous versions of this article, as well as the anonymous reader, whose comments and suggestions were extremely helpful.

Notes
1. A chrysobull, or golden bull, refers to a variety of legal documents bearing the golden bullae, or seal, of the Byzantine Emperor. In many cases they were meant to conrm treaties with foreign powers, as in the case of Venice in 1082. Nicolas Oikonomides, Chrysobull, in Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. 1, 4512. A considerable body of literature concerning the chrysobull of 1082 and its concessions to the Venetian church exists: H.F. Brown, The Venetians and the Venetian Quarter in Constantinople to the Close of the Twelfth Century, Journal of Hellenic Studies 40 (1920): 70 1; Roberto Cessi, Politica, Economica, Religione, in Storia di Venezia, 318 21; Silvano Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio nel XII secolo: I rapporti Economici, 1 16; Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations, 59 63; David Jacoby, Italian Privileges and Trade in Byzantium Before the Fourth Crusade: A Reconsideration, Annuario de studios medievales 24 (1994): 349 69. The dating of the initial chrysobull has been the subject of considerable debate. Thomas F. Madden has recently summarized the various arguments, and through a fresh examination of all available chronicles, cartularies as well as palaeographic and diplomatic evidence he supports the traditional date of May 1082. Thomas F. Madden, The chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the Venetians: The Date and the Debate, Journal of Medieval History 28 (2002): 23 41. David Jacoby has responded to Maddens work, attacking Maddens use of palaeographic evidence, but agreeing with his overall conclusions; essentially Madden is correct for the wrong reasons: David Jacoby, Rejoinder: The chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the Venetians: The Date and the Debate, Journal of Medieval History 28 (2002): 199 204. Peter Frankopan has continued the discussion with a revisionist assault on the date of 1082, asserting that there is much evidence for a date of 1092 instead. However, much of Frankopans evidence is circumstantial at best, and he is forced to explain away a large amount of evidence for the traditional dating of 1082. Peter Frankopan, Byzantine Trade Privileges to Venice in the Eleventh Century: The chrysobull of 1092, Journal of Medieval History 30 (2004): 135 60. Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio, 13. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, 61. Thomas F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice, 8 9. Madden, Enrico Dandolo, 52 3. The honoric title of protosebastos, roughly meaning the preeminent one, appeared in the late eleventh century as a part of Alexios Is general reform of the system of imperial titles, and was usually given to members of the imperial family. See Alexander Kazdhan, Sebastos, in Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. 3, 1862 3.

2. 3. 4.

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

13

11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

24. 25.

Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio, 31. Marco Pozza and Giorgio Ravegnani, eds., I Trattati con Bisanzi 992 1198, 36 45. Cessi, Politica, Economica, Religione, 320; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio, 6 8; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, 60 1. Gregory VII, S. Gregorii VII Romani, coll. 0300D 0301B. Guido Bianchi, Il Patriarca di Grado, Studi Veneziani 8 (1966): 19 125. Transcriptions of the exchange between Marango, Peter of Antioch, and Michael Cerularius may be found in Luigi Lanfranchi, ed., Codice Diplomatico Veneziano 1050 1079 (transcription, Venice: Archivio di Stato, 1940 84), 29 35 [hereafter: CDV ]. See also Bianchi, Il Patriarca di Grado, 62 81. H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 129 30. Daniella Rando, Una Chiesa di Frontiera, 1378; Madden, Enrico Dandolo, 23 4. Between 1006 and 1078 there are 10 surviving pious donations to San Zaccaria, and in all 10 cases the donors were residents of the terrarma, and in several cases were members of the Lombard nobility. The contessa of Treviso donated land in memory of her late husband in July 1006, and the count of Vicenza gave land around Padua to the convent in March 1016. The comitial house of Verona made three separate donations in the 1050s. CDV, 1000 1049, 15, 46 7; CDV, 1050 1079, 36 7, 38 9, 40 1. San Zaccaria also received several donations from families around the village of Monselice, dated March 1009, 31 January 1050, and 12 August 1078. CDV, 1000 1049, 2 3; CDV, 1050 1079, 171. The monastery even received an imperial concession of lands near Verona from Conrad I in May 1027. CDV, 1000 1049, 104 5. Irmgard Fees, Le Monache de San Zaccaria, 7 8. In 568 the Patriarch of Aquileia, eeing the Lombard invasion, settled upon the small island of Grado, a Novus Aquilensis. In subsequent decades the Lombards reestablished a mainland Patriarchate at Old Aquileia, creating duelling claims to metropolitan authority over much of the region, even though the two Patriarchs were only a few scant miles apart. This jurisdictional conict, continued later by the Frankish conquerors of the region, was ongoing throughout the eleventh century. Today Grado is a well-populated beach resort connected to mainland by a causeway, and includes a substantial landmass. Much of this development involved the draining of marshland in the nineteenth century, and throughout the Middle Ages Grado remained a small island with little noticeable population. CDV, 1000 1049, 27; CDV, 1050 1079, 49. H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, 295. A by-product of the poverty of the Venetian church was a lack of corruption. Simony and clerical marriage had not taken hold in the lagoons simply because there was little ecclesiastical property that important lay families wished to control. Rando, Una Chiesa, 137. Gregory was likely unaware that the Venetians had already attempted to solve the problem. Dum Dei et Christi nomine quadam die resideremus in palacio nostro nos quidem Dominicus Silvus per misericordiam Dei Venecie et Dalmacie dux una cum episcopis, abbatibus, iudicibus et maxima parte nostrorum delium, inter cetera que ad provectum nostre patrie pertinebant, pertractare cepimus de nostro Gradensi patriarchatu, qui nostrarum omnium ecclesiarum et totius Venecie caput. Luigi Lanfranchi ed., San Giorgio Maggiore. vol. II (Venice: Comitato per la Pubblicazione delle Fonti Relative alla Storia di Venezia, 1968), no. 31: 93 [hereafter: SGM]. Hec omnia predicti episcopatus et abbatie in kalendis septembris persolvere debent nostro patriarchatui per singulos annos. SGM, no. 31: 94. The reference in the concession to centum libras nostrorum denariorum likely notes that the coinage conceded was issued by the local Venetian mint in operation from 1056 to 1125, and not from the imperial mint at Verona, the most prominent in Northern Italy. Louise Robbert, Il Sistema Monetario in Storia di Venezia, 410. F.C. Hodgson, The Early History of Venice, 208. In primis itaque totam terram nostri ducatus que dicitur Villa, posita in Civitate Nova et centum amphoras vini, quas Caprenses de comitatu Istrie ex antique consuetudine omni anno persolvere debent nostro palacio et centum libras nostrorum denariorum, que fuerunt de camera Sancti Marci et alias ducentas libras denariorum, que fuerunt de roga. Et iste trecente libre ad lucrum esse debent, capetanea semper salva. Et insuper alias libras denariorum centum sexaginta de roga magistratus . De Olivensi etiam episcopatu libras

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denariorum viginti. De Torcellensi episcopatu libras denarorum viginti. De Metamaucensi episcopatu dimidiam piscariam que est posita in loco qui dicitur Faviraga et insuper modios frumenti quinque. De episcopatu Equiliensi modios de frumento septem. De episcopatu Civitatis Nove sex dies de terra araturia ubi sunt vine, in loco qui dicitur Mugla. De episcopatu Caprulensi fundamentum salinarum, secundum rmamentum cartule quam ipse Bonus episcopus fecit nostro patriarchatui. De monasterio Sancte Trinitatis de Brutulo modios frumenti duodecim. De monasterio Sancti Illarii libras denariorum viginti quinque. De monasterio Sancti Georgii libras denariorum decem. De monasterio Sancti Felicis de Amianas modios frumenti sex. SGM, vol. II, no. 31: 93 4. The standard ratio for silver coinage, established in the Carolingian period, was 1 libra 12 solidi 240 denari. Robbert, Il Sistema Monetario, 410. Hoc videlicet quod processor noster bone memorie Dominicus Contarenus dux laudatione episcoporum, abbatium, iudicium, ceterorumque complurium bonorum hominum statuit. SGM, no. 31: 93. See above, 2. The wide range of the exchange rate is due to differences in the gold coinage being exchanged, and the documents are not clear as to their origins, either Byzantine, Muslim, or otherwise. Robbert, The Venetian Money Market, 65. These local coins, produced between 1056 and 1125, imitated imperial coins produced out of Verona, but were devalued by half over the period. Robbert, Il Sistema Monetario, 410. Paschalis II episcopis et clericis, duci, nobililibus et populo Venetiae: dolet, metropolim Gradensis tanta inopia laborare, ut patriarcha nec in ea tute ac decenter permanere valeat nec aliquam parochiam habeat, in qua secundum dignitatis suae modum debeat commoravi. G.F. Tafel and G.M. Thomas, eds., Urkunden zur alteren Handels-und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, vol. I, 61 2 [hereafter: TTh]. For the considerable successes of the later reign of Alexios I see Warren Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society, 619 29. David Jacoby, The Venetian Quarter of Constantinople from 1082 to 1261, 1545. Pozza and Ravegnani, Trattati con Bisanzio, 30; Raymond Janin, Constantinople Byzantine, map no. 1. Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio, 31. Igitur nos quidem Vitalis Faletrus Dodoni Dei gratia Venetie et Dalmatie dux et imperialis protonsevastos, una cum nostris iudicibus et aliis bonis hominibus nostris delibus cum nostris successoribus et heredibus, nullo penitus cogente aut suadente nec vim inferente, sed iustae voluntatis constitutione et oratione abbatis ac monachorum ius comoti, optima et spontanea nostra voluntate, pro remedio animarum nostrarum, tempore domni Karimanni venerabilis abbatis monasterii Beati Georgii, damus, donamus, concedimus et contradictimus, offerimus ac transactamus eidem monasterio Beatis Georgii et prenominato eius abbati domno Karimanno suisque successoribus in perpetuum tantum de nostris proprietatis terrarum et casarum, cohopertis vel discoopertis, sitis infra urbem Costantinopolitanam, quas nos de imperatore Alexio invenimus per grossovoli et pratico cartulas. Marco Pozza, ed. Gli Atti Originali della Cancellari Veneziana I (1090 1198) (Venice: Il Cardo, 1994), no. 1: 31 2; SGM, no. 69: 168 75; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio, 36 8. Borsari, LOrganizzazione dei Possesi Veneziani, 195. Extra illud totum quod nos datum habemus ad monasterium Sancti Nicolai per cartulas rmitatis. Pozza, Cancellaria Veneziana, no. 1: 32. Ex alio latere rmante in proprietas quae nunc est Sancti Nicolai. Ibid., no. 1: 32. Borsari, LOrganizzazione dei Possessi, 195; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio, 36 9. Quia nos quidem Ordelafus Faletro, gratia Dei Venetie Dux, et Imperialis Protosevastos, cum nostris successoribus dare et persolvere debuimus nostro Gradensi Patriarchatui omni anno de roga magistratus nostri palatii libras denariorum centum sexaginta, sicut continetus in promissionis carta, quam fecit Domenicus Silvius, quondam Dux, cum Episcopis et Abbatibus et populo Venetiae, et alias centum libras denariorum, que fuerunt de camera Sancti Marci, que fuerunt expense pro Iohanne Saponario, defuncto Patriarcha. Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Mensa Patriarcale, busta 9, copia 1. TTh, vol. I, no. 32: 67. SGM, vol. II, no. 31: 93. Idcirco nos praenominatus Ordelafus, gratia Dei Venetiae Dux et Imperialis Protosevastos, cum nostris Episcopis et iudicibus et populo Venetiae cum nostris successoribus et heredibus, ab hodie in antea damus et concedimus vobis quidem, domno Iohanni Gradonico, venerabili

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42.

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43. 44.

45. 46.

47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

Gradensi Patriarchae, et vestris successoribus in perpetuum, videlicet Ecclesiam beati Archidani cum omni suo territorie et benetio, positam in regali urbe Constantinopoli, quae est antiquitus de iure et possessione nostri palatii secundum imperialis crisovoli conrmationem. TTh, vol. I, no. 32: 67 8. There is no surviving information about what clergy would have served St Akindynos prior to its donation to Grado in 1107. Likely clergy from various parish churches in the lagoons or chaplains of San Marco would have been contracted to serve a set term in Constantinople. Hanc namque preaenominatam et designatam ecclesiam cum toto suo thesauro et paliis et libris et cum omnibus suis habentiis et pertinentibus ab intus et foris, quas nunc habet et in antea aliquot modo habitura est, cum suis argasteriis universis et cum suo mankipio et furno et cum omnibus stateris et rubis et ponderibus et cum cunctis metris tam ad oleum, quam ad vinum, et cum omnibus nostris tabernis, quae in praedicta urbe sub nostra potestate esse videntur. TTh, vol. I, no. 32: 68. M.F. Hendy, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c. 3501450, 334 6. This remains only a suggestion. The Venetian clergy were drawn from the same population as the sea-going merchants, and often such clerics were involved in merchant activity on behalf of their families as well. They could have the same potential for fraud as any other lay person, but their religious function added at least a pretence of fairness. In 1149 San Giorgio di Rodosto, a Venetian church dependant on San Giorgio di Maggiore, charged Venetians two stamines, or billon trachea, to Venetians and four stamines to Byzantines. An extra charge was levied for items above a set weight. See Hendy, Byzantine Monetary Economy, 335. Ibid., 334. Itaque nulla alia statera, vel rubus, vel pondus et metrum in Constantinopoli, vel in imbolo sub manu alicuius esse debeant, nisi statera et ruba et pondera et metra praedictae Ecclesiae. TTh, vol. I, no. 32: 68. Ibid. Madden, Enrico Dandolo, 24 37; Rando, Una Chiesa di Frontiera, 173 90.

Notes on contributor
John Mark Nicovich is an assistant professor of History at William Carey University, located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. He earned his PhD at Saint Louis University under the direction of Thomas F. Madden and Warren Treadgold. His current research involves Venice and the crusading movement in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries.

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