You are on page 1of 547

amercia at war

brother agianst brother

PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. See http://code.pediapress.com/ for more information. PDF generated at: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 20:16:35 UTC

Contents
Articles
begining 1861
American Civil War Origins of the American Civil War Battle of Fort Sumter Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) Battle of Arlington Mills Battle of Vienna, Virginia Battle of Hoke's Run Battle of Blackburn's Ford First Battle of Bull Run Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Battle of Roanoke Island Battle of Elizabeth City Battle of New Bern Siege of Fort Macon Battle of South Mills Battle of Tranter's Creek Battle of Dranesville Battle of Ball's Bluff 1 1 35 72 82 88 92 96 97 100 110 136 143 148 154 158 158 159 162 166 166 181 195 198 203 206 209 212 219 234 236 239

1862 second year


Peninsula Campaign Battle of Hampton Roads Battle of Drewry's Bluff Siege of Yorktown (1862) Battle of Williamsburg Battle of Eltham's Landing Battle of Hanover Court House Battle of Seven Pines Seven Days Battles Battle of Oak Grove Battle of Beaver Dam Creek Battle of Gaines's Mill

Battle of Garnett's & Golding's Farm Battle of Savage's Station Battle of White Oak Swamp Battle of Glendale Battle of Malvern Hill Northern Virginia Campaign Battle of Cedar Mountain First Battle of Rappahannock Station Manassas Station Operations (Stonewall Jackson) Battle of Thoroughfare Gap Second Battle of Bull Run Battle of Chantilly Maryland Campaign Battle of Mile Hill Battle of Harpers Ferry Battle of South Mountain Battle of Antietam Battle of Shepherdstown Battle of Unison Battle of Fredericksburg Mud March (American Civil War)

246 247 250 253 258 261 269 274 275 277 279 295 298 310 312 318 321 343 344 346 364 366 366 367 367 404 414 433 450 458 467 469 503 503 504

1863 bloody year


Battle of Franklin's Crossing

persons
Abraham Lincoln Joshua Chamberlain Stonewall Jackson Jefferson Davis Adelbert Ames Ambrose Burnside Ellis Spear Ulysses S. Grant

foreigen power
France in the American Civil War Britain in the American Civil War

Blockade runners of the American Civil War

512

References
Article Sources and Contributors Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 525 535

Article Licenses
License 543

begining 1861
American Civil War
The American Civil War (18611865), often referred to as The Civil War in the United States, was a civil war fought over the secession of the Confederate States. 11 southern slave states declared their secession from the United States and formed the Confederate States of America ("the Confederacy"); the other 25 states supported the federal government ("the Union"). After four years of warfare, mostly within the Southern states, the Confederacy surrendered and slavery was outlawed everywhere in the nation. Issues that led to war were partially resolved in the Reconstruction Era that followed, though others remained unresolved. In the presidential election of 1860, the Republican Party, led by Abraham Lincoln, had campaigned against expanding slavery beyond the states in which it already existed. The Republicans strongly advocated nationalism, and in their 1860 platform they denounced threats of disunion as avowals of treason. After a Republican victory, but before the new administration took office on March 4, 1861, seven cotton states declared their secession and joined to form the Confederate States of America. Both the outgoing administration of President James Buchanan and the incoming administration rejected the legality of secession, considering it rebellion. The other eight slave states rejected calls for secession at this point. No foreign governments recognized the Confederacy. Hostilities began on April 12, 1861, when Confederate forces attacked a U.S. military installation at Fort Sumter in South Carolina. Lincoln responded by calling for a volunteer army from each state to recapture federal property, which led to declarations of secession by four more slave states. Both sides raised armies as the Union seized control of the border states early in the war and established a naval blockade. Land warfare in the East was inconclusive in 186162, as the Confederacy beat back Union efforts to capture its capital, Richmond, Virginia, notably during the Peninsular Campaign. In September 1862, the Confederate campaign in Maryland ended in defeat at the Battle of Antietam, which dissuaded the British from intervening.[1] Days after that battle, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which made ending slavery a war goal.[2] In 1863, Confederate general Robert E. Lee's northward advance ended in defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg. To the west, the Union gained control of the Mississippi River after the Battle of Shiloh and Siege of Vicksburg, splitting the Confederacy in two and destroying much of their western army. Due to his western successes, Ulysses S. Grant was given command of all Union armies in 1864, and organized the armies of William Tecumseh Sherman, Philip Sheridan and others to attack the Confederacy from all directions, increasing the North's advantage in manpower. Grant restructured the union army, and put other generals in command of divisions of the army that were to support his push into Virginia. He fought several battles of attrition against Lee through the Overland Campaign to seize Richmond, though in the face of fierce resistance he altered his plans and led the Siege of Petersburg which nearly finished off the rest of Lee's army. Meanwhile, Sherman captured Atlanta and marched to the sea, destroying Confederate infrastructure along the way. When the Confederate attempt to defend Petersburg failed, the Confederate army retreated but was pursued and defeated, which resulted in Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. The American Civil War was one of the earliest true industrial wars. Railroads, the telegraph, steamships, and mass-produced weapons were employed extensively. The practices of total war, developed by Sherman in Georgia, and of trench warfare around Petersburg foreshadowed World War I in Europe. It remains the deadliest war in American history, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 750,000 soldiers[3] and an undetermined number of civilian casualties. Historian John Huddleston estimates the death toll at ten percent of all Northern males 2045 years old, and 30 percent of all Southern white males aged 1840.[4] Victory for the North meant the end of the Confederacy

American Civil War and of slavery in the United States, and strengthened the role of the federal government. The social, political, economic and racial issues of the war decisively shaped the reconstruction era that lasted to 1877.

Causes of secession
The causes of the Civil War were complex, and have been controversial since the war began. The issue has been further complicated by historical revisionists, who have tried to improve the image of the South by lessening the role of slavery.[5] Slavery was the central source of escalating political tension in the 1850s. The Republican Party was determined to prevent any spread of slavery, and many Southern leaders had threatened secession if the Republican candidate, Lincoln, won the 1860 election. Following Lincoln's victory, many Southern whites felt that disunion had become their only option. While not all Southerners saw themselves as fighting to preserve slavery, most of the officers and over a third of the rank and file in Lee's army had close family ties to slavery. To Northerners, in contrast, the motivation was primarily to preserve the Union, not to abolish slavery.[6] Abraham Lincoln consistently made preserving the Union the central goal of the war, though he increasingly saw slavery as a crucial issue and made ending it an additional goal.[7] Lincoln's decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation angered both Peace Democrats ("Copperheads") and War Democrats, but energized most Republicans.[8] By warning that free blacks would flood the North, Democrats made gains in the 1862 elections, but they did not gain control of Congress. The Republicans' counterargument that slavery was the mainstay of the enemy steadily gained support, with the Democrats crushed at the 1863 elections in Ohio when they tried to resurrect anti-black sentiment.[9]

Slavery
The slavery issue addressed not only the well-being of the slaves (although abolitionists raised the issue) but also the question of whether slavery was an anachronistic evil that was incompatible with American values or a profitable economic system protected by the Constitution. The strategy of the anti-slavery forces was to stop the expansion and thus put slavery on a path to gradual extinction. To the white South this strategy trampled their Constitutional rights.[10][11] Slavery was banned in the Northwest Territory with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. By 1804 all the Northern states (states north of the Mason-Dixon line) had passed laws to abolish slavery gradually. Congress in 1807 banned the international slave trade. Slavery faded in the border states and urban areas but expanded in highly profitable cotton states of the Deep South. Despite compromises in 1820 and 1850, the slavery issues exploded in the 1850s. The new Republican Party angered slavery interests by demanding the end to its expansion. Republicans believed that without expansion slavery would eventually die out. Abraham Lincoln argued this in his 1858 House Divided Speech.[12] Much of the political battle in the 1850s focused on the expansion of slavery,[13][14] since most assumed that if slavery could not expand, it would wither and die.[15] As early as 1845, Lincoln argued that slavery could die a natural death if contained.[16] With tobacco and cotton wearing out the soil, the South believed it needed to expand slavery,[17] and many wanted to reopen the international slave trade.[18] Southern and northern resentments brought the crisis to a head in the late 1850s. Disagreements with Abolitionists caused the Whig and "Know-Nothing" parties to collapse, and new ones to arise. In 1860, the last national political party, the Democratic Party, split along sectional lines. Northerners ranging from the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison to the moderate Republican leader Lincoln[19] stressed that all men are created equal. Almost all the inter-regional crises involved slavery, starting with the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The invention of the cotton gin increased by fiftyfold the quantity of cotton that could be processed and greatly increased the demand for slave labor in the South.[20] There was controversy over adding the slave state of Missouri to the Union that led to the Missouri Compromise of 1820. A gag rule prevented discussion in Congress of petitions for ending slavery from 18351844, while Manifest Destiny became an argument for gaining new territories, where

American Civil War slavery could expand. The acquisition of Texas as a slave state in 1845 along with territories won as a result of the MexicanAmerican War resulted in the Compromise of 1850.[21] The Wilmot Proviso was an attempt by Northern politicians to exclude slavery from the territories conquered from Mexico. The popular anti-slavery novel Uncle Toms Cabin (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe greatly increased Northern resentment of slavery.[22][23] The 1854 Ostend Manifesto was an unsuccessful Southern attempt to annex Cuba as a slave state. The Second Party System broke down after passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, which replaced the Missouri Compromise ban on slavery with popular sovereignty, allowing the people of a territory to vote for or against slavery. The Bleeding Kansas controversy over the status of slavery in the Kansas Territory led pro-South Presidents Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan to attempt to admit Kansas as a slave state. Buchanan supported the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution.[24] Violence over the status of slavery in Kansas erupted with the Wakarusa War,[25] the Sacking of Lawrence,[26] and the caning of Republican Charles Sumner by the Southerner Preston Brooks,[27][28] the Pottawatomie Massacre,[29]. The 1857 Supreme Court Dred Scott decision allowed slavery in the territories even where the majority opposed slavery. The Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 included Northern Democratic leader Stephen A. Douglas' Freeport Doctrine. This doctrine was an argument for thwarting the Dred Scott decision that, along with Douglas' defeat of the Lecompton Constitution, divided the Democratic Party between North and South. Northern abolitionist John Brown's raid at Harpers Ferry Armory was an attempt to incite slave insurrections in 1859.[30] The North-South split in the Democratic Party in 1860 due to the Southern demand for a slave code for the territories completed polarization of the nation between North and South.

John Brown being adored by an enslaved mother and child as he walks to his execution on December 2, 1859.

Support for secession was strongly correlated to the number of plantations in the region.[33] States of the Deep South, which had the greatest concentration of plantations, were the first to secede. The upper South slave states of Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee had fewer plantations and rejected secession until the Fort Sumter crisis forced them to choose sides. Border states had fewer plantations still and never seceded.[34][35] As of 1860 the percentage of Southern families that owned slaves has been estimated to be 43 percent in the lower South, 36 percent in the James Hopkinson's Plantation. Planting sweet potatoes. ca. 1862/63. upper South and 22 percent in the border states that fought mostly for the Union.[36] Half the owners had one to four slaves. A total of 8,000 planters owned 50 or more slaves in 1850 and only 1,800 planters owned 100 or more; of the latter, 85% lived in the lower South, as opposed to one percent in the border states.[37] According to the 1860 U.S. census, 393,975 individuals, representing 8 percent of all US families, owned 3,950,528 slaves.[38]

American Civil War

Ninety-five percent of African-Americans lived in the South, comprising one third of the population there as opposed to one percent of the population of the North, chiefly in larger cities like New York and Philadelphia. Consequently, fears of eventual emancipation were much greater in the South than in the North.[39] The Supreme Court decision of 1857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford escalated the controversy. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's decision said that slaves were "so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect".[40] Taney then overturned the Missouri Compromise, which banned slavery in territory north of the 3630' parallel. He stated, "[T]he Act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning [enslaved persons] in the territory of the United States north of the line therein is not warranted by the Constitution and is therefore void."[41] Southern Democrats praised the Dred Scott decision, but Republicans branded it a "willful perversion" of the Constitution. They argued that if Scott could not legally file suit, the Supreme Court had no right to consider the Missouri Compromise's constitutionality. Lincoln warned that "the next Dred Scott decision"[42] could threaten Northern states with slavery.
Scars of whipped slave. This famous 1863 photo was distributed by abolitionists to illustrate what they saw as the barbarism of Southern [31] society. The victim likely suffered from keloid, according to Kathleen Collins, making the scars [32] more prominent and extensive.

Lincoln said, "This question of Slavery was more important than any other; indeed, so much more important has it become that no other national question can even get a hearing just at present."[43] The slavery issue was related to sectional competition for control of the territories,[44] and the Southern demand for a slave code for the territories was the issue used by Southern politicians to split the Democratic Party in two, which all but guaranteed the election of Lincoln and secession. When secession was an issue, South Carolina planter and state Senator John Townsend said that, "our enemies are about to take possession of the Government, that they intend to rule us according to the caprices of their fanatical theories, and according to the declared purposes of abolishing slavery."[45] Similar opinions were expressed throughout the South in editorials, political speeches and declarations of reasons for secession. Even though Lincoln had no plans to outlaw slavery where it existed, whites throughout the South expressed fears for the future of slavery. Southern concerns included not only economic loss but also fears of racial equality.[46][47][48][49] The Texas Declaration of Causes for Secession[50][51] said that the non-slave-holding states were "proclaiming the debasing doctrine of equality of all men, irrespective of race or color", and that the African race "were rightfully held and regarded as an inferior and dependent race". Alabama secessionist E. S. Dargan warned that whites and free blacks could not live together; if slaves were emancipated and remained in the South, "we ourselves would become the executioners of our own slaves. To this extent would the policy of our Northern enemies drive us; and thus would we not only be reduced to poverty, but what is still worse, we should be driven to crime, to the commission of sin."[52] Beginning in the 1830s, the US Postmaster General refused to allow mail which carried abolition pamphlets to the South.[53] Northern teachers suspected of any tinge of abolitionism were expelled from the South, and abolitionist literature was banned. Southerners rejected the denials of Republicans that they were abolitionists.[54] The North felt threatened as well, for as Eric Foner concludes, "Northerners came to view slavery as the very antithesis of the good society, as well as a threat to their own fundamental values and interests."[55] During the 1850s, slaves left the border states through sale, manumission and escape, and border states also had more free African-Americans and European immigrants than the lower South, which increased Southern fears that

American Civil War slavery was threatened with rapid extinction in this area. Such fears greatly increased Southern efforts to make Kansas a slave state. By 1860, the number of white border state families owning slaves plunged to only 16 percent of the total. Slaves sold to lower South states were owned by a smaller number of wealthy slave owners as the price of slaves increased.[56] Even though Lincoln agreed to the Corwin Amendment, which would have protected slavery in existing states, secessionists claimed that such guarantees were meaningless. Besides the loss of Kansas to free soil Northerners, secessionists feared that the loss of slaves in the border states would lead to emancipation, and that upper South slave states might be the next dominoes to fall. They feared that Republicans would use patronage to incite slaves and antislavery Southern whites such as Hinton Rowan Helper. Then slavery in the lower South, like a "scorpion encircled by fire, would sting itself to death."[57] Historians such as Eric Foner have argued that no two people held the same motivations during the civil war. He argues that while some were motivated mainly by slavery, most were motivated by some mixture of politics, culture, nationalism, honor, or any other number of motivations.[58] Other historians, such as Chandra Manning, argue that both Union and Confederate soldiers who did the actual fighting believed slavery to be the cause of the Civil War. He argues that a majority of Confederate soldiers fought to protect slavery, which they viewed as an integral part of southern society. Further, he argues that Union soldiers believed the primary reason for the war was to bring emancipation to the slaves, though many Union soldiers did not fully endorse this. Manning stated that the primary debate in Confederate states over secession was not over state rights, but rather "the power of the federal government to affect the institution of slavery, specifically limiting it in newly added territories."[59]

Sectionalism
Sectionalism refers to the different economies, social structure, customs and political values of the North and South.[60][61] It increased steadily between 1800 and 1860 as the North, which phased slavery out of existence, industrialized, urbanized and built prosperous farms, while the deep South concentrated on plantation agriculture based on slave labor, together with subsistence farming for the poor whites. The South expanded into rich new lands in the Southwest (from Alabama to Texas).[62]
Status of the states, 1861. States that seceded before April 15,

However, slavery declined in the border states and 1861 States that seceded after April 15, 1861 Union states that permitted slavery Union states that banned slavery Territories could barely survive in cities and industrial areas (it was fading out in cities such as Baltimore, Louisville and St. Louis), so a South based on slavery was rural and non-industrial. On the other hand, as the demand for cotton grew the price of slaves soared. Historians have debated whether economic differences between the industrial Northeast and the agricultural South helped cause the war. Most historians now disagree with the economic determinism of historian Charles Beard in the 1920s and emphasize that Northern and Southern economies were largely complementary.[63] Fears of slave revolts and abolitionist propaganda made the South militantly hostile to abolitionism.[64][65] Southerners complained that it was the North that was changing, and was prone to new "isms", while the South remained true to historic republican values of the Founding Fathers (many of whom owned slaves, including Washington, Jefferson and Madison). Lincoln said that Republicans were following the tradition of the framers of the Constitution (including the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise) by preventing expansion of slavery.[66]

American Civil War The issue of accepting slavery (in the guise of rejecting slave-owning bishops and missionaries) split the largest religious denominations (the Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian churches) into separate Northern and Southern denominations.[67] Industrialization meant that seven European immigrants out of eight settled in the North. The movement of twice as many whites leaving the South for the North as vice versa contributed to the South's defensive-aggressive political behavior.[68]

The Territorial Crisis and the United States Constitution


Between 1803 and 1854, a vast expansion of US territory was achieved through purchase, negotiation and conquest. These acquisitions included over a million and a quarter square miles acquired in just the last decade of this period alone.[69] Of the states carved out of these territories by 1845, all had entered the union as slave states: Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Florida and Texas, as well as the southern portions of Alabama and Mississippi.[70] And with the conquest of northern Mexico, including California, in 1848, slaveholding interests looked forward to the institution flourishing in these lands as well. Southerners also anticipated garnering slaves and slave states in Cuba and Central America.[70][71] Northern free soil interests vigorously sought to curtail any further expansion of slave soil. It was over these territorial disputes that the proslavery and antislavery forces collided over the future of slavery in America.[72][73] The existence of slavery in the southern states was far less politically polarizing than the explosive question of the territorial expansion of the institution in the west.[74] Moreover, Americans were informed by two well-established readings of the Constitution regarding human bondage. First, that the slave states had complete autonomy over the institution within their boundaries; and second, that the domestic slave trade trade among the states was immune to federal interference.[75][76] After the outlawing of the Atlantic slave trade, the only feasible strategy available to attack slavery was to restrict its introduction into the territories - a policy of containment.[77] Slaveholding interests fully grasped the danger that this strategy posed to the perpetuation of human bondage.[78][79] Both the South and the North believed: The power to decide the question of slavery for the territories was the power to determine the future of slavery itself.[80][81]

Woman with her slave, New Orleans, 1850

Four irreconcilable doctrines emerged to answer the question of federal control in the territories, and they all claimed to be sanctioned by the Constitution.[82] The traditional or conservative position was based on Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution: The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State. From these enumerated powers, two of the four doctrines emerged, each arguing that Congress had full authority to decide the fate of slavery in the territories. The precedents of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Missouri Compromise of 1820 were cited by proponents of federal control. In each of these historic compromises, the legislation provided for, but did not require, a balance between free-soil and slave-soil. In all areas not placed off-limits to slavery, the institution was quickly established there.[83] Here, the two traditional or conservative doctrines parted ways. The Constitutional Union Party regarded Congressional allocation of free-soil and, implicitly, slave-soil territory as an established method of compromise. Any dispute over slavery expansion was to end in similar apportionments. The Crittenden Compromise of 1860 was an expression of this political outlook.[84] The Republican Party, which also championed federal control over territories, rejected this narrow interpretation of the precedents. They insisted that the clause conveying authority to Congress in the territories did not bind legislators

American Civil War to any particular policy; slavery could be constitutionally excluded altogether in a territory at their discretion.[84] The only caveat the Republicans issued was that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment be applied in the territories to slavery: Congress might positively prohibit slavery, but they could never establish it; to do so, according to the Republicans, would amount to a federal mandate for slavery and violate the principles of the Declaration of Independence.[85][86] Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas and his southern Democratic Party allies devised the third of these political theories: territorial sovereignty. By this doctrine Congress would relinquish direct federal control over the internal affairs of territories regarding slavery. In this respect, territorial sovereignty (also known as popular sovereignty") diverged sharply from the two conservative theories.[86] Douglas declared that the people of a state, a territory, or otherwise have an inalienable right to govern themselves with respect to local concerns. Among these local concerns, Douglas included slavery. When challenged to explain how territorial sovereignty trumped the role of Congress as enumerated in Article Four, he said that Congress was empowered only to confer authority into the hands of the territorial government, but never to exercise any direct control.[87] The fourth in this quartet of constitutional doctrines was that of state sovereignty (also known as states rights). Among the principles of state sovereignty was that all authority regarding the institution of slavery in the territories resided in the slave states themselves. The role of the federal government was merely to enable the implementation of slave state laws when residents of the states entered the territories.[88] As early as 1847, shortly after the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, the ideology of state sovereignty emerged as a rebuttal to free soil claims to the Mexican Cession.[89][90] John C. Calhoun asserted that the federal government in the territories was only the agent of the several sovereign states, and hence incapable of forbidding the bringing into any territory of anything that was legal property in any state. He concluded that citizens from every state had the right to take their property to any territory.[91] State sovereignty gave the laws of the slaveholding states extra-jurisdictional effect. The slave-owner and his property would settle in a territory much as a colonist settled in early colonial America; all rights and privileges recognized in the mother country (or sovereign slave state) would be retained by the colonists in their new home (US territory). The United States federal government would be bound by law to protect the settlers sovereign "rights" and intercede on their behalf if state statutes were threatened.[88] Essentially, states rights was an ideology formulated and applied as a means of advancing slave state interests through federal authority and thwarting free state interests, by application of the same federal authority.[92] As historian Thomas L Krannawitter points out, [T]he Southern demand for federal slave protection represented a demand for an unprecedented expansion of federal power.[93] By 1860, these four doctrines comprised the major ideologies presented to the American public on the matters of slavery, the territories and the US Constitution.[94]

Nationalism and honor


Nationalism was a powerful force in the early 19th century, with famous spokesmen like Andrew Jackson and Daniel Webster. While practically all Northerners supported the Union, Southerners were split between those loyal to the entire United States (called "unionists") and those loyal primarily to the southern region and then the Confederacy.[95] C. Vann Woodward said of the latter group, "A great slave society...had grown up and miraculously flourished in the heart of a thoroughly bourgeois and partly puritanical republic. It had renounced its bourgeois origins and elaborated and painfully rationalized its institutional, legal, metaphysical, and religious defenses....When the crisis came it chose to fight. It proved to be the death struggle of a society, which went down in ruins."[96] Perceived insults to Southern collective honor included the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1854)[97] and the actions of John Brown in 1859.[98]

American Civil War While the South moved toward a Southern nationalism, leaders in the North were also becoming more nationally minded, and rejected any notion of splitting the Union. The Republican national electoral platform of 1860 warned that Republicans regarded disunion as treason and would not tolerate it: we denounce those threats of disunion...as denying the vital principles of a free government, and as an avowal of contemplated treason, which it is the imperative duty of an indignant people sternly to rebuke and forever silence.[99] The South ignored the warnings: Southerners did not realize how ardently the North would fight to hold the Union together.[100]

States' rights
Everyone agreed that states had certain rightsbut did those rights carry over when a citizen left that state? The Southern position was that citizens of every state had the right to take their property anywhere in the U.S. and not have it taken awayspecifically they could bring their slaves anywhere and they would remain slaves. Northerners rejected this "right" because it would violate the right of a free state to outlaw slavery within its borders. Republicans committed to ending the expansion of slavery were among those opposed to any such right to bring slaves and slavery into the free states and territories. The Dred Scott Supreme Court decision of 1857 bolstered the Southern case within territories, and angered the North.[101] Secondly the South argued that each state had the right to secedeleave the Unionat any time, that the Constitution was a "compact" or agreement among the states. Northerners (including President Buchanan) rejected that notion as opposed to the will of the Founding Fathers who said they were setting up a "perpetual union".[101] Historian James McPherson writes concerning states' rights and other non-slavery explanations: While one or more of these interpretations remain popular among the Sons of Confederate Veterans and other Southern heritage groups, few professional historians now subscribe to them. Of all these interpretations, the state's-rights argument is perhaps the weakest. It fails to ask the question, state's rights for what purpose? State's rights, or sovereignty, was always more a means than an end, an instrument to achieve a certain goal more than a principle.[102]

Slave power and free soil issues


Antislavery forces in the North identified the "Slave Power" as a direct threat to republican values. They argued that rich slave owners were using political power to take control of the Presidency, Congress and the Supreme Court, thus threatening the rights of the citizens of the North.[103]

Marais des Cygnes massacre of anti-slavery Kansans. May 19, 1858.

"Free soil" was a Northern demand that the new lands opening up in the west be available to independent yeoman farmers and not be bought out by rich slave owners who would buy up the best land and work it with slaves, forcing the white farmers onto marginal lands. This was the basis of the Free Soil Party of 1848, and a main theme of the Republican Party.[104] Free Soilers and Republicans demanded a homestead law that would give government land to settlers; it was defeated by Southerners who feared it would attract to the west European immigrants and poor Southern whites.[105]

Tariffs
The Democrats in Congress, controlled by Southerners, wrote the tariff laws in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, and kept reducing rates, so that the 1857 rates were the lowest since 1816. The South had no complaints but the low rates angered Northern industrialists and factory workers, especially in Pennsylvania, who demanded protection for their growing iron industry. The Whigs and Republicans complained because they favored high tariffs to stimulate industrial growth, and Republicans called for an increase in tariffs in the 1860 election. The increases were finally

American Civil War enacted in 1861 after Southerners resigned their seats in Congress.[106][107] Historians in recent decades have minimized the tariff issue, noting that few Southerners in 186061 said it was of central importance to them. Some secessionist documents do mention the tariff issue, though not nearly as often as the preservation of slavery.

Election of Lincoln
The election of Lincoln in November 1860 was the final trigger for secession.[108] Efforts at compromise, including the "Corwin Amendment" and the "Crittenden Compromise", failed. Southern leaders feared that Lincoln would stop the expansion of slavery and put it on a course toward extinction. The slave states, which had already become a minority in the House of Representatives, were now facing a future as a perpetual minority in the Senate and Electoral College against an increasingly powerful North. Before Lincoln took office in March 1861, seven slave states had declared their secession and joined to form the Confederacy.
Abraham Lincoln, 16th President (18611865)

Battle of Fort Sumter

The Lincoln Administration, just as the outgoing Buchanan administration before it, refused to turn over Ft. Sumterlocated in the middle of the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. Jefferson Davis ordered the surrender of the fort. Union Maj. Anderson gave a conditional reply which the Confederate government rejected, and Davis ordered Beauregard to attack the fort before a relief expedition could arrive. After a heavy bombardment on April 1213, 1861 (with no intentional casualties), the fort surrendered. On April 15, Lincoln then called for 75,000 troops from the states to recapture the fort and other federal property.[109] Rather than furnish troops and access for an attack on their fellow southern states, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas elected to join them in secession. North and South the response to Ft. Sumter was an overwhelming demand for war to uphold national honor. Only Kentucky tried to remain neutral. Hundreds of thousands of young men across the land rushed to enlist.[110]

Secession begins
Secession of South Carolina
South Carolina did more to advance nullification and secession than any other Southern state. South Carolina adopted the "Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union" on December 24, 1860. It argued for states' rights for slave owners in the South, but contained a complaint about states' rights in the North in the form of opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act, claiming that Northern states were not fulfilling their federal obligations under the Constitution. All the alleged violations of the rights of Southern states were related to slavery.
Jefferson Davis, the only President of the Confederate States of America (18611865)

American Civil War

10

Secession winter
Before Lincoln took office, seven states had declared their secession from the Union. They established a Southern government, the Confederate States of America on February 4, 1861.[111] They took control of federal forts and other properties within their boundaries with little resistance from outgoing President James Buchanan, whose term ended on March 4, 1861. Buchanan said that the Dred Scott The Union: blue, yellow (slave); decision was proof that the South had no reason for secession, and that The Confederacy: brown the Union "was intended to be perpetual", but that "the power by force *territories in light shades; control of Confederate territories disputed of arms to compel a State to remain in the Union" was not among the [112] "enumerated powers granted to Congress". One quarter of the U.S. Armythe entire garrison in Texaswas surrendered in February 1861 to state forces by its commanding general, David E. Twiggs, who then joined the Confederacy. As Southerners resigned their seats in the Senate and the House, Republicans were able to pass bills for projects that had been blocked by Southern Senators before the war, including the Morrill Tariff, land grant colleges (the Morill Act), a Homestead Act, a transcontinental railroad (the Pacific Railway Acts), the National Banking Act and the authorization of United States Notes by the Legal Tender Act of 1862. The Revenue Act of 1861 introduced the income tax to help finance the war.

The Confederacy
Seven Deep South cotton states seceded by February 1861, starting with South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas. These seven states formed the Confederate States of America (February 4, 1861), with Jefferson Davis as president, and a governmental structure closely modeled on the U.S. Constitution. Following the attack on Fort Sumter, President Lincoln called for a volunteer army from each state. Within two months, an additional four Southern slave states declared their secession and joined the Confederacy: Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee. The northwestern portion of Virginia subsequently seceded from Virginia, joining the Union as the new state of West Virginia on June 20, 1863. By the end of 1861, Missouri and Kentucky were effectively under Union control, with Confederate state governments in exile. Among the ordinances of secession passed by the individual states, those of three - Texas, Alabama, and Virginia specifically mentioned the plight of the 'slaveholding states' at the hands of northern abolitionists. The rest make no mention of the slavery issue, and are often brief announcements of the dissolution of ties by the legislatures,[113] however at least four states - South Carolina,[114] Mississippi,[115] Georgia,[116] and Texas[117] - also passed lengthy and detailed explanations of their causes for secession, all of which laid the blame squarely on the influence over the northern states of the movement to abolish slavery, something regarded as a Constitutional right by the slaveholding states.[118]

American Civil War

11

The Union states


Twenty-three states remained loyal to the Union: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. During the war, Nevada and West Virginia joined as new states of the Union. Tennessee and Louisiana were returned to Union military control early in the war. The territories of Colorado, Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Washington fought on the Union side. Several slave-holding Native American tribes supported the Confederacy, giving the Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) a small, bloody civil war.[119][120][121]

Border states
The border states in the Union were West Virginia (which separated from Virginia and became a new state), and four of the five northernmost slave states (Maryland, Delaware, Missouri, and Kentucky). Maryland had numerous pro-Confederate officials who tolerated anti-Union rioting in Baltimore and the burning of bridges. Lincoln responded with martial law and sent in militia units from the North.[122] Before the Confederate government realized what was happening, Lincoln had seized firm control of Maryland and the District of Columbia, by arresting all the prominent secessionists and holding them without trial (they were later released). In Missouri, an elected convention on secession voted decisively to remain within the Union. When pro-Confederate Governor Claiborne F. Jackson called out the state militia, it was attacked by federal forces under General Nathaniel Lyon, who chased the governor and the rest of the State Guard to the southwestern corner of the state. (See also: Missouri secession). In the resulting vacuum, the convention on secession reconvened and took power as the Unionist provisional government of Missouri.[123] Kentucky did not secede; for a time, it declared itself neutral. When Confederate forces entered the state in September 1861, neutrality ended and the state reaffirmed its Union status, while trying to maintain slavery. During a brief invasion by Confederate forces, Confederate sympathizers organized a secession convention, inaugurated a governor, and gained recognition from the Confederacy. The rebel government soon went into exile and never controlled Kentucky.[124]

A Roman Catholic Union army chaplain celebrating a Mass

After Virginia's secession, a Unionist government in Wheeling asked 48 counties to vote on an ordinance to create a new state on October 24, 1861. A voter turnout of 34% approved the statehood bill (96% approving).[125] The inclusion of 24 secessionist counties[126] in the state and the ensuing guerrilla war[127] engaged about 40,000 Federal troops for much of the war.[128] Congress admitted West Virginia to the Union on June 20, 1863. West Virginia provided about 20,00022,000 soldiers to both the Confederacy and the Union.[129] A Unionist secession attempt occurred in East Tennessee, but was suppressed by the Confederacy, which arrested over 3000 men suspected of being loyal to the Union. They were held without trial.[130]

American Civil War

12

Overview
Over 10,000 military engagements took place during the war, 40% of them in Virginia and Tennessee.[131] Since separate articles deal with every major battle and many minor ones, this article only gives the broadest outline. For more information see List of American Civil War battles and Military leadership in the American Civil War.

The beginning of the war, 1861


Lincoln's victory in the presidential election of 1860 triggered South Carolina's declaration of secession from the Union. By February 1861, an additional six Southern states made similar declarations. On February 7, the seven states adopted a provisional constitution for the Confederate States of America and established their temporary capital at Montgomery, Alabama. A pre-war February Peace Conference of 1861 met in Washington in a failed attempt at resolving the crisis. The remaining eight slave states rejected pleas to join the Confederacy. Confederate forces seized most of the federal forts within their boundaries. President Buchanan protested but made no military response apart from a failed attempt to resupply Fort Sumter using the ship Star of the West, which was fired upon by South Carolina forces and turned back before it reached the fort.[132] However, governors in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania quietly began buying weapons and training militia units. On March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was sworn in as President. In his inaugural address, he argued that the Constitution was a more perfect union than the earlier Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, that it was a binding contract, and called any secession "legally void".[133] He stated he had no intent to invade Southern states, nor did he intend to end slavery where it existed, but that he would use force to maintain possession of federal property. His speech closed with a plea for restoration of the bonds of union.[134] The South sent delegations to Washington and offered to pay for the federal properties and enter into a peace treaty with the United States. Lincoln rejected any negotiations with Confederate agents because he claimed the Confederacy was not a legitimate government, and that making any treaty with it would be tantamount to recognition of it as a sovereign government.[135] However, Secretary of State William Seward engaged in unauthorized and indirect negotiations that failed.[135] Fort Monroe in Virginia, Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina, and Fort Pickens, Fort Jefferson, and Fort Taylor, all in Florida, were the remaining Union-held forts in the Confederacy, and Lincoln was determined to hold them all. Under orders from Confederate President Jefferson Davis, troops controlled by the Confederate government under P. G. T. Beauregard bombarded Fort Sumter on April 12, forcing its capitulation. Northerners rallied behind Lincoln's call for all the states to send troops to recapture the forts and to preserve the Union,[136] citing presidential powers given by the Militia Acts of 1792. With the scale of the rebellion apparently small so far, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for 90days.[137] For months before that, several Northern governors had discreetly readied their state militias; they began to move forces the next day.[138] Confederate sympathizers seized Liberty Arsenal in Liberty, Missouri on April 20, eight days after Fort Sumter. On May 3, 1861, Lincoln called for an additional 42,034 volunteers for a period of three years.[139] Four states in the upper South (Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia), which had repeatedly rejected Confederate overtures, now refused to send forces against their neighbors, declared their secession, and joined the Confederacy. To reward Virginia, the Confederate capital was moved to Richmond.[140] The city was the symbol of the Confederacy. Richmond was in a highly vulnerable location at the end of a tortuous Confederate supply line. Although Richmond was heavily fortified, supplies for the city would be reduced by Sherman's capture of Atlanta and cut off almost entirely when Grant besieged Petersburg and its railroads that supplied the Southern capital.
The great meeting in Union Square, New York, to support the government, April 20, 1861

American Civil War

13

Anaconda Plan and blockade, 1861


Both the Union and Confederate navies played an important role during the Civil War. Winfield Scott, the commanding general of the U.S. Army, devised the Anaconda Plan to win the war with as little bloodshed as possible.[141] His idea was that a Union blockade of the main ports would weaken the Confederate economy; then the capture of the Mississippi River would split the South. Lincoln adopted the plan in terms of a blockade to squeeze to death the Confederate economy, but overruled Scott's warnings that his new army was not ready for an offensive operation because public opinion demanded an immediate attack.[142]

1861 characterized map of Scott's "Anaconda Plan"

In April 1861, Lincoln announced the Union blockade of all Southern ports; commercial ships could not get insurance and regular traffic ended. The South blundered in embargoing cotton exports in 1861 before the blockade was effective; by the time they realized the mistake it was too late. "King Cotton" was dead, as the South could export less than 10% of its cotton.[143] British investors built small, fast, steam-driven blockade runners that traded arms and luxuries brought in from England through Bermuda, Cuba and the Bahamas in return for high-priced cotton and tobacco.[144] When the Union Navy seized a blockade runner, the ship and cargo were usually condemned as a Prize of war and sold with the proceeds given to the Navy sailors; the captured crewmen were mostly British and they were simply released. The Southern economy nearly collapsed during the war. Shortages of food and supplies were largely caused by the blockade, the failure of Southern railroads, the loss of control of the main rivers, foraging by Northern armies, and the impressment of crops by Confederate armies. The standard of living fell even as large-scale printing of paper money caused inflation and distrust of the currency. By 1864 the internal food distribution had broken down, leaving cities without enough food and causing bread riots across the Confederacy.[145] On March 8, 1862, the Confederate Navy waged a fight against the Union Navy when the ironclad CSS Virginia attacked the blockade. Against wooden ships, she seemed unstoppable. The next day, however, she had to fight the new Union warship USS Monitor in the Battle of the Ironclads.[146] Their battle ended in a draw. The Confederacy lost the Virginia when the ship was scuttled to prevent capture, and the Union built many copies of Monitor. Lacking the technology to build effective warships, the Confederacy attempted to obtain warships from Britain. Northern technology achieved another breakthrough on April 1011, 1862, when a joint Army-Navy expedition reduced a major masonry fortification at Fort Pulaski guarding Savannah, Georgia. Employing the Parrott rifle cannon made masonry coastal defenses obsolete overnight. The Federals left a small garrison, releasing troops and ships for other blockading operations.[147] The Union victory at the Second Battle of Fort Fisher in January 1865 closed the last useful Southern port and virtually ended blockade running.

American Civil War

14

Conscription and desertion


In the first year of the war, both sides had far more volunteers than they could effectively train and equip. After the initial enthusiasm faded, reliance on the cohort of young men who came of age every year and wanted to join was not enough. Both sides used a draft lawconscriptionas a device to encourage or force volunteering; relatively few were actually drafted and served. The Confederacy passed a draft law in April 1862 for young men aged 18 to 35; overseers of slaves, government officials, and clergymen were exempt.[148] The U.S. Congress followed in July, authorizing a militia draft within a state when it could not meet its quota with volunteers.

A Union Regimental Fife and Drum Corps

When the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect in January 1863, ex-slaves were energetically recruited by the states, and used to meet the state quotas. States and local communities offered higher and higher cash bonuses for white volunteers. Congress tightened the law in March 1863. Men selected in the draft could provide substitutes or, until mid-1864, pay commutation money. Many eligibles pooled their money to cover the cost of anyone drafted. Families used the substitute provision to select which man should go into the army and which should stay home. There was much evasion and overt resistance to the draft, especially in Catholic areas. The great draft riot in New York City in July 1863 involved Irish immigrants who had been signed up as citizens to swell the machine vote, not realizing it made them liable for the draft.[149] Of the 168,649 men procured for the Union through the draft, 117,986 were substitutes, leaving only 50,663 who had their personal services conscripted.[150] North and South, the draft laws were highly unpopular. An estimated 120,000 men evaded conscription in the North, many of them fleeing to Canada, and another 280,000 Northern soldiers deserted during the war,[151][152] along with at least 100,000 Southerners, or about 10% all together.[153] However, desertion was a very common event in the 19th century; in the peacetime Army about 15% of the soldiers deserted every year.[154] In the South, many men deserted temporarily to take care of their families,[155] then returned to their units.[156] In the North, "bounty jumpers" enlisted to get the generous bonus, deserted, then went back to a second recruiting station under a different name to sign up again for a second bonus; 141 were caught and executed.[157]

Eastern theater 18611863


Because of the fierce resistance of a few initial Confederate forces at Manassas, Virginia, in July 1861, a march by Union troops under the command of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell on the Confederate forces there was halted in the First Battle of Bull Run, or First Manassas,[158] McDowell's troops were forced back to Washington, D.C., by the Confederates under the command of Generals Joseph E. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard. It was in this battle that Confederate General Thomas Jackson received the nickname of "Stonewall" because he stood like a stone wall against Union troops.[159]

Alarmed at the loss, and in an attempt to prevent more slave states from leaving the Union, the U.S. Congress passed the Crittenden-Johnson Resolution on July 25 of that year, which stated that the war was being fought to preserve the Union and not to end slavery. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan took command of the Union Army of the Potomac on July 26 (he was briefly general-in-chief of all the Union armies, but was subsequently relieved of that post in favor of Maj. Gen. Henry W.

Union soldiers in trenches before storming Marye's Heights at the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia, May 1863.

American Civil War Halleck), and the war began in earnest in 1862. Upon the strong urging of President Lincoln to begin offensive operations, McClellan attacked Virginia in the spring of 1862 by way of the peninsula between the York River and James River, southeast of Richmond. Although McClellan's army reached the gates of Richmond in the Peninsula Campaign,[160][161][162] Johnston halted his advance at the Battle of Seven Pines, then General Robert E. Lee and top subordinates James Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson[163] defeated McClellan in the Seven Days Battles and forced his retreat. The Northern Virginia Campaign, which included the Second Battle of Bull Run, ended in yet another victory for the South.[164] McClellan resisted General-in-Chief Halleck's orders to send reinforcements to John Pope's Union Army of Virginia, which made it easier for Lee's Confederates to defeat twice the number of combined enemy troops. Emboldened by Second Bull Run, the Confederacy made its first invasion of the North. General Lee led 45,000 men of the Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac River into Maryland on September 5. Lincoln then restored Pope's troops to McClellan. McClellan and Lee fought at the Battle of Antietam[163] near Sharpsburg, Maryland, on September 17, 1862, the bloodiest single day in United States military history.[165] Lee's army, checked at last, returned to Virginia before McClellan could destroy it. Antietam is considered a Union victory because it halted Lee's invasion of the North and provided an opportunity for Lincoln to announce his Emancipation Proclamation.[166] When the cautious McClellan failed to follow up on Antietam, he was replaced by Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside. Burnside was soon defeated at the Battle of Fredericksburg[167] on December 13, 1862, when over 12,000 Union soldiers were killed or wounded during repeated futile frontal assaults against Marye's Heights. After the battle, Burnside was replaced by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.

15

Rioters attacking a building on Lexington Avenue during the New York City draft riots of 1863

Hooker, too, proved unable to defeat Lee's army; despite outnumbering the Confederates by more than two to one, he was humiliated in the Battle of Chancellorsville[168] in May 1863. Gen. Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men during the battle and subsequently died of complications. Gen. Hooker was replaced by Maj. Gen. George Meade during Lee's second invasion of the North, in June. Meade defeated Lee at the Battle of Gettysburg[169] (July 1 to July 3, 1863). This was the bloodiest battle of the war, and has been called the war's turning point. Pickett's Charge on July 3 is often Confederate dead behind the stone wall of considered the high-water mark of the Confederacy because it signaled Marye's Heights, Fredericksburg, Virginia, killed the collapse of serious Confederate threats of victory. Lee's army during the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1863 suffered 28,000 casualties (versus Meade's 23,000).[170] However, Lincoln was angry that Meade failed to intercept Lee's retreat, and after Meade's inconclusive fall campaign, Lincoln turned to the Western Theater for new leadership. At the same time the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg surrendered, giving the Union control of the Mississippi River, permanently isolating the western Confederacy, and producing the new leader Lincoln needed, Ulysses S. Grant.

American Civil War

16

Western theater 18611863


While the Confederate forces had numerous successes in the Eastern Theater, they were defeated many times in the West. They were driven from Missouri early in the war as a result of the Battle of Pea Ridge.[171] Leonidas Polk's invasion of Columbus, Kentucky ended Kentucky's policy of neutrality and turned that state against the Confederacy. Nashville and central Tennessee fell to the Union early in 1862, leading to attrition of local food supplies and livestock and a breakdown in social organization. The Mississippi was opened to Union traffic to the southern border of Tennessee with the taking of Island No. 10 and New Madrid, Missouri, and then Memphis, Tennessee. In April 1862, the Union Navy captured New Orleans[172] without a major fight, which allowed Union forces to begin moving up the Mississippi. Only the fortress city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, prevented Union control of the entire river. General Braxton Bragg's second Confederate invasion of Kentucky ended with a meaningless victory over Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell at the Battle of Perryville,[173] although Bragg was forced to end his attempt at invading Kentucky and retreat due to lack of support for the Confederacy in that state. Bragg was narrowly defeated by Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans at the Battle of Stones River[174] in Tennessee. The one clear Confederate victory in the West was the Battle of Chickamauga. Bragg, reinforced by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's corps (from Lee's army in the east), defeated Rosecrans, despite the heroic defensive stand of Maj. Gen. George Henry Thomas. Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, which Bragg then besieged. The Union's key strategist and tactician in the West was Ulysses S. Grant, who won victories at Forts Henry and Donelson (by which the Union seized control of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers); the Battle of Shiloh;[175] and the Battle of Vicksburg,[176] which cemented The Battle of Chickamauga was one of the deadliest battles in the Western Theater. Union control of the Mississippi River and is considered one of the turning points of the war. Grant marched to the relief of Rosecrans and defeated Bragg at the Third Battle of Chattanooga,[177] driving Confederate forces out of Tennessee and opening a route to Atlanta and the heart of the Confederacy.

Trans-Mississippi theater 18611865


Guerrilla activity turned much of Missouri into a battleground. Missouri had, in total, the third-most battles of any state during the war.[178] The other states of the west, though geographically isolated from the battles to the east, saw numerous small-scale military actions. Battles in the region served to secure Missouri, Indian Territory, and New Mexico Territory for the Union. Confederate incursions into New Mexico territory were repulsed in 1862 and a Union campaign to secure Indian Territory succeeded in 1863. Late in the war, the Union's Red River Campaign was a failure. Texas remained in Confederate hands throughout the war, but was cut off from the rest of the Confederacy after the capture of Vicksburg in 1863 gave the Union control of the Mississippi River.

American Civil War

17

Conquest of Virginia and end of war: 18641865


At the beginning of 1864, Lincoln made Grant commander of all Union armies. Grant made his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, and put Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman in command of most of the western armies. Grant understood the concept of total war and believed, along with Lincoln and Sherman, that only the utter defeat of Confederate forces and their economic base would end the war.[179] This was total war not in terms of killing civilians but rather in terms of destroying homes, farms, and railroads. Grant devised a coordinated strategy that would strike at the entire Confederacy from multiple directions. Generals George Meade and Benjamin Butler were ordered to move against Lee near Richmond, General Franz Sigel (and later Philip Sheridan) were to attack the Shenandoah Valley, General Sherman was to capture Atlanta and march to the sea (the Atlantic Ocean), Generals George Crook and William W. Averell were to operate against railroad supply lines in West Virginia, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks was to capture Mobile, Alabama.

The Peacemakers (1868) by George P.A. Healy. Aboard the River Queen, March 28, 1865, General William T. Sherman, General Ulysses S. Grant, Lincoln, and Admiral David Dixon Porter discuss military plans for final months of the Civil War.

Union forces in the East attempted to maneuver past Lee and fought several battles during that phase ("Grant's Overland Campaign") of the Eastern campaign. Grant's battles of attrition at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor[180] resulted in heavy Union losses, but forced Lee's Confederates to fall back repeatedly. An attempt to outflank Lee from the south failed under Butler, who was trapped inside the Bermuda Hundred river bend. Grant was tenacious and, despite astonishing losses (over 65,000 casualties in seven weeks),[181] kept pressing Lee's Army of Northern Virginia back to Richmond. He pinned down the Confederate army in the Siege of Petersburg, where the two armies engaged in trench warfare for over nine months. Grant finally found a commander, General Philip Sheridan, aggressive enough to prevail in the Valley Campaigns of 1864. Sheridan was initially repelled at the Battle of New Market by former U.S. Vice President and Confederate Gen. John C. Breckinridge. The Battle of New Market would prove to be the Confederacy's last major victory of the war. After redoubling his efforts, Sheridan defeated Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early in a series of battles, including a final decisive defeat at the Battle of Cedar Creek. Sheridan then proceeded to destroy the agricultural base of the Shenandoah Valley,[182] a strategy similar to the tactics Sherman later employed in Georgia.

Generals William T. ShermanSherman, Ulysses S. GrantGrant & Phil SheridanSheridanUS Presidents on US postage stamps#Ulysses S. GrantArmy Issue of 1937

American Civil War

18

Meanwhile, Sherman maneuvered from Chattanooga to Atlanta, defeating Confederate Generals Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood along the way. The fall of Atlanta on September 2, 1864, guaranteed the reelection of Lincoln as president.[183] Hood left the Atlanta area to swing around and menace Sherman's supply lines and invade Tennessee in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign.[184] Union Maj. Gen. John Schofield defeated Hood at the Battle of Franklin, and George H. Thomas dealt Hood a massive defeat at the Battle of Nashville, effectively destroying Hood's army. Leaving Atlanta, and his base of supplies, Sherman's army marched Confederate dead of General Ewell's Corps who with an unknown destination, laying waste to about 20% of the farms attacked the Union lines at the Battle of in Georgia in his "March to the Sea". He reached the Atlantic Ocean at Spotsylvania, May 19, 1864. Savannah, Georgia in December 1864. Sherman's army was followed by thousands of freed slaves; there were no major battles along the March. Sherman turned north through South Carolina and North Carolina to approach the Confederate Virginia lines from the south,[185] increasing the pressure on Lee's army. Lee's army, thinned by desertion and casualties, was now much smaller than Grant's. Union forces won a decisive victory at the Battle of Five Forks on April 1, forcing Lee to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond. The Confederate capital fell[186] to the Union XXV Corps, composed of black troops. The remaining Confederate units fled west and after a defeat at Sayler's Creek, it became clear to Robert E. Lee that continued fighting against the United States was both tactically and logistically impossible.

Confederacy surrenders
Lee surrendered his Army of Northern Virginia on April 9, 1865, at the McLean House in the village of Appomattox Court House.[187] In an untraditional gesture and as a sign of Grant's respect and anticipation of peacefully restoring Confederate states to the Union, Lee was permitted to keep his sword and his horse, Traveller. On April 14, 1865, President Lincoln was shot by John Wilkes Booth, a Southern sympathizer. Lincoln died early the next morning, and Andrew Johnson became Map of Confederate territory losses year by year president. Meanwhile, Confederate forces across the South surrendered as news of Lee's surrender reached them.[188] President Johnson officially declared a virtual end to the insurrection on May 9, 1865.[189] On June 23, 1865, Cherokee leader Stand Watie was the last Confederate general to surrender his forces.[190]

American Civil War

19

Emancipation during the war


At the beginning of the war, some Union commanders thought they were supposed to return escaped slaves to their masters. By 1862, when it became clear that this would be a long war, the question of what to do about slavery became more general. The Southern economy and military effort depended on slave labor. It began to seem unreasonable to protect slavery while blockading Southern commerce and destroying Southern production. As one Congressman put it, the slaves "...cannot be neutral. As laborers, if not as soldiers, they will be allies of the rebels, or of the Union."[191] The same Congressmanand his fellow Radical Republicansput pressure on Lincoln to rapidly emancipate the slaves, whereas moderate Republicans came to accept gradual, compensated emancipation and colonization.[192] Copperheads and some War Democrats opposed emancipation, although the latter eventually accepted it as part of total war needed to save the Union. Many of the recent immigrants in the North viewed freed slaves as competition for scarce jobs, and as the reason why the Civil War was being fought.[193] Due in large part to this fierce competition with free blacks for labor opportunities, the poor and working class Irish Catholics generally opposed emancipation. When the draft began in the summer of 1863 they launched a major riot in New York City that was suppressed by the military, as well as much smaller protests in other cities.[194] Many Catholics in the North had volunteered to fight in 1861, sending thousands of soldiers to the front and taking high casualties, especially at Fredericksburg; their volunteering fell off after 1862.[195] Sentiment among German Americans was largely anti-slavery, especially among Forty-Eighters.[196] Hundreds of thousands of German Americans volunteered to fight for the Union.[197] In 1861, Lincoln worried that premature attempts at emancipation would mean the loss of the border states, and that "to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game."[198] At first, Lincoln reversed attempts at emancipation by Secretary of War Simon Cameron and Generals John C. Frmont (in Missouri) and David Hunter (in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida) to keep the loyalty of the border states and the War Democrats. Lincoln warned the border states that a more radical type of emancipation would happen if his gradual plan based on compensated emancipation and voluntary colonization was rejected.[199] Only the District of Columbia accepted Lincoln's gradual plan, which was enacted by Congress. When Lincoln told his cabinet about his proposed emancipation proclamation, Seward advised Lincoln to wait for a victory before issuing it, as to do otherwise would seem like "our last shriek on the retreat".[200] In September 1862 the Battle of Antietam provided this opportunity, and the subsequent War Governors' Conference added support for the proclamation.[201] Lincoln had already published a letter[202] encouraging the border states especially to accept emancipation as necessary to save the Union. Lincoln later said that slavery was "somehow the cause of the war".[203] Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862, and his final Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. In his letter to Hodges, Lincoln explained his belief that "If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong ... And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling ... I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me."[204]
Black and White soldiers in the Union Army. 1860s

American Civil War

20

Since the Emancipation Proclamation was based on the President's war powers, it only included territory held by Confederates at the time. However, the Proclamation became a symbol of the Union's growing commitment to add emancipation to the Union's definition of liberty.[205] Lincoln also played a leading role in getting Congress to vote for the Thirteenth Amendment,[206] which made emancipation universal and permanent.
Contrabandsan escaped slaves who fled to the Enslaved African Americans did not wait for Lincoln's action before Union Army for freedom and protection, ca. escaping and seeking freedom behind Union lines. From early years of 1862. the war, hundreds of thousands of African Americans escaped to Union lines, especially in occupied areas like Nashville, Norfolk and the Hampton Roads region in 1862, Tennessee from 1862 on, the line of Sherman's march, etc. So many African Americans fled to Union lines that commanders created camps and schools for them, where both adults and children learned to read and write.

The American Missionary Association entered the war effort by sending teachers south to such contraband camps, for instance establishing schools in Norfolk and on nearby plantations. In addition, approximately 180,000 or more African-American men served as soldiers and sailors with Union troops. Most of those were escaped slaves. Probably the most prominent of these African-American soldiers is the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. Confederates enslaved captured black Union soldiers, and black soldiers especially were shot when trying to surrender at the Fort Pillow Massacre.[207] This led to a breakdown of the prisoner and mail exchange program[208] and the growth of prison camps such as Andersonville prison in Georgia,[209] where almost 13,000 Union prisoners of war died of starvation and disease.[210] After the war, Henry Wirz, the prison's commandant, was tried for war crimes and executed. In spite of the South's shortage of soldiers, most Southern leaders until 1865 opposed enlisting slaves. They used them as laborers to support the war effort. As Howell Cobb said, "If slaves will make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong." Confederate generals Patrick Cleburne and Robert E. Lee argued in favor of arming blacks late in the war, and Jefferson Davis was eventually persuaded to support plans for arming slaves to avoid military defeat. The Confederacy surrendered at Appomattox before this plan could be implemented.[211] Historian John D. Winters, in The Civil War in Louisiana (1963), referred to the exhilaration of the slaves when the Union Army came through Louisiana: "As the troops moved up to Alexandria, the Negroes crowded the roadsides to watch the passing army. They were 'all frantic with joy, some weeping, some blessing, and some dancing in the exuberance of their emotions.' All of the Negroes were attracted by the pageantry and excitement of the army. Others cheered because they anticipated the freedom to plunder and to do as they pleased now that the Federal troops were there."[212]

The Emancipation Proclamation[213] greatly reduced the Confederacy's hope of getting aid from Britain or France. Lincoln's moderate approach succeeded in getting border states, War Democrats and emancipated slaves fighting on the same side for the Union. The Union-controlled border states (Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Delaware and West Virginia) were not covered by the Emancipation Proclamation. All abolished slavery on their own, except Kentucky and Delaware.[214]

Union Army soldier on his release from Andersonville prison in May, 1865.

American Civil War The great majority of the 4million slaves were freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, as Union armies moved south. The 13th amendment,[215] ratified December 6, 1865, finally made slavery illegal everywhere in the United States, thus freeing the remaining slaves65,000 in Kentucky (as of 1865),[216] 1,800 in Delaware, and 18 in New Jersey as of 1860.[217] Historian Stephen Oates said that many myths surround Lincoln: "man of the people", "true Christian", "arch villain" and racist. The belief that Lincoln was racist was caused by an incomplete picture of Lincoln, such as focusing on only selective quoting of statements Lincoln made to gain the support of the border states and Northern Democrats, and ignoring the many things he said against slavery, and the military and political context within which such statements were made. Oates said that Lincoln's letter to Horace Greeley has been "persistently misunderstood and misrepresented" for such reasons.[218]

21

Blocking international intervention


Europe in the 1860s was more fragmented than it had been since before the American Revolution. France was in a weakened state while Britain was still shocked by their poor performance in the Crimean War.[219] France was unable or unwilling to support either side without Britain, where popular support remained with the Union though elite opinion was more varied. They were further distracted by Germany and Italy, who were experiencing unification troubles, and by Russia, who was almost unflinching in their support for the Union.[219][220] Though the Confederacy hoped that Britain and France would join them against the Union, this was never likely, and so they instead tried to bring Britain and France in as mediators.[219][220] The Union, under Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward worked to block this, and threatened war if any country officially recognized the existence of the Confederate States of America. In 1861, Southerners voluntarily embargoed cotton shipments, hoping to start an economic depression in Europe that would force Britain to enter the war in order to get cotton.[221] Cotton diplomacy proved a failure as Europe had a surplus of cotton, while the 186062 crop failures in Europe made the North's grain exports of critical importance. It also helped to turn European opinion further away from the Confederacy. It was said that "King Corn was more powerful than King Cotton", as U.S. grain went from a quarter of the British import trade to almost half.[221] When Britain did face a cotton shortage, it was temporary, being replaced by increased cultivation in Egypt and India. Meanwhile, the war created employment for arms makers, ironworkers, and British ships to transport weapons.[222]

Crewmembers of USS Wissahickon by the ship's 11-inch Dahlgren gun, circa 1863

Charles Francis Adams proved particularly adept as minister to Britain for the U.S. and Britain was reluctant to boldly challenge the blockade. The Confederacy purchased several warships from commercial ship builders in Britain. The most famous, the CSS Alabama, did considerable damage and led to serious postwar disputes. However, public opinion against slavery created a political liability for European politicians, especially in Britain (who had herself abolished slavery in her own colonies in 1834).[223] War loomed in late 1861 between the U.S. and Britain over the Trent Affair, involving the U.S. Navy's boarding of a British mail steamer to seize two Confederate diplomats. However, London and Washington were able to smooth over the problem after Lincoln released the two. In 1862, the British considered mediationthough even such an offer would have risked war with the U.S. Lord Palmerston reportedly read Uncle Toms Cabin three times when deciding on this.[223] The Union victory in the Battle of Antietam caused them to delay this decision. The Emancipation Proclamation over time would reinforce the political liability of supporting the Confederacy. Despite sympathy for the Confederacy, France's own seizure of Mexico ultimately deterred them from war with the Union. Confederate offers

American Civil War late in the war to end slavery in return for diplomatic recognition were not seriously considered by London or Paris. After 1863, the Polish revolt against Russia further distracted the European powers, and ensured that they would continue to remain neutral.[224]

22

Victory and aftermath


Comparison of Union and CSA[225]
Union Total population Free population Slave population, 1860 Soldiers Railroad length Manufactured items Firearm production Bales of cotton in 1860 Bales of cotton in 1864 Pre-war U.S. exports 22,100,000 (71%) 21,700,000 400,000 2,100,000 (67%) CSA 9,100,000 (29%) 5,600,000 3,500,000 1,064,000 (33%)

21788 miles (unknown operator: u'strong' km) (71%) 8838 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) (29%) 90% 97% Negligible Negligible 30% 10% 3% 4,500,000 300,000 70%

Historians have debated whether the Confederacy could have won the war. Most scholars, such as James McPherson, argue that Confederate victory was at least possible.[226] McPherson argues that the Norths advantage in population and resources made Northern victory likely but not guaranteed. He also argues that if the Confederacy had fought using unconventional tactics, they would have more easily been able to hold out long enough to exhaust the Union.[227]
Andersonville National Cemetery is the final resting place for the Union prisoners who perished while being held at Camp Sumter.

Confederates did not need to invade and hold enemy territory to win, but only needed to fight a defensive war to convince the North that the cost of winning was too high. The North needed to conquer and hold vast stretches of enemy territory and defeat Confederate armies to

win.[227] Some scholars, such as those of the Lost Cause tradition, argue that the Union held an insurmountable long-term advantage over the Confederacy in terms of industrial strength and population. Confederate actions, they argue, only delayed defeat. Civil War historian Shelby Foote expressed this view succinctly: "I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back...If there had been more Southern victories, and a lot more, the North simply would have brought that other hand out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that War."[228] The Confederacy sought to win independence by out-lasting Lincoln; however, after Atlanta fell and Lincoln defeated McClellan in the election of 1864, all hope for a political victory for the South ended. At that point, Lincoln had succeeded in getting the support of the border states, War Democrats, emancipated slaves, Britain, and France. By defeating the Democrats and McClellan, he also defeated the Copperheads and their peace platform.[229] Also important were Lincoln's eloquence in rationalizing the national purpose and his skill in keeping the border states committed to the Union cause. Although Lincoln's approach to emancipation was slow, the Emancipation

American Civil War Proclamation was an effective use of the President's war powers.[230] The Confederate government failed in its attempt to get Europe involved in the war militarily, particularly the United Kingdom and France. Southern leaders needed to get European powers to help break up the blockade the Union had created around the Southern ports and cities. Lincoln's naval blockade was 95% effective at stopping trade goods; as a result, imports and exports to the South declined significantly. The abundance of European cotton and the United Kingdom's hostility to the institution of slavery, along with Lincoln's Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico naval blockades, severely decreased any chance that either the United Kingdom or France would enter the war. The more industrialized economy of the North aided in the production of arms, munitions and supplies, as well as finances and transportation. The table shows the relative advantage of the Union over the Confederate States of America (CSA) at the start of the war. The advantages widened rapidly during the war, as the Northern economy grew, and Confederate territory shrank and its economy weakened. The Union population was 22million and the South 9million in 1861. The Southern population included more than 3.5million slaves and about 5.5million whites, thus leaving the South's white population outnumbered by a ratio of more than four to one.[231] The disparity grew as the Union controlled an increasing amount of southern territory with garrisons, and cut off the trans-Mississippi part of the Confederacy. The Union at the start controlled over 80% of the shipyards, steamships, riverboats, and the Navy. It augmented these by a massive shipbuilding program. This enabled the Union to control the river systems and to blockade the entire southern coastline.[232] Excellent railroad links between Union cities allowed for the quick and cheap movement of troops and supplies. Transportation was much slower and more difficult in the South, which was unable to augment its much smaller rail system, repair damage, or even perform routine Collecting bones after the Battle of Cold Harbor. maintenance.[233] The failure of Davis to maintain positive and April 1865. productive relationships with state governors (especially Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia and Governor Zebulon Baird Vance of North Carolina) damaged his ability to draw on regional resources.[234] The Confederacy's "King Cotton" misperception of the world economy led to bad diplomacy, such as the refusal to ship cotton before the blockade started.[235] The Emancipation Proclamation enabled African-Americans, both free blacks and escaped slaves, to join the Union Army. About 190,000 volunteered, further enhancing the numerical advantage the Union armies enjoyed over the Confederates, who did not dare emulate the equivalent manpower source for fear of fundamentally undermining the legitimacy of slavery. Emancipated slaves mostly handled garrison duties, and fought numerous battles in 186465.[236] European immigrants joined the Union Army in large numbers, including 177,000 born in Germany and 144,000 born in Ireland.[237] The railroad industry became the nation's largest employer outside of agriculture. The American Civil War was followed by a boom in railroad construction, which contributed to the Panic of 1873.[238][239]

23

American Civil War

24

Results
Slavery for the Confederacy's 3.5 million blacks effectively ended when Union armies arrived; they were nearly all freed by the Emancipation Proclamation. Slaves in the border states and those located in some former Confederate territory occupied prior to the Emancipation Proclamation were freed by state action or (on December 18, 1865) by the Thirteenth Amendment. The full restoration of the Union was the work of a highly contentious postwar era known as Reconstruction. The war produced about 1,030,000 casualties (3% of the population), including about 620,000 soldier deathstwo-thirds by disease.[240] Binghamton University historian J. David Hacker believes the number of soldier deaths was approximately 750,000, 20% higher than traditionally estimated, and possibly as high as 850,000.[241][242] The war accounted for roughly as many American deaths as all American deaths in other U.S. wars combined.[243]

A double amputee Alfred A. Stratton lost his arms at Petersburg in 1864.

The causes of the war, the reasons for its outcome, and even the name of the war itself are subjects of lingering contention today. Based on 1860 census figures, 8% of all white males aged 13 to 43 died in the war, including 6% in the North and 18% in the South.[244][245] About 56,000 soldiers died in prisons during the Civil War.[246] An estimated 60,000 men lost limbs in the war.[247] One reason for the high number of battle deaths during the war was the use of Napoleonic tactics, such as charging. With the advent of more accurate rifled barrels, Mini balls and (near the end of the war for the Union army) repeating firearms such as the Spencer repeating rifle, soldiers were mowed down when standing in lines in the open. This led to the adoption of trench warfare, a style of fighting that defined the better part of World War I. The war destroyed much of the wealth that had existed in the South. Income per person in the South dropped to less than 40% than that of the North, a condition which lasted until well into the 20th century. Southern influence in the US federal government, previously considerable, was greatly diminished until the latter half of the 20th century.[248] Reconstruction Reconstruction began during the war (and continued to 1877) in an effort to solve the issues caused by reunion, specifically the legal status of the 11 breakaway states, the Confederate leadership, and the freedmen. Northern leaders during the war agreed that victory would require more than the end of fighting. It had to encompass the two war goals: secession had to be repudiated and all forms of slavery had to be eliminated. Lincoln and the Radical Republicans disagreed sharply on the criteria for these goals. They also disagreed on the degree of federal control that should be imposed on the South, and the process by which Southern states should be reintegrated into the Union. These disputes became central to the political debates after the Confederacy collapsed.

American Civil War

25

Memory and historiography


The Civil War is one of the central events in America's collective memory. There are innumerable statues, commemorations, books and archival collections. The memory includes the home front, military affairs, the treatment of soldiers, both living and dead, in the war's aftermath, depictions of the war in literature and art, evaluations of heroes and villains, and considerations of the moral and political lessons of the war.[249] The last theme includes moral evaluations of racism and slavery, heroism in combat and behind the lines, and the issues of democracy and minority rights, as well as the notion of an "Empire of Liberty" influencing the world.[250] Memory of the war in the white South crystallized in the myth of the "Lost Cause", which shaped regional identity and race relations for generations.[251]

Monument in honor of the Grand Army of the Republic, organized after the war.

150th anniversary
The year 2011 included the American Civil War's 150th anniversary. Many in the South attempted to incorporate both black history and white perspectives. A Harris Poll given in March 2011 suggested that Americans were still uniquely divided over the results and appropriate memorials to acknowledge the occasion.[252] While traditionally American films of the Civil War feature "brother versus brother" themes[253] film treatments of the war are evolving to include African American characters. Benard Simelton, president of the Alabama NAACP, said celebrating the Civil War is like celebrating the "Holocaust". In reference to slavery, Simelton said that black "rights were taken away" and that blacks "were treated as less than human beings." National Park historian Bob Sutton said that slavery was the "principal cause" of the war. Sutton also claimed that the issue of state rights was incorporated by the Confederacy as a justification for the war in order to get recognition from Britain. Sutton went on to mention that during the 100th anniversary of the Civil War white southerners focused on the genius of southern generals, rather than slavery. In Virginia during the fall of 2010, a conference took place that addressed the slavery issue. During November 2010, black Civil War reenactors from around the country participated in a parade at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.[254]

Hollywood
Hollywood's take on the war has been especially influential in shaping public memory, as seen in such films as "Birth of a Nation," "Gone with the Wind" and "Glory".[255] Filmography Andersonville (1996) An Occurence at Owl Bridge (1962) The Battle of Gettysburg (1913) The Birth of a Nation (1915) The Blue and the Gray (1982 TV series) The Civil War (1990) Civil War Minutes: Confederate (2007) Civil War Minutes: Union (2001) Cold Mountain (2003)

The Colt (2005) Dances with Wolves (1990) Dog Jack (2010)

American Civil War Drums in the Deep South (1951) The General (1926) Gettysburg (1993) Glory (1989) Gods and Generals (2003) Gone with the Wind (1939) The Good The Bad and The Ugly (1967) The Horse Soldiers (1959) The Hunley (1999) The Last Confederate: The Story of Robert Adams (2007) Major Dundee (1965) North and South (TV miniseries) Trilogy (1985, 1986, 1994) The Outlaw Josey Wales (1976) Pharaoh's Army (1995) Raintree County (1957) The Red Badge of Courage (1951) Ride with the Devil (1999) The Shadow Riders (1982) Shenandoah (1965) Sommersby (1993) "Wicked Spring" (2002)

26

Notes
[1] Howard Jones, Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War (1999) p. 154. [2] Frank J. Williams, "Doing Less and Doing More: The President and the ProclamationLegally, Militarily and Politically," in Harold Holzer, ed. The Emancipation Proclamation (2006) pp. 745. [3] (http:/ / www. binghamton. edu/ inside/ index. php/ inside/ story/ history-professor-civil-war-death-toll-has-been-underestimated) [4] " Killing ground: photographs of the Civil War and the changing American landscape (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=YpAuHGkuIe0C)". John Huddleston (2002). Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-6773-6. [5] James C. Bradford, A companion to American military history (2010) vol. 1 p. 101 [6] Foner, Eric (1981). Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=rQSYk-LWTxcC). ISBN978-0-19-502926-0. . Retrieved 2012-04-20. [7] Foner, Eric. "The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery" (2011) p 74. [8] McPherson pp 5068 [9] McPherson p 686 [10] Christopher J. Olsen (2002). Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi: Masculinity, Honor, and the Antiparty Tradition, 1830-1860 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=RrBb2ThDuCkC& pg=PA237). Oxford University Press. p.237. . Retrieved 2012-04-20. footnote 33 [11] Lacy Ford (2011). A Companion to the Civil War and Reconstruction (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=xeQAERwie80C& pg=PT28). Wiley. p.28. . Retrieved 2012-04-20. [12] Quoted in Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (2010) p. 100 [13] Glenn M. Linden (2001). Voices from the Gathering Storm: The Coming of the American Civil War (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=F20ZsA5ZeeEC& pg=PA184). United States: Rowman & Littlefield. p.236. ISBN978-0-8420-2999-5. . "Prevent, as far as possible, any of our friends from demoralizing themselves, and our cause, by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort, on slavery extension. There is no possible compromise upon it, but which puts us under again, and leaves all our work to do over again. Whether it be a Mo. Line, or Eli Thayer's Pop. Sov. It is all the same. Let either be done, & immediately filibustering and extending slavery recommences. On that point hold firm, as with a chain of steel. Abraham Lincoln to Elihu B. Washburne, December 13, 1860" [14] Let there be no compromise on the question of extending slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and, ere long, must be done again. The dangerous groundthat into which some of our friends have a hankering to runis Pop. Sov. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come, & better now, than any time hereafter. Abraham Lincoln to Lyman Trumbull, December 10, 1860. [15] Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (2nd ed. 1995) pp 31112 [16] Cited in Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln: a very short introduction (Oxford U.P., 2009) p. 61 [17] Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South (Wesleyan U.P,. 1988) p 244

American Civil War


[18] Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (2000) pp 1278 [19] Lincoln's Speech in Chicago, December 10, 1856 in which he said, "We shall again be able not to declare, that 'all States as States, are equal,' nor yet that 'all citizens as citizens are equal,' but to renew the broader, better declaration, including both these and much more, that 'all men are created equal.'"; Also, Lincoln's Letter to Henry L. Pierce, April 6, 1859. [20] The People's Chronology, 1994 by James Trager. [21] William E. Gienapp, "The Crisis of American Democracy: The Political System and the Coming of the Civil War." in Boritt ed. Why the Civil War Came 79123. [22] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 8891. [23] Most of her slave owners are "decent, honorable people, themselves victims" of that institution. Much of her description was based on personal observation, and the descriptions of Southerners; she herself calls them and Legree representatives of different types of masters.;Gerson, Harriet Beecher Stowe, p. 68; Stowe, Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin (1953) p. 39. [24] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 201204, 299327. [25] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 208. [26] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 208209. [27] Fox Butterfield; All God's Children p. 17. [28] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 210211. [29] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 212213. [30] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 356384. [31] Miriam Forman-Brunell, Leslie Paris (2010) " The Girls' History and Culture Reader: The Nineteenth Century (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=bYE0DuIxkHIC& pg=PA136)". University of Illinois Press. p.136. ISBN 978-0-252-07765-4. [32] Kathleen Collins, "The Scourged Back," History of Photography 9 (January 1985): 4345. [33] Lipset looked at the secessionist vote in each Southern state in 186061. In each state he divided the counties into high, medium or low proportion of slaves. He found that in the 181 high-slavery counties, the vote was 72% for secession. In the 205 low-slavery counties. the vote was only 37% for secession. (And in the 153 middle counties, the vote for secession was in the middle at 60%). Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Doubleday, 1960) p. 349. [34] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 242, 255, 28283. Maps on p. 101 (The Southern Economy) and p. 236 (The Progress of Secession) are also relevant. [35] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 503505. [36] James G. Randall and David Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction (1961) p. 68. [37] Randall and Donald, p. 67. [38] 1860 Census Results (http:/ / www. civil-war. net/ pages/ 1860_census. html), The Civil War Home Page. [39] James McPherson, Drawn with the Sword, p. 15. [40] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 275. [41] Roger B. Taney: Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857). [42] First Lincoln Douglas Debate at Ottawa, Illinois August 21, 1858. [43] Abraham Lincoln, Speech at New Haven, Conn., March 6, 1860. [44] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 195. [45] John Townsend, The Doom of Slavery in the Union, its Safety out of it, October 29, 1860. [46] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 243. [47] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 461. [48] William C. Davis, Look Away, pp. 130140. [49] William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, p. 42. [50] A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union, February 2, 1861 A declaration of the causes which impel the State of Texas to secede from the Federal Union. (http:/ / www2. tsl. state. tx. us/ ref/ abouttx/ secession/ 2feb1861. html) [51] Winkler, E. "A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union." (http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ 19th_century/ csa_texsec. asp). Journal of the Secession Convention of Texas. . Retrieved 2007-10-16. [52] Speech of E. S. Dargan to the Secession Convention of Alabama, January 11, 1861, in Wikisource. [53] Schlesinger Age of Jackson, p. 190. [54] David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage (2006) p 197, 409; Stanley Harrold, The Abolitionists and the South, 18311861 (1995) p. 62; Jane H. and William H. Pease, "Confrontation and Abolition in the 1850s" Journal of American History (1972) 58(4): 923937. [55] Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (1970), p. 9. [56] William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant 18541861, pp. 924. [57] William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Secessionists Triumphant, pp. 269462, p. 274 (The quote about slave states "encircled by fire" is from the New Orleans Delta, May 13, 1860). [58] (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=rQSYk-LWTxcC) [59] Eskridge, Larry (Jan 29, 2011). "After 150 years, we still ask: Why this cruel war?." (http:/ / www. cantondailyledger. com/ topstories/ x1868081570/ After-150-years-we-still-ask-Why-this-cruel-war). Canton Daily Ledger (Canton, Illinois). . Retrieved 2011-01-29. [60] Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism 18191848 (1948).

27

American Civil War


[61] Robert Royal Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 18401861 (1973). [62] Adam Rothman, Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South (2005). [63] Kenneth M. Stampp, The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War (1981) p. 198; Woodworth, ed. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996), 145 151 505 512 554 557 684; Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (1969). [64] Clement Eaton, Freedom of Thought in the Old South (1940) [65] John Hope Franklin, The Militant South 18001861 (1956). [66] Abraham Lincoln, Cooper Union Address, New York, February 27, 1860. [67] Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (1972) pp. 64869. [68] James McPherson, "Antebellum Southern Exceptionalism: A New Look at an Old Question," Civil War History 29 (September 1983). [69] Bestor, 1964, pp. 1011 [70] McPherson, 2007, p. 14. [71] Stampp, pp. 190193. [72] Bestor, 1964, p. 11. [73] Krannawitter, 2008, pp. 4950. [74] McPherson, 2007, pp. 1314. [75] Bestor, 1964, pp. 1718. [76] Guelzo, pp. 2122. [77] Bestor, 1964, p. 15. [78] Miller, 2008, p. 153. [79] McPherson, 2007, p. 3. [80] Bestor, 1964, p. 19. [81] McPherson, 2007, p. 16. [82] Bestor, 1964, pp. 1920. [83] Bestor, 1964, pp. 2021. [84] Bestor, 1964, p. 20. [85] Russell, 1966, p. 468-469 [86] Bestor, 1964, p. 21. [87] Bestor, 1964, pp. 2122. [88] Bestor, 1964, pp. 2324. [89] Russell, 1966, p. 470 [90] Bestor, 1964, p. 24. [91] Holt, 2004, pp. 3435. [92] McPherson, 2007, p. 7. [93] Krannawitter, 2008, p. 232. [94] Bestor, 1964, pp. 2425. [95] David M. Potter, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," American Historical Review, Vol. 67, No. 4 (July 1962), pp. 924950 in JSTOR (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 1845246). [96] C. Vann Woodward, American Counterpoint: Slavery and Racism in the North-South Dialogue (1971), p.281. [97] Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The Shaping of Southern Culture: Honor, Grace, and War, 1760s1880s (2000). [98] Avery Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 18481861 (1953). [99] "Republican Platform of 1860," in Kirk H. Porter, and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds. National Party Platforms, 18401956, (University of Illinois Press, 1956) p. 32. [100] Susan-Mary Grant, North over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era (2000); Melinda Lawson, Patriot Fires: Forging a New American Nationalism in the Civil War North (2005). [101] Forrest McDonald, States' Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 17761876 (2002) [102] James McPherson, This Mighty Scourge, pp. 39. [103] Before 1850, slave owners controlled the presidency for fifty years, the Speaker's chair for forty-one years, and the chairmanship of the House Ways and Means Committee that set tariffs for forty-two years, while 18 of 31 Supreme Court justices owned slaves. Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 17801860 (2000) pp. 19 [104] Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (1970). [105] Charles C. Bolton, Poor Whites of the Antebellum South: Tenants and Laborers in Central North Carolina and Northeast Mississippi (1993) p. 67. [106] Frank Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (1931), pp 11561 [107] Richard Hofstadter, "The Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil War," The American Historical Review Vol. 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1938), pp.5055 full text in JSTOR (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ pss/ 1840850) [108] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, p. 485. [109] Bornstein, David (April 14, 2011). "Lincoln's Call to Arms" (http:/ / opinionator. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2011/ 04/ 14/ lincoln-declares-war/ ). Opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com. Archived (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20110713131234/ http:/ / opinionator. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2011/

28

American Civil War


04/ 14/ lincoln-declares-war/ ) from the original on July 13, 2011. . Retrieved 2011-08-11. [110] Maury Klein, Days of Defiance: Sumter, Secession, and the Coming of the Civil War (1999). [111] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 254. [112] President James Buchanan, Message of December 8, 1860 online (http:/ / www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ ws/ index. php?pid=29501). [113] Ordinances of Secession by State (http:/ / www. civil-war. net/ pages/ ordinances_secession. asp) [114] The text of the Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union (http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ 19th_century/ csa_scarsec. asp). [115] The text of A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the State of Mississippi from the Federal Union (http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ 19th_century/ csa_missec. asp). [116] The text of Georgia's secession declaration (http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ 19th_century/ csa_geosec. asp). [117] The text of A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union (http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ 19th_century/ csa_texsec. asp). [118] Declaration of Causes of Secession (http:/ / sunsite. utk. edu/ civil-war/ reasons. html) [119] Gibson, Arrell. Oklahoma, a History of Five Centuries (University of Oklahoma Press, 1981) pg.117120 [120] "United States Volunteers Indian Troops" (http:/ / www. civilwararchive. com/ Unreghst/ unindtr. htm). civilwararchive.com. January 28, 2008. . Retrieved 2008-08-10. [121] "Civil War Refugees" (http:/ / digital. library. okstate. edu/ encyclopedia/ entries/ C/ CI013. html). Oklahoma Historical Society. Oklahoma State University. . Retrieved 2008-08-10. [122] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 284287. [123] Nevins, The War for the Union (1959) 1:119-29. [124] Nevins, The War for the Union (1959) 1:129-36. [125] "A State of Convenience, The Creation of West Virginia" (http:/ / www. wvculture. org/ History/ statehood/ statehood10. html). West Virginia Archives & History. . Retrieved 2012-04-20. [126] Curry, Richard Orr, A House Divided, A Study of the Statehood Politics & the Copperhead Movement in West Virginia, Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1964, map on page 49 [127] Weigley, Russell F., "A Great Civil War, A Military and Political History 18611865, Indiana Univ. Press, 2000, p. 55. [128] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 303. [129] Snell, Mark A., West Virginia and the Civil War, History Press, Charleston, SC, 2011, pg. 28 [130] Mark Neely, Confederate Bastille: Jefferson Davis and Civil Liberties 1993 pp. 1011. [131] Gabor Boritt, ed. War Comes Again (1995) p. 247. [132] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 234266. [133] Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Monday, March 4, 1861. [134] Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861. [135] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pp. 572573. [136] "Lincoln's Call for Troops" (http:/ / www. civilwarhome. com/ lincolntroops. htm). . [137] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 274. [138] Massachusetts in the Civil War, William Schouler, 1868 book republished by Digital Scanning Inc, 2003 See the account at (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?vid=ISBN1582180016& id=ub8cqVKoXwgC& pg=PA35& lpg=PA34& vq=baltimore& dq=schouler+ massachusetts+ civil& sig=g5za9rXjH9ttx1vzmWNN39F3YFQ). [139] "Abraham Lincoln: Proclamation 83 Increasing the Size of the Army and Navy" (http:/ / www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ ws/ index. php?pid=70123). Presidency.ucsb.edu. . Retrieved 2011-11-03. [140] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 276307. [141] Allan Peskin, Winfield Scott and the profession of arms (2003) pp. 24952. [142] Timothy D. Johnson, Winfield Scott (1998) p. 228 [143] Dean B. Mahin, One war at a time: the international dimensions of the American Civil War (2000) ch 6 [144] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 378380. [145] Heidler, 165153. [146] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 373377. [147] Fort Pulaski National Monument, National Park Service Historical Handbook Series (http:/ / www. google. com/ imgres?imgurl=http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ history/ online_books/ hh/ 18/ images/ hh18f1. jpg& imgrefurl=http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ history/ online_books/ hh/ 18/ hh18f. htm& usg=__6sa3WbdkbTZm5UCP22OCp4mQi7A=& h=338& w=250& sz=9& hl=en& start=1& zoom=1& um=1& itbs=1& tbnid=X6XQWqMD0Hb9iM:& tbnh=119& tbnw=88& prev=/ search?q=colonel+ charles+ h. + olmstead& um=1& hl=en& sa=N& biw=1260& bih=617& tbm=isch& ei=O4vtTez4M9ScgQet-7CsBw) (about 1962). Significance of the Siege [148] Albert Burton Moore. Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (1924) online edition (https:/ / www. questia. com/ PM. qst?a=o& d=10517499). [149] Barnet Schecter, The Devil's Own Work: The Civil War Draft Riots and the Fight to Reconstruct America (2007). [150] Eugene Murdock, One million men: the Civil War draft in the North (1971). [151] Mark Johnson, That body of brave men: the U.S. regular infantry and the Civil War in the West (2003) p. 575.

29

American Civil War


[152] "Desertion No Bar to Pension" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ mem/ archive-free/ pdf?res=9C0CE0D91630E033A2575BC2A9639C94659ED7CF). New York Times. May 28, 1894. . Retrieved 2011-10-03. [153] Mark A. Weitz, More Damning than Slaughter: Desertion in the Confederate Army (2005) [154] Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 17841898 (1986) p. 193. [155] Hamner, Christopher. " Great Expectations for the Civil War (http:/ / teachinghistory. org/ history-content/ ask-a-historian/ 24413)." Teachinghistory.org (http:/ / www. teachinghistory. org/ ). Retrieved 2011-07-11. [156] Ella Lonn, Desertion during the Civil War (1928) pp205-6 [157] Robert Fantina, Desertion and the American soldier, 17762006 (2006) p. 74 [158] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 339345. [159] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 342. [160] Shelby Foote, The Civil War: Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 464519. [161] Bruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword, pp. 263296. [162] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 424427. [163] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 538544. [164] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 528533. [165] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 543545. [166] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 557558. [167] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 571574. [168] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 639645. [169] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 653663. [170] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 664. [171] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 404405. [172] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 418420. [173] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 419420. [174] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 480483. [175] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 405413. [176] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 637638. [177] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 677680. [178] "Civil War in Missouri Facts" (http:/ / home. usmo. com/ ~momollus/ MOFACTS. HTM). 1998. Archived (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20071016074650/ http:/ / home. usmo. com/ ~momollus/ MOFACTS. HTM) from the original on October 16, 2007. . Retrieved 2007-10-16. [179] Mark E. Neely Jr.; "Was the Civil War a Total War?" Civil War History, Vol. 50, 2004 pp 434+ [180] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 724735. [181] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 741742. [182] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 778779. [183] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 773776. [184] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 812815. [185] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 825830. [186] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 846847. [187] William Marvel, Lee's Last Retreat: The Flight to Appomattox (2002) pp. 15881. [188] Unaware of the surrender of Lee, on April 16 the last major battles of the war were fought at the Battle of Columbus, Georgia and the Battle of West Point. [189] http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 1865/ 05/ 10/ news/ important-proclamations-belligerent-rights-rebels-end-all-nations-warned-against. html [190] Morris, John Wesley, Ghost towns of Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1977, pp. 6869, ISBN 0-8061-1420-7 [191] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 495. [192] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 355, 4946, quote from George Washington Julian on 495. [193] Baker, Kevin (March 2003). " Violent City (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20101019000238/ http:/ / americanheritage. com/ articles/ magazine/ ah/ 2003/ 1/ 2003_1_17. shtml)" American Heritage. Retrieved 2010-07-29. [194] Barnet Schecter, The Devil's Own Work: The Civil War Draft Riots and the Fight to Reconstruct America (2007), ch 6. [195] Craig A. Warren, "'Oh, God, What a Pity!': The Irish Brigade at Fredericksburg and the Creation of Myth," Civil War History, Sept 2001, Vol. 47 Issue 3, pp 193221 [196] Wittke, Carl (1952). Refugees of Revolution. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania press. [197] Christian B. Keller, "Flying Dutchmen and Drunken Irishmen: The Myths and Realities of Ethnic Civil War Soldiers", Journal of Military History, Vol/ 73, No. 1, January 2009, pp. 117145; for primary sources see Walter D. Kamphoefner and Wolfgang Helbich, eds., Germans in the Civil War: The Letters They Wrote Home (2006). [198] Lincoln's letter to O. H. Browning, September 22, 1861. [199] James McPherson in Gabor S. Boritt, ed. Lincoln, the War President pp. 5254. [200] Stephen B. Oates, Abraham Lincoln: The Man Behind the Myths, p. 106. [201] Images of America: Altoona, by Sr. Anne Francis Pulling, 2001, 10. [202] Letter to Greeley, August 22, 1862

30

American Civil War


[203] Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865 Here Lincoln states, "One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it." [204] Lincoln's Letter to A. G. Hodges, April 4, 1864. [205] James McPherson, The War that Never Goes Away [206] James McPherson, Drawn With the Sword, from the article Who Freed the Slaves? [207] Bruce Catton, Never Call Retreat, p. 335. [208] "Civil War Topics" (http:/ / www. dce. k12. wi. us/ historyday/ Topics/ CivilWar. htm). Dce.k12.wi.us. . Retrieved 2010-10-31. [209] " Blacks labored in Andersonville (http:/ / www. washingtontimes. com/ news/ 2009/ nov/ 12/ book-review-blacks-labored-in-andersonville/ )". Washington Times. November 12, 2009. [210] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 791798. [211] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 831837. [212] John D. Winters, The Civil War in Louisiana, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963, ISBN 978-0-8071-0834-5, p. 237 [213] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 557558, 563. [214] Harper, Douglas (2003). "SLAVERY in DELAWARE" (http:/ / www. slavenorth. com/ delaware. htm). Archived (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20071016062740/ http:/ / slavenorth. com/ delaware. htm) from the original on October 16, 2007. . Retrieved 2007-10-16. [215] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 840842. [216] Lowell Hayes Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (1997) p 235, the number in late 1865. [217] U.S. Census of 1860. [218] Stephen B. Oates, Abraham Lincoln: The Man Behind the Myths, 1984, Harper & Row. [219] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 546557. [220] George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: U.S. foreign relations since 1776 (2008) p 237 [221] McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 386. [222] Allen Nevins, War for the Union 18621863, pp. 263264. [223] Stephen B. Oates, The Approaching Fury: Voices of the Storm 18201861, p. 125. [224] George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: U.S. foreign relations since 1776 (2008) p 261 [225] Railroad length is from: Chauncey Depew (ed.), One Hundred Years of American Commerce 17951895, p. 111; For other data see: 1860 US census (http:/ / www2. census. gov/ prod2/ decennial/ documents/ 1860c-01. pdf) and Carter, Susan B., ed. The Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition (5 vols), 2006. [226] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 855. [227] James McPherson, Why did the Confederacy Lose? [228] Ward 1990 p 272 [229] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 771772. [230] Fehrenbacher, Don (2004). "Lincoln's Wartime Leadership: The First Hundred Days" (http:/ / quod. lib. umich. edu/ cgi/ t/ text/ text-idx?c=jala;view=text;rgn=main;idno=2629860. 0009. 103). University of Illinois. . Retrieved 2007-10-16. [231] Crocker III, H. W. (2006). Don't Tread on Me. New York: Crown Forum. p.162. ISBN978-1-4000-5363-6. [232] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 313316, 392393. [233] Heidler, David Stephen, ed. Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History (2002), 159198 [234] McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 432344. [235] Heidler, David Stephen, ed. Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History (2002), 598603 [236] Ira Berlin et al., eds. Freedom's Soldiers: The Black Military Experience in the Civil War (1998) [237] Albert Bernhardt Faust, The German Element in the United States (1909) v. 1, p. 523 online (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=4xgOAAAAIAAJ& pg=PA523). [238] Oberholtzer, Ellis Paxson. (1907) Jay Cooke: Financier Of The Civil War, Vol. 2 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=8jHiEwVmB8MC) at Google Books, pp. 378430 [239] Oberholtzer, Ellis Paxson. (1926) A History of the United States Since the Civil War 3:69122 [240] Nofi, Al (June 13, 2001). "Statistics on the War's Costs" (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20070711050249/ http:/ / www. cwc. lsu. edu/ other/ stats/ warcost. htm). Louisiana State University. Archived from the original (http:/ / www. cwc. lsu. edu/ other/ stats/ warcost. htm) on 2007-07-11. . Retrieved 2007-10-14. [241] "U.S. Civil War Took Bigger Toll Than Previously Estimated, New Analysis Suggests" (http:/ / www. sciencedaily. com/ releases/ 2011/ 09/ 110921120124. htm). Science Daily. September 22, 2011. . Retrieved 2011-09-22. [242] Hacker, J. David (September 20, 2011). "Recounting the Dead" (http:/ / opinionator. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2011/ 09/ 20/ recounting-the-dead/ ). The New York Times.com. . Retrieved 2011-09-22. [243] C. Vann Woodward, "Introduction" in James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. xix. [244] " Toward a social history of the American Civil War: exploratory essays (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=gySktxKYPGoC& pg=PA7)". Maris Vinovskis (1990). Cambridge University Press. p.7. ISBN 978-0-521-39559-5.

31

American Civil War


[245] Richard Wightman Fox (2008)." National Life After Death (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20110716083839/ http:/ / www. slate. com/ toolbar. aspx?action=read& id=2180856)". Slate.com. [246] " U.S. Civil War Prison Camps Claimed Thousands (http:/ / news. nationalgeographic. com/ news/ 2003/ 07/ 0701_030701_civilwarprisons. html)". National Geographic News. July 1, 2003. [247] " When Necessity Meets Ingenuity: Art of Restoring What's Missing (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2004/ 03/ 08/ business/ technology-when-necessity-meets-ingenuity-art-of-restoring-what-s-missing. html?src=pm)". The New York Times. March 8, 2004 [248] The Economist, " The Civil War: Finally Passing (http:/ / www. economist. com/ node/ 18486035?story_id=18486035)", April 2, 2011, pp. 2325. [249] Joan Waugh and Gary W. Gallagher, eds. Wars within a War: Controversy and Conflict over the American Civil War (U. of North Carolina Press, 2009) [250] David W. Blight, Race and Reunion : The Civil War in American Memory (2001) [251] Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause and the Emergence of the New South, 18651913 (1988) [252] Braverman, Samantha (March 29, 2011). "150 Years Later Remembering the American Civil War" (http:/ / www. harrisinteractive. com/ NewsRoom/ HarrisPolls/ tabid/ 447/ mid/ 1508/ articleId/ 739/ ctl/ ReadCustom Default/ Default. aspx). Harris Interactive Polls. . Retrieved 2011-04-22. [253] The Reel Civil War: Mythmaking in American Film (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=NfKF9RXLyr8C). Random House Digital, Inc. . Retrieved 2011-11-03. [254] "Civil War's 150th anniversary stirs debate on race" (http:/ / www. google. com/ hostednews/ ap/ article/ ALeqM5g02LT3cnj71haIQ8NXfRM-jR69yQ?docId=17de1f3fa7fe4a6999feb41ff12de8a1). Associated Press. Charles, South Carolina. December 10, 2010. . Retrieved 2010-12-18. [255] Gary Gallagher, Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know about the Civil War (U. of North Carolina Press, 2008)

32

References
Overviews
Beringer, Richard E., Archer Jones, and Herman Hattaway, Why the South Lost the Civil War (1986) influential analysis of factors; The Elements of Confederate Defeat: Nationalism, War Aims, and Religion (1988), abridged version Bestor, Arthur. 1964. The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis. (American Historical Review, LXIX, No. 2: January 1964) in Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction Ed. Irwin Unger. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York . 1970. Catton, Bruce, The Civil War, American Heritage, 1960, ISBN 978-0-8281-0305-3, illustrated narrative Davis, William C. The Imperiled Union, 18611865 3v (1983) Donald, David et al. The Civil War and Reconstruction (latest edition 2001); 700 page survey Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, (2001), ISBN 978-0-684-84944-7. Fellman, Michael et al. This Terrible War: The Civil War and its Aftermath (2nd ed. 2007), 544 page survey Guelzo, Allen C. 2004. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: the end of slavery in America. Simon & Schuster, New York Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative (3 volumes), (1974), ISBN 978-0-394-74913-6. Highly detailed military narrative covering all fronts Holt, Michael F. 2004. The fate of their country: politicians, slavery extension, and the coming of the Civil War Hill and Wang, New York. Katcher, Philip. The History of the American Civil War 18615, (2000), ISBN 978-0-600-60778-6. Detailed analysis of each battle with introduction and background Krannawitter, Thomas L. 2008. Vindicating Lincoln: Defending the Politics of Our Greatest President. Rowman & Littlefield, London. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (1988), 900 page survey of all aspects of the war; Pulitzer prize McPherson, James M. This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War. Oxford University Press. New York. McPherson, James M. Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (2nd ed 1992), textbook

American Civil War Nevins, Allan. Ordeal of the Union, an 8-volume set (19471971). the most detailed political, economic and military narrative; by Pulitzer Prize winner 1. Fruits of Manifest Destiny, 18471852; 2. A House Dividing, 18521857; 3. Douglas, Buchanan, and Party Chaos, 18571859; 4. Prologue to Civil War, 18591861; vol. 58 have the series title "War for the Union"; 5. The Improvised War, 18611862; 6. War Becomes Revolution, 18621863; 7. The Organized War, 18631864; 8. The Organized War to Victory, 18641865 Rhodes, James Ford. A History of the Civil War, 18611865 (1918), Pulitzer Prize; a short version of his 5-volume history Miller, William L. 2009. Abraham Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman Vintage Books. Russell, Robert R. 1966. Constitutional Doctrines with Regard to Slavery in Territories in Journal of Southern History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Nov. 1966), pp.466486. doi=10.2307/2204926 |jstor=2204926 Stampp, Kenneth M. 1990. America in 1857: a nation on the brink. Oxford University Press, New York. Ward, Geoffrey C. The Civil War (1990), based on PBS series by Ken Burns; visual emphasis Weigley, Russell Frank. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 18611865 (2004); primarily military

33

Biographies
American National Biography 24 vol (1999), essays by scholars on all major figures; online and hardcover editions at many libraries (http://www.anb.org/aboutanb.html) McHenry, Robert ed. Webster's American Military Biographies (1978) Warner, Ezra J., Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders, (1964), ISBN 978-0-8071-0822-2 Warner, Ezra J., Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders, (1959), ISBN 978-0-8071-0823-9 Soldiers Berlin, Ira, et al., eds. Freedom's Soldiers: The Black Military Experience in the Civil War (1998) Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse (2009) Hess, Earl J. The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat (1997) McPherson, James. For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (1998) Power, J. Tracy. Lee's Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to Appomattox (2002) Wiley, Bell Irvin. The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy (1962) (ISBN 978-0-8071-0475-0) Wiley, Bell Irvin. Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union (1952) (ISBN 978-0-8071-0476-7)

Reference books and bibliographies


Blair, Jayne E. The Essential Civil War: A Handbook to the Battles, Armies, Navies And Commanders (2006) Carter, Alice E. and Richard Jensen. The Civil War on the Web: A Guide to the Very Best Sites- 2nd ed. (2003) Current, Richard N., et al. eds. Encyclopedia of the Confederacy (1993) (4 Volume set; also 1 vol abridged version) (ISBN 978-0-13-275991-5) Faust, Patricia L. (ed.) Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (1986) (ISBN 978-0-06-181261-3) 2000 short entries Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars online edition 1995 Heidler, David Stephen, ed. Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History (2002), 1600 entries in 2700 pages in 5 vol or 1-vol editions North & South - The Official Magazine of the Civil War Society deals with book reviews, battles, discussion & analysis, and other issues of the American Civil War. Resch, John P. et al., Americans at War: Society, Culture and the Homefront vol 2: 18161900 (2005)

American Civil War Savage, Kirk, Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/36470304). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. (The definitive book on Civil War monuments.) Tulloch, Hugh. The Debate on the American Civil War Era (1999), historiography Wagner, Margaret E. Gary W. Gallagher, and Paul Finkelman, eds. The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference (2002) Woodworth, Steven E. ed. American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996) (ISBN 978-0-313-29019-0), 750 pages of historiography and bibliography online edition (http://www.questia.com/ read/14877569?title=The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research)

34

Primary sources
Commager, Henry Steele (ed.). The Blue and the Gray. The Story of the Civil War as Told by Participants. (1950), excerpts from primary sources Hesseltine, William B. ed.; The Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction (1962), excerpts from primary sources Simpson, Brooks D. et al. eds. The Civil War: The First Year Told by Those Who Lived It (Library of America 2011) 840pp, with 120 documents from 1861 online reviews (http://www.amazon.com/ Civil-War-First-Library-America/dp/1598530887/)

Further reading
Gugliotta, Guy. New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/ civil-war-toll-up-by-20-percent-in-new-estimate.html?ref=science&pagewanted=all), The New York Times, April 3, 2012, pg. D1 (of the New York edition), and April 2, 2012 on NYTimes.com. Retrieved 2012-04-03 online.

External links
American Civil War (http://www.dmoz.org/Society/History/By_Region/North_America/United_States/ Wars/Civil_War//) at the Open Directory Project Civil War photos (http://www.archives.gov/research/civil-war/photos/index.html) at the National Archives View images (http://www.loc.gov/pictures/search?st=grid&c=100&co=cwp) from the Civil War Photographs Collection (http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/cwp/) at the Library of Congress Civil War Trust (http://www.civilwar.org/) Civil War Era Digital Collection at Gettysburg College (http://www.gettysburg.edu/library/gettdigital/ civil_war/civilwar.htm) This collection contains digital images of political cartoons, personal papers, pamphlets, maps, paintings and photographs from the Civil War Era held in Special Collections at Gettysburg College. Civil War 150 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/civil-war) Washington Post interactive website on 150th Anniversary of the American Civil War. Civil War in the American South (http://www.american-south.org/) An Association of Southeastern Research Libraries (ASERL) portal with links to almost 9,000 digitized Civil War-era itemsbooks, pamphlets, broadsides, letters, maps, personal papers, and manuscriptsheld at ASERL member libraries The Civil War (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/) site with 7,000 pages, including the complete run of Harper's Weekly newspapers from the Civil War The short film A HOUSE DIVIDED (1960) (http://www.archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.54756) is available for free download at the Internet Archive Civil War Living History Reenactments (videos) (http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=U.S.+ Civil+War+reenactments&oq=U.S.+Civil+War+reenactments&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_l=youtube.12...0.

American Civil War 0.0.855.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0...0.0.U.S.) West Point Atlas of Civil War Battles (http://www.loc.gov/item/map66001088)

35

Origins of the American Civil War


Historians debating the origins of the American Civil War focus on the reasons seven states declared their secession from the U.S. and joined to form the Confederate States of America (the "Confederacy"). The main explanation is slavery, especially Southern anger at the attempts by Northern antislavery political forces to block the expansion of slavery into the western territories. Southern slave owners held that such a restriction on slavery would violate the principle of states' rights.

Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 presidential election without being on the ballot in ten of the Southern states. His victory triggered declarations of secession by seven slave states of the Deep South, and their formation of the Confederate States of America, even before Lincoln took office. Nationalists (in the North and elsewhere) refused to recognize the secessions, nor did any foreign government, and the U.S. government in Washington refused to abandon its forts that were in territory claimed by the Confederacy. War began in April 1861 when Confederates attacked Fort Sumter, a major U.S. fortress in South Carolina, the state that had been the first to declare its independence. As a panel of historians emphasized in 2011, "while slavery and its various and multifaceted discontents were the primary cause of disunion, it was disunion itself that sparked the war."[1] States' rights and the tariff issue became entangled in the slavery issue, and were intensified by it.[2] Other important factors were party politics, abolitionism, Southern nationalism, Northern nationalism, expansionism, sectionalism, economics and modernization in the Antebellum period. The United States had become a nation of two distinct regions. The free states in New England, the Northeast, and the Midwest[3] had a rapidly-growing economy based on family farms, industry, mining, commerce and transportation, with a large and rapidly growing urban population. Their growth was fed by a high birth rate and large numbers of European immigrants, especially Irish, British and German. The South was dominated by a settled plantation system based on slavery. There was some rapid growth taking place in the Southwest, (e.g., Texas), based on high birth rates and high migration from the Southeast, but it had a much lower immigration rate from Europe. The South also had fewer large cities, and little manufacturing except in border areas. Slave owners controlled politics and economics, though about 70% of Southern whites owned no slaves and usually were engaged in subsistence agriculture. Overall, the Northern population was growing much more quickly than the Southern population, which made it increasingly difficult for the South to continue to influence the national government. By the time of the 1860 election, the heavily agricultural southern states as a group had fewer Electoral College votes than the rapidly industrializing northern states. Lincoln was able to win the 1860 Presidential election without even being on the ballot in ten Southern states. Southerners felt a loss of federal concern for Southern pro-slavery political demands, and continued domination of the Federal government by "Slaveocracy" was on the wane. This political calculus

The Battle of Fort Sumter was the opening battle in a conflict that had been brewing for decades.

Origins of the American Civil War provided a very real basis for Southerners' worry about the relative political decline of their region due to the North growing much faster in terms of population and industrial output. In the interest of maintaining unity, politicians had mostly moderated opposition to slavery, resulting in numerous compromises such as the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After the Mexican-American War, the issue of slavery in the new territories led to the Compromise of 1850. While the compromise averted an immediate political crisis, it did not permanently resolve the issue of the Slave power (the power of slaveholders to control the national government on the slavery issue). Part of the 1850 compromise was the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, requiring that Northerners assist Southerners in reclaiming fugitive slaves, which many Northerners found to be extremely offensive. Amid the emergence of increasingly virulent and hostile sectional ideologies in national politics, the collapse of the old Second Party System in the 1850s hampered efforts of the politicians to reach yet one more compromise. The compromise that was reached (the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act) outraged too many northerners, and led to the formation of the Republican Party, the first major party with no appeal in the South. The industrializing North and agrarian Midwest became committed to the economic ethos of free-labor industrial capitalism. Arguments that slavery was undesirable for the nation had long existed, and early in U.S. history were made even by some prominent Southerners. After 1840, abolitionists denounced slavery as not only a social evil but a moral wrong. Many Northerners, especially leaders of the new Republican Party, considered slavery a great national evil and believed that a small number of Southern owners of large plantations controlled the national government with the goal of spreading that evil. Southern defenders of slavery, for their part, increasingly came to contend that blacks actually benefited from slavery, an assertion that alienated Northerners even further.

36

Background
Early Republic
At the time of the American Revolution, the institution of slavery was firmly established in the American colonies. It was most important in the six southern states from Maryland to Georgia, but the total of a half million slaves were spread out through all of the colonies. In the South 40% of the population was made up of slaves, and as Americans moved into Kentucky and the rest of the southwest fully one-sixth of the settlers were slaves. By the end of the war, the New England states provided most of the American ships that were used in the foreign slave trade while most of their customers were in Georgia and the Carolinas.[4] During this time many Americans found it difficult to reconcile slavery with their interpretation of Christianity and the lofty sentiments that flowed from the Declaration of Independence. A small antislavery movement, led by the Quakers, had some impact in the 1780s and by the late 1780s all of the states except for Georgia had placed some restrictions on their participation in slave trafficking. Still, no serious national political movement against slavery developed, largely due to the overriding concern over achieving national unity.[5] When the Constitutional Convention met, slavery was the one issue "that left the least possibility of compromise, the one that would most pit morality against pragmatism.[6] In the end, while many would take comfort in the fact that the word slavery never occurs in the Constitution, critics note that the three-fifths clause provided slaveholders with extra representatives in Congress, the requirement of the federal government to suppress domestic violence would dedicate national resources to defending against slave revolts, a twenty year delay in banning the import of slaves allowed the South to fortify its labor needs, and the amendment process made the national abolition of slavery very unlikely in the foreseeable future.[7] With the outlawing of the African slave trade on January 1, 1808 many Americans felt that the slavery issue was resolved.[8] Any national discussion that might have continued over slavery was drowned out by the years of trade embargoes, maritime competition with Great Britain and France, and, finally, the War of 1812. The one exception to this quiet regarding slavery was the New Englanders' association of their frustration with the war with their resentment of the three-fifths clause that seemed to allow the South to dominate national politics.[9]

Origins of the American Civil War In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the northern states (north of the Mason-Dixon Line separating Pennsylvania and Maryland) abolished slavery by 1804. In the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, Congress (still under the Articles of Confederation) barred slavery from the Mid-Western territory north of the Ohio River, but when the U.S. Congress organized the southern territories acquired through the Louisiana Purchase, the ban on slavery was omitted.

37

Missouri Compromise
In 1819 Congressman James Tallmadge, Jr. of New York initiated an uproar in the South when he proposed two amendments to a bill admitting Missouri to the Union as a free state. The first barred slaves from being moved to Missouri, and the second would free all Missouri slaves born after admission to the Union at age 25.[10] With the admission of Alabama as a slave state in 1819, the U.S. was equally divided with 11 slave states and 11 free states. The admission of the new state of Missouri as a slave state would give the slave states a majority in the Senate; the Tallmadge Amendment would give the free states a majority. The Tallmadge amendments passed the House of Representatives but failed in the Senate when five Northern Senators voted with all the Southern senators.[11] The question was now the admission of Missouri as a slave state, and many leaders shared Thomas Jefferson's fear of a crisis over slaverya fear that Jefferson described as "a fire bell in the night". The crisis was solved by the Compromise of 1820, which admitted Maine to the Union as a free state at the same time that Missouri was admitted as a slave state. The Compromise also banned slavery in the Louisiana Purchase territory north and west of the state of Missouri along the line of 3630. The Missouri Compromise quieted the issue until its limitations on slavery were repealed by the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854.[12] In the South, the Missouri crisis reawakened old fears that a strong federal government could be a fatal threat to slavery. The Jeffersonian coalition that united southern planters and northern farmers, mechanics and artisans in opposition to the threat presented by the Federalist Party had started to dissolve after the War of 1812.[13] It was not until the Missouri crisis that Americans became aware of the political possibilities of a sectional attack on slavery, and it was not until the mass politics of the Jackson Administration that this type of organization around this issue became practical.[14]

Nullification Crisis
The American System, advocated by Henry Clay in Congress and supported by many nationalist supporters of the War of 1812 such as John C. Calhoun, was a program for rapid economic modernization featuring protective tariffs, internal improvements at Federal expense, and a national bank. The purpose was to develop American industry and international commerce. Since iron, coal, and water power were mainly in the North, this tax plan was doomed to cause rancor in the South where economies were agriculture-based.[15][16] Southerners claimed it demonstrated favoritism toward the North.[17][18] The nation suffered an economic downturn throughout the 1820s, and South Carolina was particularly affected. The highly protective Tariff of 1828 (also called the "Tariff of Abominations"), designed to protect American industry by taxing imported manufactured goods, was enacted into law during the last year of the presidency of John Quincy Adams. Opposed in the South and parts of New England, the expectation of the tariffs opponents was that with the election of Andrew Jackson the tariff would be significantly reduced.[19] By 1828 South Carolina state politics increasingly organized around the tariff issue. When the Jackson administration failed to take any actions to address their concerns, the most radical faction in the state began to advocate that the state declare the tariff null and void within South Carolina. In Washington, an open split on the issue occurred between Jackson and his vice-president John C. Calhoun, the most effective proponent of the constitutional theory of state nullification through his 1828 "South Carolina Exposition and Protest".[20] Congress enacted a new tariff in 1832, but it offered the state little relief, resulting in the most dangerous sectional crisis since the Union was formed. Some militant South Carolinians even hinted at withdrawing from the Union in response. The newly-elected South Carolina legislature then quickly called for the election of delegates to a state

Origins of the American Civil War convention. Once assembled, the convention voted to declare null and void the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 within the state. President Andrew Jackson responded firmly, declaring nullification an act of treason. He then took steps to strengthen federal forts in the state. Violence seemed a real possibility early in 1833 as Jacksonians in Congress introduced a "Force Bill" authorizing the President to use the Federal army and navy in order to enforce acts of Congress. No other state had come forward to support South Carolina, and the state itself was divided on willingness to continue the showdown with the Federal government. The crisis ended when Clay and Calhoun worked to devise a compromise tariff. Both sides later claimed victory. Calhoun and his supporters in South Carolina claimed a victory for nullification, insisting that it had forced the revision of the tariff. Jackson's followers, however, saw the episode as a demonstration that no single state could assert its rights by independent action. Calhoun, in turn, devoted his efforts to building up a sense of Southern solidarity so that when another standoff should come, the whole section might be prepared to act as a bloc in resisting the federal government. As early as 1830, in the midst of the crisis, Calhoun identified the right to own slaves as the chief southern minority right being threatened: I consider the tariff act as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of things. The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar domestick [sic] institution of the Southern States and the consequent direction which that and her soil have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and appropriations in opposite relation to the majority of the Union, against the danger of which, if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the states they must in the end be forced to rebel, or, submit to have their paramount interests sacrificed, their domestic institutions subordinated by Colonization and other schemes, and themselves and children reduced to wretchedness.[21][22] On May 1, 1833, Jackson wrote of this idea, "the tariff was only the pretext, and disunion and southern confederacy the real object. The next pretext will be the negro, or slavery question."[23] The issue appeared again after 1842's Black Tariff. A period of relative free trade after 1846's Walker Tariff reduction followed until 1860, when the protectionist Morrill Tariff was introduced by the Republicans, fueling Southern anti-tariff sentiments once again.

38

Gag Rule debates


From 1831 to 1836 William Lloyd Garrison and the American Anti-Slavery Society (AA-SS) initiated a campaign to petition Congress in favor of ending slavery in the District of Columbia and all federal territories. Hundreds of thousands of petitions were sent with the number reaching a peak in 1835.[24] The House passed the Pinckney Resolutions on May 26, 1836. The first of these resolutions stated that Congress had no constitutional authority to interfere with slavery in the states and the second that it "ought not" do so in the District of Columbia. The third resolution, known from the beginning as the "gag rule", provided that: All petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers, relating in any way, or to any extent whatsoever, to the subject of slavery or the abolition of slavery, shall, without being either printed or referred, be laid on the table and that no further action whatever shall be had thereon.[25] The first two resolutions passed by votes of 182 to 9 and 132 to 45. The gag rule, supported by Northern and Southern Democrats as well as some Southern Whigs, was passed with a vote of 117 to 68.[26] Former President John Quincy Adams, who was elected to the House of Representatives in 1830, became an early and central figure in the opposition to the gag rules.[27] He argued that they were a direct violation of the First Amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances". A majority of Northern Whigs joined the opposition. Rather than suppress anti-slavery petitions, however, the gag rules only served to offend Americans from Northern states, and dramatically increase the number of petitions.[28]

Origins of the American Civil War Since the original gag was a resolution, not a standing House Rule, it had to be renewed every session and the Adams' faction often gained the floor before the gag could be imposed. However in January 1840, the House of Representatives passed the Twenty-first Rule, which prohibited even the reception of anti-slavery petitions and was a standing House rule. Now the pro-petition forces focused on trying to revoke a standing rule. The Rule raised serious doubts about its constitutionality and had less support than the original Pinckney gag, passing only by 114 to 108. Throughout the gag period, Adams' "superior talent in using and abusing parliamentary rules" and skill in baiting his enemies into making mistakes, enabled him to evade the rule and debate the slavery issues. The gag rule was finally rescinded on December 3, 1844 by a strongly sectional vote of 108 to 80, all the Northern and four Southern Whigs voting for repeal, along with 55 of the 71 Northern Democrats.[29]

39

Antebellum South and the Union


There had been a continuing contest between the states and the national government over the power of the latterand over the loyalty of the citizenryalmost since the founding of the republic. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, for example, had defied the Alien and Sedition Acts, and at the Hartford Convention, New England voiced its opposition to President James Madison and the War of 1812, and discussed secession from the Union. Southern culture

Picking cotton in Georgia.

Although a minority of free Southerners owned slaves (and, in turn, a minority of similar proportion within these slaveholders who owned the vast majority of slaves), Southerners of all classes nevertheless defended the institution of slavery[30] threatened by the rise of free labor abolitionist movements in the Northern states as the cornerstone of their social order. Based on a system of plantation slavery, the social structure of the South was far more stratified and patriarchal than that of the North. In 1850 there were around 350,000 slaveholders in a total free Southern population of about six million. Among slaveholders, the concentration of slave ownership was unevenly distributed. Perhaps around 7 percent of slaveholders owned roughly three-quarters of the slave population. The largest slaveholders, generally owners of large plantations, represented the top stratum of Southern society. They benefited from economies of scale and needed large numbers of slaves on big plantations to produce profitable labor-intensive crops like cotton. This plantation-owning elite, known as "slave magnates", was comparable to the millionaires of the following century. In the 1850s as large plantation owners out-competed smaller farmers, more slaves were owned by fewer planters. Yet, while the proportion of the white population consisting of slaveholders was on the decline on the eve of the Civil Warperhaps falling below around a quarter of free southerners in 1860poor whites and small farmers generally accepted the political leadership of the planter elite. Several factors helped explain why slavery was not under serious threat of internal collapse from any moves for democratic change initiated from the South. First, given the opening of new territories in the West for white settlement, many non-slaveowners also perceived a possibility that they, too, might own slaves at some point in their life.[31]

Origins of the American Civil War

40 Second, small free farmers in the South often embraced hysterical racism, making them unlikely agents for internal democratic reforms in the South.[32] The principle of white supremacy, accepted by almost all white southerners of all classes, made slavery seem legitimate, natural, and essential for a civilized society. White racism in the South was sustained by official systems of repression such as the "slave codes" and elaborate codes of speech, behavior, and social practices illustrating the subordination of blacks to whites. For example, the "slave patrols" were among the institutions bringing together southern whites of all classes in support of the prevailing economic and racial order. Serving as slave "patrollers" and "overseers" offered white southerners positions of power and honor. These positions gave even poor white southerners the authority to stop, search, whip, maim, and even kill any slave traveling outside his or her plantation. Slave "patrollers" and "overseers" also won prestige in their communities. Policing and punishing blacks who transgressed the regimentation of slave society was a valued community service in the South, where the fear of free blacks threatening law and order figured heavily in the public discourse of the period.

Third, many small farmers with a few slaves and yeomen were linked to elite planters through the market economy.[33] In many areas, small farmers depended on local planter elites for vital goods and services including (but not limited to) access to cotton gins, access to markets, access to feed and livestock, and even for loans (since the banking system was not well developed in the antebellum South). Southern tradesmen often depended on the richest planters for steady work. Such dependency effectively deterred many white non-slaveholders from engaging in any political activity that was not in the interest of the large slaveholders. Furthermore, whites of varying social castes, including poor whites and "plain folk" who worked outside or in the periphery of the market economy (and therefore lacked any real economic interest in the defense of slavery) might nonetheless be linked to elite planters through extensive kinship networks. Since inheritance in the South was often unequitable (and generally favored eldest sons), it was not uncommon for a poor white person to be perhaps the first cousin of the richest plantation owner of his county and to share the same militant support of slavery as his richer relatives. Finally, there was no secret ballot at the time anywhere in the United States this innovation did not become widespread in the U.S. until the 1880s. For a typical white Southerner, this meant that so much as casting a ballot against the wishes of the establishment meant running the risk of social ostracization. Thus, by the 1850s, Southern slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike felt increasingly encircled psychologically and politically in the national political arena because of the rise of free soilism and abolitionism in the Northern states. Increasingly dependent on the North for manufactured goods, for commercial services, and for loans, and increasingly cut off from the flourishing agricultural regions of the Northwest, they faced the prospects of a growing free labor and abolitionist movement in the North. Militant defense of slavery With the outcry over developments in Kansas strong in the North, defenders of slavery increasingly committed to a way of life that abolitionists and their sympathizers considered obsolete or immoral articulated a militant pro-slavery ideology that would lay the groundwork for secession upon the election of a Republican president. Southerners waged a vitriolic response to political change in the North. Slaveholding interests sought to uphold their constitutional rights in the territories and to maintain sufficient political strength to repulse "hostile" and "ruinous" legislation. Behind this shift was the growth of the cotton industry, which left slavery more important than ever to

Violent repression of slaves was a common theme in abolitionist literature in the North. Above, this famous 1863 photo of a man deeply scarred from whipping by an overseer was distributed by abolitionists to illustrate what they saw as the barbarism of Southern society.

Origins of the American Civil War the Southern economy.[34] Literature Reactions to the popularity of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe (whom Abraham Lincoln reputedly called "the little woman that started this great war") and the growth of the abolitionist movement (pronounced after the founding of The Liberator in 1831 by William Lloyd Garrison) inspired an elaborate intellectual defense of slavery. Increasingly vocal (and sometimes violent) abolitionist movements, culminating in John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859 were viewed as a serious threat, andin the minds of many Southernersabolitionists were attempting to foment violent slave revolts as seen in Haiti in the 1790s and as attempted by Nat Turner some three decades prior (1831). After J. D. B. DeBow established De Bow's Review in 1846, it grew to become the leading Southern magazine, warning the planter class about the dangers of depending on the North economically. De Bow's Review also emerged as the leading voice for secession. The magazine emphasized the South's economic inequality, relating it to the concentration of manufacturing, shipping, banking and international trade in the North. Searching for Biblical passages endorsing slavery and forming economic, sociological, historical and scientific arguments, slavery went from being a "necessary evil" to a "positive good". Dr. J.H. Van Evrie's book Negroes and Negro slavery: The First an Inferior Race: The Latter Its Normal Condition setting out the arguments the title would suggest was an attempt to apply scientific support to the Southern arguments in favor of race based slavery. Latent sectional divisions suddenly activated derogatory sectional imagery which emerged into sectional ideologies. As industrial capitalism gained momentum in the North, Southern writers emphasized whatever aristocratic traits they valued (but often did not practice) in their own society: courtesy, grace, chivalry, the slow pace of life, orderly life and leisure. This supported their argument that slavery provided a more humane society than industrial labor. In his Cannibals All!, George Fitzhugh argued that the antagonism between labor and capital in a free society would result in "robber barons" and "pauper slavery", while in a slave society such antagonisms were avoided. He advocated enslaving Northern factory workers, for their own benefit. Abraham Lincoln, on the other hand, denounced such Southern insinuations that Northern wage earners were fatally fixed in that condition for life. To Free Soilers, the stereotype of the South was one of a diametrically opposite, static society in which the slave system maintained an entrenched anti-democratic aristocracy. Southern fears of modernization According to the historian James M. McPherson, exceptionalism applied not to the South but to the North after the North phased out slavery and launched an industrial revolution that led to urbanization, which in turn led to increased education, which in its own turn gave ever-increasing strength to various reform movements but especially abolitionism. The fact that seven immigrants out of eight settled in the North (and the fact that most immigrants viewed slavery with disfavor), compounded by the fact that twice as many whites left the South for the North as vice versa, contributed to the South's defensive-aggressive political behavior. The Charleston Mercury read that on the issue of slavery the North and South "are not only two Peoples, but they are rival, hostile Peoples."[35] As De Bow's Review said, "We are resisting revolution.... We are not engaged in a Quixotic fight for the rights of man.... We are conservative."[35] Southern fears of modernity Allan Nevins argued that the Civil War was an "irrepressible" conflict, adopting a phrase first used by U.S. Senator and Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of State William H. Seward. Nevins synthesized contending accounts emphasizing moral, cultural, social, ideological, political, and economic issues. In doing so, he brought the historical discussion back to an emphasis on social and cultural factors. Nevins pointed out that the North and the South were rapidly becoming two different peoples, a point made also by historian Avery Craven. At the root of these cultural differences was the problem of slavery, but fundamental assumptions, tastes, and cultural aims of the regions were

41

Origins of the American Civil War diverging in other ways as well. More specifically, the North was rapidly modernizing in a manner threatening to the South. Historian McPherson explains:[35] When secessionists protested in 1861 that they were acting to preserve traditional rights and values, they were correct. They fought to preserve their constitutional liberties against the perceived Northern threat to overthrow them. The South's concept of republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the North's had.... The ascension to power of the Republican Party, with its ideology of competitive, egalitarian free-labor capitalism, was a signal to the South that the Northern majority had turned irrevocably towards this frightening, revolutionary future. Harry L. Watson has synthesized research on antebellum southern social, economic, and political history. Self-sufficient yeomen, in Watson's view, "collaborated in their own transformation" by allowing promoters of a market economy to gain political influence. Resultant "doubts and frustrations" provided fertile soil for the argument that southern rights and liberties were menaced by Black Republicanism.[36] J. Mills Thornton III, explained the viewpoint of the average white Alabamian. Thornton contends that Alabama was engulfed in a severe crisis long before 1860. Deeply held principles of freedom, equality, and autonomy, as expressed in republican values appeared threatened, especially during the 1850s, by the relentless expansion of market relations and commercial agriculture. Alabamians were thus, he judged, prepared to believe the worst once Lincoln was elected.[37]

42

Sectional tensions and the emergence of mass politics


The cry of Free Man was raised, not for the extension of liberty to the black man, but for the protection of the liberty of the white. Frederick Douglass

The politicians of the 1850s were acting in a society in which the traditional restraints that suppressed sectional conflict in the 1820s and 1850s the most important of which being the stability of the two-party system were being eroded as this rapid extension of mass democracy went forward in the North and South. It was an era when the mass political party galvanized voter participation to an unprecedented degree, and a time in which politics formed an essential component of American mass culture. Historians agree that political involvement was a larger concern to the average American in the 1850s than today. Politics was, in one of its functions, a form of mass entertainment, a spectacle with rallies, parades, and colorful personalities. Leading politicians, moreover, often served as a focus for popular interests, aspirations, and values. Historian Allan Nevins, for instance, writes of political rallies in 1856 with turnouts of anywhere from twenty to fifty thousand men and women. Voter turnouts even ran as high as 84% by 1860. An abundance of new parties emerged 185456, including the Republicans, People's party men, Anti-Nebraskans, Fusionists, Know-Nothings, Know-Somethings (anti-slavery nativists), Maine Lawites, Temperance men, Rum Democrats, Silver Gray Whigs, Hindus, Hard Shell Democrats, Soft Shells, Half Shells and Adopted Citizens. By 1858, they were mostly gone, and politics divided four ways. Republicans controlled most Northern states with a strong Democratic minority. The Democrats were split North and South and fielded two tickets in 1860. Southern non-Democrats tried different coalitions; most supported the Constitutional Union party in 1860. Many Southern states held constitutional conventions in 1851 to consider the questions of nullification and secession. With the exception of South Carolina, whose convention election did not even offer the option of "no secession" but rather "no secession without the collaboration of other states", the Southern conventions were dominated by Unionists who voted down articles of secession.

Origins of the American Civil War

43

Economics
Historians today generally agree that economic conflicts were not a major cause of the war. While an economic basis to the sectional crisis was popular among the Progressive school of historians from the 1910s to the 1940s, few professional historians now subscribe to this explanation.[38] According to economic historian Lee A. Craig, "In fact, numerous studies by economic historians over the past several decades reveal that economic conflict was not an inherent condition of North-South relations during the antebellum era and did not cause the Civil War."[39] When numerous groups tried at the last minute in 186061 to find a compromise to avert war, they did not turn to economic policies. The three major attempts at compromise, the Crittenden Compromise, the Corwin Amendment and the Washington Peace Conference, addressed only the slavery-related issues of fugitive slave laws, personal liberty laws, slavery in the territories and interference with slavery within the existing slave states.[40] Economic value of slavery to the South Historian James L. Huston emphasizes the role of slavery as an economic institution. In October 1860 William Lowndes Yancey, a leading advocate of secession, placed the value of Southern-held slaves at $2.8 billion.[41] Huston writes: Understanding the relations between wealth, slavery, and property rights in the South provides a powerful means of understanding southern political behavior leading to disunion. First, the size dimensions of slavery are important to comprehend, for slavery was a colossal institution. Second, the property rights argument was the ultimate defense of slavery, and white southerners and the proslavery radicals knew it. Third, the weak point in the protection of slavery by property rights was the federal government.... Fourth, the intense need to preserve the sanctity of property rights in Africans led southern political leaders to demand the nationalization of slavery the condition under which slaveholders would always be protected in their property holdings.[42] The cotton gin greatly increased the efficiency with which cotton could be harvested, contributing to the consolidation of "King Cotton" as the backbone of the economy of the Deep South, and to the entrenchment of the system of slave labor on which the cotton plantation economy depended. The tendency of monoculture cotton plantings to lead to soil exhaustion created a need for cotton planters to move their operations to new lands, and therefore to the westward expansion of slavery from the Eastern seaboard into new areas (e.g., Alabama, Mississippi, and beyond to East Texas).[43][44] Regional economic differences The South, Midwest, and Northeast had quite different economic structures. They traded with each other and each became more prosperous by staying in the Union, a point many businessmen made in 186061. However Charles A. Beard in the 1920s made a highly influential argument to the effect that these differences caused the war (rather than slavery or constitutional debates). He saw the industrial Northeast forming a coalition with the agrarian Midwest An animation showing the free/slave status of U.S. states and territories, 17891861. against the Plantation South. Critics challenged his image of a unified Northeast and said that the region was in fact highly diverse with many different competing economic interests. In 186061, most business interests in the Northeast opposed war.

Origins of the American Civil War After 1950, only a few mainstream historians accepted the Beard interpretation, though it was accepted by libertarian economists.[45] As Historian Kenneth Stamppwho abandoned Beardianism after 1950, sums up the scholarly consensus:[46] "Most historians...now see no compelling reason why the divergent economies of the North and South should have led to disunion and civil war; rather, they find stronger practical reasons why the sections, whose economies neatly complemented one another, should have found it advantageous to remain united."[47] Free labor vs. pro-slavery arguments Historian Eric Foner argued that a free-labor ideology dominated thinking in the North, which emphasized economic opportunity. By contrast, Southerners described free labor as "greasy mechanics, filthy operators, small-fisted farmers, and moonstruck theorists".[48] They strongly opposed the homestead laws that were proposed to give free farms in the west, fearing the small farmers would oppose plantation slavery. Indeed, opposition to homestead laws was far more common in secessionist rhetoric than opposition to tariffs.[49] Southerners such as Calhoun argued that slavery was "a positive good", and that slaves were more civilized and morally and intellectually improved because of slavery.[50]

44

Religious conflict over the slavery question


Led by Mark Noll, a body of scholarship[51][52][53] has highlighted the fact that the American debate over slavery became a shooting war in part because the two sides reached diametrically opposite conclusions based on reading the same authoritative source of guidance on moral questions: the King James Version of the Bible. After the American Revolution and the disestablishment of government-sponsored churches, the U.S. experienced the Second Great Awakening, a massive Protestant revival. Without centralized church authorities, American Protestantism was heavily reliant on the Bible, which was read in the standard 19th-century Reformed hermeneutic of "common sense", literal interpretation as if the Bible were speaking directly about the modern American situation instead of events that occurred in a much different context, millennia ago.[51] By the mid-19th century this form of religion and Bible interpretation had become a dominant strand in American religious, moral and political discourse, almost serving as a de facto state religion.[51] The problem that this caused for resolving the slavery question was that the Bible, interpreted under these assumptions, seemed to clearly suggest that slavery was Biblically justified:[51] The pro-slavery South could point to slaveholding by the godly patriarch Abraham (Gen 12:5; 14:14; 24:3536; 26:1314), a practice that was later incorporated into Israelite national law (Lev 25:4446). It was never denounced by Jesus, who made slavery a model of discipleship (Mk 10:44). The Apostle Paul supported slavery, counseling obedience to earthly masters (Eph 6:59; Col 3:2225) as a duty in agreement with "the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ and the teaching which accords with godliness" (1 Tim 6:3). Because slaves were to remain in their present state unless they could win their freedom (1 Cor 7:2024), he sent the fugitive slave Onesimus back to his owner Philemon (Phlm 1020). The abolitionist north had a difficult time matching the pro-slavery south passage for passage. [...] Professor Eugene Genovese, who has studied these biblical debates over slavery in minute detail, concludes that the pro-slavery faction clearly emerged victorious over the abolitionists except for one specious argument based on the so-called Curse of Ham (Gen 9:1827). For our purposes, it is important to realize that the South won this crucial contest with the North by using the prevailing hermeneutic, or method of interpretation, on which both sides agreed. So decisive was its triumph that the South mounted a vigorous counterattack on the abolitionists as infidels who had abandoned the plain words of Scripture for the secular ideology of the Enlightenment.[54] Protestant churches in the U.S., unable to agree on what God's Word said about slavery, ended up with schisms between Northern and Southern branches: the Methodists in 1844,[55] the Baptists in 1845,[56] and the Presbyterians in 1857.[57][58] These splits presaged the subsequent split in the nation: "The churches played a major role in the

Origins of the American Civil War dividing of the nation, and it is probably true that it was the splits in the churches which made a final split of the national inevitable."[59] The conflict over how to interpret the Bible was central: The theological crisis occasioned by reasoning like [conservative Presbyterian theologian James H.] Thornwell's was acute. Many Northern Bible-readers and not a few in the South felt that slavery was evil. They somehow knew the Bible supported them in that feeling. Yet when it came to using the Bible as it had been used with such success to evangelize and civilize the United States, the sacred page was snatched out of their hands. Trust in the Bible and reliance upon a Reformed, literal hermeneutic had created a crisis that only bullets, not arguments, could resolve.[60] The result: The question of the Bible and slavery in the era of the Civil War was never a simple question. The issue involved the American expression of a Reformed literal hermeneutic, the failure of hermeneutical alternatives to gain cultural authority, and the exercise of deeply entrenched intuitive racism, as well as the presence of Scripture as an authoritative religious book and slavery as an inherited social-economic relationship. The North forced to fight on unfriendly terrain that it had helped to create lost the exegetical war. The South certainly lost the shooting war. But constructive orthodox theology was the major loser when American believers allowed bullets instead of hermeneutical self-consciousness to determine what the Bible said about slavery. For the history of theology in America, the great tragedy of the Civil War is that the most persuasive theologians were the Rev. Drs. William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant.[61] There were many causes of the Civil War, but the religious conflict, almost unimaginable in modern America, cut very deep at the time. Noll and others highlight the significance of the religion issue for the famous phrase in Lincoln's second inaugural: "Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other."

45

Abolitionism
Antislavery movements in the North gained momentum in the 1830s and 1840s, a period of rapid transformation of Northern society that inspired a social and political reformism. Many of the reformers of the period, including abolitionists, attempted in one way or another to transform the lifestyle and work habits of labor, helping workers respond to the new demands of an industrializing, capitalistic society. Antislavery, like many other reform movements of the period, was influenced by the legacy of the Second Great Awakening, a period of religious revival in the new country stressing the reform of individuals which was still relatively fresh in the American memory. Thus, while the reform spirit of the period was expressed by a variety of movements with often-conflicting political goals, most reform movements shared a common feature in their emphasis on the Great Awakening principle of transforming the human personality through discipline, order, and restraint. "Abolitionist" had several meanings at the time. The followers of William Lloyd Garrison, including Wendell Phillips and Frederick Douglass, demanded the "immediate abolition of slavery", hence the

Platform of the American Anti-Slavery Society, founded in 1833 by William Lloyd Garrison and Arthur Tappan.

name. A more pragmatic group of abolitionists, like Theodore Weld and Arthur Tappan, wanted immediate action, but that action might well be a program of gradual emancipation, with a long intermediate stage. "Antislavery men",

Origins of the American Civil War like John Quincy Adams, did what they could to limit slavery and end it where possible, but were not part of any abolitionist group. For example, in 1841 Adams represented the Amistad African slaves in the Supreme Court of the United States and argued that they should be set free.[62] In the last years before the war, "antislavery" could mean the Northern majority, like Abraham Lincoln, who opposed expansion of slavery or its influence, as by the Kansas-Nebraska Act, or the Fugitive Slave Act. Many Southerners called all these abolitionists, without distinguishing them from the Garrisonians. James M. McPherson explains the abolitionists' deep beliefs: "All people were equal in God's sight; the souls of black folks were as valuable as those of whites; for one of God's children to enslave another was a violation of the Higher Law, even if it was sanctioned by the Constitution."[63] Stressing the Yankee Protestant ideals of self-improvement, industry, and thrift, most abolitionists most notably William Lloyd Garrison condemned slavery as a lack of control over one's own destiny and the fruits of one's labor. Wendell Phillips, one of the most ardent abolitionists, attacked the Slave Power and presaged disunion as early as 1845: The experience of the fifty years shows us the slaves trebling in A woodcut from the abolitionist Anti-Slavery Almanac (1839) depicts the numbersslaveholders capture of a fugitive slave by a slave patrol. monopolizing the offices and dictating the policy of the Governmentprostituting the strength and influence of the Nation to the support of slavery here and elsewheretrampling on the rights of the free States, and making the courts of the country their tools. To continue this disastrous alliance longer is madness. Why prolong the experiment?[64] Abolitionists also attacked slavery as a threat to the freedom of white Americans. Defining freedom as more than a simple lack of restraint, antebellum reformers held that the truly free man was one who imposed restraints upon himself. Thus, for the anti-slavery reformers of the 1830s and 1840s, the promise of free labor and upward social mobility (opportunities for advancement, rights to own property, and to control one's own labor), was central to the ideal of reforming individuals. Controversy over the so-called Ostend Manifesto (which proposed the U.S. annexation of Cuba as a slave state) and the Fugitive Slave Act kept sectional tensions alive before the issue of slavery in the West could occupy the country's politics in the mid-to-late 1850s. Antislavery sentiment among some groups in the North intensified after the Compromise of 1850, when Southerners began appearing in Northern states to pursue fugitives or often to claim as slaves free African Americans who had resided there for years. Meanwhile, some abolitionists openly sought to prevent enforcement of the law. Violation of the Fugitive Slave Act was often open and organized. In Boston a city from which it was boasted that no fugitive had ever been returned Theodore Parker and other members of the city's elite helped form mobs to prevent enforcement of the law as early as April 1851. A pattern of public resistance emerged in city after city, notably in Syracuse in 1851 (culminating in the Jerry Rescue incident late that year), and Boston again in 1854. But the issue did not lead to a crisis until revived by the same issue underlying the Missouri Compromise of 1820: slavery in the territories.

46

Origins of the American Civil War

47

Arguments for and against slavery


William Lloyd Garrison, a prominent abolitionist, was motivated by a belief in the growth of democracy. Because the Constitution had a three-fifths clause, a fugitive slave clause and a 20-year extension of the Atlantic slave trade, Garrison once publicly burned a copy of the U.S. Constitution and called it "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell".[65] In 1854, he said:

I am a believer in that portion of the Declaration of American Independence in which it is set forth, as among self-evident truths, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Hence, I am an abolitionist. Hence, I cannot but regard oppression in every formand most of all, that which turns a man into a [66] thingwith indignation and abhorrence.

Opposite opinions on slavery were expressed by Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens in his "Cornerstone Speech". Stephens said:

(Thomas Jefferson's) ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error.... Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that [67] the negro is not equal to the white man; that slaverysubordination to the superior raceis his natural and normal condition.

"Free soil" movement


The assumptions, tastes, and cultural aims of the reformers of the 1830s and 1840s anticipated the political and ideological ferment of the 1850s. A surge of working class Irish and German Catholic immigration provoked reactions among many Northern Whigs, as well as Democrats. Growing fears of labor competition for white workers and farmers because of the growing number of free blacks prompted several northern states to adopt discriminatory "Black Codes". In the Northwest, although farm tenancy was increasing, the number of free farmers was still double that of farm laborers and tenants. Moreover, although the expansion of the factory system was undermining the economic independence of the small craftsman and artisan, industry in the region, still one largely of small towns, was still concentrated in small-scale enterprises. Arguably, social mobility was on the verge of contracting in the urban centers of the North, but long-cherished ideas of opportunity, "honest industry" and "toil" were at least close enough in time to lend plausibility to the free labor ideology.

Abolitionist Frederick Douglass.

In the rural and small-town North, the picture of Northern society (framed by the ethos of "free labor") corresponded to a large degree with reality. Propelled by advancements in transportation and communication especially steam navigation, railroads, and telegraphs the two decades before the Civil War were of rapid expansion in population and economy of the Northwest. Combined with the rise of Northeastern and export markets for their products, the social standing of farmers in the region substantially improved. The small towns and villages that emerged as the Republican Party's heartland showed every sign of vigorous expansion. Their vision for an ideal society was of small-scale capitalism, with white American laborers

Origins of the American Civil War entitled to the chance of upward mobility opportunities for advancement, rights to own property, and to control their own labor. Many free-soilers demanded that the slave labor system and free black settlers (and, in places such as California, Chinese immigrants) should be excluded from the Great Plains to guarantee the predominance there of the free white laborer. Opposition to the 1847 Wilmot Proviso helped to consolidate the "free-soil" forces. The next year, Radical New York Democrats known as Barnburners, members of the Liberty Party, and anti-slavery Whigs held a convention at Buffalo, New York, in August, forming the Free-Soil Party. The party supported former President Martin Van Buren and Charles Francis Adams, Sr., for President and Vice President, respectively. The party opposed the expansion of slavery into territories where it had not yet existed, such as Oregon and the ceded Mexican territory. Relating Northern and Southern positions on slavery to basic differences in labor systems, but insisting on the role of culture and ideology in coloring these differences, Eric Foner's book Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (1970) went beyond the economic determinism of Charles A. Beard (a leading historian of the 1930s). Foner emphasized the importance of free labor ideology to Northern opponents of slavery, pointing out that the moral concerns of the abolitionists were not necessarily the dominant sentiments in the North. Many Northerners (including Lincoln) opposed slavery also because they feared that black labor might spread to the North and threaten the position of free white laborers. In this sense, Republicans and the abolitionists were able to appeal to powerful emotions in the North through a broader commitment to "free labor" principles. The "Slave Power" idea had a far greater appeal to Northern self-interest than arguments based on the plight of black slaves in the South. If the free labor ideology of the 1830s and 1840s depended on the transformation of Northern society, its entry into politics depended on the rise of mass democracy, in turn propelled by far-reaching social change. Its chance would come by the mid-1850s with the collapse of the traditional two-party system, which had long suppressed sectional conflict.

48

Slavery question in territories acquired from Mexico


Soon after the Mexican War started and long before negotiation of the new US-Mexico border, the question of slavery in the territories to be acquired polarized the Northern and Southern United States in the most bitter sectional conflict up to this time, which lasted for a deadlock of four years during which the Second Party System broke up, Mormon pioneers settled Utah, the California Gold Rush settled California, and New Mexico under a federal military government turned back Texas's attempt to assert control over territory Texas claimed as far west as the Rio Grande. Eventually the Compromise of 1850 preserved the Union, but only for another decade. Proposals included: The Wilmot Proviso banning slavery in any new territory to be acquired from Mexico, not including Texas which had been annexed the previous year. Passed by the United States House of Representatives in August 1846 and February 1847 but not the Senate. Later an effort to attach the proviso to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo also failed. Failed amendments to the Wilmot Proviso by William W. Wick and then Stephen Douglas extending the Missouri Compromise line (3630' parallel north) west to the Pacific, allowing slavery in most of present day New Mexico and Arizona, Las Vegas, Nevada, and Southern California, as well as any other territories that might be acquired from Mexico. The line was again proposed by the Nashville Convention of June 1850. Popular sovereignty, developed by Lewis Cass and Douglas as the eventual Democratic Party position, letting each territory decide whether to allow slavery. William L. Yancey's "Alabama Platform", endorsed by the Alabama and Georgia legislatures and by Democratic state conventions in Florida and Virginia, called for no restrictions on slavery in the territories either by the federal government or by territorial governments before statehood, opposition to any candidates supporting either the Wilmot Proviso or popular sovereignty, and federal legislation overruling Mexican anti-slavery laws. General Zachary Taylor, who became the Whig candidate in 1848 and then President from March 1849 to July 1850, proposed after becoming President that the entire area become two free states, called California and New Mexico but much larger than the eventual ones. None of the area would be left as an unorganized or organized

Origins of the American Civil War territory, avoiding the question of slavery in the territories. The Mormons' proposal for a State of Deseret incorporating most of the area of the Mexican Cession but excluding the largest non-Mormon populations in Northern California and central New Mexico was considered unlikely to succeed in Congress, but nevertheless in 1849 President Zachary Taylor sent his agent John Wilson westward with a proposal to combine California and Deseret as a single state, decreasing the number of new free states and the erosion of Southern parity in the Senate. The Compromise of 1850, proposed by Henry Clay in January 1850, guided to passage by Douglas over Northern Whig and Southern Democrat opposition, and enacted September 1850, admitted California as a free state including Southern California and organized Utah Territory and New Mexico Territory with slavery to be decided by popular sovereignty. Texas dropped its claim to the disputed northwestern areas in return for debt relief, and the areas were divided between the two new territories and unorganized territory. El Paso where Texas had successfully established county government was left in Texas. No southern territory dominated by Southerners (like the later short-lived Confederate Territory of Arizona) was created. Also, the slave trade was abolished in Washington, D.C. (but not slavery itself), and the Fugitive Slave Act was strengthened.

49

States' rights
States' rights was an issue in the 19th century for those who felt that the federal government was superseded by the authority of the individual states and was in violation of the role intended for it by the Founding Fathers of the United States. Kenneth M. Stampp notes that each section used states' rights arguments when convenient, and shifted positions when convenient.[68] For example, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was justified by its supporters as a state's right to have its property laws respected by other states, and was resisted by northern legislatures in the form of state personal liberty laws that placed state laws above the federal mandate.

States rights and slavery


Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. noted that the states' rights never had any real vitality independent of underlying conditions of vast social, economic, or political significance.[69] He further elaborated: From the close of the nullification episode of 18321833 to the outbreak of the Civil War, the agitation of state rights was intimately connected with the new issue of growing importance, the slavery question, and the principle form assumed by the doctrine was the right of secession. The pro-slavery forces sought refuge in the state rights position as a shield against federal interference with pro-slavery projects.... As a natural consequence, anti-slavery legislatures in the North were led to lay great stress on the national character of the Union and the broad powers of the general government in dealing with slavery. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that when it served anti-slavery purposes better to lapse into state rights dialectic, northern legislatures did not hesitate to be inconsistent.[70] Echoing Schlesinger, Forrest McDonald wrote that the dynamics of the tension between federal and state authority changed abruptly during the late 1840s as a result of the acquisition of territory in the Mexican War. McDonald states:

Origins of the American Civil War And then, as a by-product or offshoot of a war of conquest, slavery a subject that leading politicians had, with the exception of the gag rule controversy and Calhouns occasional outbursts, scrupulously kept out of partisan debate erupted as the dominant issue in that arena. So disruptive was the issue that it subjected the federal Union to the greatest strain the young republic had yet known.[71]

50

States' rights and minority rights


States' rights theories gained strength from the awareness that the Northern population was growing much faster than the population of the South, so it was only a matter of time before the North controlled the federal government. Acting as a "conscious minority", Southerners hoped that a strict, constructionist interpretation of the Constitution would limit federal power over the states, and that a defense of states' rights against federal encroachments or even nullification or secession would save the South.[72] Before 1860, most presidents were either Southern or pro-South. The North's growing population would mean the election of pro-North presidents, and the addition of free-soil states would end Southern parity with the North in the Senate. As the historian Allan Nevins described Calhoun's theory of states' rights, "Governments, observed Calhoun, were formed to protect minorities, for majorities could take care of themselves".[73] Until the 1860 election, the Souths interests nationally were entrusted to the Democratic Party. In 1860, the Democratic Party split into Northern and Southern factions as the result of a "bitter debate in the Senate between Jefferson Davis and Stephen Douglas". The debate was over resolutions proposed by Davis opposing popular sovereignty and supporting a federal slave code and states rights which carried over to the national convention in Charleston.[74] Davis defined equality in terms of the equal rights of states,[75] and opposed the declaration that all men are created equal.[76] Jefferson Davis stated that a "disparaging discrimination" and a fight for "liberty" against "the tyranny of an unbridled majority" gave the Confederate states a right to secede.[77] In 1860, Congressman Laurence M. Keitt of South Carolina said, "The anti-slavery party contend that slavery is wrong in itself, and the Government is a consolidated national democracy. We of the South contend that slavery is right, and that this is a confederate Republic of sovereign States."[78] Stampp mentioned Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens' A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States as an example of a Southern leader who said that slavery was the "cornerstone of the Confederacy" when the war began and then said that the war was not about slavery but states' rights after Southern defeat. Stampp said that Stephens became one of the most ardent defenders of the Lost Cause.[79] William C. Davis also mentioned inconsistencies in Southern states' rights arguments. He explained the Confederate Constitution's protection of slavery at the national level as follows: To the old Union they had said that the Federal power had no authority to interfere with slavery issues in a state. To their new nation they would declare that the state had no power to interfere with a federal protection of slavery. Of all the many testimonials to the fact that slavery, and not states rights, really lay at the heart of their movement, this was the most eloquent of all.[80]

The Compromise of 1850


The victory of the United States over Mexico resulted in the addition of large new territories conquered from Mexico. Controversy over whether these territories would be slave or free raised the risk of a war between slave and free states, and Northern support for the Wilmot Proviso, which would have banned slavery in the conquered territories, increased sectional tensions. The controversy was temporarily resolved by the Compromise of 1850, which allowed the territories of Utah and New Mexico to decide for or against slavery, but also allowed the admission of California as a free state, reduced the size of the slave state of Texas by adjusting the boundary, and ended the slave trade (but not slavery itself) in the District of Columbia. In return, the South got a stronger fugitive

Origins of the American Civil War slave law than the version mentioned in the Constitution. The Fugitive Slave Law would reignite controversy over slavery.

51

Fugitive Slave Law issues


The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 required that Northerners assist Southerners in reclaiming fugitive slaves, which many Northerners found to be extremely offensive. Anthony Burns was among the fugitive slaves captured and returned in chains to slavery as a result of the law. Harriett Beecher Stowe's best selling novel Uncle Tom's Cabin greatly increased opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law.

Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854)


Most people thought the Compromise had ended the territorial issue, but Stephen A. Douglas reopened it in 1854, in the name of democracy. Douglas proposed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill with the intention of opening up vast new high quality farm lands to settlement. As a Chicagoan, he was especially interested in the railroad connections from Chicago into Kansas and Nebraska, but that was not a controversial point. More importantly, Douglas firmly believed in democracy at the grass rootsthat actual settlers have the right to decide on slavery, not politicians from other states. His bill provided that popular sovereignty, through the territorial legislatures, should decide "all questions pertaining to slavery", thus effectively repealing the Missouri Compromise. The ensuing public reaction against it created a firestorm of protest in the Northern states. It was seen as an effort to repeal the Missouri Compromise. However, the popular reaction in the first month after the bill's introduction failed to foreshadow the gravity of the situation. As Northern papers initially ignored the story, Republican leaders lamented the lack of a popular response. Eventually, the popular reaction did come, but the leaders had to spark it. Chase's "Appeal of the Independent Democrats" did much to arouse popular opinion. In New York, William H. Seward finally took it upon himself to organize a rally against the Nebraska bill, since none had arisen spontaneously. Press such as the National Era, the New York Tribune, and local free-soil journals, condemned the bill. The Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 drew national attention to the issue of slavery expansion.

Founding of the Republican Party (1854)


Convinced that Northern society was superior to that of the South, and increasingly persuaded of the South's ambitions to extend slave power beyond its existing borders, Northerners were embracing a viewpoint that made conflict likely; however, conflict required the ascendancy of a political group to express the views of the North, such as the Republican Party. The Republican Party campaigning on the popular, emotional issue of "free soil" in the frontier captured the White House after just six years of existence. The Republican Party grew out of the controversy over the Kansas-Nebraska legislation. Once the Northern reaction against the Kansas-Nebraska Act took place, its leaders acted to advance another political reorganization. Henry Wilson declared the Whig Party dead and vowed to oppose any efforts to resurrect it. Horace Greeley's Tribune called for the formation of
Charles Sumner, the Senate's leading opponent of slavery.

Origins of the American Civil War a new Northern party, and Benjamin Wade, Chase, Charles Sumner, and others spoke out for the union of all opponents of the Nebraska Act. The Tribune's Gamaliel Bailey was involved in calling a caucus of anti-slavery Whig and Democratic Party Congressmen in May. Meeting in a Ripon, Wisconsin, Congregational Church on February 28, 1854, some thirty opponents of the Nebraska Act called for the organization of a new political party and suggested that "Republican" would be the most appropriate name (to link their cause to the defunct Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson). These founders also took a leading role in the creation of the Republican Party in many northern states during the summer of 1854. While conservatives and many moderates were content merely to call for the restoration of the Missouri Compromise or a prohibition of slavery extension, radicals advocated repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws and rapid abolition in existing states. The term "radical" has also been applied to those who objected to the Compromise of 1850, which extended slavery in the territories. But without the benefit of hindsight, the 1854 elections would seem to indicate the possible triumph of the Know-Nothing movement rather than anti-slavery, with the Catholic/immigrant question replacing slavery as the issue capable of mobilizing mass appeal. Know-Nothings, for instance, captured the mayoralty of Philadelphia with a majority of over 8,000 votes in 1854. Even after opening up immense discord with his Kansas-Nebraska Act, Senator Douglas began speaking of the Know-Nothings, rather than the Republicans, as the principal danger to the Democratic Party. When Republicans spoke of themselves as a party of "free labor", they appealed to a rapidly growing, primarily middle class base of support, not permanent wage earners or the unemployed (the working class). When they extolled the virtues of free labor, they were merely reflecting the experiences of millions of men who had "made it" and millions of others who had a realistic hope of doing so. Like the Tories in England, the Republicans in the United States would emerge as the nationalists, homogenizers, imperialists, and cosmopolitans. Those who had not yet "made it" included Irish immigrants, who made up a large growing proportion of Northern factory workers. Republicans often saw the Catholic working class as lacking the qualities of self-discipline, temperance, and sobriety essential for their vision of ordered liberty. Republicans insisted that there was a high correlation between education, religion, and hard workthe values of the "Protestant work ethic"and Republican votes. "Where free schools are regarded as a nuisance, where religion is least honored and lazy unthrift is the rule", read an editorial of the pro-Republican Chicago Democratic Press after James Buchanan's defeat of John C. Fremont in the 1856 presidential election, "there Buchanan has received his strongest support". Ethno-religious, socio-economic, and cultural fault lines ran throughout American society, but were becoming increasingly sectional, pitting Yankee Protestants with a stake in the emerging industrial capitalism and American nationalism increasingly against those tied to Southern slave holding interests. For example, acclaimed historian Don E. Fehrenbacher, in his Prelude to Greatness, Lincoln in the 1850s, noticed how Illinois was a microcosm of the national political scene, pointing out voting patterns that bore striking correlations to regional patterns of settlement. Those areas settled from the South were staunchly Democratic, while those by New Englanders were staunchly Republican. In addition, a belt of border counties were known for their political moderation, and traditionally held the balance of power. Intertwined with religious, ethnic, regional, and class identities, the issues of free labor and free soil were thus easy to play on. Events during the next two years in "Bleeding Kansas" sustained the popular fervor originally aroused among some elements in the North by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Free-State settlers from the North were encouraged by press and pulpit and the powerful organs of abolitionist propaganda. Often they received financial help from such organizations as the Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Company. Those from the South often received financial contributions from the communities they left. Southerners sought to uphold their constitutional rights in the territories and to maintain sufficient political strength to repulse "hostile and ruinous legislation". While the Great Plains were largely unfit for the cultivation of cotton, informed Southerners demanded that the West be open to slavery, oftenperhaps most oftenwith minerals in mind. Brazil, for instance, was an example of the

52

Origins of the American Civil War successful use of slave labor in mining. In the middle of the 18th century, diamond mining supplemented gold mining in Minas Gerais and accounted for a massive transfer of masters and slaves from Brazil's northeastern sugar region. Southern leaders knew a good deal about this experience. It was even promoted in the pro-slavery DeBow's Review as far back as 1848.

53

Fragmentation of the American party system


"Bleeding Kansas" and the elections of 1856
In Kansas around 1855, the slavery issue reached a condition of intolerable tension and violence. But this was in an area where an overwhelming proportion of settlers were merely land-hungry Westerners indifferent to the public issues. The majority of the inhabitants were not concerned with sectional tensions or the issue of slavery. Instead, the tension in Kansas began as a contention between rival claimants. During the first wave of settlement, no one held titles to the land, and settlers rushed to occupy newly open land fit for cultivation. While the tension and violence did emerge as a pattern pitting Yankee and Missourian settlers against each other, there is little evidence of any ideological divides on the questions of slavery. Instead, the Missouri claimants, thinking of Kansas as their own domain, regarded the Yankee squatters as invaders, while the Yankees accused the Missourians for grabbing the best land without honestly settling on it.

Radical abolitionist John Brown.

However, the 185556 violence in "Bleeding Kansas" did reach an ideological climax after John Brown regarded by followers as the instrument of God's will to destroy slavery entered the melee. His assassination of five pro-slavery settlers (the so-called "Pottawatomie Massacre", during the night of May 24, 1856) resulted in some irregular, guerrilla-style strife. Aside from John Brown's fervor, the strife in Kansas often involved only armed bands more interested in land claims or loot.
His zeal in the cause of freedom was infinitely superior to mine... Mine was as the taper light; his was as the burning sun. I could live for the slave; John Brown could die for him. Frederick Douglass speaking of John Brown

Of greater importance than the civil strife in Kansas, however, was the reaction against it nationwide and in Congress. In both North and South, the belief was widespread that the aggressive designs of the other section were epitomized by (and responsible for) what was happening in Kansas. Consequently, "Bleeding Kansas" emerged as a symbol of sectional controversy. Indignant over the developments in Kansas, the Republicansthe first entirely sectional major party in U.S. historyentered their first presidential campaign with confidence. Their nominee, John C. Frmont, was a generally safe candidate for the new party. Although his nomination upset some of their Nativist Know-Nothing supporters (his mother was a Catholic), the nomination of the famed explorer of the Far West with no political record was an attempt to woo ex-Democrats. The other two Republican contenders, William H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase, were seen as too radical. Nevertheless, the campaign of 1856 was waged almost exclusively on the slavery issuepitted as a struggle between democracy and aristocracyfocusing on the question of Kansas. The Republicans condemned the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the expansion of slavery, but they advanced a program of internal improvements combining the idealism of anti-slavery with the economic aspirations of the North. The new party rapidly developed a powerful partisan

Origins of the American Civil War culture, and energetic activists drove voters to the polls in unprecedented numbers. People reacted with fervor. Young Republicans organized the "Wide Awake" clubs and chanted "Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, Frmont!" With Southern fire-eaters and even some moderates uttering threats of secession if Frmont won, the Democratic candidate, Buchanan, benefited from apprehensions about the future of the Union.

54

Dred Scott decision (1857) and the Lecompton Constitution


The Lecompton Constitution and Dred Scott v. Sandford were both part of the Bleeding Kansas controversy over slavery as a result of the Kansas Nebraska Act, which was Stephen Douglas' attempt at replacing the Missouri Compromise ban on slavery in the Kansas and Nebraska territories with popular sovereignty, which meant that the people of a territory could vote either for or against slavery. The Lecompton Constitution, which would have allowed slavery in Kansas, was the result of massive vote fraud by the pro-slavery Border Ruffians. Douglas defeated the Lecompton Constitution because it was supported by the minority of pro-slavery people in Kansas, and Douglas believed in majority rule. Douglas hoped that both South and North would support popular sovereignty, but the opposite was true. Neither side trusted Douglas. The Supreme Court decision of 1857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford added to the controversy. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's decision said that slaves were "so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man Slave Dred Scott. was bound to respect",[81] and that slavery could spread into the territories even if the majority of people in the territories were anti-slavery. Lincoln warned that "the next Dred Scott decision"[82] could threaten Northern states with slavery.

Buchanan, Republicans and anti-administration Democrats


President James Buchanan decided to end the troubles in Kansas by urging Congress to admit Kansas as a slave state under the Lecompton Constitution. Kansas voters, however, soundly rejected this constitution at least with a measure of widespread fraud on both sides by more than 10,000 votes. As Buchanan directed his presidential authority to this goal, he further angered the Republicans and alienated members of his own party. Prompting their break with the administration, the Douglasites saw this scheme as an attempt to pervert the principle of popular sovereignty on which the Kansas-Nebraska Act was based. Nationwide, conservatives were incensed, feeling as though the principles of states' rights had been violated. Even in the South, ex-Whigs and border states President James Buchanan. Know-Nothings most notably John Bell and John J. Crittenden (key figures in the event of sectional controversies) urged the Republicans to oppose the administration's moves and take up the demand that the territories be given the power to accept or reject sovereignty. As the schism in the Democratic party deepened, moderate Republicans argued that an alliance with anti-administration Democrats, especially Stephen Douglas, would be a key advantage in the 1860 elections. Some

Origins of the American Civil War Republican observers saw the controversy over the Lecompton Constitution as an opportunity to peel off Democratic support in the border states, where Frmont picked up little support. After all, the border states had often gone for Whigs with a Northern base of support in the past without prompting threats of Southern withdrawal from the Union. Among the proponents of this strategy was The New York Times, which called on the Republicans to downplay opposition to popular sovereignty in favor of a compromise policy calling for "no more slave states" in order to quell sectional tensions. The Times maintained that for the Republicans to be competitive in the 1860 elections, they would need to broaden their base of support to include all voters who for one reason or another were upset with the Buchanan Administration. Indeed, pressure was strong for an alliance that would unite the growing opposition to the Democratic Administration. But such an alliance was no novel idea; it would essentially entail transforming the Republicans into the national, conservative, Union party of the country. In effect, this would be a successor to the Whig party. Republican leaders, however, staunchly opposed any attempts to modify the party position on slavery, appalled by what they considered a surrender of their principles when, for example, all the ninety-two Republican members of Congress voted for the Crittenden-Montgomery bill in 1858. Although this compromise measure blocked Kansas' entry into the union as a slave state, the fact that it called for popular sovereignty, rather than outright opposition to the expansion of slavery, was troubling to the party leaders. In the end, the Crittenden-Montgomery bill did not forge a grand anti-administration coalition of Republicans, ex-Whig Southerners in the border states, and Northern Democrats. Instead, the Democratic Party merely split along sectional lines. Anti-Lecompton Democrats complained that a new, pro-slavery test had been imposed upon the party. The Douglasites, however, refused to yield to administration pressure. Like the anti-Nebraska Democrats, who were now members of the Republican Party, the Douglasean insisted that they not the administration commanded the support of most northern Democrats. Extremist sentiment in the South advanced dramatically as the Southern planter class perceived its hold on the executive, legislative, and judicial apparatus of the central government wane. It also grew increasingly difficult for Southern Democrats to manipulate power in many of the Northern states through their allies in the Democratic Party.

55

Honor
Historians have emphasized that the sense of honor was a central concern of upper class white Southerners.[83] The idea of being treated like a second class citizen was anathema and could not be tolerated by an honorable southerner. The anti-slavery position held that slavery was a negative or evil phenomenon that damaged the rights of white men and the prospects of republicanism. To the white South this rhetoric made Southerners second-class citizens because it trampled their Constitutional rights to take their property anywhere.[84][85]

Origins of the American Civil War Assault on Sumner (1856) On May 19 Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner gave a long speech in the Senate entitled "The Crime Against Kansas". It which condemned the Slave Power as the evil force behind the nation's troubles. Sumner singled out elderly Senator Andrew P. Butler of South Carolina, accusing him of the most dishonorable conduct imaginable: rape and pimping for prostitution. Sumner said the Southerners had committed a "crime against Kansas": "Not in any common lust for power Northern image of the 1856 attack on Sumner did this uncommon tragedy have its origin. It is the rape of a virgin Territory, compelling it to the hateful embrace of slavery; and it may be clearly traced to a depraved desire for a new Slave State, hideous offspring of such a crime, in the hope of adding to the power of slavery in the National Government."[86] Sumner's markedly sexual innuendo cast the South Carolinian as a pimp who has "chosen a mistress [the harlot slavery]... who, though ugly to others, is always lovely to him, though polluted in the sight of the world is chaste in his sight." According to Hoffer (2010), "It is also important to note the sexual imagery that recurred throughout the oration, which was neither accidental nor without precedent. Abolitionists routinely accused slaveholders of maintaining slavery so that they could engage in forcible sexual relations with their slaves."[87] Three days later, Sumner fell victim to the Southern gentleman's-code, which instructed retaliation for impugning the honor of an elderly kinsman. Bleeding and unconscious after a nearly fatal assault with a heavy cane by Butler's nephew, U.S. Representative Preston Brooks and unable to return to the Senate for three years Sumner became the martyr to the antislavery cause. For anti-slavery partisans the episode proved the barbarism of slave society; by contrast, Brooks was lauded as a hero upholding Southern honor, with dozens of his fellow South Carolinians sending him new canes, including one with the label "Hit him again".

56

Origins of the American Civil War

57

Emergence of Lincoln
Republican Party structure
Despite their significant loss in the election of 1856, Republican leaders realized that even though they appealed only to Northern voters, they need win only two more states, such as Pennsylvania and Illinois, to win the presidency in 1860. As the Democrats were grappling with their own troubles, leaders in the Republican party fought to keep elected members focused on the issue of slavery in the West, which allowed them to mobilize popular support. Chase wrote Sumner that if the conservatives succeeded, it might be necessary to recreate the Free Soil Party. He was also particularly disturbed by the tendency of many Republicans to eschew moral attacks on slavery for political and economic arguments. The controversy over slavery in the West was still not creating a fixation on the issue of slavery. Although the old restraints on the sectional tensions were being eroded with the rapid William H. Seward, Secretary of State under Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. extension of mass politics and mass democracy in the North, the perpetuation of conflict over the issue of slavery in the West still required the efforts of radical Democrats in the South and radical Republicans in the North. They had to ensure that the sectional conflict would remain at the center of the political debate. William Seward contemplated this potential in the 1840s, when the Democrats were the nation's majority party, usually controlling Congress, the presidency, and many state offices. The country's institutional structure and party system allowed slaveholders to prevail in more of the nation's territories and to garner a great deal of influence over national policy. With growing popular discontent with the unwillingness of many Democratic leaders to take a stand against slavery, and growing consciousness of the party's increasingly pro-Southern stance, Seward became convinced that the only way for the Whig Party to counteract the Democrats' strong monopoly of the rhetoric of democracy and equality was for the Whigs to embrace anti-slavery as a party platform. Once again, to increasing numbers of Northerners, the Southern labor system was increasingly seen as contrary to the ideals of American democracy. Republicans believed in the existence of "the Slave Power Conspiracy", which had seized control of the federal government and was attempting to pervert the Constitution for its own purposes. The "Slave Power" idea gave the Republicans the anti-aristocratic appeal with which men like Seward had long wished to be associated politically. By fusing older anti-slavery arguments with the idea that slavery posed a threat to Northern free labor and democratic values, it enabled the Republicans to tap into the egalitarian outlook which lay at the heart of Northern society. In this sense, during the 1860 presidential campaign, Republican orators even cast "Honest Abe" as an embodiment of these principles, repeatedly referring to him as "the child of labor" and "son of the frontier", who had proved how "honest industry and toil" were rewarded in the North. Although Lincoln had been a Whig, the "Wide Awakes" (members of the Republican clubs), used replicas of rails that he had split to remind voters of his humble origins. In almost every northern state, organizers attempted to have a Republican Party or an anti-Nebraska fusion movement on ballots in 1854. In areas where the radical Republicans controlled the new organization, the comprehensive radical program became the party policy. Just as they helped organize the Republican Party in the summer of 1854, the radicals played an important role in the national organization of the party in 1856. Republican conventions in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois adopted radical platforms. These radical platforms in such

Origins of the American Civil War states as Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, and Vermont usually called for the divorce of the government from slavery, the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws, and no more slave states, as did platforms in Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Massachusetts when radical influence was high. Conservatives at the Republican 1860 nominating convention in Chicago were able to block the nomination of William Seward, who had an earlier reputation as a radical (but by 1860 had been criticized by Horace Greeley as being too moderate). Other candidates had earlier joined or formed parties opposing the Whigs and had thereby made enemies of many delegates. Lincoln was selected on the third ballot. However, conservatives were unable to bring about the resurrection of "Whiggery". The convention's resolutions regarding slavery were roughly the same as they had been in 1856, but the language appeared less radical. In the following months, even Republican conservatives like Thomas Ewing and Edward Baker embraced the platform language that "the normal condition of territories was freedom". All in all, the organizers had done an effective job of shaping the official policy of the Republican Party. Southern slave holding interests now faced the prospects of a Republican President and the entry of new free states that would alter the nation's balance of power between the sections. To many Southerners, the resounding defeat of the Lecompton Constitution foreshadowed the entry of more free states into the Union. Dating back to the Missouri Compromise, the Southern region desperately sought to maintain an equal balance of slave states and free states so as to be competitive in the Senate. Since the last slave state was admitted in 1845, five more free states had entered. The tradition of maintaining a balance between North and South was abandoned in favor of the addition of more free soil states.

58

Sectional battles over federal policy in the late 1850s


Lincoln-Douglas Debates The Lincoln-Douglas Debates were a series of seven debates in 1858 between Stephen Douglas, United States Senator from Illinois, and Abraham Lincoln, the Republican who sought to replace Douglas in the Senate. The debates were mainly about slavery. Douglas defended his Kansas Nebraska Act, which replaced the Missouri Compromise ban on slavery in the Louisiana Purchase territory north and west of Missouri with popular sovereignty, which allowed residents of territories such as the Kansas to vote either for or against slavery. Douglas put Lincoln on the defensive by accusing him of being a Black Republican abolitionist, but Lincoln responded by asking Douglas to reconcile popular sovereignty with the Dred Scott decision. Douglas' Freeport Doctrine was that residents of a territory could keep slavery out by refusing to pass a slave code and other laws needed to protect slavery. Douglas' Freeport Doctrine, and the fact that he helped defeat the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution, made Douglas unpopular in the South, which led to the 1860 split of the Democratic Party into Northern and Southern wings. The Democrats retained control of the Illinois legislature, and Douglas thus retained his seat in the U.S. Senate (at that time United States Senators were elected by the state legislatures, not by popular vote); however, Lincoln's national profile was greatly raised, paving the way for his election as president of the United States two years later. Background In The Rise of American Civilization (1927), Charles and Mary Beard argue that slavery was not so much a social or cultural institution as an economic one (a labor system). The Beards cited inherent conflicts between Northeastern finance, manufacturing, and commerce and Southern plantations, which competed to control the federal government so as to protect their own interests. According to the economic determinists of the era, both groups used arguments over slavery and states' rights as a cover. Recent historians have rejected the Beardian thesis. But their economic determinism has influenced subsequent historians in important ways. Modernization theorists, such as Raimondo Luraghi, have argued that as the Industrial Revolution was expanding on a worldwide scale, the days of wrath were coming for a series of agrarian, pre-capitalistic, "backward" societies throughout the world, from the Italian and American South to India. But most

Origins of the American Civil War American historians point out the South was highly developed and on average about as prosperous as the North. Panic of 1857 and sectional realignments A few historians believe that the serious financial panic of 1857 and the economic difficulties leading up to it strengthened the Republican Party and heightened sectional tensions. Before the panic, strong economic growth was being achieved under relatively low tariffs. Hence much of the nation concentrated on growth and prosperity. The iron and textile industries were facing acute, worsening trouble each year after 1850. By 1854, stocks of iron were accumulating in each world market. Iron prices fell, forcing many American iron mills to shut down. Republicans urged western farmers and northern manufacturers to blame the depression on the domination of the low-tariff economic policies of southern-controlled Democratic administrations. However the depression revived suspicion of Northeastern "Vote yourself a farm vote yourself a tariff": a campaign slogan for Abraham Lincoln in 1860. banking interests in both the South and the West. Eastern demand for western farm products shifted the West closer to the North. As the "transportation revolution" (canals and railroads) went forward, an increasingly large share and absolute amount of wheat, corn, and other staples of western producers once difficult to haul across the Appalachians went to markets in the Northeast. The depression emphasized the value of the western markets for eastern goods and homesteaders who would furnish markets and respectable profits. Aside from the land issue, economic difficulties strengthened the Republican case for higher tariffs for industries in response to the depression. This issue was important in Pennsylvania and perhaps New Jersey. Southern response Meanwhile, many Southerners grumbled over "radical" notions of giving land away to farmers that would "abolitionize" the area. While the ideology of Southern sectionalism was well-developed before the Panic of 1857 by figures like J.D.B. DeBow, the panic helped convince even more cotton barons that they had grown too reliant on Eastern financial interests. Thomas Prentice Kettell, former editor of the Democratic Review, was another commentator popular in the South to enjoy a The United States, immediately before the Civil War. All of the lands east of, or great degree of prominence between 1857 bordering, the Mississippi River were organized as states in the Union, but the and 1860. Kettell gathered an array of West was still largely unsettled. statistics in his book on Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, to show that the South produced vast wealth, while the North, with its dependence on raw materials, siphoned off the wealth of the

59

Origins of the American Civil War South.[88] Arguing that sectional inequality resulted from the concentration of manufacturing in the North, and from the North's supremacy in communications, transportation, finance, and international trade, his ideas paralleled old physiocratic doctrines that all profits of manufacturing and trade come out of the land.[89] Political sociologists, such as Barrington Moore, have noted that these forms of romantic nostalgia tend to crop up whenever industrialization takes hold.[90] Such Southern hostility to the free farmers gave the North an opportunity for an alliance with Western farmers. After the political realignments of 185758manifested by the emerging strength of the Republican Party and their networks of local support nationwidealmost every issue was entangled with the controversy over the expansion of slavery in the West. While questions of tariffs, banking policy, public land, and subsidies to railroads did not always unite all elements in the North and the Northwest against the interests of slaveholders in the South under the pre-1854 party system, they were translated in terms of sectional conflictwith the expansion of slavery in the West involved. As the depression strengthened the Republican Party, slave holding interests were becoming convinced that the North had aggressive and hostile designs on the Southern way of life. The South was thus increasingly fertile ground for secessionism. The Republicans' Whig-style personality-driven "hurrah" campaign helped stir hysteria in the slave states upon the emergence of Lincoln and intensify divisive tendencies, while Southern "fire eaters" gave credence to notions of the slave power conspiracy among Republican constituencies in the North and West. New Southern demands to re-open the African slave trade further fueled sectional tensions. From the early 1840s until the outbreak of the Civil War, the cost of slaves had been rising steadily. Meanwhile, the price of cotton was experiencing market fluctuations typical of raw commodities. After the Panic of 1857, the price of cotton fell while the price of slaves continued its steep rise. At the 1858 Southern commercial convention, William L. Yancey of Alabama called for the reopening of the African slave trade. Only the delegates from the states of the Upper South, who profited from the domestic trade, opposed the reopening of the slave trade since they saw it as a potential form of competition. The convention in 1858 wound up voting to recommend the repeal of all laws against slave imports, despite some reservations.

60

John Brown and Harpers Ferry (1859)


On October 16, 1859, radical abolitionist John Brown led an attempt to start an armed slave revolt by seizing the U.S. Army arsenal at Harper's Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia). Brown and twenty followers, both whites (including two of Brown's sons) and blacks (three free blacks, one freedman, and one fugitive slave), planned to seize the armory and use weapons stored there to arm black slaves in order to spark a general uprising by the slave population. Although the raiders were initially successful in cutting the telegraph line and capturing the armory, they allowed a passing train to continue on to Washington, D.C., where the authorities were alerted to the attack. By October 17 the raiders were surrounded in the armory by the militia and other locals. Robert E. Lee (then a Colonel in the U.S. Army) led a company of U.S. Marines in storming the armory on October 18. Ten of the raiders were killed, including both of Brown's sons; Brown himself along with a half dozen of his followers were captured; four of the raiders escaped immediate capture. Six locals were killed and nine injured; the Marines suffered one dead and one injured. The local slave population failed to join in Brown's attack. Brown was subsequently hanged for treason (against the Commonwealth of Virginia), as were six of his followers. The raid became a cause clbre in both the North and the South, with Brown vilified by Southerners as a bloodthirsty fanatic, but celebrated by many Northern abolitionists as a martyr to the cause of freedom.

Origins of the American Civil War

61

Elections of 1860
Initially, William H. Seward of New York, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, were the leading contenders for the Republican presidential nomination. But Abraham Lincoln, a former one-term House member who gained fame amid the Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, had fewer political opponents within the party and out-maneuvered the other contenders. On May 16, 1860, he received the Republican nomination at their convention in Chicago, Illinois.

1860 electoral map.

The schism in the Democratic Party over the Lecompton Constitution and Douglas' Freeport Doctrine caused Southern "fire-eaters" to oppose front runner Stephen A. Douglas' bid for the Democratic presidential nomination. Douglas defeated the proslavery Lecompton Constitution for Kansas because the majority of Kansans were antislavery, and Douglas' popular sovereignty doctrine would allow the majority to vote slavery up or down as they chose. Douglas' Freeport Doctrine alleged that the antislavery majority of Kansans could thwart the Dred Scott decision that allowed slavery by withholding legislation for a slave code and other laws needed to protect slavery. As a result, Southern extremists demanded a slave code for the territories, and used this issue to divide the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party. Southerners left the party and in June nominated John C. Breckinridge, while Northern Democrats supported Douglas. As a result, the Southern planter class lost a considerable measure of sway in national politics. Because of the Democrats' division, the Republican nominee faced a divided opposition. Adding to Lincoln's advantage, ex-Whigs from the border states had earlier formed the Constitutional Union Party, nominating John C. Bell for President. Thus, party nominees waged regional campaigns. Douglas and Lincoln competed for Northern votes, while Bell, Douglas and Breckinridge competed for Southern votes. "Vote yourself a farm vote yourself a tariff" could have been a slogan for the Republicans in 1860. In sum, business was to support the farmers' demands for land (popular also in industrial working-class circles) in return for support for a higher tariff. To an extent, the elections of 1860 bolstered the political power of new social forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution. In February 1861, after the seven states had departed the Union (four more would depart in AprilMay 1861; in late April, Maryland was unable to secede because it was put under martial law), Congress had a strong northern majority and passed the Morrill Tariff Act (signed by Buchanan), which increased duties and provided the government with funds needed for the war.

Split in the Democratic Party


The Alabama extremist William Lowndes Yancey's demand for a federal slave code for the territories split the Democratic Party between North and South, which made the election of Lincoln possible. Yancey tried to make his demand for a slave code moderate enough to get Southern support and yet extreme enough to enrage Northerners and split the party. He demanded that the party support a slave code for the territories if later necessary, so that the demand would be conditional enough to win Southern support. His tactic worked, and lower South delegates left the Democratic Convention at Institute Hall in Charleston, South Carolina and walked over to Military Hall. The South Carolina extremist Robert Barnwell Rhett hoped that the lower South would completely break with the Northern Democrats and attend a separate convention at Richmond, Virginia, but lower South delegates gave the national

Origins of the American Civil War Democrats one last chance at unification by going to the convention at Baltimore, Maryland before the split became permanent. The end result was that John C. Breckinridge became the candidate of the Southern Democrats, and Stephen Douglas became the candidate of the Northern Democrats.[91] Yancy's previous 1848 attempt at demanding a slave code for the territories was his Alabama Platform, which was in response to the Northern Wilmot Proviso attempt at banning slavery in territories conquered from Mexico. Both the Alabama Platform and the Wilmot Proviso failed, but Yancey learned to be less overtly radical in order to get more support. Southerners thought they were merely demanding equality, in that they wanted Southern property in slaves to get the same (or more) protection as Northern forms of property.[91]

62

Southern secession
With the emergence of the Republicans as the nation's first major sectional party by the mid-1850s, politics became the stage on which sectional tensions were played out. Although much of the West the focal point of sectional tensions was unfit for cotton cultivation, Southern secessionists read the political fallout as a sign that their power in national politics was rapidly weakening. Before, the slave system had been buttressed to an extent by the Democratic Party, which was increasingly seen as representing a more pro-Southern position that unfairly permitted Southerners to prevail in the nation's territories and to dominate national policy before the Civil War. But Democrats suffered a significant reverse in the electoral realignment of the mid-1850s. 1860 was a critical election that marked a stark change in existing patterns of party loyalties among groups of voters; Abraham Lincoln's election was a watershed in the balance of power of competing national and parochial interests and affiliations.[92] Once the election returns were certain, a special South Carolina convention declared "that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states under the name of the 'United States of America' is hereby dissolved", heralding the secession of six more cotton states by February, and the formation of an independent nation, the Confederate States of America. Lipset (1960) examined the secessionist vote in each Southern state in 186061. In each state he divided the counties into high, medium or low proportion of slaves. He found that in the 181 high-slavery counties, the vote was 72% for secession. In the 205 low-slavery counties. the vote was only 37% for secession. (And in the 153 middle counties, the vote for secession was in the middle at 60%).[93] Both the outgoing Buchanan administration and the incoming Lincoln administration refused to recognize the legality of secession or the legitimacy of the Confederacy. After Lincoln called for troops, four border states (that lacked cotton) seceded.[94]

Non-slavery related causes


Disputes over the route of a proposed transcontinental railroad affected the timing of the Kansas Nebraska Act.[95] The timing of the completion of a railroad from Georgia to South Carolina also was important, in that it allowed influential Georgians to declare their support for secession in South Carolina at a crucial moment. South Carolina secessionists feared that if they seceded first, they would be as isolated as they were during the Nullification Crisis. Support from Georgians was quickly followed by support for secession in the same South Carolina state legislature that previously preferred a cooperationist approach, as opposed to separate state secession.[96] The Totten system of forts (including forts Sumter and Pickens) designed for coastal defense encouraged Anderson to move federal troops from Fort Moultrie to the more easily defended Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, South Carolina. Likewise, Slemmer moved U.S. troops from Fort Barrancas to the more easily defended Fort Pickens in Florida. These troop movements were defensive from the Northern point of view, and acts of aggression from the Southern point of view. Also, an attempt to resupply Fort Sumter via the ship Star of the West was seen as an attack on a Southern owned fort by secessionists, and as an attempt to defend U.S. property from the Northern point of view.[96] The tariff issue is greatly exaggerated by Lost Cause historians. The tariff had been written and approved by the South, so it was mostly Northerners (especially in Pennsylvania) who complained about the low rates; some Southerners feared that eventually the North would have enough control it could raise the tariff at will.[97]

Origins of the American Civil War As for states' rights, while a states' right of revolution mentioned in the Declaration of Independence was based on the inalienable equal rights of man, secessionists believed in a modified version of states' rights that was safe for slavery.[96] These issues were especially important in the lower South, where 47 percent of the population were slaves. The upper South, where 32 percent of the population were slaves, considered the Fort Sumter crisisespecially Lincoln's call for troops to march south to recapture ita cause for secession. The northernmost border slave states, where 13 percent of the population were slaves, did not secede.[98]

63

Fort Sumter
When South Carolina seceded In December 1860, Major Robert Anderson, a pro-slavery, former slave-owner from Kentucky, remained loyal to the Union. He was the commanding officer of United States Army forces in Charleston, South Carolinathe last remaining important Union post In the Deep South. Acting without orders, he moved his small garrison from Fort Moultrie, which was indefensible, to the more modern, more defensible, Fort Sumter in the middle of Charleston Harbor. South Carolina leaders cried betrayal, while the North celebrated with enormous excitement at this show of defiance against secessionism. In February 1861 the Confederate States of America was formed and took charge. Jefferson Davis, the Confederate President, ordered the fort be captured. The artillery attack was commanded by Brig. Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, who had been Anderson's student at West Point. The attack began April 12, 1861, and continued until Anderson, badly outnumbered and outgunned, surrendered the fort on April 14. The battle began the American Civil War, As an overwhelming demand for war swept both the North and South, with only Kentucky attempting to remain neutral.[99] The opening of the Civil War, as well as the modern meaning of the American flag, according to Adam Goodheart (2011), was forged in December 1860, when Anderson, acting without orders, moved the American garrison from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, in defiance of the overwhelming power of the new Confederate States of America. Goodheart argues this was the opening move of the Civil War, and the flag was used throughout the North to symbolize American nationalism and rejection of secessionism. Before that day, the flag had served mostly as a military ensign or a convenient marking of American territory, flown from forts, embassies, and ships, and displayed on special occasions like the Fourth of July. But in the weeks after Major Anderson's surprising stand, it became something Robert Anderson's telegram different. Suddenly the Stars and Stripes flew as it does today, and announcing the surrender of Fort Sumter. especially as it did after September 11 from houses, from storefronts, from churches; above the village greens and college quads. For the first time American flags were mass-produced rather than individually stitched and even so, manufacturers could not keep up with demand. As the long winter of 1861 turned into spring, that old flag meant something new. The abstraction of the Union clause was transfigured into a physical thing: strips of cloth that millions of people would fight for, and many thousands die for.[100]

Origins of the American Civil War

64

Onset of the Civil War and the question of compromise


Abraham Lincoln's rejection of the Crittenden Compromise, the failure to secure the ratification of the Corwin amendment in 1861, and the inability of the Washington Peace Conference of 1861 to provide an effective alternative to Crittenden and Corwin came together to prevent a compromise that is still debated by Civil War historians. Even as the war was going on, William Seward and James Buchanan were outlining a debate over the question of inevitability that would continue among historians. Two competing explanations of the sectional tensions inflaming the nation emerged even before the war. Buchanan believed the sectional hostility to be the accidental, unnecessary work of self-interested or fanatical agitators. He also singled out the "fanaticism" of the Republican Party. Seward, on the other hand, believed there to be an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces.

The irrepressible conflict argument was the first to dominate historical discussion. In the first decades after the fighting, histories of the Civil War generally reflected the views of Northerners who had participated in the conflict. The war appeared to be a stark moral conflict in which the South was to blame, a conflict that arose as a result of the designs of slave power. Henry Wilson's History of The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America (18721877) is the foremost representative of this moral interpretation, which argued that Northerners had fought to preserve the union against the aggressive designs of "slave power". Later, in his seven-volume History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Civil War, (18931900), James Ford Rhodes identified slavery as the centraland virtually onlycause of the Civil War. The North and South had reached positions on the issue of slavery that were both irreconcilable and unalterable. The conflict had become inevitable. But the idea that the war was avoidable did not gain ground among historians until the 1920s, when the "revisionists" began to offer new accounts of the prologue to the conflict. Revisionist historians, such as James G. Randall and Avery Craven, saw in the social and economic systems of the South no differences so fundamental as to require a war. Randall blamed the ineptitude of a "blundering generation" of leaders. He also saw slavery as essentially a benign institution, crumbling in the presence of 19th century tendencies. Craven, the other leading revisionist, placed more emphasis on the issue of slavery than Randall but argued roughly the same points. In The Coming of the Civil War (1942), Craven argued that slave laborers were not much worse off than Northern workers, that the institution was already on the road to ultimate extinction, and that the war could have been averted by skillful and responsible leaders in the tradition of Congressional statesmen Henry Clay and Daniel Webster. Two of the most important figures in U.S. politics in the first half of the 19th century, Clay and Webster, arguably in contrast to the 1850s generation of leaders, shared a predisposition to compromises marked by a passionate patriotic devotion to the Union. But it is possible that the politicians of the 1850s were not inept. More recent studies have kept elements of the revisionist interpretation alive, emphasizing the role of political agitation (the efforts of Democratic politicians of the South and Republican politicians in the North to keep the sectional conflict at the center of the political debate). David Herbert Donald argued in 1960 that the politicians of the 1850s were not unusually inept but that they were operating in a society in which traditional restraints were being eroded in the face of the rapid extension of democracy. The stability of the two-party system kept the union together, but would collapse in the 1850s, thus reinforcing, rather than suppressing, sectional conflict.

Henry Wilson, author of History of The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America (18721877).

Origins of the American Civil War Reinforcing this interpretation, political sociologists have pointed out that the stable functioning of a political democracy requires a setting in which parties represent broad coalitions of varying interests, and that peaceful resolution of social conflicts takes place most easily when the major parties share fundamental values. Before the 1850s, the second American two party system (competition between the Democrats and the Whigs) conformed to this pattern, largely because sectional ideologies and issues were kept out of politics to maintain cross-regional networks of political alliances. However, in the 1840s and 1850s, ideology made its way into the heart of the political system despite the best efforts of the conservative Whig Party and the Democratic Party to keep it out.

65

Contemporaneous explanations
From Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens's "Cornerstone Speech", Savannah, March 21, 1861:

(Jefferson's) ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error.... Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his natural and normal condition.

In July 1863, as decisive campaigns were fought at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Republican senator Charles Sumner re-dedicated his speech The Barbarism of Slavery and said that desire to preserve slavery was the sole cause of the war:

[T]here are two apparent rudiments to this war. One is Slavery and the other is State Rights. But the latter is only a cover for the former. If Slavery were out of the way there would be no trouble from State Rights. The war, then, is for Slavery, and nothing else. It is an insane attempt to vindicate by arms the lordship which had been already asserted in debate. With mad-cap audacity it seeks to install this Barbarism as the truest Civilization. Slavery is declared to be the "corner-stone" of the new edifice.

Lincoln's war goals were reactions to the war, as opposed to causes. Abraham Lincoln explained the nationalist goal as the preservation of the Union on August 22, 1862, one month before his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation:

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." ... My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.... I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official [101] duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

On March 4, 1865, Lincoln said in his Second Inaugural Address that slavery was the cause of the War:

One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it.

Origins of the American Civil War

66

Notes
[1] Elizabeth R. Varon, Bruce Levine, Marc Egnal, and Michael Holt at a plenary session of the organization of American Historians, March 17, 2011, reported by David A. Walsh "Highlights from the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians in Houston, Texas" HNN online (http:/ / www. hnn. us/ articles/ 137673. html) [2] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, pages 4250 [3] The Mason-Dixon Line and the Ohio River were key boundaries. [4] Fehrenbacher pp.1517. Fehrenbacher wrote, "As a racial caste system, slavery was the most distinctive element in the southern social order. The slave production of staple crops dominated southern agriculture and eminently suited the development of a national market economy." [5] Fehrenbacher pp. 1618 [6] Goldstone p. 13 [7] McDougall p. 318 [8] Forbes p. 4 [9] Mason pp. 34 [10] Freehling p.144 [11] Freehling p. 149. In the House the votes for the Tallmadge amendments in the North were 8610 and 80-14 in favor, while in the South the vote to oppose was 661 and 64-2. [12] Missouri Compromise (http:/ / www. loc. gov/ rr/ program/ bib/ ourdocs/ Missouri. html) [13] Forbes pp. 67 [14] Mason p. 8 [15] Leah S. Glaser, "United States Expansion, 18001860" (http:/ / www. vcdh. virginia. edu/ solguide/ VUS06/ essay06c. html) [16] Richard J. Ellis, Review of The Shaping of American Liberalism: The Debates over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery. by David F. Ericson, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1994), pp. 826829 [17] John Tyler, Life Before the Presidency (http:/ / www. millercenter. virginia. edu/ index. php/ Ampres/ essays/ tyler/ biography/ 2) [18] Jane H. Pease, William H. Pease, "The Economics and Politics of Charleston's Nullification Crisis", Journal of Southern History, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1981), pp. 335362 [19] Remini, Andrew Jackson, v2 pp. 136137. Niven pg. 135137. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War pg 143 [20] Craven pg.65. Niven pg. 135137. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War pg 143 [21] Ellis, Richard E. The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (1987), page 193; Freehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina 18161836. (1965), page 257 [22] Ellis p. 193. Ellis further notes that Calhoun and the nullifiers were not the first southerners to link slavery with states rights. At various points in their careers, John Taylor, John Randolph, and Nathaniel Macon had warned that giving too much power to the federal government, especially on such an open-ended issue as internal improvement, could ultimately provide it with the power to emancipate slaves against their owners wishes. [23] Jon Meacham (2009), American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House, p. 247; Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, Vol. V, p. 72. [24] Varon (2008) p. 109. Wilentz (2005) p. 451 [25] Miller (1995) pp. 144146 [26] Miller (1995) pp. 209210 [27] Wilentz (2005) pp. 470472 [28] Miller, 112 [29] Miller, pp. 476, 479481 [30] Huston p. 41. Huston writes, "...on at least three matters southerners were united. First, slaves were property. Second, the sanctity of southerners' property rights in slaves was beyond the questioning of anyone inside or outside of the South. Third, slavery was the only means of adjusting social relations properly between Europeans and Africans." [31] Brinkley, Alan (1986). American History: A Survey. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp.328. [32] Moore, Barrington (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Beacon Press. pp.117. [33] North, Douglas C. (1961). The Economic Growth of the United States 17901860. Englewood Cliffs. pp.130. [34] Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, Slavery in White and Black: Class and Race in the Southern Slaveholders' New World Order (2008) [35] James M. McPherson, "Antebellum Southern Exceptionalism: A New Look at an Old Question", Civil War History 29 (Sept. 1983) [36] "Conflict and Collaboration: Yeomen, Slaveholders, and Politics in the Antebellum South", Social History 10 (October 1985): 27398. quote at p. 297. [37] Thornton, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 18001860 (Louisiana State University Press, 1978) [38] McPherson (2007) pp.47. James M. McPherson wrote in referring to the Progressive historians, the Vanderbilt agrarians, and revisionists writing in the 1940s, While one or more of these interpretations remain popular among the Sons of Confederate Veterans and other Southern heritage groups, few historians now subscribe to them. [39] Craig in Woodworth, ed. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996), p.505. [40] Donald 2001 pp 13438

Origins of the American Civil War


[41] Huston pp. 2425. Huston lists other estimates of the value of slaves; James D. B. De Bow puts it at $2 billion in 1850, while in 1858 Governor James Pettus of Mississippi estimated the value at $2.6 billion in 1858. [42] Huston p. 25 [43] Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 16061860 (http:/ / www. sc. edu/ uscpress/ 2007/ 3681. html) [44] Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy A-D (http:/ / www. americanforeignrelations. com/ Co-Da/ Cotton. html) [45] Woodworth, ed. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996), 145 151 505 512 554 557 684; Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (1969); for one dissenter see Marc Egnal. "The Beards Were Right: Parties in the North, 18401860". Civil War History 47, no. 1. (2001): 3056. [46] Kenneth M. Stampp, The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War (1981) p 198 [47] Also from Kenneth M. Stampp, The Imperiled Union p 198 Most historians... now see no compelling reason why the divergent economies of the North and South should have led to disunion and civil war; rather, they find stronger practical reasons why the sections, whose economies neatly complemented one another, should have found it advantageous to remain united. Beard oversimplified the controversies relating to federal economic policy, for neither section unanimously supported or opposed measures such as the protective tariff, appropriations for internal improvements, or the creation of a national banking system.... During the 1850s, Federal economic policy gave no substantial cause for southern disaffection, for policy was largely determined by pro-Southern Congresses and administrations. Finally, the characteristic posture of the conservative northeastern business community was far from anti-Southern. Most merchants, bankers, and manufacturers were outspoken in their hostility to antislavery agitation and eager for sectional compromise in order to maintain their profitable business connections with the South. The conclusion seems inescapable that if economic differences, real though they were, had been all that troubled relations between North and South, there would be no substantial basis for the idea of an irrepressible conflict. [48] James M. McPherson, Antebellum Southern Exceptionalism: A New Look at an Old Question Civil War History Volume 50, Number 4, December 2004, page 421 [49] Richard Hofstadter, "The Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil War", The American Historical Review Vol. 44, No. 1 (1938), pp. 5055 full text in JSTOR (http:/ / links. jstor. org/ sici?sici=0002-8762(193810)44:1<50:TTIOTE>2. 0. CO;2-B) [50] John Calhoun, Slavery a Positive Good, February 6, 1837 (http:/ / teachingamericanhistory. org/ library/ index. asp?document=71) [51] Noll, Mark A. (2002). America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln. Oxford University Press. pp.640. [52] Noll, Mark A. (2006). The Civil War as a Theological Crisis. UNC Press. pp.216. [53] Noll, Mark A. (2002). The US Civil War as a Theological War: Confederate Christian Nationalism and the League of the South. Oxford University Press. pp.640. [54] Hull, William E. (February 2003). "Learning the Lessons of Slavery" (http:/ / www. christianethicstoday. com/ Issue/ 043/ Learning the Lessons of Slavery By William E. Hull_043_05_. htm). Christian Ethics Today 9 (43). . Retrieved 2007-12-19. [55] Methodist Episcopal Church, South [56] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Southern_Baptists#Birth_pains [57] Presbyterian Church in the United States [58] Gaustad, Edwin S. (1982). A Documentary History of Religion in America to the Civil War. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.. pp.491502. [59] Johnson, Paul (1976). History of Christianity. Simon & Schuster. pp.438. [60] Noll, Mark A. (2002). America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln. Oxford University Press. pp.399400. [61] Miller, Randall M.; Stout, Harry S.; Wilson, Charles Reagan, eds. (1998). "title=The Bible and Slavery" (http:/ / www. questia. com/ PM. qst?a=o& docId=78824442). Religion and the American Civil War. Oxford University Press. pp.62. . [62] "The Amistad Case" (http:/ / www. npg. si. edu/ col/ amistad/ index. htm). National Portrait Gallery. . Retrieved 2007-10-16. [63] McPherson, Battle Cry p. 8; James Brewer Stewart, Holy Warriors: The Abolitionists and American Slavery (1976); Pressly, 270ff [64] Wendell Phillips, "No Union With Slaveholders", January 15, 1845, in Louis Ruchames, ed. The Abolitionists (1963), p.196. [65] Mason I Lowance, Against Slavery: An Abolitionist Reader, (2000), page 26 [66] "Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison Admits of No Compromise with the Evil of Slavery" (http:/ / members. aol. com/ jfepperson/ garrison. html). . Retrieved 2007-10-16. [67] Alexander Stephen's Cornerstone Speech, Savannah; Georgia, March 21, 1861 [68] Stampp, The Causes of the Civil War, page 59 [69] Schlessinger quotes from an essay The State Rights Fetish excerpted in Stampp p. 70 [70] Schlessinger in Stampp pp. 6869 [71] McDonald p. 143 [72] Kenneth M. Stampp, The Causes of the Civil War, p. 14 [73] Nevins, Ordeal of the Union: Fruits of Manifest Destiny 18471852, p. 155 [74] Donald, Baker, and Holt, p.117. [75] When arguing for the equality of states, Jefferson Davis said, "Who has been in advance of him in the fiery charge on the rights of the States, and in assuming to the Federal Government the power to crush and to coerce them? Even to-day he has repeated his doctrines. He tells us this is a Government which we will learn is not merely a Government of the States, but a Government of each individual of the people of the United States". Jefferson Davis' reply in the Senate to William H. Seward, Senate Chamber, U.S. Capitol, February 29, 1860, From The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 6, pp. 27784.

67

Origins of the American Civil War


[76] When arguing against equality of individuals, Davis said, "We recognize the fact of the inferiority stamped upon that race of men by the Creator, and from the cradle to the grave, our Government, as a civil institution, marks that inferiority". Jefferson Davis' reply in the Senate to William H. Seward, Senate Chamber, U.S. Capitol, February 29, 1860, From The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 6, pp. 27784. Transcribed from the Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 91618. [77] Jefferson Davis' Second Inaugural Address, Virginia Capitol, Richmond, February 22, 1862 Transcribed from Dunbar Rowland, ed., Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, Volume 5, pp. 198203. Summarized in The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 8, p. 55. [78] Lawrence Keitt, Congressman from South Carolina, in a speech to the House on January 25, 1860: Congressional Globe. [79] Stampp, The Causes of the Civil War, pages 6365 [80] William C. Davis, Look Away, pages 9798 [81] David Potter, The Impending Crisis, page 275 [82] First Lincoln Douglas Debate at Ottawa, Illinois August 21, 1858 [83] Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (1982) pp 2223, 363 [84] Christopher J. Olsen (2002). Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi: Masculinity, Honor, and the Antiparty Tradition, 18301860 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=RrBb2ThDuCkC& pg=PA237). Oxford University Press. p.237. . footnote 33 [85] Lacy Ford, ed. (2011). A Companion to the Civil War and Reconstruction (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=xeQAERwie80C& pg=PT28|). Wiley. p.28. . [86] Michael William Pfau, "Time, Tropes, and Textuality: Reading Republicanism in Charles Sumner's 'Crime Against Kansas'", Rhetoric & Public Affairs vol 6 #3 (2003) 385413, quote on p. 393 online in Project MUSE (http:/ / muse. jhu. edu/ journals/ rhetoric_and_public_affairs/ v006/ 6. 3pfau. html) [87] Williamjames Hoffer, The Caning of Charles Sumner: Honor, Idealism, and the Origins of the Civil War (2010) p. 62 [88] Donald, David; Randal, J.G. (1961). The Civil War and Reconstruction. Boston: D.C. Health and Company. pp.79. [89] Allan, Nevins (1947). Ordeal of the Union (vol. 3). III. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. pp.218. [90] Moore, Barrington, p.122. [91] William W, Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant 18541861, pages 271341 [92] Roy Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy: A History of the Political Crisis That Led Up To The Civil War (1949) [93] Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Doubleday, 1960) p. 349. [94] Maury Klein, Days of Defiance: Sumter, Secession, and the Coming of the Civil War (1999) [95] David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, pages 14150 [96] William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Secessionists Triumphant: 18541861, pages 345516 [97] Richard Hofstadter, "The Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil War", American Historical Review Vol. 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1938), pp.5055 in JSTOR (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 1840850) [98] Daniel Crofts, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis (1989 [99] Adam Goodheart, 1861: The Civil War Awakening (2011) ch 25 [100] Adam Goodheart, "Prologue", in 1861: The Civil War Awakening (2011) [101] Letter to Horace Greeley (http:/ / showcase. netins. net/ web/ creative/ lincoln/ speeches/ greeley. htm), August 22, 1862

68

References
Craven, Avery. The Coming of the Civil War (1942) ISBN 0-226-11894-0 Donald, David Herbert, Baker, Jean Harvey, and Holt, Michael F. The Civil War and Reconstruction. (2001) Ellis, Richard E. The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights and the Nullification Crisis. (1987) Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government's Relations to Slavery. (2001) ISBN 1-195-14177-6 Forbes, Robert Pierce. The Missouri Compromise and ItAftermath: Slavery and the Meaning of America. (2007) ISBN 978-0-8078-3105-2 Freehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina 18161836. (1965) ISBN 0-19-507681-8 Freehling, William W. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay 17761854. (1990) ISBN 0-19-505814-3 Freehling, William W. and Craig M. Simpson, eds. Secession Debated: Georgia's Showdown in 1860 (1992), speeches Hesseltine; William B. ed. The Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction (1962), primary documents

Huston, James L. Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the Economic Origins of the Civil War. (2003) ISBN 0-8078-2804-1 Mason, Matthew. Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic. (2006) ISBN 13:978-0-8078-3049-9 McDonald, Forrest. States' Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 17761876. (2000)

Origins of the American Civil War McPherson, James M. This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War. (2007) Miller, William Lee. Arguing About Slavery: John Quincy Adams and the Great Battle in the United States Congress. (1995) ISBN 0-394-56922-9 Niven, John. John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union (1988) ISBN 0-8071-1451-0 Perman, Michael, ed. Major Problems in Civil War & Reconstruction (2nd ed. 1998) primary and secondary sources. Remini, Robert V. Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 18221832,v2 (1981) ISBN 0-06-014844-6 Stampp, Kenneth, ed. The Causes of the Civil War (3rd ed 1992), primary and secondary sources. Varon, Elizabeth R. Disunion: The Coming of the American Civil War, 17891859. (2008) ISBN 978-0-8078-3232-5 Wakelyn; Jon L. ed. Southern Pamphlets on Secession, November 1860 April 1861 (1996) Wilentz, Sean. The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. (2005) ISBN 0-393-05820-4

69

Further reading
Historiography
Ayers, Edward L. What Caused the Civil War? Reflections on the South and Southern History (2005). 222 pp. Beale, Howard K., "What Historians Have Said About the Causes of the Civil War", Social Science Research Bulletin 54, 1946. Boritt, Gabor S. ed. Why the Civil War Came (1996) Childers, Christopher. "Interpreting Popular Sovereignty: A Historiographical Essay", Civil War History Volume 57, Number 1, March 2011 pp. 4870 in Project MUSE (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/civil_war_history/v057/ 57.1.childers.html) Crofts Daniel. Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis (1989), pp 35382 and 457-80 Etcheson, Nicole. "The Origins of the Civil War", History Compass 2005 #3 (North America) Foner, Eric. "The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions". In Beyond the Civil War Synthesis: Political Essays of the Civil War Era, edited by Robert P. Swierenga, 1975. Kornblith, Gary J., "Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise". Journal of American History 90.1 (2003): 80 pars. detailed historiography; online version (http://www.historycooperative.org/ journals/jah/90.1/kornblith.html) Pressly, Thomas. Americans Interpret Their Civil War (1966), sorts historians into schools of interpretation SenGupta, Gunja. Bleeding Kansas: A Review Essay. Kansas History 24 (Winter 2001/2002): 318341. (http:// www.kshs.org/publicat/history/2001winter_sengupta.pdf) Tulloch, Hugh. The Debate On the American Civil War Era (Issues in Historiography) (2000) Woodworth, Steven E. ed. The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (1996), 750 pages of historiography; see part IV on Causation.

Origins of the American Civil War

70

"Needless war" school


Craven, Avery, The Repressible Conflict, 183061 (1939) The Coming of the Civil War (1942) , "The Coming of the War Between the States", Journal of Southern History 2 (August 1936): 3063; in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/pss/2191911) Donald, David. "An Excess of Democracy: The Civil War and the Social Process" in David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 20935. Holt, Michael F. The Political Crisis of the 1850s. (1978) emphasis on political parties and voters Randall, James G. "The Blundering Generation", Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27 (June 1940): 328 in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/pss/1896569) James G. Randall. The Civil War and Reconstruction. (1937), survey and statement of "needless war" interpretation Pressly, Thomas J. "The Repressible Conflict", chapter 7 of Americans Interpret Their Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

Ramsdell, Charles W. "The Natural Limits of Slavery Expansion", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 16 (Sept. 1929), 15171, in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/pss/30235318); says slavery had almost reached its outer limits of growth by 1860, so war was unnecessary to stop further growth. online version without footnotes (http:// web.archive.org/web/20080605153248/http://edweb.tusd.k12.az.us/uhs/website/Courses/APUSH/1st Sem/Articles Semester 1/Artiles Semester 1/Ramsdell.htm)

Economic causation and modernization


Beard, Charles, and Mary Beard. The Rise of American Civilization. Two volumes. (1927), says slavery was minor factor Luraghi, Raimondo, "The Civil War and the Modernization of American Society: Social Structure and Industrial Revolution in the Old South Before and During the War", Civil War History XVIII (Sept. 1972). in JSTOR McPherson, James M. Ordeal by Fire: the Civil War and Reconstruction. (1982), uses modernization interpretation. Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. (1966). modernization interpretation Thornton, Mark; Ekelund, Robert B. Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War. (2004), stresses fear of future protective tariffs

Nationalism and culture


Crofts Daniel. Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis (1989) Current, Richard. Lincoln and the First Shot (1963) Nevins, Allan, author of most detailed history Ordeal of the Union 2 vols. (1947) covers 185057. The Emergence of Lincoln, 2 vols. (1950) covers 185761; does not take strong position on causation Olsen, Christopher J. Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi: Masculinity, Honor, and the Antiparty Tradition, 18301860" (2000), cultural interpretation Potter, David The Impending Crisis 18481861. (1976), Pulitzer Prize-winning history emphasizing rise of Southern nationalism Potter, David M. Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (1942). Miller, Randall M., Harry S. Stout, and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds. Religion and the American Civil War (1998), essays

Origins of the American Civil War

71

Slavery as cause
Ashworth, John Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic. (1995) "Free labor, wage labor, and the slave power: republicanism and the Republican party in the 1850s", in Melvyn Stokes and Stephen Conway (eds), The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political and Religious Expressions, 18001880, pp.12846. (1996) Donald, David et al. The Civil War and Reconstruction (latest edition 2001); 700-page survey Fellman, Michael et al. This Terrible War: The Civil War and its Aftermath (2003), 400-page survey Foner, Eric Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: the Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War. (1970, 1995) stress on ideology Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. (1981) Freehling, William W. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 17761854 1991., emphasis on slavery Gienapp William E. The Origins of the Republican Party, 18521856 (1987) Manning, Chandra. What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War. New York: Vintage Books (2007). McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (1988), major overview, neoabolitionist emphasis on slavery Morrison, Michael. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (1997) Ralph E. Morrow. "The Proslavery Argument Revisited", The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 48, No. 1. (June, 1961), pp.7994. in JSTOR (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X(196106)48:1<79:TPAR>2.0. CO;2-S) Rhodes, James Ford History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896 Volume: 1. (1920), highly detailed narrative 185056. vol 2 185660; emphasis on slavery Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. "The Causes of the Civil War" (1949) reprinted in his The Politics of Hope (1963); reintroduced new emphasis on slavery Stampp, Kenneth M. America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink (1990) Stampp, Kenneth M. And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 18601861 (1950).

External links
Civil War and Reconstruction: Jensen's Guide to WWW Resources (http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/civwar. htm) Report of the Brown University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice (http://www.brown.edu/Research/ Slavery_Justice/documents/SlaveryAndJustice.pdf) State by state popular vote for president in 1860 election (http://www.multied.com/elections/1860Pop.html) Tulane course article on 1860 election (http://www.tulane.edu/~latner/Background/BackgroundElection. html) Tulane course article on Fort Sumter (http://www.tulane.edu/~sumter/) Onuf, Peter. "Making Two Nations: The Origins of the Civil War" 2003 speech (http://www.albany.edu/ talkinghistory/index.html) The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History (http://www.gilderlehrman.org) CivilWar.com (http://www.civilwar.com) Many source materials, including states' secession declarations. Causes of the Civil War (http://civilwarcauses.org) Collection of primary documents Declarations of Causes of Seceding States (http://civilwarcauses.org/reasons.htm)

Origins of the American Civil War Alexander H. Stephens' Cornerstone Address (http://civilwartalk.com/cwt_alt/resources/documents/ cornerstone_addy.htm) An entry from Alexander Stephens' diary, dated 1866, reflecting on the origins of the Civil War. (http://www. adena.com/adena/usa/cw/cw223.htm) The Arguments of the Constitutional Unionists in 185051 (http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/civil_war_history/ v046/46.4huston.html) Shmoop US History: Causes of the Civil War (http://www.shmoop.com/intro/history/us/ causes-of-the-civil-war.html) study guide, dates, trivia, multimedia, teachers' guide Booknotes interview with Stephen B. Oates on The Approaching Fury: Voices of the Storm, 18201861, April 27, 1997. (http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/80568-1/Stephen+Oates.aspx)

72

Battle of Fort Sumter


The Battle of Fort Sumter (April 1214, 1861) was the bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter, near Charleston, South Carolina, that started the American Civil War. Following declarations of secession by seven Southern states, South Carolina demanded that the U.S. Army abandon its facilities in Charleston Harbor. On December 26, 1860, U.S. Major Robert Anderson surreptitiously moved his small command from the indefensible Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island to Fort Sumter, a substantial fortress controlling the entrance of Charleston Harbor. An attempt by U.S. President James Buchanan to reinforce and resupply Anderson, using the unarmed merchant ship Star of the West, failed when it was fired upon by shore batteries on January 9, 1861. South Carolina authorities then seized all Federal property in the Charleston area, except for Fort Sumter. During the early months of 1861, the situation around Fort Sumter increasingly began to resemble a siege. In March, Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, the first general officer of the newly formed Confederate States of America, was placed in command of Confederate forces in Charleston. Beauregard energetically directed the strengthening of batteries around Charleston harbor aimed at Fort Sumter. Conditions in the fort grew dire as the Federals rushed to complete the installation of additional guns. Anderson was short of men, food, and supplies. The resupply of Fort Sumter became the first crisis of the administration of President Abraham Lincoln. He notified the Governor of South Carolina, Francis W. Pickens, that he was sending supply ships, which resulted in an ultimatum from the Confederate government: evacuate Fort Sumter immediately. Major Anderson refused to surrender. Beginning at 4:30 a.m. on April 12, the Confederates bombarded the fort from artillery batteries surrounding the harbor. Although the Union garrison returned fire, they were significantly outgunned and, after 34 hours, Major Anderson agreed to evacuate. There was no loss of life on either side as a direct result of this engagement, although a gun explosion during the surrender ceremonies on April 14 caused two Union deaths. Following the battle, there was widespread support from both North and South for further military action. Lincoln's immediate call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion resulted in an additional four states also declaring their secession and joining the Confederacy. The Civil War had begun.

Background
Secession
On December 20, 1860, shortly after Abraham Lincoln's victory in the presidential election of 1860, South Carolina adopted an ordinance declaring its secession from the United States of America and by February 1861, six more Southern states had adopted similar ordinances of secession. On February 7, the seven states adopted a provisional constitution for the Confederate States of America and established their temporary capital at Montgomery, Alabama. A February peace conference met in Washington, D.C., but failed to resolve the crisis. The remaining eight slave

Battle of Fort Sumter states rejected pleas to join the Confederacy.[1] The seceding states seized numerous Federal properties within their boundaries, including buildings, arsenals, and fortifications. President James Buchanan protested but took no military action in response. Buchanan was concerned that an overt action could cause the remaining slave states to leave the Union, and while he acknowledged there was no constitutional authority for a state to secede, he could find no constitutional authority for him to act to prevent it.[2]

73

The forts of Charleston


Several forts had been constructed in Charleston's harbor, including Fort Sumter and Fort Moultrie, which were not among the initially seized properties. Fort Moultrie on Sullivan Island was the oldestit was the site of fortifications since 1776and was the headquarters of the U.S. Army garrison. However, it had been designed as a gun platform for defending the harbor, and its defenses against land-based attacks were feeble; during the crisis, the Charleston newspapers commented that sand dunes had piled up against the walls in such a way that the wall could easily be scaled. When the garrison began clearing away the dunes, the papers

Charleston Harbor, showing forts and Confederate artillery positions

objected.[3] Major Robert Anderson of the 1st U.S. Artillery regiment had been appointed to command the Charleston garrison that fall because of rising tensions. A native of Kentucky, he was a protg of Winfield Scott, the general in chief of the Army, and was thought more capable of handling a crisis than the garrison's previous commander, Col. John L. Gardner, who was nearing retirement. Anderson had served an earlier tour of duty at Fort Moultrie and his father had been a defender of the fort (then called Fort Sullivan) during the American Revolutionary War. Throughout the fall, South Carolina authorities considered both secession and the expropriation of Federal property in the harbor to be inevitable. As tensions mounted, the environment around the fort increasingly resembled a siege, to the point that the South Carolina authorities placed picket ships to observe the movements of the troops and threatened violence when forty rifles were transferred to one of the harbor forts from the U.S. arsenal in the city.[4] In contrast to Moultrie, Fort Sumter dominated the entrance to Charleston Harbor and, though unfinished, was designed to be one of the strongest fortresses in the world. In the fall of 1860 work was nearly done, but the fortress was thus far garrisoned by a single soldier, who functioned as a lighthouse keeper, and a small party of civilian construction workers. Under the cover of darkness on December 26, six days after South Carolina declared its secession, Anderson abandoned the indefensible Fort Moultrie, ordering its guns spiked and its gun carriages burned, and surreptitiously relocated his command by small boats to Sumter.[5]

Battle of Fort Sumter

74

President Buchanan and the Star of the West


South Carolina authorities considered Anderson's move to be a breach of faith. Governor Francis W. Pickens believed that President Buchanan had made implicit promises to him to keep Sumter unoccupied and suffered political embarrassment as a result of his trust in those promises. Buchanan, a former U.S. Secretary of State and diplomat, had used carefully crafted ambiguous language to Pickens, promising that he would not "immediately" occupy it.[6] From Major Anderson's standpoint, he was merely moving his existing garrison troops from one of the locations under his command to another. He had received instructions from the War Department on December 11, written by Major Don Carlos Buell, Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, approved by Secretary of War John B. Floyd:[7] ... you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy Maj. Robert Anderson more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.[8] Governor Pickens therefore ordered that all remaining Federal positions except Fort Sumter were to be seized. State troops quickly occupied Fort Moultrie (capturing 56 guns), Fort Johnson on James Island, and the battery on Morris Island. On December 27, an assault force of 150 men seized the Union-occupied Castle Pinckney fortification, in the harbor close to downtown Charleston, capturing 24 guns and mortars without bloodshed. On December 30, the Federal arsenal in Charleston was captured, resulting in the acquisition of more than 22,000 weapons by the militia. The Confederates promptly made repairs at Fort Moultrie and dozens of new batteries and defense positions were constructed throughout the Charleston harbor area, including an unusual floating battery, and armed with weapons captured from the arsenal.[9] President Buchanan was surprised and dismayed at Anderson's move to Sumter, unaware of the authorization Anderson had received. Nevertheless, he refused Pickens's demand to evacuate Charleston harbor. Since the garrison's supplies were limited, Buchanan authorized a relief expedition of supplies, small arms, and 200 soldiers. The original intent was to send the Navy sloop-of-war USS Brooklyn, but it was discovered that Confederates had sunk some derelict ships to block the shipping channel into Charleston and there was concern that Brooklyn had too deep a draft to negotiate the obstacles. Instead, it seemed prudent to send an unarmed civilian merchant ship, Star of the West, which might be perceived as less provocative to the Confederates. As she approached the harbor entrance on January 9, 1861, Star of the West was fired upon by a battery on Morris Island, which was staffed by cadets from The Citadel, among them William Stewart Simkins, who were the only trained artillerists in the service of South Carolina at the time. Batteries from Fort Moultrie joined in and Star of the West was forced to withdraw. Major Anderson prepared his guns at Sumter when he heard the Confederate fire, but the secrecy of the operation had kept him unaware that a relief expedition was in progress and he chose not to start a general engagement.[10]

Battle of Fort Sumter

75

Preparations for war


Conditions at the fort were difficult during the winter of 186061. Rations were short and fuel for heat was limited. The garrison scrambled to complete the defenses as best they could. Fort Sumter was designed to mount 135 guns, operated by 650 officers and men, but construction had met with numerous delays for decades and budget cuts had left it only about 90 percent finished in early 1861. Anderson's garrison consisted of just 85 men, primarily made up of two small artillery companies: Company E, 1st U.S. Artillery, commanded by Capt. Abner Doubleday, and Company H, commanded by Capt. Fort Sumter before the battle Truman Seymour. There were six other officers present: Surgeon Samuel W. Crawford, First Lt. Theodore Talbot of Company H, First Lt. Jefferson C. Davis of the 1st U.S. Artillery, and Second Lt. Norman J. Hall of Company H. Capt. John G. Foster and First Lt. George W. Snyder of the Corps of Engineers were responsible for construction of the Charleston forts, but they reported to their headquarters in Washington, not directly to Anderson. The remaining personnel were 68 noncommissioned officers and privates, eight musicians, and 43 noncombatant workmen.[11] By April the Union troops had positioned 60 guns, but they had insufficient men to operate them all. The fort consisted of three levels of enclosed gun positions, or casemates. The second level of casemates was unoccupied. The majority of the guns were on the first level of casemates, on the upper level (the parapet or barbette positions), and on the center parade field. Unfortunately for the defenders, the original mission of the fortharbor defensemeant that it was designed so that the guns were primarily aimed at the Atlantic, with little capability of protecting from artillery fire from the surrounding land or from infantry conducting an amphibious assault.[12] In March, Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard took command of South Carolina forces in Charleston; on March 1, President Jefferson Davis had appointed him the first general officer in the armed forces of the new Confederacy,[13] specifically to take command of the siege. Beauregard made repeated demands that the Union force either surrender or withdraw and took steps to ensure that no supplies from the city were available to the defenders, whose food was running low. He also increased drills amongst the South Carolina militia, training them to operate the guns they manned. Ironically, Major Anderson had been Beauregard's artillery instructor at West Point; the two had been especially close, and Beauregard had become Anderson's assistant after graduation. Both sides spent March drilling and improving their fortifications to the best of their abilities.[14] Beauregard, a trained military engineer, built-up overwhelming strength to challenge Fort Sumter. Fort Moultrie had three 8-inch Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard Columbiads, two 8-inch howitzers, five 32-pound smoothbores, and four 24-pounders. Outside of Moultrie were five 10-inch mortars, two 32-pounders, two 24-pounders, and a 9-inch Dahlgren smoothbore. The floating battery next to Fort Moultrie had two 42-pounders and two 32-pounders on a raft protected by iron shielding. Fort Johnson on James Island had one 24-pounder and four 10-inch mortars. At Cummings Point on Morris Island were stationed seven 10-inch mortars, two 42-pounders, an English Blakely rifled cannon, and three 8-inch Columbiads, the latter in the so-called Iron Battery, protected by a wooden shield faced with iron bars. About 6,000 men were available to man the artillery and to assault the fort, if necessary, including the local militia, young boys, and older men.[15]

Battle of Fort Sumter

76

Decisions for war


On March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as president. He was almost immediately confronted with the surprise information that Major Anderson was reporting that only six weeks of rations remained at Fort Sumter. A crisis similar to the one at Fort Sumter had emerged at Pensacola, Florida, where Confederates threatened another U.S. fortificationFort Pickens. Lincoln and his new cabinet struggled with the decisions of whether to reinforce the forts, and how. They were also concerned about whether to take actions that might start open hostilities and which side would be perceived as the aggressor as a result. Similar discussions and concerns were occurring in the Confederacy.[16] Following the formation of the Confederate States of America in early February, there was some debate among the secessionists whether the capture of the fort was rightly a matter for South Carolina or for the newly declared national government in Montgomery, Alabama. South Carolina Governor Pickens was among the states' rights advocates who felt that all property in Charleston harbor had reverted to South Carolina upon that state's secession as an independent commonwealth. This debate ran alongside another discussion about how aggressively the installationsincluding Forts Sumter and Pickensshould be obtained. President Davis, like his counterpart in Washington, preferred that his side not be seen as the aggressor. Both sides believed that the first side to use force would lose precious political support in the border states, whose allegiance was undetermined; before Lincoln's inauguration on March 4, five states had voted against secession, including Virginia, and Lincoln openly offered to evacuate Fort Sumter if it would guarantee Virginia's loyalty.[17] The South sent delegations to Washington, D.C., and offered to pay for the Federal properties and enter into a peace treaty with the United States. Lincoln rejected any negotiations with the Confederate agents because he did not consider the Confederacy a legitimate nation and making any treaty with it would be tantamount to recognition of it as a sovereign government. However, Secretary of State William H. Seward, who wished to give up Sumter for political reasonsas a gesture of good willengaged in unauthorized and indirect negotiations that failed.[18] On April 4, as the supply situation on Sumter became critical, President Lincoln ordered a relief expedition, to be commanded by former naval captain (and future Assistant Secretary of the Navy) Gustavus V. Fox, who had proposed a plan for nighttime landings of smaller vessels than the Star of the West. Fox's orders were to land at Sumter with supplies only, and if he was opposed by the Confederates, to respond with the U.S. Navy vessels following and to then land both supplies and men. This time, Maj. Anderson was informed of the impending expedition, although the arrival date was not revealed to him. On April 6, Lincoln notified Governor Pickens that "an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that if such attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice, [except] in case of an attack on the fort."[19] Lincoln's notification had been made to the governor of South Carolina, not the new Confederate government, which Lincoln did not recognize. Pickens consulted with Beauregard, the local Confederate commander. Soon Jefferson Davis ordered Beauregard to repeat the demand for Sumter's surrender, and if it did not, to reduce the fort before the relief expedition arrived. The Confederate cabinet, meeting in Montgomery, endorsed Davis's order on April 9. Only Secretary of State Robert Toombs opposed this decision: he reportedly told Jefferson Davis the attack "will lose us every friend at the North. You will only strike a hornet's nest. ... Legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death. It is unnecessary. It puts us in the wrong. It is fatal."[20] Beauregard dispatched aidesCol. James Chesnut, Col. James A. Chisholm, and Capt. Stephen D. Leeto Fort Sumter on April 11 to issue the ultimatum. Anderson refused, although he reportedly commented, "I shall await the first shot, and if you do not batter us to pieces, we shall be starved out in a few days." The aides returned to Charleston and reported this comment to Beauregard. At 1 a.m. on April 12, the aides brought Anderson a message from Beauregard: "If you will state the time which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and agree in the meantime that you will not use your guns against us unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you." After consulting with his senior officers, Maj. Anderson replied that he would evacuate Sumter by noon, April 15, unless he received new orders from his government or additional supplies. Col. Chesnut

Battle of Fort Sumter considered this reply to be too conditional and wrote a reply, which he handed to Anderson at 3:20 a.m.: "Sir: by authority of Brigadier General Beauregard, commanding the Provisional Forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time." Anderson escorted the officers back to their boat, shook hands with each one, and said "If we never meet in this world again, God grant that we may meet in the next." [21]

77

Bombardment
At 4:30 a.m. on April 12, Lt. Henry S. Farley, acting upon the command of Capt. George S. James, fired a single 10-inch mortar round from Fort Johnson. (James had offered the first shot to Roger Pryor, a noted Virginia secessionist, who declined, saying, "I could not fire the first gun of the war.") The shell exploded over Fort Sumter as a signal to open the general bombardment from 43 guns and mortars at Fort Moultrie, Fort Johnson, the floating battery, and Cummings Point. Under orders from Beauregard, the guns fired in a counterclockwise Bombardment of the Fort by the Confederates. sequence around the harbor, with 2 minutes between each shot; Beauregard wanted to conserve ammunition, which he calculated would last for only 48 hours. Edmund Ruffin, another noted Virginia secessionist, had traveled to Charleston to be present for the beginning of the war, and fired one of the first shots at Sumter after the signal round, a 64-pound shell from the Iron Battery at Cummings Point. The shelling of Fort Sumter from the batteries ringing the harbor awakened Charleston's residents (including diarist Mary Chesnut), who rushed out into the predawn darkness to watch the shells arc over the water and burst inside the fort.[22] Major Anderson held his fire, awaiting daylight. His troops reported for a call at 6 a.m. and then had breakfast. At 7 a.m., Capt. Abner Doubleday fired a shot at the Ironclad Battery at Cummings Point. He missed. Given the available manpower, Anderson could not take advantage of all of his 60 guns. He deliberately avoided using guns that were situated in the fort where casualties were most likely. The fort's best cannons were mounted on the uppermost of its three tiersthe barbette tierwhere his troops were most exposed to incoming fire from overhead. The fort had been designed to withstand a naval assault, and naval warships of the time did not mount guns capable of elevating to shoot over the walls of the fort; however, the land-based cannons manned by the Confederates were capable of landing such indirect fire on Fort Sumter. Fort Sumter's garrison could only safely fire the 21 working guns on the lowest level, which themselves, because they were emplaced in stone, were largely incapable of indirect fire that could seriously threaten Fort Moultrie. Moreover, although the Federals had moved as many of their supplies to Fort Sumter as they could manage, the fort was quite low on ammunition, and was nearly out at the end of the 34-hour bombardment. A more immediate problem was the scarcity of cloth gunpowder cartridges or bags; only 700 were available at the beginning of the battle and workmen sewed frantically to create more, in some cases using socks from Anderson's personal wardrobe. Because of the shortages, Anderson reduced his firing to only six guns: two aimed at Cummings Point, two at Fort Moultrie, and two at the Sullivan's Island batteries.[23] Ships from Fox's relief expedition began to arrive on April 12. Although Fox himself arrived at 3 a.m. on his steamer Baltic, most of the rest of his fleet was delayed until 6 p.m., and one of the two warships, USS Powhatan, never did arrive. Unbeknownst to Fox, it had been ordered to the relief of Fort Pickens in Florida. As landing craft were sent toward the fort with supplies, the artillery fire deterred them and they pulled back. Fox decided to wait until after dark and for the arrival of his warships. The next day, heavy seas made it difficult to load the small boats with men and supplies and Fox was left with the hope that Anderson and his men could hold out until dark on April 13.[24] Although Sumter was a masonry fort, there were wooden buildings inside for barracks and officer quarters. The Confederates targeted these with "hot shot" rounds (cannonballs that had been heated in ovens), starting fires that could prove more dangerous to the men than the explosive artillery. At 7 p.m. on April 12, a rain shower

Battle of Fort Sumter extinguished the flames and at the same time the Union gunners stopped firing for the night. They slept fitfully, concerned about a potential infantry assault against the fort. During the darkness, the Confederates reduced their fire to four shots each hour. The following morning, the full bombardment resumed and the Confederates continued firing hot shot against the wooden buildings. By noon most of the wooden buildings in the fort and the main gate were on fire. The flames moved toward the main ammunition magazine, where 300 barrels of gunpowder were stored. The Union soldiers frantically tried to move the barrels to safety, but two-thirds were left when Anderson judged it was too dangerous and ordered the magazine doors closed. He ordered the remaining barrels thrown into the sea, but the tide kept floating them back together into groups, some of which were ignited by incoming artillery rounds. He also ordered his crews to redouble their efforts at firing, but the Confederates did the same, firing the hot shots almost exclusively. Many of the Confederate soldiers admired the courage and determination of the Yankees. When the fort had to pause its firing, the Confederates often cheered and applauded after the firing resumed and they shouted epithets at some of the nearby Union ships for failing to come to the fort's aid.[25]

78

Surrender
The fort's central flagpole was knocked down at 1 p.m. on April 13, raising doubts among the Confederates about whether the fort was ready to surrender. Col. Louis Wigfall, a former U.S. senator, had been observing the battle and decided that this indicated the fort had had enough punishment. He commandeered a small boat and proceeded from Morris Island, waving a white handkerchief from his sword, dodging incoming rounds from Sullivan's Island. Meeting with Major Fort Sumter Flag Anderson, he said, "You have defended your flag nobly, Sir. You have done all that it is possible to do, and General Beauregard wants to stop this fight. On what terms, Major Anderson, will you evacuate this fort?" Anderson was encouraged that Wigfall had said "evacuate," not "surrender." He was low on ammunition, fires were burning out of control, and his men were hungry and exhausted. Satisfied that they had defended their post with honor, enduring over 3,000 Confederate rounds without losing a man, Anderson agreed to a truce at 2 p.m.[26] Fort Sumter raised Wigfall's white handkerchief on its flagpole as Wigfall departed in his small boat back to Morris Island, where he was hailed as a hero. The handkerchief was spotted in Charleston and a delegation of officers representing BeauregardStephen D. Lee, Porcher Miles, a former mayor of Charleston, and Roger Pryorsailed to Sumter, unaware of Wigfall's visit. Anderson was outraged when these officers disavowed Wigfall's authority, telling him that the former senator had not spoken with Beauregard for two days, and he threatened to resume firing. Meanwhile, General Beauregard himself had finally seen the handkerchief and sent a second set of officers, offering essentially the same terms that Wigfall had presented, so the agreement was reinstated.[27] The Union garrison surrendered the fort to Confederate personnel at 2:30 p.m., April 14. No one from either side was killed during the bombardment. During the 100-gun salute to the U.S. flagAnderson's one condition for withdrawala pile of cartridges blew up from a spark, killing Private Daniel Hough instantly and seriously injuring the rest of the gun crew, one mortally (Private Edward Gallway); these were the first fatalities of the war.[28] The salute was stopped at fifty shots. Gallway and another injured crewman were sent to the hospital in Charleston, where Gallway died a few days later. Union troops were placed aboard a Confederate steamer, the Isabel, where they spent the night and were transported the next morning to Fox's relief ship Baltic, resting outside the harbor bar.[29] Anderson carried the Fort Sumter Flag with him North, where it became a widely known symbol of the battle, and rallying point for supporters of the Union.[30]

Battle of Fort Sumter

79

Aftermath
The bombardment of Fort Sumter was the first military action of the American Civil War. Following the surrender, Northerners rallied behind Lincoln's call for all states to send troops to recapture the forts and preserve the Union. With the scale of the rebellion apparently small so far, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for 90 days.[31] Some Northern states filled their quotas quickly. There were so many volunteers in Ohio that within 16 days they could have met the full call for 75,000 men by themselves.[32] Other governors from border states were undiplomatic in their responses. For example, Gov. Claiborne Jackson wrote, "Not one man will the state of Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade", and Gov. Beriah Magoffin wrote, Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states.[33] The governors of other states still in the Union were equally unsupportive. The call for 75,000 troops triggered the secession of four additional states to join the Confederacy.[34] The ensuing war lasted four years, effectively ending in April 1865, with the surrender of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.[35]

Confederate Flag flying in Fort Sumter after the 1861 surrender

Charleston Harbor was completely in Confederate hands for almost the entire four-year duration of the war, leaving a hole in the Union naval blockade. Union forces conducted major operations in 1862 and 1863 to capture Charleston, first overland on James Island (the Battle of Secessionville, June 1862), then by naval assault against Fort Sumter (the First Battle of Charleston Harbor, April 1863), then by seizing the Confederate artillery positions on Morris Island (beginning with the Second Battle of Fort Wagner, July 1863, and followed by a siege until September). After pounding Sumter to rubble with artillery fire, a final amphibious operation attempted to occupy it (the Second Battle of Fort Sumter, September 1863), but was repulsed and no further attempts were made. The Confederates evacuated Fort Sumter and Charleston in February 1865 as Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman outflanked the city in the Carolinas Campaign. On April 14, 1865, four years to the day after lowering the Fort Sumter Flag in surrender, Robert Anderson (by then a major general, although ill and in retired status) returned to the ruined fort to raise the flag he had lowered in 1861.[36] Two of the cannons used at Fort Sumter were later presented to Louisiana State University by General William Tecumseh Sherman, who was president of the university before the war began.[37]

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] McPherson, pp. 23535; Davis, pp. 25, 12729. Detzer, pp. 6769; McPherson, pp. 24648. Burton, pp. 45; Detzer, pp. 2931; Davis, p. 120. Welcher, p. 699; Burton, pp. 6, 8; Detzer, pp. 12, 8283; Davis, p. 120. Detzer, pp. 11020; Davis, pp. 12122. Detzer, p. 78. Detzer, p. 78; Burton, p. 7. "Fort Sumter National Monument" (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ history/ online_books/ hh/ 12/ hh12b. htm). National Park Service. . Retrieved March 10, 2011. [9] Detzer, pp. 13136; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 35; Burton, pp. 1216: The weapons in the arsenal consisted of 18,000 muskets, 3,400 rifles, over 1,000 pistols, and a few artillery pieces, including five 24-pound field howitzers. [10] McPherson, pp. 26466; Burton, pp. 1720; Detzer, pp. 15561; Welcher, p. 699. [11] Welcher, p. 699.

Battle of Fort Sumter


[12] Detzer, pp. 12425; Burton, pp. 2930; "Fort Sumter National Monument" (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ history/ online_books/ hh/ 12/ hh12d. htm). National Park Service. . Retrieved March 10, 2011. [13] Eicher, High Commands, p. 810. [14] Eicher, Longest Night, p. 36. [15] Davis, pp. 13637. [16] McPherson, pp. 26163; Detzer, pp. 21214. [17] Detzer, page 212. When asked about that offer, Lincoln commented, "A state for a fort is no bad business." [18] McPherson, pp. 26871. [19] Detzer, pp. 22531, 249; Burton, p. 3335; McPherson, p. 272; Davis, pp. 13336; Welcher, p. 699. [20] Ward, Burns, and Burns, p. 38. [21] Davis, pp. 13941; Burton, pp. 3942; Detzer, pp. 25667; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 37. [22] Detzer, pp. 26871. Detzer comments that Ruffin claimed he fired the first shot, but did not. Davis, p. 146. [23] Davis, pp. 14753; Burton, pp. 4649. [24] Davis, pp. 15254. [25] Davis, pp. 15257; Burton, pp. 4951. [26] Detzer, pp. 292300; Burton, pp. 5155. [27] Detzer, pp. 292300; Davis, pp. 15760; Burton, pp. 5355. [28] Eicher, Longest Night, p. 41; Detzer, pp. 308309. [29] Ripley, p. 20. [30] Detzer, pp. 31113. [31] McPherson, p. 274. [32] "Fight for the Colors, the Ohio Battle Flags Collection, Civil War Room" (http:/ / ohsweb. ohiohistory. org/ exhibits/ fftc/ relicroom/ war. aspx?war=2). Ohio Historical Society. . Retrieved October 17, 2011. [33] Tod Widmer, "Lincoln Declares War." (http:/ / opinionator. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2011/ 04/ 14/ lincoln-declares-war/ ) New York Times Opinionator column, April 14, 2011. [34] Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 5253, 7273. [35] Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 820, 841. [36] Eicher, Longest Night, p. 834. [37] "Louisiana State University Army ROTC Unit History" (http:/ / appl003. lsu. edu/ artsci/ milscience. nsf/ $Content/ Unit+ History?OpenDocument). Louisiana State University. . Retrieved March 10, 2011.

80

References
Burton, E. Milby. The Siege of Charleston 18611865. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970. ISBN 0-87249-345-8. Davis, William C., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Brother against Brother: The War Begins. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983. ISBN 0-8094-4700-2. Detzer, David. Allegiance: Fort Sumter, Charleston, and the Beginning of the Civil War. New York: Harcourt, 2001. ISBN 0-15-100641-5. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Ripley, Warren. "War's First Death Accidental." In The Civil War at Charleston, edited by Arthur M. Wilcox and Warren Ripley. 16th ed. Charleston, SC: Evening-Post Publishing Co., 1992. OCLC636046368. Ward, Geoffrey C., Ken Burns, and Ric Burns. The Civil War, an Illustrated History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990. ISBN 978-0-394-56285-8. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/sc001.htm)

Battle of Fort Sumter

81

Further reading
Chesnut, Mary, Diary of Mary Chesnut (http://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/chesnut/maryches.html). Fairfax, VA: D. Appleton and Company, 1905. OCLC287696932. Doubleday, Abner. Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie in 186061 (http://www.pddoc.com/ skedaddle/articles/sumter_and_moultrie.htm). New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876. OCLC1320168. Hatcher, Richard W. "The Problem in Charleston Harbor: Fort Sumter and the Opening Shots of the Civil War." (http://www.civilwar.org/hallowed-ground-magazine/winter-2010/problem-in-charleston-harbor.html) Hallowed Ground Magazine (Civil War Trust), Winter 2010. Hendrickson, Robert. Sumter: The First Day of the Civil War. New York: Promontory Press, 1996. ISBN 0-88394-095-7. Klein, Maury. Days of Defiance: Sumter, Secession, and the Coming of the Civil War: New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997. ISBN 0-679-44747-4.

External links
Fort Sumter National Monument (http://www.nps.gov/fosu/) National Park Service Historical Handbook (http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/hh/12/index.htm) Battle of Fort Sumter (http://www.civilwar.org/fortsumter): Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (CWPT) Crisis at Fort Sumter (http://www.tulane.edu/~sumter/index.html) Details of requests for surrender prior to the battle (http://www.civilwarhome.com/CMHsumter.htm) Discussion of transfer of federal property within state boundaries (http://www.civilwarhome.com/ sumterownership.htm) Newspaper coverage of the Battle of Fort Sumter (http://www.newsinhistory.com/feature/ dramatic-newspaper-coverage-battle-fort-sumter-attack-began-civil-war)

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861)

82

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861)


The Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) was a skirmish between a small Union Regular Army cavalry force and a Virginia (Confederate) militia infantry company in the village of Fairfax Court House in Fairfax County, Virginia on June 1, 1861, during the early days of the American Civil War (Civil War). Captain John Quincy Marr of the Virginia Warrenton Rifles militia company of Fauquier County, Virginia[1] the first Southern (Confederate) officer or soldier to die in combat with Union soldiers, was killed in this small battle. Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Richard S. Ewell of the Provisional Army of the Confederate States was wounded. He was the first field grade Confederate officer wounded in the Civil War. Former and subsequent Virginia governor, former United States Congressman and subsequent Confederate major general William "Extra Billy" Smith took charge of the Warrenton Rifles infantry company after its captain was killed. He assisted Lt. Col. Ewell after he arrived at the scene. Smith finished the affair in command of the company as Ewell went off to send messengers for reinforcements. The Battle of Fairfax Court House was the first land battle of the Civil War between Union and Confederate land forces after the surrender of Fort Sumter. It occurred two days before the Battle of Philippi, Virginia (later West Virginia) and nine days before the Battle of Big Bethel, Virginia. A small Union cavalry force on a reconnaissance mission to gather information about the strength and disposition of Confederate forces in Fairfax County precipitated the battle when they loudly rode into the village of Fairfax Court House, taking a few prisoners and firing at random, in the early morning of June 1, 1861. Part of the Virginia (Confederate) Warrenton Rifles infantry company resisted the incursion, inflicted a few casualties and forced the Union force to retreat by a different and more circuitous route. The Union force took five prisoners, killed Captain Marr and wounded at least two others (including Lt. Col. Ewell). They gained some intelligence but a main part of it was not helpful as Union commander Lieutenant Charles Henry Tompkins's estimate of the number of Confederates at Fairfax Court House was wildly inflated. He thought there were "upwards of 1,000 men" at the village, rather than the approximately 210, plus a few civilians, who were actually there. This gave Union generals reason to pause efforts to scout in or occupy additional areas of northern Virginia until over two weeks later, In turn, this may have delayed the Manassas campaign, ultimately giving the Confederates more time to organize and concentrate their forces for the Battle of First Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas). The Union generals did not learn the number and disposition of Confederate forces beyond Fairfax Court House, most importantly those gathering at Manassas Junction, Virginia, from Tompkins's operation. After their initial surprise, the Confederate infantry held a position in the middle of town, inflicted one killed and four wounded on the Union riders and took three prisoners. Their stand forced the Union cavalrymen to retreat from the town to their base near Falls Church, Virginia by a longer route. The engagement has been characterized as inconclusive or indecisive.

Background
On April 15, 1861, the day after the U.S. Army surrendered Fort Sumter in the harbor Charleston, South Carolina to Confederate forces, President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to reclaim federal property and to suppress the rebellion begun by the seven Deep South states which had formed the Confederate States of America (Confederacy). Four Upper South States, including Virginia, refused to furnish troops for this purpose and began the process of secession from the Union with the intent of joining the Confederacy.[2] On April 17, 1861, the Virginia Secession Convention began in Richmond, Virginia for the purpose of considering the secession of Virginia. A majority of the delegates immediately passed an ordinance of secession and authorized the governor to call for volunteers to join the military forces of Virginia to defend the state against Federal military action.[3] Virginia Governor John Letcher appointed Robert E. Lee as commander in chief of Virginias army and navy forces on April 22, 1861 at the grade of major general.[3] On April 24, Virginia and the Confederate States agreed that the Virginia

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) forces would be under the overall direction of the Confederate President pending completion of the process of Virginia joining the Confederate States.[3] These actions effectively took Virginia out of the Union despite the scheduling of a popular vote on the question of secession for May 23, 1861. The popular vote of May 23, 1861 ratified the secession of Virginia. Virginia Governor Letcher issued a proclamation officially transferring Virginia forces to the Confederacy on June 6, 1861.[4] Major General Lee, as commander of the state forces, issued an order in compliance with the proclamation on June 8, 1861.[4] On May 31, 1861, about 210 Virginia (soon to be Confederate) soldiers, occupied Fairfax Court House, about 13.5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) west of Washington, D.C.[5] These were 120 cavalrymen in two companies, the Prince William cavalry and the Rappahannock cavalry, which then had about 60 men each, and about 90 infantrymen in a company known as the Warrenton Rifles.[6] Fairfax Court House was a village with about 300 inhabitants and the county seat of Fairfax County, Virginia.[7] Confederate Lt. Col. Richard S. Ewell, who had recently resigned as a captain of cavalry in the United States Army was in command of this largely untrained and ill-equipped force.[7] He had only just arrived in town and met a few officers but had not been introduced to the enlisted men.[7] Captain John Q. Marr commanded the Warrenton Rifles.[7] On the night of May 31, 1861, only two pickets were posted on the road east of town because little threat of attack from Federal forces who were no closer than 8 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away was expected.[7] The small Virginia force had taken this advanced position to help protect against the discovery of the build up of Confederate forces at Manassas Junction, Virginia, a railroad junction about 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) farther to the south.[8][9] On the same day, Brigadier General David Hunter gave verbal orders to Lieutenant Charles Henry Tompkins of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Regiment to gather information about the numbers and location of Confederate forces in the area. Hunter's instructions about entering Fairfax Court House were vague but he seemed to encourage a probe into town to discover more information.[10] At about 10:30 p.m. on the night of May 31, 1861, Tompkins led a Union force of between 50 and 86 regular army cavalrymen, dragoons and a few volunteers from Camp Union at Falls Church, Virginia, on the ordered reconnaissance mission in the direction of Fairfax Court House.[11]

83

Battle
At about 3:00 a.m. on the especially dark early morning of June 1, 1861, one of the Confederate pickets, Private A. B. Francis, ran into the town of Fairfax Court House shouting that the enemy was upon them.[12] The other picket, B. F. Florence, had been captured.[10] A few of the Prince William cavalry tried to form a battle line in the street while others ran for their horses.[13] As the Union force arrived on the Falls Church Road, most of the Confederate cavalrymen fled, leaving four of the Prince William cavalrymen in the street to be taken prisoner.[13] Captain Marr moved his men into a clover field west of the Methodist church where they had been camped, just off Little River Turnpike, and formed them into two battle lines.[13] Fleeing Confederate cavalrymen from Prince William came upon them and in the dark, some of Marr's men fired at them, wounding one of their own cavalrymen in the process.[13] The Rappahannock cavalrymen had few weapons and no ammunition so they also fled forthwith when the Union soldiers arrived.[13] According to several accounts, Captain Marr challenged the riders, asking something like "What cavalry is that?" These would have been his last words. Scattered shots were fired as the Union cavalry rode through and Captain Marr fell dead.[14][15] Some other accounts say he was killed while scouting out a better position for his men a little distance away from their line and do not mention a challenge to the Union horsemen. Whether he had moved up to challenge the Union riders or to scout out a better position for his company as some accounts suggest, Marr was not in the immediate presence or line of sight of any of his men on the very dark night when he fell in the dense field..[16] Soon, no one knew where he was or what may have happened to him.[16] His body was found in the clover field later in the morning.[17] The Union force road west through town firing some shots at random.[13] According to many of the accounts of the battle, the Union troopers fired at a man emerging from the hotel in town, who happened to be Lt. Col. Ewell, and

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) wounded him in the shoulder.[13][18] Regardless of the exact location where Ewell was wounded, he was first Confederate field grade officer wounded in the war.[19] After the initial flurry of activity, the flight of the Prince William cavalrymen and the ride on through town by the Union force, the men of the Warrenton Rifles infantry company realized that Captain Marr was no longer present.[13] As noted, Marr in fact was already lying dead in the clover field nearby, the first Confederate combat casualty of the war.[13] Most historians have concluded that he was struck by one of the random shots fired by the Union horsemen on their first ride through town.[13][20][21] The company was temporarily leaderless after Marr fell because the two lieutenants were on leave and Ewell had not yet arrived on the scene.[13] Former and subsequent Virginia governor and later major general William "Extra Billy" Smith, who had just resigned his seat in the U.S. Congress, then emerged with his rifle from the house where he was staying on his trip back home to Warrenton from Washington, D.C. Smith, at the time a 64-year old civilian, was from Warrenton, had helped recruit the company and knew many of the men. So he took charge of the company despite his lack of military training or experience.[22] Ewell soon arrived but Governor Smith had to assure the men that Ewell was who he said he was, the Confederate officer in command, before they would follow him. Ewell then placed the approximately 40 men of the Warrenton Rifles that he found at the edge of the clover field between the hotel and the courthouse (or the Episcopal Church).[23] where they were able to turn the Union force back to the west with a volley as the cavalrymen approached the Confederate position on their return trip through town.[23][24] The Virginians were not in a good position to defend themselves, however, and after Ewell presently went to find a courier to go for reinforcements, Smith moved the men to a more defensible position behind rail fences about 100 yards closer to the turnpike.[22][25] Civilians, mostly sheltered in buildings, joined in the shooting at the Union horsemen. This may have contributed to Tompkins's inflation of the number of men his force had encountered.[26][27] After having been driven back once by a volley from the Warrenton Rifles and civilian volunteers, the Union force tried to come back through town again. The Warrenton men again forced them to retreat with another three volleys.[22][10] During the exchange of fire, Lieutenant Tompkins had two horses shot from under him. One fell on and injured his foot.[22] The Confederates fired additional volleys at the Federals as they tried to pass through town again on their way back to their base at Camp Union near Falls Church, Virginia.[10] After this third failed attempt to ride through town past the Confederates,[28] the Union cavalrymen were forced to leave town through fields toward Flint Hill in the Oakton area of Fairfax County to the north of the City of Fairfax and return to Camp Union by a longer route.[29] The Confederates initially reported casualties in the affair of one dead (Captain Marr), four (later reduced to two) wounded (including Lt. Col. Ewell) and one missing.[17] A later Confederate account states that only two were wounded, but five were captured, which is in accord with the Union account which states five prisoners were taken and actually names them.[22] The Union force reported one killed, four wounded (including Lt. Tompkins) and one missing. The Union soldier killed was identified as Private Saintclair.[30] The Confederates stated that they took three prisoners and recent accounts agree.[27][31] The Union force also had lost 9 horses killed and 4 wounded.[22][32][33][34]

84

Aftermath
Besides the loss of Captain Marr, Confederate commanders, including Brigadier General Milledge Luke Bonham who was in overall command of the area,[35] were unhappy about the lack of arms and ammunition which precipitated the flight of the Confederate cavalry.[36] Union General-in-Chief Winfield Scott was displeased at Tompkins impetuous charge which Scott thought exceeded his orders to scout the Confederate positions and by the fact that Tompkins spoke to newspaper reporters before he even filed his report on the action.[37] Maj. Gen. McDowell praised Tompkins's gallantry but also criticized Tompkins for exceeding orders, without mentioning Brig. Gen. Hunter's role or what Tompkins's exact orders from Hunter were. He also said Tompkins unintentionally frustrated for a time "a more important movement." He also criticized Tompkins for speaking to the press before he

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) had even filed a report.[38][39] Neither the reports by the participants nor the contemporary accounts in the newspapers about this battle were entirely accurate since both sides inflated the number of men on the other side and the number of casualties their force inflicted on the other side, at least initially.[36] Because the war had just begun and no major battles had been fought, any sort of battle was given undue attention at this stage of the war.[40] Although this battle faded into insignificance after larger Civil War battles with many more casualties were fought, it was notable in several respects, including the occurrence of the first Confederate combat casualty of the war, the first wounding of a field grade officer, an eventual award of a Congressional Medal of Honor for actions at the first combat for which the award was given, the failure to discover the Confederate buildup at Manassas Junction, the delay in Union Army action caused by the inflated report of Confederate strength in the area and the foreshadowing of the thousands of actions of similar type and scale that would occur during the course of the war. Historian Charles Poland, Jr. wrote that the significance of the Battle of Fairfax Court House was not that it was the first land battle of the war or that the first Confederate combat death occurred during the engagement but that it was typical of thousands of other skirmishes that occurred throughout the American Civil War. He also says it was "among the antecedents of the forthcoming first battle at Bull Run."[41][42] In 1893, Charles Henry Tompkins received the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions at the Battle of Fairfax Court House. His was the first action of a Union Army officer in the American Civil War for which a Congressional Medal of Honor was awarded, although it was not awarded until 32 years later.[38] His citation reads: "Twice charged through the enemy's lines and, taking a carbine from an enlisted man, shot the enemy's captain."[43][44] No other account or source referenced on this page states that Tompkins himself shot Captain Marr.[45] A monument to Captain Marr was erected on June 1, 1904 near the front of the courthouse where it remains today. It reads: "This stone marks the scene of the opening conflict of the war of 18611865, when John Q. Marr, captain of the Warrenton Rifles, who was the first soldier killed in action, fell 800 feet south, 46 degrees West of the spot. June 1, 1861. Erected by the Marr Camp, C.V., June 1, 1904."[10] Several weeks later, on July 17, 1861, Union forces occupied Fairfax Court House as they began their move on Manassas Junction. The Confederates had abandoned the town in the face of the large Union force that was moving toward the first big battlefield of the war.[46] The Union forces moved to Centreville the next day on their way to the preliminary Battle of Blackburn's Ford on July 18, 1861 and the First Battle of Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas) on July 21, 1861. Fairfax Court House and its immediate vicinity would be the scene of several small battles or skirmishes and raids during the war.[47]

85

Notes
[1] The Warrenton Rifles would become a company of the Confederate 17th Virginia Volunteer Infantry Regiment later in the month. [2] Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. p. 48 [3] Scharf, John Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy From Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=ADMOAAAAIAAJ). New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887, p. 39. OCLC317589712. Retrieved February 1, 2011 [4] United States War Dept., Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. p. 911-912. [5] Modern highway driving distance between Fairfax City and Washington, DC is about 18 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km). [6] Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=ELlFs-Lf9jUC). Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. p. 249. Retrieved May 10, 2011. pp. 3536 [7] Poland, Jr., 2006, p. 36 [8] Longacre, Edward G. Lincoln's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-1049-1. p. 17 [9] Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. p. 33 [10] Poland, 2006, p. 82 [11] Walker, Charles D. Memorial, Virginia Military Institute: Biographical sketches of the Graduates and Eleves of the Virginia Military Institute Who Fell in the War Between the States (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=KcAiAAAAMAAJ). Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott &

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861)


Company, 1875. OCLC229174667. Retrieved May 11, 2011, p. 363 says Tompkins had 86 men. Poland, Jr., 2006, p. 37, says there were about 50 men in the patrol; he says that Tompkins reported he had 51 men, although he notes that General Irvin McDowell reported that Tompkins had 75, Poland, Jr., 2006, p. 82. Longacre, 2000. p. 18 uses the number of 75 men from McDowell's report for the size of Tompkins's force. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, p. 74. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. p. 74 says Tompkins had 50 cavalry troopers and 25 dragoons with him. Tompkins had reported he also had a few volunteers with his force. [12] Poland, 2006, p. 37 [13] Poland, 2006, p. 38 [14] Walker, 1875, p. 363 [15] Poland, 2006, p. 38 does not mention such a challenge by Marr. [16] Wise, George. History of the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry, C. S. A. (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=AS77Cym7LL0C). Baltimore: Kelly, Piet and Company, 1870. OCLC1514671. Retrieved May 13, 2011. p. 18 [17] Walker, 1875, p. 364 [18] Donald Pfanz in Richard S. Ewell: a Soldier's Life, states that Ewell challenged the riders with similar words to those attributed to Captain Marr in other accounts, out of concern that they might be the Confederate horsemen, and was answered with a pistol shot which inflicted a shoulder wound. Pfanz, Donald C. Richard S. Ewell: A Soldier's Life. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8078-2389-9. p. 127. As noted in the text, many other accounts of his wounding state that Ewell was wounded as he emerged from the hotel to find the Warrenton Rifles. [19] Pfanz, 1998, p. 128. In fact, Ewell was the first field grade officer on either side to be wounded in the war since the only earlier recorded casualty of a field grade officer was Union Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth, who was killed (not wounded) on May 24, 1861 in a non-combat situation by civilian James W. Jackson, owner of a hotel at Alexandria, Virginia where Ellsworth had just taken down a Confederate flag. [20] See additional references in footnote concerning Tompkins's Congressional Medal of Honor award below. [21] William "Extra Billy" Smith later reported that Captain Marr had a large bruise over his heart but his skin had not been penetrated, leading to the conclusion that he had been killed from the impact or shock of a spent ball. This seems to support the accounts that Marr was killed while looking for a better position not after a direct challenge to the Union cavalry. [22] Poland, 2006, p. 40 [23] Poland, 2006, pp. 39-40 [24] Only 39 of the 90 men of the Warrenton Rifles answered the roll call in the morning. Poland, 2006, p. 42 [25] Pfanz states that Ewell placed the men behind the fences. [26] Longacre, 2000, p. 18 [27] Davis, 1977, p. 34 [28] Longacre, 2000, p. 19 says the Confederates were reinforced by this time, which is in accord with Tompkins's report but not the Confederate report or Poland, 2006, p. 83, who says that reinforcements did not arrive until after the skirmish was over. Longacre also says that "Extra Billy" Smith led these reinforcements, but the only reinforcements available to Smith, who was in town from the outset, would have been the other 40 or so members of the Warrenton Rifles. [29] Wise. 1870, p. 19 [30] Moore, ed., Frank. The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=Xi8OAAAAIAAJ). 11 volumes. Volume 1, pp. 321322. New York: G.P. Putnam, D. Van Nostrand, 1861-1863; 1864-68. OCLC2230865. Retrieved May 13, 2011 [31] On the other hand, Governor Smith's report identifies one of the prisoners as "Private St. Clair" so Saintclair may be reported twice, once as a death and once as a prisoner. [32] Poland, 2006, p. 82 says the number of Union wounded is not given, which is true for Tompkins's report but McDowell's report lists four wounded. [33] Several accounts state that one Union prisoner escaped and the other two were rescued by another dash into Fairfax Court House the following night. Crafts, William August. The southern rebellion: being a history of the United States from the Commencement of President Buchanan's administration through the War for the Suppression of the Rebellion (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=9boVAQAAMAAJ). Vol. 1. Boston, Samuel Walker & Co., 1867]. OCLC6007950. Retrieved May 22, 2011. p. 234 [34] Tompkins's report stated that he "lost" 12 horses and captured 2. It may be that 3 of the wounded horses died since Tompkins filed the report a day later. Moore, vol. 1, 1861-1863, p. 321. [35] On the same day, June 1, 1861, Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard assumed command of Confederate forces in the area, establishing his headquarters at Manassas Junction, Virginia. [36] Poland, 2006, p. 41 [37] Poland, 2006, pp. 4142 [38] Longacre, 2000, p. 19 [39] As Longacre, p. 19 notes, the criticism did Tompkins's army career little harm since he became colonel of the 1st Vermont Cavalry Regiment and was awarded the grade of brevet brigadier general near the end of the war. [40] Poland, 2006, p. 35 [41] Poland, 2006, p. 43 [42] In addition, he noted that it was an example of many early engagements by untrained and inexperienced forces without proper arms and equipment. Poland, 2006, p. 44

86

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861)


[43] "Medal of Honor recipients Civil War (M-Z)" (http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ html/ moh/ civwarmz. html). United States Army Center of Military History. . Retrieved 2011-05-15. [44] Private Francis E. Brownell was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his action in killing James W. Jackson (middle initial sometimes given as "T"), the man who had just killed Union Army Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth at Alexandria, Virginia on May 24, 1861. His award also was received considerably later, in 1877, although it was not awarded as late as Tompkins's medal. Brownell's was the first action for which the Congressional Medal of Honor was awarded. Sifakis, 1988, p. 81 [45] Poland, 2006, p. 83 says that a rumor began to circulate that Marr had been shot by his own men but that the consensus became that he was killed by a stray shot from a Union trooper. Governor Smith agreed with this view. Longacre, 2000, pp. 19-20 and Pfanz, 1998, p. 128 also give the stray shot account. [46] Davis, 1977, p. 98 [47] Other skirmishes or small battles at Fairfax Court House occurred on June 1, 1861, July 17, 1861, November 18, 1861, November 27, 1861, September 2, 1862, December 27, 1862, December 28, 1862, January 9, 1863, January 28, 1863, June 4, 1863, June 27, 1863, August 6, 1863, August 24, 1863. Mosby's Fairfax Court House Raid occurred March 9, 1863. Operations were conducted around Fairfax Court House on July 28-August 3, 1863. Expeditions were conducted from Fairfax Court House August 4, 1863 and December 26-27, 1864. Scouts were conducted from Fairfax Court House on December 24-25, 1861, May 27-29, 1863, February 6-7, 1865, February 15-16, 1865 and April 8-10, 1865. Several other skirmishes occurred in the vicinity of Fairfax Court House or at nearby Fairfax Station, Virginia. Dyer, Frederick H. A compendium of the War of the Rebellion (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=OBkNAQAAMAAJ). pp. 885-886. Des Moines, IA: The Dyer Publishing Company, 1908. OCLC181358316. Retrieved May 24, 2011.

87

References
Crafts, William August. The southern rebellion: being a history of the United States from the Commencement of President Buchanan's administration through the War for the Suppression of the Rebellion (http://books.google. com/books?id=9boVAQAAMAAJ). Vol. 1. Boston, Samuel Walker & Co., 1867]. OCLC6007950. Retrieved May 22, 2011. Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Dyer, Frederick H. A compendium of the War of the Rebellion (http://books.google.com/ books?id=OBkNAQAAMAAJ). pp. 885886. Des Moines, IA: The Dyer Publishing Company, 1908. OCLC181358316. Retrieved May 24, 2011. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. Longacre, Edward G. Lincoln's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-1049-1. Moore, ed., Frank. The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events (http://books.google.com/ books?id=Xi8OAAAAIAAJ). 11 volumes. Volume 1. New York: G.P. Putnam, D. Van Nostrand, 1861-1863; 1864-68. OCLC2230865. Retrieved May 13, 2011. Pfanz, Donald. Richard S. Ewell: a Soldier's Life. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8078-2389-9. Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=ELlFs-Lf9jUC). Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. Retrieved May 10, 2011. United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. p. 911-912. "Medal of Honor recipients Civil War (M-Z)" (http://www.history.army.mil/html/moh/civwarmz.html). United States Army Center of Military History. Retrieved 2011-05-15. Walker, Charles D. Memorial, Virginia Military Institute: Biographical sketches of the Graduates and Eleves of the Virginia Military Institute Who Fell in the War Between the States (http://books.google.com/ books?id=KcAiAAAAMAAJ). Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott & Company, 1875. OCLC229174667. Retrieved May 11, 2011.

Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) Wise, George. History of the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry, C. S. A. (http://books.google.com/ books?id=AS77Cym7LL0C). Baltimore: Kelly, Piet and Company, 1870. OCLC1514671. Retrieved May 13, 2011.

88

Battle of Arlington Mills


The Battle of Arlington Mills, Virginia[1] was a small skirmish that was one of the first military engagements of the American Civil War. It occurred at about 11:00 p.m. on the night of June 1, 1861. The Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861) took place earlier that day. The skirmish at Arlington Mills occurred a week after the Union Army occupation of the area of Virginia opposite Washington, D.C. on May 24, 1861.[2] Under cover of darkness, a squad of as few as nine Virginia, soon to be Confederate, soldiers, fired a volley at Union Army soldiers from Company E of the 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment (90-day) and Company G of the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (1st New York Fire Zouaves). These companies had camped and were performing picket duty at Arlington Mill or Arlington Mills, Virginia. During the brief and confused exchange of gunfire in the dark, one Union soldier was killed and another was wounded while one Confederate soldier was wounded. This small and brief affair was one of the first combat actions of the American Civil War. The affair showed that despite the Union Army occupation of areas of northern Virginia across from Washington, D.C., Confederates could still operate in that area and strike the Union forces close to the capital city.

Background
The U.S. Army surrendered Fort Sumter in the harbor Charleston, South Carolina to Confederate forces on April 14, 1861. The next day, President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to serve for 90 days in order to reclaim federal property and to suppress the rebellion begun by the seven Deep South states which had formed the Confederate States of America (Confederacy). Four Upper South States, including Virginia, refused to furnish troops for this purpose. Instead, political leaders in these states began the process of secession from the Union with the intent of joining the Confederacy.[3] On April 17, 1861, a convention for the purpose of considering the secession of Virginia began in Richmond, Virginia.[4] The convention immediately passed an ordinance of secession and authorized the governor to call for volunteers to join the military forces of Virginia to defend the state against Federal military action.[4] Despite scheduling a popular vote to ultimately determine whether Virginia would secede from the Union, the actions of the Virginia Secession Convention and of the state government, especially Virginia Governor John Letcher, effectively took Virginia out of the Union. Governor Letcher appointed Robert E. Lee, who had just resigned as a colonel in the U.S. Army, as commander in chief of Virginias army and navy forces on April 22, 1861 at the grade of major general.[4] On April 24, 1861, Virginia and the Confederate States agreed that the Virginia forces would be under the overall direction of the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, pending completion of the process of Virginia joining the Confederate States.[4] The 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Orlando Willcox, was a three-month regiment, the only such regiment from Michigan.[5] The unit was organized at Fort Wayne, Detroit, Michigan, and mustered into United States service on May 1, 1861. The regiment left the State of Michigan for Washington, D.C. on May 13, 1861, reached Washington on May 16, 1861 and occupied Arlington Heights, Virginia and Alexandria, Virginia on May 24, 1861. Orlando Willcox was soon given brigade command. With Willcox in command of the brigade, the regiment was commanded by Major Alonzo F. Bidwell. The 1st Michigan Infantry (90-day) was attached to Orlando Willcox's Brigade, Samuel Heintzelman's Division, Irwin McDowell's Army of Northeastern Virginia. A threeyear regiment with the same regiment number replaced the 90day 1st Michigan Infantry Regiment after the original 1st Michigan Infantry Regiment was mustered out of the Union Army at the end of its term of service. First, however, the 90day men (many of whom reenlisted) would have to fight in the Battle of First Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas).

Battle of Arlington Mills On May 7, 1861 the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (1st New York Fire Zouaves) was mustered in to Federal service to serve for the duration of the war, not just for 3 months or a limited period of time. Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth commanded the regiment. The 11th New York Infantry served in the same brigade as the 1st Michigan Infantry at the First Battle of Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas). The regiment suffered extensive casualties, including many taken prisoner, at the First Battle of Bull Run during the fighting on Henry House Hill and while serving as the rear guard for the retreating Union army. Eventually, on June 2, 1862, after a period of service on guard duty at Newport News, Virginia, near Fort Monroe, the regiment, which had been suffering discipline problems, was mustered out. Many of its remaining members, including men who joined after the First Battle of Bull Run, reenlisted in other regiments. The secession of Virginia was ratified by a popular vote on May 23, 1861. Virginia Governor Letcher issued a proclamation officially transferring Virginia forces to the Confederacy on June 6, 1861. Major General Robert E. Lee, commanding the state forces, issued an order in compliance with the proclamation on June 8, 1861.[6] Despite the presence of Virginia forces in league with the Confederacy in Arlington and Alexandria, Virginia, just across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., President Lincoln did not wish to make a provocative military move into Virginia until after the popular vote on secession of the state had taken place. In the early morning hours of May 24, 1861, the day after the vote, the 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment and the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment crossed the Long Bridge into Arlington and occupied Arlington Heights. Part of the 1st Michigan Infantry, along with part of the 11th New York Infantry, continued to Alexandria while the other companies of the 11th New York Infantry crossed the Potomac by boat and occupied the town.[7] It was during this operation that Colonel Ellsworth took down a secessionist flag at the Marshall House hotel and was killed by its proprietor James W. Jackson. Jackson, in turn, was immediately killed by Private Francis E. Brownell of Ellsworth's regiment.[8] The 69th New York State Militia, a 90-day regiment, later the 69th Infantry New York State Volunteers (NYSV), under Colonel Michael Corcoran, also participated in the operation, crossing the Potomac River over the Chain Bridge. The Union regiments established camps, performed picket duty and later built part of the defenses of Washington on high ground near the river and up to about five miles (8 km) away from the river. Companies from both the 1st Michigan Infantry under Captain Brown and the 11th New York Infantry under Captain Roth[9] performed picket duty and camped at Arlington Mills, about 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from the Long Bridge at Washington.[10]

89

Battle
On the night of June 1, 1861,[11] Company E of the 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment was camped in the Arlington Mill while on picket duty [12] and Company G of the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (1st New York Fire Zouaves), having come to relieve them, was in a nearby house. At about 11:00 p.m., a squad of Virginia militia men, which contemporary newspaper accounts stated were only nine in number, approached the Union sentinels and camps and fired a volley. At least one newspaper account at the time stated that in the confusion the Michigan men in the mill and the Zouaves in a nearby house fired on each other as well as at the Virginians.[13] In any event, the Virginians (Confederates) were quickly driven off. The Union forces suffered one killed and one wounded among the New York men while the Confederates suffered one man wounded.[14] The web site of a re-enactor group states with respect to the picket duty performed by the regiment in the early days of the war: "21-year-old Henry S. Cornell of Company G, a member of Engine Co. 13, was killed and another man wounded one night on the picket line."[15] This obviously refers to the affair at Arlington Mills and provides the name of the soldier who was killed in the incident.

Battle of Arlington Mills

90

Aftermath
Following the Battle of Fairfax Court House and the skirmish at Arlington Mills on the same day, the Union Army did not attempt to move farther into northern Virginia until June 17, 1861 when a Union reconnaissance in force led to the Battle of Vienna, Virginia. Historian Charles Poland, Jr. says that the Arlington Mills skirmish and the Battle of Fairfax Court House were "among the antecedents of the forthcoming first battle at Bull Run."[16] The 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment fought at the Battle of First Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas) on July 21, 1861.[17][18] The regiment, under Major Bidwell, was mustered out August, 7, 1861. A reorganized 1st Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment (3 Years) then was organized at Detroit, Michigan, and mustered into United States service on September 16, 1861.[19] The reorganized regiment served until July, 1865. The 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (1st New York Fire Zouaves) also fought at the Battle of First Bull Run and suffered many casualties and hundreds taken prisoner as well as some desertions. The regiment was never completely and successfully reorganized and eventually was mustered out of service. Many of its men reenlisted in other New York regiments.

Current use of location


Arlington Mill was destroyed by fire in 1920.[20] In 2011, Arlington County, Virginia began work which will lead to construction of a new community center to replace a center just demolished on the site. The new center is expected to be opened by the end of 2013.[21]

Notes
[1] Arlington Mills, is at Columbia Turnpike as it crosses Four Mile Run. The road had already been built as a through road from the Long Bridge over the Potomac River at Washington, D.C. past the mill to Little River Turnpike. The Arlington Mill - Virginia Historical Markers on Waymarking.com (http:/ / www. waymarking. com/ waymarks/ WM28BB_The_Arlington_Mill) Retrieved June 2, 2011. [2] From that area the Union Army occupied points in Virginia a few miles away from their original areas of occupation on the Potomac River. [3] Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. p. 48 [4] Scharf, John Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy From Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=ADMOAAAAIAAJ). New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887, p. 39. OCLC317589712. Retrieved February 1, 2011 [5] Threemonth regiments were committed to serve only for a 3month period of time, the length of time for which President Lincoln originally called for volunteers to suppress the rebellion. [6] United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. pp. 911912. [7] Dunbar, Willis Frederick and George May. Michigan: a history of the Wolverine State (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=HqGWEAnByeMC). Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmann, 1980. ISBN 978-0-8028-7043-8. Retrieved June 15, 2011. p. 321 [8] Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle and Early Heroes Of 1861. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. p. 20 [9] The web site of a re-enactor group identifies the first captain of Company G of the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment as Captain Michael Teagen. (http:/ / www. myrtle-avenue. com/ firezou/ ) [10] Hannings, Bud. Every Day of the Civil War: A Chronological Encyclopedia (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=BC2Qbpa8OjgC). Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2010. ISBN 978-0-7864-4464-9. p. 47. Retrieved May 30, 2011 [11] A brief article in the New York Commercial of June 2, 1861 says the affair took place "shortly before midnight last night." [12] Arlington Mill was a grist mill that had been built in 1836 by George Washington Parke Custis on the Arlington estate where Little River Turnpike crossed Four Mile Run. The Official Records and other sources use the plural "Mills" in reference to the battle. George Washington had built mills on Four Mile Run in this vicinity and some of them still may have been in existence. United States War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ). Series I - Volume II. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC460898997. Retrieved June 4, 2011. p. 3 [13] Poland, 2006, p. 83 [14] Hannings, Bud. Every Day of the Civil War: A Chronological Encyclopedia (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=BC2Qbpa8OjgC). Retrieved May 30, 2011. p. 47 [15] (http:/ / www. myrtle-avenue. com/ firezou/ ) [16] Poland, 2006, p. 43

Battle of Arlington Mills


[17] Dunbar, 1980, p. 322 [18] Colonel Orlando Wilcox and Captain William Withington received the Medal of Honor for their gallant actions in the battle, during which both officers were wounded and taken prisoner. They were exchanged about a year later. Willcox later was promoted to brigadier general. Withington later became colonel of the 17th Michigan Infantry Regiment. [19] The Civil War Archive, Union Regimental Histories, Michigan (http:/ / www. civilwararchive. com/ Unreghst/ unmiinf1. htm). Retrieved June 2, 2011. [20] Arlington Historical Society (http:/ / www. arlingtonhistoricalsociety. org/ learn/ sites_properties/ commercial. html) Retrieved June 5, 2011. [21] Arlington County, Virginia (http:/ / www. arlingtonva. us/ departments/ parksrecreation/ forums/ arlingtonmill/ meetings/ page60058. aspx). Retrieved June 5, 2011.

91

References
Arlington Historical Society (http://www.arlingtonhistoricalsociety.org/learn/sites_properties/commercial. html) Retrieved June 5, 2011. The Arlington Mill - Virginia Historical Markers on Waymarking.com (http://www.waymarking.com/ waymarks/WM28BB_The_Arlington_Mill). Retrieved June 2, 2011. The Civil War Archive, Union Regimental Histories, Michigan (http://www.civilwararchive.com/Unreghst/ unmiinf1.htm). Retrieved June 2, 2011. Dunbar, Willis Frederick and George May. Michigan: a history of the Wolverine State (http://books.google. com/books?id=HqGWEAnByeMC). Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmann, 1980. ISBN 978-0-8028-7043-8. Retrieved June 15, 2011. Hannings, Bud. Every Day of the Civil War: A Chronological Encyclopedia (http://books.google.com/ books?id=BC2Qbpa8OjgC). Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2010. ISBN 978-0-7864-4464-9. p. 47. Retrieved May 30, 2011. Hansen, Harry. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC500488542. Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle and Early Heroes Of 1861. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. Scharf, John Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy From Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (http://books.google.com/books?id=ADMOAAAAIAAJ). New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887. OCLC317589712. Retrieved February 1, 2011. United States War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ). Series I Volume II. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC460898997 Retrieved June 4, 2011.

Battle of Vienna, Virginia

92

Battle of Vienna, Virginia


The Battle of Vienna, Virginia was an engagement on June 17, 1861 between a Union Army force of 271 men of the 1st Ohio Infantry and a Confederate States Army force of about 750 men, including about 575 men of the 1st South Carolina Infantry, two companies of cavalry and one company of artillery in the village of Vienna, Virginia in Fairfax County, Virginia, during the early days of the American Civil War. In an effort to expand and protect the area of Union control in northern Virginia after Union forces entered the area opposite Washington, D.C. on May 24, 1861, Union Army commanders determined to guard about 15 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of the Alexandria, Loudon and Hampshire Railroad line in Fairfax County, Virginia between Alexandria, Virginia and Vienna, Virginia. They also planned to establish camps at the outlying point of Vienna. Union Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck took the 1st Ohio Infantry along the railroad line toward Vienna, leaving detachments on guard duty along the way, in an effort to accomplish these goals. On June 17, 1861, by chance, a Confederate force from Fairfax Court House, Virginia under Colonel (later Brig. Gen.) Maxcy Gregg, which was on a scouting mission, heard the train approaching Vienna. They were able to set up an ambush along the tracks before the train reached their position. With darkness approaching, the Confederates hit the train with two cannon shots which inflicted casualties of eight killed and four wounded on the Union soldiers. The Union force scrambled off the flat cars that they were occupying and sought protection, mainly in the woods. The engineer fled with the locomotive and left the Union force to retreat on foot. The Confederates briefly pursued but the darkness and broken terrain, their orders to return to camp that night, and their apprehension that the Union force was the advance of a larger force led the Confederates to quickly call off the pursuit. Soon it would be obvious that this was a small affair in the context of the war, but all military actions were given extensive coverage and took on exaggerated importance at this early time in the war. In this minor engagement, the Union Army had suffered another loss one week after their defeat at the Battle of Big Bethel. The Union commanders were coming under increasing pressure to produce a significant victory over the Confederate rebels before the term of service of the 90day regiments expired. A notable aspect of this battle was the first military movement of troops by train in the American Civil War and involvement of a railroad in a combat situation, about a month before the Battle of First Bull Run. In fact, it was very likely the first such train movement and combat involving a railroad in any war in world history.

Background
In the early morning of May 24, 1861, the day after the secession of Virginia from the Union was ratified by popular vote, Union forces occupied Alexandria, Virginia and Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C. Union troops occupied the area up to distances of about 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from the river.[1] On June 1, 1861, a small U. S. Regular Army patrol on a scout as far as 8 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from their post at Camp Union in Falls Church, Virginia rode into Fairfax Court House, Virginia and fought a small and brief battle with part of a company of Virginia militia (soon to be Confederate Army infantry) at the Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861).[2] The patrol brought back to the Union Army commanders an exaggerated estimate of Confederate strength at Fairfax Court House. Together with an even smaller affair the same night at a Union outpost in Arlington, the Battle of Arlington Mills,[2] the Fairfax Court House engagement made Union commanders hesitate to extend their bridgehead into Virginia. On June 16, 1861, a Union force of Connecticut infantry under Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler rode over about 17 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of the Alexandria, Loudon and Hampshire Railroad line between Alexandria, Virginia and two miles (3km) past Vienna, Virginia. They reported the line clear, although one soldier had been wounded by a shot from ambush.[3] Confederate forces were in the area, however, and it was apparent to Union Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell who was in charge of the department that the railroad would not remain safe without a guard force, especially because he had received information that the Confederates planned to obstruct it.[4][5] On June 17,

Battle of Vienna, Virginia 1861, McDowell sent Brig. Gen. Schenck with the 1st Ohio Infantry under the immediate command of Col. Alexander McDowell McCook[6] to expand the Union position in Fairfax County.[7] Schenck took six companies over the Alexandria, Loudon and Hampshire Railroad line, dropping off detachments to guard railroad bridges between Alexandria, Virginia and Vienna, Virginia. As the train approached Vienna, about 4 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north of Fairfax Court House and 15 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Alexandria, 271 officers and men remained with the train.[6][8][9][10] On the same day, Confederate Col. Gregg took the 6month 1st South Carolina Infantry Regiment, about 575 men, two companies of cavalrymen (about 140 men) and a company of artillery with two artillery pieces (35 men), about 750 men in total, on a scouting mission from Fairfax Court House toward the Potomac River.[4][7][10][11] On their return trip, at about 6:00 p.m., the Confederates heard the train whistle in the distance. Gregg moved his artillery pieces to a curve in the railroad line near Vienna and placed his men around the guns.[7][12] Seeing this disposition, an elderly local Union sympathizer ran down the tracks to warn the approaching train of the hidden Confederate force. The Union officers mostly ignored his warning and the train continued down the track.[7] In response to the warning, an officer was placed on the forward car as a lookout.[13]

93

Battle
The Union soldiers were riding open gondola or platform cars as the train backed down the track toward Vienna.[7] As the train rounded a curve within 0.25 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of Vienna, one of the men spotted some Confederate cavalrymen on a nearby hill. As the Ohio soldiers prepared to shoot at the horsemen, the Confederates fired their cannons from their hiding place around the curve. The Union force suffered several casualties but were spared from incurring even more by the slightly high initial cannon shots and by quickly jumping from the slowmoving train and either running into nearby woods or moving into protected positions near the cars.[13] Schenck ordered Lieutenant William H. Raynor to go back to the engine and have the engineer take the train out of range in the other direction. Schenck quickly followed Raynor. Raynor had to help loosen the brakes. Because the brakeman had uncoupled most of the cars, the engineer left them. He did not stop for the Union soldiers to catch up but continued all the way back to Alexandria. Schenck now had no means of communication and had to have the wounded men carried back to their camp in blankets by soldiers on foot. The regiment's medical supplies and instruments had been left on the train.[13] Many of the Union infantrymen took shelter behind the cars and tried to return fire against the Confederate force amid a confusion of conflicting orders.[13] McCook reorganized many of them in the woods.[14] The two forces were slightly out of effective musket range and few shots were taken by either side. As darkness fell, the Union force was able to retreat and to elude Confederate cavalry pursuers in the broken terrain. The Confederate pursuit also was apparently called off early due to apprehension that the Union force might be only the advance of a larger body of troops and because the Confederate force was supposed to return to their post that night.[14][15] Confederates took such supplies and equipment as were left behind and burned a passenger car and five platform cars that had been left behind.<ref name="Lossing526"/[16] When the Union commanders at Arlington got word of the attack, they sent wagons to bring back the wounded and the dead but these did not reach the location of the fighting. The next day, a Union sympathizer picked up the bodies of six of the Ohio men and brought them into the Union camp.[16]

Battle of Vienna, Virginia

94

Aftermath
The Union force suffered casualties of eight soldiers killed and four wounded.[12][13][15] The Confederates reported no casualties. The Union officers were criticized for not sending skirmishers in front of the train which had moved slowly along the track and for disregarding the warning given to them by the local Union sympathizer.[17] The Battle of Vienna followed the Union defeat at the Battle of Big Bethel only a week earlier and historian William C. Davis noted that "the press were much agitated by the minor repulse at Vienna on June 17, and the people were beginning to ask when the Federals would gain some victories."[18] Historian Charles Poland, Jr. says the Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1861), the Battle of Arlington Mills, the Battle of Vienna, Virginia and several other brief clashes in the area at this time "were among the antecedents of the forthcoming first battle at Bull Run."[19] He also said that the battle has been "cited as the first time the railroad was used in warfare."[16] He no doubt was referring to the use of the railroad for troop movements or involvement in combat or both because some use of railroads for moving ammunition and supplies was made during the Crimean War.[20] Skirmishes took place at Vienna, Virginia on July 9, 1861 and on July 17, 1861 as Union forces began their slow march to Manassas, Virginia and the First Battle of Bull Run (Battle of First Manassas).[21] The railroad, which had eventually become the Washington and Old Dominion Railroad, was abandoned in the 1960s and turned into a trail. The site of the battle is at the crossing of the Washington & Old Dominion Railroad Regional Park and Park Street in Vienna, Virginia.[22]

Notes
[1] Weigley, Russell F. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 18611865. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-253-33738-0. p. 39 [2] Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 18611865. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. OCLC68283123. p. 81 [3] Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. p. 70 [4] Lossing, Benson John and William Barritt. Pictorial history of the civil war in the United States of America, Volume 1 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=gmvkkyCLMv8C). Philadelphia, George W. Childs, 1866. OCLC1007582. Retrieved May 1, 2011. p. 525 [5] Tomes, Robert. The War with the South: A History of the Great Rebellion (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=leASAAAAYAAJ). Volume 1. New York: Virtue and Yorston, 18641867. OCLC476284. Retrieved June 11, 2011. p. 323 [6] Crafts, William August. The southern rebellion: being a history of the United States from the Commencement of President Buchanan's administration through the War for the Suppression of the Rebellion (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=9boVAQAAMAAJ). Vol. 1. Boston, Samuel Walker & Co., 1867. OCLC6007950. Retrieved May 22, 2011. p. 235 [7] Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. p. 44 [8] Poland, 2006, p. 44 says the number was 274. Yet Poland says in a footnote on p. 84 that Schenck left camp with 697 and detached 387 for guard duty, which would have left him with 310 men. Given Eicher's and Davis's number of 271 for the remaining Union force, the 274 number Poland gives on p. 44 should be closer to the correct number of men on the train as it approached Vienna. [9] Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5, p. 78, gives the slightly different figure of 271 men, which actually coincides with General Schenck's report. [10] Davis, 1977, p. 71 [11] United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. pp. 128130 [12] Eicher, 2001, p. 78 [13] Poland, 2006, p. 45 [14] Tomes, 18641867, p. 325 [15] Lossing, 1866, p. 526 [16] Poland, 2006, p. 46 [17] Poland, 2006, p. 47 [18] Davis, 1977, p. 72 [19] Poland, 2006, p. 43

Battle of Vienna, Virginia


[20] Wolmar, Christian. The Railways and War (http:/ / www. christianwolmar. co. uk/ 2010/ 11/ the-railways-and-war/ ). Retrieved June 12, 2011 [21] Long, 1971, pp. 92, 96 [22] Poland, 2006, p. 85

95

References
Crafts, William August. The southern rebellion: being a history of the United States from the Commencement of President Buchanan's administration through the War for the Suppression of the Rebellion (http://books.google. com/books?id=9boVAQAAMAAJ). Vol. 1. Boston, Samuel Walker & Co., 1867. OCLC6007950. Retrieved May 22, 2011. Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 18611865. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. OCLC68283123. Lossing, Benson John and William Barritt. Pictorial history of the civil war in the United States of America, Volume 1 (http://books.google.com/books?id=gmvkkyCLMv8C). Philadelphia, George W. Childs, 1866. OCLC1007582. Retrieved May 1, 2011. Poland, Jr., Charles P. The Glories Of War: Small Battle And Early Heroes Of 1861]. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. ISBN 1-4184-5973-9. Tomes, Robert. The War with the South: A History of the Great Rebellion (http://books.google.com/ books?id=leASAAAAYAAJ). Volume 1. New York: Virtue and Yorston, 18641867. OCLC476284. Retrieved June 11, 2011. United States. War Dept, Robert Nicholson Scott, et al. The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=vo8tAAAAIAAJ) Series I, Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. OCLC427057. Retrieved May 14, 2011. Weigley, Russell F. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 18611865. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-253-33738-0.

Battle of Hoke's Run

96

Battle of Hoke's Run


The Battle of Hoke's Run, also known as the Battle of Falling Waters or Hainesville, took place on July 2, 1861, in Berkeley County, Virginia (now West Virginia) as part of the Manassas Campaign of the American Civil War. Notable as an early engagement of Confederate Colonel Thomas J. Jackson and his Brigade of Virginia Volunteers, nineteen days before their famous nickname would originate, this brief skirmish was hailed by both sides as a stern lesson to the other.[1] Acting precisely upon the orders of a superior officer[2] about how to operate in the face of superior numbers, Jackson's forces resisted General Robert Patterson's Union forces briefly and then slowly retreated over several miles.

Battle Sequence
On July 2, Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's division crossed the Potomac River near Williamsport, Maryland and marched on the main road to Martinsburg. Near Hoke's Run, the Union brigades of Cols. John J. Abercrombie and George H. Thomas encountered regiments of Col. Thomas J. Jackson's Confederate brigade, driving them back slowly. Jackson accomplished his orders to delay the Federal advance, withdrawing before Patterson's larger force.

Casualties
Figures vary. The National Park Service quotes Union as 23 and Confederate as 91 (without differentiating types of casualties).[3] Kennedy cites 75 Union deaths and 25 Confederate deaths.[4] In his Official Report, Major-General Robert Patterson states the number of Confederate deaths as "over sixty"[5] but does not describe Union casualties. After the time for propagandizing the casualty figures ended, the following Union regiments precisely reported the sacrifices of their comrades-in-arms: First Wisconsin Infantry: 1 killed, 5 wounded, 1 captured[6] Eleventh Pennsylvania Infantry: 1 killed, 10 wounded, none captured[7] Fifteenth Pennsylvania Infantry: 1 wounded, 35 captured (six of whom died in Confederate prisons within nine months)[8]

Aftermath
On July 3, Patterson occupied Martinsburg, but made no further aggressive moves until July 15, when he marched to Bunker Hill. Instead of moving on Winchester, however, Patterson turned east to Charles Town and then withdrew to Harpers Ferry. Patterson's retrograde movement took pressure off Confederate forces in the Shenandoah Valley and allowed Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah to march to support Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas Junction. Following the stunning Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, the Union commander at Hoke's Run, General Robert Patterson, was assigned popular blame without participating while the Confederate commander at Hoke's Run was assigned glory for his actions during the first major battle of the War; thereafter, the two commanders and two engagements, one a brief skirmish and the other a major battle, cannot be uncoupled in retroanalysis.

Battle of Hoke's Run

97

References
[1] High, Mike. "The C&O Canal Companion" (http:/ / www. press. jhu. edu/ books/ supplemental/ canal/ mile94fallingwaters. html). Johns Hopkins University. . Retrieved 2 March 2012. [2] Johnston, General Joseph E. "Official Report, Manassas Campaign" (http:/ / www. civilwarhome. com/ johnston1stmanassas. htm). . Retrieved 29 February 2012. [3] National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. "Battle Summary: Hoke's Run, WV" (http:/ / www. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ wv002. htm). . Retrieved 28 February 2012. [4] Kennedy, Francis H. (1998). The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed.. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.. pp.11. ISBN0-395-74012-6. [5] Robert Patterson, Major-General (1865). Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861. Philadelphia: John Campbell. pp.49. [6] "1st Wisconsin Infantry and Their Flag" (http:/ / www. wisconsinbattleflags. com/ units-flags/ 1st-wisconsin. php). . Retrieved 2 March 2012. [7] Civil War in the East. "11th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment" (http:/ / www. civilwarintheeast. com/ USA/ PA/ PA011. php). . Retrieved 3 March 2012. [8] Bates, Samuel P. (1869). History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-6; Vol I. Harrisburg, PA: B. Singerly, State Printer. pp.143.

CWSAC Report Update and Resurvey: Individual Battlefield Profiles (http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/ CWSII/WestVirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Greenbrier River to Kesslers Cross Lanes.pdf)

External links
Battle of Falling Waters (http://www.battleoffallingwaters.com)

Battle of Blackburn's Ford


The Battle of Blackburn's Ford took place on July 18, 1861, in Prince William County and Fairfax County, Virginia, as part of the First Manassas Campaign of the American Civil War. A Union brigade was ordered to probe the Confederate defenses along Bull Run to locate the Confederate left. At Blackburn's Ford, the brigade attempted to cross but Confederate fire broke up the attack and Union commanders decided to cross the creek farther upstream.

Background
On July 16, 1861, the untried Union army under Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, 35,000 strong, marched out of the Washington, D.C., defenses to give battle to the Confederate Army of the Potomac, which was concentrated around the vital railroad junction at Manassas. Moving slowly, the army reached Fairfax Court House on July 17; the next day, McDowell ordered division commander Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler to look for a fording point across Bull Run Creek and to "keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas".[1] The Confederates, about 22,000 men under the command of Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, were concentrated near the Bull Run, with detachments spread north of the creek to observe the Federals. When McDowell started his advance from Washington, the Confederate detachments slowly retreated and rejoined the main body. Beauregard expected to be attacked either on the 18th or the 19th near Mitchell's Ford; meanwhile, he continued to ask for reinforcements, especially from Joseph E. Johnston's army in the Shenandoah Valley.[2]

Battle of Blackburn's Ford

98

Battle
On July 18, Tyler advanced to Centreville and found that Centreville was unoccupied by Confederate troops. He then marched southeast to Mitchell's Ford and Blackburn's Ford, arriving at the latter about 11 a.m. Looking south across the stream, Tyler believed that the road to Manassas Junction was clear, but he failed to see the Confederate brigade of Brig. Gen. Situation July 18. ConfederateUnion James Longstreet concealed in the woods behind the ford. He ordered two howitzers under Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres to bombard the Confederates he could see, guns of the Alexandria Artillery and the Washington Artillery, but the fire had no visible effect. He ordered Col. Israel B. Richardson and part of his brigade forward.[3] Richardson's advance met initial resistance from the 1st, 11th, and 17th Virginia Infantry regiments of Longstreet's brigade. Tyler ordered Ayres to move his guns closer to the action, accompanied by cavalry, and he sent the rest of Richardson's brigade toward the ford. Richardson's assault fell apart as the 12th New York Infantry began to retreat under heavy fire, causing a wave of panic to spread through the Union line.[4] Col. Jubal A. Early arrived with his Confederate brigade after marching 2 miles north from Beauregard's headquarters at Wilmer McLean's house. The availability of this additional firepower completed the Confederate victory, and a reinforced Washington Artillery kept the Union troops under fire as they retreated. Colonel Patrick T. Moore of the 1st Virginia Infantry, later a Confederate brigadier general, received a severe head wound in the skirmish and was incapacitated for further field service.[5]

Aftermath
The failed reconnaissance-in-force at Blackburn's Ford led McDowell to decide against a frontal assault along Bull Run. He decided to attempt to cross the stream beyond the Confederate left flank, the maneuver he employed at the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21.[6] Both Longstreet and Early claimed later that the battle "went a long way towards winning the victory of the 21st, for it gave our troops confidence in themselves".[7]

Battle of Blackburn's Ford

99

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Davis, pp. 91, 100; Detzel, pp. 14951. Davis, pp. 10811. Davis, pp. 11315. Davis, pp. 11621. Warner, pp. 21920; Wert, p. 508 Davis, p. 15253. Detzel, p. 170.

References
National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va004.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Blackburns Ford to Buckland Mills.pdf) Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Detzer, David. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2004. ISBN 0-15-100889-2. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. ISBN 0-8071-0823-5. Wert, Jeffry D. "Moore, Patrick Theodore" in Historical Times Illustrated History of the Civil War, edited by Patricia L. Faust. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. ISBN 978-0-06-273116-6.

First Battle of Bull Run

100

First Battle of Bull Run


First Battle of Bull Run, also known as First Manassas (the name used by Confederate forces), was fought on July 21, 1861, in Prince William County, Virginia, near the city of Manassas. It was the first major land battle of the American Civil War. Just months after the start of the war at Fort Sumter, the Northern public clamored for a march against the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, which they expected to bring an early end to the "rebellion". Yielding to political pressure, Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell led his unseasoned Union Army across Bull Run against the equally inexperienced Confederate Army of Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard camped near Manassas Junction. McDowell's ambitious plan for a surprise flank attack on the Confederate left was poorly executed by his officers and men; nevertheless, the Confederates, who had been planning to attack the Union left flank, found themselves at an initial disadvantage. Confederate reinforcements under Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston arrived from the Shenandoah Valley by railroad and the course of the battle quickly changed. A brigade of Virginians under a relatively unknown colonel from the Virginia Military Institute, Thomas J. Jackson, stood their ground and Jackson received his famous nickname, "Stonewall Jackson". The Confederates then launched a strong counterattack, and as the Union troops began withdrawing under fire, many panicked and it turned into a rout as McDowell's men frantically ran without order in the direction of Washington, D.C. Both armies were sobered by the fierce fighting and many casualties, and realized the war was going to be much longer and bloodier than either had anticipated.

Background
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell was appointed by President Abraham Lincoln to command the Army of Northeastern Virginia. Once in this capacity, McDowell was harassed by impatient politicians and citizens in Washington, who wished to see a quick battlefield victory over the Confederate Army in northern Virginia. McDowell, however, was concerned about the untried nature of his army. He was reassured by President Lincoln, "You are green, it is true, but they are green also; you are all green alike."[1] Against his better judgment, McDowell commenced campaigning. On July 16, 1861, the general departed Washington with the largest field army yet gathered on the Northern Virginia Theater in July 1861 ConfederateUnion North American continent, about 35,000 men (28,452 effectives).[] McDowell's plan was to move westward in three columns, make a diversionary attack on the Confederate line at Bull

First Battle of Bull Run Run with two columns, while the third column moved around the Confederates' right flank to the south, cutting the railroad to Richmond and threatening the rear of the rebel army. He assumed that the Confederates would be forced to abandon Manassas Junction and fall back to the Rappahannock River, the next defensible line in Virginia, which would relieve some of the pressure on the U.S. capital.[2] The Confederate Army of the Potomac (21,883 effectives)[3] under Beauregard was encamped near Manassas Junction, approximately 25 miles (40km) from the United States capital. McDowell planned to attack this numerically inferior enemy army. Union Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's 18,000 men engaged Johnston's force (the Army of the Shenandoah at 8,884 effectives, augmented by Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes's brigade of 1,465[3]) in the Shenandoah Valley, preventing them from reinforcing Beauregard. After two days of marching slowly in the sweltering heat, the Union army was allowed to rest in Centreville. McDowell reduced the size of his army to approximately 30,000 by dispatching Brig. Gen. Theodore Runyon with 5,000 troops to protect the army's rear. In the meantime, McDowell searched for a way to outflank Beauregard, who had drawn up his lines along Bull Run. On July 18, the Union commander sent a Situation July 18. division under Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler to pass on the Confederate right (southeast) flank. Tyler was drawn into a skirmish at Blackburn's Ford over Bull Run and made no headway. Becoming more frustrated, McDowell resolved to attack the Confederate left (northwest) flank instead. He planned to attack with Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler's division at the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike and send the divisions of Brig. Gens. David Hunter and Samuel P. Heintzelman over Sudley Springs Ford. From here, these divisions could march into the Confederate rear. The brigade of Col. Israel B. Richardson (Tyler's Division) would harass the enemy at Blackburn's Ford, preventing them from thwarting the main attack. Patterson would tie down Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley so that reinforcements could not reach the area. Although McDowell had arrived at a theoretically sound plan, it had a number of flaws: it was one that required synchronized execution of troop movements and attacks, skills that had not been developed in the nascent army; it relied on actions by Patterson that he had already failed to take; finally, McDowell had delayed long enough that Johnston's Valley force was able to board trains at Piedmont Station and rush to Manassas Junction to reinforce Beauregard's men.[4] On July 1920, significant reinforcements bolstered the Confederate lines behind Bull Run. Johnston arrived with all of his army, except for the troops of Brig. Gen. Kirby Smith, who were still in transit. Most of the new arrivals were posted in the vicinity of Blackburn's Ford and Beauregard's plan was to attack from there to the north toward Centreville. Johnston, the senior officer, approved the plan. If both of the armies had been able to execute their plans simultaneously, it would have resulted in a mutual counterclockwise movement as they attacked each other's left flank.[5] McDowell was getting contradictory information from his intelligence agents, so he called for the balloon Enterprise, which was being demonstrated by Prof. Thaddeus S. C. Lowe in Washington, to perform aerial reconnaissance.

101

First Battle of Bull Run

102

Battle
On the morning of July 21, McDowell sent the divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (about 12,000 men) from Centreville at 2:30 a.m., marching southwest on the Warrenton Turnpike and then turning northwest toward Sudley Springs. Tyler's division (about 8,000) marched directly toward the Stone Bridge. The inexperienced units immediately developed logistical problems. Tyler's division blocked the advance of the main flanking column Situation morning, July 21 on the turnpike. The latter units found the approach roads to Sudley Springs were inadequate, little more than a cart path in some places, and did not begin fording Bull Run until 9:30 a.m. Tyler's men reached the Stone Bridge around 6 a.m.[6] At 5:15 a.m., Richardson's brigade fired a few artillery rounds across Mitchell's Ford on the Confederate right, some of which hit Beauregard's headquarters in the Wilmer McLean house as he was eating breakfast, alerting him to the fact that his offensive battle plan had been preempted. Nevertheless, he ordered demonstration attacks north toward the Union left at Centreville. Bungled orders and poor communications prevented their execution. Although he intended for Brig. Gen. Richard S. Ewell to lead the attack, Ewell, at Union Mills Ford, was simply ordered to "hold ... in readiness to advance at a moment's notice." Brig. Gen. D.R. Jones was supposed to attack in support of Ewell, but found himself moving forward alone. Holmes was also supposed to support, but received no orders at all.[7] All that stood in the path of the 20,000 Union soldiers converging on the Confederate left flank were Col. Nathan "Shanks" Evans and his reduced brigade of 1,100 men.[8] Evans had moved some of his men to intercept the direct threat from Tyler at the bridge, but he began to suspect that the weak attacks from the Union brigade of Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck were merely feints. He was informed of the main Union flanking movement through Sudley Springs by Captain Edward Porter Alexander, Beauregard's signal officer, observing from 8 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest on Signal Hill. In the first use of wig-wag semaphore signaling in combat, Alexander sent Federal cavalry at Sudley Spring Ford the message "Look out for your left, your position is turned."[9] Shanks hastily led 900 of his men from their position fronting the Stone Bridge to a new location on the slopes of Matthews Hill, a low rise to the northwest of his previous position.[8] The Confederate delaying action on Matthews Hill included a spoiling attack launched by Major Roberdeau Wheat's 1st Louisiana Special Battalion, "Wheat's Tigers". After Wheat's command was thrown back, and Wheat seriously wounded, Evans received reinforcement from two other brigades under Brig. Gen. Barnard Bee and Col. Francis S. Bartow, bringing the force on the flank to 2,800 men.[8] They successfully slowed Hunter's lead brigade (Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside) in its attempts to ford Bull Run and advance across Young's Branch, at the northern end of Henry House Hill. One of Tyler's brigade commanders, Col. William T. Sherman, crossed at an unguarded ford and struck the right flank of the Confederate defenders. This surprise attack, coupled with pressure from Burnside and Maj. George Sykes, collapsed the Confederate line shortly after 11:30 a.m., sending them in a disorderly retreat to

First Battle of Bull Run Henry House Hill.[10] As they retreated from their Matthews Hill position, the remainder of Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's commands received some cover from Capt. John D. Imboden and his battery of four 6-pounder guns, who held off the Union advance while the Confederates attempted to regroup on Henry House Hill. They were met by generals Johnston and Beauregard, who had just arrived from Johnston's headquarters at the M. Lewis Farm, "Portici".[11] Fortunately for the Confederates, McDowell did not press his advantage and attempt to seize the strategic ground immediately, choosing to bombard the hill with the batteries of Capts. James B. Ricketts (Battery I, 1st U.S. Artillery) and Charles Griffin (Battery D, 5th U.S.) from Dogan's Ridge.[12] Brig. Gen Thomas J. Jackson's Virginia brigade came up in support of the disorganized Confederates around noon, accompanied by Col. Wade Hampton and his Hampton's Legion, and Col. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry. Jackson posted his five regiments on the reverse slope of the hill, where they were shielded from direct fire, and was able to assemble 13 guns for the defensive line, which he posted on the crest of the hill; as the guns fired, their recoil moved them down the reverse slope, where they could be safely reloaded.[13] Meanwhile, McDowell ordered the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin to move from Dogan's Ridge to the hill for close infantry support. Their 11 guns engaged in a fierce Attacks on Henry House Hill, noon2 p.m. artillery duel across 300 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) against Jackson's 13. Unlike many engagements in the Civil War, here the Confederate artillery had an advantage. The Union pieces were now within range of the Confederate smoothbores and the predominantly rifled pieces on the Union side were not effective weapons at such close ranges, with many shots fired over the head of their targets.[14]

103

First Battle of Bull Run

104

Union retreat, after 4 p.m.

One of the casualties of the artillery fire was Judith Carter Henry, an 85-year-old widow and invalid, who was unable to leave her bedroom in the Henry House. As Ricketts began receiving rifle fire, he concluded that it was coming from the Henry House and turned his guns on the building. A shell that crashed through the bedroom wall tore off one of the widow's feet and inflicted multiple injuries, from which she died later that day.[15] "The Enemy are driving us," Bee exclaimed to Jackson. Jackson, a former U.S. Army officer and professor at the Virginia Military Institute, is said to have replied, "Then, Sir, we will give them the bayonet."[16] Bee exhorted his own troops to re-form by shouting, "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Rally behind the Virginians."[17] This exclamation was the source for Jackson's (and his brigade's) nickname, "Stonewall". There is some controversy over Bee's statement and intent, which could not be clarified because he was mortally wounded almost immediately after speaking and none of his subordinate officers wrote reports of the battle. Major Burnett Rhett, chief of staff to General Johnston, claimed that Bee was angry at Jackson's failure to come immediately to the relief of Bee's and Bartow's brigades while they were under heavy pressure. Those who subscribe to this opinion believe that Bee's statement was meant to be pejorative: "Look at Jackson standing there like a stone wall!"[18]

Ruins of Judith Henry's house, "Spring Hill", after the battle

Postwar house on site of Judith Henry house in Manassas

First Battle of Bull Run

105

Artillery commander Griffin decided to move two of his guns to the southern end of his line, hoping to provide enfilade fire against the Confederates. At approximately 3 p.m., these guns were overrun by the 33rd Virginia, whose men were outfitted in blue uniforms, causing Griffin's commander, Maj. William F. Barry, to mistake them for Union troops and to order Griffin not to fire on them. Close range volleys from the 33rd Virginia and Stuart's cavalry attack against the flank of the 11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves), which was supporting the battery, killed many of the Judith Henry grave gunners and scattered the infantry. Capitalizing on this success, Jackson ordered two regiments to charge Ricketts's guns and they were captured as well. As additional Federal infantry engaged, the guns changed hands several times.[19] The capture of the Union guns turned the tide of battle. Although McDowell had brought 15 regiments into the fight on the hill, outnumbering the Confederates two to one, no more than two were ever engaged simultaneously. Jackson continued to press his attacks, telling soldiers of the 4th Virginia Infantry, "Reserve your fire until they come within 50 yards! Then fire and give them the bayonet! And when you charge, yell like furies!" For the first time, Union troops heard the disturbing sound of the Rebel yell. At about 4 p.m., the last Union troops were pushed off Henry House Hill by a charge of two regiments from Col. Philip St. George Cocke's brigade.[20]

Capture of Ricketts' Battery, painting by Sidney E. King, National Park Service.

To the west, Chinn Ridge had been occupied by Col. Oliver O. Howard's brigade from Heintzelman's division. Also at 4 p.m., two Confederate brigades that had just arrived from the Shenandoah ValleyCol. Jubal A. Early's and Brig. Gen. Kirby Smith's (commanded by Col. Arnold Elzey after Smith was wounded)crushed Howard's brigade. Beauregard ordered his entire line forward. McDowell's force crumbled and began to retreat.[21] The retreat was relatively orderly up to the Bull Run crossings, but it was poorly managed by the Union officers. A Union wagon was overturned by artillery fire on a bridge spanning Cub Run Creek and incited panic in McDowell's force. As the soldiers streamed uncontrollably toward Centreville, discarding their arms and equipment, McDowell ordered Col. Dixon S. Miles's division to act as a rear guard, but it was impossible to rally the army short of Washington. In the disorder that followed, hundreds of Union troops were taken prisoner. Expecting an easy Union victory, the wealthy elite of nearby Washington, including congressmen and their families, had come to picnic and watch the battle. When the Union army was driven back in a running disorder, the roads back to Washington were blocked by panicked civilians attempting to flee in their carriages.[22] Since their combined army had been left highly disorganized as well, Beauregard and Johnston did not fully press their advantage, despite urging from Confederate President Jefferson Davis, who had arrived on the battlefield to see the Union soldiers retreating. An attempt by Johnston to intercept the Union troops from his right flank, using the brigades of Brig. Gens. Milledge L. Bonham and James Longstreet, was a failure. The two commanders squabbled with each other and when Bonham's men received some artillery fire from the Union rear guard, and found that Richardson's brigade blocked the road to Centreville, he called off the pursuit.[23]

First Battle of Bull Run

106

Aftermath
Today will be known as BLACK MONDAY. We are utterly and disgracefully routed, beaten, whipped by secessionists. Union diarist George Templeton Strong
[24]

If the war had turned out to be of short duration, Bull Run would have been a disaster for the Union. But if, as now seemed more plausible, a long and nasty war was inevitable, that battle had a curiously salutary effect for the Union side. It provided a wake-up call for those optimistslike Seward or even Lincolnwho had hoped for or counted on a quick result. David Detzer, Donnybrook
[25]

Bull Run was a turning point in the American Civil War ... in the sense that the battle struck with impelling force upon public opinion at home and abroad, upon Congress, and upon the Commander-in-chief. It framed new patterns of thought and led to far-reaching changes in the conduct of the war. The failure at Bull Run inspired a second Northern rising. Volunteering accelerated, 90-day men reenlisted, states rushed fresh regiments forward in plenitude. ... As they realized victory would not come readily, a new mood fastened upon Northerners. An iron resolve entered the Northern soul ... James A. Rawley, Turning Points of the Civil War
[26]

Bull Run was the largest and bloodiest battle in American history up to that point. Union casualties were 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, and 1,312 missing or captured; Confederate casualties were 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing.[27] Among the latter was Col. Francis S. Bartow, who was the first Confederate brigade commander to be killed in the Civil War. General Bee was mortally wounded and died the following day.[28] Union forces and civilians alike feared that Confederate forces would advance on Washington, D.C., with very little standing in their way. On July 24, Prof. Thaddeus S. C. Lowe ascended in the balloon Enterprise to observe the Confederates moving in and about Manassas Junction and Fairfax. He saw no evidence of massing Rebel forces, but was forced to land in Confederate territory. It was overnight before he was rescued and could report to headquarters. He reported that his observations "restored confidence" to the Union commanders.[29] The Northern public was shocked at the unexpected defeat of their army when an easy victory had been widely anticipated. Both sides quickly came to realize the war would be longer and more brutal than they had imagined. On July 22 President Lincoln signed a bill that provided for the enlistment of another 500,000 men for up to three years of service.[30] The reaction in the Confederacy was more muted. There was little public celebration as the Southerners realized that despite their victory, the greater battles that would inevitably come would mean greater losses for their side as well.[31] Beauregard was considered the hero of the battle and was promoted that day by President Davis to full general in the Confederate Army.[32] Stonewall Jackson, arguably the most important tactical contributor to the victory, received no special recognition, but would later achieve glory for his 1862 Valley Campaign. Irvin McDowell bore the brunt of the blame for the Union defeat and was soon replaced by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, who was named general-in-chief of all the Union armies. McDowell was also present to bear significant blame for the defeat of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia by Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia thirteen months later, at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Patterson was also removed from command.[33] The name of the battle has caused controversy since 1861. The Union Army frequently named battles after significant rivers and creeks that played a role in the fighting; the Confederates generally used the names of nearby towns or farms. The U.S. National Park Service uses the Confederate name for its national battlefield park, but the Union name (Bull Run) also has widespread currency in popular literature.[34] Battlefield confusion between the battle flags, especially the similarity of the Confederacy's "Stars and Bars" and the Union's "Stars and Stripes" when fluttering, led to the adoption of the Confederate Battle Flag, which eventually became the most popular symbol of the Confederacy and the South in general.[35]

First Battle of Bull Run

107

In popular media
The First Battle of Bull Run is mentioned in the novel Gods and Generals, but is depicted more fully in its film adaptation. It also appears in the first episode of the second season of the mini-series North and South. Manassas (1999) is the first volume in the James Reasoner Civil War Series of historical novels. The battle is described in Rebel (1993), the first volume of Bernard Cornwell's The Starbuck Chronicles series of historical novels. The battle is also depicted in John Jakes's The Titans, the fifth novel in The Kent Family Chronicles, a series that explores the fictional Confederate cavalry officer Gideon Kent. The battle is the subject of the Johnny Horton song, "Battle of Bull Run". Shaman, second in the Cole family trilogy by Noah Gordon, includes an account of the battle.

Sesquicentennial
Prince William County is staging special events commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Civil War through 2011. Manassas has been named the No. 1 tourist destination in the United States for 2011 by the American Bus Association for its efforts in highlighting the historical impact of the Civil War. The cornerstone of the commemoration event featured a reenactment of the battle on July 2324, 2011. Throughout the year, there will be tours of the Manassas battlefield and other battlefields in the county and a number of related events and activities.[36] The City of Manassas commemorated the 150th anniversary of the battle July 2124, 2011.[37]
The National Jubilee of Peace building at Grant and Lee avenues in Manassas, Virginia, is draped with the U.S. flag for the 150th anniversary commemoration, held on July 21, 2011, of the First Battle of Bull Run.

Notes
[1] Detzer, p. 77; Williams, p. 21; McPherson, p. 336; Davis, p. 110, attributes the remark to general-in-chief Winfield Scott. [2] Davis, pp. 11011. [3] Livermore, p. 77. [4] Eicher, pp. 91100. [5] Eicher, p. 92. [6] Beatie, pp. 28588; Esposito, text for Map 21; Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 312. [7] Eicher, p. 94; Esposito, Map 22. [8] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 312. [9] Brown, pp. 4345; Alexander, pp. 5051. Alexander recalls that the signal was "You are flanked." [10] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", pp. 31213; Rafuse, A Single Grand Victory, p. 131; Esposito, Map 22; Eicher, pp. 9495. [11] Eicher, p. 95. [12] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 313; Eicher, p. 96. [13] Salmon, p. 19. [14] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 314. [15] Detzer, p. 357; Davis, pp. 204-05. [16] Robertson, p. 264. [17] Freeman, vol. 1, p. 82; Robertson, p. 264. McPherson, p. 342, reports the quotation after "stone wall" as being "Rally around the Virginians!" [18] See, for instance, McPherson, p. 342. There are additional controversies about what Bee said and whether he said anything at all. See Freeman, vol. 1, pp. 73334. [19] Eicher, pp. 9698; Esposito, Map 23; Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", pp. 31415; McPherson, pp. 34244. [20] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", p. 315; Eicher, p. 98. [21] Rafuse, "First Battle of Bull Run", pp. 31516. [22] McPherson, p. 344; Eicher, p. 98; Esposito, Map 24. [23] Freeman, vol. 1, p. 76; Esposito, Map 24; Davis, p. 149. [24] Eicher, p. 100. [25] Detzer, p. 488.

First Battle of Bull Run


[26] Rawley, pp. 5657. [27] Eicher, p. 99. [28] Detzer, p. 383. [29] Haydon, pp. 192-93. [30] Rawley, p. 58. [31] Detzer, pp. 49293. [32] Freeman, vol. 1, p. 79. [33] Eicher, pp. 100-101. [34] McPherson, p. 346, n. 7. McPherson's popular one-volume history of the war uses the two names interchangeably because he states that "neither name has any intrinsic superiority over the other." [35] McPherson, p. 342. [36] Prince William/Manassas Convention and Visitor's Bureau (http:/ / www. visitpwc. com/ civilwaesesquicentennial. html) [37] Historic Manassas, Inc. (http:/ / www. manassascivilwar. org/ home. aspx)

108

References
Alexander, Edward P. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. ISBN 0-8078-4722-4. Ballard, Ted. First Battle of Bull Run: Staff Ride Guide (http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/1st Bull Run/ Contents.htm). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2003. ISBN 978-0-16-068078-6. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860 September 1861. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 0-306-81141-3. Brown, J. Willard. The Signal Corps, U.S.A. in the War of the Rebellion. U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Association, 1896. Reprinted 1974 by Arno Press. ISBN 0-405-06036-X. Davis, William C., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. First Blood: Fort Sumter to Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983. ISBN 0-8094-4704-5. Detzer, David. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. New York: Harcourt, 2004. ISBN 978-0-15-603143-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Praeger, 1959. Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3. Haydon, F. Stansbury. Military Ballooning during the Early Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941. ISBN 0-8018-6442-9. Livermore, Thomas L. Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-65. Reprinted with errata, Dayton, OH: Morninside House, 1986. ISBN 0-527-57600-X. First published in 1901 by Houghton Mifflin. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. "First Battle of Bull Run." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. Rafuse, Ethan S. A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas. The American Crisis Series. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2002. ISBN 0-8420-2875-7. Rawley, James A. Turning Points of the Civil War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966. ISBN 0-8032-8935-9.

First Battle of Bull Run Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. ISBN 0-9654382-6-0. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va005.htm) Professor Thaddeus Lowe's Official Report (Part I) (http://www.civilwarhome.com/loweor.htm)

109

Further reading
Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. Goldfield, David, et al. The American Journey: A History of the United States. 2nd ed. New York: Prentice Hall, 1999. ISBN 0-13-088243-7. Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of First Bull Run: An atlas of the First Bull Run (Manassas) Campaign, including the Battle of Ball's Bluff, JuneOctober 1861. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2009. ISBN 978-1-932714-60-9. Hankinson, Alan. First Bull Run 1861: The South's First Victory. Osprey Campaign Series #10. London: Osprey Publishing, 1991. ISBN 1-85532-133-5. Hennessy, John, Ethan Rafuse, and Harry Smeltzer. "Historians' Forum: The First Battle of Bull Run." Civil War History 57#2 (June 2011): 106120. Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. New York: Da Capo Press, 1992. ISBN 0-306-80464-6. First published in 1896 by J. B. Lippincott and Co. Rable, George. "The Battlefield and Beyond." Civil War History 53#3 (September 2007): 24451.

External links
Manassas National Battlefield Park website (http://www.nps.gov/mana) First Battle of Manassas: An End to Innocence, a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan (http://www.nps.gov/history/NR/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/12manassas/12manassas.htm) Battle of Bull Run (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/bullrun.html): Battle maps, photos, history articles, and battlefield news (Civil War Trust) Harper's Weekly 1861 Report on the Battle of Bull Run (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/ civil-war/1861/august/battle-bull-run.htm) Civil War Home website on First Bull Run (http://www.civilwarhome.com/1manassa.htm) Animated history of the First Battle of Bull Run (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/BullRunAnimation.html) FirstBullRun.co.uk (http://www.firstbullrun.co.uk) The First Battle of Bull Run (http://www.archive.org/details/first_battle_bull_run_librivox). General P.G.T. Beauregard. Librivox audio recording, Public Domain, 2007. First Manassas Campaign with Official Records and Reports (http://thomaslegion.net/ manassasbullrunbattlesoffirstandsecondmanassasfirstandsecondbullrun.html) Map of the Battles of Bull Run Near Manassas (http://www.wdl.org/en/item/2743/). Solomon Bamberger. Zoomable high-resolution map. Newspaper coverage of the First Battle of Bull Run (http://www.newsinhistory.com/feature/ confederates-rout-union-army-first-battle-bull-runmanassas) Manassas Civil War 150th Anniversary July 21-24, 2011 (http://www.manassascivilwar.org/home.aspx)

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

110

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War


The Eastern Theater of the American Civil War included the states of Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and the coastal fortifications and seaports of North Carolina. (Operations in the interior of the Carolinas in 1865 are considered part of the Western Theater, while the other coastal areas along the Atlantic Ocean are included in the Lower Seaboard Theater.) The Eastern Theater was the venue for several major campaigns launched by the Union Army of the Potomac to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia; many of these were frustrated by the President Lincoln visiting the Army of the Potomac at the Antietam battlefield, Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, September 1862. Photo by Alexander Gardner. commanded by General Robert E. Lee. President Abraham Lincoln sought a general to match Lee's boldness, appointing in turn Maj. Gens. Irvin McDowell, George B. McClellan, John Pope, Ambrose Burnside, Joseph Hooker, and George G. Meade to command his principal Eastern armies. It was not until newly appointed general-in-chief Ulysses S. Grant arrived from the Western Theater in 1864 to take personal control of operations in Virginia that Union forces were able to capture Richmond, but only after several bloody battles of the Overland Campaign and a nine-month siege near the cities of Petersburg and Richmond. The surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox Court House in April 1865 brought major operations in the area to a close. While many of the campaigns and battles were fought in the region of Virginia between Washington, D.C., and Richmond, there were other major campaigns fought nearby. The Western Virginia Campaign of 1861 secured Union control over the western counties of Virginia, which would be formed into the new state of West Virginia. Confederate coastal areas and ports were seized in southeastern Virginia and North Carolina. The Shenandoah Valley was marked by frequent clashes in 1862, 1863, and 1864. Lee launched two unsuccessful invasions of Union territory in hopes of influencing Northern opinion to end the war. In the fall of 1862, Lee followed his successful Northern Virginia Campaign with his first invasion, the Maryland Campaign, which culminated in his strategic defeat in the Battle of Antietam. In the summer of 1863, Lee's second invasion, the Gettysburg Campaign, reached into Pennsylvania, farther north than any other major Confederate army. Following a Confederate attack on Washington, D.C., itself in 1864, Union forces commanded by Philip H. Sheridan launched a campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, which cost the Confederacy control over a major food supply for Lee's army.

Theater of operations
The Eastern Theater included the campaigns that are generally most famous in the history of the war, if not for their strategic significance, then for their proximity to the large population centers, major newspapers, and the capital cities of the opposing parties. The imaginations of both Northerners and Southerners were captured by the epic struggles between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army of the Potomac, under a series of less successful commanders. The bloodiest battle of the war (Gettysburg) and the bloodiest single day of the war (Antietam) were both fought in this theater. The capitals of Washington, D.C., and

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Richmond were both attacked or besieged. It has been argued that the Western Theater was more strategically important in defeating the Confederacy, but it is inconceivable that the civilian populations of both sides could have considered the war to be at an end without the resolution of Lee's surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in 1865.[1] The theater was bounded by the Appalachian Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. By far, the majority of battles occurred in the 100 miles between the cities of Washington and Richmond. This terrain favored the Confederate defenders because a series of rivers ran primarily west to east, making them obstacles rather than avenues of approach and lines of communication for the Union. This was quite different than the early years of the Western theater, and since the Union Army had to rely solely on the primitive road system of the era for its primary transportation, it limited winter campaigning for both sides. The Union advantage was control of the sea and major rivers, which would allow an army that stayed close to the ocean to be reinforced and supplied.[2] The campaign classification established by the United States National Park Service (NPS)[3] is more fine-grained than the one used in this article. Some minor NPS campaigns have been omitted and some have been combined into larger categories. Only a few of the 160 battles the NPS classifies for this theater are described. Boxed text in the right margin show the NPS campaigns associated with each section.

111

Principal commanders of the Eastern Theater

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, USA

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, USA

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

112

Maj. Gen. John Pope, USA

Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, USA

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, USA

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

113

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, USA

Gen. Robert E. Lee, CSA

Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, CSA

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

114

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, CSA

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, CSA

Lt. Gen. Stonewall Jackson, CSA

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

115

Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early, CSA

Early operations (1861)


After the fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861, both sides scrambled to create armies. President Abraham Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion, which immediately caused the secession of four additional states, including Virginia. The United States Army had only around 16,000 men, with more than half spread out in the West. The army was commanded by the elderly Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, veteran of the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War. On the Confederate side, only a handful of Federal officers and men resigned and joined the Confederacy; the formation of the Confederate States Army was a matter initially undertaken by the individual states. (The decentralized nature of the Confederate defenses, encouraged by the states' distrust of a strong central government, was one of the disadvantages suffered by the South during the war.)[4] Some of the first hostilities occurred in western Virginia (now the state of West Virginia). The region had closer ties to Pennsylvania and Ohio than to eastern Virginia and thus were opposed to secession; a pro-Union government was soon organized and appealed to Lincoln for military protection. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Department of the Ohio, ordered troops to march from Grafton and attack the Confederates under Col. George A. Porterfield. The skirmish on June 3, 1861, known as the Battle of Philippi, or the "Philippi Races", had little significance other than to raise public awareness of the young general. His victory at the Battle of Rich Mountain in July was instrumental in his promotion that fall to command the Army of the Potomac. As the campaign continued through a series of minor battles, General Robert E. Lee, who, despite his excellent reputation as a former U.S. Army colonel, had no combat command experience, gave a lackluster performance that earned him the derogatory nickname "Granny Lee". He was soon transferred to the Carolinas to construct fortifications. The Union victory in this campaign enabled the creation of the state of West Virginia in 1863.[5] The first significant battle of the war took place in eastern Virginia on June 10. Union Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, based at Fort Monroe, sent converging columns from Hampton and Newport News against advanced Confederate outposts. At Big Bethel, near Fort Monroe, Colonel John B. Magruder won the first Confederate victory.[6]

First Bull Run (First Manassas)


In early summer, the commander of Union field forces around Washington was Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, an inexperienced combat officer in command of volunteer soldiers with even less experience. Many of them had enlisted for only 90 days, a period soon to expire. McDowell was pressured by politicians and major newspapers in the North to take immediate action, exhorting him "On to Richmond!" His plan was to march with 35,000 men and attack the 20,000 Confederates under Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas. The second major Confederate force in the area, 12,000 men under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, was to be held in place by

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson with 18,000 men menacing Harpers Ferry, preventing the two Confederate armies from combining against McDowell.[7] On July 21, McDowell's Army of Northeastern Virginia executed a complex turning movement against Beauregard's Confederate Army of the Potomac, beginning the First Battle of Bull Run (also known as First Manassas). Although the Union troops enjoyed an early advantage and drove the Confederate left flank back, the battle advantage turned that afternoon. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson inspired his Virginia brigade to withstand a strong Union attack, and he received his famous nickname, "Stonewall" Jackson. Timely reinforcements arrived by railroad from Johnston's army; Patterson had been ineffective in keeping them occupied. The inexperienced Union soldiers began to fall back, and it turned into a panicky retreat, with many running almost as far as Washington, D.C. Civilian and political observers, some of whom had treated the battle as festive entertainment, were caught up in the panic. The army returned safely to Washington; Beauregard's army was too tired and inexperienced to launch a pursuit. The Union defeat at First Bull Run shocked the North, and a new sense of grim determination swept the United States as military and civilians alike realized that they would need to invest significant money and manpower to win a protracted, bloody war.[8] George B. McClellan was summoned east in August to command the newly forming Army of the Potomac, which would become the principal army of the Eastern Theater. As a former railroad executive, he possessed outstanding organizational skills well-suited to the tasks of training and administration. He was also strongly ambitious, and by November 1, he had maneuvered around Winfield Scott and was named general-in-chief of all the Union armies, despite the embarrassing defeat of an expedition he sent up the Potomac River at the Battle of Balls Bluff in October.[9]

116

North Carolina coast (186165)


North Carolina was an important area to the Confederacy because of the vital seaport of Wilmington and because the Outer Banks were valuable bases for ships attempting to evade the Union blockade. Benjamin Butler sailed from Fort Monroe and captured the batteries at Hatteras Inlet in August 1861. In February 1862, Brig. Gen. Ambrose Burnside organized an amphibious expedition, also from Fort Monroe, that captured Roanoke Island, a little-known but important Union strategic victory. The Goldsboro Expedition in late 1862 marched briefly inland from the coast to destroy railroad tracks and bridges.[10] The remainder of operations on the North Carolina coast began in late 1864, with Benjamin Butler's and David D. Porter's failed attempt to capture Fort Fisher, which guarded the seaport of Wilmington. Union forces at the Second Battle of Fort Fisher, led by Alfred H. Terry, Adelbert Ames, and Porter, in January 1865, were successful in defeating Gen. Braxton Bragg, and Wilmington fell in February. During this period, the Western Theater armies of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman were marching up the interior of the Carolinas, where they eventually forced the surrender of the last major Confederate field army, under Joseph E. Johnston, in late April 1865.[11]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

117

The Valley (1862)


In the spring of 1862, Confederate exuberance over First Bull Run declined quickly, following the early successes of the Union armies in the Western Theater, such as Fort Donelson and Shiloh. George B. McClellan's massive Army of the Potomac was approaching Richmond from the southeast in the Peninsula Campaign, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's large corps was poised to hit Richmond from the north, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's army threatened the rich agricultural area of the Shenandoah Valley. For relief, Confederate authorities turned to Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, who earned his nickname at First Bull Run. His command, officially called the Valley District of the Department of Northern Virginia, included the Stonewall Brigade, a variety of Valley militia units, and the Army of the Northwest. While Banks remain north of the Potomac River, Jackson's cavalry commander, Col. Turner Ashby of the 7th Virginia Cavalry, raided the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.[12]

Valley Campaign: Kernstown to McDowell.

Banks reacted by crossing the Potomac in late February and moving south to protect the canal and railroad from Ashby. Jackson's command was operating as the left wing of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's army, and when Johnston moved from Manassas to Culpeper in March, Jackson's position at Winchester was isolated. On March 12, Banks continued his advance to the southwest ("up the Valley") and occupied Winchester. Valley Campaign: Front Royal to Port Republic. Jackson had withdrawn to Strasburg. Banks's orders, as part of McClellan's overall strategy, were to move farther south and drive Jackson from the Valley. After accomplishing this, he was to withdraw to a position nearer Washington. A strong advance force began the movement south from Winchester on March 17, about the same time that McClellan began his amphibious movement to the Virginia Peninsula.[13] Jackson's orders from Johnston were to avoid general combat because he was seriously outnumbered, but at the same time he was to keep Banks occupied enough to prevent the detachment of troops to reinforce McClellan on the Peninsula. Receiving incorrect intelligence, Banks concluded that Jackson had left the Valley, and he proceeded to move east, back to the vicinity of Washington. Jackson was dismayed at this movement because Banks was doing exactly what Jackson had been directed to prevent. When Ashby reported that only a few infantry regiments and some artillery of Banks's corps remained at Winchester, Jackson decided to attack the Union detachment in an attempt to force the remainder of Banks's corps to return. But Ashby's information was incorrect; actually, an entire Union division was still station in the town. At the First Battle of Kernstown (March 23, 1862), fought a few miles south of Winchester, the Federals stopped Jackson's advance and then counterattacked, turning his left flank and forcing him to retreat. Although a tactical defeat for Jackson, his only defeat during the campaign, it was a strategic victory for the Confederacy, forcing President Lincoln to keep Banks's forces in the Valley and McDowell's 30,000-man corps near Fredericksburg, subtracting about 50,000 soldiers from McClellan's Peninsula invasion force.[14] The Union reorganized after Kernstown: McDowell's command became the Department of the Rappahannock, Banks's corps became the Department of the Shenandoah, while western Virginia (modern West Virginia) became the Mountain Department, commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Frmont. All three commands, which reported directly to Washington, were ordered to remove Jackson's force as a threat to Washington. The Confederate authorities

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War meanwhile detached Richard S. Ewell's division from Johnston's army and sent it to the Valley. Jackson, now reinforced to 17,000 men, decided to attack the Union forces individually rather than waiting for them to combine and overwhelm him, first concentrating on a column from the Mountain Department commanded by Robert Milroy. While marching on a devious route to mask his intentions, he was attacked by Milroy at the Battle of McDowell on May 8 but was able to repulse the Union army after severe fighting. Banks sent a division to reinforce Irvin McDowell's forces at Fredericksburg, leaving Banks only 8,000 troops, which he relocated to a strong position at Strasburg, Virginia.[15] After Frmont's forces halted their advance into the Valley following McDowell, Jackson next turned to defeating Banks. On May 21, Jackson marched his command east from New Market and proceeded northward. Their speed of forced marching was typical of the campaign and earned his infantrymen the nickname of "Jackson's foot cavalry". He sent his horse cavalry directly north to make Banks think that he was going to attack Strasburg, but his plan was to defeat the small outpost at Front Royal and quickly attack Banks's line of communication at Harpers Ferry. On May 23, at the Battle of Front Royal, Jackson's army surprised and overran the pickets of the 1,000-man Union garrison, capturing nearly 700 of the garrison while suffering fewer than forty casualties himself. Jackson's victory forced Banks from Strasburg into a rapid retreat towards Winchester. Although Jackson attempted to pursue, his troops were exhausted and looted Union supply trains, slowing them down immensely. On May 25, at the First Battle of Winchester, Banks's army was attacked by converging Confederate columns and was soundly defeated, losing over 1,300 casualties and much of his supplies (including 9,000 small arms, a half million rounds of ammunition, and several tons of supplies); they withdrew north across the Potomac River. Jackson attempted pursuit but was unsuccessful, due to looting by Ashby's cavalry and the exhaustion of his infantry; after a few days of rest, he followed Banks's forces as far as Harpers Ferry, where he skirmished with the Union garrison.[16] In Washington, President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton decided that the defeat of Jackson was an immediate priority (even though Jackson's orders were solely to keep Union forces occupied away from Richmond). They ordered Irvin McDowell to send 20,000 men to Front Royal and Frmont to move to Harrisonburg. If both forces could converge at Strasburg, Jackson's only escape route up the Valley would be cut. The immediate repercussion of this move was to abort McDowell's coordinated attack with McClellan on Richmond. Starting on May 29, while two columns of Union forces pursued him, Jackson started pushing his army in a forced march southward to escape the pincer movements, marching forty miles in thirty-six hours. His army took up defensive positions in Cross Keys and Port Republic, where he was able to defeat Frmont and James Shields (from McDowell's command), respectively, on June 8 and June 9.[17] Following these engagements, Union forces were withdrawn from the Valley. Jackson joined Robert E. Lee on the Peninsula for the Seven Days Battles (where he delivered an uncharacteristically lethargic performance, perhaps because of the strains of the Valley Campaign). He had accomplished his mission, withholding over 50,000 needed troops from McClellan. With the success of his Valley Campaign, Stonewall Jackson became the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy (until he was eventually eclipsed by Lee) and lifted the morale of the public. In a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver, he pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against combined foes of 60,000.[18]

118

Peninsula Campaign (1862)


George B. McClellan spent the winter of 186162 training his new Army of the Potomac and fighting off calls from President Lincoln to advance against the Confederates. Lincoln was particularly concerned about the army of General Joseph E. Johnston at Centreville, just 30 miles (50km) from Washington. McClellan overestimated Johnston's strength and shifted his objective from that army to the Confederate capital of Richmond. He proposed to move by water to Urbanna on the Rappahannock River and then overland to Richmond before Johnston could move to block him. Although Lincoln favored the overland approach because it would shield Washington from any attack while the operation was in progress, McClellan argued that the road conditions in Virginia were intolerable, that he

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War had arranged adequate defenses for the capital, and that Johnston would certainly follow him if he moved on Richmond. This plan was discussed for three months in the capital until Lincoln approved McClellan's proposal in early March. By March 9, however, Johnston withdrew his army from Centreville to Culpeper, making McClellan's Urbanna plan impracticable. McClellan then proposed to sail to Fort Monroe and then up the Virginia Peninsula (the narrow strip of land between the James and York rivers) to Richmond. Lincoln reluctantly agreed.[19] Before departing for the Peninsula, McClellan moved the Army of the Potomac to Centreville on a "shakedown" march. He discovered there how weak Johnston's force and position had really been, and he faced mounting criticism. On March 11, Lincoln relieved McClellan of his position as general-in -chief of the Union armies so that he could devote his full attention to the difficult campaign ahead of him. Lincoln himself, with the assistance of Secretary of War Stanton and a War Board of officers, assumed command of the Union armies for the next four months. The Army of the Potomac began to embark for Fort Monroe on March 17. The departure was accompanied by a newfound sense of concern. The first combat of ironclad ships occurred on March 8 and March 9 as the CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor fought the inconclusive Battle of Hampton Roads. The concern for the Army was that their transport ships would be attacked by this new weapon directly in their path. And the U.S. Navy failed to assure McClellan that they could protect operations on either the James or the York, so his idea of amphibiously enveloping Yorktown was abandoned, and he ordered an advance up the Peninsula to begin April 4. On April 5, McClellan was informed that Lincoln had canceled the movement of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's corps to Fort Monroe, taking this action because McClellan had failed to leave the number of troops previously agreed upon at Washington, and because Jackson's Valley Campaign was causing concern. McClellan protested vociferously that he was being forced to lead a major campaign without his promised resources, but he moved ahead anyway.[20]

119

Up the Peninsula
The Union forces advanced to Yorktown, but halted when McClellan found that the Confederate fortifications extended across the Peninsula instead of being limited to Yorktown as he had expected. After a delay of about a month building up siege resources, constructing trenches and siege batteries, and conducting a couple of minor skirmishes testing the line, the Siege of Yorktown was ready to commence. However, Johnston concluded that the Confederate defenses were too weak to hold off a Union assault and he organized a withdrawal during the night of May 34. During the campaign, the Union Army also seized Hampton Roads and occupied Norfolk. As the Union forces Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. chased withdrawing Confederate forces up the Peninsula (northwest) in the direction of Richmond, the inconclusive single-day Battle of Williamsburg took place at and around Fort Magruder, one mile (1.5km) east of the old colonial capital.[21] By the end of May, the Union forces had successfully advanced to within several miles of Richmond, but progress was slow. McClellan had planned for massive siege operations and brought immense stores of equipment and siege mortars but poor weather and inadequate roads kept his advance to a crawl. And McClellan was by nature a cautious general; he was nervous about attacking a force he believed was twice his in size. In fact, his imagination and his intelligence operations failed him; the proportions were roughly the reverse. During Johnston's slow retreat up the Peninsula, his forces practiced deceptive operations. In particular, the division under John B. Magruder, who was an amateur actor before the war, was able to fool McClellan by ostentatiously marching small numbers of troops past the same position multiple times, appearing to be a larger force.[22] As the Union Army drew towards the outer defenses of Richmond, it became divided by the Chickahominy River, weakening its ability to move troops back and forth along the front. McClellan kept most of his army north of the river, expecting McDowell to march from northern Virginia; only two Union corps (IV and III) were south of the

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War river. Pressured by Confederate President Jefferson Davis and his military advisor Robert E. Lee, Johnston decided to attack the smaller Union force south of the river, hoping that the flooded Chickahominy, swollen from recent heavy rains, would prevent McClellan from moving to the southern bank. The Battle of Seven Pines (also known as the Battle of Fair Oaks), fought on May 31 June 1, 1862, failed to follow Johnston's plan, due to faulty maps, uncoordinated Confederate attacks, and Union reinforcements, which were able to cross the river despite the flooding. The battle was tactically inconclusive, but there were two strategic effects. First, Johnston was wounded during the battle and was replaced by the more aggressive General Robert E. Lee, who would lead this Army of Northern Virginia to many victories in the war. Second, General McClellan chose to abandon his offensive operations to lay siege and await reinforcements he had requested from President Lincoln; as a consequence, he never regained his strategic momentum.[23] Lee used the month-long pause in McClellan's advance to fortify the defenses of Richmond and extended the works south of the James River to a point below Petersburg; the total length of the new defensive line was about 30 miles (50km). To buy time to complete the new defensive line and prepare for an offensive, Lee repeated the tactic of making a small number of troops seem more numerous than they really were. Lee also sent Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry brigade completely around the Union army (June 1315) in order to ascertain if the Union right flank was in the air. In addition, Lee ordered Jackson to bring his force to the Peninsula as reinforcements. Meanwhile, McClellan shifted most of his forces south of the Chickahominy, leaving only Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps north of the river.[24]

120

Seven Days [[Seven Days Battles]]

June 2627, 1862. Battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mill

June 30, 1862. Battle of Glendale

July 1, 1862. Battle of Malvern Hill

Lee then moved onto the offensive, conducting a series of battles that lasted seven days (June 25 July 1) and pushed McClellan back to a safe but nonthreatening position on the James River. McClellan actually struck first on June 25 at the Battle of Oak Grove, during which two Union divisions attempted to seize ground on which McClellan planned to build siege batteries. McClellan planned to attack again the next day but was distracted by the Confederate attack at Mechanicsville or Beaver Dam Creek, on June 26. Lee observed that McClellan had positioned his army straddling the Chickahominy River and could be defeated in detail. He planned for the division of A.P. Hill to demonstrate in Porter's front while Jackson marched behind the Union positions and attacked from the rear. However, Jackson was late in arriving to his assigned position, while Hill started his attack without waiting for

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Jackson and was repulsed with heavy casualties. Despite being a Union tactical victory, McClellan still ordered Porter to retreat south towards the rest of the Union army, fearing that Porter would be surrounded by vastly superior Confederate forces by morning. Porter set up defensive lines near Gaines's Mill, covering the bridges over the Chickahominy.[25] Lee continued his offensive at the Battle of Gaines's Mill, June 27, launching the largest Confederate attack of the war against Porter's line. (It occurred in almost the same location as the 1864 Battle of Cold Harbor and had similar numbers of casualties.) The attack was poorly coordinated, and the Union lines held for most of the day, but Lee eventually broke through and McClellan withdrew again, heading for a secure base at Harrison's Landing on the James River.[26] The next two days saw minor battles at Garnett's and Golding's Farm and Savage's Station, as McClellan continued his withdraw and Lee attempted to cut off the Union retreat. The Battle of Glendale on June 30 was a bloody battle in which three Confederate divisions converged on the retreating Union forces in the White Oak Swamp, near Frayser's Farm, another name for the battle. Because of a lackluster performance by Stonewall Jackson, Lee's army failed in its last attempt to cut off the Union army before it reached the James.[27] The final battle of the Seven Days, July 1, consisted of uncoordinated Confederate assaults against the Union defensesbuttressed by artillery placements and the naval guns of the Union James River squadronon Malvern Hill. McClellan was absent from the battlefield, instead remaining on the gunboat Galena; the Union corps commanders cooperated in selecting the positions for their troops but none of them exercised overall field command. Lee's army suffered over 5,600 casualties in this effort, compared to only 3,000 Union casualties. Although the Union corps commanders felt that they could hold the field against further Confederate attacks, McClellan ordered the army to retreat back to Harrison's Landing.[28] Malvern Hill signaled the end of both the Seven Days Battles and the Peninsula Campaign. The Army of the Potomac withdrew to the safety of the James River, protected by fire from Union gunboats, and stayed there until August, when they were withdrawn by order of President Lincoln in the run-up to the Second Battle of Bull Run. Although McClellan retained command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln showed his displeasure by appointing Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck to McClellan's previous position as general-in-chief of all the Union armies on July 11, 1862.[29] The cost to both sides was high. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia suffered almost 20,000 casualties out of a total of over 90,000 soldiers during the Seven Days, McClellan almost 16,000 out of 105,445. After a successful start on the Peninsula that foretold an early end to the war, Northern morale was crushed by McClellan's retreat. Despite heavy casualties and Lee's clumsy tactical performance, Confederate morale skyrocketed, and Lee was emboldened to continue his aggressive strategy through Northern Virginia and Maryland Campaigns.[30]

121

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

122

Northern Virginia and Maryland (1862)


Following his success against McClellan on the Peninsula, Lee initiated two campaigns that can be considered one almost continuous offensive operation: defeating the second army that threatened Richmond and then continuing north on an invasion of Maryland.[31]

Army of Virginia
President Lincoln reacted to McClellan's failure by appointing John Pope to command the newly formed Army of Virginia. Pope had achieved some success in the Western Theater, and Lincoln sought a more aggressive general than McClellan. The Army of Virginia consisted of over 50,000 men in three corps. Three corps of McClellan's Army of the Potomac later were added for combat operations. Two cavalry brigades were attached directly to two of the infantry corps, which presented a lack of centralized control that had negative effects in the campaign. Pope's mission was to fulfill two objectives: protect Washington and the Shenandoah Valley, and draw Confederate forces away from McClellan by moving in the direction of Northern Virginia Campaign, August 728, 1862. Gordonsville. Pope started on the latter by dispatching cavalry to break the railroad connecting Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg. The cavalry got off to a slow start and found that Stonewall Jackson had occupied Gordonsville with over 14,000 men.[32] Lee perceived that McClellan was no longer a threat to him on the Peninsula, so he felt no compulsion to keep all of his forces in direct defense of Richmond. This allowed him to relocate Jackson to Gordonsville to block Pope and protect the railroad. Lee had larger plans in mind. Since the Union Army was split between McClellan and Pope and they were widely separated, Lee saw an opening to destroy Pope before returning his attention to McClellan. Believing that Ambrose Burnside's troops from North Carolina were being shipped to reinforce Pope, and wanting to take immediate action before those troops were in position, Lee committed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to join Jackson with 12,000 men, while distracting McClellan to keep him immobilized.[33] On July 29, Pope moved some of his forces to a position near Cedar Mountain, from whence he could launch raids on Gordonsville. Jackson advanced to Culpeper on August 7, hoping to attack one of Pope's corps before the rest of the army could be concentrated. On August 9, Nathaniel Banks's corps attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain, gaining an early advantage. A Confederate counterattack led by A.P. Hill drove Banks back across Cedar Creek. By now Jackson had learned that Pope's corps were all together, foiling his plan of defeating each in separate actions. He remained in position until August 12, when he withdrew to Gordonsville.[34] On August 13, Lee sent Maj. Gen. James Longstreet to reinforce Jackson and on the following day sent all of his remaining forces except for two brigades, after he was certain that McClellan was leaving the Peninsula. Lee himself arrived at Gordonsville to take command on August 15. His plan was to defeat Pope before McClellan's army could arrive to reinforce it by cutting bridges in Pope's rear and then attacking his left flank and rear. Pope spoiled Lee's plans by withdrawing to the line of the Rappahannock River; he was aware of Lee's plan because a Union cavalry raid captured a copy of the written order.[35] A series of skirmishes between August 22 and August 25 kept the attention of Pope's army along the river. By August 25, three corps from the Army of the Potomac had arrived from the Peninsula to reinforce Pope. Lee's new plan in the face of all these additional forces outnumbering him was to send Jackson and Stuart with half of the army on a flanking march to cut Pope's line of communication, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Pope would be forced to retreat and could be defeated while moving and vulnerable.[36]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War On the evening of August 26, after passing around Pope's right flank, Jackson's wing of the army struck the railroad at Bristoe Station and before daybreak August 27 marched to capture and destroy the massive Union supply depot at Manassas Junction. This surprise movement forced Pope to leave his defensive line along the Rappahannock and move toward Manassas Junction in the hopes of crushing Jackson's wing before the rest of Lee's army could reunite with it. During the night of August 2728, Jackson marched his divisions north to the First Bull Run (Manassas) battlefield, where he took position behind an unfinished railroad grade. Longstreet's wing of the army marched through the Thoroughfare Gap to join Jackson, uniting the two wings of Lee's army.[37]

123

Second Bull Run


In order to draw Pope's army into battle, Jackson ordered an attack on a Federal column that was passing across his front on August 28, beginning the Second Battle of Bull Run, the decisive battle of the Northern Virginia Campaign. The fighting lasted several hours and resulted in a stalemate. Pope became convinced that he had trapped Jackson and concentrated the bulk of his army against him. On August 29, Pope launched a series of assaults against Jackson's position along the unfinished railroad grade. The attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties on both sides. At noon, Longstreet arrived on the field and took position on Jackson's right flank. On August 30, Pope renewed his attacks, seemingly unaware that Longstreet was on the field. When massed Confederate artillery devastated a Union assault, Longstreet's wing of 28,000 men counterattacked in the largest simultaneous mass assault of the war. The Union left flank was crushed and the army driven back to Bull Run. Only an effective Union rearguard action prevented a replay of the First Bull Run disaster. Pope's retreat to Centreville was precipitous, nonetheless. The next day, Lee ordered his army in pursuit.[38] Making a wide flanking march, Jackson hoped to cut off the Union retreat. On September 1, Jackson sent his divisions against two Union divisions in the Battle of Chantilly. Confederate attacks were stopped by fierce fighting during a severe thunderstorm; both Union division commanders, Isaac Stevens and Philip Kearny, were killed during the fighting. Recognizing that his army was still in danger, Pope ordered the retreat to continue to Washington.[39]

Invasion of Maryland
Lee decided that his army, despite taking heavy losses during the spring and summer, was ready for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to penetrate the major Northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania and cut off the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line that supplied Washington. He also needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. And he wished to lower Northern morale, believing that an invading army wreaking havoc inside the North might force Lincoln to negotiate an end to the war, particularly if he would be able to incite an uprising in the slave-holding state of Maryland.[40] The Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River and reached Frederick, Maryland, on September 6. Lee's specific goals were thought to be an advance towards Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Maryland Campaign, actions September 3 to cutting the east-west railroad links to the Northeast, followed by September 15, 1862. operations against one of the major eastern cities, such as Philadelphia. News of the invasion caused panic in the North, and Lincoln was forced to take quick action. George B. McClellan had been in military limbo since returning from the Peninsula, but Lincoln restored him to command of all forces around Washington and ordered him to deal with Lee.[41]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Lee divided his army. Longstreet was sent to Hagerstown, while Jackson was ordered to seize the Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry, which commanded Lee's supply lines through the Shenandoah Valley; it was also a tempting target, virtually indefensible. McClellan requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, but his request was refused. In the Battle of Harpers Ferry, Jackson placed artillery on the heights overlooking the town, forcing the surrender of the garrison of more than 12,000 men on September 15. Jackson led most of his soldiers to join the rest of Lee's army, leaving A.P. Hill's division to complete the occupation of the town.[42] McClellan moved out of Washington with his 87,000-man army in a slow pursuit, reaching Frederick on September 13. There, two Union soldiers discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee's armyGeneral Order Number 191wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in detail. McClellan waited 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence, a delay that almost squandered his opportunity. That night, the Army of the Potomac moved toward South Mountain where elements of the Army of Northern Virginia waited in defense of the mountain passes. At the Battle of South Mountain on September 14, the Confederate defenders were driven back by the numerically superior Union forces, and McClellan was in a position to destroy Lee's army before it could concentrate.[43] Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggression, and learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his order had been compromised, frantically moved to concentrate his army. He chose not to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia yet, because Jackson had not completed the capture of Harpers Ferry. He also feared the effect on Confederate morale if he gave up his campaign with only the capture of Harpers Ferry to show for it. Instead, he chose to make a stand at Sharpsburg, Maryland.[44]

124

Antietam
On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee near Sharpsburg, defending a line to the west of Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, the Battle of Antietam began, with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's corps mounting a powerful assault on Lee's left flank. Attacks and Overview of the Battle of Antietam. counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church. Union assaults against the Sunken Road ("Bloody Lane") eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not pressed. In each case, Confederate reinforcements from the right flank prevented a complete Union breakthrough and McClellan refused to release his reserves to complete the breakthrough.[45] In the afternoon, Burnside's corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside's men and saving Lee's army from destruction. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in less than three quarters of his army. This enabled Lee to shift brigades and concentrate on each individual Union assault. At over 23,000 casualties, it remains the bloodiest single day in American history. Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley. Despite being tactically inconclusive, the battle of Antietam is considered a strategic victory for the Union. Lee's strategic initiative to invade Maryland was defeated. But more importantly, President Lincoln used this opportunity to announce his Emancipation Proclamation, after which the prospect of European powers intervening in the war on behalf of the Confederacy was significantly diminished.[46]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

125

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (186263)


On November 7, 1862, President Lincoln relieved McClellan of command because of his failure to pursue and defeat Lee's retreating army from Sharpsburg. Ambrose Burnside, despite his indifferent performance as a corps commander at Antietam, was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac. Once again, Lincoln pressured his general to launch an offensive as quickly as possible. Burnside rose to the task and planned to drive directly south toward Richmond. He hoped to outflank Robert E. Lee by quickly crossing the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg and placing himself in between the Confederate army and their capital. Administrative difficulties prevented the pontoon bridging boats from arriving on time, and his army was forced to wait across the river from Fredericksburg while Lee took that opportunity to fortify a defensive line on the heights behind the city. Rather than giving up or finding another way to advance, Burnside crossed the river and on December 13, launched Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862. massive frontal assaults against Marye's Heights on Lee's left flank. His attacks were more successful on Lee's right, briefly breaking through Jackson's line; but due to a misunderstanding continued to pound the fortified heights with waves of attacks, believing that this would enable the troops opposite Jackson to exploit their advantage. The Union Army lost over 12,000 men that day; Confederate casualties were approximately 4,500.[47] Despite the defeat and the dismay felt in Washington, Burnside was not yet relieved from command. He planned to resume his offensive north of Fredericksburg, but it went amiss in January 1863 in the humiliating Mud March. Following this, a cabal of his subordinate generals made it clear to the government that Burnside was incapable of leading the army. One of those conspirators was Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, who was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac on January 26, 1863. Hooker, who had an excellent record as a corps commander in previous campaigns, spent the remainder of the winter reorganizing and resupplying his army, paying special attention to health and morale issues. And being known for his aggressive nature, he planned a complex spring campaign against Robert E. Lee.[48]

[[Chancellorsville Campaign]]

May 1, 1863. Hooker loses his nerve.

May 2. Jackson's flank attack.

May 3. Lee's assaults against Chancellorsville.

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

126

May 3. Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church.

May 4-6. Union withdrawals.

Both armies remained in their positions before Fredericksburg. Hooker planned to send his cavalry, under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman, deep into the Confederate rear to disrupt supply lines. While one corps remained to fix Lee's attention at Fredericksburg, the others were to slip away and make a stealthy flanking march that would put the bulk of Hooker's army behind Lee, catching him in a vise. Lee, who had dispatched a corps of his army under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to forage in southern Virginia, was outnumbered 57,000 to 97,000.[49] The plan began executing well, and the bulk of the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and was in position on May 1. However, after minor initial contact with the enemy, Hooker began to lose his confidence, and rather than striking the Army of Northern Virginia in its rear as planned, he withdrew to a defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville. On May 2, Robert E. Lee executed one of the boldest maneuvers of the war. Having already split his army to address both wings of Hooker's attack, he split again, sending 20,000 men under Stonewall Jackson on a lengthy flanking march to attack Hooker's unprotected right flank. Achieving almost complete surprise, Jackson's corps routed the Union XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Following this success Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire while scouting in front of his army.[50] While Lee pounded the Chancellorsville defense line with repeated, costly assaults on May 3, the Union VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, finally achieved what Ambrose Burnside could not, by successfully assaulting the reduced forces on Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg. The corps began moving westward, once again threatening Lee's rear. Lee was able to deal with both wings of the Army of the Potomac, keeping the stunned Hooker in a defensive posture and dispatching a division to deal with Sedgwick's tentative approach. By May 7, Hooker withdrew all of his forces north of the Rappahannock. It was an expensive victory for Lee, who lost 13,000 men, or 25% of his army; Hooker lost 17,000, but had a lower casualty rate than Lee had incurred.[51]

Gettysburg and fall maneuvering (1863)


In June 1863, Robert E. Lee decided to capitalize on his victory at Chancellorsville by repeating his strategy of 1862 and once again invading the North. He did this to resupply his army, give the farmers of Virginia a respite from war, and threaten the morale of Northern civilians, possibly by seizing an important northern city, such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or Baltimore, Maryland. The Confederate government agreed to this strategy only reluctantly because Jefferson Davis was concerned about the fate of Vicksburg, Mississippi, the river fortress being threatened by Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg campaign. Following the death of Jackson, Lee organized the Army of Northern Virginia into three corps, led by Lt. Gens. James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and A.P. Hill.[52] Lee began moving his army northwest from Fredericksburg into the Shenandoah Valley, where the Blue Ridge Mountains screened their northward movements. Joseph Hooker, still in command of the Army of the Potomac, sent cavalry forces to find Lee. On June 9, the clash at Brandy Station was the largest predominantly cavalry battle of the war but ended inconclusively. Hooker started his entire army in pursuit; over the next few weeks, Hooker would argue with both Lincoln and Halleck over the role of the garrison at Harpers Ferry. On June 28, President Lincoln lost patience with him and relieved him of command, replacing him with V Corps commander, Maj. Gen. George G.

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Meade. After reviewing the positions of the army's corps with Hooker, Meade ordered the army to advance into southern Pennsylvania in a wide front, with the intention to protect Washington and Baltimore and to find Lee's army; he also drew up plans to defend a line behind Pipe Creek in northern Maryland in case he could not find suitable ground in Pennsylvania to fight a battle to his advantage.[53] Lee was surprised to find that the Federal army was moving as quickly as it was. As they crossed the Potomac and entered Frederick, Maryland, the Confederates were spread out over a considerable distance in Pennsylvania, with Richard Ewell across the Susquehanna River from Harrisburg and James Longstreet and A. P. Hill behind the mountains in Chambersburg. His cavalry, under Jeb Stuart, was engaged in a wide-ranging raid around the eastern flank of the Union army and was uncharacteristically out of touch with headquarters, leaving Lee blind as to his enemy's position and intentions. Lee realized that, just as in the Maryland Campaign, he had to concentrate his army before it could be defeated in detail. He ordered all units to move to the general vicinity of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.[54]

127

[[Gettysburg Campaign]]

Initial movements in the campaign, through July 3; cavalry movements shown with dashed lines.

Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863.

Battle of Gettysburg, July 2.

Battle of Gettysburg, July 3.

Retreat, July 514.

The Battle of Gettysburg is often considered the war's turning point. Meade defeated Lee in a three-day battle fought by 160,000 soldiers, with 51,000 casualties. It started as a meeting engagement on the morning of July 1, when brigades from Henry Heth's division clashed with Buford's cavalry, and then John F. Reynolds's I Corps. As the

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Union XI Corps arrived, they and the I Corps were smashed by Ewell's and Hill's corps arriving from the north and forced back through the town, taking up defensive positions on high ground south of town. On July 2, Lee launched a massive pair of assaults against the left and right flanks of Meade's army. Fierce battles raged at Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, East Cemetery Hill, and Culp's Hill. Meade was able to shift his defenders along interior lines, and they repulsed the Confederate advances. On July 3, Lee launched Pickett's Charge against the Union center, and almost three divisions were slaughtered. By this time, Stuart had returned, and he fought an inconclusive cavalry duel to the east of the main battlefield, attempting to drive into the Union rear area. The two armies stayed in position on July 4 (the same day the Battle of Vicksburg ended in a stunning Union victory), and then Lee ordered a retreat back across the Potomac to Virginia.[55] Meade's pursuit of Lee was tentative and unsuccessful. He received considerable criticism from President Lincoln and others, who believed he could have ended the war in the aftermath of Gettysburg. In October, a portion of Meade's army was detached to the western theater; Lee saw this as an opportunity to defeat the Union army in detail and to threaten Washington so no more Union forces could be sent west. The resulting Bristoe Campaign ended with Lee retreating back to the Rapidan River, having failed in his intentions. Meade was pressured by Lincoln into making one final offensive campaign in the fall of 1863, the Mine Run Campaign. However, Lee was able to cut off Meade's advance and construct breastworks; Meade considered the Confederate defenses too strong for a frontal attack and retreated back to his winter quarters.[56]

128

Grant versus Lee (186465)


In March 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of all the Union armies. He devised a coordinated strategy to apply pressure on the Confederacy from many points, something President Lincoln had urged his generals to do from the beginning of the war. Grant put Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in immediate command of all forces in the West and moved his own headquarters to be with the Army of the Potomac (still commanded by George Meade) in Virginia, where he intended to maneuver Lee's army to a decisive battle; his secondary objective was to capture Richmond, but Grant knew that the latter would happen automatically once the former was accomplished. His coordinated strategy called for Grant and Meade to attack Lee from the north, while Benjamin Butler drove toward Richmond from the southeast; Franz Sigel to control the Shenandoah Valley; Sherman to invade Georgia, defeat Joseph E. Johnston, and capture Atlanta; George Crook and William W. Averell to operate against railroad supply lines in West Virginia; and Nathaniel P. Banks to capture Mobile, Alabama.[57] Most of these initiatives failed, often because of the assignment of generals to Grant for political rather than military reasons. Butler's Army of the James bogged down against inferior forces under P.G.T. Beauregard before Richmond in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign. Sigel was soundly defeated at the Battle of New Market in May and was soon afterward replaced by David Hunter. Banks was distracted by the Red River Campaign and failed to move on Mobile. However, Crook and Averell were able to cut the last railway linking Virginia and Tennessee, and Sherman's Atlanta campaign was a success, although it dragged on through the fall.[58]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

129

Overland Campaign
In early May, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and entered the area known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania. There, in dense woods that nullified the Union army's advantages in artillery, Robert E. Lee surprised Grant and Meade with aggressive assaults. The two-day Battle of the Wilderness was tactically inconclusive, although very damaging to both sides. However, unlike his predecessors, Grant did not retreat after the battle; he sent his army to the southeast and began a campaign of maneuver that kept Lee on the defensive through a series of bloody battles and moved closer to Richmond. Grant knew that his larger army and base of manpower in the North could sustain a war of attrition better than Lee and the Confederacy could. And although Grant suffered high lossesapproximately 55,000 casualtiesduring the campaign, Lee lost even higher percentages of his men, losses that could not be replaced.[59] In the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, Lee was able to beat Grant to the crossroads town and establish a strong defensive position. In a series of attacks over two weeks, Grant hammered away at the Overland Campaign, from the Wilderness to Confederate lines, mostly centered on a salient known as the "Mule crossing the James River. Shoe". A massive assault by Winfield S. Hancock's II Corps on the "Bloody Angle" portion of this line on May 12 foreshadowed the breakthrough tactics employed against trenches late in World War I. Grant once again disengaged and slipped to the southeast.[60] Intercepting Grant's movement, Lee positioned his forces behind the North Anna River in a salient to force Grant to divide his army to attack it. Lee had the opportunity to defeat Grant but failed to attack in the manner necessary to spring the trap he had set, possibly because of an illness. After rejecting a frontal assault on Lee's positions as too costly and initially approving a plan to move around Lee's left flank, Grant changed his mind and continued moving southeast.[61] On May 31, Union cavalry seized the vital crossroads of Old Cold Harbor while the Confederates arrived from Richmond and from the Totopotomoy Creek lines. Late on June 1, two Union corps reached Cold Harbor and assaulted the Confederate works with some success. By June 2, both armies were on the field, forming on a seven-mile (11km) front. At dawn on June 3, the II and XVIII Corps, followed later by the IX Corps, assaulted the line and were slaughtered at all points in the Battle of Cold Harbor. Grant lost over 12,000 men in a battle that he regretted more than any other and Northern newspapers thereafter frequently referred to him as a "butcher".[62] On the night of June 12, Grant again advanced by his left flank, marching to the James River. He was able to disguise his intentions from Lee, and his army crossed the river on a bridge of pontoons that stretched over 2,100 feet (640 m). What Lee had feared most of allthat Grant would force him into a siege of the capital citywas poised to occur.[63]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

130

Petersburg
Grant had decided, however, that there was a more efficient way to get at Richmond and Lee. A few miles to the south, the city of Petersburg contained crucial rail links supplying the capital. If the Union Army could seize it, Richmond would be taken. However, Benjamin Butler had failed to capture it earlier and then indecisive advances by Grant's subordinates also failed to break through the thin lines manned by P.G.T. Beauregard's men, allowing Lee's army to arrive and erect defenses. Both sides settled in for a siege.[64] In an attempt to break the siege, Union troops in Ambrose Burnside's corps mined a tunnel under the Confederate line. On July 30, they detonated the explosives, creating a crater some 135 feet (41 m) in diameter that remains visible to this day. Almost 350 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast. Despite the ingenuity of the Richmond-Petersburg Theater, fall 1864. Union's plan, the lengthy, bloody Battle of the Crater, as it came to be called, was marred by poor tactical planning and was a decisive Confederate victory.[65] Through the fall and winter, both armies constructed elaborate series of trenches, eventually spanning more than 30 miles (50km), as the Union Army attempted to get around the right (western) flank of the Confederates and destroy their supply lines. Although the Northern public became quite dispirited by the seeming lack of progress at Petersburg, the dramatic success of Sherman at Atlanta helped ensure the reelection of Abraham Lincoln, which guaranteed that the war would be fought to a conclusion.[66]

Shenandoah Valley (186465)


The Shenandoah Valley was a crucial region for the Confederacy: it was one of the most important agricultural regions in Virginia and was a prime invasion route against the North. Grant hoped that an army from the Department of West Virginia under Franz Sigel could seize control of the Valley, moving "up the Valley" (southwest to the higher elevations) with 10,000 men to destroy the railroad center at Lynchburg. Sigel immediately suffered defeat at the Battle of New Market on May 15 and was soon replaced by David Hunter, who won a victory at the Battle of Piedmont on June 5. Hunter began burning Confederate agricultural resources as well as the homes of some prominent secessionists, earning him the nickname "Black Dave" from the Confederates. In Lexington he burned the Virginia Military Institute.[67] Robert E. Lee, now besieged in Petersburg, was concerned about Hunter's advances and sent Jubal Early's corps to sweep Union forces from the Valley and, if possible, to menace Washington, D.C., hoping to compel Grant to dilute his forces around Petersburg. Early got off to a good start, driving back Hunter's force in the Battle of Lynchburg. He drove down the Valley without opposition, bypassed Harpers Ferry, crossed the Potomac River, and advanced into Maryland. Grant dispatched a corps under Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright and other troops under George Crook to reinforce Washington and pursue Early.[68]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

131

[[Valley Campaigns of 1864]]

Shenandoah Valley operations, MayJuly 1864

Shenandoah Valley operations, AugustOctober 1864

At the Battle of Monocacy (July 9, 1864), Early defeated a smaller force under Lew Wallace near Frederick, Maryland, but this battle delayed his progress enough to allow time for reinforcing the defenses of Washington. Early attacked a fort on the northwest defensive perimeter of Washington (Fort Stevens (July 1112) without success and withdrew back to Virginia. He successfully fought a series of minor battles in the Valley through early August and prevented Wright's corps from returning to Grant at Petersburg. He also burned the city of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, retaliating against Hunter's earlier actions in the Valley.[69] Grant knew that Washington remained vulnerable if Early was still on the loose. He found a new commander aggressive enough to defeat Early: Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan, the cavalry commander of the Army of the Potomac, who was given command of all forces in the area, the Middle Military Division, including the Army of the Shenandoah. Sheridan initially started slowly, primarily because the impending presidential election of 1864 demanded a cautious approach, avoiding any disaster that might lead to the defeat of Abraham Lincoln.[70] Sheridan began moving aggressively in September. He defeated Early in the Third Battle of Winchester on September 19 and the Battle of Fisher's Hill on September 2122. With Early damaged and pinned down, the Valley lay open to the Union. Coupled with Sherman's capture of Atlanta and Adm. David Farragut's victory at Mobile Bay, Lincoln's re-election seemed assured. Sheridan pulled back slowly down the Valley and conducted a scorched earth campaign that presaged Sherman's March to the Sea in November. The goal was to deny the Confederacy the means of feeding its armies in Virginia, and Sheridan's army burned crops, barns, mills, and factories.[71] The campaign was effectively concluded at the Battle of Cedar Creek (October 19, 1864). In a brilliant surprise attack at dawn, Early routed two thirds of the Union army, but his troops were hungry and exhausted and many fell out of their ranks to pillage the Union camp; Sheridan managed to rally his troops and defeat Early decisively. In late fall, Sheridan sent his infantry to assist Grant at Petersburg, with his cavalry arriving the following spring. Most of the men of Early's corps rejoined Lee at Petersburg in December, while Early remained to command a skeleton force until he was relieved of command in March 1865 after his defeat at the Battle of Waynesboro, Virginia.[72]

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War

132

Appomattox (1865)
In January 1865, Robert E. Lee became the general-in-chief of all Confederate armies, but this move came too late to help the Southern cause. As the siege of Petersburg continued, Grant attempted to break or encircle the Confederate forces in multiple attacks moving from east to west; gradually, he cut all of the Confederate supply lines except the Richmond & Danville Railroad entering Richmond and the South Side Railroad supplying Petersburg. By March, the siege had taken an enormous toll on both armies, and Lee decided to pull out of Petersburg. Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon then devised a plan to have the army attack Fort Stedman on the eastern end of the Union Lines, forcing the Union forces to shorten their lines. Although initially a success, his outnumbered corps was forced back by a Union counterattack.[73]

Grant's final Petersburg assaults and the start of Lee's retreat.

Lee's retreat in the Appomattox Campaign, April 39, 1865.

Sheridan returned from the Valley and was tasked with flanking the Confederate army, which forced Lee to send forces under Maj. Gen. George Pickett and Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee to defend the flank. Grant then deployed cavalry and two infantry corps under Sheridan to cut off Pickett's forces. Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee attacked first on March 31 at Dinwiddie Court House, and succeeded in pushing back the Union forces but did not gain a decisive advantage. They withdrew their forces to Five Forks that night. On April 1, Sheridan launched another attack, flanking Pickett's forces and destroying the Confederate left wing, capturing over two thousand Confederates. This victory meant that Sheridan could capture the South Side Railroad the next day.[74] After the victory at Five Forks, Grant ordered an assault along the entire Confederate line on April 2, called the Third Battle of Petersburg, resulting in dramatic breakthroughs. During the fighting, A.P. Hill was killed. During the day and into the night, Lee pulled his forces out from Petersburg and Richmond and headed west to Danville, the destination of the fleeing Confederate government, and then south to meet up with General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. The capital city of Richmond surrendered on the morning of April 3.[75] The campaign became a race between Lee and Sheridan, with Lee attempting to obtain supplies for his retreat and Sheridan attempting to cut him off, with the Union infantry close behind. At Sayler's Creek on April 6, nearly a quarter of the Confederate army (about 8,000 men, the majority of two corps) was cut off and forced to surrender; many of the Confederate supply trains, crossing the creek to the north, were also captured. Although Grant wrote to him suggesting that surrender was his last remaining course of action, Lee still attempted to outmarch the Union forces. In Lee's final attack at Appomattox on the morning April 9, John B. Gordon's depleted corps attempted to break the Union lines and reach the supplies in Lynchburg. They pushed back Sheridan's cavalry briefly but found themselves faced with the full Union V Corps. Surrounded on three sides, Lee was forced to surrender his army to

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Grant at Appomattox Court House that day, with the formal surrender ceremony taking place two days later.[76] There were further minor battles and surrenders of Confederate armies, but Lee's surrender on April 9, 1865, marked the effective end of the Civil War. Lee, rejecting advice from some of his staff, wanted to ensure that his army did not melt away into the countryside to continue the war as guerrillas, helping to heal the divisions of the country.[77]

133

Notes
[1] Everything Military website (http:/ / www. jcs-group. com/ military/ war1861east. html). Gary W. Gallagher, in Lee and His Army in Confederate History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, ISBN 978-0-8078-2631-7), p. 173, wrote that Lee's surrendering army "represented but a fraction of the Confederacy's men under arms, yet virtually everyone, North and South, interpreted Appomattox as the end of the war. ... Wartime evidence points strongly to the conclusion that Lee was correct in believing he operated in the vital geographic area." [2] Echoes of Glory, p. 20. [3] U.S. National Park Service, Civil War Battle Studies by Campaign (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ bycampgn. htm#West) [4] Foote, vol. 1, pp. 49, 51. [5] Newell, pp. 86, 96, 170, 262. [6] Kennedy, p. 6. [7] Davis, pp. 4, 7275. [8] Davis, pp. 18687, 23439, 255. [9] Davis, p. 251; Kennedy, p. 18. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] Kennedy, pp. 5963. Kennedy, pp. 401403. Cozzens, pp. 38, 43. Cozzens, pp. 13941. Cozzens, pp. 152, 15758, 216. Cozzens, pp. 22829, 243, 25557. Cozzens, pp. 28182, 307, 315, 37077, 39698. Cozzens, pp. 40811, 477, 497. Cozzens, pp. 504, 51113. Sears (1992), pp. 46, 14, 19. Sears (1992), pp. 1617, 37. Sears (1992), pp. 3839, 4647, 6062, 7081. Sears (1992), pp. 9899, 1089. Sears (1992), pp.11820, 13539, 145. Sears (1992), pp. 155, 159, 16873. Sears (1992), pp. 18389, 197, 21011. Sears (1992), pp. 22341. Kennedy, pp. 97101. Sears (1992), p. 33537. Sears (1992), pp. 338, 351. Sears (1992), pp. 343, 345. Hennessy, p. 23. Hennessy, pp. 6, 8, 2425. Hennessy, pp. 23, 26. Hennessy, pp. 2729. Hennessy, pp. 31, 4850. Hennessy, pp. 82, 9293. Hennessy, pp. 11318, 160. Kennedy, pp. 10810. Hennessy, pp. 44950. Sears (1983), pp. 7074. Sears (1983), pp. 18, 7374, 76, 8183, 94. Sears (1983), pp. 99100, 173. Sears (1983), pp. 12324, 157. Sears (1983), pp. 17879.

[45] Sears (1983), pp. 28081, 302. [46] Sears (1983), pp. 31820. [47] O'Reilly, pp. 23, 4448, 49899.

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War


[48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] O'Reilly, pp. 474, 490, 494. Furgurson, pp. 65, 86. Furgurson, pp. 15171. Furgurson, pp. 25762, 27480, 36465. Sears (2003), pp. 1112, 43. Sears (2003), pp. 60, 72, 12023. Sears (2003), pp. 124, 134. Kennedy, pp. 20711. Kennedy, pp. 25159. Eicher, pp. 661, 691-92; Salmon, p. 251. Eicher, pp. 680-82, 691-93; Hattaway and Jones, pp. 517-26. Trudeau (1989), pp. 122, 341. Trudeau (1989), pp. 13538. Trudeau (1989), pp. 239, 244. Trudeau (1989), pp. 27073. Eicher, p. 687. Trudeau (1991), pp. 3355. Trudeau (1991), pp. 103107. Trudeau (1991), pp. 192, 25253. Cooling, pp. 8, 23; Eicher, p. 693. Cooling, pp. 1416, 89. Cooling, pp. 7879, 11720 Cooling, pp. 22425. Foote, vol. 3, pp. 55457, 56364. Foote, vol. 3, pp. 56672, 852. Calkins, pp. 9, 11. Calkins, pp. 14, 19, 24, 3536. Calkins, pp. 36, 5859, 61. Calkins, pp. 11114, 15963, 16869. Foote, vol. 3, pp. 942, 95556.

134

References
Bonekemper, Edward H., III. A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant's Overlooked Military Genius. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2004. ISBN 0-89526-062-X. Calkins, Chris. The Appomattox Campaign: March 29 April 9, 1865. Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1997. ISBN 0-938289-54-3. Cooling, B. F. Jubal Early's Raid on Washington 1864. Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1989. ISBN 0-933852-86-X. Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8078-3200-4. Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977. ISBN 0-8071-0867-7. The Editors of Time-Life Books. Echoes of Glory: Illustrated Atlas of the Civil War. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1991. ISBN 0-8094-8858-2. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 3, Red River to Appomattox. New York: Random House, 1974. ISBN 0-394-74913-8. Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. C. The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. New York: Da Capo Press, 1929. ISBN 0-306-80450-6.

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992. ISBN 0-394-58301-9. Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. ISBN 0-252-00918-5. Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-3187-X. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Newell, Clayton R. Lee Vs. McClellan: The First Campaign. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1996. ISBN 0-89526-452-8. O'Reilly, Francis Augustn. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8071-3154-7. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. ISBN 0-395-86761-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. Trudeau, Noah Andre. Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, MayJune 1864. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989. ISBN 0-316-85326-7. Trudeau, Noah Andre. The Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia June 1864-April 1865. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991. ISBN 0-316-85327-5.

135

Further reading
Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860 September 1861. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 0-306-81141-3. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command, September 1861 February 1862. New York: Da Capo Press, 2004. ISBN 0-306-81252-5. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March May 1862. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. ISBN 978-1-932714-25-8. Browning, Robert Jr. From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5. Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Catton, Bruce. Glory Road. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1952. ISBN 0-385-04167-5. Catton, Bruce. Mr. Lincoln's Army. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1951. ISBN 0-385-04310-4. Catton, Bruce. A Stillness at Appomattox. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1953. ISBN 0-385-04451-8. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. 3 vols. New York: Random House, 1974. ISBN 0-394-74913-8. Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3. Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee, A Biography (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/ Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/home.html). 4 vols. New York: Scribner, 1934. Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2.

Eastern Theater of the American Civil War Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4367). 2 vols. Charles L. Webster & Company, 188586. ISBN 0-914427-67-9. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862. Covington, GA: Mockingbird Press, 1965. ISBN 89176-007-5. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wert, Jeffry D. The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. ISBN 0-7432-2506-6. Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. ISBN 0-9654382-6-0.

136

External links
National Park Service Civil War at a Glance (http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/misc/civilwar/civilwar. htm)

Battle of Roanoke Island


The opening phase of what came to be called the Burnside Expedition, the Battle of Roanoke Island was an amphibious operation of the American Civil War, fought on February 78, 1862, in the North Carolina Sounds a short distance south of the Virginia border. The attacking force consisted of a flotilla of gunboats of the Union Navy drawn from the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, commanded by Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, a separate group of gunboats under Union Army control, and an army division led by Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside. The defenders were a group of gunboats from the Confederate States Navy, termed the Mosquito Fleet, under Capt. William F. Lynch, and about 2,000 Confederate soldiers commanded locally by Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise. The defense was augmented by four forts facing on the water approaches to the island, and two outlying batteries. At the time of the battle, Wise was hospitalized, so leadership fell to his second in command, Col. Henry M. Shaw. During the first day of the battle, the Federal gunboats and the forts on shore engaged in a gun battle, with occasional contributions from the Mosquito Fleet. Late in the day, Burnside's soldiers went ashore unopposed; they were accompanied by six howitzers manned by sailors. As it was too late to fight, the invaders went into camp for the night. On the second day, February 8, the Union soldiers advanced but were stopped by an artillery battery and accompanying infantry in the center of the island. Although the Confederates thought that their line was safely anchored in impenetrable swamps, they were flanked on both sides and their soldiers were driven back to refuge in the forts. The forts were taken in reverse. With no way for his men to escape, Col. Shaw surrendered to avoid pointless bloodshed. The Union forces occupied the island for the remainder of the war, and classified the slaves living there as contraband. More came to the island from the mainland. The Army developed a contraband camp into the Freedmen's Colony of Roanoke Island, an important experiment set up to become self-sustaining. By 1864, more than 2200 freedmen lived there, even though 150 had joined the United States Colored Troops from North Carolina. The American Missionary Association recruited teachers from the North to help educate the freedmen in reading and writing, which both children and adults were eager to learn.

Battle of Roanoke Island

137

Background
Northeastern North Carolina is dominated by its sounds; large but shallow bodies of brackish-to-salt water that lie between the mainland and the Outer Banks. Although they are all one body, intimately connected and having a common water level, they are conceptually divided into several distinct regions. The largest of these is Pamlico Sound, immediately behind Hatteras Island; to its north is the second largest, Albemarle Sound, which extends almost to the southern border of Virginia. The linkage between these two, somewhat narrow, is further constricted by Roanoke Island. The portion of the waterway between Roanoke Island and the mainland is known as Croatan Sound. Both the island and the sound are about ten miles (16km) long. The sound at its widest point is a little more than 4 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) across, the island about half that. On the eastern side of the island is Roanoke Sound, much narrower, shallower, and less important. Several North Carolina cities were sited on the sounds, among them New Bern (usually written New Berne in the mid-nineteenth century), Beaufort, Edenton, and Elizabeth City. Others, not lying directly on the sounds, were accessible to the rivers that emptied into them. As much as a third of the state is in their watershed. Through most of the first year of the Civil War, the Confederate forces retained control of the sounds, so that coastwise water-borne commerce of the eastern part of the state was unimpeded. The sounds were linked to Norfolk, Virginia by the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal and the Dismal Swamp Canal. The blockade of Norfolk could not be complete so long as cargoes could reach the city through its back door. Communications were not affected appreciably when Federal forces captured the forts on the Outer Banks at Hatteras Inlet in August 1861, as the Union Navy could not bring its deep-water vessels into the sounds through the shallow inlets.[1] Roanoke Island was the key to control of the Sounds. If controlled by the Union forces, they would have a base that could be attacked only by an amphibious operation, which the Rebels could not mount. If the Union established naval superiority there, all points on the mainland shores would be equally vulnerable to assault. The Confederate defenders would be forced into an impossible situation: they would either have to give up some positions without a fight, or they would have to spread their assets too thin to be of any use.[2]

Prelude
Further information: Roanoke Island order of battle

Confederate defense
The defense of Roanoke Island started in an accidental manner. When the Federal fleet appeared off Hatteras Inlet on August 27, 1861, the 3rd Georgia Infantry Regiment was hastily sent from Norfolk to help hold the forts there, but the forts fell before they arrived, so they were diverted to Roanoke Island. They remained there for the next three months, making somewhat desultory efforts to expel the Yankees from Hatteras Island.[3] Little was done to secure the position until early October, when Brig. Gen. Hill was assigned to command the coastal defenses of North Carolina in the vicinity of the sounds. Hill set his soldiers to putting up earthworks across the center of the island, but he was called away to service in Virginia before they were completed.[4] Shortly after his departure, his district was split in two; the southern part was assigned to Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'B. Branch, while the northern part was put in control of Henry A. Wise, whose command included Albemarle Sound and Roanoke Island, but not Pamlico Sound and its cities. It is also significant that Branch reported to Brig. Gen. Richard C. Gatlin, who commanded the Department of North Carolina, while Wise was under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger, who was in charge of the defenses of Norfolk.[5] Wise had been commander of the so-called Wise Legion, but his troops did not accompany him. The Legion was broken up, although he was able to retain two of his old regiments, the 46th and 59th Virginia. He also had three regiments of North Carolina troops, the 2nd, 8th, and 31st North Carolina, plus three companies of the 17th North Carolina. The men from North Carolina were ill-equipped and poorly clothed, often armed with nothing more than

Battle of Roanoke Island their own shotguns. All told, the number came to about 1,400 infantrymen, but the number available for duty was smaller than that because the living conditions put as many as one-fourth of the command on the sick list.[6] Wise begged Richmond to send him some guns, as had Hill before him, but the numbers that were actually sent were inadequate. They were distributed into several nominal forts: facing Croatan Sound were twelve guns in Fort Huger, at Weir's Point, the northwestern corner of the island; four guns in Fort Blanchard, about a mile (1.6km) to the southeast; and nine guns in Fort Bartow, at the romantically-named Pork Point, about a quarter of the way down the island. Across the sound, at Redstone Point opposite Fort Huger, two old canal barges had been pushed up onto the mud, protected by sandbags and cotton bales, armed with seven guns, and named Fort Forrest. These were all the guns that would bear on the sound; the southern half of the island, nearest Pamlico Sound, in the direction from which the attack would come, was unprotected. Five other guns did not face Croatan Sound: a battery of two guns on the eastern side of the island protected against possible assault across Roanoke Sound, and three others occupied an earthwork near the geometric center of the island.[7] Wise made one other contribution to the defense. He found some pile drivers, and was able to impede the sound between Forts Huger and Forrest by a double row of piles, augmented by sunken hulks. The barrier was still being worked on when the attack came.[8] The Confederate Navy also made a contribution to the defense. Seven gunboats, mounting a total of only eight guns, formed the Mosquito Fleet, commanded by Flag Officer William F. Lynch. Wise, for one, believed that their net contribution was negative. Not only were their guns taken from the forts on the island, but so were their crews. He gave vent to his feelings after the battle: "Captain Lynch was energetic, zealous, and active, but he gave too much consequence entirely to his fleet of gunboats, which hindered transportation of piles, lumber, forage, supplies of all kinds, and of troops, by taking away the steam-tugs and converting them into perfectly imbecile gunboats."[9] Despite Wise's disapproval, the Mosquito Fleet was part of the defense, and the Yankees would have to deal with it.

138

Union offense
A short time after Hatteras Island was captured for the Union, Burnside began to promote the idea of a Coast Division, to be composed of fishermen, dockworkers, and other watermen from the northeastern states, and used to attack coastal areas. He reasoned that such men were already familiar with ships, and therefore would be easy to train for amphibious operations. Burnside was a close friend of General-in-Chief George B. McClellan, so he got a respectful hearing. Although Burnside had initially intended to operate in Chesapeake Bay, in the hands of McClellan and the War Department his ideas were soon transformed into a planned assault on the North Carolina interior coast, beginning with Roanoke Island. An unspoken reason for the change of target was the mistaken belief that pro-Union sentiment was being suppressed in North Carolina, and an invasion would allow them to express their true loyalties.[10] When it was fleshed out, the invasion of North Carolina came to be known as the Burnside Expedition. As recruiting progressed, Burnside organized the Coast Division into three brigades, led by three friends from his Military Academy days. Brig. Gen. John G. Foster led the First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno the Second, and Brig. Gen. John G. Parke the Third.[11] In early January, nearly 13,000 men were ready for duty.[12] Although the Union Navy would provide most of the gunnery that would be needed to suppress the Rebel batteries, Burnside decided to have some gunboats under Army control. This immediately led to some interference between the two services. The Navy had no vessels sturdy enough to go to sea and at the same time draw little enough water to be able to pass through the shallow inlet, thought to be about 8 feet (unknown operator: u'strong'm). They therefore had to buy suitable merchant ships for conversion, at the very time that Burnside and his agents were also dickering for their ships. Because the sailors were more experienced, they were able to get most of the more suitable ships. The Army was left with a mixed bag of rickety ships that were barely seaworthy.[13] By the time the expedition got under way, the Navy had 20 gunboats, and the Coast Division had nine. The armada was

Battle of Roanoke Island supplemented by several canal boats converted into floating batteries, mounting boat howitzers and protected by sandbags and bales of hay. All told, the expedition carried 108 pieces of ordnance.[14] While Burnside's agents were purchasing the gunboats they were also buying or leasing other vessels to be used as transports. The soldiers and transports for the expedition assembled at Annapolis. Embarkation began on January 5, 1862, and on January 9 they began to get under way, with orders to rendezvous at Fort Monroe, near the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. There they met the naval contingent, and on January 11 they set sail. Until this time, only Burnside and his immediate staff knew their ultimate destination. Once at sea, the captain of each ship opened his sealed orders and learned that his ship should proceed to the vicinity of Cape Hatteras.[15]

139

Battle
From Chesapeake Bay to Pamlico Sound
For many of the Federal soldiers, the voyage to Hatteras Inlet was the worst part of the battle. Earning its reputation, the weather in the vicinity of Cape Hatteras turned foul, causing many of them to become seasick. In an act of bravado, Burnside left his comfortable quarters aboard the transport George Peabody and with his staff went aboard Army gunboat Picket. He chose this vessel because he considered her to be the least seaworthy ship in his command, and by showing his troops that he was willing to share their misery, he earned their devotion. When the storm struck, he began to doubt the wisdom of his move, but Picket survived and got him safely to his destination. Three vessels in the armada were not so lucky: City of New York, laden with ordnance and supplies; Pocahontas, carrying horses; and Army gunboat Zouave were all lost, although all persons aboard were rescued. The only personnel losses were two officers of the 9th New Jersey, who were drowned when their surfboat overturned following a visit to the flagship.[16] The entry into Pamlico Sound through Hatteras Inlet was time consuming. The swash, thought to be eight feet (2.5 m) deep, was found the hard way to be only six feet (1.9 m). Some of the Union Army ships drew too much to get across, and had to be kedged in after being lightened. Others were too deep even to be kedged in; the men or Sketch showing route of Burnside's forces to materials they carried had to be brought ashore on Hatteras Island, and Hatteras Inlet. U.S. Government Printing Office, the ships sent back. Bark John Trucks never made it at all; she could 1866 not get close enough to Hatteras Island even for the men aboard to be taken off. She returned to Annapolis with the majority of the regiment, the 53rd New York, a detachment of the command was active in the battle of Roanoke island [17][18] Not until February 4 was the fleet as ready as it ever would be and assembled in Pamlico Sound.[19] While the Northern fleet was struggling over the bar, the Confederates were strangely inert. No reinforcements were sent to the island, or, for that matter, any of the other possible targets in the region. The number of infantrymen on the island remained at about 1,400, with 800 in reserve at Nag's Head. The major change was negative: on February 1 Wise came down with what he called "pleurisy, with high fever and spitting of blood, threatening pneumonia." He was confined to bed at Nag's Head, and remained hospitalized until February 8, after the battle was over. Although he continued to issue orders, effective command on Roanoke Island fell to Col. H. M. Shaw of the 8th North

Battle of Roanoke Island Carolina Infantry.[20]

140

First day: Bombardment


The fleet got under way early the morning after they had assembled in the sound (February 5), and by nightfall were near the southern end of Roanoke Island, where they anchored. Rain and strong winds prevented movements the next day. The major activity was Goldsborough's shift of his flag from USS Philadelphia to Southfield. On February 7 the weather moderated, and the Navy gunboats got into position. They first fired a few shells inland at Ashby Harbor, the intended landing place, and determined that the defenders had no batteries there. They then moved up Croatan Sound, where they were divided; some were ordered to fire on the fort at Pork Point (Fort Bartow), while others were to concentrate their fire on the seven vessels of the Mosquito Fleet. At about noon, the bombardment began.[21]

Map of Roanoke Island, showing forts and fleet dispositions, February 7, 1862, on the left, and on the right, the battlefield where opposing armies met on February 8. Prepared by Lt. Andrews, 9th N.Y. Regiment.

The weakness of the Confederate position was revealed at this time. Only four of the guns at Fort Bartow would bear on the Union gunboats. Forts Huger and Blanchard could not contribute at all. Fort Forrest, on the other side of the sound, was rendered completely useless when gunboat CSS Curlew, holed at the waterline, ran ashore directly in front in her effort to avoid sinking, and in so doing masked the guns of the fort.[22] Losses were light on both sides despite the intensity of the fight. Several of the Union ships were hit, but none suffered severe damage. This was true for the Confederates also, aside from Curlew, but the remaining Mosquito Fleet had to retire simply because they ran out of ammunition.[23] The Army transports, accompanied by its gunboats, had in the meantime arrived at Ashby Harbor, near the midpoint of the island. At 15:00, Burnside ordered the landings to begin, and at 16:00 the troops were reaching shore. A 200-man strong Confederate force commanded by Col. John V. Jordan (31st North Carolina), in position to oppose the landing, was discovered and fired on by the gunboats; the defenders fled without any attempt to return fire.[24] There was no further opposition. Almost all of the 10,000 men present were ashore by midnight. With the infantry went six launches with boat howitzers, commanded by a young midshipman, Benjamin H. Porter. The Union soldiers pushed inland a short distance and then went into camp for the night.[25]

Second day: Union advance and Confederate surrender


The Federal soldiers moved out promptly on the morning of February 8, advancing north on the only road on the island. Leading was the First Brigade's 25th Massachusetts, with Midshipman Porter's howitzers immediately following. They were soon halted, when they struck the Confederate redoubt and some 400 infantry blocking their path. Another thousand Confederates were in reserve, about 250 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) to the rear; the front was so constricted that Col. Shaw could deploy only a quarter of his men. The defensive line ended in what were deemed impenetrable swamps on both sides, so Shaw did not protect his flanks.[26] The leading elements of the First Brigade spread out to match their opponents' configuration, and for two hours the combatants fired at each other through blinding clouds of smoke. The 10th Connecticut relieved the exhausted, but not badly bloodied, 25th Massachusetts, but they too could not advance. No progress was made until the Second Brigade arrived, and its commander, Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno, ordered them to try to penetrate the "impenetrable" swamp on the Union left. Brig. Gen. John G. Foster then ordered two of his reserve regiments to do the same on the right. About this time, Brig. Gen. John G. Parke came up with the Third Brigade, and it was immediately sent to assist. Although they were not coordinated, the two flanking movements emerged from the swamp at nearly the same

Battle of Roanoke Island time. Reno ordered his 21st Massachusetts, 51st New York, and 9th New Jersey to attack. As they were firing on the Confederates, the 23rd Massachusetts, from the First Brigade, appeared on the other end of the line. The defensive line began to crack; noting this, Foster ordered his remaining forces to attack. Under assault from three sides, the Confederates broke and fled.[27] As no fall-back defenses had been set up, and he was bereft of artillery, Col. Shaw surrendered to Foster. Included in the capitulation were not only the 1,400 infantry that he commanded directly, but also the guns in the forts. Two additional regiments (2nd North Carolina and 46th Virginia) had been sent as reinforcements. They arrived too late to take part in the battle, but not too late to be take part in the surrender. Altogether, some 2,500 men became prisoners of war.[28] Aside from the men who went into captivity, casualties were rather light by American Civil War standards. The Federal forces lost 37 killed, 214 wounded, and 13 missing. The Confederates lost 23 killed, 58 wounded, and 62 missing.[29]

141

Aftermath
Roanoke Island remained in Union control for the rest of the war. Immediately after the battle, the Federal gunboats passed the now-silent Confederate forts into Albemarle Sound, and destroyed what was left of the Mosquito Fleet at the Battle of Elizabeth City. Burnside used the island as staging ground for later assaults on New Bern and Fort Macon, resulting in their capture. Several minor expeditions took other towns on the sounds. The Burnside Expedition ended only in July, when its leader was called to Virginia to take part in the Richmond campaign. After Burnside left, North Carolina ceased to be an active center of the war. With only one or two exceptions, no notable military actions took place until the last days of the conflict, when the Battle of Fort Fisher closed Wilmington, the last open port in the Confederacy. The Army classified the slaves on Roanoke Island as contraband and by late 1862, hundreds more escaped slaves had joined them. While Foster was commander of the Department of North Carolina, in 1863 he appointed Horace James, a Congregational chaplain, as "Superintendent of Negro Affairs for the North Carolina District", encouraging him to support the former slaves in becoming educated, growing their own food, and working. Based in New Bern, James supervised the Trent River contraband camp there, but decided to make Roanoke Island a self-sustaining colony. The Freedmen's Colony of Roanoke Island was an important model that lasted four years; it had a sawmill, established a fisheries, and by 1864 it had 2200 residents. It was overcrowded when residents reached 3900 at its peak, in part because poor soil on the island limited productivity of agriculture. Many of its people worked for the Army for wages, and more than 150 men enlisted in the United States Colored Troops. Missionary teachers recruited by the American Missionary Association taught reading and writing to classes of both children and adults. It was an important step toward citizenship for the freedmen.[30]

Notes
[1] Gen. Wise, the former governor of Virginia, pointed out the importance of Roanoke Island when he requested aid before the battle: ORA I, v. 9, pp. 134, 138. Following the battle, he reiterated the evaluation in a rancorous outburst: ORA I, v. 9, p. 188. [2] The label "key" was frequently applied. ORA I, v. 4, pp. 578-79, 682, 718; v. 9, pp. 115, 126, 134, 138, 187, 188. [3] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 5264. [4] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 6263. [5] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads,, pp. 6263. Hill first reported for duty on October 4, and was relieved by Branch on November 16. Branch's district was split on December 21. [6] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 77. Battles and leaders, v. 1, p. 670. [7] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 24. [8] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 76. [9] ORA I, v. 9, p. 129. Lynch was not the only target of Wise's invective; this link gives other examples. (http:/ / ehistory. osu. edu/ osu/ books/ battles/ vol2/ pageview. cfm?page=276)

Battle of Roanoke Island


[10] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 1921. North Carolina was indeed only loosely attached to the Confederacy, but most pro-Union activity and sentiment was found in the mountainous western part of the state. [11] Burnside, Battles and leaders, p. 661. [12] ORA I, v. 9, p. 358. [13] Merrill, The Rebel shore, pp. 8687. [14] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 68. [15] Burnside, Battles and leaders, pp. 662663. [16] Burnside, Battles and leaders, v. 1, pp. 663-65. [17] The Union Army, Vol. 2, p. 89 [18] ORA I, v. 9, pp. 361362. [19] Burnside, Battles and leaders, v. 1, pp. 664666. [20] ORA I, v. 9, p. 145. [21] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 2425 [22] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 79. [23] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 8081. [24] Jordan later stated that he retreated in order not to be cut off, that he was under positive orders to save his artillery "at all hazards." ORA I, v. 9, p. 176. [25] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 81. Burnside, Battles and leaders, pp. 667668. [26] This is a presumption. Shaw did not explain why his flanks were uncovered. Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 83. [27] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 8485. [28] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 8687. [29] Battles and leaders, v.1, p. 670. Many of the Confederate missing were North Carolinians, and were presumed to have fled to their homes. [30] "The Roanoke Island Freedmen's Colony" (http:/ / www. learnnc. org/ lp/ editions/ nchist-civilwar/ 4590), provided by National Park Service, at North Carolina Digital History: LEARN NC, accessed 11 November 2010

142

Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.

References
Burnside, Ambrose E., "The Burnside Expedition," Battles and leaders of the Civil War, Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buell, eds. New York:Century, 18871888; reprint, Castle, n.d. (http:// ehistory.osu.edu/osu/books/battles/index.cfm) Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Univ. of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: The Confederate Navy's Struggle for Eastern North Carolina. Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Miller, James M., The Rebel Shore: The Story of Union Sea Power in the Civil War. Little, Brown and Co., 1957. Trotter, William R., Ironclads and Columbiads: The Coast. Joseph F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 US Navy Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18941922. Series I, volume 6 is most useful. (http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/moa_browse.html) US War Department, A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18861901. Series I, volume 9 is most useful. The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/ sources/records/list.cfm) National Park Service Battle Summary (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/nc002.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Monroes Cross Roads to Wyse Fork.pdf)

Battle of Elizabeth City

143

Battle of Elizabeth City


The Battle of Elizabeth City of the American Civil War was fought in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Roanoke Island. It took place on 10 February 1862, on the Pasquotank River near Elizabeth City, North Carolina. The participants were vessels of the U.S. Navy's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, opposed by vessels of the Confederate Navy's Mosquito Fleet; the latter were supported by a shore-based battery of four guns at Cobb's Point (now called Cobb Point), near the southeastern border of the town. The battle was a part of the campaign in North Carolina that was led by Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and known as the Burnside Expedition. The result was a Union victory, with Elizabeth City and its nearby waters in their possession, and the Confederate fleet captured, sunk, or dispersed.

Background
Elizabeth City lies near the mouth of the Pasquotank River, where it flows into Albemarle Sound from the north. North of the city is the Dismal Swamp Canal. To the east is the southern segment of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal, separated from the Pasquotank River by only a narrow neck of land.[1] Much of the food and forage delivered from North Carolina to southeastern Virginia was transported along these two canals. In particular, Norfolk, Virginia depended upon continued access to the canals for its subsistence. So long as the North Carolina Sounds remained in Confederate hands, Norfolk could be well supplied despite the blockading efforts of the Union Navy at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.

The Pasquotank River near Elizabeth City, site of battle of 10 February 1862

That changed, however, in early February 1862. In a battle fought on 78 February, the joint operation of a Union Army division under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and a naval flotilla under Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough captured Roanoke Island, a position in Croatan Sound that had previously shielded the sounds from Federal depredations. Earlier, Union ships trying to enforce the blockade on the canals would have had to enter Pamlico Sound through Hatteras Inlet, then pass several Confederate batteries on Roanoke Island before they could get into Albemarle Sound. With the elimination of the batteries, however, all that stood in the way of the Union Navy was the Mosquito Fleet of the Confederate States Navy.[2]

Prelude
Defense: the Mosquito Fleet
The first shots of the Burnside Expedition were fired on 7 February 1862, in the Battle of Roanoke Island. On that first day of the two-day battle, a force of 19 Union gunboats bombarded, rather inconclusively, four Rebel forts facing Croatan Sound and eight ships of the Confederate States Navy. The Federal ships were parts of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, commanded by Flag Officer Goldsborough. The Confederate vessels were drawn from a unit led by Flag Officer William F. Lynch, termed the "Mosquito Fleet", intended to serve on Albemarle Sound and nearby waters. Two vessels of the Mosquito Fleet were not present: CSS Appomattox had been sent away to Edenton for supplies and did not return in time for the battle, and schooner CSS Black Warrior was left out, presumably because she lacked the mobility that steam power gave the rest of the fleet.[3] The gunnery duel lasted from noon until sunset. The only significant casualty among the fleets was the loss of CSS Curlew, holed at the waterline and beached to avoid sinking; when Roanoke Island was surrendered the next day, she

Battle of Elizabeth City was burned in order to keep her out of Federal hands. One other ship was damaged, but not by enemy action: CSS Forrest damaged her screw by running on a submerged obstacle, and was thereafter unable to move under her own power. The remainder of the Mosquito Fleet suffered only minimal damage. They had to retire at the end of the day, with Forrest in tow, solely because they had nearly run out of ammunition.[4] Flag Officer Lynch took his fleet to Elizabeth City, to resupply and to repair Forrest. Failing to find ammunition to replenish his magazines, he sent Commander Thomas T. Hunter, former captain of CSS Curlew, to Norfolk. He later sent CSS Raleigh up the Dismal Swamp Canal for the same purpose. Hunter returned with enough to resupply only two ships; Lynch divided it among all of his remaining serviceable ships. Raleigh, however, was not able to return in time.[5] No further changes of status affected the Mosquito Fleet. On the eve of battle, Lynch had at his disposal six ships in the water, each with only enough shot and powder to be able to fire ten times.[6] His flagship, Sea Bird, carrying two guns, was a converted sidewheel steamer.[7] Three of his other vessels were former tugs: Appomattox[8] and Ellis,[9] each with two guns, and Beaufort,[10] with only one. Fanny,[11] with two guns, had been a transport vessel used by the United States Army until she was captured by Confederate forces near Cape Hatteras. The last vessel, CSS Black Warrior, a schooner that had been pressed into service only four days before the battle, was armed with two 32-pounder guns.[12] In addition to the eleven guns of his fleet, Lynch counted on the four guns of the Cobb's Point battery for support.[13]

144

Offense: the Union fleet


The surrender of Roanoke Island on 8 February included all the Rebel forts that had faced on Croatan Sound, so they would no longer be able to prevent passage of Union ships from Pamlico into Albemarle Sound. Flag Officer Goldsborough therefore ordered his gunboats to pursue the Mosquito Fleet and destroy it. Although none of his vessels had been seriously injured in the bombardment of the preceding day, some were damaged enough that he decided not to include them in his order. USS Hetzel as she appeared at the time of her Fourteen ships remained, however, and they carried a total of 37 guns. Civil War service. Goldsborough himself did not accompany the pursuit; in his stead was Commander Stephen C. Rowan.[14] The fourteen were all, like their Confederate counterparts, converted from civilian vessels in the first days of the war. Rowan's flagship Delaware, Hetzel, Isaac N. Seymour, John L. Lockwood, Ceres, and General Putnam[15] had all been sidewheel steamers before being acquired by the Navy. Shawsheen was also a sidewheel steamer, and like two of her opponents was a former tug. Two other sidewheel vessels, Commodore Perry and Morse, had been ferries. The remaining five ships, Louisiana, Underwriter, Valley City, Whitehead, and Henry Brinker were screw steamers.[16] If Captain Lynch had known that the Federal fleet faced a shortage of ammunition very much like his own, he perhaps would have altered his tactics, although the outcome would likely have been the same. As it was, Cdr. Rowan ordered the captains in his fleet to conserve their ammunition. They were told to use ramming and boarding, so far as was possible, to disable or capture the enemy ships.[14] On 9 February, Rowan's gunboats passed the now-silent guns of Croatan Sound and crossed Albemarle Sound. Darkness fell as they approached Elizabeth City, so they anchored for the night.[17]

Battle of Elizabeth City

145

Battle
Lynch used the time that the Union flotilla was anchored to arrange his own ships for the coming battle. He decided to base his position on the battery of four guns at Cobb's Point, placing schooner CSS Black Warrior opposite the point, and his five remaining steamships in line across the river a short distance upstream. He took this position because he expected the Union to try to reduce the battery before proceeding, as they had done three days previously in the opening phase of the Battle of Roanoke Island. His CSS Ellis after her capture final instructions to his captains included the order not to let the ships fall into enemy hands; if all else failed, they should try to escape, or else destroy their vessels.[18] At dawn on 10 February, Lynch made his first visit to the Cobb's Point battery, to coordinate its defense with his fleet. He found it manned by only seven militiamen and a single civilian. Because the battery was the strong point of his planned defense, he was constrained to order Lieutenant Commanding William Harwar Parker, captain of CSS Beaufort, to come ashore with most of his crew to man the guns. He left only enough on the ship to take her up the canal. With the additional men, only three of the four guns could be manned. When battle was joined, the militiamen promptly deserted; henceforth, only two guns could be used against the enemy.[19] The battery turned out to be irrelevant. Because his ammunition was low and his mission was to destroy the Rebel fleet, Rowan ordered his ships to bypass the battery. Parker and his men got off a few wild shots that did no harm, but they found that their guns would not bear once the Federal fleet was upstream. They therefore could only watch as their ships were destroyed by the attacking Federal fleet.[20] First of the Confederate fleet to be lost was schooner Black Warrior. She was fired on by the entire attacking force as they passed the Cobb's Point battery, so her crew abandoned her and set her afire. Likewise, Fanny was run ashore and burned. A boarding party from Ceres captured CSS Ellis in hand-to-hand combat. Her captain would have blown up Ellis, but a black coal heaver discovered the charges and revealed them to the boarding party. CSS Sea Bird attempted to escape, but was run down and sunk by Commodore Perry. CSS Beaufort and Appomattox made good their escape into the Dismal Swamp Canal. There, in the final irony, Appomattox was found to be 2in (unknown operator: u'strong'cm) too wide to pass through a lock, so she had to be burned. CSS Forrest, on the stocks to repair the damaged screw she had sustained on 8 February, was burned, along with an unnamed and uncompleted gunboat. CSS Raleigh was still at Norfolk, so she was not harmed.[21] She and Beaufort were the only vessels in the Mosquito Fleet to escape either capture or destruction. Casualties were modest. The attacking Federal fleet lost two men killed and seven wounded, while the Rebels lost in all four killed, six wounded, and 34 captured.[22] Quarter Gunner John Davis was awarded the congressional medal of honor for his actions on board the Valley City during the engagement.[23][24]

Battle of Elizabeth City

146

Aftermath
When they learned of the destruction of their fleet and the surrender of the Cobb's Point battery, Confederate troops retreating from Roanoke Island set fires in Elizabeth City, acting under orders from Brigadier General Henry A. Wise to destroy the town. About two blocks had been consumed when sailors from the Union flotilla arrived and were able to save the rest.[25] The Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal was blocked near its entrance at the North River. The retreating Rebels started the obstruction. It was completed by the victorious Federal forces, acting under the orders of Flag Officer Goldsborough.[26] The town of Edenton was taken without loss of blood on 12 February by four of Commander Cowan's gunboats. Two schooners were captured and another destroyed, and eight cannon were seized.[27] More generally, there was no longer a Confederate presence on Albemarle Sound. It remained so for most of the rest of the war; the only significant challenge to Union dominance was the short-lived experiment of CSS Albemarle in the summer of 1864. Although Norfolk was not attacked, it was isolated and increasingly worthless to the Confederate Army. In May, the city was abandoned.

CSS Albemarle

Order of Battle
Confederate: CSS Sea Bird, sidewheel steamer, flagship CSS Fanny, steamer CSS Appomattox, tug boat CSS Ellis, tug boat CSS Beaufort, tug boat CSS Black Warrior, schooner Union: USS Delaware, sidewheel steamer, flagship USS Hetzel, sidewheel steamer USS Isaac N. Semour, sidewheel steamer USS John L. Lockwood, sidewheel steamer USS Ceres, sidewheel steamer USS Shawsheen, sidewheel steamer USS Commodore Perry, sidewheel steamer USS Morse, sidewheel steamer USS Louisiana, screw steamer USS Underwriter, screw steamer USS Valley City, screw steamer USS Whitehead, screw steamer USS Henry Brinker, screw steamer

Battle of Elizabeth City

147

Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] The Dismal Swamp Canal begins a little less than 9mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Cobb's Point as the crow flies, but almost twice that measured along the river. From Cobb's Point to the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal is 12mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) in a straight line, almost three times that by water. [2] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 7588. [3] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 6667. [4] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 7175. [5] Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 7677. [6] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 596. [7] "Sea Bird" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa9/ sea_bird. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [8] "Appomattox" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa1/ appomattox. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [9] "Ellis" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa3/ ellis. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [10] "Beaufort" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa1/ beaufort. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [11] "Fanny" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa3/ fanny. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [12] "Black Warrior" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa2/ black_warrior. htm). History.navy.mil. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [13] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 88. [14] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 28. [15] Because of engine trouble, General Putnam was not able to take part in the battle. [16] See the article for each ship in DANFS. Also ORN ser. II, v. 1, pp. 54, 64, 73, 101, 102, 106, 114, 129, 151, 207, 228, 230, 239, 241. [17] ORN ser. I, v. 5, p. 607. [18] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 2829. [19] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 596. [20] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 89. [21] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 29. ORN ser. I, v. 6, pp. 607608. [22] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 29. Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 8990. ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 621. [23] "USS Valley City" (http:/ / ecbattle. home. coastalnet. com/ Medal of Honor. htm). Ecbattle.home.coastalnet.com. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [24] "US People-Davis, John, Quarter Gunner, USN" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ photos/ pers-us/ uspers-d/ j-davis. htm). History.navy.mil. 27 April 2006. . Retrieved 10 February 2012. [25] ORA ser. I, v. 9, pp. 191193. [26] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 635. [27] ORN ser. I, v. 6, p. 637.

References
Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: the Confederate Navy's struggle for eastern North Carolina. Nashville, TN: Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Parker, William Harwar, Recollections of a naval officer, 18411865. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883; reprint ed., Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1985. ISBN 0-87021-533-7 Trotter, William R., Ironclads and columbiads: the coast. Winston-Salem: John F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 US Navy Department, Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18941922. US War Department, A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18861901.

Battle of New Bern

148

Battle of New Bern


The Battle of New Bern (also known as the Battle of New Berne) was fought on 14 March 1862, near the city of New Bern, North Carolina, as part of the Burnside Expedition of the American Civil War. The US Army's Coast Division, led by Brigadier General Ambrose E. Burnside and accompanied by armed vessels from the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, were opposed by an undermanned and badly trained Confederate force of North Carolina soldiers and militia led by Brigadier General Lawrence O'B. Branch. Although the defenders fought behind breastworks that had been set up before the battle, their line had a weak spot in its center that was exploited by the attacking Federal soldiers. When the center of the line was penetrated, many of the militia broke, forcing a general retreat of the entire Confederate force. General Branch was unable to regain control of his troops until they had retreated to Kinston, more than 30 miles (about 50km) away. New Bern came under Federal control, and remained so for the rest of the war.

Background
New Bern lies on the right (southwest) bank of the Neuse River, about 37 miles (60km) above its exit into Pamlico Sound. The river is broad in this vicinity, and is deep enough that vessels that can navigate the sound can also ply the river. In the colonial era, the town was quite important as a seaport, but by the time of the Civil War Morehead City and Beaufort had largely supplanted it. Nevertheless, New Bern was still a significant military target, as the railroad (Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad)[1] that connected the coast with the interior passed through the city. A short distance further up, at Goldsboro (spelled Goldsborough in the 19th century), the line crossed the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, noted for keeping the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia supplied throughout the war. Thus, if New Bern were to fall into Federal hands, an important link in the supply chain of that army would be broken. The land in this part of North Carolina is low and rather flat, and is sometimes marshy. In 1862, the solid land was mostly covered with open pine forest, although in places it was broken into low hills with deciduous forests, separated by ravines.[2] It is crossed by many creeks that sometimes rise to the status of small rivers. One of these, the Trent River, separates New Bern from the land to its south. The slightly smaller Slocum's Creek, enters 16 miles (26km) farther down the Neuse. It was to be the landing site for the attacking Federal forces. The entire action, aside from the takeover of the city, was confined to the land between these two streams. The railroad ran on a system of berms and occasional cuts about a mile (1.6km) inland from the river. It entered the city on a bridge over the Trent River. A county road passed over the same land, also connecting New Bern with Morehead City and Beaufort. In the vicinity of the battle, it lay between railroad and the river, but it crossed the railroad about a mile and a half (2km) north of what would be the battlefield.[3] The road continued to the northwest, crossing the Trent on a drawbridge some 4 miles (6.4km) west of the city.[4] In the manner of the time, the road was unpaved, as the Union soldiers learned to their sorrow.

Battle of New Bern

149

Prelude
Following the secession of North Carolina from the Union, the defenses of the state were neglected by the Confederate government in Richmond. The War Department, directed at first by Secretary Leroy P. Walker and later by Judah P. Benjamin,[5] used the state's best-trained and best-equipped troops to take part in the campaigns in Virginia, which were given a higher priority. They were seen as protecting the Confederate capital of Richmond. When Hatteras Island fell to Union forces in August 1861, only six regiments of infantry were available to defend the entire coast of the state.[6]
The present-day location of Fort Thompson. Only

By that time, the Confederacy had divided the coastal defense into the earthenworks remain. The Neuse River can be seen in the background. separate districts for command purposes; the northern part, from near Cape Lookout to the Virginia border, was assigned to Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, who set up the defensive lines around New Bern. South of the city, across the Trent River, he had built two primary lines. First was a system of breastworks named the "Croatan Works,"[7] near Otter Creek and extending inland as far as the railroad. Six miles (10km) closer to the city was another substantial line anchored on the river by Fort Thompson. The fort held 13 guns, three of which bore on landward approaches.[8] Hill ordered construction of a series of batteries along the river to defend against attack by naval forces.[9] The Confederates blocked the river with two barriers. The first, a mile and a half (2.4km) below Fort Thompson, consisted of a double row of piles cut off below the water, capped with iron, and backed by a row of 30 torpedoes (present-day mines). Each torpedo contained about 200 pounds (100kg) of powder. The second was opposite Fort Thompson and consisted of a row of hulks and chevaux de frise, which would force ships to pass under the guns of the fort.[10] Hill hoped that he would be given sufficient manpower to fill his lines, but he was transferred to service in Virginia before the hoped-for additional troops arrived. Shortly after he was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'B. Branch, the district was divided again. Branch's command extended from Cape Lookout north only to the limits of Pamlico Sound. From there to the Virginia border and beyond was assigned to Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger, whose primary concern was the defense of Norfolk and environs. This meant in particular that Roanoke Island, between Croatan Sound and Roanoke Sound just north of Pamlico Sound, was not included in Branch's command.[11] Roanoke Island fell to a combined operation of the Union Army's Coast Division, under Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, and a Union gunboat flotilla assembled from the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under Flag Officer Louis M Goldsborough, on 78 February 1862. That battle was rapidly followed up by the gunboats alone, who wiped out the Confederate Navy's Mosquito Fleet in an assault on Elizabeth City.[12] Shortly afterward, Goldsborough had to leave the sounds for duties at Hampton Roads, and immediate command of the ships he left behind fell to Commander Stephen C. Rowan.[13] As a result of the battles, Union forces could move at will in Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds. Every city and town accessible to those sounds hence became vulnerable to attack. The most important was New Bern, and Burnside soon resolved to take it.

Battle of New Bern

150 The importance of New Bern was no more obvious to Burnside than it was to the Confederate authorities in Richmond, but they did little to secure it. Although more than a month passed after Roanoke Island fell before Burnside could mount an attack on the city, the local command received no reinforcements. One of General Branch's aides estimated that the lines would need at least 6,130 men to hold them, but he had only about 4,000 at his disposal, a number often reduced by sickness. Furthermore, many of the men were poorly-armed militiamen. The disparity between necessity and reality persuaded Branch to draw his lines in, abandoning some of the strong breastworks erected by his predecessor. The principal defense would be the line based on Fort Thompson.[14]

Defensive line at Battle of New Bern, 14 March 1862 |alt = Map prepared for General Branch, showing his defensive lines. New Bern is off the map at the top; the Federal advance would be from the bottom. The Neuse River flows from top to bottom on the right; the left is limited by Bryce Creek, roughly parallel to the river. The BeaufortNew Bern railroad bisects the image vertically. The defense on the right is a straight line from the river to the railroad, about 3/4 of the distance from the top. From the railroad to Bryce Creek, the line of defense follows another small creek. The right and left halves of the defensive line are offset at the railroad. The land is covered by woods except immediately in front of the lines, where the timber has been felled.

The Fort Thompson line that had been set up by General Hill extended only from the river to the railroad. They ended on the right in a brickyard that would figure prominently in the fighting. Because the land farther to the right was fairly firm and would allow his position to be flanked, General Branch decided to extend the line beyond the railroad and end it in a swamp. This just about doubled the length of the defensive line. He made a major blunder in laying out the line, however. In haste to complete the extension and faced with an exasperating shortage of labor, he decided to use a small creek as a natural part of the line. This creek intersected the railroad at a point some 150 yards (135 meters) up from the brickyard. The line of breastworks therefore had a dogleg in its center.[15]

Battle
Further information: New Bern order of battle

Advance
The soldiers of the Coast Division clambered into their transports at Roanoke Island on 11 March 1862 and got under way early the next morning, accompanied by 14 Navy gunboats and one gunboat of their own. One of the Navy vessels was detached to guard the mouth of the Pamlico River, where it was incorrectly rumored that the Rebels were preparing two ships to cut off transports that might become separated from Navy protection. The main force traversed Pamlico Sound, entered the Neuse River, and anchored near the mouth of Slocum's Creek at dusk. Branch was aware of their presence, and immediately ordered his forces to take up defensive positions. He sent Col. James Sinclair's 35th North Carolina Infantry to the landing at Otter Creek, in front of the Croatan work, with instructions to oppose enemy landings at that site. Colonel Zebulon Vance's 26th North Carolina was ordered into the Croatan work. Other units guarded the river upstream, and reserves were assembled at the intersection of the railroad and the Beaufort road. All units were instructed that if they were forced from their positions, they should fall back on the Fort Thompson line.[16] At dawn on 13 March, the Federal troops began to disembark. A small Rebel unit trying to contest the landing was quickly driven away by fire from the gunboats, as Col. Sinclair interpreted his orders to defend against a landing at Otter Creek narrowly.[17] Burnside spent the morning getting men and equipment ashore. With the infantry came six boat (Navy) howitzers and two Army howitzers. Because of the weather, he decided to land his other artillery closer to the enemy lines, but dense fog soon closed in, and he could not communicate with the fleet. His remaining guns

Battle of New Bern were not landed.[18] A little after noon the Union soldiers began to move toward the Confederate lines, and at about the same time the rains began. The road was soon turned into mud, and the mere act of walking required great exertion. The gunners with the howitzers accompanying the infantry soon were exhausted trying to move their pieces, so a regiment of infantry (51st Pennsylvania) were detailed to help them. Many of those foot soldiers long remembered this as the most arduous part of the battle.[19] As the soldiers made their slow progress, the gunboats kept a short distance ahead, shelling places where Rebels might be waiting. Col. R. P. Campbell, in command of the Confederate right wing, interpreted the naval gunfire as preliminary to another landing that would take the Croatan work in reverse, so he ordered a general pullback to the Fort Thompson line. Thus, when the Federal army came upon the first Confederate breastworks, they found them abandoned.[20] The Coast Division soon resumed its march. Leaving the Croatan work, First (Foster's) Brigade moved on the right, following the county road, while Second (Reno's) Brigade followed the railroad on the left. Third (Parke's) Brigade followed after the First. They continued until they came in contact with enemy pickets, about a mile and a half (2km) away from the Fort Thompson line held by the Rebels. Daylight having been exhausted, Burnside ordered a halt and had the brigades bivouac in the order of their march: First Brigade on the right near the road, Second Brigade on the left near the railroad, and Third Brigade to the rear of the First. The howitzers did not arrive until 0300 the next morning.[21]

151

The fight
The field was covered by a dense fog on the morning of 14 March. Burnside ordered his forces to form and advance on the Rebel works. The Yankees did not have complete information concerning their opponents' disposition at this time; so far as they knew, the Confederate line extended only from the river to the brickyard. In keeping with this belief, Burnside ordered the First Brigade to engage the enemy left, while the Second Brigade would try to turn their right, at the brickyard. The eight howitzers were deployed across the county road. Third Brigade Battle of New Bern as illustrated in Harper's Weekly. 5 April 1862 was held as a reserve.[22] The Army also got some dubious support from the gunboats under Commander Stephen C. Rowan, who shelled the Rebel positions although they were hidden by intervening forests. This gunfire greatly disturbed the North Carolinians, but it was inaccurate enough that Burnside eventually asked Cowan to change direction.[23] Meanwhile, on the other side, General Branch had put his regiments into the line. From his left, at Fort Thompson, to the brickyard on his right, were the 27th, 37th, 7th, and 35th North Carolina Regiments. His reserve was the 33rd Regiment. The right flank of the 35th was anchored in a brickyard kiln that was loopholed for artillery. The entire line beyond the railroad was occupied by a single regiment, the 26th North Carolina, plus a few companies of cavalry. The gap in his line created by the dogleg at the railroad was covered only by his weakest unit, a militia battalion with only two weeks of training, and armed with shotguns and hunting rifles. To give them additional support, he ordered up a two-gun battery of 24-pounders to the kiln, but they were not mounted when they came under attack.[24] The First Brigade of the Union army opposed them from the river to the railroad; right to left, the units were the 25th, 24th, 27th, and 23rd Massachusetts, and the 10th Connecticut. The Beaufort Road ran through the center of this line, and here General Foster placed the howitzers that had been dragged along.[25]

Battle of New Bern On the Federal left, General Reno, still unaware of the extension of the enemy lines beyond the railroad, ordered a part of the 21st Massachusetts to charge the brick kiln, while the 9th New Jersey and the 51st New York would engage the enemy in support. The 51st Pennsylvania was held in reserve. The charge was successful at first, but they then found themselves under fire from the whole line and were forced to pull back.[26] Burnside at this time ordered his reserve, the Third Brigade, into the line to support Reno's Second Brigade. The 4th Rhode Island replaced the 21st Massachusetts, which had used up its ammunition. While trading places, Colonel Isaac P. Rodman of the 4th Rhode Island was told by Lieutenant Colonel William S. Clark of the 21st Massachusetts that he thought that another attack on the brick kiln would be successful. Rodman sent a courier to General Parke informing him that he was taking responsibility, then formed his regiment and ordered them to charge. Armed with better knowledge of the enemy, this charge was successful. The 4th Rhode Island captured nine brass field pieces, and found themselves in rear of the Rebel entrenchments.[27] At this point, the Confederate line broke. The rupture started when the green militiamen fled and exposed the units on both of their flanks. Branch ordered his reserves to plug the gap, but they did not arrive in time. As the line was rolled up on both wings, each regimental commander in succession pulled his unit back to escape being slaughtered. General Branch ordered a retreat, which soon became a rout. The fleeing North Carolinians dashed across the bridge over the Trent River into New Bern, then burned the bridge so precipitately that some of their compatriots were left behind and were captured. They also burned a fire raft in the river, which soon drifted against the railroad bridge and destroyed it.[28] While the battle was in progress, Commander Rowan's ships had moved up the river to assist. They received only minor damage in passing the lower barrier, and then positioned themselves to shell Fort Thompson. When the fort was abandoned, they immediately passed the second barrier and moved on to New Bern. Because Branch's order to retreat included all of the Confederate river batteries, their guns were spiked and they were abandoned to the fleet. At the city, the fleet shelled the retreating Confederate troops, denying them the opportunity to regroup. The retreating units could not reform until they had fled all the way to Kinston. With both bridges destroyed, Burnside's soldiers had to be ferried across the river by the gunboats.[29] Branch had lost 64 killed, 101 wounded, and 413 captured or missing, compared to Burnside's 90 killed, 380 wounded, and a single man captured.[30]

152

Aftermath
New Bern fell and was occupied. It remained in control of the Union Army for the rest of the war. Immediately following the battle, Burnside turned his attention to his next important objective, getting control of the port at Beaufort, which was defended by Fort Macon. The Rebels did not defend Morehead City, which was occupied immediately by the Yankees, or Beaufort, which was taken on 25 March. The siege of Fort Macon began at that time.

Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] Official atlas, plate 138. [2] ORA I, v. 9, pp. 224225. [3] Official atlas, plate 40. See also the accompanying sketch from Branch's battle report. [4] ORA I, v. 9, p. 200. [5] Battles and leaders, v. 1, p. 6.

Battle of New Bern


[6] [7] [8] [9] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 17. Trotter Ironclads and Columbiads, p. 105. Trotter, Ironclads and Columbiads, p. 106. ORA I, v. 9, p. 234. ORN I, v. 7, p. 109. Five forts or batteries (including Fort Thompson) on the Neuse River are listed, and two additional batteries were on the Trent. [10] ORN I, v. 7, p. 112. The torpedoes were ineffective, presumably because of their long immersion. [11] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 6364. Local commander at Roanoke Island was Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise. [12] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 8890. Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 7581. [13] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 3132 [14] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 106. [15] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 111. ORA I, v. 9, p. 242. As Branch himself states, the extension was not a continuous line of breastworks like the other half of the line. It was instead a series of rifle pits and redans fronted by the creek. [16] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 108. ORA I, v. 9, pp. 242243. [17] ORA I, v. 9, p. 262. [18] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 109. ORA I, v. 9, p. 202. [19] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 109110. ORA I, v. 9, p. 202. [20] ORA I, v. 9, pp. 241244; 262 [21] ORA I, v. 9, p. 202. [22] ORA I, v. 9, p. 203. [23] ORN I, v. 7, pp. 117118. Rowan regarded the effect of friendly fire with Olympic detachment: "I know the persuasive effect of a 9-inch, and thought it better to kill a Union man or two than to lose the effect of my moral suasion." [24] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 111. ORA I, v. 9, p. 244. [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] ORA I, v. 9, p. 212. ORA I, v.9, pp. 223228. ORA I, v.9, pp. 238. Campbell, Storm over Carolina, pp. 9091. Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 116118. ORA I, v. 9, p. 245. ORN I, v. 7, pp. 109112. ORA I, v. 9, pp. 211, 246.

153

References
National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/nc003.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Monroes Cross Roads to Wyse Fork.pdf) Barrett, John G. The Civil War in North Carolina. The University of North Carolina Press, 1995. ISBN 0-8078-4520-5 Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Univ. of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: the Confederate Navy's struggle for eastern North Carolina. Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Davis, George B., Leslie J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, Atlas to accompany the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Government Printing Office, 18911895; reprint, Arno, 1978. Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, Battles and leaders of the Civil War. Century, 1887, 1888; reprint ed., Castle, n.d. Trotter, William R., Ironclads and columbiads: the coast. Joseph F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 US Navy Department, Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. (http:// cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/moa_browse.html) Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18941922. Series I, volume 7 is most useful. US War Department, A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 18861901. Series I, volume 9 is most useful. The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/ sources/records/list.cfm)

Siege of Fort Macon

154

Siege of Fort Macon


The Siege of Fort Macon took place from March 23 to April 26, 1862, on the Outer Banks of Carteret County, North Carolina. It was part of Union Army General Ambrose E. Burnside's North Carolina Expedition during the American Civil War. In late March, Major General Burnsides army advanced on Fort Macon, a casemated masonry fort that commanded the channel to Beaufort, 35 miles (56km) southeast of New Bern. The Union force invested the fort with siege works and on April 25 opened an accurate fire on the fort, soon breaching the masonry walls. Within a few hours the fort's scarp began to collapse, and in late afternoon the Confederate commander, Colonel Moses J. White, ordered the raising of a white flag. Burnside's terms of surrender were accepted, and the Federal troops took possession of the fort the next morning.

Background
Fort Macon was one of a system of coastal forts that were built around the borders of the still-young United States following the War of 1812. It was built on the eastern end of Bogue Bank, in the Outer Banks of North Carolina, and was intended to defend the entrance to the ports of Beaufort and Morehead City. Begun in 1826, it was completed and received its first garrison in 1834. As it was intended for defense against attacking enemy naval forces, it was built of masonry. Gunfire from a rolling ship's deck was not accurate enough at that time to be able to break down brick and stone walls. Although the advent of rifled artillery would soon make its walls vulnerable, no alterations were made in the fort. It was a generation out of date when the Civil War came.[1] After the first spate of enthusiasm, the fort was allowed to deteriorate. The woodwork rotted, the ironwork rusted, and gun carriages were allowed to decay. The garrison was steadily reduced in size, until by the time of the beginning of the Civil War the care of the fort was entrusted to a single sergeant.[2] When the fort was taken over by North Carolina troops under Captain Josiah Solomon Pender on April 14 (before the state had seceded from the Union), only four guns were mounted. The local military authorities immediately set about improving the armament. A total of 56 pieces (5 8-inch and 2 10-inch columbiads, 19 24-pounders, 32 32-pounders, and 6 field guns) were mounted, but they had ammunition for only three days of action.[3] At the time of the siege, the garrison of the fort numbered about 430 officers and men, commanded by Colonel Moses J. White. Sickness reduced this number by about a third. Despite the poor diet and other living conditions that they suffered, only one man died. Morale among the men was generally not good, as they were cut off from their families, and White was unpopular, both with his men and with the people of Beaufort. A few men deserted during the siege.[4] When battle came, the fort was outdated, inadequately armed, poorly supplied, and intended for a different form of combat than that it faced. These deficiencies are adequate to explain why the fort succumbed so readily at the first blow.

Siege of Fort Macon

155

Prelude
Shortly after the Union forces had taken possession of Hatteras Island on the Outer Banks, Brigadier General Ambrose E. Burnside developed a plan to expand Federal control of eastern North Carolina by a joint Army-Navy expedition. His plan was approved by General-in-Chief George B. McClellan and the War Department. He was given authority to recruit and organize a division, to be known as the Coast Division, which would work with the Navy's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron to take control of the North Carolina Sounds and their adjacent cities. The expedition that came to be known by his Coastal North Carolina in the vicinity of Fort name got under way in January 1862, and in early February had made Macon, showing how it dominated the seaward its first conquest, Roanoke Island. Following that, the joint forces went approaches to Morehead City and Beaufort. on to other victories at Elizabeth City and New Bern (often spelled New Berne at the time). Most of the Confederate Army were forced away from the coast as far inland as Kinston by these battles. The major exception was the garrison of Fort Macon.[5] So long as Fort Macon remained in Confederate possession, Burnside (recently promoted to rank of major general) could not use the ports at Beaufort and Morehead City, so immediately following the capture of New Bern on March 14, he ordered Brigadier General John G. Parke, commander of his Third Brigade, to reduce the fort. Parke began by seizing the towns along the inner shore: Carolina City on March 21, Morehead City on March 22, Newport on March 23, and finally Beaufort on March 25. Communications between the garrison and other Confederate forces were thereby severed.[6] Parke also had to repair a railroad bridge at Newport, burned by the retreating Confederates following the loss of New Bern; the railroad was needed for the transport of his siege artillery.[7]

Siege
On March 23, General Parke sent a message from his headquarters at Carolina City to Colonel White, demanding the surrender of the fort. He offered to release the men on parole if the fort was turned over intact. White replied tersely, "I have the honor to decline evacuating Fort Macon." [8] The siege can be regarded as starting with this exchange. The investment of the fort was not yet complete, but that was accomplished on March 29, when a company from Parke's brigade crossed the sound and landed unopposed on Bogue Banks. The Confederate infantry that would have defended against the landing, the 26th North Carolina, had been included in the retreat following the Battle of New Bern.[9] Federal siege artillery followed, and Parke set up four batteries that would bear on the fort: four 8-inch (20.3cm) mortars at a range of 1200 yards (1100 meters); four 10-inch (25.4cm) mortars at a range of 1600 yards (1460 meters); three 30-pounder (13.6kg) rifled Parrotts at a range of 1300 yards (1190 meters); and a 12-pounder (5.4kg) boat howitzer at a range of 1200 yards (1100 meters).[10] The batteries were moved up at night and remained hidden behind sand dunes until they were ready to open fire. The defenders were aware of these activities, but could not waste ammunition by firing at unseen targets. Patrols sent out from the fort to harass the Union soldiers were driven back, usually without loss. On April 17, General Burnside could state in his report to the War Department, "I hope to reduce the fort within ten days."[11] His prediction proved to be remarkably accurate. Preparations were completed by April 23, and on that day General Burnside communicated directly with Colonel White and repeated his demand for surrender, again offering to release the prisoners on parole.[12] Colonel White once more refused, so Burnside on April 24 ordered General Parke to begin the bombardment as soon as possible. Parke waited until nightfall to open the embrasures for his guns behind the dunes. The bombardment began at dawn on April 25. At first, the gunners in the fort manned their pieces and replied vigorously, but they were unable to inflict damage on the Federal guns protected by the dunes.[13]

Siege of Fort Macon The defenders were also distracted by the appearance of four vessels from the Blockading Squadron: the steamers USS Daylight, State of Georgia, and Chippewa, and the bark Gemsbok. Until this time, the Navy had not been involved with the siege, but Commander Samuel Lockwood responded to the sound of gunfire and brought his section of the fleet into action. The weather was not good for a naval bombardment, however; a strong wind created waves that caused the vessels to rock badly enough to disrupt their aim, and after about an hour, the fleet withdrew. The Navy also supplied a pair of floating batteries to the attack, but again the waves interfered, and only one of them got into action. It is not certain whether the fort sustained any hits from the ships. The Confederate return fire was accurate enough to hit two vessels, doing little damage and slightly wounding only one man.[14] The initial fire from the mortars on shore was inaccurate, but a Signal Corps officer in Beaufort, Lieutenant William J. Andrews, acting on his own responsibility, was able to deliver messages to the battery commanders telling them how to adjust their range. After noon, virtually all shots were on target.[15] Nineteen guns were dismounted.[16] The walls of the fort began to crumble under the continued pounding, and in mid-afternoon Colonel White began to fear that the magazine would be breached. At 4:30 p.m., he decided that the fort could no longer hold out, so he ordered that a white flag be raised. Firing on both sides then ceased.[17] Colonel White met with General Parke to discuss terms, and Parke at first demanded unconditional surrender. White asked him for more favorable conditions, and referred to the terms that General Burnside had offered on March 23. Parke did not concede, but agreed not to renew the bombardment until he could consult with Burnside. Burnside reasoned that White could hold out at least one more day, and further action would only cause more casualties and greater damage to the fort. He therefore agreed to adhere to his first terms. The men in the fort were allowed to give their paroles, meaning that they would not take up arms against the United States until properly exchanged. They then were permitted to return to their homes, taking with them their personal property. Shortly after dawn on April 26, the Confederate flag was lowered, the defenders marched out, and Union soldiers of the 5th Rhode Island marched in.[18]

156

Aftermath
The battle had been relatively bloodless, at least by standards that soon would be common in the Civil War. On the Union side, only one man was killed, and two soldiers and one seaman were wounded. On the Confederate side, seven were killed outright, two died of wounds, and sixteen were wounded.[19] Although the Burnside Expedition had gained notable success at little cost in North Carolina, little was done to exploit it. Wilmington, for example, would seem to have been vulnerable, but it was not attacked until the final days of the war. Burnside was recalled shortly after the victory at Fort Macon, to assist General George B. McClellan in the Peninsula Campaign in Virginia. No further major offensive actions took place, and North Carolina became a secondary theater until late in the war. The battle site is now Fort Macon State Park.

Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 133134. [2] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 134. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 35. [3] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 10, 135136. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 35, says that only 43 guns were mounted. Burnside says in his report that 54 were taken. ORA I, vol. 9, p. 275. [4] ORA I, vol. 9, p. 293. Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 138. [5] Burnside, Battles and leaders, vol. 1, pp. 660669.

Siege of Fort Macon


[6] Hawkins, Battles and leaders, vol. 1, pp. 652653. [7] ORA I, vol. 9, p. 277. [8] ORA I, v. 9, pp. 277, 278. Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 137. [9] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 135. [10] ORA I, vol. 9, p. 273, [11] ORA I, vol. 9, p. 270. [12] ORA I, vol. 9, p. 275. [13] ORA I, v. 9, pp. 273274. [14] ORN I, vol. 7, p. 279. [15] ORA I, vol. 9, pp. 291292. Trotter, ``Ironclads and columbiads, p. 143. [16] ORA I, v. 9, pp. 288, 290. White in his report says that 15 were disabled, p. 294. [17] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, pp. 144145. [18] ORA I, vol. 9, p. 275. Hawkins, Battles and leaders, vol. 1, p. 654. [19] Trotter, Ironclads and columbiads, p. 145.

157

References
Browning, Robert M. Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Univ. of Alabama, 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5 Campbell, R. Thomas, Storm over Carolina: the Confederate Navy's struggle for eastern North Carolina. Cumberland House, 2005. ISBN 1-58182-486-6 Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, Battles and leaders of the Civil War. Century, 1887, 1888; reprint ed., Castle, n.d. Burnside, Ambrose E., "The Burnside Expedition," pp. 660669. Hawkins, Rush C., "Early coast operations in North Carolina," pp. 652654. Trotter, William R., Ironclads and columbiads: the coast. Joseph F. Blair, 1989. ISBN 0-89587-088-6 Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894-1922. Ser. I, vol. 7, pp.277283. A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886-1901. The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm) Ser. I, vol. 9, pp. 270294. National Park Service Battle Summary (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/nc004.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Albemarle Sound to Kinston.pdf)

External links
Beaufort Harbor, 1862 (http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl?data=/home/www/data/gmd/gmd390/ g3904/g3904b/cw0308000.jp2&style=cwmap&itemLink=D?gmd:1:./temp/~ammem_3Dge::& title=Beaufort harbor, North Carolina.Re-survey in June and July 1862.Corrected up to April 20th 1864 Chas.G. Krebs, lith.) Fort Macon State Park Home Page (http://www.ncparks.gov/Visit/parks/foma/main.php) Battle of Fort Macon - Civil-War-Journeys.org (http://civil-war-journeys.org/fort_macon_nc.htm)

Battle of South Mills

158

Battle of South Mills


The Battle of South Mills, also known as the Battle of Camden, took place on April 19, 1862 in Camden County, North Carolina as part of Union Army General Ambrose E. Burnside's North Carolina expedition during the American Civil War. Learning that the Confederates were building ironclads at Norfolk, Burnside planned an expedition to destroy the Dismal Swamp Canal locks to prevent transfer of the ships to Albemarle Sound. He entrusted the operation to Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno's command, which embarked on transports from Roanoke Island on April 18. By midnight, the convoy reached Elizabeth City and began disembarking troops. On the morning of April 19, Reno marched north on the road to South Mills. At the crossroads a few miles below South Mills, elements of Col. Ambrose R. Wright's command delayed the Federals until dark. Reno abandoned the expedition and withdrew during the night to the transports at Elizabeth City. The transports carried Reno's troops to New Bern where they arrived on April 22.

References
CWSAC Battle Summaries, National Park Service (http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/Monroes Cross Roads to Wyse Fork.pdf)

Battle of Tranter's Creek


The Battle of Tranter's Creek was fought on June 5, 1862, in Pitt County, North Carolina, as part of Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's North Carolina expedition during the American Civil War. On June 5, Col. Robert Potter, garrison commander at Washington, North Carolina, ordered a reconnaissance in the direction of Pactolus. The 24th Massachusetts, under Lt. Col. F.A. Osborne, advanced to the bridge over Tranter's Creek, where it encountered the 44th North Carolina, under Col. George Singletary. Unable to force a crossing, Osborne brought his artillery (Co's A-G. 1t New York Marine Artillery) to bear on the mill buildings in which the Confederates were barricaded. Singletary was killed in the bombardment, and his troops retreated. The Federals did not pursue and returned to their fortifications at Washington.

References
National Park Service battle description [1] CWSAC Report Update [2]

References
[1] http:/ / www. nps. gov/ history/ hps/ abpp/ / battles/ nc006. htm [2] http:/ / www. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ CWSII/ NorthCarolinaBattlefieldProfiles/ Monroes%20Cross%20Roads%20to%20Wyse%20Fork. pdf

Battle of Dranesville

159

Battle of Dranesville
The Battle of Dranesville was a small battle during the American Civil War that took place between Confederate forces under General J.E.B. Stuart and Union forces under General Edward O.C. Ord on December 20, 1861, in Fairfax County, Virginia, as part of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's operations in northern Virginia. The two forces on similar winter-time patrols encountered and engaged one another in the crossroads village of Dranesville. The battle resulted in a Union victory.

Background
Following the Battle of Ball's Bluff on October 21, major offensive action was halted in the eastern theater, as both armies went into winter quarters. Small detachments were still occasionally sent out to probe the enemy's position and to obtain forage. Such was the case early on the morning of December 20 when General Stuart, with a mixed brigade of infantry comprising the regiments of the 6th South Carolina, 1st Kentucky, 10th Alabama, and 11th Virginia, 150 of his cavalry troopers and Allen S. Cutts's 4 gun Georgia battery, set out north from their position near Centreville to escort the army's wagons trains on a foraging expedition into Loudoun County. Meanwhile, General Ord, leading the 10,000 strong 3rd Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves set out west from Langley to clear the south bank of the Potomac River of Confederate pickets and partisans in Fairfax and Loudoun. At Colvin Run Mill, Ord left half his force to protect his rear and prevent his force from being cut off from their base at Langley.

Opposing forces
Confederate
Commander: Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart Regiments[1] 11th Virginia Volunteers: Col Samuel Garland, Jr 6th South Carolina Volunteers: Lt Col Secrest 10th Alabama Volunteers: Col J. H. Forney 1st Kentucky Volunteers: Col Thomas A Taylor Sumter Flying Artillery (Georgia): Capt Allen S. Cutt 1st North Carolina Cavalry (100 man detachment): Major James B. Gordon 2nd Virginia Cavalry, Company 'C' (50 man detachment): Capt Andrew L. Pitzer

Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart

Battle of Dranesville

160

Union
Commander: Brig. Gen. Edward O.C. Ord Regiments[2] 6th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 35th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Lt Col William M. Penrose 9th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 38th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Col Conrad Ferger Jackson 10th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 39th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Col John S. McCalmont 12th Infantry, Pennsylvania Reserves (a.k.a. 40th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Col John H. Brig. Gen. Edward O.C. Taggart Ord Kane's 1st Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment (a.k.a. 42nd Pennsylvania Volunteers): Lt Col Thomas L. Kane 1st Pennsylvania Reserve Cavalry (a.k.a. 44th Pennsylvania Volunteers): Lt Col Jacob C. Higgins Battery A, 1st Pennsylvania Reserve Artillery (a.k.a. 43rd Pennsylvania Volunteers): Capt Hezakiah Easton[3]

The battle
At about noon, Ord arrived at the intersection of the Georgetown Pike and Leesburg Pike in the village of Dranesville, where he encountered Stuart's advance cavalry pickets, which were quickly driven off by the Union force. Ord then began to lead his command west, down the Leesburg Pike. At around 1 p.m. Stuart, with the main body of his force approached Dranesville from the south, whereupon he encountered the rear of the Union detachment. Ord halted his infantry and wheeled it around to meet the Confederate threat, forming a line on the north side of the Sketch of the Affair at Dranesville, Va. Leesburg Pike. He then deployed his Matz, Otto H., 1895 artillery on an eminence near the intersection. Stuart deployed his infantry on the south side of the pike and his artillery 300 yards south of the federal position. While the Confederate infantry was deploying, the 6th South Carolina mistook the 1st Kentucky for Union troops and opened fire, which was quickly returned by the Kentuckians. Hearing the sound of gunfire, the 9th Pennsylvania charged across the turnpike but were quickly driven back. The artillery then began to duel, but owing to the strength of the Union position, the Confederate guns were quickly knocked out. Ord deployed his infantry in a skirmish line and sent it across the Pike at Stuart and the two sides squared off for nearly 2 hours. At 3 p.m., with his wagons safely away and secure from capture, Stuart ordered a withdrawal. Ord pursued for a half mile, ensuring his line of retreat was safe, before breaking off the attack and returning to Langley. The following day Stuart returned with reinforcements, but found no Federals to engage.

Battle of Dranesville

161

Results
Though the battle was small, of no strategic importance and resulted in only light casualties, it marked the first time in the east that a Union force had bested their Confederate enemy, inflicting 230 casualties while suffering only 71, and were able to drive them from the field.

Notes
[1] Stuart, J.E.B.. "Official Report" (http:/ / www. civilwarhome. com/ stuartdranesvilleor. htm). Shotgun's Home of the American Civil War. . Retrieved 20 February 2012. [2] The 'dual names' of Pennsylvania Reserve Regiments are employed by Samuel P. Bates.Bates, Samuel P. (1869). History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865, Volume I. Harrisburg, PA: B. Singerly, State Printer. pp.539544, 692719, 784875, 9071056. ISBNASINB002FK988S. [3] Boy Scout Troop 1018. "Order of Battle" (http:/ / www. troop1018. org/ History/ history_dranesville. htm). . Retrieved 19 February 2012.

References
Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide.Stackpole Books; Mechanicsburg, Pa. 2001. Evans, Thomas J and James M. Moyer. Mosby's Confederacy:A Guide to the Roads and Sites of Colonel John Singleton Mosby. White Mane Publishing Company, Inc. Shippensburg, Pa. 1991. p.46.

External links
History of the Dranesville, Virginia, area (includes information about the battle) (http://www.troop1018.org/ History/history_dranesville.htm) National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va007.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Deep Bottom II to Drewrys Bluff.pdf)

Battle of Ball's Bluff

162

Battle of Ball's Bluff


The Battle of Ball's Bluff, also known as the Battle of Harrisons Island or the Battle of Leesburg, was fought on October 21, 1861, in Loudoun County, Virginia, as part of Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's operations in Northern Virginia during the American Civil War. While a minor engagement in comparison with the battles that would take place in years to follow, it was the second largest battle of the Eastern Theater in 1861, and in its aftermath had repercussions in the Union Army's chain of command structure and raised separation of powers issues under the United States Constitution during the war.

Background
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle In the weeks preceding the battle, McClellan had been promoted to general-in-chief of all Union armies and, now, three months after the First Battle of Bull Run was building up the Army of the Potomac in preparation for an eventual advance into Virginia. On October 19, 1861, McClellan ordered Brig. Gen. George A. McCall to march his division to Dranesville, Virginia, twelve miles southeast of Leesburg, in order to discover the purpose of recent Confederate troop movements which indicated that Col. Nathan "Shanks" Evans might have abandoned Leesburg. Evans had, in fact, left the town on October 1617 but had done so on his own authority. When Confederate Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard expressed his displeasure at this move, Evans returned. By the evening of October 19, he had taken up a defensive position on the Alexandria-to-Winchester Turnpike (modern day State Route 7) east of town. McClellan came to Dranesville to consult with McCall that same evening and ordered McCall to return to his main camp at Langley, Virginia, the following morning. However, McCall requested additional time to complete some mapping of the roads in the area and, as a result, did not actually leave for Langley until the morning of October 21, just as the fighting at Ball's Bluff was heating up. On October 20, while McCall was completing his mapping, McClellan ordered Brig. Gen. Charles Pomeroy Stone to conduct what he called "a slight demonstration" in order to see how the Confederates might react. Stone moved troops to the river at Edwards Ferry, positioned other forces along the river, had his artillery fire into suspected Confederate positions, and briefly crossed about a hundred men of the 1st Minnesota to the Virginia shore just before dusk. Having gotten no reaction from Colonel Evans with all of this activity, Stone recalled his troops to their camps and the "slight demonstration" came to an end. Stone then ordered Col. Charles Devens of the 15th Massachusetts Infantry (stationed on Harrison's Island facing Ball's Bluff) to send a patrol across the river at that point to gather what information it could about enemy deployments. Devens sent Capt. Chase Philbrick and approximately 20 men to carry out Stone's order. Advancing in the dark nearly a mile inland from the bluff, the inexperienced Philbrick mistook a row of trees for the tents of a Confederate camp and, without verifying what he saw, returned and reported the existence of a camp. Stone immediately ordered Devens to cross some 300 men and, as soon as it was light enough to see, attack the camp and, per his orders, "return to your present position." This was the genesis of the Battle of Ball's Bluff. Contrary to the long-held traditional interpretation, it did not come from a plan by either McClellan or Stone to take Leesburg. The initial crossing of troops was a small reconnaissance. That was followed by what was intended to be a raiding party.[1]

Battle of Ball's Bluff

163

Battle
On the morning of October 21, Colonel Devens' raiding party discovered the mistake made the previous evening by the patrol; There was no camp to raid. Opting not to recross the river immediately, Devens deployed his men in a tree line and sent a messenger back to report to Stone and get new instructions. On hearing the messenger's report, Stone sent him back to tell Devens that the remainder of the 15th Massachusetts (another 350 men) would cross the river and move to his position. When they arrived, Devens was to turn his raiding party back into a reconnaissance and move toward Leesburg. While the messenger was going back to Col. Devens with this new information, Colonel and U.S. Senator Edward Dickinson Baker showed up at Stone's camp to Balls Bluff Battle Map find out about the morning's events. He had not been involved in any of the activities to that point. Stone told him of the mistake about the camp and about his new orders to reinforce Devens for reconnaissance purposes. He then instructed Baker to go to the crossing point, evaluate the situation, and either withdraw the troops already in Virginia or cross additional troops at his discretion. On the way upriver to execute this order, Baker met Devens' messenger coming back a second time to report that Devens and his men had encountered and briefly engaged the enemy, one company (Co. K) of the 17th Mississippi Infantry. Baker immediately ordered as many troops as he could find to cross the river, but he did so without determining what boats were available to do this. A bottleneck quickly developed so that Union troops could only cross slowly and in small numbers, making the crossing last throughout the day. Meanwhile, Devens's men (now about 650 strong) remained in its advanced position and engaged in two additional skirmishes with a growing force of Confederates, while other Union troops crossed the river but deployed near the bluff and did not advance from there. Devens finally withdrew around 2:00 p.m. and met Baker, who had finally crossed the river half an hour later. Beginning around 3:00 the fighting began in earnest and was almost

Depiction of Ball's Bluff by Alfred W. Thompson

continuous until just after dark. Col. Baker was killed at about 4:30 p.m. and remains the only United States Senator ever killed in battle. Following an abortive attempt to break out of their constricted position around the bluff, the Federals began to recross the river in some disarray. Shortly before dark, a fresh Confederate regiment (the 17th Mississippi) arrived and formed the core of the climactic assault that finally broke and routed the Union troops. Many of the Union soldiers were driven down the steep slope at the southern end of Ball's Bluff (behind the current location of the national cemetery) and into the river. Boats attempting to cross back to Harrison Island were soon

Battle of Ball's Bluff swamped and capsized. Many Federals, included some of the wounded, were drowned. Bodies floated downriver to Washington and even as far as Mt. Vernon in the days following the battle. A total of 223 Federals were killed, 226 were wounded, and 553 were captured on the banks of the Potomac later that night. It is interesting to note that the Official Records incorrectly state that only 49 Federals were killed at this battle, an error probably resulting from a mistaken reading of the report of the Union burial detail which crossed over the next day under flag of truce.[2] Fifty-four Union deadof whom only one is identifiedare buried in Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery.[3]

164

Aftermath
This Union defeat was relatively minor in comparison to the battles to come in the war, but it had an enormously wide impact in and out of military affairs. Due to the loss of a sitting senator, it led to severe political ramifications in Washington. Stone was treated as the scapegoat for the defeat, but members of Congress suspected that there was a conspiracy to betray the Union. The ensuing outcry, and a desire to learn why Federal forces had lost battles at Bull Run (Manassas), Wilson's Creek, and Ball's Bluff, led to the establishment of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which would bedevil Union officers for the remainder of the war (particularly those who were Democrats) and contribute to nasty political infighting among the generals in the high command. Lt. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., of the 20th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, survived a nearly fatal wound at Ball's Bluff to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1902. Herman Melville's poem "Ball's Bluff - A Reverie" (published in 1866) commemorates the battle. Holmes' great friend and role model, Lt. Henry Livermore Abbott also survived the battle but did not survive the war. In 1865, Abbott was posthumously promoted to Brigadier General. Another outstanding young officer named Edmund Rice also eventually reached the rank of Brigadier General, won the Congressional Medal of Honor and was fortunate enough to survive the war by near a half century. John William Grout was killed in the battle; his death inspired a poem (and later a song) titled "The Vacant Chair". The site of the battle has considerably overgrown today, though ongoing efforts by volunteers have thinned out the overgrowth and made interpretation of the battlefield much easier. It is preserved as the Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery, which was declared a National Historic Landmark in 1984.[4] The park is maintained by the Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority.[5]

In culture
Bernard Cornwell's Copperhead, the second installment of The Starbuck Chronicles, begins with the Battle of Ball's Bluff. The fictional Faulconer Legion is placed at the left flank of the Confederate position and led by Captain Starbuck's K Company, begins the rout of the Union forces. Geraldine Brooks' March, winner of the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for Fiction, also opens with the Battle of Ball's Bluff. Mr. March, the father in Louisa May Alcott's Little Women, is the chaplain serving with the Union army.

Notes
[1] Morgan, "A Little Short of Boats," Ironclad Publ.Co., 2004, pp. 73-6. [2] The Medical and Surgical History of the Civil War, Broadfoot Publ. Co., Wilmington, NC, 1992, Vol. 7 Table XXXVIII and various regimental records in National Archives, Washington, DC [3] Holien, p. 141. [4] Edwin C. Bearss (February 8, 1984). National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination: Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery (http:/ / pdfhost. focus. nps. gov/ docs/ NHLS/ Text/ 84003880. pdf). National Park Service. and Accompanying 1 aerial photograph, undated. (http:/ / pdfhost. focus. nps. gov/ docs/ NHLS/ Photos/ 84003880. pdf)PDF(110KB) [5] Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority (http:/ / www. nvrpa. org/ parks/ ballsbluff/ index. php) website

Battle of Ball's Bluff

165

References
Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Ballard, Ted (2001). "Staff Ride Guide: Battle of Ball's Bluff Guide" (http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/ ballsbluff/staff_ride_guide.htm). United States Army Center of Military History. Retrieved April 23, 2008. Farwell, Byron (1990). Ball's Bluff: A Small Battle and Its Long Shadow. McLean, Virginia: EPM Publications. ISBN0-939009-36-6. Garrison, Webb Jr., Strange Battles of the Civil War, Cumberland House Publishing, 2001, ISBN 1-58182-226-X. Holien, Kim Bernard (1995) [1985]. Battle at Ball's Bluff (third printing ed.). Orange, Virginia: Publisher's Press. ISBN0-9534221-0-2 . Morgan, James A., III (2004). A Little Short of Boats: The Fights at Ball's Bluff and Edwards Ferry, October 2122, 1861; a history and tour guide. Discovering Civil War America. 2. Fort Mitchell, Kentucky: Ironclad Publishing. ISBN0-9673770-4-8. Winkler, H. Donald, Civil War Goats and Scapegoats, Cumberland House Publishing, 2008, ISBN 1-58182-631-1. National Park Service battle summary (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va006.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Balls Bluff to Big Bethel.pdf) 150 Years Ago: Battle of Ball's Bluff Oct. 21, 1861 (http://thisweekinthecivilwar.com/?p=686/)

166

1862 second year


Peninsula Campaign
The Peninsula Campaign (also known as the Peninsular Campaign) of the American Civil War was a major Union operation launched in southeastern Virginia from March through July 1862, the first large-scale offensive in the Eastern Theater. The operation, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, was an amphibious turning movement against the Confederate States Army in Northern Virginia, intended to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond. McClellan was initially George B. McClellan and Joseph E. Johnston, commanders of the Union and successful against the equally cautious Confederate armies in the Peninsula Campaign. General Joseph E. Johnston, but the emergence of the aggressive General Robert E. Lee turned the subsequent Seven Days Battles into a humiliating Union defeat. McClellan landed his army at Fort Monroe and moved northwest, up the Virginia Peninsula. Confederate Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder's defensive position on the Warwick Line caught McClellan by surprise. His hopes for a quick advance foiled, McClellan ordered his army to prepare for a siege of Yorktown. Just before the siege preparations were completed, the Confederates, now under the direct command of Johnston, began a withdrawal toward Richmond. The first heavy fighting of the campaign occurred in the Battle of Williamsburg, in which the Union troops managed some tactical victories, but the Confederates continued their withdrawal. An amphibious flanking movement to Eltham's Landing was ineffective in cutting off the Confederate retreat. In the Battle of Drewry's Bluff, an attempt by the U.S. Navy to reach Richmond by way of the James River was repulsed. As McClellan's army reached the outskirts of Richmond, a minor battle occurred at Hanover Court House, but it was followed by a surprise attack by Johnston at the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. The battle was inconclusive, with heavy casualties, but it had lasting effects on the campaign. Johnston was wounded and replaced on June 1 by the more aggressive Robert E. Lee, who reorganized his army and prepared for offensive action in the final battles of June 25 to July 1, which are popularly known as the Seven Days Battles.[1]

Background
On August 20, 1861, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan formed the Army of the Potomac, with himself as its first commander.[2] During the summer and fall, McClellan brought a high degree of organization to his new army, and greatly improved its morale by his frequent trips to review and encourage his units. It was a remarkable achievement, in which he came to personify the Army of the Potomac and reaped the adulation of his men.[3] He created defenses for Washington that were almost impregnable, consisting of 48 forts and strong points, with 480 guns manned by 7,200 artillerists.[4]

Peninsula Campaign On November 1, 1861, Gen. Winfield Scott retired and McClellan became general in chief of all the Union armies. The president expressed his concern about the "vast labor" involved in the dual role of army commander and general in chief, but McClellan responded, "I can do it all."[5] On January 12, 1862, McClellan revealed his intentions to transport the Army of the Potomac by ship to Urbanna, Virginia, on the Rappahannock River, outflanking the Confederate forces near Washington, and proceeding 50 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) overland to capture Richmond. On January 27, Lincoln issued an order that required all of his armies to begin offensive operations by February 22, Washington's birthday. On January 31, he issued a supplementary order for the Army of the Potomac to move overland to attack the Confederates at Manassas Junction and Centreville. McClellan immediately replied with a 22-page letter objecting in detail to the president's plan and advocating instead his Urbanna plan, which was the first written instance of the plan's details being presented to the president. Although Lincoln believed his plan was superior, he was relieved that McClellan finally agreed to begin moving, and reluctantly approved. On March 8, doubting McClellan's resolve, Lincoln called a council of war at the White House in which McClellan's subordinates were asked about their confidence in the Urbanna plan. They expressed their confidence to varying degrees. After the meeting, Lincoln issued another order, naming specific officers as corps commanders to report to McClellan (who had been reluctant to do so prior to assessing his division commanders' effectiveness in combat, even though this would have meant his direct supervision of twelve divisions in the field).[6] Before McClellan could implement his plans, the Confederate forces under General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew from their positions before Washington, assuming new positions south of the Rappahannock, which completely nullified the Urbanna strategy. McClellan retooled his plan so that his troops would disembark at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and advance up the Virginia Peninsula to Richmond. However, McClellan came under extreme criticism from the press and the Congress when it was found that Johnston's forces had not only slipped away unnoticed, but had for months fooled the Union Army through the use of Quaker Guns.[7] A further complication for the campaign planning was the emergence of the first ironclad warship, CSS Virginia, which threw Washington into a panic and made naval support operations on the James River seem problematic.[8] In the Battle of Hampton Roads (March 89, 1862), Virginia defeated wooden U.S. Navy ships blockading the harbor of Hampton Roads, Virginia, including the sloop USS Cumberland, and the frigate USS Congress on March 8, calling into question the viability of any of the wooden ships in the world. The following day, the USS Monitor ironclad arrived at the scene and engaged with the Virginia, the famous first duel of the ironclads. The battle, although inconclusive, received worldwide publicity. After the battle, it was clear that ironclad ships were the future of naval warfare. Neither ship severely damaged the other; the only net result was keeping Virginia from attacking any more wooden ships.[9] On March 11, 1862, Lincoln removed McClellan as general-in-chief, leaving him in command of only the Army of the Potomac, ostensibly so that McClellan would be free to devote all his attention to the move on Richmond. Although McClellan was assuaged by supportive comments Lincoln made to him, in time he saw the change of command very differently, describing it as a part of an intrigue "to secure the failure of the approaching campaign."[10]

167

Peninsula Campaign

168

Opposing forces
Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle
Union corps commanders

Brig. Gen.Edwin V. Sumner

Brig. Gen.Samuel P. Heintzelman

Brig. Gen.Erasmus D. Keyes

The Army of the Potomac had approximately 50,000 men at Fort Monroe when McClellan arrived, but this number grew to 121,500 before hostilities began. The army was organized into three corps and other units, as follows:[11] II Corps, Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick III Corps, Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Fitz John Porter, Joseph Hooker, and Charles S. Hamilton IV Corps, Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Darius N. Couch, William F. "Baldy" Smith, and Silas Casey 1st Division of the I Corps, Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin commanding Reserve infantry commanded by Brig. Gen. George Sykes Cavalry commanded by Brig. Gen. George Stoneman The garrison of Fort Monroe, 12,000 men under Maj. Gen. John E. Wool; Wool was quickly transferred to another department for duty in Baltimore after the War Department realized that he technically outranked McClellan.
Confederate wing commanders

Peninsula Campaign

169

Maj. Gen.D. H. Hill

Maj. Gen.James Longstreet

Maj. Gen.John B. Magruder

On the Confederate side, Johnston's Army of Northern Virginia (newly named as of March 14)[12] was organized into three wings, each composed of several brigades, as follows:[13] Left Wing, Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill commanding: brigades of Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, Winfield S. Featherston, Jubal A. Early, and Gabriel J. Raines Center Wing, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet commanding: brigades of Brig. Gens. A.P. Hill, Richard H. Anderson, George E. Pickett, Cadmus M. Wilcox, Raleigh E. Colston, and Roger A. Pryor Right Wing, Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder commanding: division of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws (brigades of Brig. Gens. Paul J. Semmes, Richard Griffith, Joseph B. Kershaw, and Howell Cobb) and division of Brig. Gen. David R. Jones (brigades of Brig. Gens. Robert A. Toombs and George T. Anderson) Reserve force commanded by Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith Cavalry commanded by Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart However, at the time the Army of the Potomac arrived, only Magruder's 11,000 men faced them on the Peninsula. The bulk of Johnston's force (43,000 men) were at Culpeper, 6,000 under Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes at Fredericksburg, and 9,000 under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger at Norfolk. In Richmond, General Robert E. Lee had returned from work on coastal fortifications in the Carolinas and on March 13 became the chief military adviser to Confederate President Jefferson Davis.[14] Forces in the Shenandoah Valley played an indirect role in the campaign. Approximately 50,000 men under Maj. Gens. Nathaniel P. Banks and Irvin McDowell were engaged chasing a much smaller force under Stonewall Jackson in the Valley Campaign. Jackson's expert maneuvering and tactical success in small battles kept the Union men from reinforcing McClellan, much to his dismay. He had planned to have 30,000 under McDowell to join him.[15] Magruder had prepared three defensive lines across the Peninsula. The first, about 12 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north of Fort Monroe, contained infantry outposts and artillery redoubts, but was insufficiently manned to prevent any Union advance. Its primary purpose was to shield information from the Union about a second line extending from Yorktown to Mulberry Island. This Warwick Line consisted of redoubts, rifle pits, and fortifications behind the Warwick River. By enlarging two dams on the river, the river was turned into a significant military obstacle in its own right. The third defensive line was a series of forts at Williamsburg, which waited unmanned for use by the army if it had to fall back from Yorktown.[16]

Peninsula Campaign

170

Peninsula Campaign
Movement to the Peninsula and the Siege of Yorktown
Further information: Siege of Yorktown (1862) McClellan's army began to sail from Alexandria on March 17. It was an armada that dwarfed all previous American expeditions, transporting 121,500 men, 44 artillery batteries, 1,150 wagons, over 15,000 horses, and tons of equipment and supplies. An English observer remarked that it was the "stride of a giant."[17] With the Virginia still in operation, the U.S. Navy could not assure McClellan that they could protect operations on either the James or the York, so his plan of amphibiously enveloping Yorktown was abandoned, and he ordered an advance up the Peninsula to begin April 4.[18] On April 5, the IV Corps of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes made initial contact with Confederate defensive works at Lee's Mill, an area McClellan expected to move through without resistance. Magruder, a fan of theatrics, set up a successful deception campaign. By moving one company in circles through a glen, he gained the appearance of an endless line of reinforcements marching to relieve him. He also spread his artillery very far apart and had it fire sporadically at the Union lines. Federals were convinced that his works were strongly held, reporting that an army of 100,000 was in their path. As the two armies fought an artillery duel, reconnaissance indicated to Keyes the strength and breadth of the Confederate fortifications, and he advised McClellan against assaulting them. McClellan ordered the construction of siege fortifications and brought his heavy siege guns to the front. In the meantime, Gen. Johnston brought reinforcements for Magruder.[19]

Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion

McClellan chose not to attack without more reconnaissance and ordered his army to entrench in works parallel to Magruder's and besiege Yorktown. McClellan reacted to Keyes's report, as well as to reports of enemy strength near the town of Yorktown, but he also received word that the I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, would be withheld for the defense of Washington, instead of joining him on the Peninsula as McClellan had planned. In addition to the pressure of Jackson's Valley Campaign, President Lincoln believed that McClellan had left insufficient force to guard Washington and that the general had been deceptive in his reporting of unit strengths,

Federal Battery # 4 with 13-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) seacoast mortars, Model 1861, during the siege of Yorktown, Virginia, 1862.

Peninsula Campaign counting troops as ready to defend Washington when they were actually deployed elsewhere. McClellan protested that he was being forced to lead a major campaign without his promised resources, but he moved ahead anyway. For the next 10 days, McClellan's men dug while Magruder steadily received reinforcements. By mid April, Magruder commanded 35,000 men, barely enough to defend his line.[20] Although McClellan doubted his numeric superiority over the enemy, he had no doubts about the superiority of his artillery. The siege preparations at Yorktown consisted of 15 batteries with more than 70 heavy guns. When fired in unison, these batteries would deliver over 7,000 pounds of ordnance onto the enemy positions with each volley.[21] On April 16, Union forces probed a point in the Confederate line at Dam No. 1, on the Warwick River near Lee's Mill. Magruder realized the weakness of his position and ordered it strengthened. Three regiments under Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, with six other regiments nearby, were improving their position on the west bank of the river overlooking the dam. McClellan became concerned that this strengthening might impede his installation of siege batteries.[22] He ordered Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, a division commander in the IV Corps, to "hamper the enemy" in completing their defensive works.[23]

171

Battle of Yorktown

At 3 p.m., four companies of the 3rd Vermont Infantry crossed the dam and routed the remaining defenders. Behind the lines, Cobb organized a defense with his brother, Colonel Thomas Cobb of the Georgia Legion, and attacked the Vermonters, who had occupied the Confederate rifle pits. Unable to obtain reinforcements, the Vermont companies withdrew across the dam, suffering casualties as they retreated. At about 5 p.m., Baldy Smith ordered the 6th Vermont to attack Confederate positions downstream from the dam while the 4th Vermont demonstrated at the dam itself. This maneuver failed as the 6th Vermont came under heavy Confederate fire and were forced to withdraw. Some of the wounded men were drowned as they fell into the shallow pond behind the dam.[24] For the remainder of April, the Confederates, now at 57,000 and under the direct command of Johnston, improved their defenses while McClellan undertook the laborious process of transporting and placing massive siege artillery batteries, which he planned to deploy on May 5. Johnston knew that the impending bombardment would be difficult to withstand, so began sending his supply wagons in the direction of Richmond on May 3. Escaped slaves reported that fact to McClellan, who refused to believe them. He was convinced that an army whose strength he estimated as high as 120,000 would stay and fight. On the evening of May 3, the Confederates launched a brief bombardment of their own and then fell silent. Early the next morning, Heintzelman ascended in an observation balloon and found that the Confederate earthworks were empty.[25] McClellan was stunned by the news. He sent cavalry under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman in pursuit and ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to reboard Navy transports, sail up the York River, and cut off Johnston's retreat.[26]

Peninsula Campaign

172

Williamsburg
Further information: Battle of Williamsburg By May 5, Johnston's army was making slow progress on muddy roads and Stoneman's cavalry was skirmishing with Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, Johnston's rearguard. To give time for the bulk of his army to get free, Johnston detached part of his force to make a stand at a large earthen fortification, Fort Magruder, straddling the Williamsburg Road (from Yorktown), constructed earlier by Magruder. The Battle of Williamsburg was the first pitched battle of the Peninsula Campaign, in which nearly 41,000 Union and 32,000 Confederates were engaged.[27] Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's 2nd Division of the III Corps was the lead infantry in the Union Army advance. They assaulted Fort Magruder and a line of rifle pits and smaller fortifications that extended in an arc southwest from the fort, but were repulsed. Confederate counterattacks, directed by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, threatened to overwhelm Hooker's division, which had contested the ground alone since the early morning while waiting for the main body of the army to arrive. Hooker had expected Baldy Smith's division of the IV Corps, marching north on the Yorktown Road, to hear the sound of battle and come in on Hooker's right in support. However, Smith had been halted by Sumner more than a mile away from Hooker's position. He had been concerned that the Confederates would leave their fortifications and attack him on the Yorktown Road.[28] Longstreet's men did leave their fortifications, but they attacked Hooker, not Smith or Sumner. The brigade of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox applied strong pressure to Hooker's line. Hooker's retreating men were aided by the arrival of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's 3rd Division of the III Corps at about 2:30 p.m. Kearny ostentatiously rode his horse out in front of his picket lines to reconnoiter and urged his men forward by flashing his saber with his only arm. The Confederates were pushed off the Lee's Mill Road and back into the woods and the abatis of their defensive positions. There, sharp firefights occurred until late in the afternoon.[29] Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's 1st Brigade of Baldy Smith's division, which had marched a few miles to the Federal right and crossed Cub's Creek at the point where it was dammed to form the Jones's Mill pond, began bombarding Longstreet's left flank around noon. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill, commanding Longstreet's reserve force, had previously detached a brigade under Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early and posted them on the grounds of the College of William and Mary. Splitting his command, Early led two of his four regiments through the woods without performing adequate reconnaissance and found that they emerged not on the enemy's flank, but directly in front of Hancock's guns, which occupied two abandoned redoubts. He personally led the 24th Virginia Infantry on a futile assault and was wounded by a bullet through the shoulder.[30] Hancock had been ordered repeatedly by Sumner to withdraw his command back to Cub Creek, but he used the Confederate attack as an excuse to hold his ground. As the 24th Virginia charged, D.H. Hill emerged from the woods leading one of Early's other regiments, the 5th North Carolina. He ordered an attack before realizing the difficulty of his situationHancock's 3,400 infantrymen and eight artillery pieces significantly outnumbered the two attacking Confederate regiments, fewer than 1,200 men with no artillery support. He called off the assault after it had begun, but Hancock ordered a counterattack. After the battle, the counterattack received significant publicity as a major, gallant bayonet charge and McClellan's description of Hancock's "superb" performance gave him the nickname, "Hancock the Superb."[31] Confederate casualties at Williamsburg were 1,682, Union 2,283. McClellan miscategorized his first significant battle as a "brilliant victory" over superior forces. However, the defense of Williamsburg was seen by the South as a means of delaying the Federals, which allowed the bulk of the Confederate army to continue its withdrawal toward Richmond.[32]

Peninsula Campaign

173

Eltham's Landing (or West Point)


Further information: Battle of Eltham's Landing After McClellan ordered Franklin's division to turn Johnston's army with an amphibious operation the York River, it took two days just to board the men and equipment onto the ships, so Franklin was of no assistance to the Williamsburg action. But McClellan had high hopes for his turning movement, planning to send other divisions (those of Brig. Gens. Fitz John Porter, John Sedgwick, and Israel B. Richardson) by river after Franklin's. Their destination was Eltham's Landing on the south bank of the Pamunkey River across from West Point, a port on the York River, which was the terminus of the Richmond and York River Railroad. The landing was close to a key intersection on the road to New Kent Court House that was being used by Johnston's army on the afternoon of May 6.[33] Franklin's men came ashore in light pontoon boats and built a floating wharf to unload artillery and supplies. The work was continued by torchlight through the night and the only enemy resistance was a few random shots fired by Confederate pickets on the bluff above the landing, ending at about 10 p.m.[34] Johnston ordered Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith to protect the road to Barhamsville and Smith assigned the division of Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting and Hampton's Legion, under Col. Wade Hampton, to the task. On May 7, Franklin posted Brig. Gen. John Newton's brigade in the woods on either side of the landing road, supported in the rear by portions of two more brigades (Brig. Gens. Henry W. Slocum and Philip Kearny).[35] Newton's skirmish line was pushed back as Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade advanced, with Hampton to his right.[36] As a second brigade followed Hood on his left, the Union troops retreated from the woods to the plain before the landing, seeking cover from the fire of Federal gunboats. Whiting employed artillery fire against the gunboats, but his guns had insufficient range, so he disengaged around 2 p.m. Union troops moved back into the woods after the Confederates left, but made no further attempt to advance. Although the action was tactically inconclusive, Franklin missed an opportunity to intercept the Confederate retreat from Williamsburg, allowing it to pass unmolested.[37]

Norfolk and Drewry's Bluff


Further information: Battle of Drewry's Bluff President Lincoln witnessed part of the campaign, having arrived at Fort Monroe on May 6 in the company of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase on the Treasury Department's revenue cutter Miami. Lincoln believed that the city of Norfolk was vulnerable and that control of the James was possible, but McClellan was too busy at the front to meet with the president. Exercising his direct powers as commander in chief, Lincoln ordered naval bombardments of Confederate batteries in the area on May 8 and set off in a small boat with his two Cabinet secretaries to conduct a personal reconnaissance on shore. Troops under the command of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, the elderly commander of Fort Monroe, occupied Norfolk on May 10, encountering little resistance.[38] After the Confederate garrison at Norfolk was evacuated, Flag Officer Josiah Tattnall knew that CSS Virginia had no home port and he could not navigate her deep draft through the shallow stretches of the James River toward Richmond, so she was scuttled on May 11 off Craney Island to prevent her capture. This opened the James River at Hampton Roads to Federal gunboats.[39] The only obstacle that protected Richmond from a river approach was Fort Darling on Drewry's Bluff, overlooking a sharp bend on the river 7 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) down river from the city. The Confederate defenders, including marines, sailors, and soldiers, were supervised by Navy Cmdr. Ebenezer Farrand and by Army Captain Augustus H. Drewry (the owner of the property that bore his name) of the Southside Heavy Artillery.[40] The eight cannons in the fort, including field artillery pieces and five naval guns, some salvaged from the Virginia, commanded the river for miles in both directions. Guns from the CSS Patrick Henry, including an 8-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) smoothbore, were just upriver and sharpshooters gathered on the river banks. An

Peninsula Campaign underwater obstruction of sunken steamers, pilings, debris, and other vessels connected by chains was placed just below the bluff, making it difficult for vessels to maneuver in the narrow river.[41] On May 15, a detachment of the U.S. Navy's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under the command Cmdr. John Rodgers steamed up the James River from Fort Monroe to test the Richmond defenses. At 7:45 a.m., the USS Galena closed to within 600 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the fort and anchored, but before Rodgers could open fire, two Confederate rounds pierced the lightly armored vessel. The battle lasted over three hours and during that time, Galena remained almost stationary and took 45 hits. Her crew reported casualties of 14 dead or mortally wounded and 10 injured. Monitor was a frequent target, but her heavier armor withstood the blows. Unfortunately for her crew, her guns could not elevate high enough to fire on the Confederate batteries, 110 feet (unknown operator: u'strong'm) above the river. The USS Naugatuck withdrew when her 100-pounder Parrott rifle exploded. The two wooden gunboats remained safely out of range of the big guns, but the captain of the USS Port Royal was wounded by a sharpshooter. Around 11 a.m., the Union ships withdrew to City Point.[42] The massive fort on Drewry's Bluff had blunted the Union advance just 7 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) short of the Confederate capital.[43] Rodgers reported to McClellan that it was feasible for the Navy to land troops as close as 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Richmond, but the Union Army never took advantage of this observation.[44]

174

The armies converge on Richmond


Johnston withdrew his 60,000 men into the Richmond defenses. Their defensive line began at the James River at Drewry's Bluff and extended counterclockwise so that his center and left were behind the Chickahominy River, a natural barrier in the spring when it turned the broad plains to the east of Richmond into swamps. Johnston's men burned most of the bridges over the Chickahominy and settled into strong defensive positions north and east of the city. McClellan positioned his 105,000-man army to focus on the northeast sector, for two reasons. First, the Pamunkey River, which ran roughly parallel to the Chickahominy, offered a line of communication that could enable McClellan to get around Johnston's left flank. Second, McClellan anticipated the arrival of McDowell's I Corps, scheduled to march south from Fredericksburg to reinforce his army, and thus needed to protect their avenue of approach.[45] The Army of the Potomac pushed slowly up the Pamunkey, establishing supply bases at Eltham's Landing, Cumberland Landing, and White House Landing. White House, the plantation of W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee, son of General Robert E. Lee, became McClellan's base of operations. Using the Richmond and York River Railroad, McClellan could bring his heavy siege artillery to the outskirts of Richmond. He moved slowly and deliberately, reacting to faulty intelligence that led him to believe the Confederates outnumbered him significantly. By the end of May, the army had built bridges across the Chickahominy and was facing Richmond, straddling the river, with one third of the Army south of the river, two thirds north. (This disposition, which made it difficult for one part of the army to reinforce the other quickly, would prove to be a significant problem in the upcoming Battle of Seven Pines).[46]
New Union corps commanders

Peninsula Campaign

175

Brig. Gen.Fitz John Porter

Brig. Gen.William B. Franklin

On May 18, McClellan reorganized the Army of the Potomac in the field and promoted two major generals to corps command: Fitz John Porter to the new V Corps and William B. Franklin to the VI Corps. The army had 105,000 men in position northeast of the city, outnumbering Johnston's 60,000, but faulty intelligence from the detective Allan Pinkerton on McClellan's staff caused the general to believe that he was outnumbered two to one. Numerous skirmishes between the lines of the armies occurred from May 23 to May 26. Tensions were high in the city, particularly following the earlier sounds of the naval gun battle at Drewry's Bluff.[47]

Hanover Court House


Further information: Battle of Hanover Court House While skirmishing occurred all along the line between the armies, McClellan heard a rumor that a Confederate force of 17,000 was moving to Hanover Court House, north of Mechanicsville. If this were true, it would threaten the army's right flank and complicate the arrival of McDowell's reinforcements. A Union cavalry reconnaissance adjusted the estimate of the enemy strength to be 6,000, but it was still cause for concern. McClellan ordered Porter and his V Corps to deal with the threat.[48] Porter departed on his mission at 4 a.m. on May 27 with his 1st Division, under Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, the 3rd Brigade of Brig. Gen. George Sykes's 2nd Division, under Col. Gouverneur K. Warren, and a composite brigade of cavalry and artillery led by Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, altogether about 12,000 men. The Confederate force, which actually numbered about 4,000 men, was led by Col. Lawrence O'Bryan Branch. They had departed from Gordonsville to guard the Virginia Central Railroad, taking up position at Peake's Crossing, 4 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest of the courthouse, near Slash Church. Another Confederate brigade was stationed 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north at Hanover Junction.[49]

Peninsula Campaign

176

Porter's men approached Peake's Crossing in a driving rain. At about noon on May 27, his lead element skirmished briskly with the Confederates until Porter's main body arrived, driving the outnumbered Confederates up the road in the direction of the courthouse. Porter set out in pursuit with most of his force, leaving three regiments to guard the New Bridge and Hanover Court House Roads intersection. This movement exposed the rear of Porter's command to attack by the bulk of Branch's force, which Porter had mistakenly assumed was at Hanover Court House.[50]
Engagement Near Hanover Court-House, Virginia.

Branch also made a poor assumptionthat Porter's force was significantly smaller than it turned out to beand attacked. The initial assault was repulsed, but Martindale's force was eventually almost destroyed by the heavy fire. Porter quickly dispatched the two regiments back to the Kinney Farm. The Confederate line broke under the weight of thousands of new troops and they retreated back through Peake's Crossing to Ashland.[51] The estimates of Union casualties at Hanover Court House vary, from 355 (62 killed, 233 wounded, 70 captured) to 397. The Confederates left 200 dead on the field and 730 were captured by Porter's cavalry. McClellan claimed that Hanover Court House was yet another "glorious victory over superior numbers" and judged that it was "one of the handsomest things of the war."[52] However, the reality of the outcome was that superior (Union) numbers won the day in a disorganized fight, characterized by misjudgments on both sides. The right flank of the Union army remained secure, although technically the Confederates at Peake's Crossing had not intended to threaten it. And McDowell's Corps did not need its roads kept clear because it never arrivedthe defeat of Union forces at the First Battle of Winchester by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley caused the Lincoln administration to recall McDowell to Fredericksburg.[53] A greater impact than the actual casualties, according to Stephen W. Sears, was the effect on McClellan's preparedness for the next major battle, at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks four days later. During the absence of Porter, McClellan was reluctant to move more of his troops south of the Chickahominy, making his left flank a more attractive target for Johnston. He was also confined to bed, ill with a flare-up of his chronic malaria.[54]

Peninsula Campaign

177

Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks)


Further information: Battle of Seven Pines Johnston knew that he could not survive a massive siege of Richmond and decided to attack McClellan. His original plan was to attack the Union right flank, north of the Chickahominy River, before McDowell's corps, marching south from Fredericksburg, could arrive. However, on May 27, Johnston learned that McDowell's corps had been diverted to the Shenandoah Valley and would not be reinforcing the Army of the Potomac. He decided against attacking across his own natural defense line, the Chickahominy, and planned to capitalize on the Union army's straddle of the river by attacking the two corps south of the river, leaving them isolated from the other three corps north of the river.[55] If executed correctly, Johnston would engage two thirds of his army (22 of its 29 infantry brigades, about 51,000 men) against the 33,000 men in the III and IV Corps. The Confederate attack plan was complex, calling for the divisions of A.P. Hill and Magruder to engage lightly and distract the Union forces north of the river, while Longstreet, Battle of Seven Pines commanding the main attack south of the river, was to converge on Keyes from three directions. The plan had an excellent potential for initial success because the division of the IV Corps farthest forward, manning the earthworks a mile west of Seven Pines, was that of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, 6,000 men who were the least experienced in Keyes's corps. If Keyes could be defeated, the III Corps, to the east, could the be pinned against the Chickahominy and overwhelmed.[56] The complex plan was mismanaged from the start. Johnston issued orders that were vague and contradictory and failed to inform all of his subordinates about the chain of command. On Longstreet's part, he either misunderstood his orders or chose to modify them without informing Johnston, changing his route of march to collide with Hill's, which not only delayed the advance, but limited the attack to a narrow front with only a fraction of its total force. Exacerbating the problems on both sides was a severe thunderstorm on the night of May 30, which flooded the river, destroyed most of the Union bridges, and turned the roads into morasses of mud.[57] The attack got off to a bad start on May 31 when Longstreet marched down the Charles City Road and turned onto the Williamsburg Road instead of the Nine Mile Road. Huger's orders had not specified a time that the attack was scheduled to start and he was not awakened until he heard a division marching nearby. Johnston and his second-in-command, Smith, unaware of Longstreet's location or Huger's delay, waited at their headquarters for word of the start of the battle. Five hours after the scheduled start, at 1 p.m., D.H. Hill became impatient and sent his brigades forward against Casey's division.[58] Casey's line buckled with some men retreating, but fought fiercely for possession of their earthworks, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. The Confederates only engaged four brigades of the thirteen on their right flank that day, so they did not hit with the power that they could have concentrated on this weak point in the Union line. Casey

Peninsula Campaign sent for reinforcements but Keyes was slow in responding. Eventually the mass of Confederates broke through, seized a Union redoubt, and Casey's men retreated to the second line of defensive works at Seven Pines.[59] Hill, now strengthened by reinforcements from Longstreet, hit the secondary Union line near Seven Pines around 4:40 p.m. Hill organized a flanking maneuver to attack Keyes's right flank, which collapsed the Federal line back to the Williamsburg Road. Johnston went forward on the Nine Mile Road with three brigades of Whiting's division and encountered stiff resistance near Fair Oaks Station, the right flank of Keyes's line. Soon heavy Union reinforcements arrived. Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Sumner, II Corps commander, heard the sounds of battle from his position north of the river. On his own initiative, he dispatched a division under Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick over the sole remaining bridge. The treacherous "Grapevine Bridge" was near collapse on the swollen river, but the weight of the crossing troops helped to hold it steady against the rushing water. After the last man had crossed safely, the bridge collapsed and was swept away. Sedgwick's men provided the key to resisting Whiting's attack.[60] At dusk, Johnston was wounded and evacuated to Richmond. G.W. Smith assumed temporary command of the army. Smith, plagued with ill health, was indecisive about the next steps for the battle and made a bad impression on President Davis and General Lee, Davis's military adviser. After the end of fighting the following day, Davis replaced Smith with Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.[61] On June 1, the Confederates under Smith renewed their assaults against the Federals, who had brought up more reinforcements and fought from strong positions, but made little headway. The fighting ended about 11:30 a.m. when the Confederates withdrew. McClellan arrived on the battlefield from his sick bed at about this time, but the Union Army did not counterattack.[62]

178

Brig. Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher at the Battle of Fair Oaks, June 1, 1862.

Both sides claimed victory with roughly equal casualtiesUnion casualties were 5,031 (790 killed, 3,594 wounded, 647 captured or missing), Confederate 6,134 (980 killed, 4,749 wounded, 405 captured or missing).[63] McClellan's advance on Richmond was halted and the Army of Northern Virginia fell back into the Richmond defensive works. The battle was frequently remembered by the Union soldiers as the Battle of Fair Oaks Station because that is where they did their best fighting, whereas the Confederates, for the same reason, called it Seven Pines.[64]

Aftermath and the Seven Days


Further information: Seven Days Battles Despite claiming victory at Seven Pines, McClellan was shaken by the experience. He redeployed all of his army except for the V Corps south of the river, and although he continued to plan for a siege and the capture of Richmond, he lost the strategic initiative and never regained it.[65] Lee used the month-long pause in McClellan's advance to fortify the defenses of Richmond and extend them south to the James River at Chaffin's Bluff. On the south side of the James River, defensive lines were built south to a point below Petersburg. The total length of the new defensive line was about 30 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km). To buy time to complete the new defensive line and prepare for an offensive, Lee repeated the tactic of making a small number of troops seem larger than they really were. McClellan was also unnerved by Jeb Stuart's audacious (but otherwise militarily pointless) cavalry ride completely around the Union army (June 1315).[66] The second phase of the Peninsula Campaign took a negative turn for the Union when Lee launched fierce counterattacks just east of Richmond in the Seven Days Battles (June 25 July 1, 1862).[67] Although none of these battles were significant Confederate tactical victories (and the Battle of Malvern Hill on the last day was a significant Confederate defeat), the tenacity of Lee's attacks and the sudden appearance of Stonewall Jackson's "foot cavalry" on his western flank unnerved McClellan, who pulled his forces back to a base on the James River.[68] Lincoln later

Peninsula Campaign ordered the army to return to the Washington, D.C., area to support Maj. Gen. John Pope's army in the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run.[69] The Virginia Peninsula was relatively quiet until May 1864, when Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler again invaded as part of the Bermuda Hundred Campaign.[70]

179

Notes
[1] Although they are formally considered part of the Peninsula Campaign, the Seven Days are described in the separate Seven Days Battles article. [2] Beatie, Birth of Command, p. 480; Eicher, High Commands, pp. 372, 856. [3] Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 111. [4] Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 116. [5] McPherson, p. 360. [6] Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 14041, 149, 160; Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, pp. 2122, 108. [7] Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 16869; Burton, p. 2; Rafuse, p. 201; Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, p. 64. [8] Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, p. 103. [9] Kennedy, p. 88; Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 19599; Salmon, pp. 7276. [10] Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, pp. 98101; Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 16465. [11] Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 21415; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 35963. [12] Eicher, High Commands, pp. 323, 889; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 46. [13] Eicher, Longest Night, p. 215; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 36467. [14] Esposito, text to map 39. [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 25767. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 26, 70. Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 16769. Beatie, McClellan's First Campaign, pp. 29195; Burton, p. 4; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 39. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 4243; Burton, pp. 1415, 20. Burton, p. 15; Salmon, p. 76; Kennedy, p. 88; Rafuse, p. 205. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 58. Burton, p. 20. Salmon, pp. 7677; Burton, p. 20. Salmon, pp. 7677. Rafuse, p. 211; Esposito, map 41; Burton, p. 24; Salmon, p. 79. Salmon, p. 80. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 70. Salmon, p. 82. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 7478; Salmon, p. 82. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 7880. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 7983. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 82 Eicher, Longest Night, p. 270; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 85; Salmon, p. 83. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 85; Salmon, p. 85. Webb, p. 82. Salmon, p. 85; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 86. Salmon, p. 85. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 8992. Esposito, map 42; Salmon, p. 86; Burton, p. 5. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 93; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 273, states that it was the 2nd Virginia Artillery. Salmon, p. 87. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 9394; Salmon, p. 87; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 273. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 94. Eicher, Longest Night, p. 273; Rafuse, p. 213. Salmon, p. 88; Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 27374; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 9597. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 104106; Esposito, map 41. Rafuse, p. 212; Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 27374. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 11314.

[49] Eicher, Longest Night, p. 275; Salmon, p. 90. [50] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 114; Salmon, pp. 9091. [51] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 116; Salmon, p. 91.

Peninsula Campaign
[52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 117. Eicher, Longest Night, 276; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 117; Salmon, p. 91; Kennedy, p. 92. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 117, 129. Salmon, pp. 2021. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 11820; Miller, p. 21; Salmon, pp. 9192. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 120; Miller, pp. 2122; Downs, pp. 67576; Salmon, p. 92. Miller, p. 22; Eicher, Longest Night, p. 276; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 12123. Eicher, Longest Night, p. 277; Salmon, p. 93. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 27778; Miller, p. 23; Salmon, p. 94. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 145; Miller, p. 24; Salmon, p. 94. Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 14245. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 147. Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 149. Miller, pp. 2560. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 28081. Eicher, Longest Night, p. 281. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 29697. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 32627. Eicher, Longest Night, pp. 68082.

180

References
Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Forward to Richmond: McClellan's Peninsular Campaign. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983. ISBN 0-8094-4720-7. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860 September 1861. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 0-306-81141-3. Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March May 1862. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. ISBN 978-1-932714-25-8. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. Civil War High Commands. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3641-3. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6.

Peninsula Campaign Webb, Alexander S. The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=qbE8d82-ZVAC). Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 2002. ISBN 0-7858-1575-9. First published 1885. National Park Service battle descriptions (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm#East62)

181

Further reading
Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8078-2552-2. Martin, David G. The Peninsula Campaign MarchJuly 1862. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1992. ISBN 978-0-938289-09-8. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wheeler, Richard. Sword Over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986. ISBN 0-06-015529-9.

External links
Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.civilwaranimated.com/PeninsulaAnimation.html) Stuart's Ride around McClellan (http://www.civilwarhome.com/stuartsride.htm) National Park Service Richmond National Battlefield Park (http://www.nps.gov/rich/index.htm) Map of modern battlefield sites (http://data2.itc.nps.gov/parks/rich/ppMaps/RICHmap1.pdf)

Battle of Hampton Roads


The Battle of Hampton Roads, often referred to as either the Battle of the Monitor and Merrimack (or Merrimac) or the Battle of Ironclads, was the most noted and arguably most important naval battle of the American Civil War from the standpoint of the development of navies. It was fought over two days, March 89, 1862, in Hampton Roads, a roadstead in Virginia where the Elizabeth and Nansemond Rivers meet the James River just before it enters Chesapeake Bay. The battle was a part of the effort of the Confederacy to break the Union blockade, which had cut off Virginia's largest cities, Norfolk and Richmond, from international trade.[1] The major significance of the battle is that it was the first meeting in combat of ironclad warships. The Confederate fleet consisted of the ironclad ram CSS Virginia (built from the remnants of the USS Merrimack) and several supporting vessels. On the first day of battle, they were opposed by several conventional, wooden-hulled ships of the Union Navy. On that day, Virginia was able to destroy two ships of the Federal flotilla and was about to attack a third, USSMinnesota, which had run aground. However, the action was halted by darkness and falling tide, so Virginia retired to take care of her few wounded which included her captain, Flag Officer Franklin Buchanan and repair her minimal battle damage.[2] Determined to complete the destruction of the Minnesota, Catesby ap Roger Jones, acting as captain in Buchanan's absence, returned the ship to the fray the next morning, March 9. During the night, however, the ironclad USSMonitor had arrived and had taken a position to defend Minnesota. When Virginia approached, Monitor intercepted her. The two ironclads fought for about three hours, with neither being able to inflict significant damage on the other. The duel ended indecisively, Virginia returning to her home at the Gosport Navy Yard for repairs and strengthening, and Monitor to her station defending Minnesota. The ships did not fight again, and the blockade remained in place.[3] The battle received worldwide attention, and it had immediate effects on navies around the world. The preeminent naval powers, Great Britain and France, halted further construction of wooden-hulled ships, and others followed suit. A new type of warship was produced, the monitor, based on the principle of the original. The use of a small number

Battle of Hampton Roads of very heavy guns, mounted so that they could fire in all directions was first demonstrated by Monitor but soon became standard in warships of all types. Shipbuilders also incorporated rams into the designs of warship hulls for the rest of the century.[4]

182

The blockade at Norfolk


On April 19, 1861, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities at Charleston Harbor, President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of ports in the seceded states. On April 27, after Virginia and North Carolina had also passed ordinances of secession, the blockade was extended to include their ports also.[5] Even before the extension, local troops seized the Norfolk area and threatened the Gosport Navy Yard in Portsmouth. The commandant there, Captain Charles S. McCauley, though loyal to the Union, was immobilized by advice he received from his subordinate officers, most of whom were in favor of secession. Although he had orders from (Union) Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles to move his ships to Northern ports, he refused to act until April 20, when he gave orders to scuttle the ships in the yard and Map of events of the Battle of Hampton Roads destroy its facilities. Nine ships were burned, among them the screw frigate USSMerrimack. One (the old frigate Cumberland) was towed away successfully.[6] Merrimack burned only to the waterline, however, and her engines were more or less intact. The destruction of the navy yard was mostly ineffective; in particular, the large drydock there was relatively undamaged and soon could be restored.[7] Without firing a shot, the advocates of secession had gained for the South its largest navy yard, as well as the hull and engines of what would be in time its most famous warship. They had also seized more than a thousand heavy guns, plus gun carriages and large quantities of gunpowder.[8] With Norfolk and its navy yard in Portsmouth, the Confederacy controlled the southern side of Hampton Roads. To prevent Union warships from attacking the yard, the Confederates set up batteries at Sewell's Point and Craney Island, at the juncture of the Elizabeth River with the James. (See map.)[9] The Union retained possession of Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort on the Virginia Peninsula.[10] They also held a small man-made island known as the Rip Raps, on the far side of the channel opposite Fort Monroe, and on this island they completed another fort, named Fort Wool.[11] With Fort Monroe went control of the lower Peninsula as far as Newport News.[12] Forts Monroe and Wool gave the Union forces control of the entrance to Hampton Roads. The blockade, initiated on April 30, 1861, cut off Norfolk and Richmond from the sea almost completely.[13] To further the blockade, the Union Navy stationed some of its most powerful warships in the roadstead. There, they were under the shelter of the shore-based guns of Fort Monroe and the batteries at Hampton and Newport News and out of the range of the guns at Sewell's Point and Craney Island. For most of the first year of the war, the Confederacy could do little to oppose or dislodge them.[14]

Birth of the ironclads


When steam propulsion began to be applied to warships, naval constructors renewed their interest in armor for their vessels. Experiments had been tried with armor during the Crimean War, just prior to the American Civil War,[15] and the British and French navies had each built armored ships and were planning to build others. In 1860, the French Navy commissioned La Gloire, the world's first ocean-going ironclad warship. Great Britain followed a year later with HMSWarrior.[16][17] The use of armor remained controversial, however, and the United States Navy was generally reluctant to embrace the new technology.[18]

Battle of Hampton Roads

183

CSS Virginia

When the Civil War broke out, Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory was an early enthusiast for the advantages of armor. As he looked upon it, the Confederacy could not match the industrial North in numbers of ships at sea, so they would have to compete by building vessels that would be individually superior to those of the Union. The edge would be provided by armor.[19] Mallory gathered about himself a group of men who were able to put his vision into practice, among them John M. Brooke, John L. Porter, and William P. Williamson.[20] When Mallory's men searched the South for factories that could build engines to drive the heavy ships that he wanted, they found no place to do it immediately. At the best facility, the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, building engines from scratch would take at least a year. Upon learning this, Williamson suggested taking the engines from the hulk of Merrimack, recently raised from the bed of the Elizabeth River.[21] His colleagues promptly accepted his suggestion and expanded it, proposing that the design of their projected ironclad be adapted to the hull. Porter produced the revised plans, which were submitted to Mallory for approval. On July 11, 1861, the new design was accepted, and work began almost immediately.[22] The burned-out hull was towed into the graving dock that the Union Navy had failed to destroy. During the subsequent conversion process, the plans were further modified to incorporate an iron ram fitted to the prow. Her offense in addition to the ram consisted of 10 guns: six 9in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) smooth-bore Dahlgrens, two 6.4in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) and two 7in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) Brooke rifles.[23] Trials showed that these rifles firing solid shot would pierce up to eight inches of armor plating. The Tredagar Iron works could produce both solid shot and shell, and since it was believed that Virginia would face only wooden ships, she was given only the shell.[24] Had solid shot been used against the Monitor, the result of the battle might have been different. The armor plating, originally meant to be 1in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) thick, was replaced by double plates, each 2in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) thick, backed by 24in (unknown operator: u'strong'cm) of iron and pine. The armor was pierced for 14 gunports: four on each broadside, three forward, and three aft.[25] The revisions, together with the usual problems associated with the transportation system of the South, resulted in delays that pushed out the launch date until February 3, 1862, and she was not commissioned until February 17, bearing the name CSS Virginia.[26]

Battle of Hampton Roads

184

USS Monitor
Intelligence that the Confederates were working to develop an ironclad caused consternation for the Union, but Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles waited for Congress to meet to request permission to consider building armored vessels; Congress gave this permission on August 3, 1861. Welles appointed a commission, which came to be known as the Ironclad Board, of three senior naval officers to choose among the designs that were submitted for consideration. The three men were USS Monitor Captains Joseph Smith[27] and Hiram Paulding, and Commander Charles Henry Davis.[28] The board considered seventeen designs, and chose to support three. First of the three to be completed, even though she was by far the most radical in design, was Swedish engineer and inventor John Ericsson's USSMonitor.[29] Ericsson's Monitor, which was built at Ericsson's yard on the East River in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, incorporated new and striking design features, the most significant of which were her armor and armament. Instead of the large numbers of guns of rather small bore that had characterized warships in the past, Ericsson opted for only two guns of large caliber; he wanted to use 15in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) guns, but had to settle for 11in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) Dahlgren guns when the larger size were unavailable.[30] These were mounted in a cylindrical turret, 20ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm) in diameter, 9ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm) high, covered with iron 8in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) thick. The whole rotated on a central spindle, and was moved by a steam engine that could be controlled by one man. Ericsson was afraid that using the full 30 pounds of black powder to fire the huge cannon would raise the risk of an explosion in the turret. He demanded that a charge of 15 pounds be used to lessen this possibility. As with Virginia, it was found that the full charge would pierce armor plate, a finding that would have affected the outcome of the battle.[31] A serious flaw in the design was the pilot house from which the ship would be conned, a small structure forward of the turret on the main deck. Its presence meant that the guns could not fire directly forward, and it was isolated from other activities on the ship. Despite the late start and the novelty of construction, Monitor was actually completed a few days before her counterpart Virginia, but Virginia was activated first.[32]

Battle
Command
The Confederate chain of command was anomalous. Lieutenant Catesby ap Roger Jones had directed much of the conversion of Merrimack to Virginia, and he was disappointed when he was not named her captain.[33] Jones was retained aboard Virginia, but only as her executive officer. Ordinarily, the ship would have been led by a captain of the Confederate States Navy, to be determined by the rigid seniority system that was in place. Secretary Mallory wanted the aggressive Franklin Buchanan, but at least two other captains had greater seniority and had applied for the post. Mallory evaded the issue by appointing Franklin, head of the Office of Orders and Detail, flag officer in charge of the defenses of Norfolk and the James River. As such, he could control the movements of Virginia. Technically, therefore, the ship went into the battle without a captain.[34] On the Union side, command of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was held by Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough. He had devised a plan for his frigates to engage Virginia, hoping to trap her in their crossfire.[35] In the event, his plan broke down completely when four of the ships ran aground (one of them intentionally) in the confined waters of the roadstead. On the day of battle, Goldsborough was absent with the ships cooperating with the Burnside Expedition in North Carolina.[36] In his absence, leadership fell to his second in command, Captain John Marston of USSRoanoke. As Roanoke was one of the ships that ran aground, Marston was unable to materially influence the battle, and his participation is often disregarded. Most accounts emphasize the contribution of the

Battle of Hampton Roads captain of Monitor, John L. Worden, to the neglect of others.[37]

185

March 8: Virginia wreaks havoc on wooden Union warships


The battle began when the large and unwieldy CSS Virginia steamed into Hampton Roads on the morning of March 8, 1862. Captain Buchanan intended to attack as soon as possible.[38] Virginia was accompanied from her moorings on the Elizabeth River by Raleigh and Beaufort, and was joined at Hampton Roads by the James River Squadron, Patrick Henry, Jamestown, and Teaser. When they were passing the Union batteries at Newport News, Patrick Henry was temporarily disabled by a shot in her boiler that killed four of her crew. After repairs, she returned and rejoined the others.[39] At this time, the Union Navy had five warships in the roadstead, in addition to several support vessels. The sloop-of-war USSCumberland and frigate Congress were anchored in the channel near Newport News. Frigate St. Lawrence and the steam frigates Roanoke and Minnesota[40] were near Fort Monroe, along with the storeship USSBrandywine(1825).[41] The latter three got under way as soon as they saw Virginia approaching, but all soon ran aground. St. Lawrence and Roanoke took no further important part in the battle.[42] Virginia headed directly for the Union squadron. The battle opened when Union tug Zouave fired on the advancing enemy, and Beaufort replied. This preliminary skirmishing had no effect.[43] Virginia did not open fire until she was within easy range of Cumberland. Return fire from Cumberland and Congress bounced off the iron plates without penetrating. Virginia rammed Cumberland below the waterline and she sank rapidly, "gallantly fighting her guns as long as they were above water," according to Buchanan.[44] She took 121 seamen down with her; those wounded brought the casualty total to nearly 150.[45] Ramming Cumberland nearly resulted in the sinking of Virginia as well. Virginia's bow ram got stuck in the enemy ship's hull, and as Cumberland listed and began to go down, she almost pulled Virginia under with her. At the time the vessels were locked, one of Cumberland's anchors was hanging directly above the foredeck of Virginia. Had it come loose, the two ships might have gone down together. Virginia broke free, however, her ram breaking off as she backed away.[46][47] Buchanan next turned Virginia on Congress. Seeing what had happened to Cumberland, Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith, captain of Congress, ordered his ship grounded in shallow water. By this time, the James River Squadron,

Battle of Hampton Roads commanded by John Randolph Tucker, had arrived and joined Virginia in the attack on Congress. After an hour of unequal combat, the badly damaged Congress surrendered.[48] While the surviving crewmen of Congress were being ferried off the ship, a Union battery on the north shore opened fire on Virginia. In retaliation, Buchanan ordered Congress fired upon with hot shot, cannon balls heated red-hot. Congress caught fire and burned throughout the rest of the day. Near midnight, the flames reached her magazine and she exploded and sank.[49] Personnel losses included 110 killed or missing and presumed drowned. Another 26 were wounded, of whom ten died within days.[50] Although she had not suffered anything like the damage she had inflicted, Virginia was not completely unscathed. Shots from Cumberland, Congress, and Union troops ashore had riddled her smokestack, reducing her already low speed. Two of her guns were disabled and several armor plates had been loosened. Two of her crew were killed, and more were wounded. One of the wounded was Captain Buchanan, whose left thigh was pierced by a rifle shot.[51] Meanwhile, the James River Squadron had turned its attention to Minnesota, which had left Fort Monroe to join in the battle and had run aground.[42] After Virginia had dealt with the surrender of Congress, she joined the James River Squadron despite her damage. Because of her deep draft and the falling tide, however, Virginia was unable to get close enough to be effective, and darkness prevented the rest of the squadron from aiming their guns to any effect. The attack was therefore suspended. Virginia left with the expectation of returning the next day and completing the task. She retreated into the safety of Confederate-controlled waters off Sewell's Point for the night,[52] but had killed 400 enemy sailors and had lost two. The Union had lost two ships and three were aground.[53] The United States Navy's greatest defeat until World War II caused panic in Washington. As Lincoln's Cabinet met to discuss the disaster, the frightened Secretary of War Edwin Stanton told the others that the Virginia might attack East coast cities, and even shell the White House before the meeting ended. Welles assured his colleagues that they were safe as the ship could not traverse the Potomac river. He added that the Union also had an ironclad, and that it was heading to meet the Virginia.[53]

186

March 9: Monitor engages Virginia

Both sides used the respite to prepare for the next day. Virginia put her wounded ashore and underwent temporary repairs. Captain Buchanan was among the wounded, so command on the second day fell to his executive officer,

Battle of Hampton Roads Lieutenant Catesby ap Roger Jones. Jones proved to be no less aggressive than the man he replaced. While Virginia was being prepared for renewal of the battle, and while Congress was still ablaze, Monitor, commanded by Lieutenant John L. Worden, arrived in Hampton Roads. The Union ironclad had been rushed to Hampton Roads in hopes of protecting the Union fleet and preventing Virginia from threatening Union cities. Captain Worden was informed that his primary task was to protect Minnesota, so Monitor took up a position near the grounded Minnesota and waited.[54] All on board felt we had a friend that would stand by us in our hour of trial, wrote Captain Gershom Jacques Van Brunt, the vessels commander, in his official report the day after the engagement.[55] The next morning, at dawn on March 9, 1862, Virginia left her anchorage at Sewell's Point and moved to attack Minnesota, still aground. She was followed by the three ships of the James River Squadron.[56] They found their course blocked, however, by the newly arrived Monitor. At first, Jones believed the strange craftwhich one Confederate sailor mocked as "a cheese on a raft"to be a boiler being towed from the Minnesota, not realizing the nature of his opponent. Soon, however, it was apparent that he had no choice but to fight her.[57][53] The first shot of the engagement, was fired at Monitor by Virginia. The shot flew past Monitor and struck Minnesota, which answered with a broadside; this began what would be a lengthy engagement. Again, all hands were called to quarters, and when she approached within a mile of us I opened upon her with my stern guns and made a signal to the Monitor to attack the enemy, Van Brunt added.[55] After fighting for hours, mostly at close range, neither could overcome the other. The armor of both ships proved adequate. In part, this was because each was handicapped in her offensive capabilities. Buchanan, in Virginia, had not expected to fight another armored vessel, so his guns were supplied only with shell rather than armor-piercing shot.[58] Monitor's guns were used with the standard service charge of only 15lb (unknown operator: u'strong'kg) of powder, which did not give the projectile sufficient momentum to penetrate her opponent's armor. Tests conducted after the battle showed that the Dahlgren guns could be operated safely and efficiently with charges of as much as 30lb (unknown operator: u'strong'kg).[59] The battle finally ceased when a chance shell from Virginia struck the pilot house of Monitor and exploded, driving fragments of paint and iron through the viewing slits into Worden's eyes and temporarily blinding him.[41] As no one else could see to conn the ship, Monitor was forced to draw off. The executive officer, Lieutenant Samuel Dana Greene, took over, and Monitor returned to the fight. In the period of command confusion, however, the crew of Virginia believed that their opponent had withdrawn. Although Minnesota was still aground, the falling tide meant that she was out of reach. Furthermore, Virginia had suffered enough damage to require extensive repair. Convinced that his ship had won the day, Jones ordered her back to Norfolk. At about this time, Monitor returned, only to discover her opponent apparently giving up the fight. Convinced that Virginia was quitting, with orders only to protect Minnesota and not to risk his ship unnecessarily, Greene did not pursue. Thus, each side misinterpreted the moves of the other, and as a result each claimed victory.[60]

187

Battle of Hampton Roads

188

Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory wrote to Confederate President Davis of the action: The conduct of the Officers and men of the squadron reflects unfading honor upon themselves and upon the Navy. The report will be read with deep interest, and its details will not fail to rouse the ardor and nerve the arms of our gallant seamen. It will be remembered that the Virginia was a novelty in naval architecture, wholly unlike any ship that ever floated; that her heaviest guns were equal novelties in ordnance; that her motive power and obedience to her helm were untried, and her officers and crew strangers, comparatively, to the ship and to each other; and yet, under all these disadvantages, the dashing courage and consummate professional ability of Flag Officer Buchanan and his associates achieved the most remarkable victory which naval annals record. In Washington, belief that Monitor had vanquished Virginia was so strong that Worden and his men were awarded the Thanks of Congress:[62] Resolved . . . That the thanks of Congress and the American people are due and are hereby tendered to Lieutenant J. L. Worden, of the United States Navy, and to the officers and men of the ironclad gunboat Monitor, under his command, for the skill and gallantry exhibited by them in the remarkable battle between the Monitor and the rebel ironclad steamer Merrimack. During the two-day engagement, the U.S.S. Minnesota shot off 78 rounds of 10-inch solid shot; 67 rounds of 10-inch solid shot with 15-second fuse; 169 rounds of 9-inch solid shot; 180 9-inch shells with 15-second fuse; 35 8-inch shells with 15-second fuse and 5,567.5 pounds of service powder. Three crew members, Alexander Winslow, Henry Smith and Dennis Harrington were killed during the battle and 16 were wounded.[55]
[61]

Battle of Hampton Roads

189

Spring 1862 a standoff at Hampton Roads


Virginia remained in drydock for almost a month, getting repairs for battle damage as well as minor modifications to improve her performance. On April 4, she was able to leave drydock. Buchanan, still recovering from his wound, had hoped that Catesby Jones would be picked to succeed him, and most observers believed that Jones's performance during the battle was outstanding. The seniority system for promotion in the Navy scuttled his chances, however, and the post went to the 67-year-old Commodore Josiah Tattnall.[63] Monitor, not severely damaged, remained on duty. Like his antagonist Jones, Greene was deemed too young to remain as captain; the day after the battle, he was replaced with Lieutenant Thomas O. Selfridge. Two days later, Selfridge was in turn relieved by Lieutenant William Nicholson Jeffers.[64] By late March, the Union blockade fleet had been augmented by hastily refitted civilian ships, including the powerful SS Vanderbilt,[65] SS Arago, SS Illinois, and SS Ericsson. These had been outfitted with rams and some iron plating. By late April, the new ironclads USS Naugatuck/USRC E. A. Stevens and USS Galena and had also joined the blockade. Each side considered how best to eliminate the threat posed by its opponent, and after Virginia returned each side tried to goad the other into attacking under unfavorable circumstances. Both captains declined the opportunity to fight in water not of their own choosing; Jeffers in particular was under positive orders not to risk his ship.[66] Consequently, each vessel spent the next month in what amounted to posturing. Not only did the two ships not fight each other, neither ship ever fought again after March 9.

Destruction of the combatants


The end came first for Virginia. Because the blockade was unbroken, Norfolk was of little strategic use to the Confederacy, and preliminary plans were laid to move the ship up the James River to the vicinity of Richmond. Before adequate preparations could be made, the Confederate Army under Major General Benjamin Huger abandoned the city on May 9, without consulting anyone from the Navy. Virginia's draft was too great to permit her to pass up the river, which had a depth of only 18ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm), and that only under favorable circumstances. She was trapped and could only be captured or sunk by the Union Navy. Rather than allow either, Tatnall decided to destroy his own ship. He had her towed down to Craney Island in Portsmouth, where the crew were taken ashore, and then she was set afire. She burned through the rest of the day and most of the following night; shortly before dawn, the flames reached her magazine, and she blew up.[67] Monitor likewise did not survive the year. She was ordered to Beaufort, North Carolina, on Christmas Day, to take part in the blockade there. While she was being towed down the coast (under command of her fourth captain, Commander John P. Bankhead), the wind increased and with it the waves; with no high sides, the Monitor took on water. Soon the water in the hold gained on the pumps, and then put out the fires in her engines. The order was given to abandon ship; most men were rescued by USSRhode Island, but 16 went down with her when she sank in the early hours of December 31, 1862.[68]
Engraving of Monitor sinking

Battle of Hampton Roads

190

Who won?
The victory claims that were made by each side in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Hampton Roads, based as both were on misinterpretations of the opponent's behavior, have been dismissed by present-day historians. They agree that the result of the MonitorMerrimack encounter was victory for neither. As the combat between ironclads was the primary significance of the battle, the general verdict is that the overall result was a draw.[69] All would acknowledge that the Southern fleet inflicted far more damage than it received, which would ordinarily imply that they had gained a tactical victory. Compared to other Civil War battles, the loss of men and ships for the Union Navy would be considered a clear defeat. On the other hand, the blockade was not seriously threatened, so the entire battle can be regarded as an assault that ultimately failed.[70] However, initially after the Battle of Hampton Roads, both the Confederates and the Unions used media to claim victory for their own sides. The headline a Boston newspaper the day after the battle read "The Merrimac Driven back by the Steamer!", implying a Union victory, while Confederate media focused on their original success against wooden Union ships. Despite the battle ending in a stalemate, it was seen by both sides as an opportunity to raise war-time morale, especially since the ironclad ships were an exciting naval innovation that intrigued citizens. Evaluation of the strategic results is likewise disputed. The blockade was maintained, even strengthened, and Virginia was bottled up in Hampton Roads. Because a decisive Confederate weapon was negated, some have concluded that the Union could claim a strategic victory.[71] Confederate advocates can counter, however, by arguing that Virginia had a military significance larger than the blockade, which was only a small part of the war in Tidewater Virginia. Her mere presence was sufficient to close the James River to Federal incursions. She also imposed other constraints on the Peninsula Campaign then being mounted by the Union Army under General George B. McClellan, who worried that she could interfere with his positions on the York River. Although his fears were baseless, they continued to affect the movements of his army until Virginia was destroyed.[72]

Impact upon naval warfare


Both days of the battle attracted attention from almost all the world's navies. The USS Monitor became the prototype for the monitor warship type. She thus became one of two ships whose names were applied to entire classes of their successors. The other was HMSDreadnought. Many more were built, including river monitors, and they played key roles in Civil War battles on the Mississippi and James rivers. The US immediately started the construction of ten more monitors based on Ericsson's original larger plan, known as the Passaic-class monitors. However, while the design proved exceptionally well-suited for river combat, the low profile and heavy turret caused poor seaworthiness in rough waters. Russia, fearing that the American Civil War would spill into Russian Alaska, launched ten sister ships, as soon as Ericsson's plans reached St. Petersburg. What followed has been described as "Monitor mania".[73] The revolving turret later inspired similar designs for future warships, which eventually became the modern battleship.

Battle of Hampton Roads

191

The vulnerability of wooden hulls to armored ships was noted particularly in Britain and France, where the wisdom of the planned conversion of the battle fleet to armor was given a powerful demonstration.[74] Another feature that was emulated was not so successful. Impressed by the ease with which the Virginia had sunk the Cumberland, naval architects began to incorporate rams into their hull designs. The first purpose-built ram in the modern era was the French armored ram Taureau (1863), whose guns were said to have "the sole function of preparing the way for the ram."[75] The inclusion of rams in warship hull design persisted almost to the outbreak of World War I, despite improvements in naval gunnery that quickly made close action between warships almost suicidal, if not impossible.[76]

Stereograph of Monitor after the battle, July 1862

Commemorating the battle: Virginia


The name of the warship that served the Confederacy in the Battle of Hampton Roads has been a continuing source of confusion and some contention. She was originally a screw frigate in the United States Navy carrying the name USS Merrimack. All parties continued to use the name after her capture by secessionists while she was being rebuilt as an ironclad.[77] When her conversion was almost complete, her name was officially changed to Virginia.[78] Despite the official name change, Union accounts persisted in calling the Merrimack by her original name, while Confederate sources used either Virginia or Merrimac(k).[79] The alliteration of Monitor and Merrimack has persuaded most popular accounts to adopt the familiar name, even when it is acknowledged to be technically incorrect. A CSS Merrimac[80] did actually exist. She was a paddle wheel steamer named for the victor (as most Southerners saw it) at Hampton Roads. She was used for running the blockade until she was captured and taken into Federal service, still named Merrimac. Her name was a spelling variant of the river, namesake of USS Merrimack. Both spellings are still in use around the Hampton Roads area. A small community in Montgomery County, Virginia near the location where the iron for the Confederate ironclad was forged is now known as Merrimac. Some of the iron mined there and used in the plating on the Confederate ironclad is displayed at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth. The anchor of the Virginia sits on the lawn in front of the Museum of the Confederacy[81] in Richmond.

Commemorating the battle: Monitor


After resting undetected on the ocean floor for 111 years, the wreck of Monitor was located by a team of scientists in 1973. The remains of the ship were found upside down 16mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) off Cape Hatteras, on a relatively flat, sandy bottom at a depth of about 240ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm). In 1987, the site was declared a National Marine Sanctuary, the first shipwreck to receive this distinction.[82] Because of Monitor's advanced state of deterioration, timely recovery of remaining significant artifacts and ship components became critical. Numerous fragile artifacts, including the innovative turret and its two Dahlgren guns, an anchor, steam engine, and propeller, have been recovered. They were transported back to Hampton Roads to the Mariners' Museum in Newport News, Virginia, where they were treated in special tanks to stabilize the metal. The new USS Monitor Center at the Mariners' Museum officially opened on March 9, 2007, and a full-scale replica of USS Monitor, the original recovered turret, and artifacts and related items are now on display. Some artifacts from CSS Virginia are also on display.[83]

Battle of Hampton Roads

192

Commemorating the Battle of Hampton Roads


The Battle of Hampton Roads was a significant event in both Naval and Civil War history that has been detailed in many books, televised Civil War documentaries, and in film, to include TNT's 1991 Ironclads. In New York City, where the designer of the Monitor, John Ericsson, died in March 1889, a statue was commissioned by the state to commemorate the battle between the Ironclads.[84] The statue features a stylized male nude allegorical figure on water between two iron cleats. It is located in Msgr McGolrick Park. In Virginia, the state dedicated the Monitor-Merrimack Overlook at Anderson Park on a jetty that overlooks the site of the battle. The park contains several historical markers commemorating both ships. Also, in 1992, Virginia dedicated the $400 million, 4.6 mile-long Monitor-Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel, which is located less than 1 mile from the site of the battle.

References in Popular Culture


The film Hearts in Bondage (Republic Pictures, 1936), directed by Lew Ayres, tells the story of the building of the USS Monitor and the following Battle of Hampton Roads.

Notes
Abbreviations used in these notes: ORA (Official records, armies): War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. ORN (Official records, navies): Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.
[1] Musicant 1995, pp. 134178; Anderson 1962, pp. 7177; Tucker 2006, p. 151. [2] Anderson 1962, pp. 7175. [3] Anderson 1962, pp. 7577. [4] Tucker 2006, p. 175; Luraghi 1996, p. 148. [5] Civil War naval chronology, pp. I-9, I-12. [6] Cumberland and Merrimack, the latter renamed CSS Virginia, would meet again on March 8, 1862. [7] Musicant 1995, pp. 2640. [8] Luraghi 1996, pp. 3435, 42. [9] ORA I, v. 2, pp. 782783. [10] Fort Monroe was one of three major forts in seceded states that were still held by the Union; the others were Fort Zachary Taylor and Fort Pickens, both in Florida. [11] The fort was named Fort Calhoun when construction was started before the outbreak of the war. It was completed only after the war started, and was then renamed for the general who directed the defense of the region. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 41. [12] Joseph B. Carr, "Operations of 1861 about Fort Monroe," Battles and leaders, v. 2, pp.144152. [13] Wise 1988, p. 25. [14] Davis 1975, pp. 69, 71. [15] Gibbon 1983, p. 13. [16] Gibbon 1983, pp. 2831. [17] Contemplation of armor was not confined to Europe. The United States had spent a lot of money supporting the development of the Stevens Battery, with nothing to show for it. (Davis, Duel between the first two ironclads, p. 5.) Also, a river boatman at New Orleans, John A. Stevenson, early in the war had converted a tugboat into an armored vessel. As CSS Manassas, she was actually the first armored vessel to go into combat in the war. (Still, Iron afloat, pp. 4651.) [18] Anderson 1962, p. 67. [19] Still 1985, p. 10. [20] After the war, Brooke and Porter engaged in an unseemly fight for recognition as the originator of the Virginia design. In the controversy, the contributions of the engineer Williamson have often been overlooked. Still 1985, pp. 1113; Davis 1975, p. 141. [21] This is a more telling comment on the handicaps faced by the South than it may appear. The reason that Merrimack was in the Gosport yard was to repair her notably balky engines. [22] Still 1985, p. 15. [23] Still 1985, p. 22.

Battle of Hampton Roads


[24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] Reign of Iron, Nelson, 2004 Anderson 1962, pp. 36, 71. Still 1985, pp. 1923. Smith's son, Joseph Smith, Jr., who was also a naval officer, would be killed at Hampton Roads. Anderson 1962, pp. 6768. The other two ships were the rather conventional New Ironsides and the experimental Galena. Anderson 1962, p. 68. Davis 1975, p. 51. Nelson, Reign of iron, 2004 Davis 1975, pp. 1719. Still, Iron afloat, p. 23. Still, Iron afloat, p. 24. Davis, Duel of the first ironclads, p. 72 Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 42, 45. Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 72. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 45, does not name Marston at all. Still, Iron afloat, p. 26. Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 97. ORN I, v. 7, p. 44. Minnesota and Merrimack, upon whose hull Virginia was built, were sisters. On this Date in Civil War History - March 8-9, 1862 - Battle of Hampton Roads (http:/ / thisweekinthecivilwar. com/ ?p=1028/ ) Davis,Duel between the first ironclads, p. 98. Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 8687. ORN I, v. 7, p. 44. Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 109

193

[46] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 9092. [47] Nelson, Reign of iron: the story of the first battling ironclads, the Monitor and the Merrimack, p. 229-230 [48] Smith, captain of Congress, had been killed by a shot that blew off his head, so the decision to surrender was made by her executive officer, Austin Pendergrast. See Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 100. [49] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 98104. [50] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 109. [51] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 103, 105. [52] Still, Iron afloat, p. 32. [53] Malanowski, James (2012-03-08). "The Duel" (http:/ / opinionator. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2012/ 03/ 08/ the-duel/ ). The New York Times. . Retrieved March 13, 2012. [54] ORN I, v. 7, p. 25. [55] The Monitor, The Merrimack...The U.S.S. Minnesota? (http:/ / thisweekinthecivilwar. com/ ?p=1021/ ) [56] Still, Iron afloat, p. 33. [57] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 121. [58] Musicant, Divided waters, p. 171. [59] Schneller, "A state of war is a most unfavorable period for experiments," retrieved August 24, 2009. (http:/ / www. ijnhonline. org/ volume2_number3_Dec03/ article_schneller_dahlgren_dec03. htm#_edn73) [60] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 121134. [61] ORN I, v. 7, p. 43. [62] ORN I, v. 7, p. 39. [63] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 142. [64] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, p. 147. [65] T.J. Stiles,The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt (2009), p. 345-348 [66] Anderson, By sea and by river, p. 77. [67] Luraghi, A history of the Confederate Navy, pp. 164167. [68] Davis, Duel between the first ironclads, pp. 160164. [69] Simson, Naval strategies of the Civil War, p. 86. [70] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, p. 45. Tucker, Blue and gray navies, p. 175. [71] Musicant, Divided waters, p. 176. [72] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, pp. 4552. Simson, Naval strategies of the Civil War, p. 87. [73] G. Smirnov, V. Smirnov (1984). ", " (http:/ / mkmagazin. almanacwhf. ru/ mor_col/ mc_bo/ mc_bo_06. htm) (in Russian). - (Moscow) (1): 3132. . Retrieved 2009-02-10. [74] Luraghi, History of the Confederate Navy, p. 148. [75] Ropp, Theodore, and Stephen S. Roberts. The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 18711904. Naval Institute Press, 1987; p. 13. [76] Rose, Lisle Abbott, Power at sea: the age of navalism, 18901918 (vol. 1 of a three-volume set). Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. ISBN 0-8262-1683-8; p. 45.

Battle of Hampton Roads


[77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] USS Merrimack (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ m9/ merrimack-ii. htm) DANFS at history.navy.mil CSS Virginia (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ cfa10/ virginia. htm) DANFS record of Confederate ships at history.navy.mil For examples of each: Jones, A Rebel war clerk's diary, v. 1, p. 115; Wood, "The first fight of ironclads," Battles and leaders, v. 1, p. 692. USS Merrimac (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ danfs/ m9/ merrimac-i. htm) DANFS at history.navy.mil http:/ / www. moc. org USS Monitor Center (http:/ / www. monitorcenter. org/ preserving/ ) Mariner's Museum (http:/ / www. mariner. org/ exhibitions/ ussmonitorcenter/ ) http:/ / www. nycgovparks. org/ parks/ mcgrmcgolrickpark/ highlights/ 11366

194

References
Anderson, Bern. By sea and by river: the naval history of the Civil War. Knopf; reprint, Da Capo, n.d.; 1962. ISBN 0-306-80367-4. Browning, Robert M. Jr.. From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. University of Alabama; 1993. ISBN 0-8173-5019-5. Davis, William C.. Duel between the first ironclads. Doubleday,; 1975. Durkin, Joseph T.. Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy chief. University of North Carolina; reprint, University of South Carolina, 1987; 1954. ISBN 0-87249-518-3. Gibbons, Tony. The complete encyclopedia of battleships: a technical directory of capital ships from 1860 to the present day. Salamander Books; 1983. ISBN 0-517-37810-8. Luraghi, Raimondo. A history of the Confederate Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press; 1996. ISBN 1-55750-527-6. (translation by Paolo E. Coletta of Marina del Sud: storia della marina confederate nella Guerra Civile Americana, 1861-1865. Rizzoli, 1993.) Musicant, Ivan. Divided waters: the naval history of the Civil War. HarperCollins; 1995. ISBN 0-06-016482-4. Nelson, James L.. Reign of iron: the story of the first battling ironclads, the Monitor and the Merrimack. New York: HarperCollins; 2004. ISBN 0-06-052403-0. Quarstein, John V., C.S.S. Virginia, Mistress of Hampton Roads, self-published for the Virginia Civil War Battles and Leaders Series; 2000. ISBN 1-56190-118-0 Scharf, J. Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy from its organization to the surrender of its last vessel; its stupendous struggle with the great Navy of the United States, the engagements fought in the rivers and harbors of the South and upon the high seas, blockade-running, first use of iron-clads and torpedoes, and privateer history. New York: Rogers & Sherwood; 1887; reprint, Random House, 1996.. Simson, Jay W.. Naval strategies of the Civil War: Confederate innovations and Federal opportunism. Nashville: Cumberland House; 2001. ISBN 1-58182-195-6. Still, William N. Jr.. Iron afloat: the story of the Confederate armorclads. Vanderbilt University; 1985. ISBN 0-87249-616-3. Tucker, Spencer. Blue & gray navies: the Civil War afloat. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press; 2006. ISBN 1-59114-882-0. United States Department of the Navy, Naval History Department. Civil War naval chronology, 18611865. Government Printing Office; 1971. Wise, Stephen R.. Lifeline of the Confederacy: blockade running during the Civil War. University of South Carolina; 1988. ISBN 0-87249-554. This articleincorporates text from a publication now in the public domain:Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopdia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Battle of Hampton Roads

195

External links
A record of events in Norfolk County, Virginia (http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/lhbcb.08753), online text with an entire chapter on the battle. Civil War Naval History (http://www.multied.com/Navy/cwnavalhistory/) USS Monitor National Historical Site (http://monitor.nos.noaa.gov/) Monitor in the news (http://www.HavenWorks.com/military/uss-monitor) Its 'revolutionary' gun turret has been raised from the ocean floor. On-line exhibition of the Monitor (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/monitor/) "An original 1862 Chicago Tribune Article!" (http://www.footnote.com/spotlight/13465/ the_chicago_tribune_1862_an_account_of/) website devoted to CSS Virginia (http://cssvirginia.org/) Battle of Hampton Road website (http://www.civilwarhome.com/ironclad.htm) First Edition Report on the Battle of the Monitor and Merrimac (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/ civil-war/1862/monitor-merrimac.htm) Newspaper coverage of the Battle of Hampton Roads (http://www.newsinhistory.com/feature/ battle-hampton-roads-historic-first-clash-ironclad-warships) National Park Service Battle Summary (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va008.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Hampton Roads to High Bridge.pdf)

Battle of Drewry's Bluff


The Battle of Drewry's Bluff, also known as the Battle of Fort Darling, or Fort Drewry, took place on May 15, 1862, in Chesterfield County, Virginia, as part of the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. Five Union Navy warships, including the ironclads USSMonitor and Galena, steamed up the James River to test the defenses of Richmond, Virginia, the Confederate capital. They encountered submerged obstacles and deadly accurate fire from the batteries of Fort Darling at Drewry's Bluff, which inflicted severe damage on Galena. The Union Navy was forced to turn back.

Battle of Drewry's Bluff

196

Background
In the spring of 1862, Union Major General George B. McClellan launched an amphibious operation against Richmond by landing troops at Fort Monroe and then marching northwest up the Virginia Peninsula. After the fall of Yorktown and the withdrawal of General Joseph E. Johnston's army up the Peninsula, only the Confederate Navy ironclad CSS Virginia prevented Union occupation of the lower James River and Norfolk. When the Confederate garrison at Norfolk was evacuated by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger on May 10, Flag Officer Josiah Tattnall knew that he could not navigate Virginia through Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven the shallow stretches of the James River PinesConfederateUnion toward Richmond, so she was scuttled on May 11 off Craney Island to prevent her capture. This opened the James River at Hampton Roads to Federal gunboats. The only obstacle that protected Richmond from a river approach was Fort Darling on Drewry's Bluff, overlooking a sharp bend on the river 7mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) down river from the city. The Confederate defenders, including marines, sailors, and soldiers, were supervised by navy Commander Ebenezer Farrand and by army Captain Augustus H. Drewry (the owner of the property that bore his name) of the Southside Heavy Artillery.[1] The eight cannons in the fort, including field artillery pieces and five naval guns, some salvaged from the Virginia, commanded the river for miles in both directions. Guns from CSS Patrick Henry, including an 8in (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) smoothbore, were just upriver and sharpshooters gathered on the river banks. An underwater obstruction of sunken steamers, pilings, debris, and other vessels connected by chains was placed just below the bluff, making it difficult for vessels to maneuver in the narrow river.[2]

Battle of Drewry's Bluff

197

Battle
On May 15, a detachment of the U.S. Navy's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under the command of Commander John Rodgers steamed up the James River from Fort Monroe to test the Richmond defenses. The flotilla consisted of the ironclad gunboats USS Monitor (commanded by Lieutenant William N. Jeffers) and Galena (the flagship), the screw gunship Aroostook, the side-wheeler Port Royal, and the twin-screw ironclad Naugatuck.[3] At 07:45, Galena closed to within 600yd (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the fort and anchored, but before Rodgers could open fire, two Confederate rounds pierced the lightly-armored vessel. The battle lasted over three hours and during that time, Galena remained almost stationary and took 45 hits. Her crew reported casualties of 14 dead or mortally wounded and 10 injured. Monitor was a frequent target, but her heavier armor withstood the blows. Unfortunately for her crew, her guns could not elevate high enough to fire on the Confederate batteries, 110ft (unknown operator: u'strong'm) above the river. Naugatuck withdrew when her 100-pounder Parrott rifle exploded. The two wooden gunboats remained safely out of range of the big guns, but the captain of Port Royal was wounded by a sharpshooter. Around 11:00, the Union ships withdrew to City Point.[4]

Cpl John F. Mackie firing from the USS Galena

Aftermath
The massive fort on Drewry's Bluff had blunted the Union advance just 7mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) short of the Confederate capital, at a loss of seven Confederates killed and eight wounded.[5] Richmond remained safe. Rodgers reported to Confederate gun at Battery Dantzler, Drewry's Bluff. McClellan that it was feasible for the navy to land troops as close as 10mi (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from Richmond, but the Union Army never took advantage of this observation.[6] The area saw action again during the Siege of Petersburg in 186465. During the battle, Corporal John F. Mackie became the first Marine to earn the Medal of Honor.

Battle of Drewry's Bluff

198

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Sears, p. 93; Eicher, p. 273, states that it was the 2nd Virginia Artillery. Salmon, p. 87. Eicher, pp. 272-73. Sears, pp. 93-94; Salmon, p. 87; Eicher, p. 273. Sears, p. 94. Eicher, p. 273.

References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va012.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Deep Bottom II to Drewrys Bluff.pdf)

External links
Battle of Drury's [sic] Bluff (http://www.generalatomic.com/PerrysSaints/chapter14.html)

Siege of Yorktown (1862)


The Battle of Yorktown or Siege of Yorktown was fought from April 5 to May 4, 1862, as part of the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. Marching from Fort Monroe, Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac encountered Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder's small Confederate force at Yorktown behind the Warwick Line. McClellan suspended his march up the Peninsula toward Richmond and settled in for siege operations. On April 5, the IV Corps of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes made initial contact with Confederate defensive works at Lee's Mill, an area McClellan expected to move through without resistance. Magruder's ostentatious movement of troops back and forth convinced the Federals that his works were strongly held. As the two armies fought an artillery duel, reconnaissance indicated to Keyes the strength and breadth of the Confederate fortifications, and he advised McClellan against assaulting them. McClellan ordered the construction of siege fortifications and brought his heavy siege guns to the front. In the meantime, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston brought reinforcements for Magruder. On April 16, Union forces probed a point in the Confederate line at Dam No. 1. The Federals failed to exploit the initial success of this attack, however. This lost opportunity held up McClellan for two additional weeks while he tried to convince the U.S. Navy to bypass the Confederates' big guns at Yorktown and Gloucester Point and ascend the York River to West Point and outflank the Warwick Line. McClellan planned a massive bombardment for dawn on May 5, but the Confederate army slipped away during the night of May 3 toward Williamsburg. The battle took place near the site of the 1781 siege of Yorktown, the final battle of the American Revolutionary War in the east.

Siege of Yorktown (1862)

199

Background
McClellan had chosen to approach the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, with an amphibious operation that landed troops on the tip of the Virginia Peninsula at Fort Monroe. His Army of the Potomac numbered 121,500 men, transported starting on March 17 by 389 vessels.[] McClellan planned to use U.S. Navy forces to envelop Yorktown, but the emergence of the Confederate ironclad CSS Virginia and the Battle of Hampton Roads (March 89, 1862) disrupted this plan. The threat of the Virginia on the James River and the heavy Confederate batteries at the mouth of the York River prevented the Navy from assuring McClellan that they could control either the York or the James, so he settled on a purely land approach toward Yorktown.[1]

Federal battery with 13-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) seacoast mortars, Model 1861, during siege of Yorktown, Virginia 1862.

The Confederate defenders of Yorktown, led by Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, initially numbered only 1113,000 men;[2] the rest of the Confederate forces, under the overall command of General Joseph E. Johnston, remained spread out across eastern Virginia at Culpeper, Fredericksburg, and Norfolk. Magruder constructed a defensive line from Yorktown on the York River, behind the Warwick River, to Mulberry Point on the James River (even taking advantage of some trenches originally dug by Cornwallis in 1781[3]) to effectively block the full width of the Peninsula, although he could adequately man none of the defensive works at that time. This became known as the Warwick Line. McClellan's plan called for Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman's III Corps to fix the Confederate troops in their trenches near the York River, while the IV Corps under Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes enveloped the Confederate right and cut off their lines of communication. McClellan and his staff, ignorant of the extent of Magruder's line, assumed the Confederates had concentrated only in the immediate vicinity of Yorktown.[4]

Siege of Yorktown (1862)

200

Battle
Union advance and Lee's Mill
On April 4, 1862, the Union Army pushed through Magruder's initial line of defense but the following day encountered his more effective Warwick Line. The nature of the terrain made it difficult to determine the exact disposition of the Confederate forces. A victim of faulty intelligence, McClellan estimated that the Confederates had 40,000 troops in the defensive line and that Johnston was expected to arrive quickly with an additional 60,000. Magruder, an amateur actor before the war, exacerbated McClellan's confusion by moving infantry and artillery in a noisy, ostentatious manner to make the defenders seem a much larger forces than their actual numbers.[5]

Battle of Yorktown ConfederateUnion

The Union IV Corps first encountered the right flank of Magruder's line on April 5 at Lee's Mill, its earthwork defenses manned by the division of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws. The 7th Maine Infantry Regiment deployed as skirmishers and stopped about 1000 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) before the fortifications, where they were soon joined by the brigade of Brig. Gen. John Davidson and artillery. An artillery duel raged for several hours while Keyes ordered reconnaissance and additional units arrived, but there was no infantry fighting. On April 6, men from the 6th Maine Infantry and 5th Wisconsin Infantry, under the command of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, performed reconnaissance around Dam Number One, where Magruder had widened the Warwick to create a water obstacle nearby. They drove off the Confederate pickets and took some prisoners. Hancock considered this area a weak spot in the line, but orders from McClellan prevented any exploitation.[6] Keyes, deceived by Magruder's theatrical troop movements, believed that the Warwick Line fortifications could not be carried by assault and so informed McClellan.[7] To the amazement of the Confederates, and the dismay of President Abraham Lincoln, McClellan chose not to attack without more reconnaissance and ordered his army to entrench in works parallel to Magruder's and besiege Yorktown. McClellan reacted to Keyes's report, as well as to reports of enemy strength near the town of Yorktown, but he also received word that the I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, would be withheld for the defense of Washington, instead of joining him on the Peninsula as McClellan had planned. For the next 10 days, McClellan's men dug while Magruder steadily received reinforcements. By mid April, Magruder commanded 35,000 men, barely enough to defend his line.[8] Although McClellan doubted his numeric superiority over the enemy, he had no doubts about the superiority of his artillery. The siege preparations at Yorktown consisted of 15 batteries with more than 70 heavy guns, including two 200-pounder Parrotts and 12 100-pound Parrots, with the rest of the rifled pieces divided between 20-pounder and 30-pounder Parrotts and 4.5-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) Rodman siege rifles. These were augmented by 41 mortars, ranging in size from 8 inches (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) to 13-inch (unknown operator: u'strong'mm) seacoast mortars, which weighed over 10 tons and fired shells weighing 220 pounds. When fired in unison, these batteries would deliver over 7,000 pounds of ordnance onto the enemy positions with each volley.[9]

Siege of Yorktown (1862) As the armies dug in, Union Army Balloon Corps aeronaut Professor Thaddeus S. C. Lowe used two balloons, the Constitution and the Intrepid, to perform aerial observation. On April 11, Intrepid carried Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, a division commander of the III Corps, aloft, but unexpected winds sent the balloon over enemy lines, causing great consternation in the Union command before other winds returned him to safety. Confederate Captain John Bryan suffered a similar wind mishap in a hot air balloon over the Yorktown lines.[10]

201

Dam Number One


On April 16, the Union probed the defensive line at Dam No. 1, the point on the Warwick River near Lee's Mill where Hancock had reported a potential weakness on April 6.[11] After the brief skirmish with Hancock's men, Magruder realized the weakness of his position and ordered it strengthened. Three regiments under Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, with six other regiments nearby, were improving their position on the west bank of the river overlooking the dam. McClellan became concerned that this strengthening might impede his installation of siege batteries.[12] His order to Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, a division commander in the IV Corps, was to avoid a general engagement, but to "hamper the enemy" in completing their defensive works.[13] Following an artillery bombardment at 8 a.m., Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks and his Vermont Brigade sent skirmishers forward to fire on the Confederates. In a visit to the front, McClellan told Smith to cross the river if it appeared the Confederates were withdrawing, a movement that was already underway by early afternoon. At 3 p.m., four companies of the 3rd Vermont Infantry crossed the dam and routed the remaining defenders. Behind the lines, Cobb organized a defense with his brother, Colonel Thomas Cobb of the Georgia Legion, and attacked the Vermonters, who had occupied the Confederate rifle pits. In battle, drummer Julian Scott made several trips across the fire-swept creek in order to assist in bringing off wounded soldiers. Later he was awarded the Medal of Honor, along with First Sergeant Edward Holton and Captain Samuel E. Pingree.[14] Unable to obtain reinforcements, the Vermont companies withdrew across the dam, suffering casualties as they retreated. At about 5 p.m., Baldy Smith ordered the 6th Vermont to attack Confederate positions downstream from the dam while the 4th Vermont demonstrated at the dam itself. This maneuver failed as the 6th Vermont came under heavy Confederate fire and were forced to withdraw. Some of the wounded men were drowned as they fell into the shallow pond behind the dam.[13]

Siege of Yorktown (1862)

202

Aftermath
From a Union perspective, the action at Dam No. 1 was pointless, but it cost them casualties of 35 dead and 121 wounded; the Confederate casualties were between 60 and 75.[15] Baldy Smith, who was thrown from his unruly horse twice during action, was accused of drunkenness on duty, but a congressional investigation found the allegation to be groundless.[16] For the remainder of April, the Confederates, now at 57,000 and under the direct command of Johnston, improved their defenses while McClellan undertook the laborious process of transporting and placing Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. massive siege artillery batteries, which he planned to deploy on May 5. Johnston knew that the impending bombardment would be difficult to withstand, so began sending his supply wagons in the direction of Richmond on May 3. Escaped slaves reported that fact to McClellan, who refused to believe them. He was convinced that an army whose strength he estimated as high as 120,000 would stay and fight. On the evening of May 3, the Confederates launched a brief bombardment of their own and then fell silent. Early the next morning, Heintzelman ascended in an observation balloon and found that the Confederate earthworks were empty.[17] McClellan was stunned by the news. He sent cavalry under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman in pursuit and ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to reboard Navy transports, sail up the York River, and cut off Johnson's retreat. The stage was set for the subsequent Battle of Williamsburg.[18]

Notes
[1] Eicher, p. 215. [2] Kennedy, p. 88, states 11,000; Eicher, p. 215, and Salmon, p. 76, state 13,000. [3] Sears, p. 48. [4] Eicher, p. 215, [5] Salmon, p. 76; Kennedy, p. 88. [6] Burton, p. 20. This portion of the Warwick River is now the Lee Hall Reservoir, part of Newport News Park. [7] Sears, p. 42; Burton, p. 15. [8] Burton, p. 15; Salmon, p. 76; Kennedy, p. 88. [9] Sears, p. 58. [10] Sears, pp. 54-55. [11] Union reports in the Official Records refer to this engagement as Lee's Mill or Burnt Chimneys. Sears, p. 55, bases his work on these reports. However, more recent histories differentiate the skirmish on April 5 at Lee's Mill from the more significant action nearby on April 16, which they refer to as Dam Number One. See for example, Burton, pp. 14-19, and the Virginia Civil War Traveler map. [12] Burton, p. 20. [13] Salmon, pp. 76-77. [14] Salmon, pp. 76-77; Rickard, np. [15] Salmon, p. 77. [16] Sears, p. 56. [17] Salmon, p. 79.

Siege of Yorktown (1862)


[18] Salmon, p. 80.

203

References
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Rickard, J. "Battle of Lee's Mill" (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_lees_mills.html). Accessed August 2, 2010. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va009.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Winchester II to Yorktown.pdf) Virginia Civil War Traveler map (http://www.civilwartraveler.com/about/maps/PeninsulaMap.pdf)

Battle of Williamsburg
The Battle of Williamsburg, also known as the Battle of Fort Magruder, took place on May 5, 1862, in York County, James City County, and Williamsburg, Virginia, as part of the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. It was the first pitched battle of the Peninsula Campaign, in which nearly 41,000 Federals and 32,000 Confederates were engaged, fighting an inconclusive battle that ended with the Confederates continuing their withdrawal. Following up the Confederate retreat from Yorktown, the Union division of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker encountered the Confederate rearguard near Williamsburg. Hooker assaulted Fort Magruder, an earthen fortification alongside the Williamsburg Road, but was repulsed. Confederate counterattacks, directed by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, threatened to overwhelm the Union left flank, until Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's division arrived to stabilize the Federal position. Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's brigade then moved to threaten the Confederate left flank, occupying two abandoned redoubts. The Confederates counterattacked unsuccessfully. Hancock's localized success was not exploited. The Confederate army continued its withdrawal during the night in the direction of Richmond, Virginia.[]

Background
Further information: Confederate Order of Battle, Union Order of Battle When Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston unexpectedly withdrew his forces from the Warwick Line at the Battle of Yorktown the night of May 3, Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan was taken by surprise and was unprepared to mount an immediate pursuit. On May 4, he ordered cavalry commander Brig. Gen. George Stoneman to pursue Johnson's rearguard and sent approximately half of his Army of the Potomac along behind Stoneman, under the command of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner. He also ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to board transport ships on the York River in an attempt to move upstream and land so as to cut off Johnston's retreat. However, it took two days just to board the men and equipment onto the ships, so the maneuver had no effect on the

Battle of Williamsburg battle of May 5; Franklin's division landed and fought in the Battle of Eltham's Landing on May 7.[1] By May 5, Johnston's army was making slow progress on muddy roads and Stoneman's cavalry was skirmishing with Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, Johnston's rearguard. To give time for the bulk of his army to get free, Johnston detached part of his force to make a stand at a large earthen fortification, Fort Magruder, straddling the Williamsburg Road (from Yorktown), constructed earlier by Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder.[2]

204

Battle
Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's 2nd division of the III Corps was the lead infantry in the Union Army advance. They assaulted Fort Magruder and a line of rifle pits and smaller fortifications that extended in an arc south-west from the fort, but were repulsed. Confederate counterattacks, directed by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, threatened to overwhelm Hooker's division, which had contested the ground alone since the early morning while waiting for the main body of the army to arrive. Hooker had expected Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith's 2nd Division of the IV Corps, marching north on the Yorktown Road, to hear the sound of battle and come in on Hooker's right in support. McClellan arriving at the battle, as depicted by Currier and Ives. However, Smith had been halted by Sumner more than a mile away from Hooker's position. He had been concerned that the Confederates would leave their fortifications and attack him on the Yorktown Road.[3] Longstreet's men did leave their fortifications, but they attacked Hooker, not Smith or Sumner. The brigade of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox applied strong pressure to Hooker's line. Regimental bands playing Yankee Doodle slowed the retreating troops as they passed by, allowing them to rally long enough to be aided by the arrival of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's 3rd Division of the III Corps at about 2:30 p.m. Kearny ostentatiously rode his horse out in front of his picket lines to reconnoiter and urged his men forward by flashing his saber with his only arm. The Confederates were pushed off the Lee's Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion Mill Road and back into the woods and the abatis of their defensive positions. There, sharp firefights occurred until late in the afternoon.[4] While Hooker continued to confront the Confederate forces in front of Fort Magruder, Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's 1st Brigade of Baldy Smith's division, which had marched a few miles to the Federal right and crossed Cub's Creek at the point where it was dammed to form the Jones' Mill pond, began bombarding Longstreet's left flank around noon. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill, commanding Longstreet's reserve force, had previously detached a brigade under Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early and posted them on the grounds of the College of William and Mary. Hearing the sounds of Union artillery, Early and Hill hurried in that direction. Splitting his command, Early led two of his four

Battle of Williamsburg regiments (the 24th and 38th Virginia Infantry) through the woods without performing adequate reconnaissance and found that they emerged not on the enemy's flank, but directly in front of Hancock's guns, which occupied two abandoned redoubts. He personally led the 24th Virginia Infantry on a futile assault and was wounded by a bullet through the shoulder.[5] Hancock had been ordered repeatedly by Sumner to withdraw his command back to Cub Creek, but he used the Confederate attack as an excuse to hold his ground. As the 24th Virginia charged, D.H. Hill emerged from the woods leading one of Early's other regiments, the 5th North Carolina. He ordered an attack before realizing the difficulty of his situationHancock's 3,400 infantrymen and eight artillery pieces significantly outnumbered the two attacking Confederate regiments, fewer than 1,200 men with no artillery support. He called off the assault after it had begun, but Hancock ordered a counterattack. The North Carolinians suffered 302 casualties, the Virginians 508. Union losses were about 100. After the battle, the counterattack received significant publicity as a major, gallant bayonet charge and McClellan's description of Hancock's "superb" performance gave him the nickname, "Hancock the Superb."[6] At about 2:00 p.m., Brig. Gen. John J. Peck's brigade of Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch's 1st Division of the IV Corps arrived to support and extend the right of Hooker's line, which had, by this stage, been pushed back from the cleared ground in front of Fort Magruder into the abatis and heavy wood about 600 1000 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) from the Confederate fortifications. The morale of Hooker's troops had been affected terribly by the loss of Captain Charles H. Webber's Battery "H" of the 1st U.S. Light Artillery and Captain Walter M. Bramhall's 6th Battery of the New York Light Artillery. Peck's arrival on the field and his brigade's recovery of Bramhall's battery came at a critical moment for Hooker's division, which was on the verge of retreat.

205

Aftermath
The Northern press portrayed the battle as a victory for the Federal army. McClellan mis-categorized it as a "brilliant victory" over superior forces. However, the defense of Williamsburg was seen by the South as a means of delaying the Federals, which allowed the bulk of the Confederate army to continue its withdrawal toward Richmond. Confederate casualties, including the cavalry skirmishing on May 4, were 1,682. Union casualties were 2,283.[]

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Sears, pp. 66-70. Sears, p. 70. Salmon, p. 82. Sears, pp. 74-78; Salmon, p. 82. Sears, pp. 78-80. Sears, pp. 79-83.

References
Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va010.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Williamsburg to Winchester I.pdf)

Battle of Williamsburg

206

Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Dubbs, Carol K. Defend This Old Town: Williamsburg During The Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-8071-3017-6.

External links
Virginia Civil War Traveler map (http://www.civilwartraveler.com/about/maps/PeninsulaMap.pdf) Ricker, Harry H., III. Battle of Williamsburg (http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dgn898fn_1c7tckrdp) Detailed strategic and tactical description

Battle of Eltham's Landing


The Battle of Eltham's Landing, also known as the Battle of Barhamsville, or West Point, took place on May 7, 1862, in New Kent County, Virginia, as part of the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's Union division landed at Eltham's Landing and was attacked by two brigades of Brig. Gen. G. W. Smith's command, reacting to the threat to the Confederate army's trains on the Barhamsville Road. Franklin's movement occurred while the Confederate army was withdrawing from the Williamsburg line, but he was unable to interfere with the Confederate movement.

Background
When Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston unexpectedly withdrew his forces from the Warwick Line at the Battle of Yorktown the night of May 3, Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan was taken by surprise and was unprepared to mount an immediate pursuit. On May 4, he ordered cavalry commander Brig. Gen. George Stoneman to pursue Johnston's rearguard and sent approximately half of his Army of the Potomac along behind Stoneman, under the command of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner. These troops fought in the inconclusive Battle of Williamsburg on May 5, after which the Confederates continued to move northwest in the direction of Richmond.[1]

Battle of Eltham's Landing

207

McClellan also ordered Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division to board transport ships on the York River in an attempt to land and cut off Johnston's retreat. It took two days just to board the men and equipment onto the ships, so Franklin was of no assistance to the Williamsburg action. But McClellan had high hopes for his turning movement, planning to send other divisions (those of Brig. Gens. Fitz John Porter, John Sedgwick, and Israel B. Richardson) by river after Franklin's. Their destination was Eltham's Landing on the south bank of the Pamunkey River across from West Point, a port on the York River, which Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion was the terminus of the Richmond and York River Railroad. From the landing, it was about 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) south to the small town of Barhamsville, where a key intersection on the road to New Kent Court House was being used by Johnston's army on the afternoon of May 6.[2] Franklin's men came ashore in light pontoon boats and a 400-foot (unknown operator: u'strong'm) long floating wharf was then built from pontoons, canal boats, and lumber, so that artillery and supplies could be unloaded. The work was continued by torchlight through the night and the only enemy resistance was a few random shots fired by Confederate pickets on the bluff above the landing, ending at about 10 p.m.[3]

Battle
Johnston ordered Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith to protect the road to Barhamsville and Smith assigned the division of Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting and Hampton's Legion, under Colonel Wade Hampton, to the task. On May 7, Franklin posted Brig. Gen. John Newton's brigade in the woods on either side of the landing road, supported in the rear by portions of two more brigades (Brig. Gens. Henry W. Slocum and Philip Kearny).[4] Newton's skirmish line was pushed back as Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade advanced, with Hampton to his right. Hood was concerned about casualties from friendly fire in the thick woods, so he ordered his men to advance with unloaded rifles. Encountering a Union picket line 15 paces away, Hood wrote, "A corporal of the enemy drew down his musket upon me as I stood in front of my line." Fortunately for Hood, Private John Deal of the 4th Texas Infantry had disobeyed his orders and carried a loaded rifle; he managed to shoot the Union corporal before the latter could fire.[5] As a second brigade followed Hood on his left, the Union troops retreated from the woods to the plain before the landing, seeking cover from the fire of Federal gunboats. Whiting employed artillery fire against the gunboats, but his guns had insufficient range, so he disengaged around 2 p.m. Union troops moved back into the woods after the Confederates left, but made no further attempt to advance.[]

Battle of Eltham's Landing

208

Aftermath
The Battle at Eltham's Landing was little more than a heavy skirmish. There were 194 Union casualties and 48 Confederate.[] Franklin told McClellan, "I congratulate myself that we have maintained our position."[6] Although the action was tactically inconclusive, Franklin missed an opportunity to intercept the Confederate retreat from Williamsburg, allowing it to pass unmolested.[7] Johnston was pleased with the outcome. Considering the success his men enjoyed in executing the order "to feel the enemy gently and fall back," he humorously asked General Hood, "What would your Texans have done, sir, if I had ordered them to charge and drive back the enemy?" Hood replied, "I suppose, General, they would have driven them into the river, and tried to swim out and capture the gunboats."[6]

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Salmon, pp. 80-83. Eicher, p. 270; Sears, p. 85; Salmon, p. 83. Sears, p. 85; Salmon, p. 85. Webb, p. 82. Salmon, p. 85; Sears, p. 86. Sears, p. 86.

[7] Salmon, p. 85; Webb, p. 82, argues that Franklin's instructions "were to wait at Eltham until further orders. No mention was made about cutting off the enemy. To make the attempt alone would have been hazardous, and the remaining divisions could not concentrate for several days."

References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. Webb, Alexander S. The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=qbE8d82-ZVAC). Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 2002. ISBN 0-7858-1575-9. First published 1885. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va011.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Elthams Landing to Five Forks.pdf)

Battle of Hanover Court House

209

Battle of Hanover Court House


The Battle of Hanover Court House, also known as the Battle of Slash Church, took place on May 27, 1862, in Hanover County, Virginia, as part of the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. On May 27, elements of Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps extended north to protect the right flank of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Union Army of the Potomac. Porter's objective was to deal with a Confederate force near Hanover Court House, which threatened the avenue of approach for Union reinforcements that were marching south from Fredericksburg. The smaller Confederate force, under Colonel Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, was defeated at Peake's Crossing after a disorganized fight. The Union victory was moot, however, for the Union reinforcements were recalled to Fredericksburg upon word of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's rout in the Shenandoah Valley at First Winchester.

Background
Further information: Hanover Court House order of battle Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew his 60,000-man army from the Virginia Peninsula as McClellan's army pursued him and approached the Confederate capital of Richmond. Johnston's defensive line began at the James River at Drewry's Bluff, site of the recent Confederate naval victory, and extended counterclockwise so that his center and left were behind the Chickahominy River, a natural barrier in the spring when it turned the broad plains to the east of Richmond into swamps. Johnston's men burned most of the bridges over the Chickahominy and settled into strong defensive positions north and east of the city. McClellan positioned his 105,000-man army to focus on the northeast sector, for two reasons. First, the Pamunkey River, which ran roughly parallel to the Chickahominy, offered a line of communication that could enable McClellan to get around Johnston's left flank. Second, McClellan anticipated the arrival of the I Corps under Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell, scheduled to march south from Fredericksburg to reinforce his army, and thus needed to protect their avenue of approach.[1] The Army of the Potomac pushed slowly up the Pamunkey, establishing supply bases at Eltham's Landing, Cumberland Landing, and White House Landing. White House, the plantation of W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee, son of General Robert E. Lee, became McClellan's base of operations. Using the Richmond and York River Railroad, McClellan could bring his heavy siege artillery to the outskirts of Richmond. He moved slowly and deliberately, reacting to faulty intelligence that led him to believe the Confederates outnumbered him significantly. By the end of May, the army had built bridges across the Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion Chickahominy and was facing Richmond, straddling the river, with one third of the Army south of the river, two thirds north. (This disposition, which made it difficult for one part of the army to reinforce the other quickly, would prove to be a significant problem in the upcoming Battle of Seven Pines).[2]

Battle of Hanover Court House While skirmishing occurred all along the line between the armies, McClellan heard a rumor from a Virginia civilian that a Confederate force of 17,000 was moving to Hanover Court House, north of Mechanicsville. If this were true, it would threaten the army's right flank and complicate the arrival of McDowell's reinforcements. A Union cavalry reconnaissance adjusted the estimate of the enemy strength to be 6,000, but it was still cause for concern. McClellan ordered his close friend, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, commander of the newly formed V Corps, to deal with the threat.[3] Porter departed on his mission at 4 a.m. on May 27 with his 1st Division, under Brig. Gen. George W. Morell, the 3rd Brigade of Brig. Gen. George Sykes's 2nd Division, under Colonel Gouverneur K. Warren, and a composite brigade of cavalry and artillery led by Brig. Gen. William H. Emory, altogether about 12,000 men. The Confederate force, which actually numbered about 4,000 men, was led by Col. Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, and included the 18th, 28th, and 38th North Carolina Infantry regiments, and the 45th Georgia Infantry. They had departed from Gordonsville to guard the Virginia Central Railroad, taking up position at Peake's Crossing, 4 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest of the courthouse, near Slash Church. Another Confederate brigade was stationed 10 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) north at Hanover Junction.[4]

210

Battle
Porter's men approached Peake's Crossing in a driving rain. At about noon on May 27, his lead element, the 25th New York Infantry, encountered Col. James H. Lane's 28th North Carolina on a reconnaissance patrol at the farm owned by Dr. Thomas H. Kinney. The New Yorkers, along with the 1st U.S. Sharpshooters, skirmished briskly with the Confederates until Porter's main body arrived, driving the outnumbered Rebels up the road in the direction of the courthouse. Porter set out in pursuit with most of his force, leaving three regiments (the 2nd Maine, the 44th New York, and the damaged 25th New York), under the command of Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale, to guard the New Bridge and Hanover Court House Roads intersection, a mile to the west of Kinney's farm. This movement exposed the rear of Porter's command to attack by the bulk of Branch's force, which Porter had mistakenly assumed was at Hanover Court House.[5] Branch also made a poor assumptionthat Porter's force was significantly smaller than it turned out to beand attacked. Col. Charles C. Lee led his own regiment, the 37th North Carolina, along with the 18th North Carolina and two cannons from Latham's Battery. An initial assault by the 18th was repulsed, but when the 37th joined in, Martindale's force was almost destroyed by the heavy fire. The 44th New York suffered 25% casualties and its battle flag received 44 bullet holes.[6]

Map Illustrating the Battle of Hanover, Virginia.

Engagement Near Hanover Court-House, Virginia.

When messengers reached Porter with news of the engagement, he quickly dispatched the 9th Massachusetts and 62nd Pennsylvania regiments back to the Kinney Farm. The Confederate line broke under the weight of thousands of new troops and they retreated back through Peake's Crossing to Ashland.

Battle of Hanover Court House

211

Aftermath
General McClellan claimed that Hanover Court House was yet another "glorious victory over superior numbers" and judged that it was "one of the handsomest things of the war."[7] However, the reality of the outcome was that superior (Union) numbers won the day in a disorganized fight, characterized by misjudgments on both sides. The right flank of the Union army remained secure, although technically the Confederates at Peake's Crossing had not intended to threaten it. And McDowell's Corps did not need its roads kept clear because it never arrivedthe defeat of Union forces at the First Battle of Winchester by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley caused the Lincoln administration to recall McDowell to Fredericksburg. The estimates of Union casualties vary, from 355 (62 killed, 233 wounded, 70 captured) to 397. The Confederates left 200 dead on the field and 730 were captured by Porter's cavalry.[8] A greater impact than the actual casualties, according to historian Stephen W. Sears, was the effect on McClellan's preparedness for the next major battle, at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks four days later. During the absence of Porter, McClellan was reluctant to move more of his troops south of the Chickahominy, making his left flank a more attractive target for Johnston.[7]

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Salmon, p. 88; Eicher, pp. 273-74; Sears, pp. 95-97. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, pp. 104-06. Salmon, p. 90; Sears, pp. 113-14. Eicher, p. 275; Salmon, p. 90. Sears, p. 114; Salmon, pp. 90-91. Sears, p. 116; Salmon, p. 91. Sears, p. 117. Eicher, 276; Sears, p. 117; Salmon, p. 91; Kennedy, p. 92.

References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va013.htm)

Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8078-2552-2. Hardy, Micheal. The Battle of Hanover Court House: Turning Point of the Peninsula Campaign, May 27, 1862. McFarland & Co., 2006. ISBN 978-0786424641 Martin, David G. The Peninsula Campaign MarchJuly 1862. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1992. ISBN 978-0-938289-09-8. Speer, William H. A. Voices from Cemetery Hill: The Civil War Diary, Reports, and Letters of Colonel William Henry Asbury Speer (18611864). Edited by Allen Paul Speer. Johnson City, TN: Overmountain Press, 1997.

Battle of Hanover Court House ISBN 978-1-57072-050-5.

212

Battle of Seven Pines


The Battle of Seven Pines, also known as the Battle of Fair Oaks or Fair Oaks Station, took place on May 31 and June 1, 1862, in Henrico County, Virginia, as part of the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. It was the culmination of an offensive up the Virginia Peninsula by Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, in which the Army of the Potomac reached the outskirts of Richmond. On May 31, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston attempted to overwhelm two Federal corps that appeared isolated south of the Chickahominy River. The Confederate assaults, although not well coordinated, succeeded in driving back the IV Corps and inflicting heavy casualties. Reinforcements arrived, and both sides fed more and more troops into the action. Supported by the III Corps and Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick's division of Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner's II Corps (which crossed the rain-swollen river on Grapevine Bridge), the Federal position was finally stabilized. Gen. Johnston was seriously wounded during the action, and command of the Confederate army devolved temporarily to Maj. Gen. G.W. Smith. On June 1, the Confederates renewed their assaults against the Federals, who had brought up more reinforcements, but made little headway. Both sides claimed victory.[] Although the battle was tactically inconclusive, it was the largest battle in the Eastern Theater up to that time (and second only to Shiloh in terms of casualties thus far, about 11,000 total) and marked the end of the Union offensive, leading to the Seven Days Battles and Union retreat in late June.[1]

Background
Johnston withdrew his 60,000-man army from the Virginia Peninsula as McClellan's army pursued him and approached the Confederate capital of Richmond. Johnston's defensive line began at the James River at Drewry's Bluff, site of the recent Confederate naval victory, and extended counterclockwise so that his center and left were behind the Chickahominy River, a natural barrier in the spring when it turned the broad plains to the east of Richmond into swamps. Johnston's men burned most of the bridges over the Chickahominy and settled into strong defensive positions north and east of the city. McClellan positioned his 105,000-man army to focus on the northeast sector, for two reasons. First, the Pamunkey River, which ran roughly parallel to the Chickahominy, offered a line of communication that could enable McClellan to get around Johnston's left flank. Second, McClellan anticipated the arrival of the I Corps under Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell, scheduled to march south from Fredericksburg to reinforce his army, and thus needed to protect their avenue of approach.[2]

Battle of Seven Pines

213

The Army of the Potomac pushed slowly up the Pamunkey, establishing supply bases at Eltham's Landing, Cumberland Landing, and White House Landing. White House, the plantation of W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee, son of General Robert E. Lee, became McClellan's base of operations. Using the Richmond and York River Railroad, McClellan could bring his heavy siege artillery to the outskirts of Richmond. He moved slowly and deliberately, reacting to faulty intelligence that led him to believe the Confederates outnumbered him significantly. By the end of May, the army had built bridges across the Peninsula Campaign, map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines. ConfederateUnion Chickahominy and was facing Richmond, straddling the river, with one third of the Army south of the river, two thirds north.[3]

Opposing forces
The Union army of 105,000 men was near the outskirts of Richmond to the northeast, straddling the Chickahominy River. There were three Corps north of the river, protecting the Union railroad supply line: the V Corps under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter; the VI Corps, under Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin; and the II Corps, under Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner. South of the river were the IV Corps, under Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, in a position far forward and close to the Confederate lines; and the III Corps, under Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman. At the start of the battle on May 31, McClellan was confined to bed, ill with a flare-up of his chronic malaria.[4]

The Battle of Fair Oaks, Va. by Currier and Ives (1862)

Johnston had 60,000 men in his Army of Northern Virginia protecting the works of Richmond. His command consisted of the Right Wing, under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet (the divisions of Brig. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, commanding Longstreet's division, Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger), the Left Wing, under Maj. Gen. G.W. Smith (the divisions of Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, commanding Smith's division, and Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill), and the Reserve, under Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder (the divisions of Brig. Gens. Lafayette McLaws and David R. Jones).[5]

Johnston's plan
Johnston, who had retreated up the Peninsula to the outskirts of Richmond, knew that he could not survive a massive siege and decided to attack McClellan. His original plan was to attack the Union right flank, north of the Chickahominy River, before McDowell's corps, marching south from Fredericksburg, could arrive. However, on May 27, the same day the Battle of Hanover Court House was fought northeast of Richmond, Johnston learned that McDowell's corps had been diverted to the Shenandoah Valley and would not be reinforcing the Army of the

Battle of Seven Pines Potomac. He decided against attacking across his own natural defense line, the Chickahominy, and planned to capitalize on the Union army's straddle of the river by attacking the two corps south of the river, leaving them isolated from the other three corps north of the river.[6] If executed correctly, Johnston would engage two thirds of his army (22 of its 29 infantry brigades, about 51,000 men) against the 33,000 men in the III and IV Corps. The Confederate attack plan was complex, calling for the divisions of A. P. Hill and Magruder to engage lightly and distract the Union forces north of the river, while Longstreet, commanding the main attack south of the river, was to converge on Keyes from three directions: six brigades under Longstreet's immediate command and four brigades under D. H. Hill were to advance on separate roads at a crossroads known as Seven Pines (because of seven large pine trees clustered at that location); three brigades under Huger were assigned to support Hill's right; Whiting's division was to follow Longstreet's column as a reserve. The plan had an excellent potential for initial success because the division of the IV Corps farthest forward, manning the earthworks a mile west of Seven Pines, was that of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, 6,000 men who were the least experienced in Keyes's corps. If Keyes could be defeated, the III Corps, to the east, could the be pinned against the Chickahominy and overwhelmed.[7] The complex plan was mismanaged from the start. Johnston chose to issue his orders to Longstreet orally in a long and rambling meeting on May 30. The other generals received written orders that were vague and contradictory. He also failed to notify all of the division commanders that Longstreet was in tactical command south of the river. (This missing detail was a serious oversight because both Huger and Smith technically outranked Longstreet.) On Longstreet's part, he either misunderstood his orders or chose to modify them without informing Johnston. Rather than taking his assigned avenue of advance on the Nine Mile Road, his column joined Hill's on the Williamsburg Road, which not only delayed the advance, but limited the attack to a narrow front with only a fraction of its total force. Exacerbating the problems on both sides was a severe thunderstorm on the night of May 30, which flooded the river, destroyed most of the Union bridges, and turned the roads into morasses of mud.[8]

214

Battle of Seven Pines

215

Battle
The attack got off to a bad start on May 31 when Longstreet marched down the Charles City Road and turned onto the Williamsburg Road instead of the Nine Mile Road. Huger's orders had not specified a time that the attack was scheduled to start and he was not awakened until he heard a division marching nearby. Johnston and his second-in-command, Smith, unaware of Longstreet's location or Huger's delay, waited at their headquarters for word of the start of the battle. Five hours after the scheduled start, at 1 p.m., D.H. Hill became impatient and sent his brigades forward against Casey's division.[9] Casey's line, manned by inexperienced troops, buckled with some men retreating, but fought fiercely for possession of their earthworks, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. The Confederates only engaged four brigades of the thirteen on their right flank that day, so they did not hit with the power that they could have concentrated on this weak point in the Union line. Casey sent for reinforcements but Keyes was slow Battle of Seven Pines. in responding. Eventually the mass of Confederates broke through, seized a Union redoubt, and Casey's men retreated to the second line of defensive works at Seven Pines. During this period, both of the high commanders were unaware of the severity of the battle. As late as 2:30 p.m., Heintzelman reported to McClellan, still sick in bed, that he had received no word from Keyes. Johnston was only 2 miles from the front, but an acoustic shadow prevented him from hearing the sounds of cannons and musketry and he and his staff did not know the battle had begun until 4 p.m.[10] The Army of the Potomac was accompanied by the Union Army Balloon Corps commanded by Prof. Thaddeus S. C. Lowe, who had established two balloon camps on the north side of the river, one at Gaines's Farm and one at Mechanicsville. Lowe reported on May 29 the buildup of Confederate forces to the left of New Bridge or in front of the Fair Oaks train station.[11] With constant rain on May 30 and heavy winds the morning of May 31, the aerostats Washington and Intrepid did not launch until noon. Lowe observed Confederate troops moving in battle formation and this information was relayed verbally to McClellan's headquarters by 2 p.m.[11] Lowe continued to send reports from the Intrepid via telegraph the remainder of May 31. On June 1, Lowe reported that the Confederate barracks to the left of Richmond as being free from smoke.[12] McClellan did not follow up on this information with a counterattack by his corps north of the Chickahominy River.[13]

Battle of Seven Pines

216

Around 4:40 p.m., Hill, now strengthened by reinforcements from Longstreet, hit the secondary Union line near Seven Pines, which was manned by the remnants of Casey's division, the IV Corps division of Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch, and Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's division from Heintzelman's III Corps. Hill organized a flanking maneuver, sending four regiments under Colonel Micah Jenkins from Longstreet's command to attack Keyes's right flank. The attack collapsed the Federal line back to the Williamsburg Road, a mile and a half beyond Seven Pines. The fighting in that part of the line died out by 7:30 p.m.[14] Just before Hill's attack began, Johnston received a note from Longstreet requesting that he join the battle, the first news he had heard of the fighting. Johnston went forward on the Nine Mile Road with three brigades of Whiting's division and encountered stiff resistance near Fair Oaks Station, the right flank of Keyes's line. Soon heavy Union reinforcements arrived. Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Sumner, II Corps commander, heard the sounds of battle from his position north of the Prof. Lowe ascending in the Intrepid to observe river. On his own initiative, he dispatched a division under Brig. Gen. the Battle of Seven Pines. John Sedgwick over the sole remaining bridge. The treacherous "Grapevine Bridge" was near collapse from the swollen river, but the weight of the crossing troops helped to hold it steady against the rushing water. When told that the river could not be crossed, Sumner replied "Impossible!? Sir, I tell you I can cross! I am ordered!" After the last man had crossed safely, the bridge collapsed and was swept away. Sedgwick's men provided the key to resisting Whiting's attack. The fighting was costly as Whiting lost three of four brigade commanders. Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton went down wounded, Robert H. Hatton was killed, and J. Johnston Pettigrew was wounded and captured. On the Union side, Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard had his right arm shattered by a Mini ball. The arm was amputated, and he would not return to action for several months.[15] The most historically significant incident of the day occurred around dusk, when Johnston was struck in the right shoulder by a bullet, immediately followed by a shell fragment hitting him in the chest. He fell unconscious from his horse with a broken right shoulder blade and two broken ribs and was evacuated to Richmond. G.W. Smith assumed temporary command of the army. Smith, plagued with ill health, was indecisive about the next steps for the battle and made a bad impression on Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General Robert E. Lee, Davis's military adviser. After the end of fighting the following day, Davis replaced Smith with Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.[16]

General Thomas Francis Meagher at the Battle of Fair Oaks, June 1, 1862.

On June 1, the Confederates renewed their assaults against the Federals, who had brought up more reinforcements and fought from strong positions, but made little headway. Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division of the II Corps had arrived, along with two brigades from Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's division of the III Corps (the third under Brig. Gen Cuvier Grover was left behind to guard the bridges at White Oak Swamp). They engaged Huger's and Longstreet's divisions, whose lines finally broke under the attacks. The fighting ended about 11:30 a.m. when the Confederates withdrew. McClellan arrived on the battlefield from his sick bed at about this time, but the Union Army did not counterattack.[17]

Battle of Seven Pines Total Confederate strength on the field was about 40,000 men in 4 divisions (out of 7 divisions and 52,000 total men under Johnson's command). Two brigades (Blanchard's and Hood's) were held in reserve and did not get into the fighting at all. Union strength was almost 52,000 men for the three army corps engaged (out of five corps and 92,000 total). All infantry brigades present on the field participated in the battle.

217

Aftermath
Both sides claimed victory with roughly equal casualties, but neither side's accomplishment was impressive. George B. McClellan's advance on Richmond was halted and the Army of Northern Virginia fell back into the Richmond defensive works. Union casualties were 5,031 (790 killed, 3,594 wounded, 647 captured or missing) and Confederate 6,134 (980 killed, 4,749 wounded, 405 captured or missing).[] The battle was frequently remembered by the Union soldiers as the Battle of Fair Oaks Station because that is where they did their best fighting, whereas the Confederates, for the same reason, called it Seven Pines. Historian Stephen W. Sears remarked that its current common name, Seven Pines, is the most appropriate because it was at the crossroads of Seven Pines that the heaviest fighting and highest casualties occurred.[18] Despite claiming victory, McClellan was shaken by the experience. He wrote to his wife, "I am tired of the sickening sight of the battlefield, with its mangled corpses & poor suffering wounded! Victory has no charms for me when purchased at such cost."[19] He redeployed all of his army except for the V Corps south of the river, and although he continued to plan for a siege and the capture of Richmond, he lost the strategic initiative. An offensive begun by the new Confederate commander, Gen. Robert E. Lee, would be planned while the Union troops passively sat in the outskirts of Richmond. The Seven Days Battles of June 25 through July 1, 1862, drove the Union Army back to the James River and saved the Confederate capital.[20] The change in leadership of the Confederate Army in the field as a result of Seven Pines had a profound effect on the war. On June 24, 1862, McClellan's massive Army of the Potomac was within 6 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) of the Confederate capital of Richmond; Union soldiers wrote that they could hear church bells ringing in the city. Within 90 days, however, Robert E. Lee had driven McClellan from the Peninsula, Pope had been soundly beaten at the Second Battle of Bull Run, and the battle lines were 20 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) from the Union capital in Washington. It would take almost two more years before the Union Army again got that close to Richmond, and almost three years before it finally captured it.

Notes
[1] Miller, p. 25. [2] Salmon, p. 88; Eicher, pp. 27374; Sears, pp. 9597. [3] Salmon, p. 90; Sears, pp. 10406. [4] Eicher, pp. 27677. [5] Eicher, p. 276. [6] Salmon, pp. 2021. [7] Sears, pp. 11820; Miller, p. 21; Salmon, pp. 9192. [8] Sears, p. 120; Miller, pp. 2122; Downs, pp. 67576; Salmon, p. 92. [9] Miller, p. 22; Eicher, p. 276; Sears, pp. 12123. [10] Eicher, p. 277; Salmon, p. 93. [11] Lowe, p. 133. [12] Lowe, pp. 135-137. [13] Sears, pp. 149-150. [14] Miller, p. 23; Eicher, pp. 27778; Salmon, p. 94. [15] Eicher, p. 278; Sears, pp. 136-38, 143; Miller, p. 23; Salmon, p. 94. [16] Sears, pp. 145; Miller, p. 24; Salmon, p. 94. [17] Sears, pp. 14245. [18] Sears, p. 149. [19] Eicher, p. 279. [20] Miller, pp. 2560.

Battle of Seven Pines

218

References
Downs, Alan C. "Fair Oaks/Seven Pines." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Lowe, Thaddeus S. C. My Balloons in Peace and War: Memoirs of Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, Chief of the Aeronautic Corps of the Army of the United States during the Civil War. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004. ISBN 978-0-7734-6522-0. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va014.htm) Virginia War Museum battle description (http://www.peninsulacampaign.org/7pines.shtml) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Sappony Church to Spotsylvania Court House.pdf)

Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.

External links
Battle of Seven Pines in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Seven_Pines_Battle_of) Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/Peninsulah.html) Prof. Thaddeus Lowe, the Civil War Years (http://www.thaddeuslowe.name/CWyears.htm) The bridge that saved an Army: Grapevine Bridge and the Battle of Fair Oaks (http://www. thisweekinthecivilwar.com/?p=1254/)

Seven Days Battles

219

Seven Days Battles


The Seven Days Battles was a series of six major battles over the seven days from June 25 to July 1, 1862, near Richmond, Virginia during the American Civil War. Confederate General Robert E. Lee drove the invading Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, away from Richmond and into a retreat down the Virginia Peninsula. The series of battles is sometimes known erroneously as the Seven Days Campaign, but it was actually the culmination of the Peninsula Campaign, not a separate campaign in its own right. The Seven Days began on June 25, 1862, with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove, but McClellan quickly lost the initiative as Lee began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville) on June 26, Gaines's Mill on June 27, the minor actions at Garnett's and Golding's Farm on June 27 and June 28, and the attack on the Union rear guard at Savage's Station on June 29. McClellan's Army of the Potomac continued its retreat toward the safety of Harrison's Landing on the James River. Lee's final opportunity to intercept the Union Army was at the Battle of Glendale on June 30, but poorly executed orders allowed his enemy to escape to a strong defensive position on Malvern Hill. At the Battle of Malvern Hill on July 1, Lee launched futile frontal assaults and suffered heavy casualties in the face of strong infantry and artillery defenses. The Seven Days ended with McClellan's army in relative safety next to the James River, having suffered almost 16,000 casualties during the retreat. Lee's army, which had been on the offensive during the Seven Days, lost over 20,000. As Lee became convinced that McClellan would not resume his threat against Richmond, he moved north for the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Maryland Campaign.

Start of the Peninsula Campaign


The Peninsula Campaign was the unsuccessful attempt by McClellan to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond and end the war. It started in March 1862, when McClellan landed his army at Fort Monroe and moved northwest, up the Virginia Peninsula beginning in early April. Confederate Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder's defensive position on the Warwick Line caught McClellan by surprise. His hopes for a quick advance foiled, McClellan ordered his army to prepare for a siege of Yorktown. Just before the siege preparations were completed, the Confederates, now under the direct command of Johnston, Map of events during the Peninsula Campaign to the Battle of Seven PinesConfederateUnion began a withdrawal toward Richmond. The first heavy fighting of the campaign occurred in the Battle of Williamsburg (May 5), in which the Union troops managed some tactical victories, but the Confederates continued their withdrawal. An amphibious flanking movement to Eltham's Landing (May 7) was ineffective in cutting off the Confederate retreat. In the Battle of Drewry's Bluff (May 15), an attempt by the United States Navy to reach Richmond by way of the James River was repulsed.[1]

Seven Days Battles As McClellan's army reached the outskirts of Richmond, a minor battle occurred at Hanover Court House (May 27), but it was followed by a surprise attack by Johnston at the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks on May 31 and June 1. The battle was inconclusive, with heavy casualties, but it had lasting effects on the campaign. Johnston was wounded and replaced on June 1 by the more aggressive Robert E. Lee. Lee spent almost a month extending his defensive lines and organizing his Army of Northern Virginia; McClellan accommodated this by sitting passively to his front, waiting for dry weather and roads, until the start of the Seven Days. Lee, who had developed a reputation for caution early in the war, knew he had no numerical superiority over McClellan, but he planned an offensive campaign that was the first indication of the aggressive nature he would display for the remainder of the war.[2]

220

Opposing forces
Further information: Seven Days Confederate order of battle, Seven Days Union order of battle The armies that fought in the Seven Days Battles comprised almost 200,000 men, which offered the potential for the largest battles of the war. However, the inexperience or caution of the generals involved usually prevented the appropriate concentration of forces and mass necessary for decisive tactical victories.

Union
Union corps commanders Confederate commanders

Maj. Gen.Stonewall Jackson

Maj. Gen.James Longstreet

Maj. Gen.John B. Magruder

Seven Days Battles

221

Maj. Gen.A. P. Hill

Maj. Gen.Benjamin Huger (general)Benjamin Huger

Maj. Gen.Theophilus H. Holmes

Brig. Gen.Edwin V. Sumner

Brig. Gen.Samuel P. Heintzelman

Brig. Gen.Erasmus D. Keyes

Brig. Gen.Fitz John Porter

Brig. Gen.William B. Franklin

McClellan's Army of the Potomac, with approximately 104,000 men,[] was organized largely as it had been at Seven Pines.[3]

Seven Days Battles II Corps, Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick. III Corps, Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny. IV Corps, Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Darius N. Couch and John J. Peck. V Corps, Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. George W. Morell, George Sykes, and George A. McCall. VI Corps, Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin commanding: divisions of Brig. Gens. Henry W. Slocum and William F. "Baldy" Smith. Reserve forces included the cavalry reserve under Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke (Jeb Stuart's father-in-law) and the supply base at White House Landing under Brig. Gen. Silas Casey.

222

Confederate
Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was larger than the one he inherited from Johnston, and, at about 92,000 men,[] the largest Confederate army assembled during the war.[4] Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, having just arrived from his victories in the Valley Campaign, commanded a force consisting of his own division (now commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder) and those of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, and Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill. Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's "Light Division" (which was so named because it traveled light and was able to maneuver and strike quickly) consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. Charles W. Field, Maxcy Gregg, Joseph R. Anderson, Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, James J. Archer, and William Dorsey Pender. Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's division consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. James L. Kemper, Richard H. Anderson, George E. Pickett, Cadmus M. Wilcox, Roger A. Pryor, and Winfield Scott Featherston. Longstreet also had operational command over Hill's Light Division. Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder commanded the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Brig. Gen. David R. Jones, and Magruder's own division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger's division consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. William Mahone, Ambrose R. Wright, Lewis A. Armistead, and Robert Ransom, Jr. Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes' division consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gens. Junius Daniel, John G. Walker, Henry A. Wise, and the cavalry brigade of Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart.

Planning for offensives


Lee's initial attack plan, similar to Johnston's plan at Seven Pines, was complex and required expert coordination and execution by all of his subordinates, but Lee knew that he could not win in a battle of attrition or siege against the Union Army. It was developed at a meeting on June 23. The Union Army straddled the rain-swollen Chickahominy River, with the bulk of the army, four corps, arrayed in a semicircular line south of the river. The remainder, the V Corps under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, was north of the river near Mechanicsville in an L-shaped line facing north-south behind Beaver Dam Creek and southeast along the Chickahominy. Lee's plan was to cross the Chickahominy with the bulk of his army to attack the Union north flank, leaving only two divisions (under Maj. Gens. Benjamin Huger and John B. Magruder) to hold a line of entrenchments against McClellan's superior strength. This would concentrate about 65,500 troops to oppose 30,000, leaving only 25,000 to protect Richmond and to contain the other 60,000 men of the Union Army. The Confederate cavalry under Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart had reconnoitered Porter's right flank (as part of a daring, although militarily pointless, circumnavigation of the entire Union Army from June 12 to June 15) and found it vulnerable.[5] Lee intended for Jackson to attack Porter's right flank early on the morning of June 26, and A.P. Hill would move from Meadow Bridge to Beaver Dam Creek, which flows into the Chickahominy, advancing on the Federal trenches.

Seven Days Battles (Lee hoped that Porter would evacuate his trenches under pressure, obviating the need for a direct frontal assault.) Following this, Longstreet and D.H. Hill would pass through Mechanicsville and join the battle. Huger and Magruder would provide diversions on their fronts to distract McClellan as to Lee's real intentions. Lee hoped that Porter would be overwhelmed from two sides by the mass of 65,000 men, and the two leading Confederate divisions would move on Cold Harbor and cut McClellan's communications with White House Landing.[6] McClellan also planned an offensive. He had received intelligence that Lee was prepared to move and that the arrival of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's force from the Shenandoah Valley was imminent. (McClellan was aware of Jackson's presence at Ashland Station, but did nothing to reinforce Porter's vulnerable corps north of the river.)[7] He decided to resume the offensive before Lee could. Anticipating Jackson's reinforcements marching from the north, he increased cavalry patrols on likely avenues of approach. He wanted to advance his siege artillery about a mile and a half closer to the city by taking the high ground on Nine Mile Road around Old Tavern. In preparation for that, he planned an attack on Oak Grove, south of Old Tavern and the Richmond and York River Railroad, which would position his men to attack Old Tavern from two directions.[8]

223

The Seven Days


Oak Grove
Further information: Battle of Oak Grove McClellan planned to advance to the west, along the axis of the Williamsburg Road, in the direction of Richmond. Between the two armies was a small, dense forest, 1200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) wide, bisected by the headwaters of White Oak Swamp. Two divisions of the III Corps were selected for the assault, commanded by Brig. Gens. Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny. Facing them was the division of Confederate Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger.[9] Soon after 8 a.m., June 25, the Union brigades of Brig. Gens. Daniel E. Sickles (the Excelsior Brigade), Cuvier Grover, both of Hooker's division, and John C. Robinson stepped off. Although Robinson and Grover made good progress on the left and in the center, Sickles's New Yorkers encountered difficulties moving through their abatis, then through the upper portions of the swamp, and finally met stiff Confederate resistance, all of which threw the Seven Days Battles, June 2627, 1862. Federal line out of alignment. Huger took advantage of the confusion by launching a counterattack with the brigade of Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright against Grover's brigade. At a crucial moment in the battle, the 25th North Carolina of Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom's brigade, in their first combat engagement, delivered a perfectly synchronized volley of rifle fire against Sickles's brigade, breaking up its delayed attack and sending the 71st New York into a panicked retreat, which Sickles described as "disgraceful confusion."[10]

Seven Days Battles Heintzelman ordered reinforcements sent forward and also notified army commander McClellan, who was attempting to manage the battle by telegraph from 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away. McClellan ordered his men to withdraw back to their entrenchments, mystifying his subordinates on the scene. Arriving at the front at 1 p.m., seeing that the situation was not as bad as he had feared, McClellan ordered his men forward to retake the ground for which they had already fought once that day. The fighting lasted until nightfall.[11] The minor battle was McClellan's only tactical offensive action against Richmond. His attack gained only 600 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) at a cost of over 1,000 casualties on both sides and was not strong enough to derail the offensive planned by Robert E. Lee, which already had been set in motion.[12]

224

Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville)


Further information: Battle of Beaver Dam Creek Lee's plan called for Jackson to begin the attack on Porter's north flank early on June 26. A.P. Hill's Light Division was to advance from Meadow Bridge when he heard Jackson's guns, clear the Union pickets from Mechanicsville, and then move to Beaver Dam Creek. D.H. Hill and Longstreet were to pass through Mechanicsville and support Jackson and A.P. Hill. South of the river, Magruder and Huger were to demonstrate to deceive the four Union corps on their front.[13] Lee's intricate plan went awry immediately. Jackson's men, fatigued from their recent campaign and lengthy march, ran at least four hours behind schedule. By 3 p.m., A.P. Hill grew impatient and began his attack without orders, a frontal assault with 11,000 men. Porter extended and strengthened his right flank and fell back to concentrate along Beaver Dam Creek and Ellerson's Mill. There, 14,000 well entrenched soldiers, aided by 32 guns in six batteries, repulsed repeated Confederate attacks with substantial casualties.[14]
This was the first of four occasions within the next seven days when Jackson would fail to display initiative, resourcefulness, or dependabilitythe very qualities that were later to raise him to the stature of one of the foremost military leaders. Col. Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas of American Wars
[15]

Jackson and his command arrived late in the afternoon and he ordered his troops to bivouac for the evening while a major battle was raging within earshot. His proximity to Porter's flank caused McClellan to order Porter to withdraw after dark behind Boatswain's Swamp, 5 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the east. McClellan was concerned that the Confederate buildup on his right flank threatened his supply line, the Richmond and York River Railroad north of the Chickahominy, and he decided to shift his base of supply to the James River. He also believed that the diversions by Huger and Magruder south of the river meant that he was seriously outnumbered. (He reported to Washington that he faced 200,000 Confederates, but there were actually 85,000.)[16] This was a strategic decision of grave importance because it meant that, without the railroad to supply his army, he would be forced to abandon his siege of Richmond. A.P. Hill, now with Longstreet and D.H. Hill behind him, continued his attack, despite orders from Lee to hold his ground. His assault was beaten back with heavy casualties.[17] Overall, the battle was a Union tactical victory, in which the Confederates suffered heavy casualties and achieved none of their specific objectives due to the seriously flawed execution of Lee's plan. Instead of over 60,000 men crushing the enemy's flank, only five brigades, about 15,000 men, had seen action. Their losses were 1,484 versus Porter's 361. Despite the short-term Union success, however, it was the start of a strategic debacle. McClellan began to withdraw his army to the southeast and never regained the initiative.[18]

Seven Days Battles

225

Gaines's Mill
Further information: Battle of Gaines's Mill By the morning of June 27, the Union forces were concentrated into a semicircle with Porter collapsing his line into an east-west salient north of the river and the four corps south of the river remaining in their original positions. McClellan ordered Porter to hold Gaines's Mill at all costs so that the army could change its base of supply to the James River. Several of McClellan's subordinates urged him to attack Magruder's division south of the river, but he feared the vast numbers of Confederates he believed to be before him and refused to capitalize on the overwhelming superiority he actually held on that front.[19] Lee continued his offensive on June 27, launching the largest Confederate attack of the war, about 57,000 men in six divisions.[20] A.P. Hill resumed his attack across Beaver Dam Creek early in the morning, but found the line lightly defended. By early afternoon, he ran into strong opposition by Porter, deployed along Boatswain's Creek and the swampy terrain was a major obstacle against the attack. As Longstreet arrived to the south of A.P. Hill, he saw the difficulty of attacking over such terrain and delayed until Stonewall Jackson could attack on Hill's left.[21] For the second time in the Seven Days, however, Jackson was late. D.H. Hill attacked the Federal right and was held off by the division of Brig. Gen. George Sykes; he backed off to await Jackson's arrival. Longstreet was ordered to conduct a diversionary attack to stabilize the lines until Jackson could arrive and attack from the north. In Longstreet's attack, Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett's brigade attempted a frontal assault and was beaten back under severe fire with heavy losses. Jackson finally reached D.H. Hill's position at 3 p.m. and began his assault at 4:30 p.m.[22] Porter's line was saved by Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's division moving into position to bolster his defense. Shortly after dark, the Confederates mounted another attack, poorly coordinated, but this time collapsing the Federal line. Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade opened a gap in the line, as did Pickett's Brigade on its second attempt of the day. By 4 a.m. on June 28, Porter withdrew across the Chickahominy, burning the bridges behind him.[23] For the second day, Magruder was able to continue fooling McClellan south of the river by employing minor diversionary attacks. He was able to occupy 60,000 Federal troops while the heavier action occurred north of the river.[24] Gaines's Mill was the only clear-cut Confederate tactical victory of the Peninsula Campaign.[25] Union casualties from the 34,214 engaged were 6,837 (894 killed, 3,107 wounded, and 2,836 captured or missing). Of the 57,018 Confederates engaged, losses totaled 7,993 (1,483 killed, 6,402 wounded, 108 missing or captured).[26] Since the Confederate assault was conducted against only a small portion of the Union Army (the V Corps, one fifth of the army), the army emerged from the battle in relatively good shape overall. However, although McClellan had already planned to shift his supply base to the James River, his defeat unnerved him and he precipitously decided to abandon his advance on Richmond.[27]

Union withdrawal
The night of June 27, McClellan ordered his entire army to withdraw to a secure base at Harrison's Landing on the James. His actions have puzzled military historians ever since. He was actually in a strong position, having withstood strong Confederate attacks, while having deployed only one of his five corps in battle. Porter had performed well against heavy odds. Furthermore, McClellan was aware that the War Department had created a new Army of Virginia and ordered it to be sent to the Peninsula to reinforce him. But Lee had unnerved him, and he surrendered the initiative. He sent a telegram to the Secretary of War that included the statement: "If I save this Army now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washingtonyou have done your best to sacrifice this Army." (The military telegraph department chose to omit this sentence from the copy given to the Secretary.)[28]

Seven Days Battles McClellan ordered Keyes's IV Corps to move west of Glendale and protect the army's withdrawal, and Porter was to move to the high ground at Malvern Hill to develop defensive positions. The supply trains were ordered to move south toward the river. McClellan departed for Harrison's Landing without specifying any exact routes of withdrawal and without designating a second-in-command. For the remainder of the Seven Days, he had no direct command of the battles. Gaines's Mill and the Union retreat across the Chickahominy was a psychological victory for the Confederacy, signaling that Richmond was out of danger.[29] Lee's cavalry reported that Union troops had abandoned their defense of the Richmond and York River Railroad and the White House supply depot on the York River. That information, plus the sighting of large dust clouds south of the Chickahominy River, finally convinced Lee that McClellan was heading for the James. Until this time, Lee anticipated that McClellan would be withdrawing to the east to protect his supply line to the York River and positioned his forces to react to that, unable to act decisively while he awaited evidence of McClellan's intentions.[30]

226

Garnett's & Golding's Farm


Further information: Battle of Garnett's & Golding's Farm While Lee's main attack at Gaines's Mill was progressing on June 27, the Confederates south of the Chickahominy performed a reconnaissance in force to determine the location of McClellan's retreating army. Magruder ordered Brig. Gen. Robert A. Toombs's brigade forward to "feel the enemy." Toombs, a Georgia politician with a disdain for professional officers, instead launched a sharp attack at dusk against Baldy Smith's VI Corps division near Old Tavern at the farm of James M. Garnett. The attack was easily repulsed by the brigade of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock.[31] On June 28, Toombs again was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance, but turned it into an attack over the same ground, meeting the enemy at the farm of Simon Gouldin (also known as Golding). Toombs took it upon himself to order his fellow brigade commander, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson, to join the assault. Two of Anderson's regiments, the 7th and 8th Georgia, preceded Toombs's brigade into the assault and were subjected to a vigorous Federal counterattack by the 49th Pennsylvania and 43rd New York, losing 156 men.[32] These were the only attacks south of the Chickahominy River in conjunction with Gaines's Mill, but they helped to convince McClellan that he was being subjected to attacks from all directions, increasing his anxiety and his determination to get his army to safety at the James.[33]

Savage's Station
Further information: Battle of Savage's Station On June 29, the bulk of McClellan's army concentrated around Savage's Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad, a Federal supply depot since just before Seven Pines, preparing for a difficult crossing through and around White Oak Swamp. It did so without centralized direction because McClellan had personally moved south of Malvern Hill after Gaines's Mill without leaving directions for corps movements during the retreat nor naming a second in command. Clouds of black smoke filled the air as the Union troops were ordered to burn anything they could not carry. Union morale plummeted, particularly so for those wounded, who realized that they were not being evacuated from Savage's Station with the rest of the Army.[34] Lee devised a complex plan to pursue and destroy McClellan's army. Longstreet's and A.P. Hill's divisions looped back toward Richmond and then southeast to the crossroads at Glendale, Holmes's division headed farther south, to the vicinity of Malvern Hill, and Magruder's division was ordered to move due east to attack the Federal rear guard. Stonewall Jackson, commanding three divisions, was to rebuild a bridge over the Chickahominy and head due south to Savage's Station, where he would link up with Magruder and deliver a strong blow that might cause the Union Army to turn around and fight during its retreat.[35] McClellan's rear guard at Savage's Station consisted five divisions from Sumner's II Corps, Heintzelman's III Corps, and Franklin's VI Corps. McClellan considered his senior corps commander, Sumner, to be incompetent, so he appointed no one to command the rear guard.[36]

Seven Days Battles Initial contact between the armies occurred at 9 a.m. on June 29, a four-regiment fight about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) west of Savage's Station, lasting for about two hours before disengaging.[37] Meanwhile, Jackson was not advancing as Lee had planned. He was taking time to rebuild bridges over the Chickahominy and he received a garbled order from Lee's chief of staff that made him believe he should stay north of the river and guard the crossings. These failures of the Confederate plan were being matched on the Union side, however. Heintzelman decided on his own that his corps was not needed to defend Savage's Station, so he decided to follow the rest of the army without informing his fellow generals.[38] Magruder was faced with the problem of attacking Sumner's 26,600 men with his own 14,000. He hesitated until 5 p.m., when he sent only two and a half brigades forward. Union artillery opened fire and pickets were sent forward to meet the assault.[39] The two brigade front of Kershaw and Semmes began to push the narrow defensive line of one of Sedgwick's brigades. Sumner managed this part of the battle erratically, selecting regiments for combat from multiple brigades almost at random. By the time all of these units reached the front, the two sides were at rough paritytwo brigades each. Although Magruder had been conservative about his attack, Sumner was even more so. Of the 26 regiments he had in his corps, only 10 were engaged at Savage's Station.[40] The fighting turned into a bloody stalemate as darkness fell and strong thunderstorms began to move in. The "Land Merrimack"the first instance of an armored railroad battery to be used in combatbombarded the Union front, with some of its shells reaching as far to the rear as the field hospital. The final action of the evening was as the Vermont Brigade, attempting to hold the flank south of the Williamsburg Road, charged into the woods and were met with murderous fire, suffering more casualties of any brigade on the field that day.[41] There were about 1,500 casualties on both sides, plus 2,500 previously wounded Union soldiers who were left to be captured when their field hospital was evacuated. Stonewall Jackson eventually crossed the river by about 2:30 a.m. on June 30, but it was too late to crush the Union Army, as Lee had hoped. General Lee reprimanded Magruder, but the fault for the lost opportunity must be shared equally with the poor staff work at Lee's own headquarters and a less than aggressive performance by Jackson.[42]

227

Seven Days Battles

228

Glendale (Frayser's Farm) and White Oak Swamp


Further information: Battle of Glendale and Battle of White Oak Swamp Most elements of the Union Army had been able to cross White Oak Swamp Creek by noon on June 30. About one third of the army had reached the James River, but the remainder was still marching between White Oak Swamp and Glendale. After inspecting the line of march that morning, McClellan rode south and boarded the ironclad USS Galena on the James.[43] Lee ordered his army to converge on the retreating Union forces, bottlenecked on the inadequate road network. The Army of the Potomac, lacking overall command coherence, presented a discontinuous, ragged defensive line. Stonewall Jackson was ordered to press the Union rear guard at the White Oak Swamp crossing while the largest part of Lee's army, some 45,000 men, would attack the Army of the Potomac in mid-retreat at Glendale, about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest, splitting it in two. Huger's division would strike first after a three-mile (5km) march on the Charles City Road, supported by Longstreet and A.P. Hill, whose divisions were about 7 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the west, in a mass attack. Holmes was ordered to capture Malvern Hill.[44]

Seven Days Battles, June 30, 1862.

The Confederate plan was once again marred by poor execution. Huger's men were slowed by felled trees obstructing the Charles City Road, spending hours chopping a new road through the thick woods. Huger failed to take any alternative route, and, fearing a counterattack, failed to participate in the battle. Magruder marched around aimlessly, unable to decide whether he should be aiding Longstreet or Holmes; by 4 p.m., Lee ordered Magruder to join Holmes on the River Road and attack Malvern Hill. Stonewall Jackson moved slowly and spent the entire day north of the creek, making only feeble efforts to cross and attack Franklin's VI Corps in the Battle of White Oak Swamp, attempting to rebuild a destroyed bridge, although adequate fords were

Seven Days Battles

229

nearby, and engaging in a pointless artillery duel. Jackson's inaction allowed some units to be detached from Franklin's corps in late afternoon to reinforce the Union troops at Glendale. Holmes's relatively inexperienced troops made no progress against Porter at Turkey Bridge on Malvern Hill, even with the reinforcements from Magruder, and were repulsed by effective artillery fire and by Federal gunboats on the James.[45] At 2 p.m., as they waited for sounds of Huger's expected attack, Lee, Longstreet, and visiting Confederate President Jefferson Davis were conferring on horseback when they came under heavy artillery fire, wounding two men and killing three horses. A.P. Hill, the commander in that sector, ordered the president and senior generals to the rear. Longstreet attempted to silence the six batteries of Federal guns firing in his direction, but long-range artillery fire proved to be inadequate. He ordered Col. Micah Jenkins to charge the batteries, which brought on a general fight around 4 p.m.[46]
Seven Days Battles, July 1, 1862.

Although belated and not initiated as planned, the assaults by the divisions of A.P. Hill and Longstreet, under Longstreet's overall command, turned out to be the only ones to follow Lee's order to attack the main Union concentration. Longstreet's 20,000 men were not reinforced by other Confederate divisions of Huger and Jackson, despite their concentration within a three-mile (5km) radius. They assaulted the disjointed Union line of 40,000 men, arranged in a two-mile (3km) arc north and south of the Glendale intersection, but the brunt of the fighting was centered on the position held by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, 6,000 men under Brig. Gen. George A. McCall, just west of the Nelson Farm. (The farm was owned by R.H. Nelson, but its former owner was named Frayser and many of the locals referred to it as Frayser's, or Frazier's, Farm.)[47] Three Confederate brigades made the assault, but Longstreet ordered them forward in a piecemeal fashion,[48] over several hours. Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper's Virginians charged through the thick woods first and emerged in front of five batteries of McCall's artillery. In their first combat experience, the brigade conducted a disorderly but enthusiastic assault, which carried them through the guns and broke through McCall's main line with Jenkins's support, followed up a few hours later by Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox's Alabamans. The Confederate brigades met stiff resistance in sometimes hand-to-hand combat.[49] On McCall's flanks, the divisions of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker (to the south) and Brig. Gens. Philip Kearny and Henry W. Slocum (to the north), held against repeated Confederate attacks. Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick's division, which had units both in reserve and around White Oak Swamp, came up to fill a gap after a brutal counterattack. Heavy fighting continued until about 8:30 p.m. Longstreet committed virtually every brigade in the divisions under his command, while on the Union side they had been fed in individually to plug holes in the line as they occurred.[50] The battle was tactically inconclusive, although Lee failed to achieve his objective of preventing the Federal escape and crippling McClellan's army, if not destroying it. Union casualties were 3,797, Confederate about the same at

Seven Days Battles 3,673, but more than 40% higher in killed and wounded. Although Jackson's wing of the army and Franklin's corps comprised tens of thousands of men, the action at White Oak Swamp included no infantry activity and was limited to primarily an artillery duel with few casualties.[51]

230

Malvern Hill
Further information: Battle of Malvern Hill The final battle of the Seven Days was the first in which the Union Army occupied favorable ground. Malvern Hill offered good observation and artillery positions, having been prepared the previous day by Porter's V Corps. McClellan himself was not present on the battlefield, having preceded his army to Harrison's Landing on the James, and Porter was the most senior of the corps commanders. The slopes were cleared of timber, providing great visibility, and the open fields to the north could be swept by deadly fire from the 250 guns[52] placed by Col. Henry J. Hunt, McClellan's chief of artillery. Beyond this space, the terrain was swampy and thickly wooded. Almost the entire Army of the Potomac occupied the hill and the line extended in a vast semicircle from Harrison's Landing on the extreme right to Brig. Gen. George W. Morell's division of Porter's corps on the extreme left, which occupied the geographically advantageous ground on the northwestern slopes of the hill.[53] Rather than flanking the position, Lee attacked it directly, hoping that his artillery would clear the way for a successful infantry assault. His plan was to attack the hill from the north on the Quaker Road, using the divisions of Stonewall Jackson, Richard S. Ewell, D.H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. William H.C. Whiting. Magruder was ordered to follow Jackson and deploy to his right when he reached the battlefield. Huger's division was to follow as well, but Lee reserved the right to position him based on developments. The divisions of Longstreet and A.P. Hill, which had been the most heavily engaged in Glendale the previous day, were held in reserve.[54] Once again, Lee's complex plan was poorly executed. The approaching soldiers were delayed by severely muddy roads and poor maps. Jackson arrived at the swampy creek called Western Run and stopped abruptly. Magruder's guides mistakenly sent him on the Long Bridge Road to the southwest, away from the battlefield. Eventually the battle line was assembled with Huger's division (brigades of Brig. Gens. Ambrose R. Wright and Lewis A. Armistead) on the Confederate right and D.H. Hill's division (brigades of Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood and Col. Evander M. Law) on the Quaker Road to the left. They awaited the Confederate bombardment before attacking.[55] Unfortunately for Lee, Henry Hunt struck first, launching one of the greatest artillery barrages in the war from 1 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. The Union gunners had superior equipment and expertise and disabled most of the Confederate batteries. Despite the setback, Lee sent his infantry forward at 3:30 p.m. and Armistead's brigade made some progress through lines of Union sharpshooters. By 4 p.m., Magruder arrived and he was ordered forward to support Armistead. His attack was piecemeal and poorly organized. Meanwhile, D. H. Hill launched his division forward along the Quaker Road, past Willis Church. Across the entire line of battle, the Confederate troops reached only within 200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) of the Union Center and were repulsed by nightfall with heavy losses.[56]
It wasn't war; it was murder. Major General D.H. Hill

Lee's army suffered 5,355 casualties (versus 3,214 Union) in this wasted effort, but continued to follow the Union army all the way to Harrison's Landing. On Evelington Heights, part of the property of Edmund Ruffin, the Confederates had an opportunity to dominate the Union camps, making their position on the bank of the James potentially untenable; although the Confederate position would be subjected to Union naval gunfire, the heights were an exceptionally strong defensive position that would have been very difficult for the Union to capture with infantry. Cavalry commander Jeb Stuart reached the heights and began bombardment with a single cannon. This alerted the Federals to the potential danger and they captured the heights before any Confederate infantry could reach the scene.[57]

Seven Days Battles

231

Aftermath
Our success has not been as great or complete as we should have desired. ... Under ordinary circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. General Robert E. Lee
[58]

My conscience is clear at least to this extentviz.: that I have honestly done the best I could; I shall leave it to others to decide whether that was the best that could have been done& if they find any who can do better am perfectly willing to step aside & give way. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, letter to his wife
[58]

The Seven Days Battles ended the Peninsula Campaign. The Army of the Potomac encamped around Berkeley Plantation, birthplace of William Henry Harrison. The Union defensive position was a strong one that Lee did not consider attacking, withdrawing instead to the defenses of Richmond. With its back to the James River, the army was protected by Union gunboats, but suffered heavily from heat, humidity, and disease. In August, they were withdrawn by order of President Lincoln to reinforce the Army of Virginia in the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run.[59] Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia suffered about 20,000 casualties (3,494 killed, 15,758 wounded, and 952 captured or missing) out of a total of over 90,000 soldiers during the Seven Days. McClellan reported casualties of about 16,000 (1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded, and 6,053 captured or missing) out of a total of 105,445. Despite their victory, many Confederates were stunned by the losses.[60] The effects of the Seven Days Battles were widespread. After a successful start on the Peninsula that foretold an early end to the war, Northern morale was crushed by McClellan's retreat. Despite heavy casualties and clumsy tactical performances by Lee and his generals, Confederate morale skyrocketed, and Lee was emboldened to continue his aggressive strategy through Second Bull Run and the Maryland Campaign. McClellan's previous position as general-in-chief of all the Union armies, vacant since March, was filled on July 23, 1862, by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, although McClellan did retain command of the Army of the Potomac. Lee reacted to the performances of his subordinates by a reorganization of his army and by forcing the reassignment of Holmes and Magruder out of Virginia.[61]

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. xi; Miller, pp. 818; Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, p. 5; Eicher, pp. 26874. Rafuse, p. 220; Miller, pp. 2025; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 26; Eicher, pp. 27580. Eicher, p. 282; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 195, 35963. Eicher, pp. 28182; Sears, Gates of Richmond, 195, 36467. Esposito, text to map 45 (called Stuart's raid "of dubious value"); Time-Life, p. 2530; Rafuse, p. 221; Harsh, pp. 8081; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 1823; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 19597; Eicher, pp. 28283. [6] Eicher, p. 283; Time-Life, p. 31; Rafuse, p. 221. [7] Salmon, pp. 9697. [8] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 183; Esposito, map 44; Time-Life, p. 31; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 4143; Salmon, p. 97. [9] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 43; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 184. [10] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 18587; Time-Life, p. 31; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 45; Salmon, p. 98. [11] Eicher, p. 283; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 4748; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 18788. [12] Salmon, p. 98; Eicher, p. 283. [13] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, p. 63; Eicher, p. 283; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 194. [14] Esposito, map 45; Harsh, p. 92; Eicher, p. 284; Salmon, pp. 99100. [15] Esposito, map 45. [16] Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 205. [17] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, pp. 66, 88; Time-Life, pp. 3436; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 62, 8081; Rafuse, pp. 22125; Salmon, pp. 100101; Eicher, pp. 28384. [18] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 208209; Eicher, pp. 28485; Salmon, p. 101. [19] Kennedy, pp. 9394; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 183208; Salmon, pp. 99101.

Seven Days Battles


[20] Time-Life, p. 45. [21] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 21026; Kennedy, p. 96; Eicher, p. 285; Salmon, pp. 103106; Time-Life, p. 45; Harsh, p. 94; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 83. [22] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 89; Eicher, p. 285; Kennedy, p. 96; Salmon, pp. 104106. [23] Kennedy, pp. 9697; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 22742; Salmon, p. 106. [24] Eicher, p. 287. [25] Salmon, p. 107. [26] Eicher, p. 288; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 289. [27] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 24951. [28] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 151; Rafuse, p. 225; Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, p. 88; Esposito, map 46; Time-Life, pp. 4748. [29] Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 213, 219; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 16465, 200. [30] Salmon, p. 107; Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 216; Rafuse, p. 225; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 156; Esposito, map 46; Time-Life, p. 49; Harsh, p. 95. [31] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 247, 258; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 143; Salmon, p. 108. [32] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 25859; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 17074; Salmon, p. 108. [33] Salmon, p. 108. [34] Miller, p. 46; Eicher, p. 290; Salmon, p. 111; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 174. [35] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 261; Salmon, p. 110; Eicher, p. 290. [36] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, 90; Eicher, p. 290; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 261; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 17984; Salmon, p. 111. [37] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 26566. [38] Esposito, map 46; Time-Life, p. 50; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 202; Eicher, p. 291; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 267; Salmon, pp. 11112. [39] Salmon, p. 112; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 270. [40] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 271; Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, p. 93; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 21220; Salmon, p. 112. [41] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 26972; Eicher, p. 291; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 191. [42] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 22223; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 274; Salmon, p. 112; Eicher, p. 291. [43] Time-Life, p. 52; Rafuse, pp. 22728; Eicher, pp. 29091; Kennedy, p. 98; Salmon, p. 113. [44] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 23135; Esposito, map 47; Eicher, p. 291; Salmon, pp. 11315. [45] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, pp. 9798; Time-Life, pp. 52, 55; Rafuse, p. 226; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 25154; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 115; Eicher, pp. 29192. [46] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 26667, 275; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 290; Kennedy, p. 100. [47] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 294; Kennedy, p. 100; Time-Life, p. 56; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 27580; Salmon, p. 116. [48] Esposito, map 47. [49] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 29499; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 281; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 116. [50] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 300306; Kennedy, p. 100; Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, pp. 104105; Time-Life, p. 59; Salmon, p. 116. [51] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 257, 300; Time-Life, p. 60; Salmon, p. 119; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 307. [52] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 307, cites 268 "available for use, not including siege artillery." [53] Time-Life, p. 63; Eicher, p. 293; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 30910. [54] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, pp. 10910; Esposito, map 47. [55] Eicher, p. 293; Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, pp. 11012. [56] Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, pp. 11619; Eicher, p. 293; Time-Life, pp. 63, 8771. [57] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 38183. [58] Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 391. [59] Rafuse, p. 231; Burton, Peninsula & Seven Days, p. 121; Time-Life, p. 72; Eicher, p. 296. [60] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 34345; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, p. 387. [61] Harsh, pp. 9697; Eicher, p. 304; Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, pp. 39198; Time-Life, pp. 9092.

232

Seven Days Battles

233

References
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Editors of Time-Life Books. Lee Takes Command: From Seven Days to Second Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4804-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle descriptions (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm#East62)

Further reading
Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8078-2552-2. Martin, David G. The Peninsula Campaign MarchJuly 1862. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1992. ISBN 978-0-938289-09-8. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Webb, Alexander S. The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=qbE8d82-ZVAC). Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 2002. ISBN 0-7858-1575-9. First published 1885. Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. ISBN 0-671-70921-6. Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. Wheeler, Richard. Sword Over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986. ISBN 0-06-015529-9.

Seven Days Battles

234

External links
Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/PeninsulaAnimation.html) [[fr:Bataille de Sept Jours]

Battle of Oak Grove


The Battle of Oak Grove, also known as the Battle of French's Field or King's School House, took place on June 25, 1862, in Henrico County, Virginia, the first of the Seven Days Battles (Peninsula Campaign) of the American Civil War. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Two Union divisions of the III Corps attacked across the headwaters of White Oak Swamp, but were repulsed by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger's Confederate division. McClellan, who was 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) in the rear, initially telegraphed to call off the attack, but ordered another attack over the same ground when he arrived at the front. Darkness halted the fighting. Union troops gained only 600 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm), at a cost of over a thousand casualties on both sides.

Background
Following the stalemate at the Battle of Seven Pines on May 31 and June 1, 1862, McClellan's Army of the Potomac sat passively in their positions around the eastern outskirts of Richmond. The new commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, used the following three and a half weeks to reorganize his army, extend his defensive lines, and plan offensive operations against McClellan's larger army. McClellan received intelligence that Lee was prepared to move and that the arrival of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's force from the Shenandoah Valley was imminent.[1] McClellan decided to resume the offensive before Lee could. Anticipating Jackson's reinforcements marching from the north, he increased cavalry patrols on likely avenues of approach. He wanted to advance his siege artillery about a mile and a half closer to the city by taking the high ground on Nine Mile Road around Old Tavern. In preparation for that, he planned an attack on Oak Grove, south of Old Tavern and the Richmond and York River Railroad, which would position his men to attack Old Tavern from two directions. Known locally for a stand of tall oak trees, Oak Grove was the site of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill's assault at Seven Pines on May 31 and had seen numerous clashes between pickets since that time.[2] The attack was planned to advance to the west, along the axis of the Williamsburg Road, in the direction of Richmond. Between the two armies was a small, dense forest, 1200 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) wide, bisected by the headwaters of White Oak Swamp. Two divisions of the III Corps were selected for the assault, commanded by Brig. Gens. Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny. Facing them was the division of Confederate Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger.[3]

Battle
At 8:30 a.m., June 25, three Union brigades stepped off in orderly line of battle. From right to left, they were commanded by Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles (the Excelsior Brigade), Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, both of Hooker's division, and Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson from Kearny's division. Although Robinson and Grover made good progress on the left and in the center, Sickles's New Yorkers encountered difficulties moving through their abatis, then through the upper portions of the swamp, and finally met stiff Confederate resistance, all of which threw the Federal line out of alignment. Huger took advantage of the confusion by launching a counterattack with the brigade of Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright against Grover's brigade.[4]

Battle of Oak Grove Adding to the confusion, one of Wright's Georgia regiments wore red Zouave uniforms. Many of Grover's men believed that only the Union Army had Zouave units, so were reluctant to fire on their own men. When they finally realized that Union troops would not be approaching from the direction of Richmond, they opened fire. At a crucial moment in the battle, the 25th North Carolina of Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom's brigade, in their first combat engagement, delivered a perfectly synchronized volley of rifle fire against Sickles's brigade, breaking up its delayed attack and sending the 71st New York into a panicked retreat, which Sickles described as "disgraceful confusion."[5] Informed of Sickles's reverse, corps commander Heintzelman ordered reinforcements sent forward and also notified army commander McClellan, who was attempting to manage the battle by telegraph from 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away. McClellan, unaware of most details of the engagement, became alarmed and at 10:30 a.m. ordered his men to withdraw back to their entrenchments, an order that mystified his subordinates on the scene. He telegraphed that he would be arriving at the front in person, which caused a 2.5 hour lull in the action. At 1 p.m., seeing that the situation was not as bad as he had feared, McClellan ordered his men forward to retake the ground for which they had already fought once that day. The fighting lasted until nightfall.[6]

235

Aftermath
The minor battle was McClellan's only tactical offensive action against Richmond. His attack gained only 600 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) at a cost of over 1,000 casualties on both sides and was not strong enough to derail the offensive planned by Robert E. Lee, which already had been set in motion. The next day, Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy River, near Mechanicsville, the first major battle of the Seven Days, and the beginning of a strategic retreat by the Union Army.[7]

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Salmon, pp. 9697. Sears, p. 183; Salmon, p. 97. Sears, p. 184. Sears, pp. 18586; Salmon, p. 98. Sears, pp. 18687; Salmon, p. 98. Sears, pp. 18788. Salmon, p. 98.

References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va015.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Oak Grove to Opequon.pdf)

Battle of Oak Grove

236

Further reading
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.

Battle of Beaver Dam Creek


The Battle of Beaver Dam Creek, also known as the Battle of Mechanicsville or Ellerson's Mill, took place on June 26, 1862, in Hanover County, Virginia, as the first major engagement[1] of the Seven Days Battles during the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. It was the start of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's counter-offensive against the Union Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, which threatened the Confederate capital of Richmond. Lee attempted to turn the Union right flank, north of the Chickahominy River, with troops under Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, but Jackson failed to arrive on time. Instead, Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill threw his division, reinforced by one of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill's brigades, into a series of futile assaults against Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps, which occupied defensive works behind Beaver Dam Creek. Confederate attacks were driven back with heavy casualties. Porter withdrew his corps safely to Gaines Mill.

Background and Lee's plan


After the Battle of Seven Pines, on May 31 and June 1, McClellan and the Army of the Potomac sat passively at the outskirts of Richmond for almost a month. Lee, newly appointed commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, devoted this period to reorganizing his army and preparing a counter-attack. He also sent for reinforcements. Stonewall Jackson arrived on June 25 from the Shenandoah Valley following his successful Valley Campaign. He brought four divisions: his own, now commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder, and those of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, and Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill[2] The Union Army straddled the rain-swollen Chickahominy River. Four of the Army's five corps were arrayed in a semicircular line south of the river. The V Corps under Brig. Gen. Porter was north of the river near Mechanicsville in an L-shaped line running north-south behind Beaver Dam Creek and southeast along the Chickahominy. Lee moved most of his army north of the Chickahominy to attack the Union north flank. He left only two divisions (under Maj.

Seven Days Battles, June 2627, 1862

Battle of Beaver Dam Creek Gens. Benjamin Huger and John B. Magruder) to face the Union main body. This concentrated about 65,000 troops against 30,000, leaving only 25,000 to protect Richmond against the other 60,000 men of the Union army. It was a risky plan that required careful execution, but Lee knew that he could not win in a battle of attrition or siege against the Union army. The Confederate cavalry under Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart had reconnoitered Porter's right flank (as part of a daring, although militarily pointless, circumnavigation of the entire Union army from June 12 to June 15) and found it vulnerable. McClellan was aware of Jackson's arrival and presence at Ashland Station, but did nothing to reinforce Porter's vulnerable corps north of the river.[3] Lee's plan called for Jackson to begin the attack on Porter's north flank early on June 26. Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Light Division was to advance from Meadow Bridge when he heard Jackson's guns, clear the Union pickets from Mechanicsville, and then move to Beaver Dam Creek. The divisions of Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and James Longstreet were to pass through Mechanicsville, D.H. Hill to support Jackson and Longstreet to support A.P. Hill. Lee expected Jackson's flanking movement to force Porter to abandon his line behind the creek, and so A. P. Hill and Longstreet would not have to attack Union entrenchments. South of the Chickahominy, Magruder and Huger were to demonstrate, deceiving the four Union corps on their front.[4]

237

Battle
Lee's intricate plan went awry immediately. Jackson's men, fatigued from their recent campaign and lengthy march, ran at least four hours behind schedule. By 3 p.m., A.P. Hill grew impatient and began his attack without orders: a frontal assault with 11,000 men. Brig. Gen. George A. McCall's Union division was forced back. Porter reinforced McCall with the brigades of Brig. Gens. John H. Martindale and Charles Griffin, and extended and strengthened his right flank. He fell back and concentrated along Beaver Dam Creek and Ellerson's Mill. There, 14,000 well entrenched infantry, supported by 32 guns in six batteries, repulsed repeated Confederate attacks with substantial casualties.[5] Jackson and his command arrived late in the afternoon. However, unable to find A.P. Hill or D.H. Hill, Jackson did nothing. Although a major battle was raging within earshot, he ordered his troops to bivouac for the evening. A.P. Hill, now with Longstreet and D.H. Hill behind him, continued his attack, despite orders from Lee to hold his ground. His assault was beaten back with more casualties.[6] Jackson did not attack, but his presence near Porter's flank caused McClellan to order Porter to withdraw after dark behind Boatswain's Swamp, five miles (8 km) to the east. McClellan was concerned that the Confederate buildup on his right flank threatened his supply line, the Richmond and York River Railroad north of the Chickahominy, and he decided to shift his base of supply to the James River. (He also believed that the demonstrations by Huger and Magruder showed that he was seriously outnumbered.) This was a strategic decision of grave import because it meant that, without the railroad to supply his army, he had to abandon his siege of Richmond.[7]

Aftermath
Overall, the battle was a Union tactical victory, in which the Confederates suffered heavy casualties and achieved none of their specific objectives due to the seriously flawed execution of Lee's plan. Instead of over 60,000 men crushing the enemy's flank, only five brigades, about 15,000 men, had seen action. Their losses were 1,484 versus Porter's 361. Lee's staff recalled that he was "deeply, bitterly disappointed"[8] by Jackson's performance, but communication breakdowns, poorly written orders from Lee, and bad judgment by most of Lee's other subordinates were also to blame.[9] Despite the Union tactical success, however, it was the start of a strategic debacle and the unraveling of the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan began to withdraw his army to the southeast and never regained the initiative. The next day the Seven Days Battles continued as Lee attacked Porter at the Battle of Gaines' Mill.[10]

Battle of Beaver Dam Creek

238

Notes
[1] The Battle of Oak Grove is considered the start of the Seven Days, but it was a very minor battle in comparison to those that followed. [2] Salmon, p. 96; Eicher, pp. 281-82. [3] Sears, pp. 195-97; Eicher, pp. 282-83. [4] Eicher, p. 283; Sears, p. 194. [5] Eicher, p. 284; Salmon, pp. 99-100. [6] Salmon, p. 101. [7] Salmon, pp. 100-01; Eicher, pp. 283-84. [8] Sears, p. 208. [9] Sears, pp. 208-09; Eicher, pp. 284-85. [10] Sears, p. 209; Salmon, p. 101.

References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va016.htm)

Further reading
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.

External links
The Battle of Beaver Dam Creek (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/beaver-dam-creek.html): Battle maps, history articles, photos, and preservation news (CWPT) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Balls Bluff to Big Bethel.pdf)

Battle of Gaines's Mill

239

Battle of Gaines's Mill


The Battle of Gaines's Mill, sometimes known as the First Battle of Cold Harbor or the Battle of Chickahominy River, took place on June 27, 1862, in Hanover County, Virginia, as the third of the Seven Days Battles (Peninsula Campaign) of the American Civil War. Following the inconclusive Battle of Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville) the previous day, Confederate General Robert E. Lee renewed his attacks against the right flank of the Union Army, relatively isolated on the northern side of the Chickahominy River. There, Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps had established a strong defensive line behind Boatswain's Swamp. Lee's force was destined to launch the largest Confederate attack of the war, about 57,000 men in six divisions. Porter's reinforced V Corps held fast for the afternoon as the Confederate attacked in a disjointed manner, first with the division of Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill, then Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, suffering heavy casualties. The arrival of Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's command was delayed, preventing the full concentration of Confederate force before Porter received some reinforcements from the VI Corps. At dusk, the Confederates finally mounted a coordinated assault that broke Porter's line and drove his men back toward the Chickahominy river. The Federals retreated across the river during the night. The Confederates were too disorganized to pursue the main Union force. Gaines's Mill saved Richmond for the Confederacy in 1862; the tactical defeat there convinced Army of the Potomac commander Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to abandon his advance on Richmond and begin a retreat to the James River. The battle occurred in almost the same location as the 1864 Battle of Cold Harbor and had a similar number of total casualties.

Background
Further information: Seven Days Battles McClellan's Army of the Potomac had pushed to within a few miles of the Confederate capital of Richmond and had stalled following the Battle of Seven Pines in late May 1862. Lee wanted to take the initiative, believing that remaining on the strategic defensive would play into Union hands and allow the Confederacy to be worn down. He planned to shift his 90,000-man Confederate army to the north of Richmond, and attack McClellan's right flank. The Confederate cavalry under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart had ridden around McClellan's army, confirming that the flank was opennot anchored on Totopotomoy Creekand vulnerable. Lee planned to use Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's force, transported by rail from the Shenandoah Valley, to attack on McClellan's right and rear, while the remainder of his army under Maj. Gens. A.P. Hill, James Longstreet, and D.H. Hill attacked from the direction of Mechanicsville.[1] The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, but the first major battle started the next day when Lee launched a large-scale assault against McClellan at the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek (or Mechanicsville). Lee attacked Porter's V Corps north of the Chickahominy, while the bulk of the Union Army was relatively unoccupied south of the river. Although this battle was a tactical victory for the Union, McClellan realized that he could not keep Porter's corps in place with Jackson threatening his flank. He ordered Porter to begin a withdrawal and at the same time decided to change the army's base of supply from White House on the Pamunkey River to Harrison's Landing on the James River. (This decision was fatal to McClellan's campaign because by abandoning the railroad that led from the Pamunkey, he would no longer be able to supply his planned siege of Richmond with the necessary heavy artillery.)[2] Several of McClellan's subordinates urged him to attack the Confederate division of Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder south of the Chickahominy, but he feared the vast numbers of Confederates he believed to be before him and failed to capitalize on the overwhelming superiority he actually held on that front. Magruder assisted in this misapprehension by ordering frequent, noisy movements of small units back and forth and by using groups of slaves with drums to simulate large marching columns. Furthermore, the Union Army Balloon Corps, which had performed

Battle of Gaines's Mill the only aerial observation during the Peninsula Campaign, was now joined by a Confederate competitor. Capt. Langdon Cheves of South Carolina had constructed a multicolored balloon of dress silk obtained from Charleston and Savannah, which sailed aloft tethered to a boxcar on the York River Railroad, manned by Maj. Edward Porter Alexander. The appearance of this balloon reinforced McClellan's fear that the Confederates were planning for an offensive against his left flank. For the second day, the Confederates were able to continue fooling McClellan south of the river by employing minor diversionary attacks to command the attention of 60,000 Federal troops while the heavier action occurred north of the river.[3] The order to Porter's corps came just before dawn and they did not have adequate time to prepare a strong rear guard for the withdrawal, resulting in numerous men from Brig. Gen. George A. McCall's division being captured by the advancing Confederates. Porter selected a new defensive line on a plateau behind Boatswain's Swamp, just to the southeast of a mill owned by Dr. William F. Gaines. It was a strong position, with two divisions laid out in a semicircleBrig. Gen. George W. Morell on the left and Brig. Gen. George Sykes on the rightand two divisions in reserveBrig. Gen. George A. McCall and Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, the latter on loan to Porter from Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's VI Corps. Slocum's division had not crossed the river by the start of the battle, held up by McClellan's concern about an impending attack on Franklin's front.[4]

240

The ruins of Gaines's Mill, burned by a Union cavalry raid in 1864, led by Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan.

Lee's offensive plan for June 27 was similar to that of the preceding day. He would use A.P. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions to pressure Porter's corps as it withdrew, while Stonewall Jackson, augmented by D.H. Hill (Jackson's brother-in-law), hit Porter's right and rear. The combined effort of all of Lee's force was destined to be the largest Confederate attack of the war, about 57,000 men in six divisions. Lee traveled to Walnut Grove Church to meet with Jackson and describe the plan, which called for Jackson to march toward Old Cold Harbor, and then south beyond Porter's flank. Unfortunately, Lee made Seven Days Battles, June 2627, 1862. ConfederateUnion incorrect assumptions about Porter's disposition. He assumed that the V Corps would defend the line of Powhite Creek, somewhat to the west of Porter's actual location.[5]

Battle of Gaines's Mill

241

Battle
The first actions of the battle occurred between noon and 1 p.m. on June 27 after D.H. Hill's division reached Old Cold Harbor, where it was scheduled to link up with Stonewall Jackson's command. Hill pushed through the crossroads with two brigades, which encountered unexpected infantry fire. Seeking to suppress the fire, he brought forward the Jeff Davis Battery from Alabama, but it was soon outgunned by two six-gun batteries manned by U.S. regulars from Brig. Gen. George Sykes's division. Hill was surprised at the level of resistance and also that he seemed to be meeting the front of the Union force, not the expected flank, so he determined to wait for Jackson's arrival before moving further. The noise from this engagement failed to reach General Lee at his headquarters, the house owned by William Hogan, named "Selwyn".[6]

A.P. Hill's attack

A.P. Hill's division had moved across Beaver Dam Creek early in the morning, finding the former Union line lightly defended. As they proceeded eastward and approached Gaines's Mill at about the time that D.H. Hill's men were engaged, Porter formally asked McClellan to send Slocum's division across the Chickahominy over Alexander's Bridge to support him. Hill's lead brigade, under Brig. Gen. Ewell's attack Maxcy Gregg, was held up by skirmishers from Col. Hiram Berdan's 1st U.S. Sharpshooters and the 9th Massachusetts Infantry. By early afternoon, he ran into strong opposition by Porter, deployed along Boatswain's Creek and the swampy terrain was a major obstacle against the

Battle of Gaines's Mill

242

advance. Attacks by the brigades of Brig. Gens. Gregg, Dorsey Pender, Joseph R. Anderson, and Lawrence O'Bryan Branch made little headway. A particularly bloody engagement occurred as the 1st South Carolina Rifles attacked a Massachusetts battery, but were repulsed by Zouaves of the 5th New York, which inflicted 57% casualties (76 killed, 221 wounded, and 58 missing) on the South Carolinians, the greatest Confederate regimental losses of the day.[7] Instead of pursuing a fleeing enemy, as his orders had directed, A.P. Hill had General Confederate attack attacked an entrenched Union position, losing about 2,000 of his 13,200 men in the failed attempt. Combined with his attacks at Mechanicsville the previous day, the Light Division had lost over a quarter of its men. General McClellan was encouraged by the telegrams Porter sent back to his headquarters a few miles to the rear. He replied, "If the enemy are retiring and you are a chasseur, pitch in." He also told Franklin to cross the river over the Duane bridge and attack the enemy's flank if he saw a chance, but he was dismayed to hear that the VI Corps commander had destroyed the bridge for fear of a possible enemy attack. At the same time, Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner of the II Corps reported enemy activity in his front. McClellan's optimism was dashed and he ordered that his headquarters equipment be packed up in preparation for the retreat. On the Confederate side, General Lee had been an active participant in the failed assault, rallying his troops too close to the front for their comfort. As Longstreet arrived to the southwest of A.P. Hill, he saw the difficulty of attacking over such terrain and delayed until Stonewall Jackson could attack on Hill's left.[8] For the second time in the Seven Days, however, Jackson was late. A guide from the 4th Virginia Cavalry, Pvt. John Henry Timberlake, had misunderstood Jackson's intent and led him down the wrong road. After they counter-marched, losing about an hour, Jackson's troops found the road to Old Cold Harbor obstructed by trees felled by the retreating Union army and were harassed by sharpshooters, delaying their arrival. The first of Jackson's command to reach the battlefield was the division of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, who was met by Lee's aide, Walter Taylor, and instructed to move into action immediately. Lee was concerned that Porter would counterattack the weakened troops of A.P. Hill, so he ordered Longstreet to conduct a diversionary attack to stabilize the lines until Jackson's full command could arrive and attack from the north. In Longstreet's attack, Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett's brigade attempted a frontal assault and was beaten back under severe fire with heavy losses. Pickett himself was wounded in the shoulder. Confederate President Jefferson Davis was among the party witnessing Pickett's failed attempt.[9] Ewell began his attack immediately, around 3:30 p.m., without waiting for his entire division to come on line. General Lee's instructions were to advance along the same axis used by the brigades of Gregg and Branch, to maintain the momentum of the attack. He sent in his lead brigade, Louisianans under Col. Isaac Seymour, commanding in Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor's absence for medical reasons. Seymour was relatively inexperienced and his troops became confused in the woods and bogs of Boatswain's Swamp. Their confusion increased when Col. Seymour was killed by a Union rifle volley. Maj. Roberdeau Wheat, the colorful leader of the Louisiana Tigers Battalion, moved to the front to lead the brigade, but he was also killed with a bullet through his head. The Louisiana

Battle of Gaines's Mill Brigade withdrew from the battle. Ewell's attack continued with two regiments from the brigade of Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble, but they could not advance beyond the swamp, falling with about 20% casualties. Porter was starting to receive reinforcements from Slocum's division and he brought forward troops to feed into gaps in his line. However, despite telegrams from Porter for more assistance, General McClellan gave no thought to the advantages of a counterattack. He asked his corps commanders south of the river whether they had any troops they could spare. When no one volunteered, he directed Sumner of the II Corps to send two brigadesabout one tenth of the armyacross the river, but because of the distances involved they would not reach the scene for another three hours.[10] When Stonewall Jackson finally reached Old Cold Harbor, weary from the marching and counter-marching, he began to arrange his troops and those of D.H. Hill to trap the Federals he expected to be driven east by Longstreet and A.P. Hill. He soon received instructions from General Lee that informed him of the current situation and he began to prepare his command to assault the main Federal line. Faulty staff work prevented his men from moving forward for over an hour. While Jackson rode back and forth distractedly, his chaplain, Maj. Robert L. Dabney, took the initiative to find the divisions of Brig. Gens. William H. C. Whiting and Charles S. Winder and corrected the garbled instructions they had received. Generals Lee and Jackson met on the Telegraph Road to coordinate a final assault across the entire Federal line.[11] Lee's assault at 7 p.m. was conducted by 16 brigades, about 32,100 men. Porter had about 34,000 men to defend the line, but many of these were worn out from the previous attacks and command cohesion was hampered by feeding isolated reinforcements into the line to fill gaps. Nevertheless, they had the advantages of good defensible terrain and superiority in artillery. The Confederates were not able to advance "Battle of Gaines Mill, Valley of the simultaneously in a neat battle line over the 2.25-mile front, but rushed Chickahominy, Virginia, June 27, 1862." Records forward and were repulsed intermittently in smaller unit actions. On of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 1985. the Confederate left, the assault by D.H. Hill's division met heavy resistance from the regulars of Sykes's division around the McGehee house. In the center, the Georgians of Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton's brigade were in their first battle. They pushed forward with the assistance of the Stonewall Brigade of Winder's division, along with Elzey's and Trimble's of Ewell's division. The Confederate right was opposed by the most difficult terrain, a quarter-mile open wheatfield that sloped down to Boatswain's Swamp and then faced two lines of Union defenders on higher ground. James Longstreet wrote in his report, "I was, in fact, in the position from which the enemy wished us to attack him."[12] As the sun was starting to go down, William Whiting's division achieved the breakthrough on Longstreet's front. Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's Texas Brigade move forward swiftly and aggressively and broke a hole in the line. Pickett's brigade also succeeded in its second assault of the day. Confederate breakthroughs on their center and right could not be countered and the Union line crumbled. Sykes's regulars conducted an orderly withdrawal from the McGehee house to Grapevine Bridge. The Union brigades of Brig. Gens. Thomas F. Meagher and William H. French arrived from the II Corps, too late to help other than as a rear guard for Porter's retreat. A battalion of the 5th U.S. Cavalry under Captain Charles J. Whiting made a desperate charge against the Texas Brigade, but was forced to surrender after heavy losses. By 4 a.m. on June 28, Porter withdrew across the Chickahominy, burning the bridges behind him.[13]

243

Battle of Gaines's Mill

244

Aftermath
Gaines's Mill was an intense battle, the largest of the Seven Days and the only clear-cut Confederate tactical victory of the Peninsula Campaign.[] Union casualties from the 34,214 engaged were 6,837 (894 killed, 3,107 wounded, and 2,836 captured or missing). Of the 57,018 Confederates engaged, losses totaled 7,993 (1,483 killed, 6,402 wounded, 108 missing or captured).[] Since the Confederate assault was conducted against only a small portion of the Union Army (the V Corps, one fifth of the army), the army emerged from the battle in relatively good shape overall. Lee's victory, his first of the war, could have been more complete if it were not for the mishaps of Stonewall Jackson. Historian Stephen W. Sears speculates that it were not for Jackson's misdirected march and his poor staff work, the major assault that Lee unleashed at 7 p.m. could have occurred three or four hours earlier. This would have put Porter in grave jeopardy, without any last-minute reinforcements and the cover of darkness. He quotes Edward Porter Alexander, prominent Confederate artillery officer and postwar historian: "Had Jackson attacked when he first arrived, or during A.P. Hill's attack, we would have had an easy victorycomparatively, & would have captured most of Porter's command."[14] Although McClellan had already planned to shift his supply base to the James River, his defeat unnerved him and he precipitously decided to abandon his advance on Richmond and begin the retreat of his entire army to the James. Gaines's Mill and the Union retreat across the Chickahominy was a psychological victory for the Confederacy, signaling that Richmond was out of danger.[15]

Notes
[1] Salmon, pp. 64, 9697. [2] Kennedy, pp. 9394; Burton, pp. 7981; Sears, pp. 183208; Salmon, pp. 99101. [3] Eicher, p. 287; Sears, pp. 21516. Sears notes that stories about the silk coming from donated ladies' dresses is apocryphal. [4] Salmon, pp. 102103; Sears, pp. 21415. [5] Time-Life, p. 45; Sears, pp. 21719. [6] Sears, pp. 21921; Burton, p. 103. Salmon, p. 102, states that the artillery engagement occurred at 2 p.m. Welcher, p. 819, states 11 a.m. [7] Burton, pp. 9199; Sears, pp. 22326; Kennedy, p. 96; Eicher, p. 285; Salmon, pp. 103104. [8] Burton, pp. 94, 99101; Sears, pp. 227. [9] Burton, pp. 102104; Sears, pp. 22728, 23233; Welcher, p. 820. [10] Sears, pp, 22834; Eicher, p. 285; Burton, pp. 102104, 113, 129; Kennedy, p. 96; Salmon, pp. 104106. [11] Sears, pp, 23435; Burton, pp. 11011; Salmon, p. 106. [12] Sears, pp, 23640; Burton, pp. 11727. [13] Burton, pp. 12736; Kennedy, pp. 9697; Sears, pp. 24042; Salmon, p. 106; Welcher, p. 820. [14] Sears, pp. 24950. [15] Sears, pp. 25051.

References
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Editors of Time-Life Books. Lee Takes Command: From Seven Days to Second Bull Run. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4804-1. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6.

Battle of Gaines's Mill Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 18611865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va017.htm)

245

Further reading
Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/Atlases/american_civil_war/Civil_war.html). Harsh, Joseph L. Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 18611862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2. Miller, William J. The Battles for Richmond, 1862. National Park Service Civil War Series. Fort Washington, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1996. ISBN 0-915992-93-0. Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Spruill, Matt III, and Matt Spruill IV. Echoes of Thunder: A Guide to the Seven Days Battles. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006. ISBN 1-57233-547-5.

External links
Battle of Gaines's Mill in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Gaines_s_Mill_Battle_of) The Battle of Gaines' Mill (http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gaines-mill.html): Battle maps, history articles, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust) Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/PeninsulaAnimation.html)

Battle of Garnett's & Golding's Farm

246

Battle of Garnett's & Golding's Farm


The Battle of Garnett's and Golding's Farms took place June 2728, 1862, in Henrico County, Virginia, as part of the Seven Days Battles (Peninsula Campaign) of the American Civil War. While battle raged north of the Chickahominy River at Gaines's Mill on June 27, Confederate Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder conducted a reconnaissance in force that developed into a minor attack against the Union line south of the river at Garnett's Farm. The Confederates attacked again near Golding's Farm on the morning of June 28 but were easily repulsed. These "fixing" actions heightened the fear in the Union high command that an all-out attack would be launched against them south of the river.

Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac quickly lost the initiative as Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek on June 26 and Gaines's Mill on June 27. The Army of the Potomac began its retreat toward the James River.[1] Lee's cavalry reported that Union troops had abandoned their defense of the Richmond and York River Railroad and the White House supply depot on the York River. That information, plus the sighting of large dust clouds south of the Chickahominy River, convinced Lee that McClellan was heading for the James.[2]

Battle
While Lee's main attack at Gaines' Mill was progressing on June 27, the Confederates south of the Chickahominy performed a reconnaissance in force to determine the location of McClellan's retreating army. Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder, who up to this time had engaged the Union forces on the Peninsula primarily with theatrical diversions, ordered Brig. Gen. Robert A. Toombs's brigade forward to "feel the enemy." Toombs, a Georgia politician with a disdain for professional officers, instead launched a sharp attack at dusk against Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith's VI Corps division near Old Tavern at the farm of James M. Garnett. The attack was easily repulsed by the brigade of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, inflicting 271 casualties among the Georgians.[3] On June 28, Toombs again was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance, but turned it into an attack over the same ground, meeting the enemy at the farm of Simon Gouldin (also known as Golding). Toombs took it upon himself to order his fellow brigade commander, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson, to join the assault. Two of Anderson's regiments, the 7th and 8th Georgia, preceded Toombs's brigade into the assault and were subjected to a vigorous Federal counterattack by the 49th Pennsylvania and 43rd New York, losing 156 men.[4]

Aftermath
Union casualties were 189, Confederate 438.[] These were the only attacks south of the Chickahominy River in conjunction with Gaines's Mill, but they helped to convince McClellan that he was being subjected to attacks from all directions, increasing his anxiety and his determination to get his army to safety at the James.[5] Lee's pursuit of the main bulk of McClellan's army continued on June 29 at the Battle of Savage's Station.

Notes
[1] Salmon, p. 64. [2] Salmon, p. 107. [3] Sears, pp. 247, 258; Salmon, p. 108. [4] Sears, pp. 25859; Salmon, p. 108. [5] Salmon, p. 108.

Battle of Garnett's & Golding's Farm

247

References
Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6.

External links
National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va018.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Gaines Mill to Guard Hill.pdf)

Battle of Savage's Station


The Battle of Savage's Station took place on June 29, 1862, in Henrico County, Virginia, as fourth of the Seven Days Battles (Peninsula Campaign) of the American Civil War. The main body of the Union Army of the Potomac began a general withdrawal toward the James River. Confederate Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder pursued along the railroad and the Williamsburg Road and struck Maj. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner's II Corps (the Union rearguard) with three brigades near Savage's Station, while Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's divisions were stalled north of the Chickahominy River. Union forces continued to withdraw across White Oak Swamp, abandoning supplies and more than 2,500 wounded soldiers in a field hospital.

Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac quickly lost the initiative as Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek on June 26, Gaines' Mill on June 27, and the minor actions at Garnett's and Golding's Farm on June 27 and June 28. The Army of the Potomac continued its retreat toward the James River.[1] The bulk of McClellan's army concentrated around Savage's Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad, preparing for a difficult crossing through and around White Oak Swamp. It did so without centralized direction because McClellan had personally moved south of Malvern Hill after Gaines' Mill without leaving directions for corps movements during the retreat nor naming a second in command. Clouds of black smoke filled the air as the Union troops were ordered to burn anything they could not carry. Union morale plummeted, particularly so for those wounded, who realized that they were not being evacuated from Savage's Station with the rest of the Army.[2] Lee devised a complex plan to pursue and destroy McClellan's army. While the divisions of Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and A.P. Hill looped back toward Richmond and then southeast to the crossroads at Glendale, and Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes's division headed farther south, to the vicinity of Malvern Hill, Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder's division was ordered to move due east along the Williamsburg Road and the York River Railroad to attack the Federal rear guard. Stonewall Jackson, commanding his own division, as well as the divisions of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill and Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, was to rebuild a bridge over the Chickahominy and head due south to Savage's Station, where he would link up with Magruder and deliver a strong blow that might cause the Union Army to turn around and fight during its retreat.[3]

Battle of Savage's Station McClellan's rear guard at Savage's Station consisted of the II Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner (two divisions), the III Corps, under Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman (two divisions), and the VI Corps, under Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin (one division). McClellan considered his senior corps commander, Sumner, to be incompetent, so he appointed no one to command the rear guard.[4]

248

Battle
Initial contact between the armies occurred at 9 a.m. on June 29. On the farm and orchards owned by a Mr. Allen, about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) west of Savage's Station, two Georgia regiments from the brigade of Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson fought against two Pennsylvania regiments from Sumner's corps for about two hours before disengaging, suffering 28 casualties to the Pennsylvanians' 119. The highest ranking casualty was Confederate Brig. Gen. Richard Griffith, who was mortally wounded by a Union shell fragment.[5] Magruder, who was alleged to be under the influence of morphine to combat a bout of indigestion, was confused and became concerned that he might be attacked by a superior force. He requested reinforcements from Lee, who ordered two brigades from the division of Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger to assist, under the condition that they would have to be returned if they were not engaged by 2 p.m.[6] Meanwhile, Jackson was not advancing as Lee had planned. He was taking time to rebuild bridges over the Chickahominy and he received a garbled order from Lee's chief of staff that made him believe he should stay north of the river and guard the crossings. These failures of the Confederate plan were being matched on the Union side, however. Heintzelman decided on his own that his corps was not needed to defend Savage's Station, Sumner's and Franklin's being sufficient, so he decided to follow the rest of the army without informing his fellow generals.[7] Magruder was forced to give up the two brigades from Huger's division at 2 p.m. and was faced with the problem of attacking Sumner's 26,600 men with his own 14,000. He hesitated until 5 p.m., when he sent only two and a half brigades forward. Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw commanded the left flank, Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes the center, and Col. William Barksdale (Griffith's Brigade) the right. Franklin and Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick were on a reconnaissance to the west of Savage's Station when they saw Kershaw's brigade approaching. Their immediate assumption was that these were men from Heintzelman's corps, but they soon realized their mistake. This was the first indication of Heintzelman's unannounced departure and Sumner, for one, was particularly outraged, refusing to speak to Heintzelman the following day. Union artillery opened fire and pickets were sent forward to meet the assault.[8] Magruder's attack was accompanied by the first armored railroad battery to be used in combat. Earlier in June, General Lee had hoped to counter the approach of McClellan's siege artillery by rail by using his own weapon: a 32-pounder Brooke naval rifle, shielded by a sloping casemate of railroad iron, nicknamed the "Land Merrimack." It was pushed by a locomotive at about the speed of the marching infantry.[9] However, even with this impressive weapon, which outgunned anything the Federal artillerists possessed, the results of Magruder's decision to send only part of his smaller force against a much larger enemy were predictable.[10] The first Union unit to engage was one of Sedgwick's brigades, Philadelphians led by Brig. Gen. William W. Burns, but his defensive line proved inadequate to cover the two brigade front of Kershaw and Semmes. Sumner managed this part of the battle erratically, selecting regiments for combat almost at random. He sent in two of Burns's regiments, and then the 1st Minnesota Infantry from another brigade in Sedgwick's division, and finally one regiment each from two different brigades in Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division. By the time all of these units reached the front, the two sides were at rough paritytwo brigades each. Although Magruder had been conservative about his attack, Sumner was even more so. Of the 26 regiments he had in his corps, only 10 were engaged at Savage's Station.[11] The fighting turned into a bloody stalemate as darkness fell and strong thunderstorms began to move in. The Land Merrimack bombarded the Union front, with some of its shells reaching as far to the rear as the field hospital. The final actions of the evening were by the Vermont Brigade, commanded by Colonel William T. H. Brooks, of Brig.

Battle of Savage's Station Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith's division. Attempting to hold the flank south of the Williamsburg Road, the Vermonters charged into the woods and were met with murderous fire, suffering more casualties of any brigade on the field that day. The brigade as a whole took 439 casualties; the 5th Vermont regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Lewis A. Grant, lost nearly half of its men, 209 of 428.[12]

249

Aftermath
The battle was a stalemate at the cost of about 1,500 casualties on both sides, plus 2,500 previously wounded Union soldiers who were left to be captured when their field hospital was evacuated. Stonewall Jackson eventually crossed the river by about 2:30 a.m. on June 30, but it was too late to crush the Union Army, as Lee had hoped. Most of the Army of the Potomac crossed White Oak Swamp Creek unmolested by noon on June 30. General Lee reprimanded Magruder in a dispatch: "I regret much that you have made so little progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory that pursuit should be most vigorous. ... We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely." However, the fault for the lost opportunity must be shared equally with the poor staff work at Lee's own headquarters and a less than aggressive performance by Jackson. The Seven Days continued with the much larger Battle of Glendale and the Battle of White Oak Swamp on June 30.[13]

Notes
[1] Salmon, p. 64. [2] Eicher, p. 290; Salmon, p. 111. [3] Sears, p. 261; Salmon, p. 110; Eicher, p. 290. [4] Eicher, p. 290; Sears, p. 261; Salmon, p. 111. [5] Sears, pp. 265-66. [6] Salmon, p. 111. [7] Eicher, p. 291; Sears, p. 267; Salmon, pp. 111-12. [8] Salmon, p. 112; Sears, p. 270. [9] Sears, pp. 269-70. [10] Eicher, p. 291. [11] Sears, p. 271; Salmon, p. 112. [12] Sears, pp. 271-72; Eicher, p. 291. [13] Sears, p. 274; Salmon, p. 112; Eicher, p. 291.

References
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide (http://www.bibliobase.com/history/readerscomp/ civwar/html/cw_000106_entries.htm). 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va019.htm) CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/Sappony Church to Spotsylvania Court House.pdf)

Battle of Savage's Station

250

Further reading
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Burton, Brian K. The Peninsula & Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-6246-1.

External links
Battle of Savage's Station in Encyclopedia Virginia (http://encyclopediavirginia.org/ Savage_s_Station_Battle_of)

Battle of White Oak Swamp


The Battle of White Oak Swamp took place on June 30, 1862 in Henrico County, Virginia as part of the Seven Days Battles (Peninsula Campaign) of the American Civil War. As the Union Army of the Potomac retreated southeast toward the James River, its rearguard under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin stopped Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's divisions at the White Oak Bridge crossing, resulting in an artillery duel, while the main Battle of Glendale raged two miles (3 km) farther south around Frayser's Farm. White Oak Swamp is generally considered to be part of the larger Glendale engagement. Because of this resistance from Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's VI Corps, Jackson was prevented from joining the consolidated assault on the Union Army at Glendale that had been ordered by General Robert E. Lee, producing an inconclusive result, but one in which the Union Army avoided destruction and was able to assume a strong defensive position at Malvern Hill.

Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but McClellan quickly lost the initiative as Lee began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek on June 26, Gaines's Mill on June 27, the minor actions at Garnett's and Golding's Farm on June 27 and June 28, and the attack on the Union rear guard at Savage's Station on June 29. McClellan's Army of the Potomac continued its retreat toward the safety of Harrison's Landing on the James River.[1] Most elements of McClellan's army had been able to cross White Oak Swamp Creek by noon on June 30. About one third of the army had reached the James River, but the remainder was still marching between White Oak Swamp and Glendale.[2] Lee ordered his Army of Northern Virginia to converge on the retreating Union forces, bottlenecked on the inadequate road network. Stonewall Jackson was ordered to press the Union rear guard at the White Oak Swamp crossing while the largest part of Lee's army, some 45,000 men, would attack the Army of the Potomac in mid-retreat at Glendale, about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest, splitting it in two.[3] Stonewall Jackson had acquired fame for his brilliant campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, but had performed poorly so far under Lee's command in the Seven Days.[4] Perhaps too fatigued from his campaign and travel from the Valley, he arrived late at Mechanicsville (Beaver Dam Creek) and inexplicably ordered his men to bivouac for the night within clear earshot of the battle. He was late and disoriented at Gaines's Mill. He was late again at Savage's Station.[5] The upcoming action in support of Lee's assault at Glendale would offer him another opportunity. Jackson and Lee met privately on the morning of June 30 at Savage's Station and Lee's exact orders were not recorded, but they apparently were for Jackson to march to White Oak Swamp and engage the Union forces there to prevent them from reinforcing the remainder of the rear guard at Glendale.[6]

Battle of White Oak Swamp The last Union unit to travel south through White Oak Swamp, and thus Jackson's target, was the VI Corps under Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisting of the divisions of Brig. Gens. William F. "Baldy" Smith and Israel B. Richardson.[6]

251

Battle
Jackson's men marched south on the White Oak Road with their artillery chief, Colonel Stapleton Crutchfield, at the head of the column. They marched slowly because they were accompanied by thousands of wounded Union prisoners and many of the stores that they obtained at Savage's Station. They found that the single bridge over the swamp had been burned two hours earlier. Jackson arrived at noon and approved Crutchfield's gun emplacement that was designed to fire diagonally from a ridge across the swamp against the Union batteries and infantry positions that they saw about 300 yards (unknown operator: u'strong'm) away. At 2 p.m. on June 30, seven Confederate batteries of 31 guns opened fire, catching the Union troops by surprise and disabling several of their cannons.[7] After ordering his engineers to begin rebuilding the bridge, Jackson directed Col. Thomas T. Munford's 2nd Virginia Cavalry to cross the swamp and capture some of the Union guns abandoned during the bombardment. As the men Seven Days Battles, June 30, 1862. and horses waded through water that was belly deep and fouled with debris, Jackson and Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill crossed the river to perform a personal reconnaissance. A Union artillery shell exploded only a few feet away from the generals mounted on horseback, although neither was injured. Jackson saw that Union artillery and infantry was reinforcing the position, and that Federal sharpshooters would play havoc with his engineers on the bridge. He realized that this was not a place that he could make an opposed crossing.[8] Munford reported that he found a ford a quarter of a mile downstream that would be suitable for the infantry to cross. Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton found a closer point at which a simple bridge could be built for infantry. Jackson ordered him to build the bridge, but took no specific action to cross the swamp, having decided that it was infeasible to attack if he could not cross his artillery. While the artillery duel across the swamp escalated to over 40 guns, and while the battle at Glendale raged less than 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) away, Jackson sat beneath a large oak tree and fell asleep for over an hour.[9]

Battle of White Oak Swamp

252

Aftermath
Jackson's inaction allowed some units to be detached from Franklin's corps in late afternoon to reinforce the Union troops at Glendale. Jackson did not inform Lee of his situation and Lee did not send anyone to find Jackson until it was too late to make a difference. Although Jackson's wing of the Army and Franklin's corps comprised tens of thousands of men, the action at White Oak Swamp included no infantry activity and was limited to primarily an artillery duel. The Confederates lost 3 artillerymen killed and 12 wounded, but there is no exact record of the number of Union casualties; historian Brian K. Burton estimates as many as 100 Union casualties, with the highest losses in the 5th New Hampshire, which had 5 men killed and 9 wounded.[] After dinner with his staff that night, Jackson fell asleep again, with a biscuit clenched between his teeth. Upon awakening he announced, "Now, gentlemen, let us at once to bed, and rise with the dawn, and see if tomorrow we can do something." Two weeks later he offered an explanation for his unusually lethargic conduct at the battle: "If General Lee had wanted me, he could have sent for me."[10] Lee never criticized Jackson's performance in the battle.[11] Edward Porter Alexander, the prominent Confederate artillery commander and postwar historian, lamented about the great lost opportunity at Glendale and White Oak Swamp: "When one thinks of the great chances in General Lee's grasp that one summer afternoon, it is enough to make one cry ... to think that our Stonewall Jackson lost them."[12]

Notes
[1] Salmon, p. 64. [2] Eicher, pp. 290-91; Kennedy, p. 98; Salmon, p. 113. [3] Eicher, p. 291; Salmon, pp. 113-15. [4] See, for instance, Freeman, R.E. Lee, vol. 2, p. 247: "... by every test, Jackson had failed throughout the Seven Days." [5] Salmon, pp. 64-65. [6] Salmon, p. 117. [7] Robertson, p. 493; Salmon, p. 117. [8] Robertson, p. 494; Salmon, p. 117. [9] Robertson, pp. 494-95; Salmon, pp. 117-19. [10] Robertson, pp. 495-96. [11] Sears, p. 278. [12] Robertson, p. 496.

References
Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee, A Biography (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/ Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/home.html). 4 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 193435. OCLC166632575. Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6. Robertson, James I., Jr. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997. ISBN 0-02-864685-1. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. National Park Service battle description (http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va020a.htm)

Battle of White Oak Swamp CWSAC Report Update (http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/CWSII/VirginiaBattlefieldProfiles/White oak Road to Wilderness.pdf)

253

External links
Animated history of the Peninsula Campaign (http://www.historyanimated.com/Peninsulah.html)

Battle of Glendale
The Battle of Glendale, also known as the Battle of Frayser's Farm, Frazier's Farm, Nelson's Farm, Charles City Crossroads, New Market Road, or Riddell's Shop, took place on June 30, 1862, in Henrico County, Virginia, on the sixth day of the Seven Days Battles (Peninsula Campaign) of the American Civil War.[1] The Confederate divisions of Maj. Gens. Benjamin Huger, James Longstreet, and A.P. Hill converged on the retreating Union Army in the vicinity of Glendale or Frayser's Farm. Longstreet's and Hill's attacks penetrated the Union defense near Willis Church. Union counterattacks sealed the break and saved their line of retreat along the Willis Church Road. Huger's advance was stopped on the Charles City Road. The divisions led by Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson were delayed by Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's corps at White Oak Swamp. Confederate Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes made a feeble attempt to attack the Union left flank at Turkey Bridge but was driven back. This had been Lee's best chance to cut off the Union army from the James River. That night, the Union army established a strong position on Malvern Hill.[2]

Background
The Seven Days Battles began with a Union attack in the minor Battle of Oak Grove on June 25, 1862, but McClellan quickly lost the initiative as Lee began a series of attacks at Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville) on June 26, Gaines's Mill on June 27, the minor actions at Garnett's and Golding's Farm on June 27 and June 28, and the attack on the Union rear guard at Savage's Station on June 29. McClellan's Army of the Potomac continued its retreat toward the safety of Harrison's Landing on the James River.[3] After Gaines's Mill, McClellan left his army with no clear instructions on routes of withdrawal and without naming a second-in-command. The bulk of the V Corps (less McCall), under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, moved to occupy Malvern Hill, while the remaining four corps of the Army of the Potomac were essentially operating independently in their fighting withdrawal. Most elements of the army had been able to cross White Oak Swamp Creek by noon on June 30. About one third of the army had reached the James River, but the remainder was still marching between White Oak Swamp and Glendale. (Glendale was the name of a tiny community at the intersection of the Charles City Road and the Quaker Road, or Willis Church Road, which led over Malvern Hill to the James River.)[4] After inspecting the line of march that morning, McClellan rode south and boarded the ironclad USS Galena on the James.[5] Lee ordered his Army of Northern Virginia to converge on the retreating Union forces, bottlenecked on the inadequate road network. The Army of the Potomac, lacking overall command coherence, presented a discontinuous, ragged defensive line. Stonewall Jackson was ordered to press the Union rear guard at the White Oak Swamp crossing while the largest part of Lee's army, some 45,000 men, would attack the Army of the Potomac in mid-retreat at Glendale, about 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) southwest, splitting it in two. Huger's division would strike first after a three-mile (5 km) march on the Charles City Road, supported by Longstreet and A.P. Hill, whose divisions were about 7 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) to the west, in a mass attack. Holmes was ordered to cannonade retreating Federals near Malvern Hill.[6]

Battle of Glendale

254

Battle
As with most of the Seven Days Battles, Lee's plan was poorly executed. Huger was slowed by felled trees obstructing the Charles City Road, a result of the efforts of pioneers from Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's division. Huger had his men spend hours chopping a new road through the thick woods in what became known as the "Battle of the Axes". He failed to take any alternative route, and, fearing a counterattack, failed to participate in the battle. By 4 p.m., Lee ordered Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder to join Holmes on the River Road and attack Malvern Hill, the left flank of the Union line, then ordered him to assist Longstreet, so his division spent the day countermarching. Stonewall Jackson moved slowly and spent the entire day north of the creek, making only feeble efforts to cross and attack Franklin's VI Corps in the Battle of White Oak Swamp, attempting to force back the enemy so that a destroyed bridge could be rebuilt, although adequate fords were nearby, by a fruitless artillery duel. (Despite his stunning victories in the recent Valley Campaign, or perhaps due to the fatigue of Seven Days Battles, June 30, 1862. that campaign, Jackson's contributions to the Seven Days were marred by slow execution and poor judgment throughout) His presence did draw two of Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick's three brigades, which had been defending the Charles City crossroads, north as reinforcements. McCall's division had stopped at Charles City Crossroads on its march to rejoin Porter. The gap in the line left by Sedgwick was noticed and plugged by his three brigades. Holmes's inexperienced troops (from his Department of North Carolina, attached to the Army of Northern Virginia) made no progress against Porter at Turkey Bridge and Malvern Hill and were repulsed by artillery fire and by the Federal gunboats Galena and Aroostook on the James.[7] At 2 p.m., as they waited for sounds of Huger's expected attack, Lee, Longstreet, and visiting Confederate President Jefferson Davis were conferring on horseback when they came under heavy artillery fire, wounding two men and killing three horses. A.P. Hill, the commander in that sector, ordered the president and senior generals to the rear. Longstreet attempted to silence the six batteries of Federal guns firing in his direction, but long-range artillery fire proved to be inadequate. He ordered Col. Micah Jenkins to charge the batteries, which brought on a general fight around 4 p.m.[8] Although belated and not initiated as planned, the assaults by the divisions of A.P. Hill and Longstreet, under Longstreet's overall command, turned out to be the only ones to follow Lee's order to attack the main Union concentration. Longstreet's 20,000 men were not reinforced by other Confederate divisions of Huger and Jackson, despite their concentration within a three-mile 3 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) radius. They assaulted the disjointed Union line of 40,000 men, arranged in a 2 miles (unknown operator: u'strong'km) arc north and south of the Glendale intersection, but the brunt of the fighting was centered on the position held by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, 6,000 men under Brig. Gen. George A. McCall, just west of the

Battle of Glendale Nelson Farm owned by Nelson, north of Willis Church. (The farm was owned by R.H. Nelson, but its former owner was named Frayser and many of the locals referred to it as Frayser's, or Frazier's, Farm.)[9] McCall's division included the brigades of Brig. Gen. George G. Meade on the right and Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour on the left, with the brigade of Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds (led by Col. Seneca G. Simmons since Reynolds's capture at Boatswain's Swamp after Gaines's Mill) in reserve.[10] Three Confederate brigades were sent forward in the assault, from north to south: Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, Col. Micah Jenkins (Anderson's Brigade), and Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper. Longstreet ordered them forward in a piecemeal fashion, over several hours. Kemper's Virginians charged through the thick woods first and emerged in front of five batteries of McCall's artillery. In their first combat experience, the brigade conducted a disorderly but enthusiastic assault, which carried them through the guns and broke through McCall's main line with Jenkins's support, followed up a few hours later by Wilcox's brigade of Alabamians. The Confederate brigades met stiff resistance from Meade and Seymour in bitter hand-to-hand combat where men stabbed each other with bayonets and used rifles as clubs. Officers even took to using their (normally ornamental) swords as weapons. Meade was wounded in the fighting, two of his artillery batteries captured (Lt. Alanson Randol's and Capt. James Cooper's), but one was retaken. McCall was captured when he mistakenly rode into the Confederate picket line, looking for positions to place his rallied men.[11] On McCall's northern flank, the division of Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny held against repeated Confederate attacks with reinforcements of Caldwell's brigade and two brigades from Slocum's division. On the southern flank, Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker's division repelled and once pursued minor attacks. Sedgwick's division, whose brigades had returned from near White Oak Swamp, came up to fill a gap after a brutal counterattack. Heavy fighting continued until about 8:30 p.m. Longstreet committed virtually every brigade in the divisions under his command, while on the Union side they had been fed in individually to plug holes in the line as they occurred.[12]

255

Aftermath
The battle was tactically inconclusive, although Lee failed to achieve his objective of preventing the Federal escape and crippling McClellan's army, if not destroying it. Longstreet's performance had been poor, sending in brigade after brigade in a piecemeal fashion, rather than striking with concentrated force in the manner for which he would be known later in the war. He also was not supported by Huger and Jackson, as Lee had planned. Instead of attacking, both generals merely kept their divisions on the north side of White Oak Swamp and launching no action other than an occasional artillery exchange. Union casualties were 3,797 (297 killed, 1,696 wounded, and 1,804 missing or captured). Confederate casualties were comparable in total3,673 (638 killed, 2,814 wounded, and 221 missing)but more than 40% higher in killed and wounded. Longstreet lost more than a quarter of his division.[13] Union generals Meade and Edwin V. Sumner and Confederate generals Joseph R. Anderson, Dorsey Pender, and Winfield S. Featherston were wounded.[] On the evening of June 30, McClellan, who had witnessed none of the fighting, wired the War Department: "My Army has behaved superbly and have done all that men could do. If none of us escape we shall at least have done honor to the country. I shall do my best to save the Army." He later requested 50,000 reinforcements (which the War Department had no chance of providing). "With them, I will retrieve our fortunes."[14] McClellan has received significant criticism from historians about his detachment from the battle, sailing on the Galena out of touch while his men fought. Ethan Rafuse wrote that after McClellan supervised the deployment of three corps near the Glendale crossroads, what he did next "almost defies belief. ... Even though his men were at the time engaged in a fierce battle near Glendale ... he spent the afternoon on board the Galena, dining with [Captain] Rodgers and traveling briefly up river to watch the gunboat shelling of a Confederate division that had been spotted marching east along the River road toward Malvern Hill." Brian K. Burton wrote that, "more than on any other day, McClellan's judgment on the thirtieth is suspect. He had arranged for signal communications between Malvern Hill and the river but that is a poor substitute. To leave units from five different corps at a vital point with no overall commander is to court disaster."

Battle of Glendale Stephen W. Sears wrote when McClellan deserted his army on the Glendale and Malvern Hill battlefields during the Seven Days, he was guilty of dereliction of duty."[15] After the battle, Lee wrote, "Could the other commands have cooperated in this action, the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy."[16] Confederate Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill was even more direct: "Had all our troops been at Frayser's Farm, there would have been no Malvern Hill."[17] Confederate Brig. Gen. Edward Porter Alexander wrote after the war that, "Never, before or after, did the fates put such a prize within our reach. It is my individual belief that on two occasions in the four years, we were within reach of military successes so great that we might have hoped to end the war with our independence. ... The first was at Bull Run [in] July 1861 ... This [second] chance of June 30, 1862 impresses me as the best of all."[18] Lee would have only one more opportunity to intercept McClellan's army before it reached the safety of the river and the end of the Seven Days, at the Battle of Malvern Hill on July 1.[19]

256

Notes
[1] The NPS battle summary (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va020b. htm) lists the alternative names for the battle, although most other sources do not mention Riddell's Shop. Riddell's blacksmith shop was located at the Glendale crossroads (Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 278) and was an alternative name for the Glendale Cross Roads (Welcher, p. 825). Another engagement took place in this area on June 13, 1864, during the Overland Campaign, and the name Riddell's Shop is usually used for that. [2] NPS (http:/ / www. cr. nps. gov/ hps/ abpp/ battles/ va020b. htm). [3] Salmon, p. 64. [4] Burton, p. 165. [5] Eicher, pp. 29091; Kennedy, p. 98; Salmon, p. 113. [6] Eicher, p. 291; Salmon, pp. 11315; Burton, pp. 26869; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 291. [7] Burton, pp. 25758, 27375; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 115; Eicher, pp. 29192. [8] Burton, p. 275; Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 290; Kennedy, p. 100. [9] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 294. [10] Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 116. [11] Burton, pp. 289, 29596; Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 29499; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 116. [12] Sears, Gates of Richmond, pp. 300306; Burton, pp. 28286; Kennedy, p. 100; Salmon, p. 116. [13] Sears, Gates of Richmond, p. 307. [14] Wert, pp. 11617. [15] Rafuse, p. 227; Burton, p. 243; Sears, Controversies and Commanders, p. 17. [16] Lee's battle report, Official Records, Series I, Vol XI/2 [S# 13]. [17] Alexander, p. 98. [18] Alexander, pp. 109110. [19] Salmon, p. 66.

References
Alexander, Edward P. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. ISBN 0-8078-4722-4. Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-253-33963-4. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website (http://www. dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/). Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6.

Battle of Glendale Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4. Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4. Sears, Stephen W. Controversies & Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1999. ISBN 0-395-86760-6. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-89919-790-6. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion (http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm): a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union a