Rural Tourism Social Redefinition by the win-win-win1 Perspective in Less Developed Countries (L.D.C)
Case study : ETANAM, North West Greece Wet land area “Amvrakikos Gulf”

Professor Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis , PhD Director School of Management and Economics Technological Educational Institute Kalamata/ Greece 2007

(1) worldwide known in the local development field as “Papakonstantinidis Model”


Abstract The paper deals with the possibility, rural tourism to be used as a methodological tool for rural-local development, under globalization conditions, emphasising the bargaining problem between three parts, i.e the tourism services providers, the consumers of these services (tourists) and the Community, as the third or invisible part of the bargain. The paper focuses on those forces in the bargain (rural tourism bargain) which derive “conflicts”: It is proved that these forces, deriving pure competition, could be transformed by the suggested win-win-win Model (and the followed new types of bargaining behaviour) into a pure cooperation at local level, thus maximizing the result for all the involved parts ( The Rural Tourism ProvidersThe Tourists and the Community) A case-study from the North-West Greece (Amvrakikos wet-land Area) is referred as a typical win-win-win paradigm coming from a less developed and isolated place.

KEY-WORDS Rural Tourism, Local Development, Sensitization, bargain, three- part negotiations, decision making, policy planners, methodology: win-win-win model, utilities & shares BIOSKETCH Professor Dr. Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis, Local Government Department Head- Technological Educational Institute, Antikalamos, 24.100 Kalamata, Greece. papakonstantinidis@teikal.gr Economist, Mathematician, Lawyer with an excellent (9.29) M.Sc in the field of Regional Development (I.P.A), M.A (credits) in Rural Development (Center for Development Studies- U.C.GIRL . He has obtained his Ph.D in the “Local Development” scientific field. Member of the E.U Commission task force for the L.E.A.D.E.R E.U Initiative (1989-1991), General Reporter of the “European Center of Public Enterprises (C.E.E.P)” ‘s Regional Affairs Committee (1985-1990), member of the E.U Commission (DG X) “Green Team”, Head of the Agricultural Bank’s “Local Development Office” (1991-2001). 41 mono-graphies, 94 published papers in authorised scientific magazines and minutes of World Congresses, 3000 articles , having visited and studied more than five thousand (5.000) small rural communities all over E.U (Greece, Ireland, U.K, Sweden etc) for development reasons. Rural Development visitor professor in e-learning “Euracademy” (Leonardo da Vinci II E.U Program) –Visby-Gotland University / SLU Sweden and also the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’, Centre for Regional Studies(2003-2006). Member of the Editorial Board of the “Journal of Applied Economics and Management”-India, Member of the International Sociological Association (I.S.A)- (Research Committee –R.C 26), Member of the European Regionalist Association,(ERSA) member of the Board of Agrotouristiki S.A (2001), member of the Board of “Evrytania S.A” (19962001) etc Eleven (11) times awarded at the international level for research work –three times by the U.N “North-South Co-operation Program”- in the field of local development.115 times awarded at national level for personal contribution in developing small rural –and isolated – areas in Greece. He has been characterised as the “father of Rural Tourism in Greece”: -G.T.P/6.92, Member of the Board of the Greek Regionalists Association - Rural tourism teaching work: “Up-to-date” e-learning training school Cyprus 2004, Professor in the National School of Local Administration (ESTA) (2007-), Member of the International Advisory Committee of the Asian Journal of Tourism and Hospitality Management (A.J.T.H.M) -Santo Tomas University Manila Philippines (2007-)

1. Introduction: The concept


There are three (3) –at least- reasons, for which scientific fields from different directions could be combined on rural tourism redefinition, towards its social perspective: 1. Rural Tourism is mainly a business sector, deriving profit for tourist accommodations and tourism services owners. 2. Rural tourism may be considered at the same time as a methodological tool for local development planners and policy makers. 3. Rural tourism could be concerned as a typical win-win-win case-study, in the frame of the bargaining problem According to those perceptions on rural tourism activity, one should focus on “relations” (economic, social, cultural etc) among the actors, i. e the “providers” of rural tourism services, the “customers”/ clients of those services (tourists) and the “Community” (local community) in which those accommodations are established or rural tourism services are offered The point is “how Rural Tourism- a business activity- could provide the community with social results, through its profit diffusion, among the people living in the community, especially in those Less Developed Countries (L.D.C), during the Globalization Age” , taking into account that: • The main feature of globalization conditions consists of setback to real terms of the development due to wealth concentration, regional and local inequalities , the absolute poverty in large parts of the planet, lack of food and medical care in these parts, increasingly children mortality, increasingly economic migration trends, dramatic climate changes, due to human activities, armed conflicts, terms confusion. • Over the second half of the 20th century, we have seen the continuous transformation of the world's population from rural to urban, and this change is likely to continue in decades to come. This phenomenon goes beyond migration statistics. • Rural Tourism may be concerned as a local action promoting both the economic and the social dimension ( i.e local development, cultural, environmental and political dimension etc) of a rural place • Rural Tourism may contribute in maintaining the local people in rural places, as well as in convincing young people, living in cities to come back and work in rural places. • It is –therefore- necessary, to redefine “rural tourism” term as a local activity by both, the political-ideological and the strategic dimension thus meeting the “market rules”, which paper focuses on: In particular it is necessary to be proved that “rural tourism” social redefinition must be seen as a typical win-win-win bargaining problem between “providers” the rural services, the “consumers” or clients of those services and the community, in which each part has to win. In this “bargain”, COMMUNITY may be concerned as the “third” (or invisible) part of an hypothetic three-part negotiation taking part at any time of the development process. For those social results to be achieved, it is necessary local cohesion to be based on “information” coming

4 from the sensitization process. From the other hand, “sensitization” may be the result of “knowledge transformation” coming up from the combination of two types of knowledge, i. e “sympathetic” and “systemic” By its turn, this combination may lead to a “new” bargaining behavior , thus market rules (i.e “pure competition” behavior) to be overcome. Rural Tourism is referred by both criteria as a “smooth” business activity and a “smooth” rural places’ policy intervention, in respect with the natural, cultural, social and political environment : These “Rural Places” (small rural Communities in Less Developed Countries, far away from the Metropolitan Centers) define a sub-spatial unity (community, society) This paper focuses on those “rural communities” or “rural societies”: These societies have not any (alternative) opportunity for developing/ and/or promoting their own resources (human, physical, cultural) waiting for a help/ and or/investments coming from outside. In the opposite, “Rural Communities” must start the development process “from inside” (endogenous rural/local development) based on their own human force. This may be a difficult objective during the “Globalization Age”. What it is needed is “people who live in these areas to try alone for developing and managing their own physical, cultural etc sources in order “rural places” to gain their own “identity” and competitiveness in the world tourist market. But how? To answer the question, it is necessary the “Territory-Community” term to be redefined in terms of those “social” market “sides”, based on local cohesion, local sensitization and solidarity: The paper highlights those “hidden” sides of market (globalization), emphasizing the “bargaining problem” among three “players” i.e the providers tourist services ( local population of a destination)- letter A, the consumers of these services (tourists)- letter B, and the Community,- letter C which form a triangle(A-BC) of success: Each “player”(A, B, C) may win in this bargain [ win-winwin], by “reconstructing” his own “winning strategy” and/ or “behavior” in the bargain, so the “territory-community” term should be redefined Rural Tourism may be the suitable methodological “tool” letting the “players (A, B, C) realize this win-win-win transformation. A sub-spatial unity (i.e society, community) may be redefined by the bargaining instant reflections strategies or behaviors, in which this unity [letter “C”] “participates” as the third or invisible part of negotiations between two bargainers. This could be done in only one position, (or equilibrium point), the limit-end of the sensitization process. “TerritoryCommunity” term should be defined on this limit; and Rural Tourism is the Methodological Tool for sensitizing local population around a “flag theme” or a “common theme” at local level, as the scheme”1”, below.

Scheme (1)- Flow Diagram)


Rural Tourism: How business is transformed in a local development tool win – win – win Model


Rural Tourism as Business (competitiveness) Rural Tourism as Methodological Tool (sensitizationcohesion solidarity)

Provider Rural Tourism Services (A)

Tourists (B)

(territory-community term as the limit of sensitization process)

2. Literature related to the subject It is, therefore, necessary to start with the “new trends in regional development policy” / The “New Innovation Theory” (N. I. T) – (M. M Fischer, 2000). N. I. T provides us with useful methodological tools, like knowledge creation and knowledge transfer. Using these tools in the “bargaining problem”, it is necessary to analyze pure individual winning strategies (Nash “Non-cooperative Game Theory”win-win model) in the bargain. Information may be the “link” between knowledge creation and bargaining process. In particular, “Information” is a power factor in pure individuals winning strategies. The more information, the more possibilities for someone to “win” in the bargain Redefinition of the “territory-community” term is achieved by what we call Integrated Information; it is a “combination” of answers given to each of participants in the bargain, meeting three different questions in the

6 same person, especially, “what is the best for me, in relation with the best of the other AND the best of this sub-spatial unity/ “community” (as the third-invisible part of the bargain) – “the 3-person information” (or the win-win-win model). Each of the participants, using the integrated, or 3-person information in the bargain, then, a new bargaining behavior (the win-win-win behavior) may be created: It seems to be closer to “pure cooperation”, than competitiveness . The last one may be concerned as a survival need: “During next decades, climate conditions may be proved to be the only one “enemy” or competitor against human activities” (U. S Environmental Committee Report, February 2004).On this limit-point “territory-community” term redefinition meets fluent situation /evolution in the post-industrial period, as the outcome of this win-win-win process. The concept, based on the Modern Innovation Theory, analyses the decision making under the prism of the sensitization process, developing in the bargain, in order to “produce” social cohesion and solidarity which are the pillars of the “territory-community” term. “Territory-community” term has therefore to be redefined, in a “new term” by the limit-end of the integrated information through the sensitization process, leading to “social behavior” 3. The new (proposed) approach , step by step • Negotiation may be concerned as the base of our economic and social life. Each of us actively participates in thousand of “negotiations” even no obviously: Driving his car in traffic, actively participating in the market (buyer/sellers) relations between husbands-wives, or even the “love game” may be concerned as forms or types of negotiation, / or “game”, according to Non Cooperative Games Theory.(J.F. Nash, 1950) Each of us, starting negotiations with another expects to gain a profit (economic, social etc) Each of us knows the rules of the negotiation; otherwise he she/ has no interest to participate as negotiator in negotiations/ or “game” Each of us is a “player” according to Games Theory. He (she) knows a priori that the other part (or player) is as clever as he is. He has to respect that the other person may be as clever as he is. Each of us does not regret for his/her choice Each of us, participating in a negotiation has to take a decision (or to make a choice) in relation with the other negotiator’s decision, or reacting to the other’s choice He/she has to decide according to his/her expectations, as well as to instant reflection In real terms, he/she has to make and follow a strategy: [We need to trust eachother (see at “Contract Social” J. J Rousseau) Nowadays conditions overcame State Rules; therefore we must analyze the bargaining problem, in terms of reacting, (instant reflections strategies) recognising “competitors” instead of people who will to cooperate. It is obvious that individual choices (strategies) may be characterized by interdependence as well as by interaction to other’s choices during the bargaining problem. In its math expression (Nash 1951) “An n –person game is a set of n players or positions, each with an associate finite set of pure strategies and

• •

• •

7 corresponding to each player I a payoff function pi which maps the set of all n-tuples of pure strategies into the real numbers. Each of “negotiators” has, therefore to double think (2-person anticipation) according to his & the other’s expectations so both to win, maximising the outcome of negotiation (win-win) A two 2–person anticipation is based on utilities. According to Nash Theory a unique solution exists that maximises the product of the participants utilities. There is, therefore an interaction between “utilities” and “strategies” In particular, “utility” expresses individual choices based on individual necessities (real or fantastic) “Strategies” express choices + will in personal level, taking into account the interaction factor (the other’s choices) Utility is the subjective factor and strategy is the objective factor of the same anticipation. Negotiation may lead either in “agreement” or disagreement Utility expresses the constraint or the “fear factor” of disagreement for whom needs the agreement more than the other negotiator. Who needs more, negotiation to be led in agreement expects more utility, but –probably he has to loose in terms of “shares”, due to risk lack In the opposite, who is indifferent about “agreement” or expects no more utility /per unit he has- to win in “shares” under the dogma “the more risk, the more profit” (In math terms (Utility Theory): If A & B represent two individual alternative anticipations and small letters (a & b)represent real numbers then the utility function will satisfy the following properties u(A)>u(B) is equivalent to “A is more desirable than B” If 0<p<1, then u [p A+(1-p)B= p u A+(1-p)u B If u1 , u2 are utility functions for two individuals and c (S) represents the solution point in a set “S’ and pi are payoff functions for each player I, and (&) are strategies then for every player Pi(&)= max [pi(&), ri.. (ri=the each player desirable outcome)

ð Lim Pi(&)Qi(&)=max PiQi (1) ià ∞ ð Ua =x , Ub = (100-x)k ,k= is the key fact (2) ð f’ = [x (100-x)k ]’= 0 so that Ua + Ub=max
• The (1) expresses utilities/strategies, as the interaction between two negotiators and (2) expresses the utility function- as a shares/utility combination The bargaining problem is bringing up to decision making during negotiations of A & B. (Table 1)


TABLE 1 Random Sharing between “A” and “B” Share Α (%) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 Share Β (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Utility Α 71 70 68 64 60 52 40 Utility Β 0 1 5 10 16 23 31 Utility AXB

0 70 340 960 960 1196 1240 (max) 30 70 24 40 960 20 80 12 50 600 10 90 4 61 244 0 100 0 80 0 J.F. Nash highlighted the “payoffs” of the bargain, out of “personal expectations” Note: Utility is a personal matter: Utility “units” are not compared. B) Utility “units” expresse the “fear of disagreement” (no shares for anyone).c) If “A” needs more the “agreement” than the payoff, then he should be ready to accept any form of agreement. d) If “A” has decided not to accept the agreement, then he risks more but –at the same time- wins more from the agreement if it is realized e)The “utility range” expresses the optimist instant reflection for each part UTILITY FUNCTION: Suppose that “winning strategies” [ Pi, Qi] are corresponded 1-1 with the players’ (bargainers’) UTILITY ( linear function: corresponds 1-1 to bargainers’ Utility Function), under the dogma “the more decisive to break the contract down, the more satisfied from the bargain leading to the contract That is true: Bargainers expectations are 1-1 to expected Utilities for each of them, coming from the bargain. From the other hand, the more information, the more uncertainty (Ch Nikolaides, 1999) . Bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation People operate in a competitive base rather, than co-operative: Winning strategies are led by bargaining rules (pure competition rules). Nash has described the “bargaining problem” not by expectations, but, directly, by the results (pay-off of the bargain) In a math form (as below):


Pi x Qi→ Ua + Ub = max If Ua = x, Ub = (100-x)k Then Ua+Ub=max → [ x(100-x)k]΄ = 0 Then x’ (100-x) + x [ (100-x)k]’ = 0 then 1(100-x) + x k (100-x)k-1 = 0 then xk (100-x)k-1= - 1(100-x)k then x k (100-x)k-1 = - 1 (100-x)k-1 (100-x)1 then xk = (100-x)1 (100-x)10k-1 : [- 1 (100-x)k-1] if (100-x) # 0, then xk = 100-x xk + x =100 then x(k+1) = 100 in real terms, x(k+1) = -100 [the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers] Finally:


x = 100 / (k+1)

If k=0 , then each of a, b may win the 100% of pay-offs /the other “nothing”=0 If k=1 , then each of them (a and b) my win the 50% If k>1 then “a” may win a percentage >50% If k<1, then “b” may win a percentage >50% In our example, the crucial point [ the max] is 1240 (40x31) : this is the point of final agreement led in by the bargain. On that point the shares are: 40% for “A” and 60% for “B”. On that point, personal satisfaction or utility units are 40 units for A and 31 units for B : That’s the point of agreement, expressed “fear of breaking down the agreement for “player” “A” and risk of breaking down the agreement for the player B In an 2-person anticipation, each of two (2) bargainers may ask themselves one question, as the result of “good strategies” [instant reflection thinking] in the bargain What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best

10 for himself –thus recognizing that the other person may be as clever as I am. The following methodology is adopted(Papakonstantinidis): knowledge creation⇒ creating a “non conflict” behavior ⇒ inserting sensitization⇒ integrated information creation⇒ uncertainty due to negative entropy⇒ thus, smoothing potential conflicts⇒closing differences in the competitive bargain⇒payoff-utilities & shares, influencing behavior in the bargain /individual winning strategies influencing by a “new behavior ⇒in the opposite, the more decisive, the more risk ,should derive more profit in a globalizing world but ⇒ inserting sensitization in the bargain⇒thus smoothing the conflict strategies taking into account the “C” factor ⇒ converting a bilateral “conflict” into a 3-part negotiation ⇒ leading to a “new” social perception , the win-win-win perception, including a real cooperation 4.Information as bargaining strength factor • in the Age of Information (2007) the information factor is the most important: The more information, the more preparation in negotiation, the more strength in the bargain • But information has to be formed by knowledge conversion • According to the “New Innovation Theory” , knowledge conversion is introduced corresponds [1-1] to a specific type of information, Possible cases/orders, between “tacit” and “codified” knowledge produce the four (4) major processes of knowledge conversion, leading to types of behavior (see below): Scheme: Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types of Behavior Sympathetic Conceptual procedura Systemi Conceptual Procedural Socializatio Externalization Internalization Networking Sensitizatio Strategic

tacit tacit Codifie Codifie Sympathetic Systemic Papakonstantinidis

tacit Codified tacit codified Systemi Systemic

11 Introducing the sensitisation process in suggested Model we have more possibilities to “create” a new form of information, called the “integrated information” in the bargain • “Integrated Information” is the new term introduced to the suggested model which leads to a “new social existence” i.e the socialization. The introduced information (+) may by “sensitization” thus creating a new behavior type. This type “socialization” let me introduce the factor “C” (Community, World Values, social cohesion, solidarity, may GOD) in the bargain, as the third or invisible part of negotiation. Thus “Sensitization” may be proved to be a useful planning tool, especially, in the most of rural areas. • By introducing the “C factor” in the bargain it is succeeded a bilateral relation to be transformed into a “three part” relation (A & B competitors and the “C” part- the “invisible part”), thus smoothing the conflicts -the 2-poles perception in negotiation, at local (at least) level. • Each of two (2) bargainers may ask him/her self two(2) questions: What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try the best for himself –thus recognizing that the other person may be as clever as I am, AND taking [at the same time] into account that “Community”- as the third or invisible part of negotiations between two (2) also participates and also tries to do the best for itself (or winwin-win)? • Concluding, local development planners may find the proposed “win-win-win approach” as a useful methodological tool in local development planning, by introducing the sensitization process in local people, thus succeeding “social cohesion and local solidarity in the community. Therefore, “territory-community” may be “self-defined” by social cohesion and solidarity developing by introducing the “sensitization process” in the “bargain” –under globalization conditions- in local level, thus transferring a pure competitiveness into a pure cooperation among local people • [The win-win-win perception] converting a bilateral bargain to a 3-part negotiations including the “Community” as the third/ invisible part[scheme 1] Scheme 1 A •



Suppose that the more Information,→ the more uncertainty for the Future → the more need for cooperation, according to the modeling factor, (APPENDIX) as well as : • Pi(&) :Sum of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from the choices of the bargainer “A”, based on information given while reaching the ∞ • Qi(&):Set of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from the choices of the bargainer “B”, based on information given while reaching the ∞ • Ri(&): Set of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from the choices of the bargainer “C”, [ the “Community” , concerned as the “third” or “invisible” partner] based on information given while reaching the ∞ • There is a “link” between “utilities” and “individual winning strategies” that means , ƒ(u) ⇔ƒ(&), where, “&” is a set of good individual strategies

Max PQR = max of payoffs PQR THEN: limPi(&)Qi(&)Ri(&)=maxPQR i→∞ (see the schemes (1) and (2) at the end of the paper

• •

The “new” system (the equilibrium point, according to Nash Theory) could lead to a pure cooperation situation, between the 2 involved parts in the bargain (individuals and the “Community” – which could be seen as the “third-invisible” part in a two-persons bargain) ; this could occur as the result of an “instant individual reaction” due to given information (transferred knowledge). From this point of view, I think that my suggestion facilitate competitors to understand each-other’s situation, thus improving the quality of the bargain, as a “new social existence” in the globalizing world. Otherwise, a 3-person non cooperative bargaining game may form in its limit pure cooperation conditions between the involved parts, as integrated information let them create a 3-band codified knowledge, at the same time i.e Rural community is the “weak partner” in the bargaining game, in the world market but this situation should be conversed, in terms of «collective choice».

4.The Suggesting “win-win-win” Sharing vs Nash Sharing
TABLE 2 (PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS PROPOSAL) The Suggesting Sharing between “A , “B” and “C”

Share Α (%) 90 80 70 60 50 41 32

Share Β (%) 4 13 22 31 40 50 60

Utility Α 71 70 68 64 60 52 40

Utility Β 1 2 5 10 16 23 31

Utility AXB 71 140 340 640 960 1196 1240

Share C (%) 6 7 8 9 10 9 8

Utility C 1 2 3 4 5 4 3

Utility AXBXC 71 280 1020 2560 4800 max 4784 3720

13 23 14 70 80 24 12 40 50 960 600 7 6 2 1 1920 600

Note: 1. “C” is the Community , as the “third” invisible part in the bargain- & 2. The less shares for A+B the more share for the “invisible” bargainer “C” A THREE-PART BARGAIN SUGGESTION: (Papakonstantinidis) Introducing “C” = Community, as he third or “invisible” part of negotiations between TWO Let, a, b the bargainers and “c” the “invisible part Then, let us to define utilities: Ua = x Uc = lx, when l = is a factor of the “x” proportion Ub = (100-x-lx)k It is obvious –according to example 1- that : Ua + Ub = Uc = max → x [ (100-x-lx) k ]’ = 0 then k x’ (100-x-lx) + x [(100-x-lx)k]’ = 0 then k 1(100-x-lx) + xk (100-x-lx)k-1= 0 then k-1 xk (100-x-lx) + 1(100-x-lx) k = 0 then xk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx) = 0 then xk (100-x-lx)k-1 = -[1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx)] if (100-x-lx) # 0, then xk = -[ (100-x-lx)] then xk +x +lx = 100 .... (really ...= -100) [the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers] x(k+1+l) = 100 finally

X = 100 / (k+1+l)
Cases If k=0 , l = 0, then each of a, b, c “bargainers” may win the 100% of “bargaining result” (output)

14 If k=1 , l=0 then each of the a and c may win the 50% and the bargainer “b” nothing at all If k=1 , l=1 then each of the a, b and c “bargainers” may win the 33.33 % (equal portions) : This is the equilibrium point (equality of shares) If k>1, l>1 then “a” and “b” may win a percentage >33.33%, but there is a “portion” for the Community- “C” (as the third-or “invisible” part of the “bargain between TWO”) If k<1, l<1 then “c” may win a percentage >50% At any case, introducing the Community “C” , as the third or “invisible” part in any bargain between TWO (2), there is the possibility of reforming the world perception: EXAMPLE
Introducing the “Environmental Protection” (the “C” factor) in any oil dealing procedure between TWO bargainers (i.e oil producer country and TEXACO Company), -in the form of SENSITIZATIONThen, the result may be quite different than existing, in terms of human & environmental approach!!

6. Rural Tourism in L. D. C as a typical bargaining case Let’s see “Rural Tourism” as a typical case of the bargain: The sellers (or providers) rural tourism services – tour operators included- try to offer their services in a higher price and low cost so to maximize their net profit In the opposite, the buyers (tourists) of rural tourism services try to enjoy the maximum quality of those services in the lowest price, so that to maximize their utility coming from rural tourism, in a low cost. This is a typical case of bargain. It is not obvious in the most “famous” -and developed- tourist destinations: These tourist destinations are rather incorporated in wider tourist networks (ie hotel chains etc). There aren’t opportunities, in these places for developing a “new” pattern or a “new” identity in the world tourist market. These areas are out of scientific interest. The paper focuses on Less Developed Countries (L. D. C) and the rural areas, which have no “tourist identity” even they have tourist sources. These places have survival problems in the world (tourist) market. They are needed to be helped to overcome their survival problems, by innovative methodological approaches: Rural Tourism may be proved to be a “good practice” toward this direction. Suppose, now, that rural tourism services providers decide to adopt a “new” strategy in order to attract more tourists in their place: They decide to co-operation instead of acting alone [first instant reflections in the (rural tourism) bargain] as for example, creating those well-known “Local Quality Contracts” This decision is respected to work positive for tourist choices [ second instant reflections in the bargain] as tourists understand that the “providers decision” should improve the quality of tourism services offered. So they “accept” to pay a price for these services above the minimum cost. At the same time, rural tourism providers accept to offer better quality services to tourists, beyond market rules (cost/benefit analysis). From the other hand, rural pace’s local authorities “understand the new dynamic” for the Community by the “new” bargaining behavior. They have to claim a “better share” for the Community, from both, “providers” and “tourists”, in terms of economic and social “respect”. (The third instant reflections in the bargain, coming from the third/ and/ or/ invisible part of rural tourism negotiations).

15 Rural Tourism services Providers (letter “A”) as well as tourists (letter “B”) understand that they have the obligation to satisfy the conditions put by the Community (Local Authorities- letter “C”) and even to participate in rural place development process ( the last instant reflection in the bargain) It’s obvious, that: 1. a bilateral pure economic relation is transported in a three-part relation, included the Community 2. Community (the “C” factor) –as the third or invisible part of rural tourism negotiation- claims its own share from the bargain between “Providers” and “Customers” (Tourists) ; and this claim is been accepted by those “real bargainers” (A + B) 3. The “equilibrium point” –i.e the agreement - may be succeeded in what point the Rural Tourism Services Providers’ Utility(Ua) AND Tourists’ Utility (Ub) coming from the services offered AND the Community Utility (Uc) coming both from quality services offered improvement and satisfied tourists number increase become MAX [ in math, Ua+Ub+Uc = max], so that each of the THREE participants to win: This point (the equilibrium point)may be concerned as the limit-end point of a continuous sensitization process in the proposed (new) win-win-win methodological bargaining approach (rural tourism as a local development methodological “tool”.

Case study:ETANAM N-W Greece-Wet land area “Amvrakikos Gulf”
“Amvrakikos Gulf “, in North-West Greece may be an excellent paradigm of a winwin-win Rural Tourism: Rural Tourism services Providers, and tourists and the Community (Preveza) have succeeded to win, or to get profit, through Rural Tourism activities, due to “Leader” EU Application in this area, even if it was less developed and isolated, far away from the metropolitan centers. Indeed, since 1992, Amvrakikos Gulf -with a wonderful landscape including both a wet-land and α mountain area- had a limited tourist activity, due to its isolation, as it was away from the metropolitan centers. Fishing was the main local population employment. Age average was 65+ as young people leaved their place, looking for a better income as well better living conditions in the nearest urban centers. In 1992 –a year after L. E. A. D. E. R, European Union Initiative (Program) application in Greece- a Local Action Group named ETANAM (from the initial letters of Greek works “Etairia ANaptyxis AMvrakikou” / i.e Amvrakikos Development Company ) in the form of an Anonymous Society (S.A) has been appeared in this area, by some young educated people, who had come back to their place (In real terms, ETANAM was there before Leader E.U Program, as a branch of the Agricultural Bank of Greece, with a limited responsibility in the local development process) ETANAM S.A was the result of a continuous sensitization process among local people : It was an “agreement”/ a compromise between local authorities, rural cooperatives, tourist accommodations owners’ Association, etc, who decided, to joint their own forces - instead of acting alone and each-other competitive (win-win relations between rural tourism providers ) by offering higher quality rural tourism

16 services- under the “umbrella” of Leader EU Program. [win-win relations between tourism providers and consumers(tourists)] As Local Authorities (Municipality of Preveza and other small villages around Preveza) decided to actively participate in this “central forum” i.e the Local Action Group named ETANAM S.A then it was obvious that they had also to coordinate the rural tourism system as well as to claim profit for themselves, coming from rural tourism activity in Amvrakikos Gulf Area- the third “win” (the win-win-win model) ETANAM S.A succeeded to change the route in Amvrakikos Wet-land Area: From less developed and isolated rural place, Amvrakikos changed in a developed tourist place, with thousands of tourists per year. Local income has improved 2 or 3 times above Young people came back to work in rural tourism services An observatory has been made for tourists, in order to see the wonderful birds to put their eggs in the sound Nowadays, Amvrakikos Gulf is a famous tourist destination , combining sea, wet-land and mountain landscape: it is a simple but wonderful win-win-win example of an endogenous local development based on a pure cooperation, instead competition

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