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N. Structural Realism after Kenneth Waltz the Cold War
Some studentsof in-
ternational politicsbelieve thatrealismis obsolete.1They argue that,although realism's concepts of anarchy, self-help, and power balancing may have been appropriateto a bygone era, theyhave been displaced by changed conditions and eclipsed by better ideas. New times call for new thinking.Changing conditionsrequirerevised theoriesor entirely different ones. True,if the conditionsthata theorycontemplatedhave changed, the theory no longer applies. But what sorts of changes would alter the international political systemso profoundlythat old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant?Changes ofthe systemwould do it; changes in the systemwould not. Within-system changes take place all the time,some important, some not. Big in the means of transportation, and war fighting, for changes communication, how states and other agents interact.Such changes example, stronglyaffect occur at the unit level. In modern history, perhaps in all of history, or the introduction nuclear weaponry was the greatestof such changes. Yet in the of nuclear era, international politics remains a self-helparena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system. of Changes in the structure the systemare distinctfromchanges at the unit level. Thus, changes in polarityalso affect how statesprovide fortheirsecurity Significant changes take place when the number of great powers reduces to two or one. With more than two, states rely for theirsecurityboth on their
Kenneth Waltz, is N. FordProfessor PoliticalScienceat theUniversity California, former of of Berkeley, a Research Associate theInstitute Warand Peace Studiesand Adjunct at of of Professor Columbia University. I am indebted to Karen Adams and RobertRauchhaus forhelp on this articlefromits conception to its completion.For insightful criticisms wish to thank RobertArt,Richard I and constructive WarnerSchilling,and Mark Sheetz. Betts,Barbara Farnham,Anne Fox, RobertJervis, 1. For example, RichardNed Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War,and the Failure W. of Realism," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 249-277; Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall Security, 1999), pp. 5-55; Bruce Russett,GraspingtheDemocratic Peace: Principles a Post-Cold WarPeace for (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993); Paul Schroeder,"Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory,"International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108-148; and JohnA. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. ProgressiveResearch Programs:An ApPoliticalScience praisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition,"American Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912.
International Secuirity, 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41 Vol. ? 2000 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute Technology of
International Security 25:1 | 6
own internalefforts and on alliances theymay make with others.Competition in multipolarsystemsis more complicated than competitionin bipolar ones because uncertainties about the comparativecapabilities of states multiplyas numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and strengthof coalitionsare hard to make. Both changes of weaponry and changes of polarity were big ones with ramifications that spread through the system, yet they did not transform it. If the systemwere transformed, international politics would no longer be international politics,and the past would no longer serve as a guide to the future.We would begin to call internationalpolitics by another name, as some do. The terms"world politics" or "global politics,"forexample, suggest that politics among self-interestedstates concerned with their security has been replaced by some otherkind of politics or perhaps by no politics at all. What changes,one may wonder,would turninternational politicsintosomething distinctly different? The answer commonly given is that international and realismis being renderedobsolete as democpoliticsis being transformed its racy extends its sway,as interdependence tightens grip,and as institutions smooth the way to peace. I consider these points in successive sections. A fourthsection explains why realisttheoryretainsits explanatorypower after the Cold War.
and Democracy Peace
The end of the Cold War coincided with what many took to be a new democratic wave. The trend toward democracy combined with Michael Doyle's rediscoveryof the peaceful behavior of liberal democraticstates interse contributesstrongly the belief that war is obsolescent,if not obsolete, among to the advanced industrialstates of the world.2 The democraticpeace thesis holds that democracies do not fightdemocracies. Notice that I say "thesis," not "theory" The belief that democracies constitutea zone of peace rests on a perceived high correlationbetween formand international outcome. Francis Fukuyama thinksthat governmental the correlation perfect: is Never once has a democracyfoughtanotherdemocracy JackLevy says that it is "the closest thingwe have to an empiricallaw
2. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and ForeignAffairs, Parts 1 and 2," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4 (Summer and Fall 1983); and Doyle, "Kant: Liberalism and World Politics,"American PoliticalScienceReview, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
LiberalWar:American Politicsand International Security (Ithaca.7 Conformity countriesto a prescribed 3. Germanyturnedout not to British.S. and American view afterAugust of 1914. ChristopherLayne."International Security. Ido Oren. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.and War. Rabb.This was Immanuel Kant's point. 4."Kant.6 That rathergives the game away Liberal democracies have at times prepared forwars against other liberal democracies and have sometimes come close to fighting them. ShouldAmerica SpreadDemocracy? Debate (CamthatGermany'sdemocraticcontrolof bridge. are 5.as factsdo. his LiberalPeace."American PoliticalScienceReview. The explanationgiven generallyruns this way: Democracies of the right kind (i. Subsequent Kant references found in this work. competitive suffrage. 1997). Vol. Liberalism. The termhe used was Rechtsstaat republic. 56. pp. ChristopherLayne. Perceptionsof Imperial of Vol. JackS. pp. No. 662. pp.Mass. Levy.. "Domestic Politics and War.and his definition a republic was so restrictive or of that it was hard to believe that even one of them could come into existence. 6.forthcoming). FrancisFukuyama. 2 (Fall 1995). eds. for example. 157ff.Y: Cornell University Press. Waltz. No. JohnM. 87-125.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 7 the in the study of international relations. TheOriginand Prevention Major Wars(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity of Press. 4 (1991). have not a theory we but a purportedfact begging foran explanation. 5-49. in the A second half of Layne and Sean M. 2 (Fall 1994). 88. Cf. No. 1989). 20.4And iftheydid. Germany. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. How. Lynn-Jones. Owen. could Britain and France fighteach other over Fashoda in 1898 when Germany lurked in the background? In emphasizing the internationalpolitical reasons for democracies not fightingeach other. Vol. No. 2 (June1962).a freepress. And how does one definewhat the rightsort of democracyis? Some American scholars thoughtthatWilhelmine Germany was the very model of a modern democratic state with a wide honest elections. parties. Vol. p. let alone two or more. N." International Security. JohnOwen tried to finessethe problem of definition arguing thatdemocracies thatperceive one anotherto be liberal by democracies will not fight. Vol. of Layne gets to the heartof the matter."in RobertI.. "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon.a legislaturethat controlledthe purse. who can say thattheywould continue to be of the rightsort or continueto be democracies at all? The shortand sad lifeof the WeimarRepublic is a reminder. and a highlycompetentbureaucracy5But in the French. ."3 But. if it is true thatdemocracies rest reliablyat peace among themselves. liberal ones) are peaceful in relationto one another. 7. argues convincingly foreignand military policy was no weaker than France's or Britain's. 19. 24. No. 19. 2 (Fall 1994). Rotbergand Theodore K. be a democracyof the rightkind. "The Subjectivity the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U. KennethN."PoliticalScienceand Politics.e.. p.: MIT Press." International Security. ChristopherLayne shows that some wars between democracieswere avertednot because of the reluctanceof democracies to fighteach other but for fear of a thirdparty-a good realist reason.
. THE CAUSES OF WAR To explain war is easier than to understandthe conditionsof peace.with enough democracies in the world. Over the centuries. This is a conclusion thatKant would not sustain.thatis. would do it wrong. 254-256. Gerhard Ritter.Grasping Democratic the Peace.The ideal of nineteenth-century liberalswas the police state. The guarantee of the state's proper external behavior would derive fromits admirable internalqualities. The ideal of the laissez-fairestate finds many counterparts among studentsof international politicswith theiryen to get the power out of power politics. Francis Fukuyama finds it "perfectlypossible to imagine anarchic state systems that are nonetheless peaceful. so long as it remained democratic. since at least the seventeenthcenis tury"8Thus the structure removed fromstructural theoryDemocraticstates would be so confident the peace-preserving of effects democracythatthey of would no longer fear that another state. Leopold von Ranke.the sure way to abolish war. The American William Graham Sumner and many othersshared theirdoubts. liberalshave shown a strongdesire to get the politicsout of politics.International Security 25:1 | 8 politicalformmay eliminatesome of the causes of war. and Russett. German historiansat the turn of the nineteenthcenturywondered whetherpeacefullyinclined states could be planted and expected to grow where dangers fromoutside pressed daily upon them.and the structure of structural theory Proponents of the democraticpeace thesis write as though the spread of of democracy will negate the effects anarchy No causes of conflictand war will any longer be found at the structurallevel.the national out of international politics.9Kant a centuryearlier entertainedthe same worry The 8. . and Otto Hintze.TheEnd ofHistory theLastMan (New York:Free Press. it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy. the state that would confineits activitiesto catchingcriminalsand enforcing contracts.pp.1992).The democraticpeace thesiswill hold only if all of the causes of war lie inside of states. 24. For example. p.the dependence out of interdependence. the politicsout of international out politics. ."That is Kant's answer: The natural state is the state of war.is to abolish international politics. it cannot eliminateall of them. FrancisFukuyama. Under the conditions of international politics.war recurs. then. the relativeout of relativegains. 9.the securitydilemma of states) that have dominated practice . Bruce Russett believes that. If one asks what may cause war." He sees no reason to associate anarchy with war. the simple answer is "anything.
1" Some of the major democracies-Britain in the nineteenth centuryand the United States in the twentieth century-have been among the most powerful states of theireras. 1975. The first the duty of the state is to defend itself. . Powerful statesoftengain theirends by peaceful means where weaker states eitherfail or have to resortto war.thereis no such thingas an unjust war. Everyone has also known at least since David Hume thatwe have no reason to believe thatthe association of events provides a basis forinferring presence of a causal relation. 12."may be involved merelyin the conditionof a more powerfulneighborpriorto any action at all.Americanpolicy may have been wise in both cases. and outside of a juridical order none but the state itselfcan definethe actions required. Immanuel Kant. his Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections theRecentTransformationWorld on of Politics(New York:HarperCollins.The White House Years(Boston: Little..So do the instanceswhen a democracydid fight 10. D. troopswhose mere presencemade fighting war elected rulerof Chile.As Henry Kissingerput it: "I don't see why we need to stand by of and watch a countrygo Communist due to the irresponsibility its own people.JohnMueller the properlyspeculates that it is not democracythat causes peace but that other conditions cause both democracy and peace. pp. (New York:Harper and Row. W. trans. Hastie (Edinburgh:T. The Philosophy Law.1979)."13That is the way it is with democracies-their people may show bad judgment. "Lesion of a less powerfulcountry.Twenty Years' Crisis:An Introduction theStudyofInternational to Relations.Realismafter Cold War | 9 the Structural seventhpropositionof his "Principlesof the Political Order" avers thatestablishmentof the proper constitution internally requiresthe proper orderingof externalrelationsof states. was sysunnecessary Salvador Allende."Is War Still BecomingObsolete?" paper presentedat the annual meetingof the cf. a 23.12 deemed the demoThus. 1995).Washington. Every student of international politics is aware of the statisticaldata supportingthe democraticpeace thesis.000troopswithina week.pp. and T.because its leaders thoughtthat his governmentwas taking a wrong turn. 11.Brown. 1946). "The KissingerDoctrine. 35. and in the State of Nature an attack under such circumstanceswould be In warrantable. February27. 129-132. 13. 55ff. the Americangovernment craticallyelected Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic too weak to bring The United States toppled his governmentby sending order to his country. Quoted in AnthonyLewis." Kant writes. but its actions surely cast doubt on the democratic anotherdemocpeace thesis. 17.withoutthe open tematically use of force. 1887). chap."10 the state of nature.p. Edward Hallett Carr. JohnMueller. Clark. 218. 2d ed. AmericanPoliticalScience Association."New York Times.C. of p. democratically and effectively underminedby the United States. and see Henry Kissinger."Wayward" democraciesare especiallytempting objectsof intervention by otherdemocracies thatwish to save them. August-September1991.
In 1914. In response to domestic interests. Holland. the United States and Britainbecame more democratic.the structure international of politicswould remain anarchic.JohnQuincy Adams. The structureof internationalpolitics is not transformed changes by internalto states. In the absence of an externalauthority. as has happened forexample in Pakistan and Jordan. I am temptedto say thatthe democraticpeace thesisin the formin which A its proponentscast it is irrefutable. p. but even if all states became democratic. Indeed. McDougall.France and Britainwere among the principal adversaries in the great power politics of the nineteenth century.yes. 1997). No.International Security 25:1 | 10 racy. and the possibilityof war was at times seriously entertainedon both sides of the Atlantic. Venice.He answered thattherehave been "almost as many popular as royal wars. The problemis heightened because liberal democracies. Kenneth N.14 do the instances in which democraticallyelected legislatureshave So clamored forwar. CrusaderState (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Quoted in Walter A. Germanyfollowed 14. Waltz. averred "that the governmentof a Republic with the leaders of a freepeople as neighborwas as capable of intriguing In as ing monarchs."PS: PoliticalScienceand Politics. 5. state cannot be sure that today's friendwill not be a tomorrow's enemy Indeed. 4 (December 1991). PromisedLand. Carthage.Rome. but the Dominican Republic and Chile were not liberal democracies nor perceived as such by the United States. "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective." He cited the many wars foughtby republican Sparta. liberal democracy at war with another countryis unlikelyto call it a liberal democracy Democracies may live at peace with democracies. . 24. and Mueller. the democraticpluralismof Germanywas an underlying cause of the war. 28 and n. as they prepare for a war they may fear.as they were earlier. in response to JamesMonroe's contrary claim. Athens. See. for example. and doubts about the latter's democraticstandingmerelyillustratethe problem of definition. and Britain. Once one begins to go down thatroad."Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" p. begin to look less liberal and will look less liberal still if they begin to fight one."'15 the latterhalf of the nineteenthcentury. 36. Vol. thereis no place to stop.however widespread the changes may be. democraticEngland and France foughtdemocraticGermany. 15. One can of course say. Their becoming democracies did not change their behavior toward each other.bitternessgrew between them.In Federalist to Paper number six. Alexander Hamilton asked whetherthe thirteen states of the Confederacymightlive peacefullywith one anotheras freelyconstituted republics. democracies have at times behaved as though today's democracyis today's enemyand a presentthreat them.
Tokyo. urged the United States to take measures to enhance democracy around the world. Page quoted in Waltz." During the Vietnam of War. WarrenChristopher. 16.many Americans would say that Japan was not a democracy afterall. theveryexistenceof undemocratic political and intellectualleaders have oftentaken this view. aside fromwhat they do. During World War I.Secretary State Dean Rusk claimed that the "United States cannot be is secure untilthe totalinternational environment ideologicallysafe.p. WalterHines Page. aside fromwhat theydo.we mightsay. Part 2. Doyle. The task. and thenadd as a word of essentialcautionthattheinternal excellenceofstates is a brittle basis of peace. Rusk quoted in Layne. p.Thus former of claimed that"demoSecretary StateWarrenChristopher cratic nations rarely start wars or threatentheir neighbors."18 Policies statesis a danger to others. And today if a war thata few have fearedwere foughtby the United States and Japan.FormerArmyChiefof Staff Americanmilitary General Gordon Sullivan. "Kant or Cant. as Michael Doyle has noted. DEMOCRATIC WARS Democracies coexist with undemocraticstates. .fight least theirshare at of wars against others.Democracies promote war because they at times decide that the way to preserve peace is to defeatnondemocraticstates and make them democratic. 17." replacingthe negative aim of containmentwith a positive one: "To promote democracy. the State.will be taken up by the with some enthusiasm. and ForeignAffairs.-JapanRelationship:The Responsibility Change.Japan. Americanambassador to England.S.Bureau of Public Affairs.March 11. Liberal Legacies. State.and War:A Theoretical Analysis(New York: Columbia University Press. 1994 (U. forexample. 1959). 121. favoreda new military "model. What'can we conclude? Democracies rarelyfight democracies. in claimed thatthere"is no security any partof theworld where people cannot thinkof a government withouta king and never will be. simplybecause theyare undemocratic. Liberal interventionismis again on the march. one fears. 46."17 One might suggest that he tryhis propositionout in Central or South America.theydo.PresidentBill Clintonand his national security adviser. 3." p. "The U. Man. Citizens of democraticstates also tend to thinkof undemocraticstates as bad.AnthonyLake. 18. but merelya one-party state.American aside." address to to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives.16 Citizens of democraticstates tend to thinkof their countriesas good.S. 337.Structural Realismafter Cold War I 11 the policies bound to frighten both Britainand Russia." p. "Kant. Departmentof Officeof Public Communication). simply because they are democratic.Although democracies seldom fight democracies.
"21 because crusaders go to war for righteous causes. is war fervor people and theirrepresentatives at timeshard to contain."The Returnof the Bomb.Forceand Statecraft: ed.25:1 | 12 International Security Other voices urge us to enter and economic prosperity. 64.1973).P. 2d Diplomatic Problems Our Time. or it is a crime." Having apparently solved the problem of justice at home.23 Democraticgovernments may respond to internalpolitical imperahave tives when theyshould be respondingto externalones. if the world can be made safe for democracy only by making it and to use thembecomes a duty.The thenall means are permitted democratic. p.his party would have lost the next election. the latterholds. which they define for themselvesand tryto impose on others. for 22.peace has to be contrived. Make ThistheLast War(New York:G."20 R.even iftheywish to.H. alas. 15. into a "struggleto ensure thatpeople are governed well. thought. 22 (1994). 1998. For in task. Turregano and RickyLynnWaddell.Thus British constrained electoralcalculationsto deferpreventive by Prime MinisterStanley Baldwin said that if he had called in 1935 forBritish rearmamentagainst the German threat. war among self-directed doing so is a difficult breakout.democracies no doubt fewer than others.Thus of Hans Morgenthau believed that "the democraticselection and responsibility as system morality an effective of government officials destroyedinternational of restraint. and governmentsare sometimes measures. Quoted in Clemson G. All governments their faults. Gordon Craig and Alexander George. But.5thed. ." New Republic.and all statesare at timesdeficient accomplishingit. p. Peter Beinart. Politics amongNations:TheStruggle Powerand Peace. of The Militaryand Operations Other than War. 19. (New York: Knopf. 1990)."19 regional stability. of 23. p. 20.or even tryto arouse it. Tawney Crusades are frightening said: "Either war is a crusade. 1.p."Journal PoliticalScience. any government. 1945). as Kant believed. Morgenthau. Hans J. That peace may prevail among democraticstates is a comforting The obverse of the proposition-that democracy may promote war against If undemocraticstates-is disturbing. "the strugglefor liberal government As becomes a strugglenot simplyforjustice but forsurvival. 21. (New York:OxfordUniversity Press. August 3. Quoted in Michael Straight. "FromParadigm to Paradigm Shift: Vol."22 states will occasionally Since. we cannot even say for sure thatthe spread of democracywill bringa net decrease in the amount of war in the world.but that is not good enough to sustain the democraticpeace thesis. Putnam's Sons.One mighthave hoped thatAmericans would have learned thattheyare not verygood at causing democracyabroad. 27. 248. p. Democratic leaders may respond to the fervorfor war that theircitizens sometimesdisplay.
As a matterof fact. The intervention. In the first. Two hundred years later.Devotees of the democraticpeace thesis overlook it.JohnStuartMill.Kant hoped therepublicanform would gradually take hold in the world.thenthe country witha capability of creatingthem may be temptedto do so. If the democraticpeace thesisis right. a unipolar world. Ifthe conditionsof peace are lacking. to and Bill Clintonare all interventionist liberals. Ever since liberals first it expressed theirviews. in Peace is maintainedby a delicate balance of internaland externalrestraints.remarkably.one may notice that even forworthyends. and prosperity them. Woodrow Wilson.One may believe.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 13 the Witha republicestablishedin a strongstate. Inside of. to work to upliftbenightedpeoples and bring the benefitsof liberty. peace depends on a precarious balance of forces. one has to wonder whetherdemocracy is safe forthe world.which it had previouslyaccepted. structural realisttheoryis wrong. If the world is now safe fordemocracy. Some have urged liberalstates justice. . are to at the whim of the stronger. with Kant. oftenbrings more harm than good. while agreeingon the benefits to the world. States having a surplus of power are temptedto use it.Otherliberals. In the second.as the United States is now. in a bipolar world. denied the jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of Justice. In both it cases. overreaction. theyhave been divided. forexample. it flauntedthe law embodied in theCharter of the Organization of AmericanStates. as well as outside of.America provided the hope. Kant insists. the United States demonstrateda as disregarded decade ago by mining Nicaraguan waters and by invading Panama. The effect heightenedwhen one democratic is statebecomes dominant. In 1795. that republics are by and large good states and that unbalanced power is a danger no matterwho wields it. use Kant's language. still does. Kant understood this. the United States blatantlyviolated internationallaw.The end is noble.no state can intervenein the internalarrangementsof another. When democracyis ascendant. vice to which greatpowers easily succumb in a multipolarworld is inattention. but as a matterof right. overextention. the interventionist spiritflourishes. the circle of democratic states.of which it was a principalsponsor. The laws of voluntaryfederations. Peace is the noblestcause of war.The causes of war lie not simply in states or in the state system.and weaker statesfear theirdoing so.theyare found in both. have emphasized the difficulties and the dangers of actively seeking its propagation. a conditionthat in the twentiethcenturyattended the winning of hot wars and cold ones. whetheror not by force. Giuseppe Mazzini.Kant and Richard thatdemocracycan bring Cobden.
and at timesSusan Strange. War before of The Civilization: MythofthePeaceful Press. 1 (February 1996).interdependence adds the propulsive motive. the more extreme effect becomes. thatwith increasesof trade and intermarriage . Vol. and one cannot sensibly pursue an interestwithout taking others' into account. in foughta long and bloody war. 1950-85. What requires emphasis is that. and Russett.27 Close interdependenceis a conditionin which one party can scarcely move without jostling others."Assessing the Journal PeaceResearch.war became more frequent. pp. 196.interdependenceis a weak one. Lawrence Keely.TheRetreat theState:The Diffusion Press.or so some believe.The Soviet economy but was planned so that its far-flung parts would be not just interdependent integrated. Stronglyaffirmative answers are given by JohnR.25 BeforeWorldWar I."Economic Interdependence:A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?"Journal Peace Research. (New York:Putnam's. 423-442.and the power of the marketnow rivals or surpasses the power of the state.each other's secondbest customers. a small push the ripplesthroughsocietyThe closerthe social bonds.It also multipliesthe occasions forconflicts that may promote resentment and even war. 3 (Summer 1998).Huge factoriesdepended fortheiroutput on products exchanged 24. Norman Angell. "The Third Leg Organizationsand MilitarizedDisputes. 441-467. No. Powerin the World Economy (New York:Cambridge University 26. 1986).1996). 33. of LiberalPeace withAlternative Specifications: Trade StillReduces Conflict. Davis. Norman Angell believed thatwars would not be fought because they would not pay. No." of the Kantian Tripod forPeace: International International Organization." Vol.and enlarged ed. 1913). 1996). and in 25. That interdependencepromotes war as well as peace has been said often enough.The Rise oftheTrading State:Commerce Coalitions theModernWorld of of (New York:Basic Books.p. No.either way. Democratic states may increasingly power of the profit devote themselves to the pursuit of peace and profits. pp.4th rev.26 Interdependence some ways promotes peace by multiplyingcontacts among states and contributing to mutual understanding. Oneal and Bruce Russett.Oneal. 4 (July1999). 52. among the forces that shape international politics.International Security 25:1 | 14 The WeakEffects Interdependence of If not democracyalone. Katherine Barbieri. and David R.shows Savage(New York:OxfordUniversity among tribes. 27. Vol. yet Germany and Britain. One countryis then inclined to treatanothercountry's interests acts as events withinits own polityand to attemptto controlthem. 36. Interdependence withinmodernstatesis much closerthanitis across states. Richard Rosecrance. The trading state is replacing the political-military state. may not the spread of democracycombined with the of tightening nationalinterdependence fulfill prescription peace offered the for by nineteenth-century liberals and so oftenrepeated today?24 the supposTo of edly peacefulinclination democracies. The GreatIllusion.
(New York:Harper2d Collins. It is more a dependent than an independent variable. Internally. The PoliticalEconomy International of (Princeton. With others.J.Despite the tightintegration the Soviet economy.eds. see especially Robert Relations Gilpin. Cf. mutual resentment. 1989). ed.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 15 the with others. States. are obscured by the substitution RobertKeohane's and JosephNye's term"asymmetric interdependence"forrelationsof dependence and independence among states.One must wonder whether economic interdependenceis more effectthan cause. and sometimesbad. a gray one with the effects interdependencesometimes good. NationalDiversity GlobalCapitalism (Ithaca. Waltz. Nye. utopias were set in isolation fromneighborsso thatpeople could construct theircollectivelifeuncontaminated contactwith by nor war is possible. Keohane and JosephS." to swimmingseparatelylooks attractive those able to do it. of and culturalenrichment. interdependencebecomes so close that integration the proper word to describe it. war. neitherconflict international The zone in between is becomes national politics..28 The impulse to protect one's identity-cultural and political as well as economic-from encroachmentby others is strong. you have more ways of influencing and affecting my 28.such as Japan'smanaged trade. and Suzanne Bergerand Ronald Dore. 13. Powerand Interdependence. shy away frombecoming excessively dependent on goods and resources that may be denied them in crisesand wars.: Winthrop. providing of the benefits divided labor.the state fell of apart.like integration. IfI depend more on you than me you depend on me.mutual understanding. N. Spiegel and Waltz. of othersgaining less.to avoid excessive dependence on others. 1996). From Plato onward. . The uneven effects interdependence.With zero interdependence.chap. Robert0. Yugoslavia provides another stark illustration. 1971).When it seems that "we will sinkor swim together.in StevenL.29 integration. On states managing interdependenceto avoid excessive dependence. Mass. and 1987). Conflict World in Politics (Cambridge. 10. internal economic interestswere too weak to hold the countrytogether. KennethN. depends on other conditions. chap. and conflict. goods and capital flowfreely where peace among countries appears to be reliably established. Interdependencebecomes inteis gration because internallythe expectationthat peace will prevail and order will be preservedis high.Once externalpolitical pressure lessened.30Relatively independent states are in a stronger positionthanrelatively dependentones. 30. 29.:PrincetonUniversity Press. eds. Interdependence.Externally. States take measures.. if they can affordto. leading to protectionism.Y: Cornell University Press. N. of with some partiesto it gainingmore.
Art analyzes the fungibility power in detail.but by an of odd route. 32. of .. 4 (Summer 1996).When serious slippage occurs. of as national.31 In a 1970 essay. The historyof American foreignpolicy since World War II is replete with examples of how the United States used its superioreconomic capabilityto promoteits political and securityinterests. The International Corporation (Cambridge.Mass. RobertJ. 33.is very fungibleforstrongones.1986). If weak statesmay have decisive advantages on some issues.and firms of the stronger statescontrolthe largestmarketshares anyway. p. ibid. "Theoryof WorldPolitics. and see KennethN. See. 28. the effects inequality are blunted. Keohane emphasized thatpower is notveryfungible Keohane. Waltz.has shiftedthe balance of power away fromstatesand towardworld markets. and (3) some power has "evaporated" with no one exercising it."Reflection on Theoryof International Politics:A Response to My Critics.throughinternational production. Again.withno centralauthority. Keohane and Nye are on both sides of the issue. ed. Strange. Omitting the word "dependence" blunts the inequalities that mark the relations of states and makes them all seem to be on the same footing. Interdependencesuggests a condition of roughly equal dependence of parties on one another. not of very fungibleforweak states. power is not veryfungible." of of Security Vol. rich and poor nations are similarlyentangled in a thickweb of interdependence. Studies.Susan Strangereached the same conclusion.stronger statesstep in to reverseit.Separatingone "issue area" fromothers and emphasizing that weak states have advantages in some of them reduces the sense of inequality Emphasizing the low fungibility power furthers of the effect. 5. "The Myth of National Interdependence.Much of international. In The Retreat theState. 46." Charles P. See Art. Kindleberger.: MIT Press.I described interdependence an ideology used by Amerias cans to camouflagethe greatleverage the United States enjoys in international politics by making it seem that strongand weak.however.33 international In politics. in ed. 189.. But power.."in ibid. KennethN. Her argument is that "the progressive integrationof the world economy. No."American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility Force."She advances threepropositions in support of her argument:(1) power has "shiftedupward fromweak states to strongerones" having global or regional reach.pp.32 her recentbook."Neorealism in and Its Critics (New York:Columbia University Press. (2) power has "shifted sideways fromstates to marketsand thus to non-stateauthoritiesderiving power fromtheirmarketshares". power does sometimesslip away and sometimesmove sideways to markets. 1970). Waltz.One may doubt whethermarketsany more escape the controlof major states now than they 31. for example.politicsis about inequalities.International Security 25:1 | 16 fate than I have of affecting yours.Retreat theState.
. 192."35AfterWorld War II. . 35.The witheringaway of the power of the state.The patternsare hardlynew ones. and the governments the statesin reality of direct society in America. n. it was puzzling to be told that states were losing controlover their externalaffairs. Despite believing that power has moved from states to markets. pp.P. 446. In the twentieth century. as compared to when? Weak states have lost some of but strongstates have not theirinfluenceand controlover externalmatters. The absence of empire hardly means. Alexis de Tocqueville.trans.that the extent of America's influence and control over the actions of others is of lesser moment.Democracy America." And near the end.She observed near the beginningof her book thatthe "authority-the 'power over' global outcomes enjoyed by American society. and nineteenth lost theirs.1988). might thinkStrange's first propositionis the importantone. realist or not.George Lawrence (New York: Harper Perennial. the behavstate with the longestreach repeated Britain'sinterventionist strongest ior and. in ed.And the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is obliged to follow the American lead.Anyone.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 17 the did in the nineteenth century earlier-perhaps less so since the competence or of states has increased at least in proportion to increases in the size and complicationsof markets.Losing control.Russians.whetherinter34. Alexis de Tocqueville observed during his visit to the United States in 1831 that "the Federal Governmentscarcelyever in interferes any but foreign affairs. p. 25."Ifone wondered which government the she had in mind. however. without building an empire. governmentsin Western Europe disposed of about a quarter of theirpeoples' income.Strange recognized reality. Ibid.and therefore indirectly the United States by government-is stillsuperiorto thatof any othersocietyor any othergovernment."34 The historyof the past two centurieshas been one of centralgovernments acquiring more and more power. despite the misgivingsof Germany or Japan. Never since the Roman Empire has power been so concentratedin one state.one wonders. In the eighteenth centuries. At a time when Americans.on an ever widening scale. and Chinese were decryingthe controlof the stateover theirlives. Britons. The proportion now is more than half. J. Mayer. since the end of the Cold War. she answered immediately:"The fate of Mexico is decided in Washingtonmore than Wall Street.the strongeststate with the longest reach intervenedall over the globe and built history'smost extensiveempire. 1. she remarkedthat the "authorityof governments tends to over-rule caution ofmarkets.
lateramended to suit its purposes.and the strange case of NATO's (the NorthAtlanticTreaty Organization's) outlivingits purpose shows why realists believe thatinternational institutions shaped and limitedby the statesthat are Liberal institutionfound and sustain themand have littleindependenteffect. constructed under Americanauspices after longer. more of a wish and an illusion than a realityin most of is the world. Because major allies were the closely interdependentmilitarily. the word "alliance" took on a different meaning. a prolonged period of war.International Security 25:1 | 18 nally or externally. autarky.NATO not states until.but thenagain it may not. The Limited Role ofInternational Institutions One of the chargeshurled at realisttheoryis thatit depreciatesthe importance of institutions. the United States or the Soviet Union. The international WorldWar II and economicsystem. One country. the twentieth centuryfor the most part was an unhappy one. of alists paid scant attention organizationsdesigned to buttressthe security to fromrealisttheories.however. provided most of the . Yet even as relations vary. The members of opposing alliances beforeWorldWarI were tightly knitbecause of theirmutual dependence. and more war followed.contrary expectationsinferred to only survived the end of the Cold War but went on to add new membersand or to promiseto embracestillmore. may last The characterof internationalpolitics changes as national interdependence tightensor loosens. the core of an alliance consisted of a small numberof states Theircontributions one another's security to were of of comparable capability. In its last quarter. In the new bipolar world.Far frominvalidatingrealisttheory casting the doubt on it. the interdependenceof states became unusually close. defectionof one would have made its partnersvulnerable to a competingalliance.Instead. states have to take care of themselvesas best they can in an anarchic environment. The charge is justified. which to many portended a peaceful and prosperous future. Not only are the effects close interdependbut so also is its durability ence problematic.but twenty-five years is a slight base on which to of ground optimisticconclusions. crucialimportancebecause theywere of similarsize. the clouds lifteda little. Under the Pax Britannica.the recenthistory NATO illustrates subordination of to of international institutions national purposes. EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS The nature and purposes of institutions change as structures vary In the old multipolarworld. Internationally.
"Shaping Strategy withoutthe Threat. American officialsdid not proclaim that defense spending had to be increased for that reason. when France stopped playing its part in NATO's military plans. NATO supposedly validates these thoughts. and the Balance of World Power.38In a basic sense."39By the end of July. 37."37 expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War's end and ultimatelyto disappear. 75-76. 257 (London: International Institute StrategicStudies.theymay take on somethingof a lifeof theirown. Vol. pp. withoutwaiting forany such plans. 18. institutionalists claim.becoming less dependent on the wills of theirsponsors and members. Snyder. "InternationalStructure. they may begin to act with a measure of autonomy. 39. Vol. p. National Force. Waltz.Structural Realismafter Cold War I 19 the securityforits bloc. guarantee against whom? Functions vary as structures change."Adephi Paper No. 1997).: Cornell University Press. "The EmergingStructureof International Politics. N. the expectationhas been borne out. NATO and the WTO (Warsaw TreatyOrganization) were treatiesof guarantee ratherthan old-stylemilitary alliances. the major European members of NATO announced large reductionsin theirforcelevels. American officialsdid not proclaim that with China's defection. Thus the end of the Cold War quickly changed the behavior of allied countries. Having won the war 36.pp. and the individual and collectivebehavior of its members altered accordingly. 192. have long lives. NATO announced that the alliance would "elaborate new force plans consistentwith the revolutionarychanges in Europe. No. p. Properlyspeaking. No. Early in the Cold War. See Kenneth N.but once created. 21.AlliancePolitics(Ithaca.Y.In early Julyof 1990." Journal International of Affairs. Glenn H. 80-81. 219."International Security. Withits old purpose dead.especially big ones with strongtraditions. Kenneth N. Even the pretense unilaterally of continuingto act as an alliance in settingmilitary policy disappeared. Organizations.Americansspoke with alarm about the threatof monolithiccommunism arising fromthe combined strength the of Soviet Union and China. Waltz. 38. Winter1990/91). yet the bloc's disintegration caused scarcelya ripple. 2 (Fall 1993). how does one explain NATO's survival and are expansion? Institutions hard to createand set in motion. 2 (1967). as does the behavior of units.36 Glenn Snyderhas remarkedthat"alliances have no meaning apart fromthe I adversarythreatto which theyare a response. The withdrawalof France fromNATO's command structure and the defectionof China fromthe Soviet bloc failed even to tilt the centralbalance. Similarly. for . The March of Dimes is an example sometimes cited. JohnRoper.America's defensebudget could safelybe reduced by 20 or 10 percentor even be reduced at all. NATO is no longer even a treaty guarantee of because one cannot answer the question.
noticingthatas an alliance NATO has lost its major function.The abilityof the United States to extend instituthe life of a moribund institution nicely illustrateshow international tions are createdand maintainedby stronger statesto serve theirperceived or misperceivedinterests. p." the "The Sociology of Imperialism. 25 (emphasis in original).it did finda worthycause to pursue. in whom presumablywanted to keep theirjobs. senior deputy to the undersecretary of state for European affairs. 1 (Autumn 1993). Futureof NATO.40Once created. JohnKornblum. for 42.Realists. 1993 NATO headquarterswas manned by 2."provides a vehicle forthe applicationof Americanpower and vision to the securityorder in Europe. A big organizationis managed by large numbersof bureaucratswho develop a in stronginterest its perpetuation." NATO on Track the 21st Century.International Security 25:1 | 20 against polio." he wrote.and the more so once it has become well established. 20.but states determineits fate. createan organization and it will findsomethingto do. the ameliorationof birth as defects. JosephA. The institutionalist interpretation misses the point. Neoliberal Institutionalism.41 The durabilityof NATO even as the structure international of politics has changed.Even thoughthe most appealing ones-cancer. its mission was accomplished. neatly described NATO's new role. and the old purpose of as the organizationhas disappeared. diseases of the heart and lungs. it.S. multiple sclerosis."42The survival and expansion of NATO tell us much about American power and influenceand little about as institutions multilateral entities. and the 41. is interpreted institutionalists evidence by strongly arguing forthe autonomy and vitalityof institutions.One can fairly claim thatthe March of Dimes enjoys continuity an organization.Accordingto GuntherHellmann and Reinmost of hard Wolf.A deeply entrenched international bureaucracycan help to sustain the organization. ConferenceReport (The Hague: NetherlandsAtlanticCommission. Schumpeter." Schumpeter. How can one make such a claim forNATO? The question of purpose may not be a veryimportant one.it cast about fora new malady to cure or contain.Liberal institutionalists take NATO's seeming vigor as confirmation the importanceof internaof tional institutions and as evidence of theirresilience. No.JohnKornblum. 3. 40.1994). Vol. "Neorealism. Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf.640 officials. "The Alliance.and cysticfibrosis-were already taken. Nevertheless. 14. p.U.an organizationbecomes hard to get rid of.see it mainly as a means of polimaintainingand lengthening America's grip on the foreignand military cies of European states. writingof armies. 1955). .put it this way: "created zvarsthatrequired the by Imperialism machine nowcreated warsit required." Security Studies.pursuing an end consonant with its originalpurpose. p. in and Social Classes (New York:Meridian Books."NATO's Second Half Century-Tasks foran Alliance. NATO is firstof all a treaty made by states.
41 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin. 45. Withthe administration's Clintonneeded to show Bosnian policy in trouble.Withthe nationalheroes Lech Walesa NATO and Vaclav Havel clamoringfortheircountries'inclusion. 23. Mark S. formedin 1954. The Bush administration quickly squelched these ideas. 1 (Summer 1995).that international tional ratherthan international interests."International Security. decided to strengthen that institution as both NATO's European pillar and the defense component of the European Union. and its policies were to be made in Washington. 22. Robert0. . President that "we are pleased that our Allies George Bush could say with satisfaction in the WesternEuropean Union . and the inabilityof the WesternEuropean Union in the more than four decades of its existence to find a significant role independent of the United States. . 40. could be revived as the instrument its for realization. 170. the expansion of NATO would make it so: to serve what powerfulstatesbelieve to be theirinterests. despite America's support of it.Washington. Think of the defeat of the European Defense Community in 1954. Security. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew'sletterto the governments European memof bers of NATO warned against Europe's formulating independentpositions on defense.C. How are we "to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding internationalinstitutionsif such institutionsare lacking in sigIf nificance?"45 the answer were not already obvious. The day after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in December of 1991. 1992).S. and the Clinton administration continued to see. France and Germany had thought that a European security and defense identitymight be developed within the EU and that the Western European Union. Vol. Cf. 1997. "Correspondence:Debating the Unipolar Moment. NATO as the instrument for maintainingAmerica's domination of the foreignand military policies of European states. March 18-22. Realism reveals what liberal institutionalist institutions serve primarilyna"theory"obscures: namely.In 1991. 20. Martin. Weaker stateshave troublefashioninginstitutions to serve theirown ends in theirown ways.. D. especially in the securityrealm. Alan S. Sheetz. U. No. Milward. .foreclosing membershipwould have handed anotherissue to the Republican Partyin the 43."43 The European pillar was to be containedwithinNATO. 3 (Winter1997/98).at p."The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 21 the The Bush administration saw."International Vol. The European RescueoftheNation-State (Berkeley:University California of Press. himself effective an foreign policy leader.p. Keohane and Lisa L. and Mike Winnerstig. 44. "Rethinking Alliance Dynamics. p. ask: of replyingto JohnMearsheimer's criticism liberal institutionalism. No." paper presentedat the annual meetingof the International Studies Association.
No. I.Zbigniew Brzezinskiwent to Kiev with the message thatUkraine should prepare itselfto join NATO by the year 2010.It pushes Russia toward China instead of drawing Russia toward Europe and America. JamesM. Cleveland. 1 (Winter1998). J.by expanding. NATO. Md. It weakens those Russians most inclined toward liberal democracy and a marketeconomy It strengthens Russians of the opposite inclination. March 1998). Vol. 1 (Spring 1995). TheDawn ofPeace in Europe(New York:Twentieth CenturyFund Press.World Policy Institute. and Detroit. isolated and at times surrounded. pp. And see his Not Whether When:The U.: Brookings. 38." Washington Quarterly. No." Survival. See Michael E.and increases its burdens. "Arms Makers See Bonanza in Selling NATO Expansion.It reduces hope for further large reductionsof nuclear weaponry. No. p.Black. 2000).L. Hartung. June29. To tout NATO's eastward march. pp. With good reason. 1996). D. has lobbied heavily in favorof NATO's expansion. Not only do new membersrequireNATO's protection. 48. expectingto capture its usual large share of a new market. and announced plans to use a military testingground in westernUkraine."WelfareforWeapons Dealers 1998: The Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion" (New York: New School forSocial Research. scarcelyconsidered the plight of its defeated adversary Throughoutmodern history. 49. 21. 1 (Spring 1996). Many Russians believe that." New York Times.NATO held naval exerciseswithUkrainein theBlack Sea. 34-52. 1997.48 draws new lines of divisionin Europe. and Jeff Gerthand Tim Weiner. led by America. Russia has been rebuffedby the West. 47. "The Masque of Institutions.citieswith significant numbers of East European voters."NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision. 8. pp. William D. The expansion of NATO extends its military interests. New members of NATO will be required to improve theirmilitary infrastructure to buy modernweapons.and can findno logical stoppingplace west of Russia." Survival.In Juneof 1998.47 The reasons for expanding NATO are weak. Vol. enlarges its responsibilities. 5-35.1999). The reasons for opposing It expansion are strong. 37."The Flawed Logic of Expansion. theyalso heightenits concernover destabilizingevents near their 46. with more joint exercisesto come. Russians fear that NATO will not only admit additional old membersof the WTO but also former republics of theSoviet Union. the more Russia is forcedto look to the east ratherthan to the west.46 Votes and dollars are the lifeblood of American politics.C. Decision to but EnlargeNATO (Washington. Vol. The American and arms industry. Goldgeier. 175-201. . Philip Zelikow. 94-95. Michael Mandelbaum. alienatesthose leftout. Brown. NATO brazenly broke WTO memberswould not be promises it made in 1990 and 1991 thatformer allowed to join NATO.: Rowman Gifts Bearing and Littlefield.S.International Security 25:1 | 22 congressional elections of 1994.RussiaFaces NATO Expansion: Bearing or Arms?(Lanham. In 1997.49 The farther NATO intrudesinto the Soviet Union's old arena. President Clintongave major speeches in Milwaukee.
. Balkan operationsin of the air and even more so on the ground exacerbate differences interest of among NATO membersand strainthe alliance. European conditions and Russian opposition work against the eastward extension of NATO.000 strongrapid reactionforceand enlargingthe role of the WEU.the motivationsof the artificersof expansion-President Clinton. Pressing in the opposite directionis the momentum of American expansion. In 1997.S.50Yet investing in defense slows economic growth. the tensionbetween a NATO controlledby the United States and a NATO allowing for independent European action will again be bothersome.In the absence of European initiative.and mountingtroublesmay bringexpansion to a halt.One may wonder.U. and of Liberal Britain. European membersmarvel at the surveillance and communicationscapabilities of the United States and stand in awe of the modern militaryforcesat its command. p. The task of building democracy is not a militaryone. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. In any event. The momentum of expansion has oftenbeen hard to break. Europeans express determination modernize theirforcesand to to develop their ability to deploy them independently. The militarysecurityof new NATO members is not in jeopardy. Europe's reaction to to America's Balkan operations duplicates its determination remedydeficiencies revealed in 1991 during the Gulf War. however.. Kramer told the Czech defense ministrythat it was spending too little on defense. of Czarist Russia. their political of developmentand economic well-beingare. Expansion buys trouble.defensespendingstimulateseconomicgrowth 50. Thus Balkan eruptions become a NATO and not just a European concern. True. and others-were to nurture democracy in young.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 23 the borders.a determination thatproduced few results. long-suffering countries. 72.the prospectof militarily bogging down in the Balkans teststhe alliance and may indefinitely delay its furtherexpansion. Ibid. fragile. Americans believe they must lead the way because the credibility NATO is at stake. a thoughtborne out by the empires of Republican Rome. Aware of their weaknesses. One is oftenremindedthatthe United States is not just the dominantpower in the world but that it is a liberaldominant power. Will it be different time?Perhaps.By common calculation.why this should be an American rather than a European task and why a militaryrather than a political-economic organizationshould be seen as the appropriatemeans for carryingit out.yetifEuropean statesdo achieve their this goals of creatinga 60. AssistantSecretary Defense Franklin D.
52. Indeed. Keohane has 51."54 Yes! Liberal institutionalism. Having claimed that his realism is "not well specified.but of froman underestimation America's folly The survival and expansion of NATO illustratenot the defectsbut the limitations structural of explanations. effectagree with him. Strange."53Dependent on what?-on "the realitiesof power and interest." in difference conjunctionwith power tutions. 42. Thus Susan Strange.it turnsout."they note that "institutional both as independent and dependent varitheoryconceptualizes institutions Instiables."52 for by Keohane and Martin.but has. in trenchantcriticismof institutional theory. Keohane and Martin. "is no longer a as to been swallowed up by it. country'sinternalimpulses a prevail.In Eastern Europe. in fact. 55.A state the that is strongerthan any other can decide for itselfwhetherto conformits policies to structural pressuresand whetherto avail itselfof the opportunities thatstructural change offers. 46."The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. 54."The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. "A . 192-193. On realistshave noticed that whetherinstitutions have strongor weak effects depends on what states intend. in pondering the state's retreat. economic not military securityis the problem and enteringa military alliance compounds it. Keohane and Martin.realistsinsist"that institutions have only marginaleffects. withlittlefearof adverse affects the shortrun.Thze of Years' Crisis. Structures shape and shove. The error of realist predictionsthatthe end of the Cold War would mean the end of NATO arose not froma failureof realisttheoryto comprehend international politics. Twenty 107: "international governmentis. Mearsheimersays. Using the example of NATO to reflect the relevance of realism afterthe on Cold War leads to some importantconclusions.Strongstates use institutions.International Security 25:1 | 24 about half as much as directinvestmentin the economy. theydo not determine actionsof states." 53. 42."55 clear alternative realism. and see pp. "make a significant realities. The winner of the Cold War and the sole remaininggreat power has behaved as unchecked powers have usually done. whether fueled by liberal or by other urges. theyinterpret as laws."51 the contrary. in ways thatsuit them. xiv.p."p. Cf. p. In the absence of counterweights. Mearsheimer.in theireffort refuteMearsheimer's to Interestingly.Retreat theState. in Do liberal institutionalists provide betterleverage for explaining NATO's survival and expansion? Accordingto Keohane and Martin."p."pp. in effect.an instrument the pursuit of national interest othermeans.observes that "internationalorganization is above all a tool of national government. 85. governmentby that state which supplies the power necessaryforthe purpose of governing.. Ibid. Institutionalist theory. Carr.p. as it never was an alternativeto realism. 46. Realist Reply.
has disappeared. intra-alliance management.. p. cf. Institutional theory attributes institutions to causal effects thatmostlyoriginate withinstates. NATO lasted as a militaryalliance as long as the Soviet Union appeared to be a directthreatto its members. 1 (Spring 1996). Alliances illustratethe weaknesses of institutionalism with special clarity..Colo. is an anomaly. balancing continued within as well as across alliances. 193.It survives and expands now not because of its institutions mainlybecause the United Stateswants but it to. Previous alliances lacked institutions because in the absence of a hegemonic leader. this is a realistexpectation. Keohane. Powerand Interdependence. "Theoryof World Politics. are required in order to preventa securitycompetitionthat would promote conflict and impairthe institutions the European Union. The case of NATO nicely illustratesthis shortcoming.Structural Realismafter Cold War 125 the stressed. The TripleAlliance and the Triple Entente were quite durable. where he describes his approach as a "modified p. and it is a task not forthe alliance but forits leader. and unsurprisingly ends with realistconclusions. In strength may depend in parton theirinstitutional characteristics. preservingNATO. there hardly being any. of. Keohane has remarked that "alliances are institutions. RobertJ.58 he emphasizes. . but one must wonder in how large a part. Keohane. 251. 15.which Keohane and Nye sought "to broaden. and both their durabilityand ." PoliticalScience Quarterly. Robert0. Neorealism and Its Critics. 58."57 part. but because the core members of each alliance looked outward and saw a pressing threatto theirsecurityPrevious alliances did not lack institutions because states had failed to figureout how to constructbureaucracies.Robert Art has argued forcefully American troops in Europe."56The institutional approach startswith structural theory. The secondarytask of an alliance.1989). applies it to the origins and operations of institutions. Vol.continuesto be performed the United by States even though the primarytask. and maintainingAmerica's leading role in it. I suppose. The point is worthpondering. In his view. NATO's survival also exposes an interesting aspect of balance-of-power that without NATO and without theory." p. defense against an externalenemy.but I need to say here only thatit 56. NATO now within. in Keohane.No. International and Inistitutions StatePozver:Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder. European states will lapse into a "securitycomAs petition"among themselves. Art." 57. "Why WesternEurope Needs the United States and NATO.has as its core structural realism. They lasted not because of alliance institutions. Keohane and Nye. the dampening of intra-alliance tension is the main task left. structural researchprogram. 111.: Westview.
International Security 25:1 | 26 further illustratesthe dependence of internationalinstitutionson national decisions. p. 43. "Global Communicationsand National Power: Lifeon theParetoFrontier. when the United But States found that the systemno longer served its interests.Balancingamong statesis not inevitable. Keohane believes that "avoiding military conflict Europe afterthe Cold in War depends greatlyon whetherthe next decade is characterizedby a continuous patternof institutionalized If cooperation."60 one accepts the conclusion. No. p. Eitherinternational remainclose to the and institutions conventions. p. "The nature of institutional as arrangements.1993). Quoted in ibid. As a high-levelEuropean diplomat put it.62 Citing examples fromthe past 350 years. and betterthe hegemonic power should be at a distance than next door. eds. Americaand Europein an Era of Change(Boulder. 1 (April 1991)."59Acceptingthe leadership of a hegemonicpower preventsa balance of power fromemergingin Europe. leadership.International institutions created by the more are survive in theiroriginal formas long as powerfulstates. Stephen D. "The Diplomacy of Structural Change: MultilateralInstitutions Strategies. of ." World Politics.and the institutions of or theyserve the major interests theircreators. treaties. Keohane.As in Europe. p.Structural The Third Worldagainst Global Liberalism (Berkeley: Conflict: University California.S. A European power brokeris a hegemonic power. are thoughtto do so. 61. Nixon shocks the of 1971 were administered. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL AIMS What is trueof NATO holds forinternational institutions generallyThe effects thatinternational institutions may have on national decisions are but one step removed fromthe capabilities and intentions the major state or states that of Woods systemstrongly affected gave thembirthand sustainthem. 62." Stephen Krasner put it.The Bretton individual statesand the conduct of international affairs. 234.: Westview... a hegemonic power may suppress it. StephenD. 263 and passim. "is better of to explained by the distribution national power capabilitiesthan by efforts solve problemsof marketfailure"61-or. by anythingelse. Vol.1985).I would add. 53. "it is not acceptable that the lead nation be European. the question remains: What or who sustains the "pattern of institutionalized cooperation"?Realists know the answer. Krasner. but not on one of our own.Colo. We can agree on U. 36. and State 60.Krasnerfound thatin all of the instances"it was the value of strong states that dictated rules that were applied in a 59. Robert0."in Helga Haftendornand ChristianTuschhoff. of underlyingdistribution national capabilities or they court failure. Krasner.
1 (Summer 1999). 5. 1. Robert Gilpin explains the oddity. pp. Realist theory predicts that balances a disrupted will one day be restored. William will take place. a universallyrecognized international institution. 63. We don't have the rightto subverta democracybut we do have the rightagainst an undemocraticone.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 27 the discriminating fashion only to the weak. 3-28. unipolarityappears as the least durable of international configurations. 65. it will be a long time Wohlforth argues thatthoughrestoration Of necessity. Quoted in RobertTucker. hardlystands in the way of a strongnation that decides to intervenein a weak one.but strongstatesbend or break laws when theychoose to. This is so fortwo main reasons."International Vol. that some rightsare more fundamentalthan the rightof nations to nonintervention.See Gilpin. Wohlforth.The latteris a task for theories about how national governmentsrespond to pressures on them and take advantage of opportunitiesthat may be present. 1 (Spring 1994). Security.. 5-41. Upon the demise of the Soviet Union. 1985). Theorycannotsay when "tomorrow"will come on because international political theorydeals with the pressuresof structure states and not with how states will respond to the pressures.." ReviewofInternational PoliticalEconomy."64 Most international law is obeyed most of the time." Security Studies. 5. One does. the internationalpolitical system became unipolar. p. 24.A limitationof the theory. "The Stabilityof a Unipolar World."63 The sovereigntyof nations. In the light of structural theory. William C. according to a the senior official.66 in sayingwhen it will happen. 3 (Spring 1996). No. pp. StephenD. Balancing Power:Not Todaybut Tomorrow Withso many of the expectationsthatrealisttheorygives rise to confirmed by what happened at and afterthe end of the Cold War. 64. No. Thus.observe balancing tendenciesalready takingplace. realisttheoryis betterat saying what will happen than coming. Intervention theReaganDoctrine and (New York:Council on Religious and International Affairs. p. Anotherkey propositionis thatthe balancing of power by some states against others recurs. is that it cannot say when. 16. Vol. "International PoliticalEconomy:Abiding Discord. The bottomline was yes. Krasner. ..65 key propositionderived fromrealisttheoryis that international politics reflects distribution national capabilities. 66. Reagan administration "debated whetherwe had the right to dictatethe formof anothercountry'sgovernment. limitation common to social science theories. "No One Leaves a Political Realist. Vol. No.a propothe of sitiondaily borne out.one may wonder why A realismis in bad repute. however.
Wesson.Even so. thinkof itselfas actingforthe sake of peace. WesternEuropean countriesand. Quoted in Ted RobertGurr.constrained each other. 68. Faced withunbalanced power.The two countries.overwhelmingpower repels and leads others to tryto balance against it.reached the same conclusion thatRobertWesson had reachedearlier:"Imperial decay is . Cf. Ted Robert Gurr."Persistenceand Change in PoliticalSystems. can PoliticalScienceReviezv.weaker states will worry about its future behavior. The powerfulstatemay. is a potential danger to others.America's foundingfathers warned againsttheperilsofpower in the absence of checks and balances.restraint.are definedto the likingof the powerful. fromRobertG.and well-beingin the world.thus weakening themselves in the long run. These terms.the United States has behaved and.after examining336 polities.1800-1971."67 other reason for the The shortduration of unipolarityis that even if a dominantpower behaves with moderation. however..of Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler of Germany. of Louis XIV and Napoleon I of France.Now the United States is alone in the world. and how theyinteracted.and the United States does. until its power is broughtinto balance. and forbearance. were dominant factorsin international politics. the constancy of the Soviet threatproduced a constancyof Americanpolicy.which may conflict with the preferences and interestsof others. justice.however. Hapsburg ruler of Spain.In international politics. 67. some states tryto increase theirown strength theyally with or othersto bringthe international distribution power into balance.what the United States and the Soviet Union did.The Rise and Fall ofGreatPowers:Economic Changeand Military from 1500 to 2000 Conflict (New York:Random House. 1967). beginningin the 1950s. Paul Kennedy. illustrate point. No. whoever wields it. As nature abhors a vacuum. For almost half a century. 1987). will continue to behave in ways thatsometimesfrighten others. Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics?Throughoutthe Cold War. primarily resultof themisuse ofpower a which follows inevitablyfromits concentration. so international politicsabhors unbalanced power."Ameri- ImperialOrder (Berkeley: Universityof California Press. unpaginated preface. the THE BEHAVIOR OF DOMINANT POWERS Will the preponderantpower of the United States elicit similar reactions? Unbalanced power. 1504. With benign intent. Vol. The reacof tions of other states to the drive fordominance of Charles V. The .International Security 25:1 | 28 One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders. p..Other countriescould relyon the United States for protectionbecause protectingthem seemed to serve American security interests. 4 (December 1974).
S.a country'spolicy becomes sporadic and self-willed. unbalanced power leaves weaker states feelinguneasy and gives themreason to strengthen theirpositions. Aside fromspecificthreatsit may pose.the United States failed to respond until Senator Robert presidential Dole moved to make Bosnia's peril an issue in the forthcoming and it acted not for the sake of its own securitybut to maintain election. what country group of countrieshas the materialcapabilityand thepolitical or will to bringthe "unipolar moment"to an end? 68. When Yugoslavia's collapse was followed by genocidal war in successor states.oftenwith the intentionof bringingdemocracy to them. When President on JimmyCarter moved to reduce American troops in South Korea.The in United States has a long historyof intervening weak states. 28. 1991.thus riskingits own cities. A dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves it.Japanhad increasingdoubts about the reliability the As increased. Concentratedpower invites distrustbecause it is so easily misused.but by internal political pressure and national ambition.WesternEuropean American nuclear deterrent. To understand why some states want to bring power into a semblance of balance is easy.Realismafter Cold War | 29 the Structural of beginningin the 1970s. p. News and World Report. "Cover Story:Communism's Collapse Poses a Challenge to America's Military. The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreignpolicy choices."68Constancy of threat produces constancy of policy. Contemplatingthe historyof States and measuringits capabilities. and later its when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and strengthened forcesin the Far East."U. its leadership position in Europe. absence of threat permits policy to become are capricious. October 14. One example is enough to show this. Soviet strength countriesbegan to wonder whetherthe United States could be counted on to use its deterrent theirbehalf.othercountriesmay well wish forways to fend offits benign ministrations. When few if any vital interests endangered.but with power so sharplyskewed. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union. . I'm running chairmanof the Joint Chiefsof Staff: out of enemies. Japan developed similarworries. the United States no longer faces a major threatto its securityAs General Colin Powell said when he was "I'm runningout of demons. American policy was generated not by external security interests. I'm down to Castro and Kim I1 Sung. American behavior over the past in centuryin Central America provides little evidence of self-restraint the the United absence of countervailingpower.
See Josef Security. p. Vol. fact. Vol. and thus restoringa balance."The EmergingStructure International Studies? Realist Myths and "The Neoidealist Moment in International 71. Previous wars lefta sufficient number of great powers standing to Theory enables one to permita new balance to be rathereasily constructed.Jr.71Seldom do signs of vindication appear so promptly. 37. the materialsforconstructing new balance were readily a at hand. StudiesQuarterly. Grand Vol. In the aftermath of earliergreatwars. 79. Charles W.despite the dangers of unbalanced power. 21. 88. 149. Kegley. Clearly somethinghas changed. No.the explanation for sluggish balancing is a simple one. are the European Union or Germanyleading a coalition. Russia."69Others believe that the leaders of states have In learned that playing the game of power politics is costlyand unnecessary. Some believe that the United States is so nice that."International the New International .believes this to be so. Michael Mastanduno. in historicalperspectives. but a forbearancethat will give other countriesat long last the chance to deal with theirown problems and make theirown mistakes.. 19.the new balance is emerging it slowly. which has become impossible. conditionsdeterminethat.othersdo not feelthe fear thatwould spur them to action."International analysis of America's role. among others. 4 (Spring 1997). No. power will check power.In our perspective.But I would not bet on it. 69. sensibly. although he ends his articlewith the thoughtthat "eventually. No. say thata new balance of power will formbut not to say how long it will take. I ended a 1993 article this way: "One may hope that America's internal preoccupations will produce not an isolationist policy. Realities. The candidates for becoming the next great powers. The countriesoftheEuropean Union have and in a moredistantfuture.theory to expect its restoration."'Bismarck' or 'Britain'?Toward an AmericanGrand Joffe's interesting International Secuirity. will come in the blink of an eye. p.China. Victoriesin major wars leave the balance of power badly skewed. Charles Kegley has said. 4 (Spring 1995)."p.The international equilibriumis broken. Strategyafterthe Cold War.25:1 | 30 International Security BALANCING POWER IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD The expectationthatfollowingvictoryin a greatwar a new balance of power will formis firmly grounded in both historyand theory The last fourgrand coalitions (two against Napoleon and one in each of the world wars of the twentiethcentury)collapsed once victorywas achieved. Michael Mastanduno." Politics. realists will be vindicated. of 70.Those who referto the National and international unipolar moment are right.S. Strategy afterBipolarity. Waltz. "Preservingthe Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U."70I should think that few would do so now. The winningside emerges as leads one a dominantcoalition. Japan.that if the world becomes multipolar once again. 2 (June1993).
Europe may not remain in its supine position forever.and show a desire to directtheirown destiny. as Foreign MinisterHubert V6drinerecentlyput it. however.makingbold or riskyaction impossible.p.however. signs of fundayet mental change in mattersof foreignand militarypolicy are faint." President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister as Lionel Jospincall for a strengthening such multilateralinstitutions the of InternationalMonetary Fund and the United Nations. will not be able to claim a louder voice in alliance affairsunless it builds a platformfor giving it expression. Frenchleaders oftenvent theirfrustration pine and for a world.Vol. . "European Integrationand Security. . No. not just a single one.If Europeans ever mean to write a tune to go with their libretto. consistingof heads of state and government.Americanshave talked of a European pillar forthe alliance. Is It a Misalliance?" New YorkTimes. and military capabilities-but lacks theorganizationalabilityand the collectivewill to use them. to agree on the essential interests theyshare and which theywill agree to defendand promotetogether.the European Union can act only with the consentof its members. On questions of foreign and military policy. Inaction as Yugoslavia sank into chaos and war signaled thatEurope will not act to stop wars even among near neighbors. The achievementof a large measure of economic integration withouta corresponding political unity is an accomplishmentwithout historical precedent. More to the point. Jacques Delors. February15.73 German and Britishleaders now more oftenexpress similar discontent. 1999."Survival. ."72 Policies thatmustbe arrived at by consensus can be carriedout only when theyare fairly inconsequential. earlier.Now as withEurope's secondaryposition. 73. Craig R. Withless pressure and more members.technology. 106. 1 (March/April 1991). "NATO at 50: WithNations at Odds.it has even less hope of doing so now. Al.WesternEurope was unable to make its own foreign and military policies when its was an organizationof six or nine states living in fear of the Soviet Union. .If French and 72.they will have to develop the unity in foreignand militaryaffairsthat they are achieving in economic matters.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 31 the been remarkably successful in integratingtheir national economies. resources.Europe. although how this would diminish America's influence is not explained. p. As Jacques Delors said when he was presidentof the European Commission: "It will be forthe European Council. European leaders expressdiscontent chafeat America's makingmost of the important decisions. 33. The European Union has all the tools-population. Whitney. "of several poles. V6drinecomplains thatsince PresidentJohnKennedy. Only when the United States decides on a policy have European countriesbeen able to follow it. a pillar thatis never built.
" 75." American PoliticalScienceReviezv. unless Germany. Economically. Al.the United States and the world will begin to European military treatEurope as a major force.In the meantime. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. becomingimpatient. The European Economic Communitywas formedin 1957 and has grown route to incrementally its presentproportions.But where is the incremental to a European foreignand militarypolicy to be found? European leaders have not been able to findit or even have triedvery hard to do so.San Francisco.the is all-but-inevitable movementfromunipolarityto multipolarity takingplace not in Europe but in Asia. INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE AND NATIONAL RESPONSES internationalpolitics centered on Europe. 76.75China has fiveto seven intercontinental able to hit almost any American targetand a dozen or more missiles able to reach the west coast of the United States (DF-4s). Vol. say. The internaldevelopmentand the externalreaction of China and Japan are steadily raising both countries to the great power very hard so level.76Liquid fueled. its nuclear forcesto a level of paritywith the United Statesifit has easily raise missiles (DF-5s) not already done so. world wars ended Europe's dominance.Strategically.someday emerge as a greatpower is a matterforspeculation. "The EmergingStructure International Politics.Seattle. A growth rate of 7 to 9 percentdoubles a country'seconomy every ten to eight years. p. a coalition.25:1 | 32 International Security Britishleaders decided to merge theirnuclear forcesto formthe nucleus of a organization. 84.and San Diego ifChina happens to have a few more DF-4s than the United States thinksor if it should fail to destroyall of them on the ground? Deterrenceis much easier to contrivethan most Americans China's growthrate. Sanger and Erik Eckholm.74China will emerge as a greatpower even withouttrying China can long as it remains politicallyunited and competent. 1999. given its presentstage of have surmised. It does not require quantitativeor qualitative equality of forces.Europe will count forlittlein international decides to lead ahead as the eye can see. economic development.WhetherEurope will somehow. March 15. Even during Asia's near economic collapse of the 1990s. David E. In the absence politicsforas far of radical change. Nuclear parity is reached when countries have second-strikeforces. of 74. "Will Beijing's Nuclear Arsenal Stay Small or Will It Times.See Waltz.can be sustained at 7 to 9 percentforanotherdecade or more. immobile missiles are vulnerable.but would the United States risk the destructionof. China's growthrate remained approximatelyin that range. Two Throughout modern history. Mushroom?" New York . The followingfour pages are adapted fromWaltz. No. 3 (September1990).
even though many Japanese may prefernot to. Taiwan is an unending source of tension. Given the expectationof conflict. Historically. one must wonder whetherJapan will remain immune to them.Sooner or later. the choice is a difficult one to sustain. Japan is made uneasy now by the steady growthof China's military budget. Even though one may believe that fears of nuclear blackmail are misplaced. The Korean peninsula has more militaryforcesper square territory kilometerthan any otherportionof the globe. the possession of mostbut not all of the capabilitiesof a greatpower leaves a state vulnerable to othersthathave the instruments thatthe lesser statelacks.Disputes exist between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands. one may wonder how any state with the economic capabilityof a greatpower can refrain fromarmingitselfwith the weapons thathave served so well as the great deterrent.The high volume of a country'sexternalbusiness thrustsit ever more deeply into world affairs. Japan's power has grown and spread remarkably The growth of a country'seconomic capabilityto the great power level places it at the center of regional and global affairs. Cambodia is a troublesomeproblemforboth Vietnamand China. Economically. statusof countrieshas usually sooner.the international . For a countryto choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly For thatreason.can hardly be ignored by with the United States cast doubt Japan. Its reluctance.and the gradual growth of its sea. and the competitionhas oftenled to conflict. undergoing modernization. Japan is obviously reluctantto assume the mantle of a great power. The presence of China's ample nuclear forces. as rumorsabout North Korea's developing nuclear capabilitiesgained credence. Japanbecame acutelyaware of its lack of observationsatellites. and between Japanand China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands.produce apprehensionin all of China's neighborsand add to the sense of instability a region where issues of sovereignty in and disputes over abound.combined with the drawdown of American militaryforces.however. For example.Uncomfortable dependencies and perceived vulnerabilities have led Japan to acquire greater military capabilities. Remindersof Japan's deof pendence and vulnerability multiplyin large and small ways.In a self-help system. strategically located and supposedly rich in oil. Countries have always competed forwealth and security.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 33 the Unlike China.the less so because economic conflicts on the reliability American militaryguarantees.It widens the range of a state's interestsand increases theirimportance. and the necessityof taking care of one's interests. Its nearly3 millionstrong army. stateshave been sensitiveto changing relations of power among them. is steadily though slowly waning.and air-power projection capabilities. Half a dozen countries lay claim to all or some of the SpratlyIslands.
77As a secret reportof the Ministryof Foreign Affairs put it in 1969: "For the time 77. Pakistan. Norman D." in Harry H. however. and theUnitedStates(Berkeley:Institute East Asian Studies. aftervictoryover China in 1894-95. China.the governmenthas defined all of its Self-DefenseForces as conNuclear weapons purely for defense formingto constitutional requirements. the United States broke with its centuries-long traditionof actingunilaterallyand refusing make long-term to commitments. ASEAN.Japan will equip itselfwith a nuclear force. "Japan's Defense Policy: The InternalDebate.is a constrainedone. In the standingsuffered previous half century. Because of the extentof theirinterests. Does Japan once again aspire to a larger role internationally? concerted regional activity. Japan is being pressed to enlarge its conventionalforces and to add nuclear ones to protectits interests. Japan's behavior in the past half centuryreflectsthe abrupt change in its international because of its defeatin war. would be deemed constitutional should Japan decide to build some.whetheror not openly. Japanese nuclear inhibitions arising fromWorldWar II will not last indefinitely. othersmay wish to avoid doing so. seeking and gaining Its its prominencein such bodies as the IMF and the World Bank. and its obvious pride in economic and technologicalachievementsindicate that it does. The behavior of states responds more to externalconditionsthan to internalhabit if externalchange is profound. Japanese officialshave indicated that when the protectionof America's is extended deterrent no longer thoughtto be sufficiently reliable.International Security 25:1 | 34 risen in step with theirmaterialresources. Profoundchange in a country's international situationproduces radical change in its externalbehavior. whetheror not reluctantlySome countries may striveto become great powers.Japan pressed for preeminencein Asia. Consistentlysince the mid-1950s. Japan. largerunits existingin a contentiousarena tend to take on systemwidetasks. of University California.Japan has put itself politicallyand technologicallyin a position to do so. AfterWorld War II.Countrieswith greatpower economies have become great powers.eds. When externalconditionspress firmly enough. The choice.. Kendall and Clara Joewono. Increasingly. and othersfrom perhaps North Korea have nuclear weapons capable of deterring threateningtheir vital interests. Levin.1990).How long can Japan live alongside other nuclear stateswhile denyingitselfsimilarcapabilities?Conflicts and crisesare certainto make Japanaware of thedisadvantages ofbeing withoutthe military instruments thatotherpowers command. if not beyond. of . may expect themto expire as one generationalmemoriesfade. they shape the behavior of states.India.
Structural Realismafter Cold War | 35 the being.ed. 81." in Harrison. However." Journal East Asian Affairs. of Vol. 80. 1992). while seeing to it thatJapan will not be interfered with in this regard. p."78 In March of 1988. 1996). 2. we will keep the economic and technicalpotentialforthe productionof nuclear weapons. No. . 2 (September1998). p. Pyle. No. 1994. and theUnitedStates. 276.regardlessof joining the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]or not. 83.81 Prime MinisterShigeru Yoshida in the early 1950s suggested thatJapan should rely on American protectionuntil it had rebuiltits economy as it gradually prepared to stand on its own feet. 2 (Summer/Fall1994).C. 364. 82. Press."Japanand Nuclear Weapons. Vol. quoted in Selig S.Prime In MinisterTsutumuHata mentionedin parliamentthatJapan had the abilityto make nuclear weapons."State of the Field Report:Researchon JapaneseSecurity Policy. of both Koreas." New York Times. Harrison.JapanDisavows Any Nuclear-Arms Expertise. Juneof 1994. TheJapanese D.80 Where some see Japan as a "global civilian power" and believe it likelyto remain one.Remaining months or moments away from having a nuclear militarycapability is well designed to protectthe country'ssecuritywithoutunduly alarmingits neighbors.: AEI Question: Powerand Purposein a New Era (Washington. A4. the main cause of Japan's greater"interest enhanced defense capabilities"is its in belief that America's interestin "maintainingregional stabilityis shaky"84 Whether or reluctantly not. 41.C. Michael J."JapanBeginningto Flex Its Military Muscles. 7. David Arase. for example.p. David E.Japan. KennethB. 10.83 the opinion of Masanori Nishi. June22.judiciouslysummarized different interpretations Japan's securitypolicy. we will maintainthe policy of not possessing nuclear weapons."Mainichi. 1999. 79. "The Capability to Develop Nuclear Weapons Should Be Kept: Ministryof Foreign Affairs SecretDocument in 1969. 84. a defense official. April 8. p. ASEAN. "US and ASEAN Perceptionsof Japan's Role in the Asian-PacificRegion. and of Russia combines with ineviof table doubts about the extentto which Japan can relyon the United States to In protectits security."AccessAsia of Review.p. Hanami. Andrew Hanami. p. others see a countrythat has skillfully used the protectionthe United States has afforded and adroitlyadopted the means of maintainingits securityto its regional environment. Sanger. The hostility China. StephanieStrom.79 Only a balanced conventionalnuclearmilitary capabilitywould meetthisrequirement.p. 9." New York Times.. Japan'sNuclearFuture(Washington. Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita called for a defensive capabilitymatchingJapan's economic power. 26."In Face-SavingReverse." in Kendall and Joewono. August 1.82 Japan has laid a firmfoundationfordoing so by developing much of its own weaponry instead of relyingon cheaper imports.: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace.Green.Japanand China will followeach otheron theroute 78. 1994. D. points out that Japan wonders whether the United States would help defend Hokkaido. "Japan and the MilitaryBalance of Power in Northeast Asia.
nuclear weapons moderate the behavior to of theirpossessors and renderthemcautious whenever crisesthreaten spin out of control.W.is closer to greatpower produce the most technologically status at the moment. By continuingto keep threatis in sight. China has the greaterlong-term potential. The GreatWall and theEmptyFortress: China's Search Security for (New York:W. Nathan and RobertS. Ross. 38. Historically.while nuclear weapons keep the peace among those who enjoy their protection. No. The ComingConflict zvith China (New York:AlfredA. In the not very long run. and graduallyreactedto them. and the the changingrelationsof countrieswithinthe East and the West.the United Statespursues the same goal in Europe. encountersof East and West have oftenended in tragedy Yet. 86.85 hegemonytheynow enjoy in mean thattheyintend to maintainthe strategic to the absenceof such a balance. Knopf.and by 100. changing relations of East to West. Munro. with the world's second or third largest defense budget and the ability to advanced weaponry. military. The Americanaspirationto freezehistoricaldevelopmentby workingto keep the world unipolar is doomed.and political resources. with or withoutAmerican participation.and South Korea. Japan.86The actions and reactionsof China. 2 (Summer 1996). where no military extendingNATO eastward.Security 25:1 | 36 International to becoming great powers.Japan. Richard Bernsteinand Ross H. Whatever worries the United States has and whatever it Japanhas threats feels.Norton. demographic. creatinga new balance of power are in East Asia.are takingplace in a nuclear context. Vol.1997). Americanssee a future threatto their improvethe qualityof its inferior and others' interests.China thenworriesas Japanimprovesits airlift sealiftcapabilitiesand as the United States raises its supportlevel forforcesin South Korea. When Americans speak of preservingthe balance of power in East Asia the Chinese understandablytake this to through their militarypresence.Fortunately." Survival. America's policy of containingChina by keeping 100. Michael J. "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalismto ReluctantRealism.The tensionsand conflicts thatintensify when profound changes in world politics take place will continue to mar the relations of nations. Self. . which is becomingpartof the new balance of power in the world. 43. p. the task will exceed America's economic. and Andrew J. Green and Benjamin L.000troops in WesternEurope.Japanhas themearlierand feelsthemmore intensely.000troopsin East Asia and by providingsecurity guaranteesto Japanand South Korea is intendedto keep a new balance of power fromformingin Asia. and the very effort maintaina hegemonic position is the surestway to undermine to 85. 1997). as we know fromhappy experience. When China makes steady but modest efforts forces.
No. oftenact in ways that create futureenemies. and dismemberment. Tellingly. . is not universal and omnipresent.1998).earned its lastingenmity.often bringslastingenmities. Thus Germany.87 States are freeto disregardthe imperativesof power. This has long been the conditionof the WesternHemisphere. the United States won a telling victory Victoryin war. International RelationsTheory and the Third World. American leaders seem to believe that America's preeminentposition will last indefinitely The United States would then remain the dominant power withoutrivals risingto challenge it-a position withoutprecedentin modern historyBalancing. The effort maintain dominance stimulates some countries to work to to overcome it. Whetheror not balancing takes place also depends on the decisions of governments." Survival.88This alienates Russia and nudges it toward China instead of drawing it toward Europe and the United States. Bismarck persuaded the kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna afterthe great victoryat K6niggratzin 1866. 88. 147. Witha historyof conflict RelationsTheoryand the Third World(New York: St. Multipolarity developing beforeour eyes. As theoryshows and historyconfirms. Moreover.it is emergingin accordance with the balancing imperative. Moreover. Enlargement. American political leaders to a dismaying extent thinkof East or Westratherthan of theirinteraction.Structural Realismafter Cold War | 37 the it. p. JohnLewis Gaddis commentsthathe has never known a time when therewas less and NATO support among historiansforan announced policy. United States is repeatingpast errorsby extending its influenceover what used to be the province of the vanquished. 87. contrast. abounds in examples of states that failed to mind theirown security or interests throughinternalefforts externalarrangements. Prussia took no Austrian territory. 40.suffered invasion.relatively weak and divided statesmay findit impossible to concerttheirefforts countera hegemonicstatedespite ample provoto cation. Grand Strategy.and the Allies' harsh In of treatment GermanyafterWorldWar I produced a similareffect. Stephanie Neuman. Stephanie Neuman's book. In the Cold War.by taking Alsace and most of Lorraine fromFrance in 1871. "History. having become Austriafor Hungary. was available as an alliance partner Germanyin 1879.Winners is of wars.Magnanimity victory rare. and as one would expect.Gaddis. Vol. In the Treatyof Prague. that is how balances of is power are made.but theymust expectto pay a price fordoing so.A dominant power may suppress balancing as the United States has done in Europe. Thus Austria. 1 (Spring 1998).Ratherthan the learningfromhistory. ed.. in however. of course. facingfew impedimentsto the exerciseof theirwills. loss of autonomy. International Martin's. Despite much talk about the "globalization" of internationalpolitics.
That states trydifferent . The relatively ous relationsthe United States and China enjoyed during the 1970s began to sour in the late 1980s when Russian power visibly declined and American To hegemonybecame imminent. however. In this section.requiringless less demanding and a more rewardingstrategy effort and extracting lower costs while promisingconcreterewards.25:1 | 38 Security International along a 2. therefore with some reflections balancing Structural and the theoryof balance of power thatfollowsfrom theory.The United States cannot preventa new balance of It power fromforming.to follow.with ethnicminoritiessprawling across it.many states have insufficient sources forbalancing and littleroom formaneuver.China drew close to Russia afterWorld War II and remained so until the United States seemed harmoniless. the United States has provided the key to Russian-Chinese relations over the past half century Feeling Americanantagonismand fearingAmericanpower. and to are its alienate China by lecturing leaders on how to rule theircountry.to strategiesof resortto balancing when they have to. bandwagoning is another. Indeed. can hasten its coming as it has been earnestlydoing.The lattermay sometimes seem a than balancing.a weak formofbandwagoning.or in regional subsystems. and the Soviet Union more. Balancing is a strategy survival.stateshave to make perilous choices.States tryvarious strategiesforsurvival.a way of attempting to maintain a state's autonomous way of life. alienate Russia by expanding NATO. They may hope to avoid war by thanby rearming appeasing adversaries. the discussion of balancing has been more empirical and I on end speculativethan theoretical. To argue that bandwagoning represents behavior more common to statesthanbalancing has become a bit a of a fad. Amid the of pressures of domestic politics and the shifting uncertainties international politics.of a threatto China. the United States is doing its best to help them do so. To believe that an affirmative the ance-of-powertheoryis.do not lead one to expect thatstates will always or even usually engage in for balancing behavior.rather reand realigningto thwartthem. Moreover. theory.600 mile border. Balancing is one of them.They have to jump on the wagon only later to wish theycould fall off. policies could afford. it. of Balancing theory does not predict uniformity behavior but ratherthe strongtendencyof major states in the system. Whether states bandwagon more often than they balance is an answer would refutebalinteresting question. mineral-rich but to Russia and China will findit difficult cooperate effectively. with a and sparsely populated Siberia facingChina's teemingmillions. and onlya foolish powerfulcountry thatonlyan overwhelmingly one be tempted.to misinterpret theoryand to commit what one mightcall "the numericalfallacy"-to draw a qualitativeconclusion froma quantitativeresult.
Waltz.has not been transformed. Conclusion Every time peace breaks out. Without the shadow. . The world. people pop up to proclaim thatrealism is dead. anarchicconditionact myopically-that is. and politics for a time we will live with unipolarity. 4 (Spring 1988).If the day were here. Structuralchange affectsthe behavior of states and the outcomes their interactions produce. States could combine their efforts cheerfullyand work to maximize collective gain without worrying about how each mightfarein comparison to others. Vol.international politics was not remade by the forces and factorsthat some believe are creatinga new world order. however. and the appearance of the patternsthe behavior produces. the leaders of states would no longer have to ask themselves how they will get along tomorrowas well as today. the Cold War "is firmly rooted in the structure postwar international of politicsand will last as long as thatstructure endures. The revolutionin Soviet affairs and the end of the Cold War were not broughtby democracy. Occasionally. on calculationsof immediateinter89."89 it did. the ominous shadow of the futurecontinues to cast its pall over interactingstates. international tutions. and the Cold War ended only when the bipolar structure So of the world disappeared.Transformation. 18. one finds the statementthat governmentsin their natural. structure international the of has simplybeen remade by the disappearance of theSoviet Union. As I wrote some years ago."The OriginsofWar in NeorealistTheory. 628. should all the more be seen as impressiveevidence supportingthe theory. It does not break the essentialcontinuity international of of politics." Journal Interdisciplinary of History.Those who set the Soviet Union on the path of reform were old Soviet apparatchikstrying rightthe Soviet economy in orderto preserveits to position in the world. however.The transformation international politicsalone could do that.awaits the day when the international systemis no longer populated by states that have to help themselves. States' perennial uncertaintyabout their fates presses governments to prefer relative over absolute gains. one would be able to say who could be relied on to help the disadvantaged or endangered.the Structural Realismafter Cold War | 39 survival is hardlysurprising.Instead the Cold War ended exactlyas structural realism led one to expect. or instiinterdependence. KennethN. Instead. Moreover. That is anotherway of saying thatinternational politicshas been transformed.The recurrent emergenceof balancing behavior. No. p.
Neorealism in The Debate (New York:Columbia University Press. 1 (March 1993).theymay. and happy he alone.and no other. States do not live in the happiest of conditionsthatHorace in one of his odes imagined for man: Happy the man." David Baldwin. 93. World War I was a preventivewar all around. 103. The problems of governmentsdo not arise from their short time horizons.preserving. They see the long shadow of the future. 1984).J. Keohane.but they have trouble reading its contours. 1984). Keohane. widening the gap in welfare or and strength between themselves and others. see also p." See Powell. Tomorrowdo thyworst. "Guns.The Evolution Cooperation of (New York:Basic Books. 1993). military allocations.perhaps because they tryto look too far ahead and see imaginary dangers. 117 on the question of the compatibility liberal institutionalism and structural realism.however.The one conditionforsuccess is thatthe game be played under the shadow ofthefuture.Worries 90. RobertAxelrod and Robert0. leads to greater American PoliticalScienceReview. RobertAxelrod.International Security 25:1 | 40 est-while hoping that the futurewill take care of itself.France and Britainsuffered fromthe same fear about Germany.maximizes collectivegain over time. . RobertPowell shows that "a longer shadow . 92..it works against it in the latter. My revision. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:Strategies and Neoliberalism: Contemporary and Institutions.The shadow may facilitatecooperation in the former. The point is made by Robert0. the futurewas what the major stateswere obsessivelyworried about.91 Yet. theysay. 116. N. "the shadow of the futureseemed so small" (p. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane believe that World War I might have been averted if certainstates had been able to see how long the future'sshadow was. 108. pp.have to concernthemselvesnot with maximizing collectivegain but with lessening. In 1914. No. 99. For German leaders.In an important sense. Future fears dominated hopes forshort-term gains. 92). as their own discussion shows. 91.:PrincetonUniversity Press. The war was promptedless by considerations of present security and more by worries about how the balance might change later. . ed.90 Political leaders may be astigmatic. 87.forI have lived today. The contours of the future's in shadow look different hierarchicand anarchic systems. p." of Vol.Realists are said to sufferfromthis optical defect.but responsibleones who behave realistically not suffer do frommyopia.93 Because statescoexistin a self-help system. . After Hegemony: Cooperation Discordin theWorld and PoliticalEconomy (Princeton. who can say. and Anarchy.92 RobertAxelrod has shown that the "tit-for-tat" tactic. Germany feared Russia's rapid industrialand population growth. and in addition Britainworried about the rapid growth of Germany'snavy. Butter.
Until and unless a transformation occurs. theydo strongly conditiontheiroperation and limittheir accomplishment. it remains the basic theoryof international politics. .Structural Realismafter Cold War | 41 the about the futuredo not make cooperation and institution building among nations impossible. Liberal institutionalists were rightto starttheirinvestigations with structural realism.
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