JOHN M.

KEUY LIBRARY

DONATED

WHY OF DR. GEORGE HEIMAN
iN

St.

Michael

University of s College, Toronto

THE

WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH UNDER THE EDITORSHIP
OF

W. D. ROSS, M.A.
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF ORIEL COLLEGE DEPUTY PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

VOLUME
BY W.

XI

RHETORICA
RHYS ROBERTS

DE RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
E. S.

FORSTER

DE POETICA
INGRAM BYWATER

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1924

Oxford University Press
London
Edinburgh

Glasgow
Melbourne

Copenhagen

New

York

Toronto
Calcutta

Cape

Town

Bombay

Madras

Shanghai

Humphrey

Milford Publisher to the UNIVERSITY

Printed in England

RH ETO R
BY

I

C

A

W.

RHYS ROBERTS,

LITT. D.

EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF CLASSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS; FORMERLY FELLOW OF KING S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, AND PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES, BANGOR.

GOREU AWEN GWIRIONEDD
adiecere bonae paulo plus artis Athenae, scilicet ut vellem curvo dinoscere rectum,

atque inter silvas Academi quaerere verum.

HORACE,

Epistles,

ii.

2,

43-5.

UNIVERSITATEM CAMBRENSEM
ET

UNIVERSITATEM LOIDENSEM
VERITATIS

CUM NOVAE TUM ANTIQUAE UTRAMQUE STUDIOSAM EX ANIMO SALUTAT
RHETORICAE ARISTOTELIAE INTERPRES QUALISCUMQUE.

5e Kai 01 civdputTroi Trpbs TO d\r)des rrecpuKacni
rfjs aXr/tfciap.

tKavws Kai ra
i,

TrXet co

ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric,
dia,

C. I,

1355* 15-17.

8e fcrnv

rj

prjTOpiKrj

TO (pv(Ti elvai Kpeirrco
7rpoo~riKOv at Kpivets
eTTirt/z^o ecos
.

T&V
81

evavTLcov, aicrre tav

p.r)

Kara TO

avTatv

r)TTO.<jSai

TOVTO 8 eVrlv a^iov

ib.,

i355

a

21-4.

dXX* aei
cos
a.7r\S)S
$vva<rflai

T<i\r]@f)

KOL

TO.

/3eXri co TTJ

<pv<rti

eixrvKXayiaTOTepa KOI
alo~xpov

TOVTOIS arorroi/ el rco (rattan fiev fSorjdeiv eaira), Xoyw 8 OVK alo~xpdv o p.a\\ov idiov e
eiTTCti/.

rrpos be

TTJS

TOV

o-to/xaros ^pcta;.

ib.,

135

a

5

37-

A

2

PREFACE
IN making
its final

volume

consist of the Rhetoric

and

a the Poetics (together with the RJietorica ad Alexandrum minor tract of uncertain authorship), the Oxford Translation
of Aristotle follows the usual order in which the collected

be arranged. The two great, and most characteristic, treatises which deal with the art of Public Speaking and the art of Poetry bring the long and amazing procession of Aristotle s thought to a Language, as the instrument of thought and fitting close.

Aristotelian works have come,

by

tradition, to

feeling, is the

theme they have
its

in
;

common

workaday and
attribute of

loftiest

uses

language in its language which, as the
;

opening chapter of the Rhetoric

sets forth,
in

is

the distinctive

man and
to us,

his best

weapon

upholding truth
it

and

justice.

In the last two words of the Poetics as

has

come down

we may

fancy that

we hear

Aristotle

quietly taking leave of all the science, the logic, the meta physics, and the political and moral wisdom that have gone
before
:

elpTJo-Qco

roc-aura,

Let

it

suffice to

have said thus

much As for
.

those

who age

after

age make so-so attempts to

translate Aristotle into other tongues, they can only hope that they may, to some slight extent, have shunned the

reproach of obscurity and may, in this and other ways, have striven to respond to the pious aspirations of the Emir of
the Faithful, as quoted in
Rhetoric-.
l
(

Cope
:

s

Introduction

to

Aristotle s

Ibn-Roschd (Averroes), IbnTofai me fit appeler et me dit J ai entendu aujourd hui 1 emir des se de obscurite d Aristote et croyants plaindre de ses traducteurs Pint a Dieu, disait-il, qtiil se rencontrdt qnelqiiun qui vonlut commenter ces livres et en expliquer
jour,
disait
"

Un

1

:

clairement

le sens,

pour
et I

les

rendre accessibles aux hommes
edition, p. 17).

"

\

(Renan, Averroes

Averro isme, 3rd

vi

PREFACE

To the Introduction (Macmillan, 1867) and the Com mentary (Cambridge University Press, 1877) of that fine and still lamented scholar, Edward Meredith Cope, all
British students of the Rhetoric

following translation I am W. D. Ross, to Dr. A. S.

owe a great debt. In the further indebted to Professor

Way (for his verse renderings), to Professor E. A. Sonnenschein and Professor E. S. Forster,
former colleague at Leeds, Mr. L. H. G. Greenwood, whose singular command both of Greek and of English has been of the utmost service to me throughout.
all

and above

to

my

It

should be added that

Roemer

s

recension (2nd edition,

1898) of the Greek text has been followed in the main. Divergences from it are noted as they occur.

W.

RHYS ROBERTS.

New Years
1924.

Day,

NOTE.
tlie

watchword of 1 lie University of Wales, as given at the head of dedicatory page, may be translated^ word by word, as Optima Musa Veritas Our young Universities of Wales and Leeds will not, in
77ic
.

their youthful exuberance, forget that Aristotlethinkers of Athens, the earliest of all Universities

like other great prized truth and In oratory the best Athenian thinkers would right more than oratory. have liked to see a modest ally of truth and right. But, as in his remarkable Preface (Book 1, c. /) Aristotle gently joints out, when he is looking with a philosopher s eye upon the Greek oratory known to him,
all

good things can be abused save virtue alone.

CONTENTS
BOOK
c. i.
I

RHETORIC

is

the counterpart (avTiarpofyos) of Dialectic.

It is

a

The argumentative subject that can be treated systematically. modes of persuasion (iricneis} are the essence of the art of rhetoric :

appeals to the emotions warp the judgement. The writers of current text-books on rhetoric give too much attention to the forensic branch (in which chicanery is easier) and too little to the political (where the

Argumentative persuasion (Wo-ris) is a sort of and the rhetorical form of demonstration is the enthymeme (eV0u/^/ua). Four uses of rhetoric. Its possible abuse is no argument against its proper use on the side of truth and justice. The honest rhetorician has no separate name to distinguish him from
issues are larger).

demonstration

(nTroSa^i?),

the dishonest.
the faculty of observing in any given of persuasion Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric, and some do not. The rhetorician finds the latter kind (viz. witnesses, contracts, and the like)
c. 2.

Definition of rhetoric as

case the available

means

.

ready to his hand. has three divisions
character
(rjOos)

The former kind he must provide
(i) the speaker
s

which

will

make

himself; and it of power evincing a personal his speech credible (2) his power
; ;

of stirring the emotions (rrddrj) of his hearers (3) his power of proving a truth, or an apparent truth, by means of persuasive arguments. Hence rhetoric may be regarded as an offshoot of dialectic, and also
of ethical (or, political) studies.

example
(b)

(rrapaSf 17/^0),

The persuasive arguments are (a) the corresponding to induction (fTrayco-y^) in dialectic ;
;

the enthymeme, corresponding to the syllogism (c} the apparent enthymeme, corresponding to the apparent syllogism. The enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Rhetoric has regard to classes of men, not to individual men its subjects, and the premisses from which it argues, are in the main such as present alternative possibilities in the sphere of human action and it must adapt itself to an audience of untrained thinkers who cannot follow a long train of reasoning. The premisses from which enthymemes are formed are probabilities and signs and signs are either fallible or infallible, in which latter case they are termed The lines of argument, or topics, which enthymemes follow
;

;

*

;

Vlll

CONTENTS

distinguished as common (or, general) and special (i. e. special or ethics). The special lines a to single study, such as natural science should be used discreetly, if the rhetorician is not to find himself deserting his own field for another.

may be

There are three kinds of rhetoric A. political (deliberative), and C. epideictic (the ceremonial oratory of display). Their (a) divisions, (/3) times, and (y) ends are as follows A. Political exhortation and dehortation, (/3) future, (y) expediency and (a) inexpediency B. Forensic (a) accusation and defence, (/3) past, (y) C. Epideictic (a) praise and censure, (/3) present, justice and injustice
c. 3.
:

B. forensic (legal),

:

;

;

(y)

honour and dishonour.
(A)

c. 4.

The

(i)

ways and means,

subjects of Political Oratory fall under five main heads : (2) war and peace, (3) national defence, (4) imports

and

exports, (5) legislation.

The scope

of each of these divisions.

In urging his hearers to take or to avoid a course of action, the political orator must show that he has an eye to their happiness.
c. 5.

Four some

definitions (of a popular kind

:

as usual in the Rhetoric),

and

fourteen constituents, of happiness.

c. 6.

The
and

political

hearers,

this involves

speaker will also appeal to the interest of his a knowledge of what is good. Definition

and analysis of things
c. 7.

good
good

.

Comparison
?
.

of

things.

Of two good

things,

which

is

the better
or

This entails a consideration of degree

the lore of

less

more
c. 8.

of all

The political speaker will find his powers of persuasion most enhanced by a knowledge of the four sorts of government democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, and their characteristic Definition of the four sorts customs, institutions, and interests.
severally.
c. 9.

Ends

of each.

(C) Epideictic speaker is concerned with virtue and vice, The forms of virtue. praising the one and censuring the other. Which are the greatest virtues ? Some rhetorical devices used by the
epideictic

The

speaker amplification , especially. Amplification is particularly appropriate to epideictic oratory examples, to political ; enthymemes, to forensic.
: ;

c. 10.

(B)
its

The Forensic speaker should have
perpetrators,

studied wrongdoing

its

Definition of wrongdoing as injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. Law is either (a) special, viz. that written law which regulates the life of a particular community, or (b) general, viz. all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere. Enumeration and elucidation of the

motives,

and

its

victims.

seven causes of
(2) nature,
(3)

human

action,
;

viz.

three

involuntary, (i) chance,

compulsion

and four voluntary,

reasoning, (6) anger, (7) appetite.

viz. (4) habit, (5) All voluntary actions are good or

CONTENTS
apparently good, pleasant or apparently pleasant. expedient) has been discussed under political oratory.
has yet to be considered.
c. ii.

ix

The good (or The pleasant

Definition of pleasure,
viz.

motives for wrongdoing,
discussed in chapters
c. 12.

and analysis of things pleasant. The advantage and pleasure, have thus been
lead

6, 7, II.

The characters and circumstances which wrong, or make them the victims of wrong.

men

to

commit

c. 13. Actions just and unjust may be classified in relation to (i) the law, (2) the persons affected. The law may be (a] special, i. e. the law The of a particular State, or (b] universal, i. e. the law of Nature. persons affected may be (a) the entire community, (o) individual

members

of

it.

action, or not

A wrongdoer must either understand and intend the understand and intend it. In the former case, he must

be acting either from deliberate choice or from passion. It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt. Unwritten law (1) includes in its purview the conduct that springs from exceptional
friends
law.
is

goodness or badness, e.g. our behaviour towards benefactors and (2) makes up for the defects in a community s written code of
;

Its existence partly is, and partly not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law intended, where they find themselves unable to define things exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that held good always which in fact only holds good usually. Further remarks on the

This second kind

is

equity.
;

not, intended

by

legislators
;

nature and scope of equity.

The worse of two acts of wrong done to others is that which prompted by the worse disposition. Other ways of computing the comparative badness of actions.
c. 14.
is

c. 15.

The

non-technical
strictly

(extrinsic)

means

of persuasion

those
are

which do not
five in

belong to the

art (re xwj) of rhetoric.

They

number, and pertain especially to forensic oratory:

(i) laws,

How laws may be (2) witnesses, (3) contracts, (4) tortures, ($) oaths. discredited or upheld, according as it suits the litigant. Witnesses
may be
;

sayers expressed their opinions about some disputed matter, and witnesses who give their evidence in court). Ancient witnesses are more trust

either ancient (viz. poets and other notable persons ; sooth proverbs) ; or recent (viz. well-known contemporaries who have

worthy than contemporary. How contracts, and evidence given under may be belittled or represented as important. In regard to a man may either both offer and oaths, a fourfold division exists accept an oath, or neither, or one without the other that is, he may
torture,
:

offer

an oath but not accept one, or accept an oath but not

offer one.

CONTENTS
BOOKj
c.
i.

II

any rate must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief he must also (i) make his own character look right and (2) put his
political

Since rhetoric

and forensic

rhetoric, at

exists to affect the giving of decisions, the orator

;

hearers,

who
:

character

he

are to decide, into the right frame of mind. should make his audience feel that

As

to his

own

he possesses

prudence, virtue, and goodwill. This is especially important in a deliberative assembly. In the law courts it is especially important that he should be able to influence the emotions, or moral affections,
of the jury

who
;

try the case.

Definition of the several emotions.

In

regard to each emotion we must consider (a) the states of mind in which it is felt (I)} the people towards whom it is felt ; the grounds on which it is felt.
(<;)

c. 2.

In cc. 2-1

1

the various emotions are defined,

and are also

discussed (with incidental observations) from the three points of view In c. 2, Anger is the subject. The orator must so just indicated.

speak as to
c. 3. c. 4.
c. 5.

make

his hearers

angry with his opponents.
Anger).

Calmness

(as the opposite of

Friendship and Enmity.

Fear and Confidence.

c. 6.
c. 7.

Shame and Shamelessness.
Kindness and Unkindness.
Pity.

c. 8.

c. 9.
c. 10.
c. ii.

Indignation.

Envy.
Emulation.

c. 12.

The

various types of

human

character are next considered, in

and moral qualities and to the various ages and fortunes. By ages are meant youth, the prime of life, and old age; by fortunes are meant birth, wealth, power, and their
opposites.
c. 13.
c. 14.

relation to the various emotions

The

youthful type of character

is

thereupon depicted.

The

character of elderly men.
of

The character The

men

in their
;

prime from thirty
c. 15.

to five-and-thirty

the

prime. The body is mind about forty-nine.
is

in

its

gifts of fortune

by which human character

affected.

First,

good

birth.

c. 16.
c. 17.

Second, wealth.
Third, power.
Retrospect,

c. 18.

and glance forward.

The forms

of

common

argument

to all oratory will next

be discussed.

CONTENTS
:

xi

c. 19. The four general lines of argument (KOIVO\ TOTTOI) are (l) The Possible and Impossible ; (2) Fact Past (3) Fact Future ; (4) Degree.
;

The two general modes of persuasion (icoivai rrio-Tfis) are example (TrnpaSfiy/ua), (2) the enthymeme (eV0up?/ia) the maxim Examples are either (a) (yvanrj) being part of the enthymeme.
c.

20.

:

(i) the

;

historical parallels, or (b} invented parallels, viz. either (a) illustrations
(irapapoXai), or
(/3)

fables (Xttyoi), such as those of Aesop.

Fables are

suitable for popular addresses ; and they have this advantage, that they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels

among
c. 21.

actual past events.

maxim is a general statement about Use of maxims. It is an incomplete enthymeme. Four questions of practical conduct. kinds of maxims. Maxims should be used (a) by elderly rnen, and
Advantages of maxims (a) they (b} to controvert popular sayings. enable a speaker to gratify his commonplace hearers by expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they themselves hold about particular cases (b} they invest a speech with moral character.
: ;

A

Enthymemes. In enthymemes we must not carry our reason ing too far back, nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion. There are two kinds of enthymemes : (a) the demonstra
c. 22.
tive,

refutative,

formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions (b} the formed by the conjunction of incompatible propositions.
;

c. 23. Enumeration of twenty-eight topics (lines of argument) on which enthymemes, demonstrative and refutative, can be based [see Index, under argument, lines of ]. Two general remarks are added (a) the refutative enthymeme has a greater reputation than the demonstrative, because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are clearer to the audience (b) of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the
:

;

beginning, so long as they are not obvious at first sight for part of the pleasure we feel is at our own intelligent anticipation or those which we follow well enough to see the point of them as soon as the
;

last
c.

word has been
24.

uttered.
[see

Nine topics of apparent, or sham, enthymemes
].

Index,

under fallacious arguments
c.

25. Refutation.

An argument may

be refuted either
Objections

by

a

counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection.
raised in four
; :

may

be

ment

ways (a) by directly attacking your opponent s own state by putting forward another statement like it (y) by putting forward a statement contrary to it (3) by quoting previous decisions.
(/3)
;
;

c.

and

26. Correction of two errors, possible or actual (i) Amplification Depreciation do not constitute an element of enthymeme,
:

in the sense

of

a line of enthymematic argument

;

(2) refutative

xii

CONTENTS
different species

from constructive. This brings he thought-element of rhetoric the way to invent and refute persuasive arguments. There remain the subjects of (A) style and (B) arrangement.

enthymemes are not a
an end the

to

treatment of

BOOK
c. i.

III

(A) Style.

It is

say

it

in the right

way.

we must also not enough to know what to say of the delivery (which presents Upon subject
;

itself

here) no systematic treatise has been composed, though this art
to

has

much

ever, been touched

do with oratory (as with poetry). The matter has, how upon by Thrasymachus in his Appeals to Pity
:

.

the right thing in speaking really is that we should fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts and yet the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, what

As

to the place of style

;

ever

it

is

we have

to

expound

to others.

Through the

influence of the

poets, the language of oratorical prose at first took a poetical colour, as in the case of Gorgias. But the language of prose is distinct from

and, further, the writers of tragic poetry itself have now given up those words, not used in ordinary talk, which adorned the
that of poetry
;

early drama.

the main, the same definition and methods apply alike and to prose style. Style, to be good, must be clear it must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and excess of dignity. How these qualities may be attained. Rare, compound, and invented words must be used sparingly in prose; in which, over and above the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage, and even these need care. The language of
c. 2.

Still, in

to poetical

;

oratorical prose should, in fact, be like that of ordinary conversation. Some discussion of metaphor.
c. 3.

Four

faults of prose style, with illustrative
;

examples

:

(i)

mis

use of

compound words

(2)

employment of strange words;
;

(3) long,

unseasonable, or frequent epithets
c. 4.

(4)

inappropriate metaphors.

The

simile

prose as well as in of the nature of poetry.

a full-blown metaphor. Similes are useful in verse but they must not be used often, since they are
is
;

Metaphors can

easily

Instances of simile, from Plato and the orators. be turned into similes, and similes into metaphors.

The

always apply reciprocally to either of
c. 5.
is

proportional [as defined in the Poetics, c. 21] metaphor must its co-ordinate terms.

The foundation

of

good

style
(i)

is

discussed under

five

heads:

right

correctness of language, which use of connecting words;

(2) use of special, and not vague general, terms; (3) avoidance of ambiguity (4) observance of gender (5) correct indication of grammatical number. A composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver; it should avoid (i) uncertainties as to punctuation,
;
;

(2)

zeugma,

(3) parenthesis.

CONTENTS
c. 6.

xiii

Impressiveness of

style.
;

Six heads
(2)

:

(i)

the use of a descrip
;

tion instead of a simple
for singular

name
(4)

metaphors and epithets
;

(3) plural

number

;

words
c. 7.

;

(6)

description

by

repetition of the article means of negation.

(5)

connecting

An appropriate style will adapt itself to Appropriateness. (i) the emotions of the hearers, (2) the character of the speaker, (3) the nature of the subject. Tact and judgement are needed in all varieties
of oratory.

The form of the language should not be Prose rhythm. on the other nor, hand, without any rhythm at all. Of the metrical,
c. 8.

ordinary,

various possible rhythms, the heroic is too grand, the iambic too and the trochaic too like a riotous dance. The best rhythm

for prose is the

The paean

www

paean, since from this alone no definite metre arises. should be used for the beginning, and the paean

www
c. 9.

for the end, of a sentence.

Periodic style

The language
;

of prose

must be either

(i) free-

or (2) compact (i. e. periodic). running, like that of Herodotus period may be defined as a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance. It may have one member (clause), or more than one.

A

A
or

period of
(b)

makes makes the

either (a) simply divided, Antithesis implies contrast of sense. Parisosis the two members of a period equal in length. Paromoeosis
antithetical.
first

more than one member may be

or last words of both

members

like

each other.

Homoeoteleuton denotes similarity
c. 10.

in terminations only.

Smart and popular sayings. Three chief features of these pointed sayings are: (i) antithesis, (2) metaphor, and (3) vividness e. of or the the scene before our (i. actuality power setting
clever,

eyes

).

The graphic power of setting things before the eyes implies the use of expressions that represent objects as in a state of activity :
c. ii.

often gives metaphorical life to lifeless things in this fashion. touch of surprise also contributes to liveliness. People feel they have learnt something hence the pleasure given by apophthegms,

Homer

A

;

riddles,

and puns.

Similes, proverbs,

and hyperboles

also find a place

here, being related to metaphors.
its own appropriate style. The not that of spoken oratory, nor are those of The written style is the political and forensic speaking the same. more finished the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery alike

c. 12.

Each kind

of rhetoric has
is

style of written

prose

:

the kind of oratory that reflects character and the kind that stirs emotion. The style of oratory addressed to public assemblies resembles scene-painting. In the one and the other, high finish in detail is superfluous and seems better away. The forensic style is

xiv

CONTENTS
;

Ceremonial oratory is the most literary, for more highly finished. and next to it forensic oratory. To analyse it is meant to be read that it must be agreeable or magnificent, is add and still further, style useless for why should it have these traits any more than restraint
;

,

liberality
c. 13.

,

or any other moral excellence

?

and

proof.

speech has two essential parts statement (B) Arrangement. To these may be added introduction and epilogue.
:

A

c. 14.

Introduction.

The

introduction corresponds to the prologue

poetry and the prelude in flute-music. The most essential function and distinctive property of the introduction is to indicate the aim of the
in

speech. An introduction may (i) excite or allay prejudice; (2) exalt In a political speech an introduction is seldom found, or depreciate. for the subject is usually familiar to the audience.

The various lines of c. 15. Prejudice. or allaying prejudice.
c. 16.

argument suitable

for exciting

Narration,

(i)

rule,

not be continuous but intermittent

In ceremonial oratory, narration should, as a variety is pleasant, and the
:

facts in

a celebrity s praise are usually well known. (2) In forensic oratory, the current rule that the narration should be rapid is wrong : Tightness consists neither in rapidity nor in conciseness, but in the

happy mean.
the plaintiff.
;

The defendant
(3)

will

make

less

use of narration than

In political oratory there is least opening for narra tion nobody can narrate what has not yet happened. If there is narration at all* it will be of past events, the recollection of which will
it

help the hearers to make better plans for the future. Or employed to attack some one s character, or to eulogize him.
c 17. Arguments.

may

be

conclusive proofs,
fall
(c)

of the Arguments is to attempt In forensic oratory, the question in dispute will under one of four heads : (a) the fact, (b) the existence of injury,
(i)

The duty

the

amount

of injury, (d)

the justification.

(2)

In ceremonial

oratory, the facts themselves will usually be taken on trust, and the speaker will maintain, say, the nobility or the utility of the deeds in
(3) In political oratory, it will be urged that a proposal impracticable or that, though practicable, it is unjust, or will do no good, or is not so important as its proposer thinks. Argument by

question.
is

;

1

example

is

meme

better suits forensic.
;

highly suitable for political oratory, argument by enthyEnthymemes should not be used in

unbroken succession they should be interspersed with other matter. If you have proofs to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse as well if you have no enthymemes, then fall back upon moral discourse after all, it is more fitting for a good man to Hints display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner. as to the order in which arguments should be presented. As to
;
:

character

:

you cannot well say complimentary things about yourself

CONTENTS
the

xv

or abusive things about another, but you can put such remarks into mouth of some third person.
c. 18.

Interrogation

and

Jests.

The

best

moment

to

employ

interrogation is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in absurdity. In replying to questions, you must meet them, if they are ambiguous, by drawing

reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer. Jests are supposed to be of some service in controversy. Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnest

which he was right. Jests have been classified in the Poetics. see that you are becoming to a gentleman, others are not choose such as become you. Irony better befits a gentleman than buffoonery the ironical man jokes to amuse himself, the buffoon to
ness
1
;

in

Some

;

;

amuse other people.
c. 19.

You must
ill

This has four parts. Epilogue (Peroration, Conclusion). (i) make the audience well disposed towards yourself and

facts,
(4)

disposed towards your opponent, (2) magnify or minimize the leading (3) excite the required kind of emotion in your hearers, and
refresh their

memories by means of a

recapitulation.

In your

closing words you may dispense with conjunctions, and thereby mark * the difference between the oration and the peroration : I have done.

You have heard me.
ment.

The

facts are before you.

I

ask for your judge

RHETORICA
BOOK
I I

RHETORIC

is

1 the counterpart of Dialectic.

Both

alike

1354"

are concerned with such things as come, more or less, with in the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of

both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and

5

Ordinary people do this either at random Both ways or through practice and from acquired habit.
to attack others.

being possible, the subject can plainly be handled syste 2 for it is possible to inquire the reason why matically,

some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an
inquiry
is

10

the function of an art.
of the current treatises on rhetoric have

Now, the framers

constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of 3 persuasion are the only true constituents of the art every
:

thing else

merely accessory. These writers, however, say about nothing enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely
is
1 Rhetoric and Dialectic may be roughly Englished as the art the art of logical discussion . Aristotle s of public speaking and philosophical definition of Rhetoric is given at the beginning of c. 2.

15

2
6<w

Troielv,

Bywater

:

oScoTroieii

attempts at logical argument on which he would himself like to see Rhetoric rely. In the next b a chapter, I355 35-i356 4, he gives to the term the wide range it had in current rhetorical usage, and concludes with a reference to the argumentative side: al Se ev Xo-ya) 5ta rov dfiitvvvai (fxilwadai
ai>ro>

3

Aristotle here

means by

pr. Tn orei? those
,

A

c

TO>

*/

uniform rendering of the wo rd is hardly possible, but at the outset it is important to stress Aristotle s fundamental view (im plied etymologicaliy in the term Trio-rets) that, from the nature of its materials, Rhetoric is, in general, persuasive rather than fully demon strative. When in later portions of the treatise a single-word rendering is as avoiding given, arguments will be preferred to proofs confusion with an-odei let? and re/t/u^pia.
SeiKvvvai.
,

A

645-10

B

T3

54

a

RHETORICA
a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down

20 in

some

states

especially in well-governed states

were

to say. applied everywhere, such people would have nothing All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical
effect to their
i

This

is

thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert

35

one the judge 1 by moving him to anger or envy or pity might as well warp a carpenter s rule before using it. Again,
a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened.

to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instruche must decide for himself all such 30 tions from the litigants
:

As

points as the law-giver has not already defined for him. Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should

themselves

define all the

leave as few as
b

may

points they possibly can and be to the decision of the judges and
;

this for several reasons.

First, to find

one man, or a few

I354 men,

who are sensible persons and capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason

5

of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases

brought before them.
selves to be so
10

They

will often

have allowed them

much

influenced

by

feelings of friendship or

hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. In general, then, the judge
should,
sible.

we say, be allowed to decide as few things as pos But questions as to whether something has happened
is

or has not happened, will be or will not be,
1

or

is

not,

Here, and in what follows, the English reader should understand judge in abroad sense, including jurymen and others who judge
.

BOOK
must of necessity be
cannot foresee them.
left

I.

i

b

I354
15

If this

to the judge, since the lawgiver is so, it is evident that any

about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the introduction or the
one
lays
rules

who

down

narration

theorizing about non-essentials as
art.

or any of the other divisions of a speech, is if they belonged to the
20

The only question with which these writers here how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator s proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us nothing, that is, about how to gain skill
deal
is
;

in

same systematic 1 principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private
that,

enthymemes. Hence it comes

although

the

25

individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead
in court.

The
less

reason for this

is

there

is

inducement to talk

that in political oratory about non-essentials.

oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political 30
Political

debate the
sion
fore, to

man who is forming a judgement is making a deci
vital interests.

about his own

There

is

no need, there

prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic
is

oratory this

not enough

;

to conciliate the listener

is

what

pays here. It is other people s affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and lis
tening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. Hence in many places, as 1355 we have said already, 2 irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the

law-courts

:

in the public

assembly those who have to form

a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that. It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, 3
is
1

concerned with the modes of persuasion.
*

Persuasion

is

The words orator and oratory have the advantage of brevity, but the reader will bear in mind that public speaker and * public speaking are in some ways nearer the Greek conception of rhetor
and rhetoric
2
*.

3

1354*22.

On

its

technical

side.

B a

I

3 55

a

RHETORICA
persuaded
strated.
this
is,

5

clearly a sort of demonstration, since when we consider a thing to

The
in

orator

s

demonstration

is

are most fully have been demon an enthymeme, and

we

general,

the

most
is

effective

of the

modes

of

persuasion. consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or
10

The enthymeme

a sort of syllogism, and the

of one of

its

branches.

It follows plainly, therefore, that

he

who

is

best able to see
is

how and from what
be best skilled

elements a

syllogism

produced

will also

in the

enthy

15

meme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict The true and the approximately true are apprehended logic. the same it may also be noted that men have a by faculty sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess
;

at truth
It

is

has

likely to make a good now been shown that
;

guess at probabilities. the ordinary writers on

rhetoric treat of non-essentials
20

it

has also been shown

why
of

they have inclined more towards the forensic branch
oratory.

Rhetoric is useful (i) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what

they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers

More themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. not before some audiences even the over, (2) possession of
25

the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge im

and there are people whom one cannot Here, then, we must use, as our modes of per suasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as
plies instruction,
instruct.

we observed
1

the Topics 1 when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. 2 Further, (3) we must be able to
in
Topics,
2
i.

a 2, 1 01

30-4.
. .

Rhetoric is useful audience is quoted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his First Letter to Ammaeits, c. 6. Other references to Aristotle and the Rhetoric will be found in Roberts edition of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The Three Literary Letters The First Letter discusses the chronology PP- 2 5-7, 5 2 -.8 5 161-7. of Aristotle s life and the date of his Rhetoric.
. ,

The passage

BOOK

I.

i

1355"

employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly
and that, if another man argues unfairly, be able to confute him. 1 No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend impartially.
what the
facts are,

30

we on our

part

may

:

35

themselves equally well to the contrary views.

things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in.
;

No

Again,

(4)

it

is

absurd to hold that a

man ought

to

be I355 b

ashamed of being unable

to defend himself with his limbs,

but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, 2 when the use of rational speech is more

human being than the use of his limbs. be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except
distinctive of a

And

if

it

virtue,

and above

all

against the things that are most useful,

5

as strength, health, wealth, generalship. man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict

A

the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly. It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic it
;

is

clear, also, that
is

it

is

useful.

It is clear, further, that its
i

function

to discover the

not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather means of coming as near such success as the

resembles

In this it circumstances of each particular case allow. all other arts. For example, it is not the function
of medicine simply to

make

a

man

him

as far as

may

be on the road to health

quite healthy, but to put it is possible to
;

give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function

of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent
Reading rols \6yots avrol in 1. 33. Xoyop, as comprising both ratio and oratio* is not easily translated with brevity.
2
1

15

I35 5

b

RHETORICA
means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to What makes discern the real and the apparent syllogism. a man a sophist is not his faculty, but his moral purpose.
In rhetoric, however, the term rhetorician may describe either the speaker s knowledge of the art, or his moral
1
*

20

purpose.

In dialectic

it

is

different: a

man

is

a

sophist

because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a dialecti cian in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty. Let us now try to give some account of the systematic
itself principles of Rhetoric

of the right

method and means

must of succeeding in the object we set before us. make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define
25

We

what

rhetoric

is.

may be defined as the faculty of observing in 2 the available means of persuasion. This case any given is not a function of any other art. Every other art can
Rhetoric
instruct

or

persuade

about

its

own

particular
is

subject-

matter
3o

;

for instance,

medicine about what

healthy and

unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other
arts

and sciences.

of observing the presented to us
35

;

But rhetoric we look upon as the power means of persuasion on almost any subject and that is why we say that, in its technical

character,

2

it

is

not concerned with any special or definite
strictly to the

class of subjects.

Of
art

the

of rhetoric

modes of persuasion some belong and some do not. 3 By the

latter I

mean

such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such
as

we

rhetoric.

can ourselves construct by means of the principles of The one kind has merely to be used, the other

has to be invented.
i. e. there is no special Greek term to denote the sophistical rhetorician, whereas the sophistical dialectician has the name of sophist pJ]Tti)p, in fact, can mean either a trained speaker or a tricky
.

1

speaker. 2 In its technical character as an art (T*X VII) 3 Some are technical, others non-technical
.

BOOK
Of

I.

2

1356

the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word I356 a there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the
personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain l frame of mind the third on
;

the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker s
personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. believe good men more fully and more readily than others this is true generally
5

We

:

is, and absolutely true where exact This is certainty impossible and opinions are divided. kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his It is not true, as some character before he begins to speak. writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the

whatever the question

10

personal
character
of

goodness revealed

by the speaker
;

contributes

nothing to his

may

power of persuasion on the contrary, his almost be called the most effective means
he
possesses.

persuasion

Secondly, persuasion

may
15

come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that
present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their

This subject shall be treated in detail when we to speak of the emotions. 2 Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a
efforts.

come

or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive 20 arguments suitable to the case in question. There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. Thfc man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear,
truth

be able

(i) to

reason logically,

(2)

to understand

human

character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions that is, to name them and
describe them, 3 to they are excited.

know
It

their causes

and the way

in

which
25

thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical
1

i.e.

the right,

fit,

required frame of mind.

2
ii,

cc. 2-11.

3

To

state their nature

and

quality, their

genus and

differentia.

I 3 56

a

RHETORICA
studies

and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other As a matter of fact, it is a branch of 30 human failings.

may

fairly

be called

political

;

dialectic

and similar

to

it,

as

we

said at the outset. 1

Neither

rhetoric

nor dialectic
:

is

the scientific study of any one

35

both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.
separate subject

With regard
I356
b

to

the

persuasion achieved

by proof or

apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the
other, so
it is

in rhetoric.

The example

is

an induction, the

5

a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is enthymeme an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical Every syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction.
is

one

either

10

15

through proof does in fact use examples there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at -all is bound to use cither syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics 2 )^ it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics ^ where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When, we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or
effects persuasion

who

enthymemcs

or

:

;

usually, this
rhetoric.

is

called syllogism in dialectic,

enthymeme
:

in

each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say for what has been said in the Methodics 4 applies equally well here in
It is plain also that
;

20

some

oratorical
;

styles

memes
1
i.

and
a

in like

examples prevail, in others enthy manner, some orators are better at the
ii.

"

3
4

A

I354 i. Top. i. i and

I.

Anal. Pr.
12.

23, 24

;

Anal. Post.

i.

I.

b Cp. 68

13.

lost logical treatise of Aristotle;

but cp. Bonitz Index,

b p. ioi .

BOOK
former and some at the

I.

2

I356

b

latter. Speeches that rely on other kind, but those as the are as examples persuasive the louder which rely on enthymemes excite applause. The 1 sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses,

we

will

discuss

later.

processes themselves

A statement
is

is

Our next step more clearly. persuasive and credible
it

2

is

to define the

25

either because

it

directly self-evident or because

from other statements that

appears to be proved In either case it is are so.

persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases.

Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to 30 cure any or all of a given class of patients this alone is its
:

business

individual cases are so infinitely various that no In the same systematic knowledge of them is possible.
:

way

the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not
;

35

construct

syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call
its

for discussion

;

and

rhetoric, too,

draws upon the regular
is

subjects of debate.

The duty
deliberate

of rhetoric

to deal with 1357*

such matters as

upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of The subjects of our deliberation are such as reasoning.

we

seem to present us with

alternative

possibilities

:

about

5

things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.
It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and
;

at the
1

same time are so
of this
,

little

accepted that they
is

call for 10

Or The reason
and Bywater.
ii,

if

avrvv

omitted with Muretus transla

tion
2

cc.

20-4.

I357

a

RHETORICA
proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that
;

15

are not generally admitted or believed. The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an
induction,

matters.

fewer

and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, often than those which make up the normal syllogism.

For
to
20

if

any

of these propositions
it
;

is

a familiar fact, there
it

is

no

need even to mention

the hearer adds

himself.

show that Dorieus has been

victor in a contest for

Thus, which

the prize is a crown, it is enough to say For he has been victor in the Olympic games without adding And in the
,

Olympic games the prize
knows. There are few
the
basis

is

a crown

,

a fact which everybody

facts of the

necessary
1

type that can form

25

Most of the things syllogisms. about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all
of rhetorical

them
state

our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that

what

is

merely usual or possible must be drawn from
necessary
;

premisses that do the same, just as
30

conclusions

must be drawn from necessary premisses this too is clear to us from the Analytics? It is evident, therefore, that the
propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be will most of them be only necessary Now the materials of enthymemes are usually true.
,

and Signs, which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. Probability is a thing
Probabilities

A

35

that usually happens

;

not,

however, as some definitions
class

would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but
only
1

if

it

belongs to

trie

of

the

contingent
,

or
.

2

An. Pr.

Retaining the manuscript reading
\.

e

o>i

,

materials

sources

8,

12-14, 27.

BOOK
variable
.

I.

2

I357

a

It

bears the
l

which

it is

probable

relation to that in respect of as the universal bears to the particular.
b

same

Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement I357 it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular.

Of

The

kind is a complete proof (TCK/XTJ/HOI;) the kind has no specific name. By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based and
infallible
;

fallible

:

5

kind of Sign is called complete this proof when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward
this
:

shows us why

a

complete proof, meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed (nt-nepavusvov) for the word Wpay has the same meaning (of end or boundary ) as the word TtKfjiap in the ancient tongue. Now the one kind of
;

10

Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, The fact that Socrates was wise and Here we certainly just is a sign that the wise are just have a Sign but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it docs not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, The fact that he
*
. ;

has a fever

is

a sign that he

is ill

,

or,

The

fact that she

is 15
.

giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that,
if

the particular statement

is

true,

is

irrefutable.

The

other

kind of Sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated

by

saying,

The
.

fact that

he breathes

fast

is

a sign that he
20

has a fever

This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may
breathe hard without having a fever.
It

has, then,

been stated above what

is

the nature of

a Probability, of a Sign, and of a complete proof, and what 1 a more are the differences between them. In the Analytics* 1 to i. e. bears the same relation to the conclusion to be reached that to which its general probability is directed to the particular probable case which has to be proved. 2 An. Pr. ii. 27.
:

I357

b

RHETORICA
explicit description has been given of these points
;

it

is

there
into
35

shown why some of these reasonings can be put syllogisms and some cannot.

has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject-matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated

The example

above.

Its

relation to the proposition

it

supports

is

not

that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor When but of part to part, or like to like.

whole to whole, two statements

are of the

same

order, but

one

is
.

more

familiar than the

The argument may, for 30 other, the former is an example in be that instance, Dionysius, asking as he does for a to make himself a despot. For in is scheming bodyguard,
the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot
as soon as he got
in

35

at Megara and known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly
it
; ;

and so did Theagenes

the same

way

all

other instances

:

1

supposed to be demonstrative. There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymernes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody one that also subsists between the syllogisms
5

of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really to belongs rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to
treated
;

those

we have not yet
fail

acquired.

Missing this distinction,

people

to notice that the

their particular
10 clearer

more correctly they handle the further subject they are getting away
dialectic.

from pure rhetoric or
if

This statement

will

be

expressed more fully. I mean that the proper of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the subjects
1

Lit.

that

it
.

nobody

else)

is the man who is scheming The Greek word-order makes

.

.

.

who asks

.

.

.

(and

this plain.

BOOK

I

2

a

I358

things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of 1 Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of

argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the
2 On argument concerned with the more or less this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially

line of

.

15

disconnected subjects right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. But there are also those special
are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which

Lines of

Argument which

it is

ethics,

impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about and other propositions about ethics on which nothing

can be based about natural science.
applies throughout.

The same
will

principle 20

The

general Lines of Argument have

no special subject-matter; and therefore

not increase

our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions
suitable
for

special

Lines of Argument, 3 the nearer one

comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating
the required principles, but one s science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong. Most enthymemes are in fact
25

based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in

;

the Topics^ therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general

Lines of
to
all

special Lines of

Argument on which they are to be founded. By Argument I mean the propositions peculiar each several class of things, by general those common to
classes alike.

We may
first

begin with the special Lines of

Argument.
varieties.
1

But,

Having
after
i.

us classify rhetoric into its distinguished these we may deal with of
all, let
2

Or

n

Comma
:

Topics, Commonplaces.
fie

i.e.
:

the topic of degree.
after
e /cXe -y/^iai
:

bracket
4

peXrtov

and after Trporao-fts no comma with some manuscripts.
;

no

Cp. Top.

10, 14

iii.

5

;

Soph.

EL

9.

I358

a

RHETORICA
them one by
each
is

35

which each must the and employ. propositions composed,
one, and try to discover the elements of
falls

Rhetoric

into

three

divisions,

determined by the 3

three classes of listeners to speeches.

elements

in

speech-making
it is

For of the three speaker, subject, and person

addressed
b

I358 speech s with a decision to
observer.
5
1

the last one, the hearer, that determines the end and object. The hearer must be either a judge,

make about

things past or future, or an

A member of the

assembly decides about future
:

while those who juryman about past events 2 s skill are observers. orator From on the decide merely this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory
events, a
(i) political, (2) forensic,
3

and

(3)

the ceremonial oratory of
to
is

display. Political speaking urges us either

do or not

to

do

something
10

:

one of these two courses

always taken by

private counsellors, as well as by men who address public Forensic speaking either attacks or defends assemblies.

somebody one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of These three display either praises or censures somebody.
:

kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time.
political orator
15 is

The
about

concerned with the future

:

it

is

things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past one
;

man

accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is,

men
20

properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all praise or blame in view of the state of things existing

at the time,

though they often

find

it

useful also to recall

the past and to
:

make guesses

at the future.

a mere onlooker, present nt a show, where he decides no b grave political or legal issue (cp. I39i 16-20) and plays no higher role than that of speech taster or oratorical connoisseur. Political has been preferred to deliberative, as being clearer to the English reader. The oratory of the (parliamentary) counsellor is meant. Omitting Roemer s brackets.

Or deliberative (advisory), legal, and epideictic the oratory respectively of parliamentary assemblies, of law-courts, and of cere monial occasions when there is an element of display show declamation , and the result is a set speech or harangue
:

3

,

,

.

BOOK
of
its

I.

3
in view, one for each orator aims at estab

I 35 8

l

Rhetoric has three distinct ends
three kinds.

The

political

expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good if he urges its rejection, he
lishing the
; ;

does so on the ground that it will do harm and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honour
;

able

relative to this

or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and main consideration. Parties in a law-case

25

aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and
relative to this one.

aim

at

Those who praise or attack a man proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and
all

they too treat
this one.

other considerations with reference to

the three ends

That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at we have mentioned is shown by the fact that will sometimes not try to establish anything else. speakers
Thus, the litigant
will

30

sometimes not deny that a thing has

happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit otherwise there would be
;

no need of a

trial.

So

too, political orators often

make any
35

concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an

expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble

them

at

all.

In like manner those

who

praise or censure a

not consider whether his acts have been expedient 1359* or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable.

man do

Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death,

and that otherwise he need not die yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was
:

5

to live on. 1
It is

evident from what has been said that

it is

these three

subjects,

more than any
1

others, about which the orator
his
ff.

must be able to have propositions at
Homer,
Iliad^ xviii. 97

command.

Now

I

3 59

a

RHETORICA
the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Proba

10

and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a particular kind of
bilities,
1 syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions. and not impossible ones, can Since only possible actions,

2 ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also can

15

not have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker
alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a

thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur. Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending
20

themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either

absolutely or relatively

;

and therefore

it

is

plain that

we

must

also

have

at

our

command

propositions about great

ness or smallness and the greater or the lesser propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to

say which
25

is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser and so on. act of justice or injustice Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we arc
;

inevitably

them.

We

bound to master the propositions relevant to must now discuss each particular class of these
namely those
dealt with in political, in
lastly in legal, oratory.

subjects in turn,

ceremonial, and
30

then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of 4 good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only
First,

things,

with such as

may

or

may

not take place.

Concerning

things which exist or will exist inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take place, no counsel can be given. Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things
of Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs i. e. relating to the three subjects of the expedient, the just, and the noble/ 2 c the reference being to panegyrical Reading TreTrpax&n with oratory in the first case, to forensic in the second. Cp. Scholia, D. 12
1

A

:

(ed.

Rabe).

BOOK
which

I.

4
;

I359
for this class includes
35

a

may

or

may

not take place

some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident and about these it is useless to offer counsel.
;

people deliberate;

Clearly counsel can only be given on matters about which 1 matters, namely, that ultimately depend

on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not.

Now

I359

b

to

enumerate and

classify

accurately the

usual

subjects of public business, and further to frame, as far. as possible, true definitions of them, is a task which we must

not attempt on the present occasion. For it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to a more instructive art and a more

-

branch of knowledge and as it given a far wider subject-matter than
real
;

is,

rhetoric has been

strictly

belongs to

it.

The
a

said already, 2 that rhetoric is is, combination of the science of logic and of the ethical 10

truth

as indeed

we have
it is

branch of

politics

;

and

partly like dialectic, partly like

But the more we try to make either sophistical reasoning. dialectic or rhetoric not, what they really are, practical
faculties,

but sciences, the more
;

destroying their true nature

for

we we

shall inadvertently be shall be re-fashioning

15

be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and
shall

them and

forms of reasoning. those points which it

Even
is

here, however, we will mention of practical importance to distinguish,

their fuller treatment falling naturally to political science.

which

The main matters on which all men deliberate and on political speakers make speeches are some five in
:

20

ways and means, war and peace, national defence, and imports exports, and legislation. As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to know the number and extent of the country s sources

number

of revenue, so that,
1

if

any

is

being overlooked,

it

may

be

25

i.

e.

can only be given when we are asking ourselves what we are
c.

to do.
in

Aristotle repeatedly (e.g. ii, involves a decision by a judge, both

18) insists that effective rhetoric

a cp. notes on I354 25 decisions normally mean action.

judge and

a broad sense
i.

:

and I358 b

decision being used 2. In politics such

2

2.

I356

a

25

ff.

646-10

I3

59

b

RHETORICA
added, and, if any is defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenditure of the country, in order it may be abolished, or, that, if any part of it is superfluous, For men become if any is too large, it may be reduced.
richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also comprehensive view of by reducing their expenditure.

A

?>o

these questions cannot be gained solely from experience in home affairs in order to advise on such matters a man
;

must be keenly interested
other lands.

in the

methods worked out

in

35

and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the nature of that actual and potential strength and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that

As

to Peace

;

;

be maintained with those stronger than his own, and that his own may have power to make war or not against
peace
a

may

I36o those that are weaker.
military
his

He

should know, too, whether the
is

power of another country
;

like or unlike that of
affect their relative

own

for this is a

matter that
in

may

strength.

With the same end

view he must, besides,

have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended similar causes are likely
;

5

to

have similar

results.

With regard
strength

to National

Defence
the

:

about the methods of defence

in actual use,

he ought to know all such as the

and

character

of

positions of the forts

this last

defensive force and the means that he must be well

10

acquainted with the lie of the country in order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed if it
not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with special care. With regard to the Food Supply he must know what
is
:

outlay will

meet the needs of his country l what kinds of food are produced at home and what imported and what articles must be exported or imported. This last he must
;

;

1

Comma

after yroAft

:

no

comma

after iroia.

BOOK
know in order be made with
two

T.

4

I36o

a

that agreements and commercial treaties may There are, indeed, the countries concerned.

15

sorts of state to

give no cause for states with which

which he must see that his countrymen offence, states stronger than his own, and

advantageous to trade. But while he must, for security s sake, be able to take all this into account, he must before all things under for it is on a country s laws stand the subject of legislation
it is
;

that

whole welfare depends. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what internal developments or external attacks each of them
its
;

20

tends to be destroyed.
internal

When
I

I

speak of destruction through

developments
far

refer to the fact that all constitutions,
all,

except the best one of

are destroyed both

by not being
25

enough and by being pushed too far. Thus, pushed loses its vigour, and finally passes into oligarchy, democracy not only when it is not pushed far enough, but also when it is pushed a great deal too far just as the aquiline and noses by not being into normal not turn nose the snub only aquiline or snub enough, but also by being too violently aquiline or snub arrive at a condition in which they no longer
;

look like noses at
It is useful, in

all.

framing laws, not only to study the past 30 s of one own country, in order to understand which history constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a

knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitu From this we can see that books of travel tion are suited. are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn The political the laws and customs of different races.
speaker
will also

35

find the researches

of historians useful.

But

all this is

the business of political science and not of

rhetoric.

These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the political speaker must possess. 1 Let us now go I36o b back and state the premisses from which he will have to
1

Not

inserting ras Trporao-eis in

1.

38.

C

2

I36o

b

RHETORICA
argue
It
in

favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding
individual

1 these and other matters.

5

in

may be said that every common aim at a certain

man and

all

men 5

end which determines what

they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up Let us, then, by briefly, is happiness and its constituents.

way

nature of happiness, and
constituent parts.
10

of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the what are the elements of its

For

all

advice to do things or not to do

them

is

make

concerned with happiness and with the things that whatever creates or increases for or against it
;

happiness or some part of happiness,

we ought

to

do

;

whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives
opposite,

rise to its

we ought

not to do.

IP

define happiness as prosperity combined with or as the secure enjoy virtue; or as independence of life
;

We may

ment of the maximum of pleasure

;

or as a good condition

of property and body, together with the power of guarding one s property and body and making use of them. That

happiness

is

one or more of these things, pretty well every
happiness
birth,
it

body

agrees*
this definition of

From
20 stituent

follows that

its

con-

parts are

:

good

plenty of friends, good

friends, wealth,

good

children, plenty of children, a

happy

old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty,

strength large stature, athletic powers, together with fame,

be and he possesses these internal 25 completely independent these external goods for besides these there are no others to have (Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external.) Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure. As we have already ascertained what happiness in general is, so now let us 30 try to ascertain what each of these parts of it is. Now good birth in a race or a state means that its
honour, good luck, and virtue.
if

A

man

cannot

fail

to

;

Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire says of this chapter: II est fait pour etonner beaucoup ceux qui croient non-seulement a notre superiorite, mais en outre a tine difference radicale entre nous et les Grecs.

1

BOOK
members

I.

5

1360*

are indigenous or ancient ; that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung

many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire. The good birth of an individual, which may come either
are free citizens,

from the male or the female side, implies that both parents and that, as in the case of the state, the founders of the line have been notable for virtue or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women,

35

young and

old.
c

phrases possession of good children and of children bear a quite clear meaning. Applied to a

The

many com
a

munity, they
of

mean
:

that

its

young men are numerous and
regard to bodily excellences, I36l
;

good quality

good

in

such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic powers

and also

in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual,

they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good qualities we have described. Both male and female
are here included
;

5

the excellences of the latter are, in body,
;

beauty and stature
that
is

in soul,

not sordid. 1

self-command and an industry Communities as well as individuals
10

should lack none of these perfections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians,
the state of

The
and

bad, almost half of human life is spoilt. constituents of wealth are plenty of coined money

women
;

is

:

ownership of numerous, large, and also the ownership of numerous and beautiful estates All these beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly,
territory

the
;

15

and

useful.

The

useful kinds are those that are productive,

the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By productive I mean those from which we get our

income by enjoyable those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion
*

;

,

security is the ownership of property in such places and under such conditions that the use of it is in our power

of

;

20

1 Or, as Thomas Hobbes well gives it in his Briefe of the Rhetorique, housewiferie without sordidnesse
.

Art

oj

I 3 6i

a

RHETORICA
and
it is

our
it.

own

if it is

in

our
it

or keep
selling

By

disposing of

own power to dispose of it I mean giving it away or

it.

than

in

Wealth as a whole owning them it is
;

consists in using things rather that is, really the activity

the use
25

of property that constitutes wealth.

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise. Honour is the token of a man s being famous for doing good. It is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good but also to the man who can do
;

30

good

in future.
life

or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time for many gain
tion of
life,

Doing good and the means of

refers either to the preserva

which seem small, but the place and the The constituents of honour are it. occasion account
honour
for things

for

:

35 sacrifices

commemoration, in verse or prose privileges l state front seats at civic celebrations grants of land 3 2 statues burial among foreigners, public maintenance and such presents as are obeisances and giving place of men various bodies regarded as marks of honour. among
;
; ;
; ; ;

;

;

;

For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour which explains why honour;

money-loving persons desire it. The b it is a piece of to both what they want I36l present brings property, which is what the lovers of money desire and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire.
loving as
well
as
; ;

The
tion

excellence of the

body

is

health

;

that

is,

a condi

5

us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies for many people are healthy as we are told Herodicus was and these no one can congratulate

which allows

;

;

they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do. Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a

on their health

,

for

body
1 8

fit

to endure the exertion of running
;

strength

which means that he
*

is

and of contests of pleasant to look at and
;

More

briefly,

precedence
;

.

Or, (splendid) tombs

3

sepulchres.

Pensions

.

BOOK

1

I.

5

I36I

therefore all-round athletes are the

most

beautiful, being 10

naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for

For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for also. the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to
speed be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be from all those deformities of old age which cause pain 2 to others. 1 Strength is the power of moving some one else
free

15

at will

;

to
;

grip

him

you must either thus you must be strong in

do

this,

pull,
all

push, lift, pin, or of those ways or at

to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one s movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength,
least in
is

some.

Excellence in size

20

He who can swiftness implying strength. his in a certain them fast forward and move fling legs way, and far, is good at running he who can grip and
and swiftness
;
;

hold

down
:

is

good

at wrestling

;

he who can drive an
25

adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast,
while he

who can do
in old
;

all is

an

all-round

athlete.

Happiness and painlessly

age
a

is

for

man

the coming of old age slowly has not this happiness if he
or
tardily

grows
arises

old

either

quickly,

but painfully.

It

both from the excellences of the body and from good luck. If a man is not free from disease, or if he is not

strong,

he

will

not be free from suffering

;

nor can he

30

continue to live a long and painless life unless he has good luck. 3 There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite

independent of health or strength
long

;

for

many
;

who

lack the excellences of the
is

body

people live but for our

present purpose there of this.

no use

in

going into the details

The terms
of

possession of

many

friends

and possession
for

35

good

friends

need no explanation;

we

define

a

1 b Or, to be free from pain (cp. I36l 27), through escaping the ravages of old age . 2 But a reference to wrestling is more Possibly, something else probable, and erepov (not Zrepov TL] suggests another person
.
.

3

Comma

after drradrjs

:

no

comma

after aXvjros

:

OVT bracketed.

I36i

b

RHETORICA
friend

as

one who
to be

will

always
for you.

try, for

what he takes

good

your sake, to do The man towards whom
these are worthy men,

many

feel

thus has

many

friends

;

if

he has good

friends.

I362

a

luck means the acquisition or possession of all or or most important, of those good things which the most, Some of the things that are due to luck are due to luck. but many are in to artificial contrivance be due may also

Good

;

5

example those which are due to nature though, to be sure, things due to luck may actually be contrary to nature. Thus health may be due to artificial All contrivance, but beauty and stature are due to nature. such good things as excite envy are, as a class, the outcome
dependent of
art, as for

of good luck.

Luck

is

also the cause of

good things that
:

happen

contrary to reasonable expectation

as when, for

your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked or when a missile hits the next man and
instance, all
;

10

misses you or when you are the only man not to go to a place you have gone to regularly, while the others go
;

there for the

first

time and are

killed.

All such things are

reckoned pieces of good luck.

As to virtue, it is most closely connected with the subject of Eulogy, and therefore we will wait to define it until we come to discuss that subject. 1
i
r,

It is

now

in urging,

plain what our aims, future or actual, should be 6 and what in deprecating, a proposal the latter
;

being the opposite of the former.
deliberative orator s

Now
:

aim

is

utility

the political or deliberation seeks to
it

20

determine not ends but the means to ends, i. e. what most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing.

is

We

ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main Goodness and Utility in general.

facts

about

We may
chosen for
all

define a
its

good thing
;
;

as that

which ought to be

own sake
by
all

or as that for the sake of which
or as that which
is

we by

choose something else
things, or

sought after

things that have sensation or reason, or
1
i,

c. 9.

BOOK
which
will

I.

6
;

I362

be sought after by any things that acquire reason

or as that

which must be prescribed

for a

given individual by

25

reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual or as that whose reason, this being his individual good presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition or as self-sufficiency or as what produces, main
;

;

;

tains, or entails characteristics

of this kind, while preventing

and destroying their opposites. One thing
in either of

may entail
(2)

another
3

two ways
entails

Thus learning
life

in three

simultaneously. first as being healthy produces health senses secondly, as food produces health and thirdly, as exercise
:

subsequently. knowledge subsequently, health entails Things are productive of other things
(i)

simultaneously,

;

;

does

now

All this being settled, we it does so usually. i. e. see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good ; the latter entails 35

freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently.

The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, for in propor tion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition
1 The virtues, too, must be good or removal of evil. something good for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. 2 Pleasure, again, must be a good is of all animals to aim at it. since it the nature thing, Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be
;

5

good

things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

The
cient
1

following

is

a more detailed

list

of things that must

1

be good.

Happiness, as being desirable in itself
itself,

and

suffi

by

and as being that
.

for

whose sake we choose

Other readings are (i) TOUTO, for the Reading TOVTU with A c difference between the greater and the lesser constitutes acquisition of good in the one case and removal of evil in the other ; and (2) TOVTOV, for the acquisition and the removal of the difference between the greater and the lesser amount to the acquisition of good and the removal of evil respectively
. *

separately

:

in c. 9.

I362

b

RHETORICA
other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, 1 magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul. Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many

many

15

of pleasure

is productive both therefore and is life, thought the greatest these two of goods, since things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by

other good things

:

for instance, health

and of

20

Wealth, again for it is the excellence of and also productive of many other good things. Friends and friendship for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things. So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and usually accompanied by the
ordinary people.
possession,
: :

presence of the good things that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action since all such qualities
;

are productive of

what

is

good.

Further

good

parts, strong

25

and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what is good. And life since, even Similarly, all the sciences and arts. if no other were the result of life, it is desirable in good

memory,

receptiveness, quickness of intuition,

:

itself.

And

justice, as the

The above
30

are pretty well

cause of good to the community. all the things admittedly good.

argue

In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may in the following ways That is good of which the
:

contrary is bad. That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be
;

cowards,

clearly

courage

is

of

particular

value to our

35

countrymen. generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning
:

And

2 Surely would Priam exult.

This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that
1
i.

e.

loftiness of
i.

mind, greatness of

spirit.

verse-translations throughout are by Dr. A. S. Way, with occasional adaptations. Aristotle, like other Greek writers, often indicates, as here, a whole passage by a few words taken from it.
Iliad,

2

255.

The

BOOK
of our enemies.
;

I.

6

1

I362

gether Further: that which
is,

that

Hence it is said that evils draw men to 8 when the same thing is hurtful to them both. I363
is

not in excess

is

good,

1

and that

which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed
;

to be an end

means

;

an end reached through a long chain of and any end is a good. Hence the lines beginning 5
:

And
and

for

leave behind

Priam (and Troy-town them a boast 2
;

s

folk)

should they

To

Oh, it were shame have tarried so long and return empty-handed as
erst

we came

3
;

and there
the door
.

is

also the proverb about

breaking the pitcher at

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good for, as has been 4 shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and most people is taken to be equivalent to everybody That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good. So, again, that which is praised by our enemies for when even those who have a [or by the worthless] a think thing good, it is at once felt that every one grievance
;
* .

10

;

must agree with them
only because
less
it

;

our enemies can admit the fact

is

whom

their friends censure

evident, just as those must be worth and their enemies do not.
15

(For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides when he wrote
:

5 Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint. )

favour

Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as

Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men delibe
Paris
rately choose to
1

do

;

this will include the things already

Reading
Iliad,
ii.

2

160.

ov with the manuscripts. s Iliad,
4
.

The mean
ii.

is

298.

meant. 4 1362*23.

6

Simonides, liagm. 50, Bergk

1363*
20

RHETORICA
mentioned, and also whatever

may

be bad for their enemies

or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are practicable in two senses (i) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done
:

*

easily

when they

the

difficulty

are done either without pain or quickly of an act lies either in its painfulness or in
:

25

1 the long time it takes. Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish and they wish to have either no evil at all or at
;

balance of good over evil. This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight. Good,
least a

too, are things that are a

man

s

very own, possessed by no

one

them. 2

the credit of having exceptional are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and
else,
;

for this increases

So

30 things

whatever they feel they ought to have but lack such may indeed be trifling, but none the less men de
liberately

make them
;

the goal of their action.

And

things

easily effected

for these are practicable (in the sense of

being easy)
ceeded.

such things are those in which every one, or most people, or one s equals, or one s inferiors have suc
;

35

by which we shall gratify annoy our enemies and the things chosen by those whom we admire and the things for which we are fitted by nature or experience, since we think we shall suc ceed more easily in these and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken
also are the things

Good

our friends or

:

:

:

:

b

I363

to be not only pleasant but also better. Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour
:

honour, money-loving men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must
for

derive our
5

means of persuasion about Good and

Utility.

Since, however, it often happens that people agree that 7 two things are both useful but do not agree about which is

Or perhaps better, Men deliberately choose a thing if it is .... the rest of the chapter thus being a list of Trpoaipera (cp. ovdev yap TJTTOV irpompovvrai rnvrn rrparrfiv 1. 30 and also 11. 19, 2O above). Or, the value put upon them (sc. by their possessor).
1
;

BOOK

I.

7

1363

the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative good ness and relative utility. thing which surpasses another may be regarded as

A

being that other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being what is contained in the
first

thing.

Now to

call a

implies a comparison of it while great and small

thing greater or more always with one that is smaller or less
*
,

,

much and

little

,

are terms
is

10

comparison with normal magnitude. The great that which surpasses the normal, the small is that which surpassed by the normal and so with many and few
used
in
;

is

.

are applying the term good to what is desir able for its own sake and not for the sake of something
else
;

Now we

to that at which
if
;

choose

wisdom

to what they would all things aim could they acquire understanding and practical and to that which tends to produce or preserve
;

15

such goods, or is always accompanied by them. Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an end being that for the sake of which all else is done), and for

each individual that thing

is

a good which

fulfils

these con

ditions in regard to himself.

number of goods
number,
if
;

a greater a greater good than one or than a smaller that one or that smaller number is included in
It follows, then, that
is

the count

for then the larger
is

and the smaller quantity
the larger.

smaller, in 20 as contained surpassed being

number surpasses the

the largest member of one class surpasses the largest member of another, then the one class surpasses the other and if one class surpasses another, then the largest

Again,

if

;

member
other.

of the one surpasses the largest

member

of the

Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller than women. Con versely, if men in general are taller than women, then the
tallest

25

man

is

taller

than the
is

tallest

woman.

For the

superiority of class over class
riority possessed

proportionate to the supe

Again, where one good is always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it is greater than the other,

by

their largest specimens.

for the use of the

second thing

is

implied in the use of the

30

I36s

b

RHETORICA
first.

A

thing

may

be accompanied by another

in three

ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially. Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health life),

knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently, cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating. Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two for it must surpass the greater as well as the less of the other
;

two.
35

thing productive of a greater good than another is productive of is itself a greater good than that other. For this conception of productive of a greater has been implied
in

A

our argument. 1
is

greater good

itself

Likewise, that which is produced by a a greater good thus, if what is whole
;

some

more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure.
is

1364** Again, a thing

which

is

desirable in itself

is

a greater

good

than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome, since the latter is
not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is and this was our definition of the good. 2 Again, if one of two is an and the is other end, not, the former is the things
;

greater good, as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else as, for example, exercise is
;

5

sake of physical well-being. And of two things that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things, is the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing.

chosen

for the

(That which stands less in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second,
while the second can exist without the
the better.
first,

the second
else

is is

That which does not need something
than that which does, and presents
is

more
10

self-sufficing

itself as

a greater

good

for that reason.

ning of other things
1

Again, that which is a begina greater good than that which is not,

i.e.

good
tivity
2

is

i5) said that what is productive of good; it follows, then, from our way of looking at produc and degree that what is productive of a greater good is a
,

we have already (i363 b

greater good.

1362*22.

BOOK
and that which
is

I.

7

1364*

is a cause is a greater good than that which the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come

not

;

into existence.

Again, where there are two sets of con sequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause and conversely, that are themselves the more important itself the more important which has beginning or cause is
;

the

more important consequences.

Now it is plain,
may

from

all 15

that has been said, that one thing

be shown to be more another than from two opposite points of view important it may appear the more important (i) because it is a begin 1 ning and the other thing is not, and also (2) because it is not
:

a beginning and the other thing is on the ground that the end is more important and is not a beginning. 2 So Leodamas,

when accusing Callistratus, said that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer, since it would not
have been done

20

On the other if he had not planned it. hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some one to do it men, said he, plot a thing
3
;

only

in

order to carry
is

it

out.
is

Further, what
plentiful.
less useful
:

rare

a greater good than what

is

Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though it is harder to get, and therefore better worth

25

getting. Reversely, it may be argued that the plentiful is a better thing than the rare, because we can make more use

of

it.

useful,

For what is often whence the saying

useful surpasses

what

is

seldom

The
More generally
because
1
:

best of things

is
is

water. 4
better than the easy, is better

the hard thing
:

it

is

rarer

and
;

reversely, the easy thing

Or, first principle following examples.

here and in what follows.

But cp. the two

2 might perhaps expect on the ground that it is the end, not the beginning, that matters reading ovx 17 dpxv (ovx apx^), or taking OVK apxr) to mean not any poor beginning But cp. the -LeodamasChabrias example. 3 Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, pp. 244, 245.
;
.

We

4

Pindar, Olympians,

i.

I.

I364

a

RHETOR 1C A
That is the and whose greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, Positive goodness and badness are loss affects us more. more important than the mere absence of goodness and badness for positive goodness and badness are ends, which
than the hard, for
it

30

is

as

we wish

it

to be.

:

the mere absence of them cannot be.

Further, in proportion

as the functions of things are noble or base, the things themselves are good or bad conversely, in proportion as
:

35

the things themselves are good or bad, their functions also for the nature of results corresponds with are good or bad that of their causes and beginnings, and conversely the
;

their results.

nature of causes and beginnings corresponds with that of Moreover, those things are greater goods, is more desirable or more honourable. in which superiority

Thus, keenness of sight
smell,

sight
;

more desirable than keenness of generally being more desirable than smell
is

generally

and

similarly, unusually great love

of friends

being more honourable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love of friends is more honourable than ordinary
love of money. Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler than the other, an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler than an unusual degree of the
other.

another
5

Again, one thing is more honourable or better than the if it is more honourable or better to desire it
;

importance of the object of a given instinct corresponds to the importance of the instinct itself; and for the same
another,
is more honourable or better than more honourable and better to desire it. Again, if one science is more honourable and valuable than another, the activity with which it deals is also more honour able and valuable as is the science, so is the reality that is

reason,

if

one thing
is

it

;

its

10

object, each science being authoritative in its own sphere. So, also, the more valuable and honourable the object of a

science, the
is

in

more valuable and honourable the science itself consequence. Again, that which would be judged, or

which has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the ablest, must be
so;

either without qualification, or in

so far as they use

BOOK

I.

7

1364*

This is their understanding to form their judgement. indeed a general principle, applicable to all other judge ments also; not only the goodness of things, but their

and general nature are in fact just what and understanding will declare them to be. knowledge Here the principle is applied to judgements of goodness, since one definition of good was what beings that acquire
essence, magnitude,
c

15

l fromwhich any given case it clearly follows that that thing is better which understanding declares to be so. That, again, is a better thing which

understanding will choose

in

:

their being better

attaches to better men, either absolutely, or in virtue of 20 as courage is better than strength. And that is a greater good which would be chosen by a better
;

man, either absolutely, or
instance, to suffer

in virtue of his

being better

:

for

wrong rather than to do wrong, for that would be the choice of the j uster man. Again the pleasanter
,

the better, since all things pursue pleasure, and things instinctively desire pleasurable sensation for its own sake; and these are two of the characteristics by which
is

of two things

good and the end have been defined. One pleasure is greater than another if it is more unmixed with pain, or more lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better than the less noble, since the noble is either what is pleasant or what
the
*
*

25

is

desirable in

itself.

And

those things also are greater
to bring about for

goods which men

desire

more earnestly

themselves or for their friends, whereas those things which they least desire to bring about are greater evils. And
those things which are more lasting are better than those which are more fleeting, and the more secure than the less
3

;

the enjoyment of the lasting has the advantage of being longer, and that of the secure has the advantage of suiting our wishes, being there for us whenever we like. Further, in

accordance with the rule of co-ordinate terms and inflexions
of the

same stem, what is true of one such related word is all. Thus if the action qualified by the term brave is more noble and desirable than the action qualified by the term temperate then bravery is more desirable than
true of
(
,

35

temperance

and

*

being brave
1

than
14.

(

being temperate

.

Cp. 1363*

RHETORICA
That, again, which is chosen by all is a greater good than that which is not, and that chosen by the majority than that
as

cnosen by the minority. For that which all desire is good, we have said T and so, the more a thing is desired, the
;

better

it

is.

Further, that

is

the
or

better thing which

is

considered so by competitors enemies, or, again, by authorized judges or those whom they select to represent them.. In the first two cases the decision is virtually that

And
5
it
;

of every one, in the last two that of authorities and experts. sometimes it may be argued that what all share is
the better thing, since it is a dishonour not to share in at other times, that what none or few share is better,
it is

since

things are, the So with the are. better the therefore they honour is. as things that earn greater honours than others it were, a measure of value and the things whose absence
rarer.

The more praiseworthy

nobler and

;

involves

and the things comparatively heavy penalties that are better than others admitted or believed to be good,
;

ic

Moreover, things look better merely by being divided into

seem to surpass a greater number of things than before. Hence Homer says that Meleager was roused to battle by the thought of
their parts, since they then

All horrors

that

light

on a folk whose city

is

ta en

of

their foes,

15

they slaughter the men, when the burg is wasted with ravening flame, When strangers are haling young children to thraldom, 2 (fair women to shame).

When

The same
after the

same as

effect is produced by piling up facts in a climax manner of Epicharmus. The reason is partly the in the case of division (for combination too makes

the impression of great superiority), and partly that the original thing appears to be the cause and origin of im

portant results. And since a thing is better when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be due
20 to

seasons, ages, places, times

When
1

a
b

man
14ix.

or one s natural powers. accomplishes something beyond his natural
3

i363

2

Iliad)

592-4 (Aristotle seems to quote from memory, here and

elsewhere).

BOOK

I.

7

I36s

power, or beyond his years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way, or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of nobleness, goodness, and
justice, or of their opposites.

Hence the epigram on the
25

victor at the

Olympic games

:

In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven, 1 I carried my loads of fish from Argos to Tegea town.

So

Iphicrates used to extol himself by describing the low estate from which he had risen. Again, what is natural is
better than

what

is

Hence the words
I

acquired, since of Homer
:

it is

harder to come by.

have learnt from none but myself. 2
;

30

And

when

the best part of a good thing is particularly good Pericles in his funeral oration said that the country s loss of its young men in battle was as if the spring were
as
3
.

pressing for example, in old age and times of sickness. And of two things that which leads more directly to the end in view is the better. So too is that which is better for people generally as well as for a particular individual. Again, what can be got is better than what cannot, for it is good in a given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the end of life is better than what is not, since those things are ends in a greater degree which are nearer the end. What aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance. We may define what aims at appearance as what a man will not choose if nobody is to know of his having it. This would seem to show that to receive benefits is more desirable than to confer them, since
is
;

taken out of the year service when the need

So with those things which are of

35

a

man

will

choose the former even

if

nobody

is

to

know

of

it, but it is not the general view that he will choose the latter if nobody knows of it. What a man wants to be is

better than

what a man wants to seem,
reality.
4
.

for in

aiming at that
that justice

5

he
1

is

aiming more at

Hence men say
2

Simonides, fragm. 163, Bergk Odyssey, xxii. 347. a Cp. iii, c. 10, i4il 4. This famous simile is not found in the Funeral Oration of Pericles, as given by Thucydides in his Second
3

Book

;

cp. Roberts, Patriotic

Poetry : Greek and English pp. 77, 127. D 3
,

I3

65

b

RHETORICA
is

of small value, since

it is

more

desirable to

seem

just than

That is better to be just, whereas with health it is not so. than useful more they are for than other things which is for a number of different purposes example, that which noble conduct. For life, pleasure, and life,
;

promotes

good

10 this

reason wealth and health are

commonly thought

to

be

of the highest value, as possessing all these advantages. which is accompanied Again, that is better than other things both with less pain and with actual pleasure; for here there is more than one advantage and so here we have the good of feeling pleasure and also the good of not feeling pain. And of two good things that is the better whose addition to a third thing makes a better whole than the addition
;

15

same thing will make, Again, those seen to possess are better than those are we which things which we are not seen to possess, since the former have the Hence wealth may be regarded as a greater air of reality. That which is is known to others. existence its if good
of the other to the
1

dearly prized

is

better than

what

is

not

that some people have only one

of,

the sort of thing though others have

Accordingly, blinding a one-eyed man inflicts worse injury than half-blinding a man with two eyes for the one-eyed man has been robbed of what he dearly prized.

more

like

it.-

;

20

The grounds on which we must base our arguments, when we are speaking for or against a proposal, have now been
set forth

more or

less

completely.
effective qualification for success

The most important and
in
is

8

persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs to understand all the forms of government and to
their respective customs, institutions, and For all men are persuaded by considerations of interest, and their interest lies in the maintenance of

discriminate
25 interests.

their

the established order.

Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government there are as many different
;

supreme authorities
ment.

The forms
1

as there are different forms of govern of government are four democracy*

30 oligarchy,

aristocracy,

monarchy. The supreme right to SOMW (Munro). Reading
r<u

BOOK

I.

8

136s

1

judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers. Democracy is a form of government under which the

A

citizens distribute the offices of state

among themselves by

lot, whereas under oligarchy there is a property qualifica 1 tion, under aristocracy one of education. By education I mean that education which is laid down by the law for it
;

loyal to the national institutions that 35 hold office under an aristocracy. These are bound to be
is

those

who have been

looked upon as the best men and it is from this fact that this form of government has derived its name ( the rule of
,

the best
tion in

Monarchy, as the word implies, is the constitu ). which one man has authority over all. There are 1366* two forms of monarchy kingship, which is limited by 2 which is not limited prescribed conditions, and tyranny
:

,

by anything. We must also notice the ends which the various forms
of government pursue, since people choose in practice such actions as will lead to the realization of their ends. The

end of democracy is freedom of oligarchy, wealth of the maintenance of national education and aristocracy,
;

;

5

of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. It is clear, then, that we must those particular distinguish customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the
institutions
;

ideal of each constitution, since

men choose

their

means with

But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain
reference to their ends.
;

10

namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together. Similarly, we should know the moral
qualities himself,

each form of government, for the moral of character each is bound to provide us with special our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it.
qualities characteristic of

We shall learn
as

the qualities of governments in the same way we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate acts of choice and these are
;

15

determined by the end that inspires them.
1

2

with special reference Perhaps discipline Despotism, autocracy.
:

to Sparta.

I366

a

RHETORICA
the objects, immediate or distant, which we are to aim when urging any proposal, and the grounds on which we are to base our arguments in favour of its utility. We have also briefly considered the means and methods by which we shall gain a good knowledge of the moral qualities and institutions peculiar to the various forms
at

We have now considered

20

of government only, however, to the extent demanded by the present occasion a detailed account of the subject has
;

been given

in

the Politics^

25

have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, 2 since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the required view of our own
characters

We

9

our second method of persuasion. 3 The ways in which to make them trust the goodness of other people

are also the

ways

in

which to make them trust our own.
;

nor is it always Praise, again, may be serious or frivolous 30 of a human or divine being but often of inanimate things, or of
the humblest of the lower animals.

Here too we must know

on what grounds to argue, and must, therefore, now discuss
the subject, though by way of illustration only. 4 The Noble is that which is both desirable for its

own sake

and also worthy of praise

;

or that which

is

both good and

also pleasant because good. If this is a true definition of 35 the Noble, it follows that virtue must be noble, since it is

both a good thing and also praiseworthy. Virtue is, according to the usual view, a faculty of providing and
preserving good things
great benefits,
;

and benefits of

or a faculty of conferring many all kinds on all occasions.

b I366 The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, mag nificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom. If virtue is a faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to others, for this reason men honour most the just and the 5 and

courageous, since courage
1

is

useful to others in war, justice

Politics,
2

iii

Or
i.

(here

and iv. and elsewhere),
to

the Mean.
4

e.

enough

Goodness and Badness, the Fine and 3 a i356 2 and 5. make our meaning clear.

BOOK
both
in

I.

9
liberality
it,
;

1366
liberal

war and
let their

in peace.

Next comes

money go people other people care more for
is

instead of fighting for

whereas
else.

money than
;

for

anything

the virtue through which everybody enjoys his own Justice its opposite is injuspossessions in accordance with the law tice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in

10

Courage is the virtue that disposes men do noble deeds in situations of danger, in accordance with the law and in obedience to its commands cowardice
defiance of the law.
to
;

the opposite. Temperance is the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical pleasures are concerned incontinence is the opposite. Liberality disposes us to spend
is
;

15

money

for

others

good

;

illiberality

is

the

opposite.

Magnanimity is the virtue that disposes us to do good to others on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness of
Magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in matters involving the spending of money. The opposites of these two are smallness of spirit and meanness respec Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which 20 tively.
spirit].

enables

men

to

come

to wise decisions about the relation to

happiness of the goods

and

evils that

have been previously

mentioned. 1
a sufficient account, for our present purpose, of virtue and vice in general, and of their various forms. As
is

The above

to further aspects of the subject, it is not difficult to discern the facts it is evident that things productive of virtue are 25 noble, as tending towards virtue ; and also the effects of virtue,
;

that

is,

leads.

And
it

the signs of its presence and the acts to which since the signs of virtue, and such acts as it
of a virtuous

it is

to him, are of noble, signs courage, and everything done courageously, must be noble things 30 and so with what is just and actions done justly. (Not,

the

mark

man

to

do or have done
or

follows

that

all

deeds

;

the other virtues

however, actions justly done to us here justice is unlike justly does not always mean nobly when a man is punished, it is more shameful that this should be justly than unjustly done to him). The same is true of
;
; ;

the other virtues.

Again, those actions are noble for which
1

Cp. i362

b 10-28.

I366

b

RHETORICA
the reward
is

35

So
for

are those in which a

simply honour, or honour more than money. man aims at something desirable
else s sake
;

some one

those a
self
;

man

does for his

good absolutely, such as country without thinking of him
actions

actions

good

in their

own

nature

;

actions that are not

are those actions whose advantage may be enjoyed after death, as opposed to those whose advantage for the latter are more is enjoyed during one s lifetime
:

good simply for the selfish. Noble also

individual, since individual interests are

Also, all actions done likely to be for one s own sake only. for the sake of others, since these less than other actions are

done
5

for

one

s

own sake
;

;

and

all

successes which benefit

others and not oneself; and services done to one s bene and good deeds generally, since they factors, for this is just
s own profit. And the opposites of those things of which men feel ashamed, for men are ashamed of saying, doing, or intending to do shameful things. So

are not directed to one

when Alcaeus
10

said
to thee,

Something I fain would say Only shame restraineth me,

1

Sappho wrote
If for things good and noble thou wert yearning, If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning,

No
15

What

load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh thou with honour wishest thou wouldst say. 2
;

Those things,

also, are
;

noble for which
for

without feeling fear

they

things which lead to fair fame. is nobler than another if it

men strive anxiously, thus about the good Again, one quality or action
feel

is

being: those qualities are noble which give more pleasure to other people than to their possessors hence the

thus

a

man

s

will

be nobler than

that of a naturally finer a woman s.

And

;

20

nobleness of justice and just actions. It is noble to avenge oneself on one s enemies and not to come to terms with

them

;

for requital
is

is

just,

and the

just

is

noble

;

and not

to

surrender

a sign of courage. Victory, too, and honour class of noble things, since they are desirable to the belong even when they yield no fruits, and they prove our supe1

Alcaeus, fragm. 55, Bergk

4
.

2

Sappho, fragm.

28,

Bergk

4
.

BOOK
riority in

I.

9

1367*

good

qualities.

Things that deserve to be remem

bered are noble, and the more they deserve this, the nobler they are. So are the things that continue even after death
;

those which are always attended by honour those which are exceptional and those which are possessed by one person alone these last are more readily remembered than
;
;

25

So again are possessions that bring no profit, since So are are more they fitting than others for a gentleman. the distinctive qualities of a particular people, and the symbols of what it specially admires, like long hair in Sparta,
others.

where

this

is

perform any it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free man not to live at another s beck and call.

of a free man, as it is not easy to menial task when one s hair is long. Again, 30

a

mark

are also to assume, when we wish either to praise a man or blame him, that qualities closely allied to those which he for instance, that the actually has are identical with them
;

We

cautious

stupid

man is cold-blooded and treacherous, and that the man is an honest fellow or the thick-skinned man a
;

35

good-tempered one. We can always idealize any given man by drawing on the virtues akin to his actual qualities thus we may say that the passionate and excitable man is
or or that the arrogant man is superb Those who run to extremes will be said to I36y b impressive possess the corresponding good qualities rashness will be

outspoken

;

.

;

That will courage, and extravagance generosity. be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs into danger and needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause if a man is open-handed to any one and every one, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody. We must also take into account the nature of our par
called
;

5

ticular audience

when making
to say,
it

Socrates used

is

not

a speech of praise for, as difficult to praise the
;

Athenians to an
1

Athenian audience. 1 If the audience esteems a given quality, we must say that our hero has that Cp. Plato, Menexenus, 235 D

I367

b

RHETORICA
no matter whether we are addressing Scythians or Spartans or philosophers. Everything, in fact, that is esteemed we are to represent as noble. After all, people regard the two things as much the same.
All actions are noble that are appropriate to the man who does them if, for instance, they are worthy of his ancestors
:

10 quality,

15

For it makes for happiness, and past career. a noble thing, that he should add to the honour he already has. Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better
or of his

own

is

and nobler than the appropriate ones would be for instance, one who was just an average person when all went well becomes a hero in adversity, or if he becomes better and easier to get on with the higher he rises. Compare the what I am I and was saying of Iphicrates, Think what and the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games,
;

if

;

In time past, bearing a yoke on

my

shoulders, of

wood

unshaven

] ;

and the encomium of Simonides,

A woman
20

whose

father,
all.
2

whose husband, whose brethren

were princes
Since

praise a man for what he has actually done, and fine actions are distinguished from others by being inten

we

3 tionally good, we must try to prove that our hero s noble acts are intentional. 3 This is all the easier if we can make

assert coincidences
25

out that he has often acted so before, and therefore we must and accidents to have been intended. 3

Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that they must have been intended, 3 and that they prove the good qualities of the man who
did them.
Praise
is

man
to

s

good

the expression in words of the eminence of a qualities, and therefore we must display his

actions as the product of such qualities. Encomium refers what he has actually done; the mention of accessories,
1

such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our a 7, I365 24-8, for this and the previous quotation. Cp. 2 4 Simonides, fragm. in, Bergk
i.
.

3

Deliberate intention, based on moral choice,

is

meant

in all these

BOOK
story credible

I.

9

1367*
30

good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him. Yet the actual deeds are
s

evidence of the doer

character: even

if

a

man

has not

actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. To call any one blest is, it may be added, the same x but these are not the same thing as to call him happy thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him the two latter are a part of calling happy just as goodness is
; ; 4
,

35

a part of happiness. To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the
differently expressed. 1368* action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. Thus
latter case

become encomiums when

When we know what

the statement

A

man

to fortune but of
this,

should be proud not of what he owes what he owes to himself, if put like
;

amounts to a suggestion to make it into praise we must put it thus, Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself. 2 Conse think want to what whenever praise any one, quently, you do and when want to you you would urge people to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man
*
;

5

for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one

or other of

There

two opposite forms of expression accordingly. are, also, many useful ways of heightening the

10

effect of praise.

We

must, for instance, point out that a

man is the only one, or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or that he has done it better than any one else And we all these distinctions are honourable.
;

must, further, make much of the particular season and occasion of an action, arguing that we could hardly have
1 In other words, felicitation terms. 2

and congratulation are synonymous
32.

Cp. Isocrates, Evagoras

45 and Panath.

I368

a

RHETORICA
looked for
it

just then.

If a

man
this
;

has often achieved the
that
is

same
15

success,

we must mention

a strong point

;

he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. So, too, if it is on his account that observances have been devised and instituted to encourage or honour such achievements as
his own thus we may praise Hippolochus because the first encomium ever made was for him, or Harmodius and
:

Aristogeiton because their statues were the first to be put up in the market-place. And we may censure bad men for the
opposite reason.
20

you cannot find enough to say of a man himself, you may pit him against others, which is what Isocrates used to do owing to his want of familiarity with forensic pleading. 1 The comparison should be with famous men that will
Again,
if
;

it strengthen your case who are themselves great.
;

2

is

a noble thing to surpass men It is only natural that methods

2 should be attached particularly heightening the effect to speeches of praise at proving superiority over aim they

of

*

;

25

and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. Hence if you cannot compare your hero with famous men, you should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence. And, in general, of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this heightening of effect is most suitable for declamations, where we take our hero s actions as
others,

admitted

facts,

and our business

is

simply to invest these

with dignity and nobility.
30 to deliberative
;

divination

speeches from past events.

3 are most suitable Examples for we judge of future events by

Enthymemes

are

most

suitable to forensic speeches;

it is our doubts about past events that most admit of arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving that it did happen.

1 avvrjdtutv ( familiarity/ instead of want of familiarity ), the reading of the inferior manuscripts, may be thought to be more in keeping with the context here and also with the tenour of iii, c. 13 notwithstanding that dvTurapaftoXr) has a wider meaning in iii. 13 and iii. 19 than here. But Isocrates does not seem to have had much actual practice as a pleader in the law-courts, though he wrote speeches for the use of litigants. 2 avgijTiKov and aVgya-is indicate rhetorical efforts to magnify, extol,
:

amplify.
3
i.

e.

Cp. I368 10 and ii, c. 26. arguments from parallel cases.

b

BOOK
The above
all,

I.

9

I368

a

are the general lines on which all, or nearly have of speeches praise or blame are constructed. seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such

We

speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and No special treatment of censure and censures are made.

35

vituperation is needed. and it their contraries
;

Knowing
is

the above facts,

we know

out of these that speeches of

censure are made.

IO

b have next to treat of Accusation and Defence, and to I368 enumerate and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms

We

used therein.

There are three things we must ascertain number of the incentives to wrong first, of mind of wrongdoers third, the the state doing second, kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition. We But before that let will deal with these questions in order.
the nature and
;
;

5

us define the act of

We may
inflicted

describe

wrong-doing wrong-doing
.

as

injury voluntarily

By

Law is either special or general. contrary to law. written law which regulates the life law I mean that special
community; by general
*

of a particular

law, all those unwritten

principles which are supposed to be acknowledged every- y, where. We do things voluntarily when we do them con- 10 1 sciously and without constraint. (Not all voluntary acts are 2 no one is deliberate, but all deliberate acts are conscious ignorant of what he deliberately intends.) The causes of our deliberately intending harmful and wicked acts contrary For the wrongs to law are (i) vice, (2) lack of self-control. 3

a

does to others will correspond to the bad quality or Thus it is the mean qualities that he himself possesses.

man

15

man who

will

wrong others about money, the

profligate in

matters of physical pleasure, the effeminate in matters of his comfort, and the coward where danger is concerned
terror

makes him abandon those who
4

are involved in the

same danger. The ambitious man does wrong for the sake of honour, the quick-tempered from anger, the lover of victory for the sake of victory, the embittered man for the
sake of revenge, the stupid
1
i.

20

man
4

because he has misguided
2
i.

e.

and therefore conscious.
moral weakness.

3
i.

e.

Greek,

e. and therefore voluntary. the honour-loving man
.

I368

b

RHETORICA
notions of right and wrong, the shameless man because he does not mind what people think of him and so with the
;

rest

any wrong that any one does

to others corresponds to

his particular faults of character. 1
25

However,
in

our

this subject has already been cleared up in part discussion of the virtues 2 and will be further

3 We have explained later when we treat of the emotions. now to consider the motives and states of mind of wrong

30

and to whom they do wrong. Let us first decide what sort of things people are trying to get or avoid when they set about doing wrong to others. For it is plain that the prosecutor must consider, out of all the aims that can ever induce us to do wrong to our neighbours, how many, and which, affect his adversary while the defendant must consider how many, and which, do not affect him. Now every action of every person either
doers,
is

;

or

is

himself
3?

not due to that person himself. Of those not due to some are due to chance, the others to necessity
;

of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature. Consequently all actions that are not due to a

man
a

himself are due either to chance or to nature or to

I36g compulsion. All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to rational or
irrational craving.
i.

e.

a ivis/i

Rational craving is a craving for good, nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it
is

good.
5

Irrational craving

Thus
causes
:

4 twofold, viz. anger and appetite. every action must be due to one or other of seven

chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. It is superfluous further to distinguish actions to the doers ages, moral states, or the like it is according
;

of course true that, for instance,

young men do have

hot

tempers and strong appetites
10

not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite. it is of Nor, again, is action due to wealth or poverty
;

still, it is

;

similarly each of the other people (who do wrong to with reference to his particular part of the subjectb matter (of bad character) Cp. vTroKei/ueVcoi/ rrpayfjidrcov, I359 15. 2 B i, c. 9. ii, cc. i-ii. 4 Full stop after tiriQvpia. In translating eVi$u/ut a, desire has some times been used, as well as * appetite
Lit.,

1

and

others does

it)

.

Tii>a)i>

.

BOOK

I.

10

I36g

a

course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it, and that rich men, being able to command
needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or
:

.

poverty but to appetite.
unjust men, and
all

others

who

Similarly, with just men, and are said to act in accordance

15

with their moral-qualities, their actions will really be due to one of the causes mentioned either reasoning or emotion
:

due, indeed, sometimes to good dispositions and good emotions, and sometimes to bad but that good qualities should be followed by good emotions, and bad by bad, is merely an accessory fact it is no doubt true that the temperate man, for instance, because he is temperate, is
;

20

always and at once attended by healthy opinions and appetites in regard to pleasant things, and the intemperate

man by unhealthy ones. So we must ignore such distinctions. Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people
usually go together for while there are no definite kinds of action associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old,
;

25

And, generally speaking, all those accessory just or unjust. qualities that cause distinctions of human character are
e. g. the sense of wealth or poverty, of being 1 or shall be This dealt with later let us lucky unlucky. now deal first with the rest of the subject before us. 30 The things that happen by chance are all those whose

important

:

cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way. The definition of chance shows just what they are. Those
things

happen by nature which have a fixed and

internal 35

cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually. 13 5g b There is no need to discuss in exact detail the things that

happen contrary to nature, nor to ask whether they happen in some sense naturally or from some other cause it would seem that chance is at least partly the cause of such events. Those things happen through compulsion which take place
;

5

contrary to the desire or reason of the doer, yet through his own agency. Acts are done from habit which men do
1

ii,

cc. 12-17.

b

I36g

RHETORICA
because they have often done them before. Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already 1 mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as means to

10

for that reason, an end, and are performed for that reason since even licentious persons perform a certain number of useful actions, but because they are pleasant and not because they are useful. To passion and anger are due all
:

acts of revenge.
things.

Revenge and punishment are different Punishment is inflicted for the sake of the person
;

punished
feelings.
15

revenge for that of the punisher, to satisfy his (What anger is will be made clear when we come
2 the emotions. )

to

discuss

Appetite

is

the cause of

all

actions that appear pleasant. Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant
things, for there are

many

actions not naturally pleasant

20

which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant. Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either

good or pleasant
evils or
25 for

;

for I
evils

apparent

reckon among goods escape from and the exchange of a greater evil

a less (since these things are in a sense positively desirable), and likewise I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange

We must ascertain, then, the of a greater pain for a less. of the things that are useful and pleasant. The useful has been previously examined in connexion with
number and nature
30 political

oratory

;

pleasant.

Our
if

various

adequate, even

to examine the must be regarded as they are not exact, provided they are clear.
let

3

us

now proceed

definitions

We may
a

lay
its

it

down

that Pleasure

is

a

movement,
is

a II

movement by which
brought into
opposite.

the soul as a whole
;

I37

If this
is

normal state of being is what pleasure is,

consciously and that Pain is the
it

is

clear that the

pleasant

what tends to produce
i,

this condition, while that
c. 6.

1

c.

6.

2

ii, c.

2.

i,

BOOK
which tends to destroy
it,

I.

ii

1370*

or to cause the soul to be brought

into the opposite state, is painful. It must therefore be a as rule to move a natural towards state of being, pleasant

natural process has achieved the of that natural state. Habits also are complete recovery for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is pleasant habit is a thing not unlike nature what virtually natural
particularly
;
; ;

when a

5

happens often

akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often. Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us for force is unnatural,
is
;

and that is why what been rightly said
All that
is

is

compulsory

is

painful,

and

it

has
TO

done on compulsion

is

bitterness unto the soul.

1

acts of concentration, strong effort, and strain are necessarily painful they all involve compulsion and force,
all
;

So

in which case it is custom that makes them pleasant. The opposites to these are pleasant and hence ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep belong to the class of pleasant things for these are all free from any element of compulsion. Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the desire

unless

we

are

accustomed to them,

;

15

;

within us, since desire is the craving for pleasure. Of the desires some are irrational, some associated with reason. 2

By
*

irrational

I

mean those which do not

arise

from any

opinion held by the mind. Of this kind are those known ao for instance, those originating in the body, as natural such as the desire for nourishment, namely hunger and
;

and a separate kind of desire answering to each kind of nourishment and the desires connected with taste and
thirst,
;

sex and sensations of touch
hearing, and
vision.
;

in general; and those of smell, Rational desires are those which we

25

many things see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good. Further, pleasure is the conscious
;

are induced to have

there are

we

desire to

ness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion but 3 is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will imagination
1

2

8

Evenus, fragm. 8, Bergk are accompanied, or not accompanied, by a rational principle/ mental picturing (fxivTao-ia, fancy impression.
. * , ,

4

645.10

I370

a

RHETORICA
mind of a man who remembers or expects something an image or picture of what he remembers or If this is so, it is clear that memory and expects.
always be
in the

30

being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant
expectation
is

also,

and perceived, past and remembered, or and expected, since we perceive present pleasures, remember past ones, and expect future ones. Now the
either present

future
b

I 37

things that are pleasant to
that,

remember

are not only those

when actually perceived as present, were pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good. Hence the words
Sweet
tis

when rescued

to

remember

1

pain,

and
5

Even his griefs are a joy long after to one that remembers All that he wrought and endured. 2

The
free

reason of this

is

that

it is

from

evil.

The

when felt to afford us either great or but And in general, not delight great painful benefit. all the things that delight us when are they present also do
those that
10 so,

things present are

it

pleasant even to be merely is pleasant to expect are

as a rule, when we merely remember or expect them. Hence even being angry is pleasant Homer said of wrath

that

Sweeter

it

is

by
3

far

than the honeycomb dripping with

sweetness

for no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our
15

Some pleasant feeling is associated superiors in power. with most of our appetites we are enjoying either the
;

of a past pleasure or the expectation of a future one, just as persons down with fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy remembering the drinks they have had and

memory

20 talking or writing
1

looking forward to having more. So also a lover enjoys about his loved one, or doing any little
Euripides,
2

Andromeda, fragm. 133
)

N

2
.

Cp. Odyssey xv. 400, 401.
Iliad, xviii. 109.

BOOK
thing connected with

I

ii

I3?o

b

him him memory and make

Indeed, it is imagination. besides enjoying some one s presence, we remember him when he is gone, and feel pain as well as pleasure, because

these things recall him to actually present to the eye of always the first sign of love, that
;

all

he

is

there no longer.

Similarly there

is

an element of
35

pleasure even in mourning and lamentation for the departed. There is grief, indeed, at his loss, but pleasure in remember

ing

him and
in his

as

it

were seeing him before us

in his

deeds

and

life.

We

can well believe the poet when he says

He

spake, and in each of lament. 1
too, is pleasant
fail
;

man s
it is

heart he

awakened the love

Revenge,
it is

pleasant to get anything that

painful to

pain when they
c

fail

to get, and angry people suffer extreme 30 but they enjoy to get their revenge
;

the prospect of getting not merely to bad losers

it.

,

Victory also but to every one

is
;

pleasant,

and

the winner sees

himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a

The pleasantness or less keen appetite for being that. that of course combative of victory implies sports and
more
a contests are pleasant (since in these it often I371 2 happens that some one wins ) and also games like knuckle

intellectual

bones,

ball,

dice,

and draughts.

And

similarly with the

serious sports ; accustomed to
first,

some of these become pleasant when one is them while others are pleasant from the
;

like

hunting with hounds, or indeed any kind of

hunting.

For where there

is

That

is

why

forensic pleading

competition, there is victory. and debating contests are

5

pleasant to those

who

are accustomed to

them and have the

Honour and good repute are among capacity for them. the most pleasant things of all they make a man see himself in the character of a fine fellow, especially when he
;

credited with it by people whom he thinks good judges. His neighbours are better judges than people at a distance his associates and fellow-countrymen better than strangers
is

10

;

;

his
1

contemporaries better than posterity; sensible persons
Iliad, xxiii. 108
;

Apparently one of the mild witticisms occasionally found Rhetoric. But cp. lines 5 and 6 below.

2

Odyssey,

iv.

183.
in the

E

2

a

I37i

RHETORICA
better than foolish ones

than a small number
case, are the

:

a large number of people better those of the former class, in each
;

more

likely to

be good judges of him.

Honour
inferior

and
15

credit

bestowed by those

whom you
:

think

much

to yourself

e.g. children or animals

not for

its

own
is
it

sake,

anyhow
to

if

you do not value: you do value it, it is for
if

some other
things
;

reason.

Friends belong to the class of pleasant
love
it

it

pleasant

you love wine, you

certainly find
for this too
20

delightful: and

makes a man
:

pleasant to be loved, see himself as the possessor of
is

goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it to be loved means to be valued for one s desires to possess

be admired is also pleasant, honour implied. Flattery and the flatterer is a man who, you flatterers are pleasant believe, admires and likes you. To do the same thing often
personal qualities. simply because of the
:

own

To

25 is

1 pleasant, since, as we saw, anything habitual is pleasant. And to change is also pleasant change means an approach to nature, whereas invariable repetition of anything causes
:

the excessive prolongation of a settled condition

:

therefore,

says the poet,

Change
That
is

is

in all

2 things sweet.

why what comes

to us only at long intervals
;

is

for it is a pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing had we from what what comes before, and, besides, change
30

only at long intervals has the value of

rarity.

Learning
;

things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule 3 wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is an object of desire while in learning one is
;

brought

into

one

s

natural

condition.

Conferring and
;

to receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things to confer a receive a benefit is to get what one desires
;

I

37 jb benefit implies both possession and which are things we try to attain. It

superiority,,
is

both of

because beneficent

acts are pleasant that people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and to supply what they lack.
1

i,

c. 10,

I369

b i6.
3

2

Euripides, Orestes, 234. Retaining paQiiv.

BOOK

I.

ii

b

I37i

Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant
for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry

5

and every product
the object imitated

of skilful imitation
is

;

this latter,
;

even

if

itself which pleasant here gives delight the spectator draws inferences ( That is a so-and-so and thus learns something fresh. 1 Dramatic )

not

itself

for

it is

not the object

;

10

turns of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because we feel all such things are wonderful. And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred

and similar things are usually pleasant to each other for instance, one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to
;

another man, horse, or young person.
, ,

Hence the proverbs
,

15

2 beast knows beast mate delights mate like to like of them. But since and the rest jackdaw to jackdaw everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves. For all this resemblance and kinship is present particularly in the relation of an individual to
*
,

20

himself.

And

because
is

follows that

what

our

we own

are
is

all

fond

of ourselves,

it

pleasant to all of us, as for

instance our

own deeds and

words.

That

is

why we
;

are

usually fond of our flatterers, [our lovers,] and honour also It is of our children, for our children are our own work. also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole

25

thing thereupon becomes our own work.
over others
is

And

since

power
others.

very pleasant,
is

it

is

pleasant to be thought
it

wise, for practical
(Scientific

wisdom secures us power over
also pleasant, because
is

wisdom

the

know

ledge of

many wonderful
it

us are ambitious,

must

Again, since most of things.) be pleasant to disparage our
30

3 neighbours as well as to have power over them. It is pleasant for a man to spend his time over what he feels he

can do best

;

just as the poet says,
1

2 8

Cp. Poetics, c. 4, I448 Odyssey, xvii. 218. Retaining KOI TO

b

5-19.

b

I37l

RHETORICA
To He To that he bends himself, that each day allots most time, wherein 1 is indeed the best part of himself.

*

Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things, it follows that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or

deeds.
treatise

We have discussed the ludicrous separately on the Art of Poetry?
1

in

the

So much
ing
their

for the subject of pleasant things

opposites we can

easily see

by consider what things are
:

unpleasant.

The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others we are next to consider the states of mind in which
;

12

5

they do

it,

and the persons to
:

whom

they do
that

it.

They must themselves suppose
done, and done by them being found out, or that
if

the thing can be either that they can do it without

they are found out they can

escape being punished, or that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or those they care for. The general subject of apparent
possibility and impossibility will be handled later on, 10 since it is relevant not only to forensic but to all kinds of
:j

But it may here be said that people think that speaking. they can themselves most easily do wrong to others without
it if they possess eloquence, or practical or much ability, legal experience, or a large body of friends, or a great deal of money. Their confidence is greatest if

being punished for

they personally possess the advantages mentioned but even without them they are satisfied if they have friends or
:

15

supporters or partners who do possess them they can thus both commit their crimes and escape being found out and punished for committing them. They are also safe, they
:

think,

if

they are on good terms with their victims or with

the judges who try them. Their victims will in that case not be on their guard against being wronged, and
Euripides, fragm. 183 Not found in the Poetics, as it exists to-day. Aristotle probably analysed the causes and conditions of laughter, when treating of
.

1

N

2

2

Comedy 3
ii,

in his lost
19.

Second Book,

c.

BOOK
will

I.

12

I372
instead of pro

a

make some arrangement with them
;

secuting

while their judges will favour them

because

20

they like them, either letting them off altogether or im They are not likely to be found posing light sentences.
if their appearance contradicts the charges that might be brought against them for instance, a weakling is unlikely to be charged with violent assault, or a poor and ugly man Public and open injuries are the easiest to with adultery.

out

:

nobody could at all suppose them possible, and The same is true of therefore no precautions are taken. crimes so great and terrible that no man living could be 25 here too no precautions are taken. suspected of them For all men guard against ordinary offences, 1 just as they
do, because
:

guard against ordinary diseases

;

but no one takes precau

You feel tions against a disease that nobody has ever had. a if enemies or either no have safe, too, great many you
;

if

you have none, you expect not to be watched and there if fore not to be detected you have a great many, you 2 will be watched, and therefore people will think you can never risk an attempt on them, and you can defend your innocence by pointing out that you could never have taken
;

3

such a
the

risk.

You may
it

also trust to hide your crime

way you do

or the place

you do

it

in,

or

by some by

convenient means of disposal. You may feel that even if you are found out you can stave off a trial, or have it postponed, or corrupt your judges
:

you can avoid paying or can at least postpone doing so for a long time damages, or that you are so badly off that you will have nothing to
if
:

or that even

you are sentenced

35

lose.

doing
is

feel that the gain to be got by wrong great or certain or immediate, and that the penalty b small or uncertain or distant. It may be that the I372
is

3

You may

advantage to be gained
tion
:

is greater than any possible retribu as in the case of despotic power, according to the popular view. You may consider your crimes as bringing

you

solid profit, while their
1

punishment

is

nothing more than

2
3

Retaining
i.

KOL ra the victims of the injustice. after Inserting, or supplying,
e.

:
>/

cp.

I372

b

RHETORTCA
being called bad names. Or the opposite argument may appeal to you your crimes may bring you some credit (thus you may, incidentally, be avenging your father or mother, like
:

5

Zeno), whereas the punishment may amount to a fine, or ban ishment, or something of that sort. People may be led on to

wrong others by no man by both

either of these motives or feelings; but they will affect people of quite opposite

You may be encouraged by having often characters. escaped detection or punishment already; or by having
10

often tried and failed

;

for in crime, as in war, there are

men

up the struggle. You may the on spot and the pain later, or the get your pleasure on the and the loss later. That is what appeals gain spot

who

will

always refuse to give

to

weak-willed persons

and weakness of

will

may

be

to all the objects of desire. It may on the contrary appeal to you as it does appeal to selfcontrolled and sensible people that the pain and loss are
15

shown with regard

immediate, while the pleasure and profit come later and You may feel able to make it appear that your last longer. crime was due to chance, or to necessity, or to natural
causes, or to habit
failed to

in fact, to put it generally, as if you had rather than actually done wrong. You may right be able to trust other people to judge you equitably. You may be stimulated by being in want which may mean that
:

do

:

20

you want

poor people do, or that you want You may be encouraged by luxuries, as rich people do. a having particularly good reputation, because that will save you from being suspected or by having a particularly bad
necessaries, as
:

one, because nothing you are likely to do will make it worse. The above, then, are the various states of mind in which

about doing wrong to others. The kind of people to whom he does wrong, and the ways in which he does it, must be considered next. The people to whom he
a
sets

man

does
25 this

it

are those

who have what he wants

himself, whether
for enjoy

means

necessities or luxuries

and materials

His victims may be far off or near at hand. are near, he gets his profit quickly if they are far
;

ment. 1

If
off,

they ven-

1

Colon

after

drroAaucrii>.

BOOK
geance
is slow,,

I.

12

1372"

as those think

They may be those who
and watchful, since
those
all

who plunder the Carthaginians. are trustful instead of being cautious such people are easy to elude. Or
30

easy-going to have enough energy to an offender. Or sensitive people, who are not apt prosecute to show fight over questions of money. Or those who have
are too

who

been wronged already by many people, and yet have not prosecuted such men must surely be the proverbial Mysian 1 Or those who have either never or often been prey
; .

wronged before in neither case will they take precautions if they have never been wronged they think they never will, and if they have often been wronged they feel that surely it cannot happen again. Or those whose character has been
; ;

35

attacked in the past, or is exposed to attack in the future they will be too much frightened of the judges to make up
:

their

minds to prosecute, 2 nor can they win
this is true of those

their case

if

they

do

:

who

are hated or unpopular. 3

An- I373

a

pretend

is those who their injurer can have, themselves or through their ancestors or friends, treated badly, or intended to treat badly, the man himself, or his ancestors, or those he cares for ; as the

other likely class of victim

man may proverb says, wickedness needs but a pretext wrong his enemies, because that is pleasant he may equally wrong his friends, because that is easy. Then there are those
.
:

A

who have no

friends,
;

and those

who

lack eloquence and

5

practical capacity these will either not attempt to prosecute, or they will come to terms, or failing that they will lose their
case.
in waiting for trial or
;

whom it does not pay to waste time damages, such as foreigners and small farmers they will settle for a trifle, and always be ready to leave off. Also those who have themselves wronged
There are those
others, either often, or in the

same way
it

being wronged themselves

for

is

felt

as they are now that next to no

10

wrong is done to people when it is the same wrong as they have often themselves done to others if, for instance, you assault a man who has been accustomed to behave with
:

1

i.e.

2
3

cTTcguvai

an easy prey. is perhaps not needed ol Reading
o>j/

in the

Greek

text.

1373
violence to others.

RHETORICA
So too with those who have done
have meant
to,

wrong
15

to others, or

or

mean

to, or are likely

to do so; there

is something fine and pleasant in wronging such persons, it seems as though almost no wrong were done. Also those by doing wrong to whom we shall be

gratifying our friends, or those we admire or love, or our masters, or in general the people by reference to whom we

mould our

lives.

Also those

whom we may wrong

and

Also those against yet be sure of equitable treatment. whom we have had any grievance, or any previous differences
20

with them, as Callippus had when he behaved as he did to Dion here too it seems as if almost no wrong were being
:

done.

Also those who are on the point of being wronged

by others
feel

if we fail to wrong them ourselves, since here we we have no time left for thinking the matter over. So

Aenesidemus is said to have sent the cottabus prize to Gelon, who had just reduced a town to slavery, because Gelon had got there first and forestalled his own attempt. Also those by wronging whom we shall be able to do
25

many righteous acts cure the harm done.
it is

a duty to

for we feel that we can then easily Thus Jason the Thessalian said that do some unjust acts in order to be able to do
;

many

just ones.

Among

the kinds of

wrong done

to others are those that
:

30

commonly one expects to be forgiven for doing these. Also those that can easily be kept dark, as where things that can rapidly be consumed like eatables are concerned, or things that can easily be changed in shape, colour, or combination, or things that can
easily be stowed away almost anywhere portable objects that you can stow away in small corners, or things so like others of which you have plenty already that nobody can tell

are done universally, or at least

the difference.

There are

also

wrongs of a kind that shame

35

prevents the victim speaking about, such as outrages done to the women in his household or to himself or to his sons.

Also those

for

prosecute any one

which you would be thought very trifling wrongs, or wrongs

litigious to for

which

people are usually excused. The above is a fairly complete account of the circum-

BOOK
stances under which

T.

12 to others, of the sort of

I373

a

men do wrong

wrongs they do, of the sort of persons to them, and of their reasons for doing them.
It will

whom

they do

now be

well to

make

b a complete classification of I373

just

and unjust actions. We may begin by observing that and they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, kinds two the of classes to two also relatively By persons. Particular of law I mean particular law and universal law. and down law is that which each community lays applies to
its

y
5

.

own members
is

:

Universal law

partly written and partly unwritten. the law of nature. For there really is, as
this
is

and every one to some extent divines, a natural justice is binding on all men, even on those who have that injustice It is this that no. association or covenant with each other.
Sophocles Antigone clearly means when she says that the of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the burial
prohibition
:

10

she means that

it

was

just
it

by
is,

nature.
1

-V

Not
But

of to-day or yesterday
lives eternal
:

none can date
bids us
kill

its

birth.

And

so Empedocles,

when he

no

living creature,

says that doing this
for others,

is

not just for

some people while unjust
15

Nay,

but, an all-embracing law, through the realms of

the sky

Unbroken

it

stretcheth,
3

and over the earth

s

immensity.
.
.

2

And

as

Alcidamas

The

actions that

we ought

says in his Messeniac Oration. to do or not to do have also
.

been divided into two classes as affecting either the whole community or some one of its members. From this point of view we can perform just or unjust acts in either of two

20

ways

towards one definite person, or towards the

com

munity.

The man who

doing wrong to some service in the army is doing wrong to the community.
;

guilty of adultery or assault is definite person the man who avoids
is

Sophocles, Antigone, 456, 7 (raCra, not roGro, in Sophocles). Empedocles, 380. Cp. Diels, Vors?, i, p. 275 ; Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 225. ( 3 According to the scholiast, the words of Alcidamas were, God has left all men free ; Nature has made no man a slave Cp. BaiterSauppe, Or. Aft., Pt. ii, p. 154 (Alcid., Messen., fragm. i).
2
.

1

1373
25

RHETORICA
Thus the whole
into
class of unjust actions

may

be divided
will

two

classes, those affecting

the community, and those

affecting

one

or

more other persons.

We

next,

going further, remind ourselves of what being 1 means. it Since has been that settled wronged already a be must must intentional, being wronged doing wrong
1

before

consist in having an injury

intends to do
3 o (1)

it.

In order to be wronged, a

done to you by some one who man must

harm, (2) suffer it against his will. The various possible forms of harm are clearly explained by our 2 have previous separate discussion of goods and evils.
suffer actual

We

also seen that a voluntary action

is

one where the doer

knows what he is doing. 3 We now see that every accusation must be of an action affecting either the community or some individual. The doer of the action must either understand
35

and intend the

action, or not understand

and intend

it.

In

the former case, he must be acting either from deliberate choice or from passion. (Anger will be discussed when we

speak of the passions
of
a

4
;

the motives for crime and the state

I374

it

of the criminal have already 5 been discussed.) Now often happens that a man will admit an act, but will not

mind

admit the prosecutor
that label implies. not that he stole

for the act nor the facts which admit that he took a thing but it that he struck some one first, but not he that committed outrage that he had intercourse with
s label

6

He
;

will

(

;

a woman, but not that he committed adultery that he is the guilty of theft, but not that he is guilty of sacrilege
; ,

5

object stolen not being consecrated that he has encroached, but not that he has encroached on State lands that he
;

;

has been in communication with the enemy, but not that he has been guilty of treason Here therefore we must
.

be able to distinguish what

from what

is

not,

if

we

theft, outrage, or adultery, are to be able to make the justice of
is

our case clear, no matter whether our aim is to establish a man s guilt or to establish his innocence. Wherever such
10

charges are brought against a man, the question
1 i,

is

whether
c. 2.

c. 10.

2
i,

c. 6.

3
i,

c.

10.

4
ii,

5
i,

cc. ii

and
:

12.

a specification or description of the alleged offence, (iriypaij.ua with a claim for a corresponding penalty.

6

BOOK
he
is

a
I.

13

I374

not guilty of a criminal offence. It is deliberate constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt, and that purpose such names as outrage or theft imply deliberate purpose
or
is

as well as the

to

blow does not always amount mere action. it is struck with some such purpose if but only outrage as to insult the man struck or gratify the striker himself. Nor does taking a thing without the owner s knowledge
,

A

15

always amount

to

theft

,

but only

if it is

taken with the

intention of keeping it and injuring the owner. with these charges, so with all the others.

And

as

We

saw that there are two kinds of right and wrong con

duct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, have now discussed the kind the other by unwritten. about which the laws have something to say. The other

We

20

kind has

two varieties. First, there is the conduct from that springs exceptional goodness or badness, and is visited accordingly with censure and loss of honour, or with praise and increase of honour and decorations for instance,
itself
:

gratitude to, or requital of, our benefactors, readiness to help our friends, and the like. The second kind makes up This for the defects of a community s written code of law.
is

25

equity people regard the sort of justice which goes beyond existence partly is and partly is not intended
;

what we

call

it

as just ; it is, in fact, the written law. Its

by

legislators

;

not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law intended, where they find themselves unable to define things 30 exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that held good
;

always which
is

or where it in fact only holds good usually not easy to be complete owing to the endless possible cases presented, such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that
;

may be
to

used to

inflict

wounds
list

a lifetime would be too short
of these.
If,

make out
is

a complete

then, a precise

impossible and yet legislation is necessary, the and so, if a man law must be expressed in wide terms has no more than a finger-ring on his hand when he lifts it

statement

;

35

to strike or actually strikes another man, he is guilty of a criminal act according to the written words of the law
;

but he

is

innocent really, and

to be so.

From

b equity that declares him I374 this definition of equity it is plain what
it is

1374
sort of actions,

RHETORICA
and what sort of persons, are equitable or Equity must be applied to forgivable actions and it must make us distinguish between criminal acts on the one hand, and errors of judgement, or misfortunes, on the other. (A misfortune is an act, not due to moral badness, that has unexpected results an error of judgement is an act, also not due to moral badness, that has results that might have been expected a criminal act has results that is have been but due to moral might expected, badness, for
the reverse.
;
: :

5

10

actions inspired by our appetites.) Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature to think less about the laws than about the man who framed

that

is

the source of

all

;

them, and

less

about what he said than about what he

meant

;

not to consider the actions of the accused so

much
as the

as his intentions, nor this or that detail so
15

much

whole story

;

to ask not

what a man

is

now but what he

has

always or usually been. It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits
a
20

be patient when we are wronged to settle to prefer negotiation and not by force for an arbitrator goes by the equity arbitration to litigation of a case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power
conferred
;

to

;

dispute by

;

for equity.

The above may be taken
nature of equity.

as a sufficient account of the

The worse of two
25

acts of

wrong done

to others

is

that 14

which most

prompted by the worse disposition. trifling acts may be the worst ones
is

;

Hence the as when

^Callistratus charged

Melanopus with having cheated the

The con temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols. is is true of just acts. This verse because the greater is here potentially contained in the less there is no crime that
:

a

man who

has stolen three consecrated half-obols would

30

act

shrink from committing. Sometimes, however, the worse is reckoned not in this way but by the greater harm
it

that

does.

Or

it

may

be because no punishment
;

for

it is

severe enough to be adequate

or the

harm done may be

BOOK
incurable

I.

14

1374*

1 a difficult and even hopeless crime to defend; or the sufferer may not be able to get his injurer legally

punished, a fact that makes the harm incurable, since legal punishment and chastisement are the proper cure. Or

has suffered wrong may have inflicted some fearful punishment on himself; then the doer of the
again, the

man who

wrong ought in justice to receive a still more fearful punish- 35 ment. Thus Sophocles, when pleading for retribution to Euctemon, who had cut his own throat because of the a outrage done to him, said he would not fix a penalty less I375 2 than the victim had fixed for himself. Again, a man s
crime

man, or the only man, or almost the only man, to commit it or if it is by no means the first time he has gone seriously 3 wrong in the same way or if his crime has led to the thinking-out and in
is

worse

if

he has been the

first

:

:

vention of measures to prevent and punish similar crimes thus in Argos a penalty is inflicted on a man on whose

5

account a law

is

passed, and
:

also on those on

whose account

the prison was built or if a crime is specially brutal, or or if the report of it awakes more terror specially deliberate than pity. There are also such rhetorically effective ways
:

of putting

it

as the following

:

That the accused has

dis

regarded and broken not one but
like

many solemn

obligations
i

between
of

oaths, promises, pledges, or rights of intermarriage states here the crime is worse because it consists

and that the crime was committed in the where criminals are punished, as for example very place do it is perjurers argued that a man who will commit a crime in a law-court would commit it anywhere. Further, the worse deed is that which involves the doer in special

many

crimes

;

shame; that whereby a man wrongs his benefactors for he does more than one wrong, by not merely doing them harm but failing to do them good; that which breaks the
unwritten laws of justice the better sort of man will be just without being forced to be so, and the written laws

15

depend on force while the unwritten ones do
1

not.

It

may
.

2

3

Or, due punishment then being Cp. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. Retaining

difficult
ii,

or impossible

p. 165.

I375

a

RHETORICA
however be argued otherwise, that the crime is worse which breaks the written laws for the man who commits crimes
:

for
20

provided will not hesitate over crimes for which no penalty is provided at all. So much, then, for the comparative badness of criminal actions.

which

terrible penalties are

There are
persuasion
;

means of 15 and we must now take a cursory view of these,
also the so-called

non-technical

1

since they are specially characteristic of forensic oratory. They are five in number laws, witnesses, contracts,
:

tortures, oaths.
25

First, then, let us take

laws and see

how they

are to be

used

2 persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence. If the written law tells against our case, clearly we 3 must

in

appeal to the universal law, and

insist on its greater equity must that the juror s oath I will justice. argue verdict to honest give my according my opinion means

and
3

We

that one will not simply follow the letter of the written law. must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change

We

either, for

it is

the law of nature, whereas written laws often

do change. This is the bearing of the lines in Sophocles Antigone^ where Antigone pleads that in burying her brother she had broken Creon s law, but not the unwritten law
:

*375

Not
But

live eternal

Not (And brave Gods

of to-day or yesterday they are, (none can date their birth.) I would fear the wrath of any man,
:

4 vengeance) for defying these. is true and profitable, but and that consequently the written

We shall
that

argue that justice indeed
justice
is
it

sham
is

not,

law
5

not,

because

does not

fulfil

that justice is like silver, and judges, if the genuine is to be counterfeit. Or that the better a

Or

the true purpose of law. must be assayed by the

man

distinguished from the is, the more he will
in preference to the

follow and abide
written.
1

by the unwritten law Or perhaps that the law in
2

question contradicts

Cp.
3

C. 2,

supra.
in

Pi ere,

and

More
4

literally,

Retaining TrpoT-peVoira Kal cmorpeirovra. follows, we must be taken in a general sense. tells against his case, clearly the litigant must. ... He
K<H

what

must argue, &c.

So with you elsewhere:

e.g.

I372
:

a
>

b
.

Sophocles, Antigone, 456 (ruCr

o^

Aristotle

TOVTW Sophocles).

BOOK

I.

15

1375

some other highly-esteemed law, or even contradicts itself. Thus it may be that one law will enact that all contracts
must be held binding, while another forbids us ever to make Or if a law is ambiguous, we shall turn it illegal contracts. about and consider which construction best fits the interests of justice or utility, and then follow that way of looking at it. Or if, though the law still exists, the situation to meet which it was passed exists no longer, we must do our best If however to prove this and to combat the law thereby. our we must law the written case, urge that the supports
honest opinion verdict according to is not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of
oath
to give
10

15

my

my

perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means. Or that no one chooses what is absolutely good, but every

one what
as

is

good

for himself.

1

Or
all.

that not to use the laws

is

bad

as to have

no laws at

arts, it

does not pay

that, as in the other 20 to try to be cleverer than the doctor
:

Or

for less

harm comes from the doctor

s

mistakes than from

Or that trying the growing habit of disobeying authority. to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden by those
codes of law that are accounted best.
are concerned, the above discussion
is

So

far as

the laws
25

probably

sufficient.

to witnesses, they are of two kinds, the ancient and the recent and these latter, again, either do or do not
;

As

share in the risks of the
the poets and ments are known to

trial.

By

ancient

witnesses I

mean

all

other notable persons whose judge Thus the Athenians appealed to all.
;

as a witness about Salamis and the men of 30 Tenedos not long ago appealed to Periander of Corinth in their dispute with the people of Sigeum and Cleophon
;

Homer 2

supported by quoting the elegiac verse of Solon, maintaining that discipline had long been slack in the family of Critias, or Solon would never have written,
his accusation of Critias

Pray
1

thee, bid

the red-haired Critias do what his father

commands him. 3
sc., and our written laws, which were made for us, may not reach the abstract ideal of perfection, but they probably suit us better than if they did. 4 2 s Iliad, ii. 557. Solon, fragm. 22, Bergk
.

I375

b

RHETORICA
These witnesses are concerned with past events.

As
:

to

thus I376 future events we shall also appeal to soothsayers e Themistocles l quoted the oracle about the wooden wall
as

a

a reason for engaging the enemy s fleet. Further, 2 evidence. form of one has been as said, proverbs are,

Thus

if

an old man,
5

you are urging somebody not to make a you will appeal to the proverb, Never show an old man kindness. 3

friend of

Or

if

you are urging that he who has made away with

fathers should also

make away with
the
father

their sons, quote,
his

Fool,

slayeth 4 avenge him.

who

and leaveth

sons

to

Recent

witnesses are well-known people

pressed their opinions about

who have ex some disputed matter: such

opinions will be useful support for subsequent disputants on the same points thus Eubulus used in the law-courts against
:

10

Chares the reply Plato 5 had made to Archibius, It has become the regular custom in this country to admit that one There are also those witnesses who share is a scoundrel
.

the risk of punishment if their evidence is pronounced false. These are valid witnesses to the fact that an action was or

was not done, that something
15

is

or

is

not the case

;

they

are not valid witnesses to the quality of an action, to its being just or unjust, useful or harmful. On such questions Equality

the opinion of detached persons is highly trustworthy. Most trustworthy of all are the ancient witnesses, since

they cannot be corrupted. In dealing with the evidence of witnesses, the following If you have no witnesses on your are useful arguments.
side,
is

you

will
;

argue that the judges must decide from what

that this is meant by probable giving a verdict in that probabilities accordance with one s honest opinion
;

Herodotus, vii. 141, 143. a general statement, apparently. Or possibly (cp. Poetics I454 in sense i. e. evidence of the the indicated are evidence 25) proverbs But the Greek expression usually has the meaning which it future. bears in (e.g.) I395 b 5. 3 Diogenianus, vi. 61, iii. 89. 4 Stasinus, Cypria, fragm. 22 (Kinkel, Epicoriim Graecorum Frag menta y i, p. 31). 6 Disputed whether the Comic Poet or the Philosopher.
2

1

A

,

BOOK
ties are

I.

15
;

1376*

cannot be bribed to mislead the court

and that probabili-

20

never convicted of perjury. If you have witnesses, and the other man has not, you will argue that probabilities cannot be put on their trial, and that we could do without
the evidence of witnesses altogether if we need do no than balance the pleas advanced on either side.

more

The evidence

of witnesses
;

may
:

refer either to ourselves

or to our opponent

questions of personal character be at a loss for useful evidence.
of fact supporting our

and either to questions of fact or to so, clearly, we need never For if we have no evidence

25

own case or telling against that of our opponent, at least we can always find evidence to prove Other our own worth or our opponent s worthlessness.
arguments about a witness
that he
is

a friend or an

enemy

or neutral, or has a good, bad, or indifferent reputation, and 30 any other such distinctions we must construct upon the

same general

1 use for the regular rhetorical proofs. Concerning contracts argument can be so far employed as to increase or diminish their importance and their

lines as

we

credibility

;

we

shall try to increase
if

both

if

they
in

favour,

and to diminish both

they

tell

our I376 b favour of our
tell in

opponent.

Now

for confirming or upsetting the credibility

of contracts the procedure is just the same as for dealing with witnesses, for the credit to be attached to contracts

.depends upon the character of those who have signed them or have the custody of them. The contract being once

admitted genuine, we must insist on its importance, if it supports our case. We may argue that a contract is a law, and that, while though of a special and limited kind
;

do not of course make the law binding, the law does make any lawful contract binding, 2 and that the law itself as a whole is a sort of contract, so that any one who disregards or repudiates any contract is repudiating the law itself. Further, most business relations those, namely, that are voluntary are regulated by contracts, and if these
contracts
lose their binding force,

10

human

intercourse ceases to exist.

We need

not go very deep to discover the other appropriate
1

2

Comma

enthymemes

cp. ii, c. 23. (not full stop) after o-vv6f)Kas.
:

F 2

RHETORTCA
15

20

25

arguments of this kind. If, however, the contract tells against us and for our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we can use to fight a law that tells against us. We do not regard ourselves as bound to observe a bad law which it was a mistake ever to pass and it is ridiculous to suppose that we are bound to observe a bad and mistaken contract. Again, we may argue that the duty of the judge as umpire is to decide what is just, and therefore he must ask where justice lies, and not what this And that it is impossible to or that document means. fraud or by force, since it is founded on pervert justice by nature, but a party to a contract may be the victim of either fraud or force. Moreover, we must see if the contract contravenes either universal law or any written law of our own or another country and also if it contradicts
:

;

any other previous or subsequent contract arguing that the subsequent is the binding contract, or else that the previous one was right and the subsequent one fraudulent
;

suits us. Further, we must consider the question of utility, noting whether the contract is against these arguments 30 the interest of the judges or not and so on are as obvious as the others.

whichever way

;

Examination by torture
great weight
is

is

one form of evidence, to which
it is

often

attached because
it

in

a sense

compulsory.

Here again

is

not hard to point out the

available grounds for magnifying its value, if it happens to tell in our favour, and arguing that it is the only form of

evidence that
I

377 ^ ^ ^
a

te ^ s a g amst us
is

say what

or, on the other hand, for refuting an d for our opponent, when we may true of torture of every kind alike, that people
is

infallible

;

under
truth,
5

its

compulsion tell lies quite as often as they tell the sometimes persistently refusing to tell the truth,

sometimes recklessly making a false charge in order to be We ought to be able to quote cases, let off sooner. familiar to the judges, in which this sort of thing has actually happened. [We must say that evidence under torture is
not trustworthy, the fact being that
thick-witted,
1
1

many men whether

tough-skinned, or stout of heart endure their
Omitting
ol after
rraxv(f>povs.

BOOK

a
I.

15

I377

ordeal nobly, while cowards and timid men are full of bold ness till they see the ordeal of these others so that no trust
:

can be placed in evidence under torture.] In regard to oaths, a fourfold division can be made.

A
10

man may

either both offer

and accept an oath, 1 or
that
is,

neither,

or one without the other

he

may

offer

an oath but

There not accept one, or accept an oath but not offer one. is also the situation that arises when an oath has already been sworn either by himself or by his opponent.
If

you refuse to

offer

an oath, you
;

may argue

that

men do

not hesitate to perjure themselves and that if your opponent does swear, you lose your money, whereas, if he does not, 2 you think the judges will decide against him and that the
;

risk of

an unfavourable verdict

is

preferable, since

you

trust
1

the judges and do not trust him. If you refuse to accept an oath,
;

5

you may argue that an oath is always paid for that you would of course have taken it if you had been a rascal, since if you are a
rascal

you had
in that

3

better

make something by

it,

and you
succeed.

would

case have to swear in order to

Thus your

refusal, you argue, must be due to high principle, of not to fear perjury and you may aptly quote the saying of Xenophanes,
:

Tis not

fair

that he

who

fears not

God should

challenge

20

him who doth. 4
It is as if

a strong

man were

to challenge a weakling to

strike, or be struck by, him.

If

you agree

to accept

an oath, you
;

may

argue that you
(to invert

trust yourself but not

your opponent

and that

the remark of Xenophanes) the fair thing is for the impious man to offer the oath and for the pious man to accept it
;

and that

it

would be monstrous

to accept an oath in

you yourself were unwilling a case where you demand that the
if

1 i. e. both demand an oath from his adversary (call upon him to swear to the truth of his statements) and take an oath himself. 2 Retaining KOI. 3 (iv should perhaps be omitted with the inferior manuscripts. 4 read rdo-e^el, with Bywater (/. of Ph. xxxii, Diels, Vors?) i. 44
:

t

p. 116).

a

I377
25

RHETORICA
judges should do so before giving their verdict. If you wish to offer an oath, you may argue that piety disposes and that your you to commit the issue to the gods
;

opponent ought not to want other judges than himself, since you leave the decision with him and that it is out
;

rageous for your opponents to refuse to swear about this question, when they insist that others should do so.

30

we see how we are to argue in each case separately, we see also how we are to argue when they occur in pairs, namely, when you are willing to accept the
that

Now

oath but not to

offer

it

;

to offer
;

it

but not to accept

it

;

both to accept and to offer it or to do neither. These are of course combinations of the cases already mentioned, and so your arguments also must be combinations of the

arguments already mentioned. If you have already sworn an oath that contradicts your present one, you must argue that it is not perjury, since perjury is a crime, and a crime must be a voluntary action,
5

whereas actions due to the force or fraud of others are

You must further reason from this that perjury the on intention and not on the spoken words. But depends if it is your opponent who has already sworn an oath that
involuntary.
contradicts his present one, you must say that if he does not abide by his oaths he is the enemy of society, and that this is the reason why men take an oath before administering

the laws.
10

My opponents insist that you, the judges, must abide by the oath you have sworn, and yet they are not 1 And there are other arguments abiding by their own oaths.
which

may be used

to

magnify the importance of the oath.
non-technical

[So much,
1

then, for the
full

modes of persuasion.]

After eppevovaiv,

stop instead of note of interrogation.

BOOK

II. i

BOOK
I

II

WE

have now considered the materials to be used

in

supporting or opposing a political measure, in pronouncing eulogies or censures, and for prosecution and defence in
the law courts.

have considered the received opinions arguments so as to convince our hearers those opinions with which our e-nthymemes deal, and out of which they are built, in each of the three kinds of oratory, according to what may be called the special
on which we may
best base our

We

20

needs of each.

But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions the hearers decide between one political speaker and the orator must not another, and a legal verdict is a decision

make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the Particularly in political oratory, but right frame of mind. also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator s influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the That the orator s own character right frame of mind.
only try to
;

25

right is particularly important in political that the audience should be in the right frame of 30 speaking in When people are feeling friendly and lawsuits. mind,
:

should

look

placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally
different or the

same thing with a
the

different intensity

man who comes before him as having done little wrong, if judgement, they regard when feel hostile, they take the opposite view. any they if are Again, they eager for, and have good hopes of, a
they
feel friendly to
;

when I378 them for
:

2

thing that will be pleasant
certainly will

if it happens, they think that it and be good for them whereas if happen 5 they are indifferent or annoyed, they do not think so. There are three things which inspire confidence in the
:

orator

s

own

character

the three, namely, that induce us to

I 3 78

a

RHETORICA
believe a thing apart from

10

any proof of it good sense, False statements moral and character, goodwill. good and bad advice are due to one or more of the following Men either form a false opinion through three causes.
: ;

want of good sense or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not
;

well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course.

I5

who
will

These are the only possible cases. It follows that any one is thought to have all three of these good qualities
inspire
trust
in

his

audience.

The way

to

make
:

ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good must be l the gathered from the analysis of goodness already given

way

to establish your

to establish that of others.

own goodness is the same as the way Good will and friendliness of

2 disposition will form part of our discussion of the emotions, to which we must now turn.

20

The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, pain or pleasure. with their opposites. must arrange what we have to

We

say about each of them under three heads. Take, instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover

for
(i)

what the
25

state of

mind of angry people

is,

(2)

who

the

they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points unless we know
;

people are with

whom

all

three,

we
is

shall

be unable to arouse anger

in

any one.

The same
in this

true of the other emotions.
list

So

just as earlier

work we drew up a

30 orator, let us

now proceed

in the

of useful propositions for the same way to analyse the

subject before us.

Anger may be defined
pain, to a conspicuous

as an impulse,

accompanied by 2

revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one s friends. If this is a proper
1
i,

c. Q.

2
ii,

c. 4.

BOOK
definition of anger,
it

II.

2

must always be felt towards some g. Cleon, and not man in general. It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends. It must always I378 be attended by a certain pleasure that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For since nobody aims at what
particular individual,
e.

he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant. Hence it has been well said about wrath,
Sweeter
it

5

is

by

far

than the

honeycomb dripping with

sweetness,
1 spreads through the hearts of men. It is also attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts the act of vengeance, and the images then dwell

And

called

upon up cause

pleasure, like

the

images called up

in

dreams.
slighting is the actively entertained something as obviously of no importance.
things, as well as

Now

We

opinion of think bad
;

10

we

good ones, have serious importance and think the same of anything that tends to produce such

things, while those

which have little or no such tendency There are three kinds of slight and insolence, (i) Contempt is one ing contempt, spite, kind of slighting: you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant, and it is just such things that you slight. 2 it is a thwarting another man s (2) Spite is another kind

we consider unimportant.

in

;

wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his The slight arises just from the fact that you do getting it.

not aim at something for yourself: clearly you do not think that he can do you harm, for then you would be afraid
of

20

him

instead of slighting him, nor yet that he can
for

do you

any good worth mentioning,
to

make

friends with him.
it

then you would be anxious (3) Insolence is also a form

of slighting, since

consists in doing

and saying things

that cause

shame

to the victim, not in order that anything

may happen
j

to yourself, or because anything has
109 (cp.
i,

happened

25

xviii.

c. II,

2

h i37O 12 supra}.
:

Or,

spite

seems

to

show contempt

if

</>cuVrai

Karaippovelv is

retained.

b

I37

RHETORICA
tion

to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved. (Retalia is not insolence but vengeance.) The cause of the
* ,

pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill-treating them.
is why youths and rich men are insolent they think themselves superior when they show insolence. One sort of insolence is to rob people of the honour due to them

That

;

;

30

the unimportant, you certainly slight for good or evil, that has no honour paid to it. So Achilles
;

them thus

for

it

is

says in anger

:

He
and

hath taken
dishonour,
1

my

prize for himself

and hath done

me

Like an alien honoured by none, 2 man expects to meaning that this is why he is angry.

A

J

379 much

a

be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, 3 is in goodness, and generally in anything in which he
as where money is concerned a superior where looks for respect from a poor man speaking is concerned, the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak the ruler demands the respect of the ruled, and the man who thinks he ought
their
:

wealthy man

;

;

to be a ruler

demands the

thinks he ought to be ruling.

respect of the man whom he Hence it has been said
is

Great

is

the wrath of kings, whose father

Zeus almighty, 4
5

and
5

Yea, but his rancour abideth long afterward
their great resentment being

also,

due to

their great superiority.

Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment, and these are the people whom
he has treated or
to
treat
is

well, either

treating well, or means or has meant himself, or through his friends, or

through others at his request. It will be plain by now, from what has been said, (i) in what frame of mind, (2) with what persons, and (3) on what
1

2

Iliad,
3

i.

356.

Ib. ix. 648.

Reading ns (Spengel), in place of raurn. Or &c. thing common to them and him in which he
,

ev

raur&>

in

any

*

5

Iliaii,

ii.

196.

Ib.

i.

82.

BOOK

II.

2

I379

a

(i) The frame of mind is grounds people grow angry, In that condition, that in which any pain is being felt.

10

a

man

is

always aiming

at

something.

Whether, then,

another

opposes him either directly in any way, as by him from drinking when he is thirsty, or preventing whether indirectly, the act appears to him just the same
;

man

some one works against him, or or otherwise vexes him while he

fails

equally angry in all these cases. afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or

work with him, is in this mood, he is Hence people who are
to

15

any

other unsatisfied desires are

prone to anger and easily

roused

:

especially against those

who

slight their present

distress.

Thus a
poor

sick

man

is

angered by disregard of

disregard of his poverty, a man waging war by disregard of the war he is waging, a lover by disregard of his love, and so throughout, any other sort 20 of slight being enough if special slights are wanting.
his illness, a

man by

Each man
him, to his
if

is

predisposed,

by

the emotion

own

we happen

unexpected

particular anger. to be expecting a contrary result for a quite evil is specially painful, just as the quite
:

Further,

now controlling we are angered

unexpected fulfilment of our wishes is specially pleasant. Hence it is plain what seasons, times, conditions, and periods of life tend to stir men easily to anger, and where and when this will happen and it is plain that the more we are under these conditions the more easily we
;

25

are stirred.

These, then, are the frames of mind
easily stirred to

in

which men are

anger.

angry are those
conduct
that are
is

who

insolent.

whom we get or at us, for such laugh, mock, jeer Also those who inflict injuries upon us
The
persons with

marks of

insolence.

These

injuries

must be such
:

30

for as are neither retaliatory nor profitable to the doers only then will they be felt to be due to insolence. Also

those

who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about
thus those

:

are eager to win fame as philosophers get with those who show contempt for their philosophy ; 35 angry those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry

who

I379

a

RHETORICA
with those

who show contempt

for their

so on in other cases.

We
we

feel

appearance and particularly angry on this
;

account

if

we suspect

that

are in fact, or that people think

we
I379
b

are, lacking completely or to

qualities in question.

excel in the qualities ignore the jeering. Again,

any effective extent in the For when we are convinced that we for which we are jeered at, we can

we

than with other people, since we to treat us well and not badly.

are angrier with our friends feel that our friends ought

We

are angry with those

5

usually treated us with honour or regard, if a comes and they behave to us otherwise for we change think that they feel contempt for us, or they would still
:

who have

be behaving as they did before. And with those who do not return our kindnesses or fail to return them adequately,

T

and with those who oppose us though they are our inferiors for all such persons seem to feel contempt for us those who oppose us seem to think us inferior to themselves, and those who do not return our kindnesses seem to think that those kindnesses were conferred by inferiors. And we feel with men of no account at all, if they particularly angry
: ;

slight us. slight
is felt

For,

by our

towards people

hypothesis, the anger caused by the who are not justified in slighting

us, and our inferiors are not thus justified. Again, we feel angry with friends if they do not speak well of us or treat us well and still more, if they do the contrary or if they do not perceive our needs, which is why Plexippus is angry
;
;

15

1 for this want of Meleager in Antiphon s play shows are us that they we do not fail perception slighting

with

;

to perceive the needs of those for

whom we

care.

Again,

are angry with those who rejoice at our misfortunes or simply keep cheerful in the midst of our misfortunes, since

we

20

shows that they either hate us or are slighting us. Also who are indifferent to the pain they give us this is why we get angry with bringers of bad news. And with those who listen to stories about us or keep on looking at our weaknesses this seems like either slighting us or
this

with those

:

;

hating us

;

for those

who

love us share in
to

all

our distresses
at his

and

it

must

distress
1

keep on looking 2 Antiphon, Meleager, Nauck p. 792.

any one

own

,

BOOK
weaknesses.
classes of people
:

II.

2

I379
slight us before five

b

Further, with those

who

namely,

(i)

our

rivals, (2)

those

whom we
25
:

wish to admire us, (4) those for (3) whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us if any one slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry. Again, we feel angry with those who slight us in
admire,
those

whom we

connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion our parents, children, wives, or subjects. And
with those

who do

not return a favour, since such a slight

is

30

unjustifiable.

levity

Also with those who reply with humorous when we are speaking seriously, for such behaviour
contempt.

indicates

And

with those
it

who
is

treat

us

less

well than they treat everybody else ; contempt that they should think we

another mark of

do not deserve what

every one
as

else deserves.

when our own names
;

Forgetfulness, too, causes anger, are forgotten, trifling as this may
to be another sign that we are to negligence, and to neglect us is

35

be

since forgetfulness
;

is felt

being slighted to slight us.

it is

due

in

persons with whom we feel anger, the frame of mind which we feel it, and the reasons why we feel it, have now all been set forth. Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry.

The

1380**

3

Since growing calm is the opposite of growing angry, and calmness 1 the opposite of anger, we must ascertain in what frames of mind men are calm, towards whom they feel calm,

5

and by what means they are made
be defined as a settling we get angry with those

so.

Growing calm may
;

down or quieting of anger. Now who slight us and since slighting is a voluntary act, it is plain that we feel calm towards those who do nothing of the kind, or who do or seem to do it Also towards those who intended to do involuntarily.
the opposite of what they did do. Also towards those who treat themselves as they have treated us since no one
:

10

1

Or: gentleness, mildness,

placability, patience

(with the corre

sponding adjectives).

I38o

a

RHETORICA
can be supposed to slight himself. who admit their fault and are sorry
grief at

Also towards those
:

15

we accept their what they have done as satisfaction, and cease to be angry. The punishment of servants shows this those who contradict us and deny their offence we punish all the more,
since
:

we cease to be incensed against those who agree that The reason is that it is they deserved their punishment. shameless to deny what is obvious, and those who are
but

shameless towards
20

us

slight
feel

us

:

anyhow, we do

not

us and show contempt for shame before those of whom

we

are thoroughly contemptuous. Also we feel calm to wards those who humble themselves before us and do not we feel that they thus admit themselves our gainsay us inferiors, and inferiors feel fear, and nobody can slight any one so long as he feels afraid of him. That our anger
;

25

who humble themselves before us is shown even by dogs, who do not bite people when they sit
ceases towards those

down. 1

We

also feel

calm towards those who are serious

when we

are serious, because then

we

feel

that

we

are

treated seriously and not contemptuously. Also towards those who have done us more kindnesses than we have done

Also towards those who pray to us and beg for Also mercy, since they humble themselves by doing so. towards those who do not insult or mock at or slight any
them.
30

one

or not any worthy person or any one like our In general, the things that make us calm may be inferred by seeing what the opposites are of those that make
at
all,

selves.

us angry.

We

are not angry with people
;

as long as we fear or respect of a person and also at the

we fear or respect, them you cannot be afraid same time angry with him.
;

3?

Again, we feel no anger, or comparatively little, with those who have done what they did through anger we do not feel that they have done it from a wish to slight us, for no

one slights people when angry with them, since slighting is I38o painless, and anger is painful. Nor do we grow angry with those who reverence us.
b

As
is

to the

plainly

the

frame of mind that makes people calm, it opposite to that which makes them
1

Cp. Odyssey,

xiv.

29-31.

BOOK
;

II.

3

I

3 8o

b

angry, as when they are amusing themselves or laughing or feasting when they are feeling prosperous or success

when, in fine, they are enjoying freedom from pain, or inoffensive pleasure, or justifiable hope. Also when time has passed and their anger is no longer And vengeance fresh, for time puts an end to anger. taken on one previously person puts an end to even
ful
;

or satisfied

5

greater anger
crates,

felt

against another person.

Hence

Philo-

being asked by some one, at a time when the public was angry with him, Why don t you defend yourself?
did right to reply, the time ? When

The time is not yet. Why, when is see some one else calumniated. For men become calm when they have spent their anger on
I

10

somebody

else.

This happened

though the people were

more

Ergophilus irritated against him than
:

in the case of

against Callisthenes, they acquitted him because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the day before. Again,
1 they have convicted the offender or if he has already suffered worse things than they in their would have themselves inflicted upon him for they anger

men become calm

if

;

15

;

feel as if

they were already avenged. Or if they feel that are in the wrong and are suffering justly themselves they is not excited by what is just), since men no (for anger
longer think then that they are suffering without justifica

and anger, as we have seen, 2 means this. Hence we ought always to inflict a preliminary punishment in if that is done, even slaves are less words aggrieved
tion
;
:

20

actual punishment. also feel calm if we think that the offender will not see that he is punished on our

by the

We

account and because of the

way he has

treated us.

For

anger has to do with individuals. This is plain from the 2 definition. Hence the poet has well written
:

Say

that

it

was Odysseus, sacker of

3

cities,

implying that Odysseus would not have considered him self avenged unless the Cyclops perceived both by whom and for what he had been blinded. Consequently we do

A
2
ii,

c
.

Or

e\eS><riv

(A
8

c

corr.)

if

they pity
ix.

.

c. 2, init.

Odyssey,

504.

I3

8o b
25

RHETORTCA
not get angry with any one
anger, and
in particular

who cannot be aware

of our

cease to be angry with people \ve feel that the worst has been done for are once they dead, feel pain nor anything neither will to them, and that they
else that

we

we

in

our anger aim at making them

feel.

And

therefore the poet has well made Apollo say, in order to put a stop to the anger of Achilles against the dead Hector,

For behold
1

in his fury

he doeth despite to the senseless
to calm others
;

clay.
30 It is

you you must put your hearers into the corresponding frame of mind, and represent those with whom they are angry as formidable, or as worthy of reverence, or as benefactors, or as involuntary agents, or as much distressed at what they have done.
must draw upon these
lines of

now

plain that

when you wish

argument

Let us now turn to Friendship 2 and Enmity, and ask 4 towards whom these feelings are entertained, and why. We We 35 will begin by defining friendship and friendly feeling. towards one as describe any may friendly feeling wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own a I38i sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who feels thus and
excites these feelings in return
:

those

who
is

think they
the sort of

feel

thus towards each other think themselves friends.

This

being assumed,

it

follows that your friend
is

man

who
5

shares your pleasure in what
is

what

unpleasant, for

good and your pain in sake and for no other reason. your
will
feel

This pleasure and pain of his
wishes for you, since

be the token of

his

good

we

all

glad at getting what

we
;

wish

for,

and pained
are,

at getting

then, are friends to

whom

what we do not. Those, the same things are good and evil

and those who
10
;

same people wishes, and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, they show themselves each other s friends.
1

moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the for in that case they must have the same

its

and elsewhere it is difficult to translate $iXeu< (and related words) by any single English equivalent to be a friend , to like , to love , may have to be used in turn. Cp. W. D. Ross,
;

2

Iliad, xxiv. 54. In this chapter

Aristotle, p. 230.

BOOK
Again, we

II.

4

a

I38i

feel friendly to those who have treated us well, either ourselves or those we care for, whether on a large

scale, or readily, or at

some

was for wish to
to those
selves.

our own

sake.

treat us well.

And also And also to

particular crisis provided it to those who we think
;

our friends friends, and
15

who

like,

And

or are liked by, those whom we like ouralso to those who are enemies to those whose

we

enemies we are, and dislike, or are disliked by, those whom For all such persons think the things good which dislike.

we think good,
this, as

we

so that they wish what is saw, is what friends must do.
1

good

for us

;

and

And

also to those

who

are willing to treat us well where money or our personal 20 and therefore we value those who are safety is concerned
:

liberal, brave, or just.

just we consider to be those which means those who work for their living, especially farmers and others who work with We also like temperate men, because their own hands.

The
;

who do

not live on others

they are not unjust to others
those

;

and, for the

same

reason,

25

who mind friends we wish
:

their

own

business.

And

also those

whose

to be, if it is plain that they wish to be our such are the morally good, and those well thought friends of by every one, by the best men, or by those whom we

admire or who admire

us.

And

also those with
:

whom

it is

such are the good- 30 pleasant to live and spend our days tempered, and those who are not too ready to show us our mistakes, and those who are not cantankerous or quarrel

some

who

such people are always wanting to fight us, and those fight us we feel wish for the opposite of what we wish

for ourselves
;

and those who have the tact to make and take a joke here both parties have the same object in view, 2 when they can stand being made fun of as well as do it
prettily themselves.

35

And we
good

those

who

praise such
if

also feel friendly towards qualities as we possess, and

they praise the good qualities that we are not especially too sure we do possess. And towards those who are cleanly 1381** in their person, their dress, and all their way of life.

And

towards those

who do

not reproach us with what

we

i.

e.

both wish to pass the time pleasantly.

G

b

I38i

RHETORICA
have done amiss to them or they have done to help us, for both actions show a tendency to criticize us. And towards those who do not nurse grudges or store up grievances, but
are always ready to

5

they

will

behave

for we take it that friends again find we them behaving to to us just as

make

;

10

And towards those who are not evil speakers else. and who are aware of neither their neighbours bad points nor our own, but of our good ones only, as a good man always will be. And towards those who do not try to thwart us when we are angry or in earnest, which would mean being ready to fight us. And towards those who have some serious feeling towards us, such as admiration for us, or belief in our goodness, or pleasure in our company
every one
;

especially

15

about qualities in us for which we especially wish to be admired, esteemed, or liked. And towards those who are like ourselves in character and occupation, provided they do not get in our way or gain their living from the same source as we do for then it will
if

they

feel

like

this

be a case of potter against potter

*

:

Potter to potter and builder to builder begrudge their reward. 1

And

those

who

desire the

possible for us both to same trouble arises here too.

same things as we desire, if it is share them together otherwise the
;

And

towards those with

whom

20

we are on such terms that, while we respect their opinions, we need not blush before them for doing what is con
ventionally

wrong

:

as well as towards those before
to

whom

we should be ashamed
our
rivals,

do anything
either
us.

and those

whom we

really wrong. Again, should like to envy us

though without ill-feeling least we wish them to like
those

we like these people or at And we feel friendly towards

whom we

help to secure good for themselves, provided

we
25

those
as

are not likely to suffer heavily by it ourselves. who feel as friendly to us when we are not with

And
them

when we

are

which

is

why

all

men

feel friendly

towards

those

who

are faithful to their dead friends.

And, speaking
TCK.TOVI

generally, towards those
1

who

are really fond of their friends

Hesiod,

Works and Days,

25 KCU Kepa^evs Kepa^el Koreei KCU

BOOK

IT

4
;

I 3 8i

b

and do not desert them in trouble of all good men, we feel most friendly to those who show their goodness as friends. Also towards those who are honest with us, including those who will tell us of their own weak points it has just been said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is 1 conventionally wrong, and if we do have this feeling, we do not love them if therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them. We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or uncomfortable nobody can like a
:

30

;

man

of

whom

he

feels frightened.

Friendship has various

forms

comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on. Things that cause friendship are doing kindnesses
:

;

doing

35

them unasked and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason. a Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference I382
;

to their opposites. spite or calumny.

Enmity may be produced by anger

or

Now

whereas anger arises from offences
;

against oneself, enmity
character.

may arise even without that
we take

we may

hate people merely because of what

to be their

Anger
all

is

Callias or a Socrates

always concerned with individuals a whereas hatred is directed also against

5

classes

hate any thief and any informer. Moreover, be can cured anger by time but hatred cannot. The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him
:

we

;

the angry man wants his victims to feel the hater does not mind whether they feel or not. All painful but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are things are felt
;

harm

;

;

10

presence causes no pain. And anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not. Much may happen to
the least
felt,

since

their

;

make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer
for

15

what they have done

;

the other would have

them cease

to exist.
It is plain from all this that we can friends or enemies if they are not, we can
;

prove people to be

make them out to be

1

i38i

b 20.

G

2

1382*
so;
if

RHRTORICA
they claim to be so, we can refute their claim and if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we 1 can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer.
;

20

To turn next to Fear, what follows will show the things 5 and persons of which, and the states of mind in which, we Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance feel afraid. due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil
in the future.

or painful evils only for there are some evils, e. g. wickedness or stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten us I mean only such as amount to
;
:

Of destructive

25

And even these only if they appear great pains or losses. not remote but so near as to be imminent we do not fear
:

things that are a very long way off for instance, we all know we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is From this definition it will follow that not close at hand.
:

fear

is

caused by whatever

we

feel

30 us

destroying us, or of harming Hence the very indications of such things great pain. are terrible, making us feel that the terrible thing itself is
close at

us in

has great power of ways that tend to cause

danger and anger of people who for it is plain that they have the they are on the point of doing
.

hand we mean by

;

the approach of what

is

terrible

is

just

what

indications are the enmity have power to do something to us
;

Such

35

possession of power for it is evil that makes him unjust.
;
;

do it, and so it. Also injustice in the unjust man s will to do Also outraged virtue in
will

to

I38a

b

possession of power for it is plain that, when outraged, it always has the will to retaliate, and now it has the power to

do

so.

Also

fear felt

by those who have the power

to

do

something to us, since such persons are sure to be ready to do it. And since most men tend to be bad slaves to
5 it is, as a rule, a terrible greed, and cowards in danger thing to be at another man s mercy and therefore, if we have done anything horrible, those in the secret terrify us
;

with the thought that they
1

may
,

betray or desert

us.

And

c Reading a^Lcrj^rjTOvvTos with A and e (// onorepav (or e( OTrorepav if Or: a^). they dispute (a/x^ta/S^roOi/ra?) with us through anger or through hatred, we can bring them into whichever of the two we prefer

(i. e.

into greater

anger or greater hatred).

BOOK
those

II.

5

1382*

us wrong are terrible to us when we are for as a rule men do wrong to others liable to be wronged

who can do

;

whenever they have the power to do it. And those who have been wronged, or believe themselves to be wronged,
are terrible
;

10

opportunity.

for they are always looking out for their Also those who have done people wrong, if
:

they possess power, since they stand in fear of retaliation we have already l said that wickedness possessing power is
terrible.

Again, our

rivals for
it

a thing cause us fear
;

when

we cannot both have
war with such men.

at

once
also

We

are always at fear those who are to
for
15

we

be feared by stronger people than ourselves: if they can hurt those stronger people, still more can they hurt us and, for the same reason, we fear those whom those stronger
people are
actually
afraid
of.

;

Also those

who have

Also those who destroyed people stronger than we are. are attacking people weaker than we are either they are
:

already formidable, or they will be so when they have thus grown stronger. Of those we have wronged, and of our enemies or rivals, it is not the passionate and outspoken 20

whom we

have to fear, but the quiet, dissembling, since we never know when they are upon unscrupulous us, we can never be sure they are at a safe distance. All terrible things are more terrible if they give us no chance
;

of retrieving a blunder either no chance at all, or only one Those that depends on our enemies and not ourselves.
things are also worse which

we cannot,

or cannot easily, help.

25

Speaking generally, anything causes us to feel fear that when it happens to, or threatens, others causes us to feel pity.

The above are, roughly, the chief things that are terrible Let us now describe the conditions under and are feared. which we ourselves feel fear. If fear is associated with the
expectation that something destructive will happen to us,
plainly
30

nobody happen to him we cannot happen to us, nor people who we believe cannot inflict them upon us nor shall we be afraid at times when we think
; ;

will

be afraid

believes nothing can shall not fear things that we believe

who

ourselves safe from them.
1

It follows therefore that fear is

1382*34.

I 3 82

b

RHETORICA
by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular time. People do not believe this when
felt

35

1383** they are, or think

they

are, in the

midst of great prosperity,

and are

in

consequence

insolent,

contemptuous, and reckless

5

of character produced by wealth, physical nor yet when they of friends, power abundance strength, feel they have experienced every kind of horror already and have grown callous about the future, like men who are being if they are to feel the flogged and are already nearly dead anguish of uncertainty, there must be some faint expectation This appears from the fact that fear sets us of escape. can be done, which of course nobody does what thinking
:

the kind

when things are hopeless. Consequently, when it is ad visable that the audience should be frightened, the orator
must make them
10

feel

thing, pointing out that
to

that they really are in danger of some it has happened to others who
are, like

were stronger than they
happened,
people
in

and is happening, or has themselves, at the hands of

unexpected people, unexpected time.
that cause

an unexpected form, and at an

15

Having now seen the nature of fear, and of the things the various states of mind in which it, and it is felt, we can also see what Confidence is, about what It is the op things we feel it, and under what conditions. of fear, and what causes it is the opposite of what posite
causes
it is, fear therefore, the expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible it may
; :

be due either to the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes alarm. We feel it if we can
20

take steps trouble if
; ;

many, or important, or both

to cure or prevent

we have neither-wronged others nor been wronged them if we have either no rivals at all or no by strong ones if our rivals who are strong are our friends or have
;

treated us well

or been treated well

by us

;

or

if

those

whose
25

interest

is

the same as ours are the more numerous

party, or the stronger, or both. As for our own state of mind,

we

feel

confidence

if

we

BOOK
believe

II.

5

I3

83

we have

or have often

often succeeded and never suffered reverses, met danger and escaped it safely. For there

beings face danger calmly they may have no experience of it, or they may have means thus when in danger at sea people may feel 30 to deal with it confident about what will happen either because they have
: :

are two reasons

why human

no experience of bad weather, or because their experience We also feel gives them the means of dealing with it. confident whenever there is nothing to terrify other people like ourselves, or people weaker than ourselves, or people than whom we believe ourselves to be stronger and we believe
or conquered others who Also if we believe 35 are as strong as they are, or stronger. ourselves superior to our rivals in the number and importance
this
if

we have conquered them,

wealth, extensive bodies of physical strength, strong supporters, territory, and the possession of all, or the most important,

of the advantages

that

make men formidable

Also if we have wronged no one, or not appliances of war. or not those of whom we are afraid and generally, if many,
;

our relations with the gods are satisfactory, as will be shown
especially by signs and oracles. The fact is that anger makes us confident that anger is excited by our knowledge that

5

we

are not the wrongers but the wronged, and that the divine 1 power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged.
10

Also when, at the outset of an enterprise, we believe that we cannot and shall not fail, or that we shall succeed So much for the causes of fear and confidence. completely.

6

We now turn
will

to

Shame and Shamelessness

;

what follows

explain the things that cause these feelings, and the persons before whom, and the states of mind under which,

they are
in

defined as pain or disturbance regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit and shamelessfelt.
;

Shame may be

15

things.
1

ness as contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad If this definition be granted, it follows that we feel

The connexion
be clearer
if

will

</)o/3o{}j/rai.

The

shows us that we

of thought, as indicated by the yap after a colon (rather than a full stop) is placed after argument runs the fact that we have the divine favour have been wronged that makes us angry and anger
:

;

;

makes

us confident.

RHETORICA
shame
20

selves or to those

bad things as we think are disgraceful to our we care for. These evils are, in the first Such are throwing away place, those due to moral badness. one s shield or taking to flight for these bad things are due to
at such
;

cowardice.

Also, withholding a deposit or otherwise wrong for these acts are due to injustice. ing people about money Also, having carnal intercourse with forbidden persons,
;

at

wrong

times, or in

to licentiousness.

wrong places for these things are due Also, making profit in petty or disgraceful
; ;

25

ways, or out of helpless persons, e. g. the poor, or the dead whence the proverb He would pick a corpse s pocket for all this is due to low greed and meanness. Also, in
matters, giving less help than you might, or none at or accepting help from those worse off than yourself so also borrowing when it will seem like begging begging when

money
all,

;

;

it

return
33

seem like asking the return of a favour asking such a when it will seem like begging praising a man in order that it may seem like begging and going on begging in spite
will
; ; ;
:

of failure

all

such actions are tokens of meanness.

Also,

1 praising people to their face, and praising extravagantly a

3.;

man s good p oints and glozing over his weaknesses, and showing extravagant sympathy with his grief when you are in his presence, and all that sort of thing all this shows the
;

disposition of a flatterer. Also, refusing to endure hardships that are endured by people who are older, more delicately brought up, of higher rank, or generally less capable of

endurance than ourselves
Also, accepting benefits,

shows effeminacy. especially accepting them often, from
:

for all

this

5

another man, and then abusing him for conferring them all this shows a mean, Also, talking ignoble disposition. incessantly about yourself, making loud professions, and
:

appropriating the merits of others for this is due to boastfulness. The same is true of the actions due to any of the other forms of badness of moral character, of the tokens of
;

such badness, &c.

Another
10

sort of

a share in
or
1

they are all disgraceful and shameless. bad thing at which we feel shame is, lacking the honourable things shared by every one else,
:

by

all

or nearly
the

all

who

are like ourselves.
be
:

By

*

those

With

KoAuJceiaf,

meaning may

(which

is

a sign) of

flattery.

BOOK
like ourselves
I

II.

6

1384**

mean

those of our

own

race or country or

age or family, and generally those who are on our own level. Once we are on a level with others, it is a disgrace to be,

and so with other if it is seen to be advantages all the more our own fault wherever we are ourselves to blame for our
are say, less well educated than they
:

;

so, in

each case,
it

:

15

present, past, or future circumstances,
this

follows at once that

is to a greater extent due to our moral badness. are moreover ashamed of having done to us, having had

We

in

done, or being about to have done to us acts that involve us dishonour and reproach ; as when we surrender our
persons, or lend ourselves to vile deeds, e. g. when we submit And acts of yielding to the lust of others are to outrage.

shameful whether willing or unwilling (yielding to force being an instance of unwillingness), since unresisting submis
sion to

20

them is due to unmanliness or cowardice. These things, and others like them, are what cause the

feeling of shame.

Now

since

shame

is

a mental picture of
25

which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion,
disgrace, in
it

follows

that

are

those whose
:

the people before whom we feel opinion of us matters to us.

shame Such

persons are those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we
respect.
us,

who
from

admire those, and wish those to admire possess any good thing that is highly esteemed
;

We

30

or

whom we

are

that

they are able to

very anxious to get something We give us as a lover feels.

compete with our equals.

We

respect, as true, the views

of sensible people, such as our elders and those who have been well educated. And we feel more shame about a

thing

done openly, before all men s eyes. Hence the For this reason we shame dwells in the eyes .* proverb, feel most shame before those who will always be with us and those who notice what we do, since in both cases eyes
if it is
1
2 Cp. Euripides, Cresphontes^ fragm. 457, N.

at Scb?

eV

o</>0aX/uoio-i

RHETORICA
are upon us.

We
it

also feel

it

same imputation
opinions about
those

as ourselves

before those not open to the for it is plain that their
:

are the opposite of ours.

Also before

who
;

are hard on

any one whose conduct they think
:

5

wrong for what a man does himself, he is said not to resent when his neighbours do it so that of course he does resent And before those their doing what he does not do himself.

who

are
is

others

likely to tell everybody about you as good as not believing you wrong.

;

not telling

People are

likely to tell others about you if you have wronged them, or if they since they are on the look out to harm you
;

speak evil of everybody, for those who attack the innocent And before will be still more ready to attack the guilty.
those
10

whose main occupation is with their neighbours people like satirists and writers of comedy these failings are really a kind of evil-speakers and tell-tales. And before
;

those

who have
feel

their attitude to us has
is

why we

known us come to grief, since amounted to admiration so far that ashamed to refuse those a favour who ask
never yet
:

one
15

for the first

time

we have not

as yet lost credit with

them.

Such are those who are
;

just beginning to wish to

be

our friends

for

they have seen our best side only (hence the
:

l appropriateness of Euripides reply to the Syracusans) and such also are those among our old acquaintances who

know nothing

to our discredit.

And we

are

ashamed not

merely of the actual shameful conduct mentioned, but also of the evidences of it not merely, for example, of actual
:

20

sexual intercourse, but also of its evidences and not merely of disgraceful acts but also of disgraceful talk. Similarly we feel shame not merely in presence of the persons
;

mentioned but also of those who will tell them what we have done, such as their servants or friends. And, generally, we feel no shame before those upon whose
The scholiast (ed. Rabe, p. 106) tells us that Euripides was sent to negotiate peace with the Syracusans, and rinding them unwilling said You ought, men of Syracuse, to respect our expressions of esteem if only because we are new petitioners. The Euripides in
:

1

question

poems

well have been the tragic poet the popularity of whose Syracuse, and whose turn for rhetorical argument, are beyond dispute. Cp. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, p. 216.

may

:

at

BOOK
opinions

II.

6

I384

b

we

quite look

down

as untrustworthy (no one feels
;

shame before small children or animals) nor are we ashamed of the same things before intimates as before strangers, but before the former of what seem genuine faults, before the latter of what seem conventional ones. The conditions under which we shall feel shame are
having people related to us like those before 1 whom, as has been said, we feel shame. These are, as was stated, persons whom we admire, or who admire us,
these
:

25

first,

by whom we wish to be admired, or from whom we some service that we shall not obtain if we forfeit their good opinion. These persons may be actually looking on (as Cydias represented them in his speech on land 2 assignments in Samos, when he told the Athenians to
or
desire

30

imagine the Greeks to be standing all around them, actually seeing the way they voted and not merely going to hear
it or again they may be near at hand, afterwards) may be likely to find out about what we do. This is why in misfortune we do not wish to be seen by those who

about

:

35

or

once wished themselves like us
admiration.

;

for

such a feeling implies
acts or

And men

feel

shame when they have

exploits to their credit on which they are bringing dishonour, 1385** whether these are their own, or those of their ancestors,

or those of other persons with whom they have some close connexion. Generally, we feel shame before those
for

whose

own

misconduct

we should

also

feel

it

those

already mentioned ; those who take us as their models those whose teachers or advisers we have been
;
;

5

or other people, it may be, like ourselves, we are. 3 For there are many things that

whose rivals shame before

such people makes us do or leave undone.

And we

feel

more shame when we are likely to be continually seen by, and go about under the eyes of, those who know of our Hence, when Antiphon the poet was to be disgrace. cudgelled to death by order of Dionysius, and saw those who were to perish with him covering their faces as they
1

10

1384^7.
Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Aft., Pt. ii, p. 318. Or, who resemble, it may be, those whose rivals

2 3

we

are.

1385*

RHETORICA
went through the
faces
?

Is

it

lest

do you cover yoiu some of these spectators should see you
gates, he said,

Why

to-morrow ?
15

So much for Shame to understand Shamelessness, we need only consider the converse cases, and plainly we shall have all we need.
;

To

take Kindness next

:

the definition of

us towards
of mind.
is

whom
be

it

is

felt,

why, and
be
defined

in

it will show 7 what frames

Kindness
to

under the influence of which a

man

said

kind

may

as

helpfulness

towards some one
20

not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the
in need,

person helped.
to get, or

Kindness
it

is

great

if

shown

to one

who

is

in great need, or

who needs what
at

who needs

important and hard an important and difficult crisis
is

;

or

the helper is the only, the first, or the chief person to give the help. 1 Natural cravings constitute such needs
if
;

and
is

in particular cravings,

accompanied by

pain, for

what

kind
25

not being attained. The appetites are cravings of this sexual desire, for instance, and those which arise
:

during bodily injuries and in dangers for appetite is active both in danger and in pain. Hence those who stand by us
;

in

poverty or

in

banishment, even

if

they do not help us

much, are yet really kind to us, because our need is great and the occasion pressing for instance, the man who gave the
;

The helpfulness must therefore meet, 3 preferably, just this kind of need and failing just this kind, some other kind as great or greater. now see to 30 whom, why, and under what conditions kindness is shown ;
in
;

mat

the Lyceum. 2

We

and these facts must form the basis of our arguments. We must show that the persons helped are, or have been, in such pain and need as has been described, and that their
helpers gave, or are giving, the kind of help described, can also see how to 35 in the kind of need described.

We

1

Perhaps av
KT\.

77

should be read, as giving an easier construction for

fJiOVOS
2

mat
3

Particulars unknown. Can some friend in need have provided a for a poor and fainting follower of the unwearied peripatetic Aristotle to rest upon ? If so, the illustration is semi-humorous

Retaining

ruD, A c

.

BOOK
:

II

7

I3

8s

a

make our opponents unkind we maintain that they are being or appear may have been helpful simply to promote their own interest 1 is not kindness or that their this, as has been stated,
eliminate the idea of kindness and
:

action

was

accidental, or

was forced upon them

;

or that

they were not doing a favour, but merely returning one, whether they know this or not in either case the action is
a mere return, and
is

therefore not a kindness even if the

doer does not
this subject

know how

the case stands.

we must look at all the

In considering 2 an act may categories
:

5

a particular thing, (i) it has a particular magnitude or (3) quality, or (4) is (2) done at a particular time or (5) place. As evidence of the
it

be an act of kindness because

is

want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had been refused to the man in need or that the same service, or an equal or greater one, has been given to his
;

enemies; these facts show that the service in question was not done for the sake of the person helped. Or we

may point out that the thing desired was worthless and that the helper knew it no one will admit that he is in need 10 of what is worthless.
:

8

So much

for

Kindness and Unkindness.

Let us now

consider Pity, asking ourselves what things excite pity, and for what persons, and in what states of our mind pity is felt. Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain caused by the sight
painful, which befalls one and which we might expect it, to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to In order to feel pity, we must obviously be befall us soon.

of

some

evil,

destructive

or

who does

not deserve

15

capable of supposing that some

some
is

friend of ours,

evil may happen to us or and moreover some such evil as is
is

stated in our definition or
therefore

more or

less

of that kind.
ruined,

It

by completely suppose that no further evil can befall them, since the worst has befallen them already nor by those who imagine
;

not

felt

those

who

20

themselves immensely fortunate

their

feeling

is

rather

presumptuous
all
1

insolence, for
2

when they think they possess
clear that the impossibility
i

the good things of
1385** 18.

life, it is

Cp. Categ.

b

25

ff.

I385

b

RHETORICA
of evil befalling

them

will

25

good things in question. them are such as have already had
; ;

be included, this being one of the Those who think evil may befall
it

befall

them and have
good

elderly men, owing to their safely escaped from it sense and their experience weak men, especially
inclined to cowardice
;

men

and also educated people, since these can take long views. Also those who have parents living, or children, or wives for these are our own, and the evils mentioned above may easily befall them. And those who
;

30

moved by any courageous emotion such as anger or confidence (these emotions take no account of the future), nor by a disposition to presumptuous insolence (insolent men, too, take no account of the possibility that
are neither

35

happen to them), nor yet by great fear (panic-stricken people do not feel pity, because they are taken up with what is happening to themselves) only In those feel pity who are between these two extremes. order to feel pity we must also believe in the goodness of if you think nobody at least some people good, you will
something
evil will
;
;

a I386 believe that everybody deserves we feel pity whenever we are

evil fortune.

And, generally,

in the condition of

remem

bering that similar misfortunes have happened to us or ours, or expecting them to happen in future.

So much
pity.

for the

mental conditions under which we
is

feel

What we

pity

stated clearly in the definition.

All

5

unpleasant and painful things excite pity if they tend to and all such evils as are due to destroy and annihilate
;

chance,
evils are

if
:

The painful and destructive they are serious. death in its various forms, bodily injuries and
lack of food.

afflictions, old age, diseases,

The

evils
(it

due
is

to

chance are
10

:

friend lessness,

scarcity of friends

a

away from friends and companions), deformity, weakness, mutilation evil coming from a source from which good ought to have come; and the frequent
pitiful thing to be torn
;

repetition of such misfortunes.

Also the coming of good
e. g.

when the worst has happened King s gifts for Diopeithes
15

:

the arrival of the Great
his

after

death.

Also that
all,

no good should have befallen a man at he should not be able to enjoy it when it has.
either

or that

BOOK
like these.

II.

8

1386*

The grounds, then, on which we feel pity are these or The people we pity are: those whom we
if

know,

in that case

only they are not very closely related to us we feel about them as if we were in danger

ourselves.

For

this reason

Amasis did not weep, they say, at
20

the sight of his son being led to death, but did weep when he saw his friend begging l the latter sight was pitiful, the
:

former
it

terrible,

and the

terrible is different

from the

pitiful

;

tends to cast out pity, and often helps to produce the opposite of pity. Again, we feel pity when the danger is
near ourselves. 2

Also we pity those who are

like us in age,
;

character, disposition, social standing, or birth

for in all 25

appears more likely that the same misfortune us Here too we have to remember the befall also. may general principle that what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others. 3 Further, since it is when
these cases
it

the sufferings of others are close to us that they excite our pity (we cannot remember what disasters happened a hundred
centuries ago, nor look forward to what will happen a hundred centuries hereafter, and therefore feel little pity, if 30 it follows that those who heighten any, for such things)
:

the effect of their words with suitable gestures, tones, dress, and dramatic action generally, are especially successful in
exciting pity
:

they thus put the disasters before our eyes,

and make them seem close to

Anything that has
soon,
is

us, just coming or just past. just happened, or is going to happen particularly piteous so too therefore are the tokens
:

I386

b

and the actions of sufferers the garments and the of those who have already suffered the words and the
;

like
like

of those actually suffering of those, for instance, who are on the point of death. Most piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are persons of noble
character:

5

whenever they are

so,

our pity

is

especially

excited, because their innocence, as well as the setting of

seem
1

their misfortunes before our eyes, close to ourselves.
Cp. Herod,
iii.

makes

their misfortunes

14.
:

For our feeling Or, inserting ov yap with Vahlen pity [but terror] when the danger is near ourselves.
8

2

is

no longer

Cp. I382

b

26, 27.

I386

b

RHETORICA
Most
directly

opposed

to

pity

is

the

feeling

called

9

10

Pain at unmerited good fortune is, in one Indignation. sense, opposite to pain at unmerited bad fortune, and is due
to the

same moral

qualities.
;

Both

feelings are associated
feel feel
is

with good moral character it is our duty both to sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to
15

indignation

at
is

unmerited

prosperity;
is

for

whatever

ascribe indigna tion even to the gods. It might indeed be thought that envy is similarly opposed to pity, on the ground that envy
is

undeserved

unjust, and that

why we

closely akin to indignation, or even the same thing. But it is not the same. It is true that it also is a disturbing

20

But it is excited pain excited by the prosperity of others. not by the prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us or equal with us. The two feelings
this in common, that they must be due not to some untoward thing being likely to befall ourselves, but only to what is happening to our neighbour. The feeling ceases to

have

be envy in the one case and indignation in the other, and becomes fear, if the pain and disturbance are due to the prospect of something bad for ourselves as the result of
the other
25

man s good
will

fortune.

The

feelings of pity

and

indignation obviously be attended by the converse If you are pained by the unmerited of satisfaction. feelings
distress of others,

you

will

by

their

merited

distress.

be pleased, or at least not pained, Thus no good man can be
or
as

by the punishment of parricides These are things we are bound to rejoice at,
pained
30

murderers.

we must

at

both these things are just, and both give pleasure to any honest man, since he cannot help expecting that what has happened to a man like him
the prosperity of the deserving
;

will

with

happen to him too. All these feelings are associated And their the same type of moral character.
;

1387*

contraries are associated with the contrary type the man who is delighted by others misfortunes is identical with For any one who is the man who envies others prosperity.

pained by the occurrence or existence of a given thing must be pleased by that thing s non-existence or destruction. We can now see that all these feelings tend to prevent pity

BOOK

II.

9

a

I387

(though they differ among themselves, for the reasons given), so that all are equally useful for neutralizing an
appeal to pity.

5

We

will first consider Indignation

reserving the other

emotions for subsequent discussion and ask with whom, on what grounds, and in what states of mind we may be These questions are really answered by what indignant.
has been said already. Indignation undeserved of good fortune. sight
is

pain caused
is,

by the
10

It

then,

plain to

begin with that there are some forms of good the sight Thus a man may be just or of which cannot cause it. moral or brave, goodness but we shall not be acquire
:

indignant with him for that reason, any more than we shall Indignation is roused by pity him for the contrary reason.

the sight

of

things, roughly speaking,

wealth, power, and the like which are deserved

by all those by good men
15

and by those who possess the goods of nature noble birth, beauty, and so on. Again, what is long established seems akin to what exists by nature and therefore we feel more indignation at those possessing a given good if they have as a matter of fact only just got it and the prosperity it brings
;

with

rich give more offence than those of whose wealth long standing and inherited. The same is true of those who have office or power, plenty of friends, a 20 feel the same when these advantages fine family, &c.
it.

The newly
is

We

of theirs secure them others.
give us

For here again, the newly

rich

by obtaining office through their riches than do those whose wealth is of long standing; and so

more

offence

in all other cases.
is felt

The

reason

is

that what the latter have

not

:

to be really their own, but what the others have is 25 what appears to have been always what it is is regarded

and so the possessions of the newly rich l do not seem to be really their own. Further, it is not any and every man
as real,

that deserves any given kind of good there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness in such things; thus it is appropriate for brave men, not for just men, to have
;

fine

weapons, and for
the

make
1

of family, not for parvenus, to 2 distinguished marriages. Indignation may therefore
:

men

3

ot

erepoi

new men,

the outsiders.

2

Insert colon after

a

I387

RHETORICA
properly be
for him,
felt

though he
felt

also

be

is not appropriate be a good man enough. It may when any one sets himself up against his

when any one gets what

may

superior, especially against his superior in

some

particular

respect

whence the

lines

Only from battle he shrank with Aias Telamon s son Zeus had been angered with him, had he fought with
;

a mightier one

1
j

but also, even apart from that, when the inferior in any sense contends with his superior a musician, for instance, with a just man, for justice is a finer thing than music.
;

5

Enough has been said to make clear the grounds on which, and the persons against whom, Indignation is felt they As for the are those mentioned, and others like them. if we do ourselves deserve it we feel it feel people who the greatest possible goods and moreover have them, for it
;

is an injustice that those who are not our equals should have been held to deserve as much as we have. Or, secondly, we feel it if we are really good and honest people our judgement is then sound, and we loathe any kind of in
;

justice.
TO

Also

if

we

are

particular ends, especially others are getting without

if

ambitious and eager to gain we are ambitious for what

generally, if we and that others do not,

think that

we

we

And, get it. ourselves deserve a thing are disposed to be indignant
is

deserving to

with those others so far as that thing

concerned.

Hence

servile, worthless, unambitious persons are not inclined to Indignation, since there is nothing they can believe them

selves to deserve.

From
15

all this it is

plain

what

sort of

whose misfortunes, distresses, or failures
:

men those we ought

are at
to feel

by considering the facts pleased, or at least not pained If described we see at once what their contraries are.
therefore our speech puts the judges in such a frame of mind as that indicated and shows that those who claim
pity on certain definite grounds do not deserve to secure
Iliad, xi. 542. scripts of the Iliad.
1

The second

line is not

found

in the existing

manu

BOOK

II.

9
it, it

1387"

pity but do deserve not to secure for the judges to feel pity.

will

be impossible

20

IO

To
is

take

Envy next we can
:

see on

what persons, and

in

what

states of

what grounds, against mind we feel it. Envy
feel
it

pain at the sight of such good fortune as consists of the
;

good things already mentioned
;

towards our equals not with the idea of getting something for our We shall feel selves, but because the other people have it.
it if

we

I

we have, or think we mean equals in birth,

have, equals
relationship,
feel

;

and by
age,

equals

25

disposition,

distinction, or wealth.

a
in

little

short

high place
is

else

taking
if

exceptionally
especially

envy also if we fall but of having everything which is why people and prosperity feel it they think every one what belongs to themselves. Also if we are distinguished for some particular thing, and
;

We

that

thing

is

wisdom

or

good

Ambitious men are more envious than those who are
;

fortune. 30 not.

So also those who profess wisdom they are ambitious to be thought wise. Indeed, generally, those who aim at a reputation for anything are envious on this particular point. And small-minded men are envious, for everything seems The good things which excite envy have great to them. been The deeds or possessions which mentioned. already
arouse the love of reputation and honour and the desire for fame, and the various gifts of fortune, are almost all subject
to envy
;

1388**

and particularly
are entitled to

if
it,

we
or

think

we

if

desire the thing ourselves, or having it puts us a little

clear also

above others, or not having it a little below them. It is what kind of people we envy that was included in what has been said already we envy those who are near
;
:

5

us in time, place, age, or reputation. 1

Hence the

line

:

Ay, kin can even be jealous of

their kin. 2

Also our fellow-competitors, who are indeed the people just mentioned we do not compete with men who lived a hundred centuries ago, or those not yet born, or the
dead, or those
1
3

who

dwell near the Pillars of Hercules, 3 or
2

10

Not
i.e.

inserting KCU yeWt.

2 Aeschylus, fragm. 305, N.

those

who

dwell at the farthest limits of the western world.

H

1

I388

a

RHETORICA
those
far

our opinion or that of others, we take to be below us or far above us. So too we compete with

whom,

in

those

who

follow the
in

same ends

as ourselves

:

we compete

with our rivals

who
15

sport or in love, and generally with those and it is therefore these are after the same things
;

whom we
the saying

are
:

bound

to

envy beyond

all

others.

Hence

Potter against potter. 1

We

also
is
;

thing
equals
20

envy those whose possession of or success in a a reproach to us these are our neighbours and for it is clear that it is our own fault we have
:

missed the good thing
excites

envy

in us.

We

question this annoys us, and also envy those who have what we
in
;

ought to have, or have got what we did have once. Hence old men envy younger men, and those who have spent much envy those who have spent little on the same thing. And

men who have not got a thing, or not got it yet, envy those who have got it quickly. We can also see what things and
what persons give pleasure to envious people, and in what mind they feel it the states of mind in which they feel pain are those under which they will feel pleasure in the contrary things. If therefore we ourselves with whom the decision rests are put into an envious state of mind, and those for whom our pity, or the award of something desirable, is claimed are such as have been described, it is obvious that they will win no pity from us.
states of
2,;
:

We
follows
30

will
its
it is

next

consider

Emulation, showing

in

what

II

which

causes and objects, and the state of mind in Emulation is pain caused by seeing the felt.

presence, in persons whose nature is like our own, of good things that are highly valued and are possible for ourselves
to acquire but it is felt not because others have these It goods, but because we have not got them ourselves. is therefore a good feeling felt by good persons, whereas
;

35

envy is a bad feeling felt by bad persons. Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question, envy makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having
1

Hesiod,

Works and Days,

25.

Cp.

ii,

c. 4,

I38i

b

17 above.

BOOK
them.

II. ii

1388*

Emulation must therefore tend to be
it

who

believe themselves to deserve certain

they have not got,
to things

felt by persons good things that b being understood that no one aspires I388

which appear impossible. 1 It is accordingly felt by the young and by persons of lofty disposition. Also by
those

men

who possess such good things as are deserved by held in honour these are 2 wealth, abundance of
and the
like
;

friends, public office,

on the assumption that

5

good men, they are emulous to gain such goods because they ought, in their belief, to belong to men whose state of mind is good. Also by those whom all others
they ought to be
think deserving. also feel it about anything for which our ancestors, relatives, personal friends, race, or country are specially honoured, looking upon that thing as really our own,

We

and therefore feeling that we deserve to have it. Further, since all good things that are highly honoured are objects of emulation, moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object, and also all those good things that are useful and
serviceable
to

10

others

:

for

men honour

those

who

are

morally good, and also those who do them service. So with those good things our possession of which can give enjoyment
to our neighbours

wealth and beauty rather than health. can see, too, what persons are the objects of the feeling. They are those who have these and similar things those

We

15

3 mentioned, as courage, wisdom, public office. Holders of public office generals, orators, 4 and all who can do many people a good turn. possess such powers Also those whom many people wish to be like those who

already

;

acquaintances or friends; those whom many admire, or whom we ourselves admire and those who have been praised and eulogized by poets or prose-writers. 5

have

many

;

20

Persons of the contrary sort are objects of contempt for the feeling and notion of contempt are opposite to those of emulation. Those who are such as to emulate or
:

The sense required seems to be not got, provided they are possible impossible to get.
:

1

.

good things that they have no one claims what appears
.
.

*
4

Retaining yap, videlicet.
faropes
:

3

Cp. I388
.

b

5

and

i,

c. 6.

Or,

public speakers, advocates, politicians, statesmen. or chroniclers speech- writers
i.
;

e.

I388

b

RHETORIC A
be

emulated

by

others

are

inevitably

disposed

to

be

25

contemptuous of all such persons as are subject to those bad things which are contrary to the good things that are
the objects of emulation despising them for just that reason. Hence we often despise the fortunate, when luck comes to them without their having those good things which
:

are held in honour.

30

This completes our discussion of the means by which the emotions may be produced or dissipated, and upon which depend the persuasive arguments connected with the emotions.
several

Let us

now

consider

the

various

types

of

human

12

character, in relation to the emotions

and moral

qualities,

fortunes.

showing how they correspond to our various ages and By emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like these we have discussed already. 1 By moral qualities I mean virtues and vices these also have been discussed
; ;

already,

men

as well as the various things that various types of tend to will and to do. 3 By ages I mean youth,

2

35 the prime of life, and old age. By fortune I mean birth, 1389* wealth, power, and their opposites in fact, good fortune

and

ill

fortune.

To begin men have
5

with the Youthful type of character. Young strong passions, and tend to gratify them

Of the bodily desires, it is the sexual by indiscriminately. which they are most swayed and in which they show absence of self-control. They are changeable and fickle in their
desires,

which are violent while they

last,

but quickly over

:

their impulses are keen but not deep-rooted, and are like sick people s attacks of hunger and thirst. They are hotjo their

tempered and quick-tempered, and apt to give way to anger; bad temper often gets the better of them, for owing to their love of honour they cannot bear being slighted, and are indignant if they imagine themselves While they love honour, they love victory unfairly treated.
still more and victory
;

for
is

youth is eager one form of this.
2 i,

for superiority over others,

They love both more than
3
i,

1

ii,

cc.

i

ff.

c. 9.

c. 6,

I363

a

19.

BOOK

II.

12

I3

89

a

they love money, which indeed they love very little, not having yet learnt what it means to be without it this is the point of Pittacus remark about Amphiaraus. 1 They
witnessed
readily,

15

look at the good side rather than the bad, not having yet many instances of wickedness. They trust others

They

are sanguine

because they have not yet often been cheated. nature warms their blood as though
; ;

with excess of wine

and besides

met with few disappointments.

they have as yet Their lives are mainly
that,
;

20

spent not in memory but in expectation for expectation refers to the future, memory to the past, and youth has a on the long future before it and a short past behind it
:

first

day and can only look forward. They are easily cheated, Their owing to the sanguine disposition just mentioned. hot tempers and hopeful dispositions make them more courageous than older men are; the hot temper prevents
fear,

2

of one

s life

one has nothing

at all to

remember,

25

and the hopeful disposition creates confidence
feel

;

we

cannot

fear

so

long as

we

are

feeling

angry, and

any
are

expectation of
shy,

good makes

us

confident.

They

accepting the rules of society in which they have been trained, and not yet believing in any other 30 standard of honour. They have exalted notions, because

they have not yet been humbled by life or learnt its moreover, their hopeful disposition necessary limitations makes them think themselves equal to great things and
;

means having exalted notions. They would always rather do noble deeds than useful ones their lives are and regulated more by moral feeling than by reasoning whereas reasoning leads us to choose what is useful, moral goodness leads us to choose what is noble. They are fonder of their friends, intimates/ and companions than
that
: ;

35

3

older

men

are,

because they like spending their days

in the

company of others, and have not yet come to value either their friends or anything else by their usefulness to them
selves.
1

All their mistakes are in the direction of doing

2 3

The remark is unknown. Not to be taken quite literally
KOI
4>tXot

:

cp. eVi

rfj

reXevraia i^tpa,

1389^4.

fC6tot,

with Vahlen.

I38g

b

RHETORICA
things excessively and vehemently.
l

5

precept and hate too much, and the same with everything else. They think they know everything, and are always quite sure about it this, in fact, is why they overdo everything.
; ;

They disobey Chilon s by overdoing everything they love too much

do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do them actual harm. They are ready to pity others, because they think every one an honest man,
If they

or

their
10

anyhow better than he is: they judge their neighbour by own harmless natures, and so cannot think he deserves

to be treated in that way. They are fond of fun and there fore witty, wit being well-bred insolence.

Such, then,

is

the character of the Young.

The

character 13

of Elderly Men men who are past their prime may be said to be formed for the most part of elements that are

15

the contrary of all these. They have lived many years they have often been taken in, and often made mistakes

;

;

on the whole is a bad business. The result is that are sure about nothing and under -do everything. They they think but they never know and because of their hesita

and

life

,

;

tion they always

everything this
20
2

add a possibly or a perhaps putting way and nothing positively. They are
,

cynical

;

that

is,

they tend to put the worse construction on

everything. Further, their experience makes them distrustful and therefore suspicious of evil. Consequently they neither
love

warmly nor hate
will

bitterly,

they love as though they will

but following the hint of Bias some day hate and hate as

25

some day love. 3 They are small-minded, because they have been humbled by life their desires are set upon nothing more exalted or unusual than what will help them to keep alive. They are not generous, because money is one of the things they must have, and at the same time their experience has taught them how hard it is to get
though they
:

and how easy to
1

lose.

They

are cowardly,

and are always
,

p.r)dev tiyav

:

ne quid nimis,
a

(do) nothing

in excess

don

t

overdo

anything
2

.

Taking up I389
.

17,

which

may be translated

they are not cynical

but charitable
3

Or,

enemies as probable future friends

they treat their friends as probable future enemies and their b ; cp. note on i38o 34.

BOOK
anticipating danger
;

II.

13

I389

b

unlike that of the young, who are 30 warm-blooded, temperament is chilly old age has paved the way for cowardice fear is, in fact, a form of chill.
their
;

;

They

love

life

;

and

all

the more

when

their last

day has

come, because the object of all desire is something we have not got, and also because we desire most strongly that which we need most urgently. They are too fond of themselves
;

35

this

is

one

form that small-mindedness takes.
guide
is

Because of
noble

this,

they

their

lives

too

much by
is

considerations of what

useful
is

and too

little

by what

for the useful is
is

what

good

for oneself,

and the 1390*

noble what

good absolutely.
;

They
for

are not shy, but
is

shameless rather

caring less for what
feel

noble than for

what

is

useful,

they

contempt

what people may
;

think of them.

They

lack confidence in the future

partly

most things go wrong, or anyhow through experience turn out worse than one expects; and partly because of 5
for

their cowardice.
for

They live by memory
them of and hope
is

rather than
as

what

is left
;

to

life is
is

but

little

by hope compared with
;
;

the long past
past.

This, again,

of the future, memory of the the cause of their loquacity they are
of

continually

they enjoy remembering it. Their fits of anger are sudden but feeble. Their sensual passions have either altogether gone or have
talking
past,
their
:

the

because

10

vigour consequently they do not feel their and their actions are inspired less by what much, passions do than feel they by the love of gain. Hence men at this time of life are often supposed to have a self-controlled character; the fact is that their passions have slackened, and they are slaves to the love of gain. They guide their
lost

15

by reasoning more than by moral feeling reasoning being directed to utility and moral feeling to moral goodness. If they wrong others, they mean to injure them, not to
lives
;

insult

them.

Old men may
old

feel pity, as

well as

young men,
out of
20

but not for the same reason.
kindness
;

Young men

feel it

men

out of weakness, imagining that any-

thing that befalls any one else might easily happen to them, 1 Hence which, as we saw, is a thought that excites pity.
1

ii,

c. 8,

1386*24 and

29.

I390

a

RHETORICA
they are querulous, and not disposed to jesting or laughter the love of laughter being the very opposite of querulousness.

25

Such are the characters of Young Men and Elderly Men. People always think well of speeches adapted to, and and we can now see how to reflecting, their own character
:

compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and our selves to our audiences.

As
3

for

Men

in their

Prime, clearly

we

shall find that they 14

have a character between that of the young and that of the old, free from the extremes of either. They have neither that excess of confidence which amounts to rashness, nor too
trust
b

timidity, but the right amount of each. They neither nor distrust but everybody everybody, judge people Their lives will be guided not by the sole correctly.

much

I39

consideration either of what

is

noble or of what

is

useful,

but by both

;

neither

by parsimony nor by

5

and proper. they will be brave as well as temperate, and temperate as well as brave these virtues are divided between the young and the old the young are brave but intemperate,
is fit

by what
;

prodigality, but So, too, in regard to anger and

desire

;

;

the old temperate but cowardly. To put it generally, all the valuable qualities that youth and age divide between

them are united
10

or defects are replaced

body is in mind about
So much

its

prime of life, while all their excesses The by moderation and fitness. to from the thirty five-and-thirty prime
in the
;

1

forty-nine.

J5

for the types of character that distinguish youth, 15 old age, and the prime of life. will now turn to those Gifts of Fortune by which human character is affected.

We

.20

Good Birth. Its effect on character is make those who have it more ambitious it is the way of all men who have something to start with to add to the pile, and good birth implies ancestral distinction. The well-born man will look down even on those who are as good as his own ancestors, because any far-off distinction is greater than
First let us consider

to

;

1

It is

sometimes supposed that Aristotle was writing the Rhetoric

about the age of forty-nine.

BOOK
the

II.

15
1

1390*

and better to boast about. Being well-born, which means coming of a fine stock, must be distinguished from nobility, which means being true to

same thing

close to us,

the family nature a quality not usually found in the well In the generations born, most of whom are poor creatures. of men as in the fruits of the earth, there is a varying yield
;

25

then, where the stock is good, exceptional men are 2 A clever produced for a while, and then decadence sets in.

now and

stock will degenerate towards the insane type of character, like the descendants of Alcibiades or of the elder Dionysius
;

a steady stock towards the fatuous and torpid type, like the 30 descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates. 16

The type
surface
for
;

all

of character produced by Wealth lies on the to see. Wealthy men are insolent and

arrogant standing
exists
;

;

their possession of wealth affects their under they feel as if they had every good thing that

wealth becomes a sort of standard of value for

it

everything else, and therefore they imagine there is nothing 1391* cannot buy. They are luxurious and ostentatious luxu
;

rious,

because of the luxury in which they live and the
;

ostentatious and vulgar, prosperity which they display like other minds are regularly occu their because, people s, with the of their love and pied admiration, and also object

5

because they think that other people s idea of happiness is the same as their own. It is indeed quite natural that they should be affected thus for if you have money, there are
;

always plenty of people who come begging from you. Hence the saying of Simonides about wise men and rich men, in answer to Hiero s wife, who asked him whether it

was better
for
I

to

grow

see the wise doors.

men

s

rich or wise. Why, rich, he said men spending their days at the rich Rich men also consider themselves worthy
;
;

i

to hold public office

for they consider they already
office.

have

the things that give a claim to
1

In a word, the type

i.e. his own ancestors may not be any better than the contem poraries he looks down on, but their distinction (such as it is) has the boasted patina of age upon it. 2 dva&idvviv may also be taken transitively and then (after an interval of unproductiveness) the families begin again to produce them
:

(Cope).

I39i

a

RHETORICA
There
of character produced by wealth is that of a prosperous fool. is indeed one difference between the type of the
:

15

the newly-enriched and those who have long been rich newly-enriched have all the bad qualities mentioned in an exaggerated and worse form to be newly-enriched means,
so to speak, no education in riches. The wrongs they do others are not meant to injure their victims, but spring from
insolence or self-indulgence,
in adultery.
e. g.

those that end in assault or

20

As

to

Power
it

:

here too

it

may

fairly

be said that the type 17

of character

produces
it

is

mostly obvious enough.

Some

elements in this type
are better.

shares with the wealthy type, others Those in power are more ambitious and more

manly in character than the wealthy, because they aspire to do the great deeds that their power permits them to do.
35

Responsibility makes them more serious they have to keep paying attention to the duties their position involves. They
:

are dignified rather than arrogant, for the respect in which they are held inspires them with dignity and therefore with

3

moderation dignity being a mild and becoming form of If they wrong others, they wrong them not on arrogance. a small but on a great scale. Good fortune in certain of its branches produces the types
these conditions are in fact

of character belonging to the conditions just described, 1 since more or less the kinds of good

fortune that are regarded as most important. It may be added that good fortune leads us to gain all we can in the way of family happiness and bodily advantages. 2 It does

I39 1 indeed make
there
is

men more supercilious and more reckless but one excellent quality that goes with it piety, and respect for the divine power, in which they believe because of events which are really the result of chance. This account of the types of character that correspond to
;

5

differences of age

3

or fortune

4

may

end here

;

for to arrive

namely, those of the poor, the unfortunate, and the powerless, we have only to ask what the opposite qualities are.
1 3
ii,

at the opposite types to those described,

viz.

good birth, wealth, 4 cc. 12-14.

and power.
ii

2

Cp. I36o

b

19-23,

cc. 15-17.

BOOK
18

II.

18

b

I39i

The

(When we know
no further use
is

use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions. a thing, and have decided about it, there is
10

This is so even if one in speaking about it.) and a urging him to do or not addressing single person to do something, as when we scold a man for his conduct or
try to change his views the single person is as much your judge as if he were one of many; we may say, without qualification, that any one is your judge whom you have to
:

matter whether we are arguing against an actual opponent or against a mere proposition in the latter case we still have to use speech and overthrow
persuade.

Nor does

it

;

the opposing arguments, and

we
f

attack these as

we should

15

Our principle holds good of attack an actual opponent. ceremonial speeches also ; the onlookers for whom such
a speech

put together are treated as the judges of it. Broadly speaking, however, the only sort of person who can strictly be called a judge is the man who decides the issue in
is

some matter
be decided.

of public controversy
in

;

that

is,

in

law

suits

and

in political debates,

both of which there are issues to In the section on political oratory an account
20

has already been given of the types of character that mark the different constitutions. 1

The manner and means of investing speeches with moral may now be regarded as fully set forth. Each of the main divisions of oratory has, we have seen, 2 its own distinct purpose. With regard to each division, we
character

have noted the accepted views and propositions upon which we may base our arguments for political, 3 for ceremonial, 4 and for forensic speaking. 5 We have further determined
completely by what means speeches

25

may be

invested with

the required moral character. are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory. All orators, besides their special lines of argument, are bound to use,
G topic of the Possible and Impossible and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will fo happen in future. Again, the topic of Size is common

We

for instance, the

;

to all oratory
1
i,

;

all

of us have to argue that things are bigger
3
i,
:

c. 8.

2
i,

c. 3.

cc. 4-8.

4
i,

c. 9.
1.

5
i,

cc. 10-14.

Bywater TW

Trepi

dvvarov

and

ro n?p\ peyfOovs in

32.

b

I39i

RHETORICA
or smaller than they seem, whether we are making political speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or

a !3Q2 defending in the law-courts. Having analysed these subjects, we will try to say what we can about the general principles of arguing by enthymeme and example by the addition of which we may hope to complete the project with which
*
,

we
5

Of the above-mentioned general lines of argu as has been that concerned with Amplification is ment, l ceremonial to most said speeches already appropriate
set out.
;

;

that concerned with the Past, to forensic speeches, where that the required decision is always about the past concerned with Possibility and the Future, to political

speeches.

10

speak of the Possible and Impossible. 19 may plausibly be argued That if it is possible for one of a pair of contraries to be or happen, then it is e. g. if a man can be cured, he can possible for the other

Let us

first

It

:

:

also

fall

ill

;

for

any two

in so far as

they are contraries.

contraries are equally possible, That if of two similar

That if the harder things one is .possible, so is the other. of two things is possible, so is the easier. That if a thing can come into existence in a good and beautiful form, then
it

15

more

can come into existence generally easily than a beautiful house.
;

;

thus a house can exist

That

if

the beginning

of a thing can occur, so can the end for nothing impossible occurs or begins to occur thus the commensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side neither occurs nor can
;

begin to occur.
20

That

if

the end

is

possible, so

is

ning

;

for all things that occur
is

have a beginning. That
:

the beginif that

which

posterior in essence or in order of generation can

come into being, so can that which is prior thus if a man can come into being, so can a boy, since the boy comes first in order of generation and if a boy can, so can a man, 2 for the man also is first. That those things are possible of
;

25

which the love or desire

is

natural

loves or desires impossibilities.
1
i,

for no one, as a rule, That things which are the
;

2

c. 9viz. in

essence

:

rather than,

for the

boy

is

the beginning

.

BOOK

II.

19

1392*

object of any kind of science or art are possible and exist or come into existence. That anything is possible the first step in whose production depends on men or things which
or persuade to produce it, by our greater our control of them, or our friendship with them. strength, That where the parts are possible, the whole is possible
;

we can compel

and where the whole is possible, the parts are usually 30 For if the slit in front, the toe- piece, and the upper possible. leather can be made, then shoes can be made and if shoes, then also the front slit and toe-piece. That if a whole I392 b genus is a thing that can occur, so can the species and if
; ;

the species can occur, so can the genus: thus, if a sailing vessel can be made, so also can a trireme and if a trireme,
;

then a sailing vessel also. That existence depends on each other
for instance,
.

if
is

one of two things whose
possible, so
if is

the other

;

half, then double That if a thing can be produced without art or preparation, it can be produced still more certainly by the
if
,

double

then

half, and

5

careful application of art to

it.

Hence Agathon has

said

:

To some
That
if

things we by art must needs attain, Others by destiny or luck we gain. 1

anything
it is

is

possible to inferior, weaker, and stupider 10
;

more so for their opposites thus Isocrates said people, that it would be a strange thing if he could not discover a 2 As for Impossibility, thing that Euthynus had found out. we can clearly get what we want by taking the contraries of
the arguments stated above. Questions of Past Fact may be looked at in the following ways First, that if the less likely of two things has occurred,
:

15

the more likely must have occurred also. That if one thing that usually follows another has happened, then that other thing has happened that, for instance, if a man has
;

That if a man forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt it. had the power and the wish to do a thing, he has done it for every one does do whatever he intends to do whenever
;

he can do
further,
1

it,

there

being nothing to stop him.
in

That,
if

20

he has done the thing
8,

question
2

either

he

Agathon, fragm.

N. 2

Cp. Isocr.

xviii. 15.

I392

b

RHETORICA
intended it and nothing external prevented him or if he had the power to do it and was angry at the time or if he had the power to do it and his heart was set upon it for people as a rule do what they long to do, if they can bad people through lack of self-control good people,
; ;

;

;

25 if

because their hearts are set upon good things. Again, that a thing was going to happen it has happened if a man was going to do something he has done it, for it is
, ; ,

likely that

the intention was carried

out.

That

if

one
for

thing happened another or with a view to
if
it

has

which
it,

naturally happens the other has happened
;

before
;

has lightened, it has also thundered and instance, if an action has been it has been done. That attempted, if one thing has happened which naturally happens after
another,
or with a view to which that other happens, then that other (that which happens first, or happens with a view to this thing) has also happened thus, if it has
;

30

thundered

done

it

has also lightened, and if an action has been has been attempted. Of all these sequences some
it

are inevitable and

some merely

usual.

The arguments

for

the non- occurrence of anything can obviously be found by considering the opposites of those that have been mentioned.

I393

a

How questions of Future Fact should be argued is clear from the same considerations That a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it or if along with the power to do it there is a craving for the result, or
:

;

anger, or calculation, prompting done, in these cases, if the man
or even
5 if

it.

1

That the thing

will

be
it,

is

actually setting about
for usually

he means to do

it

later

what we mean

to

do happens rather than what we do not mean to do. That a thing will happen if another thing which naturally
it

happens before
clouding over,
it

has already happened
likely to rain.

;

thus,

if

it

is

is

That

if

the means to an
;

end have occurred, then the end is likely to occur there is a foundation, there will be a house.
10 things,

thus,

if

For arguments about the Greatness and Smallness of the greater and the lesser, and generally great things and small, what we have already said will show the line to
1

Full stop (not

comma)

after 6Vrn.

BOOK

II.

19

I393

a

In discussing deliberative oratory we have spoken take. about the relative greatness of various goods, and about the 1 Since therefore in each type greater and lesser in general. of oratory the object under discussion is some kind of

whether it is utility, nobleness, or justice it is clear that every orator must obtain the materials of amplifica 2 To go further than this, and tion through these channels. try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority,

good

15

is

to argue without an object

;

in practical life, particular

facts

count more than generalizations. Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the reverse, of past or future fact, and of the
relative greatness or smallness of things.

20

20

The special forms of oratorical argument having now been discussed, we have next to treat of those which are common
to
all

kinds of oratory.

These are of two main kinds,
;

Example

and

Enthymeme

for the

Maxim
for
it

is

part

of an enthymeme. 3

We

will first treat of

argument by Example,
;

has the

25

nature of induction, which is the foundation of reasoning. This form of argument has two varieties one consisting
the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter, again, there are two
in

varieties,

fables of

the illustrative parallel and the fable (e. g. the Aesop, or those from Libya). As an instance of 30
facts,

the

mention of actual
:

take

the

following.

The

We must prepare for war against speaker may argue thus the king of Persia and not let him subdue Egypt. For
Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized I393 b Egypt but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes, again, did not attack us until he had seized Egypt
; ;

but once he had seized

it,

he did cross.

If therefore the

present king seizes Egypt, he also will cross, and therefore

we must not let him. The illustrative parallel
used
1
:

is

e. g.

Public

officials
2

the sort of argument Socrates ought not to be selected by lot.

i,

c. 7.

i.e.

8

i.e.

not (as

some

think) a third
J

some kind of good. main kind.

Cp.

645-10

1393
P

RHETORICA
using the lot to select athletes, instead of those who are fit for the contest or using the lot choosing to select a steersman from among a ship s crew, as if we
is

That

like

;

ought to take the man on whom the man who knows most about it.
Instances
Phalaris,
10 leader.

lot falls,

and not the

of the

fable

are

that
in

of Stesichorus about

and that of Aesop

defence of the popular
Phalaris

When

the people of

Himera had made

military dictator, and were going to give him a bodyguard, Stesichorus wound up a long talk by telling them the fable of the horse who had a field all to himself. Presently there

came
15

a stag

and began to
so.

spoil his pasturage.

wishing to revenge himself on the stag, asked a
could help him to do
let

The horse, man if he
you
;

The man
to

*

said,

Yes,

if

will

your back with javelins in The horse agreed, and the man mounted but my hand instead of getting his revenge on the stag, the horse found
bridle
.

me

you and get on

himself the slave of the man.
20

You

too

,

said Stesichorus,

take care

you meet
If

your desire for revenge on your enemies, the same fate as the horse. By making Phalaris
lest, in

you have already let yourselves be bridled. him get on to your backs by giving him a body guard, from that moment you will be his slaves.
military dictator,

you

let

25

Aesop, defending before the assembly at Samos a popular who was being tried for his life, told this story fox, in crossing a river, was swept into a hole in the rocks
leader
:

A
;

and, not being able to get out, suffered miseries for a long time through the swarms of fleas that fastened on her.

A

hedgehog, while roaming around, noticed the fox and feeling sorry for her asked if he might remove the fleas. But the fox declined the offer and when the hedgehog
; ;

asked why, she replied,
30

These

fleas are
;

by

this

time

full

of

not sucking much blood if you take them away, others will come with fresh appetites and drink up all the

me and
blood

I

have

1

left.

So,

men

of

Samos
;

,

said Aesop,

my

client will

do you no further harm

he

is

wealthy already.

I394

a

But if you put him to death, others will come along who are not rich, and their peculations will empty your treasury
completely.

BOOK

II.

20
;

1394

Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies and they have one advantage they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events. You will in fact frame them just as you

you require is the power of a thinking out your analogy, power developed by intellectual But while it is easier to supply parallels by training.
frame
illustrative parallels: all

5

inventing fables,

it is

more valuable

for

the political speaker

to supply them by quoting what has actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what the past

has been.
try to demonstrate our point by this and to convince our hearers thereby.

by Enthymeme, we must method of Example, If we can argue by Enthymeme, we should use our Examples as subsequent

Where we

are unable to argue

TO

supplementary evidence.

They should

not precede the

that will give the argument an inductive air, which only rarely suits the conditions of speech-making. 1 If they follow the enthymemes, they have the effect of

Enthymemes

:

same

For the must reason, you put your examples you give if you put them last, a single one a large number of them is sufficient even a single witness will serve if he is a good
witnesses giving evidence, and this always
if

tells.

first

15

;

;

one.

It

has

now been

stated
are,

argument by Example there are to be employed.
21

how many varieties of and how and when they

We now turn to the use of Maxims, in order to see upon what subjects and occasions, and for what kind of speaker, they will appropriately form part of a speech. This will appear most clearly when we have defined a maxim. It is a statement not about a particular fact, such as the
;

2o

character of Iphicrates, but of a general kind nor is it about any and every subject e. g. straight is the contrary of curved is not a maxim but only about questions of
;

practical

conduct,

courses

of

conduct to be chosen or
is

25

avoided.
1

Now
.

an

Enthymeme

a syllogism dealing with
except before a small

Perhaps, audience

which does not

suit skilled orators

I

1

I394

a

RHETORICA
such practical subjects.
It
is

therefore roughly true that

the premisses or conclusions of Enthymemes, considered apart from the rest of the argument, are Maxims e. g.
:

30

Never should any man whose wits are sound Have his sons taught more wisdom than their
;

fellows. 1

Here we have a Maxim add the reason or explanation, and the whole thing is an Enthymeme thus
;

It

Ill-will

makes them idle and therewith they earn and jealousy throughout the city. 2
;

I394

b

Again,

There
and

is

no man
is

in all things prosperous, 3
all
is

There
5

no man among us
latter,

free,
it, is

are

maxims

;

but the

taken with what follows

an Enthymeme For all are slaves of money or of chance. 4

From

this definition of a

maxim

it

follows that there are

TO

maxims. In the first place, the maxim may or may not have a supplement. Proof is needed where the statement is paradoxical 5 or disputable no supplement is wanted where the statement contains nothing paradoxical/
four kinds of
;

either
truth,

because the view expressed
e. g.
is

is

already a

known
seemeth

Chiefest of blessings to me, 6

health for a man, as

it

this being the general opinion
T

:

or because, as soon as the
e. g.

5

view

is

stated,

it is

clear at a glance,

No
Of
the

love

is

true save that

which loves

for ever. 7

Maxims

that do have a supplement attached,
e.

some

are part of an

Enthymeme,

g.

Never should any man whose wits are sound, &c. 8
not stated as parts of Enthymemes
1

Others have the essential character of Enthymemes, but are these latter are reckoned
;

4

6

ib. 297. Euripides, Medea, 295. Euripides, fragm. 661, N. Euripides, Hec^{ba^ 864 f. Surprising, startling, heretical, unorthodox. Possibly a fragment of Epicharmus cp. Meineke, Fragmenta
;

2

3

2

Comicorum Graecorum,
7

pp. 169, 170. 8 Euripides, Troades, 1051. Euripides, Medea, 295.
iii,

BOOK
the best
;

II.

21
for the

1394*
view
20

they are those
is

in

which the reason
e. g.

expressed

O
To say maxim
;

simply implied, 1 mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath.
it

is

the added words

not right to nurse immortal wrath is a mortal man give the reason.

O

Similarly, with the
2

words

Mortal creatures ought to cherish mortal, not immortal
thoughts.

What has been said has shown us how many kinds of 25 Maxim there are, and to what subjects the various kinds are They must not be given without supplement appropriate.
if

they express disputed or paradoxical views

:

we must,

in

that case, either put the supplement first of the conclusion, e. g. you might say,

and make a maxim For my part, since
30

both unpopularity and idleness are undesirable, I hold that or you may say this first, it is better not to be educated and then add the previous clause. Where a statement,
;

without being paradoxical, is not obviously true, the reason In such cases should be added as concisely as possible.

both laconic and enigmatic sayings are suitable thus one might say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, Insolence 1395* 3 is better avoided, lest the cicalas chirp on the ground
:

.

men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced. For a young man to use them is like telling stories unbecoming; to use them in handling things in which one has no experience is silly and ill-bred a fact sufficiently
is
:

The

use of

Maxims

appropriate only to elderly

5

proved by the special fondness of country fellows for striking
out maxims, and their readiness to air them. 4 To declare a thing to be universally true when
it is

not

is

most appropriate when working up
indignation in our hearers
after the facts
;

feelings of horror

and
or

especially

by way of preface,

have been proved. Even hackneyed and maxims are to be used, if they suit one s commonplace because they are commonplace, every one purpose just
:

10

Epicharmus ? Fragm. Adesp. 79, N. Cp. Roberts, Demetrius on Style, pp. 119, 181, 260. The cicalas would have to chirp on the ground if an enemy cut down the trees. 4 Not inserting Ka66\ov.
3

1

2

2

I395

a

RHETORICA
seems to agree with them, and therefore they are taken for Thus, any one who is calling on his men to risk an engagement without obtaining favourable omens may quote
truth.

One omen
Or,
15
if

of

all is best,

that

we

1 fight for our fatherland.

he

is

calling

on them to attack a stronger force The War-God showeth no favour. 2

Or, if he is urging people to destroy the innocent children of their enemies
Fool,

who

him. 3

slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge

proverbs are also maxims, e. g. the proverb An Attic 4 You are not to avoid uttering maxims that neighbour

Some

.

20

contradict such sayings as have become public property know thyself and nothing in (I mean such sayings as excess ), if doing so will raise your hearers opinion of your
e. character, or convey an effect of strong emotion g. an angry speaker might well say, It is not true that we ought to know ourselves anyhow, if this man had known himself, he would never have thought himself fit for an army
:

command.
-5

It will raise

people

s

opinion of our character

to say, for instance, ought not to follow the saying that bids us treat our friends as future enemies much better
:

We

to treat our enemies as future friends.

5

The moral purpose
:

should be implied partly by the very wording of our maxim. Failing this, we should add our reason e. g. having said

We
as
if

should treat our friends, not as the saying advises, but they were going to be our friends always we should
,

add
30

for the other
it,

behaviour

is

that of a traitor

:

or

we

might put
ever

I

disapprove of that saying.

A

true friend

will treat his friend as if
;

and
in

again,

he were going to be his friend for Nor do I approve of the saying

"nothing

excess":

we

are

bound

to hate

bad men

excessively.
Ibid, xviii. 309. 243. Cp. i, c. 15, 1376*7. put in the form of a proposition ( An Attic neighbour is a restless neighbour ), this is a maxim. For the proverb itself see Zenobii Centuria, ii. 28 (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiographi Graeci, i, p. 40 \ and cp. Roberts. Ancient Boeotians, pp. 21 ff. 6 Cp. 11, c. 13, 1389-23-5.
Iliad,
xii.
4 1

2

3

When

BOOK
One

II.

21

I395

b

great advantage of Maxims to a speaker is due to 1395** the want of intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions

which they hold themselves about particular cases. I will explain what I mean by this, indicating at the same time how we are to hunt down the maxims required. The
1 maxim, as has been already said, is a general statement, and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion: e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad children, he will agree with any one who tells him, Nothing is more annoying than having neighbours or, Nothing is more
,

5

The orator be the parent of children. has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on
foolish than to

10

This is one advantage of using same subjects. which is more important it is another There maxims. There is moral invests a speech with moral character.
these

character in every speech in which the moral purpose
:

is

and maxims always produce this effect, conspicuous because the utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral principles

15

they display the
character.

so that, speaker as a
:

if

the

maxims

are sound,

So much

for the

man of sound moral Maxim its nature, varieties,
*

proper use, and advantages.

22

We now

subject of looking for them, and then proceed to what is a distinct question, the lines of argument to be embodied in them.
It
is

come to the Enthymemes, and will begin the with some general consideration of the proper way

20

has already 2 been pointed out that the a syllogism, and in what sense it is so.
the

Enthymeme
have also

We

differences between it and the syllogism of Thus we must not carry its reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurity 25 nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, It is this or we shall waste words in saying what is manifest.

noted

dialectic.

:

1

T

I394 23.

<)

f\ A cl

a

2
i,

c. 2,

i356

b
3,

1357*

16.

I395

b

RHETORICA
simplicity that

makes the uneducated more

effective

than the

makes them, as the poets l tell us, charm the crowd s ears more finely 3 Educated men lay down broad general principles unedu cated men argue from common knowledge and draw obvious We must not, therefore, start from any and conclusions. every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority a I396 they recognize and there must, moreover, be no doubt in
.

educated when addressing popular audiences

;

:

the minds of most,

if

not

all,

put forward really are of this

of our judges that the opinions sort. should also base our

We

arguments upon probabilities as well as upon certainties. The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether
5

our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue. Otherwise we can

have no materials out of which to construct arguments. I mean, for instance, how could we advise the Athenians
their strength,
10

whether they should go to war or not, if we did not know whether it was naval or military or both, and
great
; ;

what their revenues amount to who their it is and enemies are what wars, too, they have waged, and so on ? Or how could we and with what success if knew we them nothing about the sea-fight at eulogize of or battle the Salamis, Marathon, or what they did for the

how

friends

;

;

15

Heracleidae, or any other facts like that? All eulogy is based upon the noble deeds real or imaginary that stand
to the credit of those eulogized. On the same principle, the invectives are based on facts of the opposite kind
:

orator looks to see what base deeds

real or
is

stand to the discredit of those he

imaginary attacking, such as

treachery to the cause of Hellenic freedom, or the enslave ment of their gallant allies against the barbarians (Aegina, 2
20

Potidaea,

3

&c.), or

any other misdeeds of
So, too, in

this

kind that are
:

recorded against them.

a court of law

whether

we are prosecuting or defending, the existing facts of the case.
1

we must pay
It
2

attention to
difference
27;
iv. 57.

makes no
ii.

8

Cp. Euripides, Hippolytus, 989. Cp. Thucyd. ii. 70.

Cp. Thucyd.

BOOK
whether the subject
a
is

II.

22

1396*

the Lacedaemonians or the Athenians,

god we must do the same thing. Suppose it to be Achilles whom we are to advise, to praise or blame, to accuse or defend here too we must take the facts, real or imaginary these must be our material, whether we are to praise or blame him for the noble or base deeds he has done, to accuse or defend him for his just or unjust treatment of others, or to advise him about what is or is not to his The same thing applies to any subject whatever. interest.
or a
;
;
;

man

25

3

Thus,

handling the question whether justice is or is not start with the real facts about justice and We see, then, that this is the only way in which goodness.
in

a good,

we must

any one ever proves anything, whether
strictly
:

cogent or not not all facts only those that bear on the matter in hand nor, plainly, can Con proof be effected otherwise by means of the speech.
:

b arguments are I396 can form his basis, but

his

sequently, as appears in the Topics^ we must first of all have by us a selection of arguments about questions that may and then we must arise and are suitable for us to handle
;

5

try to think out arguments of the same type for special needs as they emerge not vaguely and indefinitely, but by keeping our eyes on the actual facts of the subject we have to speak
;

and gathering in as many of them as we can that bear upon it for the more actual facts we have at our command, the more easily we prove our case and the more closely they bear on the subject, the more they will seem to
on,

closely

:

;

10

belong to that speech only instead of being commonplaces. By commonplaces I mean, for example, eulogy of Achilles because he is a human being or a demi-god, or because he
joined the expedition against Troy these things are true of many others, so that this kind of eulogy applies no better
:

to Achilles than to

Diomede.

The

are those that are true of Achilles alone

special facts here needed such facts as that
;

15

he slew Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus the invulnerable, who prevented all the Greeks from landing, and again that he was the youngest man who joined the ex
pedition,

and was not bound by oath to join it, and so on. Here, then, we have our first principle of selection of
1

20

Cp. Top.

i,

c.

14.

I396

b

RHETORICA
Enthymemes
selected,

that which refers to the lines of
will

argument

We

now

classes of enthymemes.

consider the various elementary (By an elementary class of enthyline of

meme I mean
will begin, as
25

the same thing as a

argument

.)

We

we must begin, by observing that there are two One kind proves some affirmative kinds of enthymemes. or negative proposition the other kind disproves one. The
;

difference between the
syllogistic proof tive enthymeme

two kinds

is

the same as that between

and disproof in dialectic. The demonstra is formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; the refutative, by the conjunction of incom
patible propositions.

We may
argument

now be

said to have in our

hands the
it

lines of

for the various special subjects that

is

useful

30 or necessary to handle, having selected the propositions suitable in various cases. have, in fact, already as certained the lines of argument applicable to enthymemes

We

evil, the noble and the base, justice and and also to those about types of character, 1 Let us now lay hold emotions, and moral qualities. a of certain about the whole facts I397 subject, considered from a different and more general point of view. In the course

about good and
injustice,

of

our discussion

we

will

take note of the
2

distinction

between lines of proof and lines of disproof: those lines of argument used in what seem to be enthymemes, but are not, since they do not represent valid syllogisms. 3
5

and also of

Having made all this clear, we will proceed to classify Objections and Refutations, showing how they can be 4 brought to bear upon enthymemes.
i.

One

line of positive

5

proof

is

based upon consideration 23

Observe whether of the opposite of the thing in question. 6 If it has not, you has that opposite the opposite quality.
refute
10
it.

the
g.
;
.

original

proposition
is

;

if

it
;

has,

you
If

establish
is

E.
1

Temperance
;

beneficial

for licentiousness

hurtful
i,

7 Or, as in the Messenian speech,
2
8

war
4

is

the

1-18. cc. 4-14 ii, c. 24. ii, c. 23. ii, c. 25. ii, cc. Positive proof, as opposed to Refutation. 6 i.e. the quality opposite to that which, in the proposition under examination, is said to attach to the original thing.
5 7

Cp. I373

b

1

8.

BOOK
l

II.

23
is

I397

a

cause of our present troubles, peace
things right again
.

what we need to put

Or

not even evil-doers should Anger us if they meant not what they did, Then can we owe no gratitude to such As were constrained to do the good they did
if

For

us.

2

15

Or
Since in this world liars may win belief, Be sure of the opposite likewise that this world Hears many a true word and believes it not. 3

got by considering some modification of the key-word, and arguing that what can or cannot be said of the one, can or cannot be said of the
2.

Another

line of

proof

is

20

other

:

e. g.

just

does not always

mean
,

*

beneficial
it is

,

or

justly

would always mean beneficially

whereas

not

4 desirable to be justly put to death. 3. Another line of proof is based

upon

correlative ideas.

noble or just treatment to the must have received noble that other another, you argue or just treatment or that where it is right to command
If
it

is

true that one

man gave

;

obedience,

must have been right to obey the command. Thus Diomedon, the tax-farmer, said of the taxes If it is no disgrace for you to sell them, 5 it is no disgrace for us to 5 Further, if well or justly is true of the buy them
it
: .

25

person to
the doer.
It

whom
But

a thing

it is

done, you argue that it is true of possible to draw a false conclusion here.
is

may

be just that

A

should be treated in a certain way,
3

and yet not just that he should be so treated by B. Hence you must ask yourself two distinct questions (i) Is it right
:

that

A

should be thus treated

?

(3) Is it right

that

B

should I397

b

thus treat him? and apply your results properly, according as your answers are Yes or No. Sometimes in such a
case the two answers differ: you may quite easily have a position like that in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes
:

Cp. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, p. 154 (Alcid., Messen., fragm. 2). 2 80, Nauck possibly by Agathon, or Theodectes, or Antiphon. 3 2 4 b Euripides, Thyestes, fragm. 396, N. Cp. i, c. 9, I366 33. 5 i. e. the right of collecting ihein.
2

1

Fragm. Adesp.

;

I397

b

RHETORICA
And
to

was there none

to loathe

thy mother

s

crime

?

l

which question Alcmaeon

in reply says,

5

Why, there are two things to examine And when Alphesiboea asks what he means, he
They judged her
Again there
is
fit

here.

rejoins

:

to die, not

me

to slay her.

the lawsuit about Demosthenes and the
;

men

who
him
J

killed
justly,

Nicanor
it

was

as they were judged to have killed thought that he was killed justly. And

in the case of the man who was killed at Thebes, the judges were requested to decide whether it was unjust that he should be killed, since if it was not, it was argued that it could not have been unjust to kill him.

of proof is the a fortiori. Thus it may even the gods are not omniscient, certainly human beings are not. The principle here is that, if a quality does not in fact exist where it is more likely to exist, it clearly does not exist where it is less likely. Again,
4.

Another

line
if

be argued that

J

5

his

the argument that a man who strikes his father also strikes neighbours follows from the principle that, if the less
is

likely thing

true, the

more

likely thing

is

true also

;

for a

man

is

less likely to strike

his father than

to strike his

neighbours.

The argument,
if

then,
is

may

run thus.
it

may
true

be urged that,
it

a thing
it is

not true where
less likely
;

is

Or it more
:

likely,

is

not true where
it is

it is

or that,

if it is

where

less likely,

true where

it is

more

likely

according as
the lines

we have

This argument
:

a thing is or is not true. 2 be used in a case of parity, as in might also
to

show that

Thou
20
1

hast pity for thy
for

Hast none

sire, who has lost his sons 3 Oeneus, whose brave son is dead ?

:

i. e. was there nobody who thought the slaying of her a just act ? 2 Theodectes, Alcmaeon, N. p. Soi. 2 The reasoning in the text shows confusion, and the text is un certain. We might rather have expected the following connexion of The argument, then, may run thus that if the less likely is thought
,
:

true the

more

likely

is

true

;

not true, the less likely show, &c.
3

is

or as before that if the not true : according as
;

more

we have

likely is to

Fragm. Adesp.

Si,

Nauck 2

?

from the Meleager of Antiphon or

Euripides.

BOOK
And,
or
f

II.

23
;

1397"

again,

if

Theseus did no wrong, neither did Paris

if
;

Paris

the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did or if Hector did well to slay Patroclus, Paris did
.

well to slay Achilles l And if other followers of an art not bad are philosophers 2 neither are And * if men,
.

generals are not bad men because it often happens that And they are condemned to death, neither are sophists the remark that if each individual among you ought to
.

25

think of his own city s reputation, you ought all to think of the reputation of Greece as a whole 5. Another line of argument is based on considerations
.

of time.
said,
if
it,

did

Thus Iphicrates, in the case against Harmodius, before doing the deed I had bargained that, if I I should have a statue, you would have given
?

me

one.

the deed

Will you not give me one now that I have done You must not make promises when you are
:>>

30

expecting a thing to be done for you, and refuse to fulfil them when the thing has been done. And, again, to induce the Thebans to let Philip pass through their territory

was argued 4 that if he had insisted on this 1398* before he helped them against the Phocians, they would have promised to do it. It is monstrous, therefore, that just because he threw away his advantage then, and trusted their honour, they should not let him pass through now 6. Another line is to apply to the other speaker what he has said against yourself. It is an excellent turn to give to a debate, as may be seen in the Teucer* It was
into Attica,
it
.

employed by Iphicrates in his reply to Aristophon. Would No you \ he asked, take a bribe to betray the fleet ? said Aristophon and Iphicrates replied, Very good if you, who are Aristophon, would not betray the fleet, would 6 I, who am Iphicrates ? Only, it must be recognized before hand that the other man is more likely than you are to commit the crime in question. Otherwise you will make
.
;
: 1

5

2 3 4

Polycrates, Or. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, p. 223 Cp. I socrates, Antidosis^ 209. Baiter-Sauppe, p. 179 Lysias, Or. xviii, fragm. I.
;
;

ix,

fragm.

i.

5 6

by Philip Of Sophocles

Sc.

s
;

ambassadors

cp. Hi, c. 15, I4l6 I. Baiter-Sauppe, op. cit., p. 191 ; Lysias, Or. Ixv, fragm.

to the b

Thebans.
I.

T398

a

RHETORICA
yourself ridiculous if it is Aristeides who is prosecuting, you cannot say that sort of thing to him. The purpose is to discredit the prosecutor, who as a rule would have it
;

TO

appear that

his

character

is

better
is
is

than

that

of

the

defendant, a pretension which it the use of such an argument
if

desirable to upset. But in all cases ridiculous

you are attacking others for what yourself, or are urging others to do
nor would do yourself.
15
7.

you do or would do what you neither do

Another
Thus,

line

terms.
either a

of proof is secured by defining your What is the supernatural ? Surely it is

20

{

god or the work of a god. Well, any one who work of a god exists, cannot help also l that Or take the argument of believing gods exist \ is Goodness true Iphicrates, nobility neither Harmodius nor Aristogeiton had any nobility before they did a noble He also argued that he himself was more akin deed to Harmodius and Aristogeiton than his opponent was. At any rate, my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are. 2 Another example may be found in the Alexander? Every one will agree that
believes that the
;

.

by incontinent people we mean those who are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one love. further example is to be found in the reason given by Socrates for not going

A

25

to the court of Archelaus.

He
.

said that

one

is

insulted

by being unable to requite benefits, as well as by being unable to requite injuries 4 All the persons mentioned
define their term

and get

at

its

essential

meaning, and

then use the result when reasoning on the point at issue. 8. Another line of argument is founded upon the various
senses of a word.

Such a word

is

rightly

,

as has been

explained
1

in the Topics:

Cp. Plato, ApoL 27 c-e. Baiter-Sauppe, op. cit., p. 179; Lysias, Or. xviii, fragm. 2. From some rhetorical essay on Alexander (viz. Paris), possibly by Polycrates. Cp. Baiter-Sauppe, op. cit.) p. 223 (Polycrates, Or. i.\, fragm. 2). 4 Cp. Xenophon, ApoL Socr. 17 Diog. Laert,, Vit. Socr. ii. 5, 25. 5 in the correct updais [presumably in the equivocal senses (i) technical way and (2) with moral justification ] is not found in the existing text of the Topics, but may have been in the text of a similar
2

3

;

BOOK
9.

II.

23
division.

I398
Thus,
:

a

Another

line is

based upon logical

All
in

men do wrong from one
and
line

my case A
10.

B

of three motives, A, B, or C 30 are out of the question, and even the

accusers do not allege

C

l
.

Another

is

based upon induction.

Thus from

the case of the
that

woman women everywhere

of Peparethus it might be argued can settle correctly the facts about

Another example of this occurred at Athens 1398** 2 and his son, when the boy s mother revealed the true facts and yet another at Thebes, in the case between Ismenias and Stilbon, when Dodonis proved that it was Ismenias who was the father of her son Thettaliscus, and he was in consequence always
their children.
in

the case between the orator Mantias

:

regarded as being be taken from the

so.

A further instance of induction
3
:

may
5

Law of Theodectes

If

we do

not hand

over our horses to the care of

other people s horses, nor ships other people s ships, and if this
alike,

men who have mishandled to those who have wrecked
is

true of everything else

then

men who have

failed to secure other

people

s

safety are not to be employed to secure our own. instance is the argument of Alcidamas 4
:

Another
TO

honours

the

wise.

Every one Thus the Parians have honoured
of his
bitter

Archilochus, in spite

tongue

;

the Chians
;

Homer,

though

he

was

Mytilenaeans Sappho,

not their countryman though she was a woman

the
;

the

Lacedaemonians actually made Chilon a member of their the senate, though they are the least literary of men Italian Greeks honoured Pythagoras the inhabitants of Lampsacus gave public burial to Anaxagoras, though he was an alien, and honour him even to this day. (It may be
; ;

15

argued that peoples for whom philosophers legislate are always prosperous) on the ground that the Athenians became
written. Possibly, however, the meaning that in the Topics the right use of words has been discussed. Cp. Topics, i, c. 15 and ii, c. 3. 1 The speaker is supposed to be disproving some charge of wrong doing. 2 Cp. Demosth., Or. xviii, Boeot. de nom., 7, 10.
is,

work when the Rhetoric was
It

may be mentioned

b Cp. I399 i infra, and Baiter-Sauppe," Or. At/., Pt. ii, (Theodectes, No juoy, fragm. i). 4 Baiter-Sauppe, op. tit., p. 155 (Alcidamas, Movo-clop, fragm.
3

p.

247

2).

I398

b

RHETORICA
prosperous under Solon s laws and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus, while at Thebes no sooner did the
leading men to prosper.

become philosophers than the country began
line

n. Another

of argument

is

founded upon some

decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject 20 or on one like it or contrary to it. Such a proof is most

one has always decided thus but if not every one, then at any rate most people or if all, or most, wise or good men have thus decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or any one whose decision they cannot gainsay
effective if every
;
;

because he has complete control over them, or those whom it is not seemly to gainsay, as the gods, or one s father, or

one
25

s

teachers.

loss of dignity submit to the judgement of the Areopagus, and yet Mixidemides could not. 1 Or as Sappho said, Death is an evil thing the gods have so judged it, or they would die 2 Or again as Aristippus said in reply to Plato when he spoke somewhat
;
.

Mixidemides, that Goddesses could without

Thus Autocles said, when attacking it was a strange thing that the Dread

30

too dogmatically, 3 as Aristippus thought

our friend

And
a I3gg the
ful

Well, anyhow, meaning Socrates, never spoke like that Hegesippus, having previously consulted Zeus at
: .

,

Olympia, asked Apollo

at
,

same as for him

his father s

Delphi whether his opinion was implying that it would be shame

to contradict his father.

Thus too

Isocrates

argued that Helen must have been a good woman, because Theseus decided that she was 4 and Paris a good man,
;

5

and was since w hen Conon good, Evagoras also, says Isocrates, met with his misfortune he betook himself to Evagoras without trying any one else on the way. 6 T2. Another line of argument consists in taking separately
all

because the goddesses chose him before

others
r

5

;

1

2

Cp. Baiter-Sauppe, op. /., 4 Sappho, fragm. 137, Bergk
:

p.
.

220 (Autocles).

3
4

e noy-yeXriKterfpo^. too professorially Isocrates, He/en, 18-38.

5

Ibid.,
c

41-8; but cp. Baiter-Sauppe,

op. cit., p. 223.

Isocrates,

Evagoras

>

51

ff.

BOOK
the parts of a subject. What sort of motion
that.
1

II.

23
:

1399

Such
is

that given in the Topics * the soul ? for it must be this or
is
:

The Socrates of Theodectes provides an example What temple has he profaned ? What gods recognized
state has

by the

he not honoured

5

?

13. Since it happens that any given thing usually has both good and bad consequences, another line of argument consists in using those consequences as a reason for urging

10

that a thing should or should not be done, for prosecuting or defending any one, for eulogy or censure. E.g. education 3 leads both to unpopularity, which is bad, and to wisdom,

which

Hence you either argue, It is therefore not well to be educated, since it is not well to be unpopular 115 or you answer, No, it is well to be educated, since it is well
is

good.

4

to be wise

.

The Art of Rhetoric 5

of Callippus

is

made up

of this line of argument, with the addition of those of 6 Possibility and the others of that kind already described.
14.

Another

line of

argument

is

used when

we have
be done

to
in

urge or discourage a course of action that
either of

may

two opposite ways, and have to apply the method mentioned to both. The difference between this one just and the last is that, whereas in the last any two things are For contrasted, here the things contrasted are opposites.
instance, the priestess enjoined
:
,

20

upon her son not to take to if you say what is right, For public speaking men will hate you if you say what is wrong, the gods will The reply might be, On the contrary, you hate you. ought to take to public speaking for if you say what is if you say what is wrong, right, the gods will love you men will love you. This amounts to the proverbial It is just this situation, buying the marsh with the salt viz. when each of two opposites has both a good and a bad
she said,
;
:
;

25

*

.

consequence opposite respectively to each other, that has been termed divarication.
Cp. Top. ii. 4 iv. I. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Alt., Pt. ii, p. 247 (Theodectes, 2Kporovs ATToXoyia, fragm. l). 3 Reading KCIKOV 6V, with Herbert Richards.
;

1

2

4

Cp. Euripides, Medea, 294
Lit.
ii,

:

ii,

c.

2 supra.

5
6

the

Art

,

viz.

the

Art (System] of Rhetoric

(Oratory}.

c.

19 supra.

645-10

I399

a

RHETORICA
15.

argument is this: The things people are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and but in their hearts they prefer their own 30 nobleness advantage. Try, in face of this, to establish the point of

Another

line of

approve of openly

;

view which your opponent has not adopted. This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict

common
1 6.

opinion.

line is that of rational correspondence. E. g. Iphicrates, when they were trying to compel his son, a youth under the prescribed age, to perform one of the

Another

you count tallboys 1 And men, you will next be voting short men boys b I399 Theodectes in his Laiv* said, You make citizens of such mercenaries as Strabax and Charidemus, as a reward of
35 state
tall,

duties because he

was

said

If

.

their

merits

;

will

you not make

exiles of such citizens

as

those

who have done
?

irreparable

harm among the

mercenaries
17.

5

Another line is the argument that if two results are same their antecedents are also the same. For instance, it was a saying of Xenophanes that to assert that the gods had birth is as impious as to say that they die the consequence of both statements is that there is a time when
the
;

the gods do not exist. 3 This line of proof assumes generally that the result of any given thing is always the same e. g.
:

10

you are going to decide not about Isocrates, but about the value of the whole profession of philosophy. 4 Or, to 5 or, to share in the give earth and water means slavery
;

Common
1 8.

Peace

means obeying
line of

orders. 6

We

are to

make

either such assumptions or their opposite, as suits us best.

Another

men do
an
15

not always

make

argument is based on the fact that the same choice on a later as on
:

occasion, but reverse their previous choice. the When we were exiles, we following enthymeme E.g. in return order to now we have returned, it would fought
earlier
;

Pt. ii, p. 219. Cp. I398 6. pp. 43, 44. 4 Adopting Spengel s conjecture Trepi IrroKparouy for the manuscript reading Trept SoKparoi cp. Isocrates -n-fpi ai TiSoortcos-, 173.
3

1

Cp. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Aft.,
Diels, Vors?,
i,

2

b

s-

:

5

Cp. Herodotus,

iv.

126, 127.

6

Cp. [Demosthenes] Or.

xvii,

30.

BOOK

II.

23

1399

be strange to choose exile in order not to have to fight. l On one occasion, that is, they chose to be true to their

homes
19.

at the cost of fighting,

fighting at the cost of deserting their

and on the other to avoid homes.
is

Another

line of

argument

the assertion that

some
20

possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one e. g. that a gift was given in order to cause pain by its withdrawal. This notion underlies the lines
:
:

God
The

gives to
ruin of

many
will

great prosperity,

Not of good

towards them, but to make
25

them more conspicuous. 2
:

Or take the passage from the Meleager of Antiphon

To
Or

Of Meleager s prowess unto
chose out Odysseus
that his

slay no boar, but to be witnesses Greece. 3

the argument in the Ajax^ of Theodectes, that Diomede 5 not to do him honour, but in order

companion might be a

lesser

man than

himself
30

such a motive for doing so is quite possible. 20. Another line of argument is common to forensic and
deliberative oratory, namely, to consider inducements
deterrents,

and

and

the

motives

people have

for

doing or

These are the conditions which make us bound to act if they are for us, and to refrain from action if they are against us that is, we are bound to act if the action is possible, easy, and useful to ourselves or our friends or hurtful to our enemies this is true even
avoiding the actions in question.
: ;

35

if

the action entails

loss,

provided the loss

is

solid advantage. pointing to such conditions,

by the
the

A

outweighed

speaker will urge action by

to

the deterrents being out the and the inducements by the defence, pointed by As for the defence, This topic forms the prosecution.
.
.

opposite. materials for accusation or defence

and discourage it by pointing These same arguments also form the 1400*

.

whole Art of Rhetoric both of Pamphilus and of Callippus.
21. Another line of argument refers to things which are supposed to happen and yet seem incredible. We may argue
1 3

5

5

n. Cp. Lysias, Or. xxxiv, 2 Antiphon, fragm. 2, N. p. 792, Cp. Iliad, x. 3i8-i?4.
,

2

Fragm. Adesp. 4
Cp.

82,
,

N. 2

Nauck 2

p. 801.

K

2

I4oo

a

RHETORICA
that people could not have believed them, if they had not been true or nearly true even that they are the more
:

be true because they are incredible. For the which men believe are either facts or probabilities if, things therefore, a thing that is believed is improbable and even
likely

to

:

incredible,

it

must be

true, since

it is

certainly not believed

because

what
10

at all probable or credible. Androcles of the deme Pitthus said
it

is

An

example
tried

is

in

his well-

known arraignment of the law. The audience shout him down when he observed that the laws
a law to set them right.
salt,

to

required

Why, he went
;

on,

fish

need
for
oil,
2

improbable and incredible as this might seem creatures reared in salt water and olive-cakes l need
incredible as
22.
it is

that

Another

line of

what produces argument is to
;

oil

should need

it.

refute our

opponent

s

15

case

or words that

by noting any it anywhere displays
(i)

contrasts or contradictions of dates, acts,

and

this in

any of the

three following connexions,

He says he is conduct, e. g. spired with the Thirty. (2) Referring to our
e.

Referring to our opponent s devoted to you, yet he con

own

conduct,

g.

He

says

I

am

litigious,

and yet he cannot prove that

20 I

have been engaged in a single lawsuit. (3) Referring to both of us together, e. g. He has never even lent any one a penny, but / have ransomed quite a number of you.
23.

Another

line that is useful for

men and
is

causes that

have been really or seemingly slandered,
;

to

show why

25

the facts are not as supposed pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. Thus a woman, who had palmed off her son on another woman, was thought
to be the lad s mistress because she

when her
be

Ajax^ of where tells the reason Theodectes, Odysseus Ajax why, though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought so. 24. Another line of argument is to show that if the cause is present, the effect is present, and if absent, absent. For
1

action was explained the charge was Another example is from the groundless.

embraced him but shown to
;

i.e.

2
3

cakes made of dried olives. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, pp. 153-4 (Androcles). 2 Cp. Nauck p. Soi.
,

BOOK
by proving the cause you

II.

23

I

4 oo

b

at once prove the effect, and exist without its cause. can Thus conversely nothing of Leodamas accused had his name Thrasybulus having

30

recorded as a criminal on the slab in the Acropolis, and of erasing the record in the time of the Thirty Tyrants to which Leodamas replied, for the Thirty Impossible
:

:

would have trusted

me
is

all

the

more

if

my
l

quarrel with the
35

commons had been
25.

inscribed on the slab.
to

Another

line

consider whether the accused

2 person can take or could have taken a better course than that which he is recommending or taking, or has taken. If

not !4OO and since no one chooses deliberately consciously guilty, This argument is, however, fallacious, for it what is bad. 3
this better course,
it is

he has not taken

clear that he

is

b

often

becomes
clear.

clear after the event
better,

how

the action could
this

have been done
from
26.

though before the event

was

far

Another
any

line

is,

sistent with

past action, to

when a contemplated action is incon examine them both together. 4

5

the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they should or should not sacrifice to Leucothea and mourn for
her,

Thus, when

he advised them not to mourn for her

if
if

they thought
they thought

her a goddess, and not to sacrifice to her her a mortal woman. 5
27.

previous mistakes the grounds c Thus, in the Medea of Carcinus the accusers allege that Medea has slain her children at are not to be all events seen Medea they say, they
line
is

Another

to

make

of accusation or defence.

10

;

,

having made the mistake of sending her children away. In defence she argues that it is not her children, but Jason,

whom

she would have slain

;

for
if

it

would have been a

mistake on her part not to do this

she

had

clone the other.
15

This special line of argument for enthymeme forms the whole of the Art of Rhetoric in use before Theodorus. 7
1

Baiter-Sauppe, Or.
i.

2 3
i.

e.

e.

4 5

Comma

ft., Pt. ii, pp. 216-17. better suited to effect the evil purpose with which he bad means to effect his purpose.

A

is

charged.

after rrfTrpaypevois, not after a pa.

Diels, Vors?,
6
,

7

i, p. 44 (Xenophanes). 2 Cp. Nauck p. 798. But Cp. Spengel, a-vvaya>yii re^co^, pp. IO2, 103.

I400

b

RHETORICA
28.

Another

line

is

to

draw meanings from names.
thou art steel
in

Sophocles,

for instance, says,

O
This
line

steel in heart as

name. 1
gods.

of argument

is

common
*

in praises of the

20

Thus, too, Conon called Thrasybulus rash in counsel. And Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, You are always bold in battle of Polus, and of the you are always a
;

colt"

\

legislator

Draco that

his laws

were those not of a human

being but of a dragon^ so savage were they.
Euripides, Hecuba says of Aphrodite, Her name and Folly s (d(f)pocrvi>r)s) rightly begin and Chaeremon writes

And,
2

in

alike,

Pentheus
25

a

name foreshadowing

grief

(Trej/flo?)

to come. 3

The Refutative Enthymeme has a greater reputation than the Demonstrative, because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are
clearer to the audience.
tive or demonstrative, those are

30

But of all syllogisms, whether refutamost applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the beginning, so long as they
first

are not obvious at
is

sight

for part of the pleasure
;

we

feel

at our

own

intelligent anticipation

or those which

we

follow well enough to see the point of
last

them

as soon as the

word has been

uttered.

35

Besides genuine syllogisms, there may be syllogisms that 2 4 look genuine but are not and since an enthymeme is a of a merely syllogism particular kind, it follows that,
;

besides genuine enthymemes, there genuine but are not.
i.

may

be those that look

Among

a

1401

Enthymeme
(a)

the

the lines of argument that form the Spurious first is that which arises from the particular
is

words employed.

One

variety of this

when

as in dialectic, with

out

make
1

having gone through a final statement as if
2

it

any reasoning process, we were the conclusion of such
is

a process,

Therefore so-and-so
:

not true
crt5/}po>

,

Therefore

the construction of is made clear Soph, fragm. 597, N. by the scholiast (Rabe, p. 146), who gives the context of the line.
2

3

Euripides, Treaties, 990.

Chaeremon, fragm.

4,

N. 2

,

p. 783.

BOOK
also so-and-so

II.

24
1

1401* a

must be true

so too in rhetoric

com
5

enthymeme, such language being the proper province of enthymeme, so that it is seemingly the form of wording here that
causes the illusion mentioned.

pact and

antithetical utterance passes for an

In order to produce the effect

of genuine reasoning by our form of wording it is useful to summarize the results of a number of previous reason

some he saved others he avenged the Greeks as ings 2 Each of these statements has been previously 10 he freed \
:

proved from other facts but the mere collocation of them gives the impression of establishing some fresh conclusion. Another variety is based on the use of similar words (b)
;

for

e. g. the argument that the mouse different things must be a noble creature, since it gives its name to the most august of all religious rites for such the Mysteries 3 are. Or one may introduce, into a eulogy of the dog, the
;

15

dog-star

or Pan, because Pindar said

:

O

thou blessed one

!

Thou whom they of Olympus The hound of manifold shape
or

call
4
:

That follows the Mother of Heaven

we may argue

that,

because there

there not being a dog about, there is Or that Hermes is readier than
shares, since

disgrace in honour in being a dog. 5
is

much

any other god to go
round except of him. 6

20

we never say

shares

all

that speech 7 is a very excellent thing, since are not said to be worth money but to be

Or

good men worthy of

esteem

the phrase worthy of esteem also having the of worth speech meaning line is to assert of the whole what is true of Another 2.
.

7

the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole. whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though
in the sphere of speech i.e. enthymemes Bad e. rhetoric )( dialectic. which ought to produce enthymemes dialectic and bad rhetoric are here in question.
1

A

25

Lit.

in the case of

:

,

i.

I socrates, Evagoras, 65-9. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att. y Pt. ii, p. 228 (Polycrates). 4 5 viz. a dog-philosopher, a Cynic. Pindar, fragm. 96, Bergk 8 Hermes is common Alluding to the proverb Koivos Ep^s, Shares in your luck 7 The same Greek word (\oy<n) is here used for speech and esteem hence what follows. 3
.

2

,

!

:

a

I40i

RHETORIC A
often they are not. You have therefore to adopt whichever of these two lines better suits your purpose. That is how one e. knows that there is that Euthydemus argues g. any
:

a trireme in the Peiraeus, since he knows the separate details that make up this statement. 1 There is also the

argument that one who knows the letters knows the whole word, since the word is the same thing as the letters which
?,o

compose
is

it

;

or that,

if

a double portion of a certain thing

harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things
c
:

should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme is For one good refutative put as follows, demonstrative
;

thing cannot be made up of two bad things. line of argument is fallacious. Again, there

The whole
is

saying that Thrasybulus put
35

down

thirty tyrants,

Polycrates where the

2 Or the argument in speaker adds them up one by one. the Orestes of Theodectes. where the argument is from part

to whole

:

Tis right that she
c

who

3 slays her lord should die.

It is right, tpo, that
:

Still, I4OI good perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. The fallacy might also be said to be due

b

the son should avenge his father. these two things are what Orestes has done. 4

Very

to omission, since the speaker fails to say

by whose hand

a

husband-slayer should die. 3. Another line is the use of indignant language, whether to support your own case or to overthrow your opponent s.
5

We

do

this

when we paint a highly-coloured
does
so,
if

situation without having proved the

facts* of

picture of the it if the
:

defendant
innocence
;

he produces an

impression

of

his

the prosecutor goes into a passion, he an produces impression of the defendant s guilt. Here there the hearer infers guilt or is no genuine enthymeme

and

:

1

For

this

argument of Euthydemus

,

see

Cope

s

Commentary^

ii,

pp. 307, 308. 2 Baiter- Sauppc, Or. Att., Ft. ii, p. 221 (Polycrates). Thirty thirty tyrants , as contrasted separate tyrants are suggested by with The Thirty Tyrants (= one single tyranny). 3 2 * Retaining Theodectes, fragm. 5, N. p. 803.
,

BOOK
innocence,

II.

24
and the inference
is

1401

but

no proof

is

given,
*

fallacious accordingly.

or single instance, as certain evidence which, again, yields no valid proof. Thus, it might be said that lovers are useful to their countries,
4.

Another

line is to use
;

a

Sign

,

I0

since the love of

Harmodius and Aristogeiton caused the
tyrant
1 Or, again, that Hipparchus. there is, of since he is a vicious man

downfall

of

the

Dionysius is a thief, course, no valid proof here
thief,
5.

;

not every vicious

man

is

a

though Another line represents the accidental as essential. An instance is what Polycrates says of the mice, that they came to the rescue because they gnawed through the 2 Or it might be maintained that an invitation bowstrings. to dinner is a great honour, for it was because he was not invited that Achilles was angered with the Greeks at Tenedos. 3 As a fact, what angered him was the insult involved it was a mere accident that this was the particular
is
;

every thief

a vicious man.

15

form that the insult took.
In the the argument from consequence. Alexander, for instance, it is argued that Paris must have had a lofty disposition, since he despised society and lived
6.
is

Another

2o

by himself on Mount Ida

:

because lofty people do this kind

of thing, therefore Paris too, we are to suppose, had a lofty soul. 4 Or, if a man dresses fashionably and roams around at night, he is a rake, since that is the way rakes behave.

Another similar argument points out that beggars sing and dance in temples, and that exiles can live wherever they please, and that such privileges are at the disposal of those we account happy; and therefore every one might be regarded as happy if only he has those privileges. What matters, however, is the circumstances under which the
privileges are enjoyed.

25

Hence

this line too falls

under the

head of
7.

fallacies

by

omission.

Another

line consists in representing as causes things 3

which are not causes, on the ground that they happened
1

2
8

Cp. Plato, Symposium, 182 B, c. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, pp. 221, 222 (Polycrates). 4 2 Sophocles, A^ntw^ o-i AXo-yos-, N ancle p. 161. B.-s., pp. 222, 223.
,

1401

RHETORICA
along with or before the event in question. They assume that, because B happens after A, it happens because of

A.

Demades
cause of
8.

Politicians are especially fond of taking this line. Thus said that the policy of Demosthenes was the
all

the mischief,

for after

it

the war occurred

l
.

Another

line consists in leaving out

any mention of

35

time and circumstances.

g. the argument that Paris was justified in taking Helen, since her father left her free to choose here the freedom was presumably not perpetual

E.

:

;

!4O2

a

could only refer to her first choice, beyond which her Or again, one might say father s authority could not go. 2 but it that to strike a free man is an act of wanton outrage
it
;

not so in every case only when it is unprovoked. eristical dis 9. Again, a spurious syllogism may, as in with absolute be of the based on confusion the cussions,
is

5

not absolute but particular. As, in dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what-is-not is, on the ground that what-is-not is what-is-not or that the unknown
is
;

that which

can be known, on the ground that

it

can be

known

to be

unknown

so also in rhetoric a spurious enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some particular probability
:

with absolute probability.
is

Now

no particular probability
says,

universally probable

:

as

Agathon
this

10

One might perchance say
That things improbable
For what
is

oft will

was probable 3 hap to men.

probable that improbable this, one might argue that

improbable does happen, and therefore it is Granted things will happen.
{

15

what is improbable is probable \ But this is not true absolutely. As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner so here it arises because the probability
;

in question

is

not general but

specific.

It is

of this line of
is

argument
If

that
is

Corax

s

Art of Rhetoric

composed.

not open to the charge for instance if a the defence is that for violent assault be tried weakling
the accused
!

315 (Demades): cp. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The Three Literary Letters, pp. 80, 81, 1 66, 167. 2 Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att Ft. ii, p. 223 (Polycrates). 2 3 Agathon, fragm. 9, N. p. 765.
1

B.-S.,

p.

,

,

BOOK
the charge

II.

24

I402

a

he was not likely to do such a thing. But if he is open to the defence is still i.e. if he is a strong man
20

that he was not likely to do such a thing, since he could be And sure that people would think he was likely to do it. so with any other charge the accused must be either open
:

or not open to

it

:

there

is

in either case

an appearance of
case the

probable innocence, but whereas probability is genuine, in the former
in

in
it

the latter

the special sense mentioned. 1

can only be asserted This sort of argument

illustrates

what
better.

is

seem the

meant by making the worse argument Hence people were right in objecting to
25

the training Protagoras undertook to give them. 2 It was a fraud the probability it handled was not genuine but
;

spurious,
Eristic.

and has a place

in

no

art

3 except Rhetoric and

25

Enthymemes, genuine and apparent, have now been
described
;

the next subject

is

their Refutation.

3

syllogism or

argument may by by bringing an objection. It is clear that counter-syllogisms can be built up from the same lines of arguments as the original syllogisms for the materials of syllogisms are the ordinary opinions of men, and such
:

An

be refuted either

a

counter-

opinions often contradict each other. Objections, as appears in the Topics* may be raised in four ways either by directly

35

attacking your opponent

statement, or by putting forward another statement like it, or by putting forward
s
*

own
it,

a

statement

contrary

to

or

by quoting

previous

decisions.
i.

By
is

attacking your opponent
this
:

for

instance,

if

his

own statement I mean, enthymeme should assert that
s

love

b always good, the objection can be brought in two i4O2 ways, either by making the general statement that all

seems
2

to

mean

special unusual senses
3

in the broad simple sense as opposed to (such as that in Agathon s proposition).

Cp. Plato, Protag., 319 A. i. e. in the perverted form of rhetoric that is related to genuine rhetoric as eristic (and other sophistic) is related to genuine dialectic. Aristotle is hampered throughout by having no special name for this perverted rhetoric, as he has noted at the end of the opening chapter of his treatise (i355 b 17-21 above). 4 Cp. Topics, viii. 10, and Anal, 7V., ii. 26.

1402^

RHETORICA
want
is

an

evil

,

or

by making

there would be no talk of
evil loves as well as
2.

Caunian love

the particular one that l if there were not

An

good ones. objection from a contrary statement

is

raised

5

when, for instance, the opponent s enthymeme having concluded that a good man does good to all his friends,

you
3.

object,

That proves nothing,
.

for a

bad man does not do

evil to all his friends

example of an objection from a like statement is, enthymeme having shown that ill-used men always hate their ill-users, to reply, That proves nothing, for wellused men do not always love those who used them well
the
.

An

4.

The

decisions

mentioned are those proceeding from
if

well-known
10

men

;

for instance,

the

enthymeme employed

allowance ought to be made for drunken offenders, since they did not know what they were the objection will be, Pittacus, then, deserves no doing
has concluded that
,

Some

approval, or he would not have prescribed specially severe
penalties for offences due to drunkenness Enthymemes are based upon one or other of four kinds
.

of alleged fact

:

(i) Probabilities, (2)
2

Examples,

(3) Infallible

15

Signs, (4) Ordinary Signs. (i) Enthymemes based upon Probabilities are those which argue from what is, or is

supposed to

Example
or

be, usually true. (2) Enthymemes based upon are those which proceed by induction 3 from one

more

then

similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and argue deductively to a particular inference. (3)
Infallible

Enthymemes based upon
20

Signs are those which

argue from the inevitable and invariable. (4) Enthymemes based upon ordinary Signs are those which argue from

some

Now
can,

universal or particular proposition, true or false. (i) as a Probability is that which happens usually

but not always,
it is

clear,

Enthymemes founded upon Probabilities always be refuted by raising some objection.
is
: :

The
for
25 is

not always genuine it may be spurious showing not that your opponent s premiss not probable, but only in showing that it is not inevitably
refutation
it

consists in

1

The

2

Fallible signs.

incestuous love of Byblis for her brother Caunus. 3 Retaining &

BOOK
true.

II.

25

Hence

tion that
fallacy.

always in defence rather than in accusa possible to gain an advantage by using this For the accuser uses probabilities to prove his case
it is

it is

:

and to refute a conclusion as improbable
thing as to refute
it

is

not the same

as not inevitable.

Any argument

based
:

upon what usually happens is always open to objection 1 otherwise it would not be a probability but an invariable and necessary truth. But the judges think, if the refutation 30
takes

form, either that the accuser s case is not or that they must not decide it which, as we probable For of a false is they ought to decide reasoning. said, piece
this
;

by considering not merely what must be true but also what is likely to be true this is, indeed, the meaning of
: 1

giving a verdict in accordance with one s honest opinion Therefore it is not enough for the defendant to refute
.

the accusation
to be true:
to
is

by proving that the charge is not bound he must do so by showing that it is not likely
For
this

35

be true.

purpose
:

his objection

must

state

what

more usually true than the statement attacked. It may do so in either of two ways either in respect of frequency It will be most convincing if or in respect of exactness.
it

does so

in

both respects

;

for

if

happens oftener as we represent
represent
(2)
it,

it

the thing in question both and happens more as we
2

the probability

is

particularly great.

Fallible Signs,

can be refuted even
at the outset. 3

and Enthymemes based upon them, if the facts are correct, as was said

For we have shown in the Analytics^ that no Fallible Sign can form part of a valid logical proof. be refuted (3) Enthymemes depending on examples may 5 If we have a in the same way as probabilities. negative
argument is refuted, in so far as it is proved not inevitable, even though the positive examples are more And if the positive examples similar and more frequent. are more numerous and more frequent, we must contend
that the present case is dissimilar, or that its conditions are dissimilar, or that it is different in some way or other.
1 2

5

instance, the

Not

4

eVi TO TTO\V Km. inserting ra wrongly repeated in Roemer s text. B Not inserting Anal. Pr., ii. 27.
&>$

3
i,

c. 2,

I357

b

13, 14.

ev.

I403

a

RHETORICA
(4)
It will

10

Enthymemes

they do from the Analytics?
fact alleged
15

be impossible to refute Infallible Signs, and resting on them, by showing in any way that not form a valid logical proof: this, too, we see
All we can do
exist.
is is

to

show

that the
it

does not
is
:

If there

no doubt that
refutation

does, and that it becomes impossible
tion which
is

an

Infallible
is

for this

Sign, equivalent to a demonstra

now

clear in every respect.

2 Amplification and Depreciation are not an element of 26 2 enthymeme. By an element of enthymeme I mean the
{

same thing as a
class

line

embracing a large

of enthymematic argument a general number of particular kinds of enthy

meme.
20

Amplification and Depreciation are one kind of enthymeme, viz. the kind used to show that a thing is great or small just as there are other kinds used to show that a thing
;

is

good or bad,
;

just or unjust,

and anything

else of the sort.

All these things are the subject-matter of syllogisms and enthymemes none of these is the line of argument of an

enthymeme
25

;

no more,

therefore, are

Amplification and

Depreciation. Nor are Refutative
Constructive.

Enthymemes a

For

it is

different species from clear that refutation consists either

proof or in raising an objection. In the first case we prove the opposite of our adversary s state ments. Thus, if he shows that a thing has happened, we
in offering positive

show that it has not we show that it has.
;

30 tinction

if

it has not happened, could not be the disThis, then, there were one, since the same means are

if

he shows that

employed by both parties, enthymemes being adduced to show that the fact is or is not so-and-so. An objection, on the other hand, is not an enthymeme at all, but, as was said in the Topics? it consists in stating some accepted
opinion from which it will be clear that our opponent has not reasoned correctly or has made a false assumption.
35

Three points must be studied in making a speech and we have now completed the account of (i) Examples, Maxims,
;

1 2

3

Anal. Pr., ii. 27. i.e. an elementary Cp. Top., viii. 10.

class,

a primary type

:

cp. 1396** 21.

BOOK
to invent

II.

26
the

1403*

Enthymemes, and in general the //20^///-element and refute arguments. We have next 1 (2) Style, and (3) Arrangement.

way

to discuss

BOOK
I

III
first,

IN making a speech one must study three points:
the

second, the style, or to be used the language, third, proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech. have already specified the sources of persuasion. have shown that these are three
;
;

means of producing persuasion

We

We

what they are and why there are only these 10 three for we have shown that persuasion must in every case be effected either (i) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impres
in
;
; :

number

2

sion of the speakers character, or (3) of the statements made.

by proving the truth
and the sources

Enthymemes

also have been described,
;

from which they should be derived there being both 3 special and general lines of argument for enthymemes. Our next subject will be the style of expression.

Ig

For

it

is

not enough to

must

also

afforded

much help is thus say it as towards producing the right impression of a
;

know we ought

"what

we ought

to say

;

we

speech. The the one that

first

question to receive attention was naturally
first

comes

naturally

produced from the

facts themselves.

how persuasion can be The second is how to
third

set these facts out in language.
;

A

would be the

20

this is a thing that affects the proper method of delivery success of a speech greatly but hitherto the subject has been neglected. Indeed, it was long before it found a way
;

into the arts of tragic drama and epic recitation: at first 4 their tragedies themselves. It is plain that poets acted

delivery has just as

much

to

do with oratory
it
*

as with poetry. 25

(In connexion with poetry,
1

has been studied by Glaucon
, ,

Xe|iy

:

to
,

expression

be translated language diction speech style wording &c., according to the shade of meaning con
,
,

,

veyed
c. 6,
2
i,

in

each context.
b
13, 14.
3

Cp. the definition of Ae
i

is

given in the Poetics,
*

I45o

c. 2.

and

4

ii.

Or,

delivered

.

1403
of Teos
right

RHETORICA
among
others.)
It
is,

essentially, a

matter of the
the various
;

management

of the voice

to

express

emotions
30

of speaking loudly, softly, or
;

between the two

of high, low, or intermediate pitch of the various rhythms that suit various subjects. These are the three things volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm that a

speaker bears

in

mind.

It

is

those

who

do bear them
;

in

mind who
just as in

usually win prizes

in

the dramatic contests
for

and

drama the

actors

now count

more than the

poets, so it is in the contests of public life, owing to the No systematic treatise 35 defects of our political institutions. upon the rules of delivery has yet been composed ; indeed,

made no progress till late in the day. Besides, delivery is very properly not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry. 2 Still, the whole business
even the study of language
1

of rhetoric being concerned with appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, unworthy though it is,

because we cannot do without
ing really
is

it.

The

right thing in speak

that

we should be

satisfied not to
:

annoy our
:

5

we ought in fairhearers, without trying to delight them ness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts
nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts. Still, as has been already said, other things affect
the result considerably, owing to the defects of our hearers. 3 The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others:

10

way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not, however, so much importance as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer.
the

uses fine language when teaching geometry. the principles of delivery have been worked out, will they produce the same effect as on the stage. But only

Nobody

When

From this and other indications it would seem that Aristotle The regards delivery as a subordinate part of Aeir, expression classification of vTroKptcris under Xt^is is helped by the relation of the latter to Xets- is a mode of speaking 2 Or, is thought to be vulgar, when viewed from a lofty standpoint on any noble view 3 The average member of a large audience is regarded as a i, c. i.
1
*
.

\tyen>.

.

,

.

*

heed

sorry creature (/Lto^^poy), carried to reason.

away by

his feelings

and paying little

BOOK

III. i

I404

a

very slight attempts to deal with them have been made and by a few people, as by Thrasymachus in his Appeals to

and can hardly be systematically taught. The principles of good diction can be so taught, and therefore we have men of ability in this
Pity
-

1

Dramatic

ability

is

a natural

gift,

15

direction too,

who win

prizes in their turn, as well as those

excel in delivery speeches of the written or speakers kind owe more of their effect to their diction than literary
to their thought.

who

was naturally the poets who first set the movement 2 for words represent things, and they had also going the human voice at their disposal, which of all our
It
;

20

recitation

organs can best represent other things. Thus the arts of and acting were formed, and others as well. Now it was because poets seemed to win fame through
their fine

language when their thoughts were simple enough,
25

that the language of oratorical prose at first took a poetical 3 Even now most uneducated colour, e.g. that of Gorgias.
poetical language makes the finest That is not true the language of prose is discourses. This is shown by the state of distinct from that of poetry.

people

think

that

:

things to-day, its character.

when even the language of tragedy has
Just as

altered
30

iambics were adopted, instead of 4 because tetrameters, they are the most prose-like of all metres, so tragedy has given up all those words, not used in
ordinary talk, which decorated the early drama and are It is there still used by the writers of hexameter poems. which the manner a fore ridiculous to imitate poetical
poets themselves have dropped and it is now plain that we have not to treat in detail the whole question of style, but may confine ourselves to that part of it which concerns our
;

35

The other the poetical part present subject, rhetoric. of it has been discussed in the treatise on the Art of Poetry?
2
1

We
pp. 93
2
i.

may, then,
ff.

start

from the observations there made,
ii,

I44

b

Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt.
e.

p.

164

;

Spengel,

Artium Scriptores,

the

movement towards
*

the conscious cultivation of beautiful

language. 3 Cp. Spengel, Artium Scriptores, pp. 69 ff. 4 a Cp. Ao-yov, I404 28. Or, speech-like .

6

Poetics, cc. 20-2.

I404

b

RHETORICA
Style to be good must be including the definition of style. that clear, as is proved by the fact speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has
to do.
It must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation poetical language is certainly free 1 Clearness from meanness, but it is not appropriate to prose. is secured by using the words (nouns and verbs alike) that Freedom from meanness, and are current and ordinary.
;

5

adornment too, are secured by using the other words mentioned in the Art of Poetry? Such variation from what is usual makes the language appear more stately. People clo not feel towards strangers as they do
positive
10

towards their own countrymen, and the same thing

is

true

It is therefore well to give to of their feeling for language. air: an unfamiliar people like what strikes everyday speech

them, and are struck by what is out of the way. In verse the such effects are common, and there they are fitting
:

persons and things there spoken of are comparatively remote from ordinary life. In prose passages they are far less often
15 fitting

because the subject-matter
is

is

less

exalted.

Even

in poetry, it

not quite appropriate that fine language should be used by a slave or a very young man, or about

very

trivial subjects

:

even

in

propriate, must sometimes be toned down, though

poetry the style, to be ap at other
see that a writer

times heightened.
disguise

We

can

now

must

his art and give the impression of speaking Naturalness is persuasive, naturally and not artificially. 20 artificiality is the contrary for our hearers are prejudiced and think we have some design against them, as if we
;

were mixing their wines for them. It is like the difference between the quality of Theodorus voice and the voices his really seems to be that of the of all other actors
:

character
1

who

is

speaking, theirs do not.

We

can hide our
to the defi

This

last clause explains the cautious

addition just

made

nition as given in the Poetics.

Poetry,

it

is

pointed out, often heightens

expression in a way which would seem pretentious arid intolerable in the examples from Euripides and Dionysius the Brazen prose a cp. in I4o5 28-34. Still, in the main, the same definition and methods apply to both poetical and prose style.
;

2

Poetics, cc. 21, 22.

BOOK

III.

2

I4

04

b

purpose successfully by taking the single words of our This is composition from the speech of ordinary life.

done

in

poetry by Euripides,
1

who was

the

first

to

show the
are

25

way

to his successors.
is

Language

composed of nouns and

verbs.

Nouns

2 of the various kinds considered in the treatise on Poetry. Strange words, compound words, and invented words must be

used sparingly and on few occasions on what occasions we 3 The reason for this restriction has been 30 indicated they depart from what is suitable, in already
:

shall state later.

:

the direction of excess.

In the language of prose, besides

the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage. This we gather from the fact that these two classes of terms, the proper or regular

and the metaphorical these and no others are used by everybody in conversation. We can now see that a good
produce a style that is distinguished with out being obtrusive, and is at the same time clear, thus 4 satisfying our definition of good oratorical prose. Words of
writer

35

can

5 ambiguous meaning are

to

mislead

his
I

hearers.

chiefly useful to enable the sophist Synonyms are useful to the
is

poet,

by which

mean words whose ordinary meaning

the
;

(advancing] and ftabi&iv (proceeding) these two are ordinary words and have the same meaning.

same, e.g.
In the

Koptvto-Oat.

1405*

as we have already said, will be found definitions of these kinds of words; a classification of Metaphors ; and mention of the fact that metaphor is of

Art of Poetry

6

,

Prose-writers great value both in poetry and in prose. must, however, pay specially careful attention to metaphor,

5

because their other resources are scantier than those of poets.

Metaphor, moreover, gives
distinction as nothing else can

style
:

clearness,
it is

charm, and

and

not a thing whose
10

use can be taught
epithets,

by one man
fitting,

must be
to

to another. Metaphors, like which means that they must fairly
:

correspond failing this, appropriateness will be conspicuous the want of
:

the thing signified

their

in-

harmony
p.

1

Cp. Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
Poetics,
c.

On
6

2

Literary Composition,
4

78 n.

21.
in the

3
iii,

cc. 3, 7.

iii,

c.

2

ad

init.

6

Homonyms,

Greek.

Cp. Poetics,

cc. 21, 22.

L 2

I405

a

RHETORICA
between two things
side
is

by

side.

It is like

will suit

an old

man

;

emphasized by their being placed having to ask ourselves what dress certainly not the crimson cloak that

15

young man. And if you wish to pay a compliment, must take your metaphor from something better in the you same line if to disparage, from something worse. To
suits a
;

20

since opposites are in the same meaning I have suggested if you say that a man class, you do what who begs prays and a man who prays begs for praying and begging are both varieties of asking. So Iphicrates called Callias a mendicant priest instead of a torch-bearer and Callias replied that Iphicrates must be uninitiated or he would have called him not a mendicant torch-bearer Both are religious titles, but priest but a one is honourable and the other is not. Again, somebody calls actors hangers-on of Dionysus but they call them
illustrate

my

:

,

;

,

.

,

selves
25

(

artists

:

each of these terms

is

a metaphor, the one

intended to throw
him.

dirt at the actor,

the other to dignify
.

now call themselves purveyors We crime a mistake, or a mistake a crime. We can say that a thief took a thing, or that he plundered

And

pirates

can thus

call a

*

his victim.

An expression
oar,

like that of
s

Euripides Telephus,

King of the
30 is

on Mysia
king

coast he landed, 1

of

inappropriate the subject,

;

the word

goes beyond the dignity
is

and so the

ait

not

concealed.

A

metaphor may be amiss because the very syllables of the words conveying it fail to indicate sweetness of vocal
utterance.

Thus Dionysius
s
2
.

screech poetry Calliope But the metaphor is both, to be sure, vocal utterances. unlike those of bad, because the sounds of screeching
,

the Brazen in his elegies calls Poetry and screeching are

Further, in using poetry, are discordant and unmeaning. to names nameless to give things, we must draw metaphors
35

3

them not from remote but from kindred and
1

similar things,

2
3

Euripides, Telephus^ N. p. 583. 4 Dionysius Chalcus, fragm. 7, Bergk vol. ii, p. 264. The syllables of K/uu yj? are, it seems, regarded as ugly and non
,

2

,

significant.

BOOK
so that the kinship
is

III.

2

are said.
I

Thus

clearly perceived as soon as the in the celebrated riddle
fire

words

marked how a man glued bronze with

to another

man

s

body,

1

but both it and gluing are a the process is nameless kind of application, and that is why the application of Good riddles the cupping-glass is here called a gluing
;
{

.

do, in general,

provide

us

with

satisfactory

metaphors

:

for metaphors imply riddles, and therefore a good riddle can furnish a good metaphor. Further, the materials of meta

5

phors must be beautiful
of
all

their

and the beauty, like the ugliness, words may, as Licymnius says, lie in their sound or in 2 meaning. Further, there is a third consideration one
;

that upsets the fallacious argument of the sophist Bryson, that there is no such thing as foul language, because
in
is

whatever words you put a given thing your meaning One term may describe the same. This is untrue.
set
it

!0

a thing

and

more truly than another, may be more like it, more intimately before our eyes. Besides, two
;

words will represent a thing in two different lights so on this ground also one term must be held fairer or For both of two terms will indicate fouler than another.
different

15

but not simply their fairness or their foulness, or if so, at any rate not in an equal degree. The materials of metaphor must be beautiful to the ear, to

what

is fair,

or

what

is foul,

the understanding, to the eye or
better, for instance, to say

some other physical sense. 3 It is rosy-fingered morn V than or, worse still, red-fingered morn crimson-fingered The epithets that we apply, too, may have a bad and ugly or a aspect, as when Orestes is called a mother-slayer 4 better one, as when he is called his father s avenger Simonides, when the victor in the mule-race offered him a small fee, refused to write him an ode, because, he said, it was so unpleasant to write odes to half-asses: but on
.

20

*

;

.

25

receiving an adequate fee, he wrote
vol. Cleobulina, fragm. I, Bergk Style, p. 231. a Cp. Blass, Att. Bereds?, i, p. 86.
,

1

4

ii,

p.

62.

Cp. Demetrius,

On

3

Iliad,

i.

477, &c.

*

Euripides, Orestes, 1587, 1588.

I405

b

RHETORIC A
1 Hail to you, daughters of storm-footed steeds,

though of course they were daughters of asses

too.

The

same

effect is attained

a bad thing less 30 Take, for instance, the banter of Aristophanes in the 2 cloaklet Babylonians where he uses goldlet for gold
c ,

make

by the use of diminutives, which bad and a good thing less good.

But alike for scoff, and plaguelet diminutives we must be wary in and using using epithets and must observe the mean.
for

cloak

,

scofflet

.

in

35

Bad taste in language may take any (i) The misuse of compound words.
stance, talks of the

of four forms

:

3
for in

Lycophron,
4

many-visaed heaven above the giantstrait-fathed shore
3
;

crested earth
a

,

and again the

and

I4o6 Gorgias of the pauper-poet flatterer and oath-breaking and Alcidamas uses such expressions as over-oath-keeping* $
the soul filling with rage and face becoming flaine-flnshed\ and he thought their enthusiasm would be is sue-fraught and issue-fraught he made the persuasion of his words and sombre-hued is the floor of the sea 5 The way all these words are compounded makes them, we feel, fit for verse6 This, then, is one form in which bad taste is shown. only. For (2) Another is the employment of strange words. instance, Lycophron talks of the prodigious Xerxes and 7 Alcidamas of a toy for poetry and spoliative Sciron and says whetted with the the witlessness of nature
,

*

5

.

;

*

10

,

unmitigated temper of his spirit third form is the use of long, unseasonable, or (3)
.

8

A

It is appropriate enough for a poet to frequent epithets. 9 milk but in prose such epithets are some talk of white
,

times lacking in appropriateness or, when spread too thickly, plainly reveal the author turning his prose into poetry.
1

2
8
4

5
6

Simonides, fragm. 7, Bergk vol. iii, p. 390. Aristophanes, Babylonians, Meineke, ii. 982. Cp. Blass, Att. Bereds?, ii, p. 364. Baiter- Sauppe, op. tit., p. 131 (Gorgias, fragm. vii. 2). Ibid., p. 156 (Alcidamas). The meaning seems to be that such compounds have a dithyrambic
,

4

cast
7

;

On Style
9

cp. orav Sitfvpa/j/Sw&ijff o-vvrfBij 17 diVXaxrtff TOV ovop-aros, Demetrius, b pp. 125, 233 (referring to this chapter), and also I4o6 2 infra.
>

Blass, loc.

tit.

8

Baiter-Sauppe, op.
434.

tit., p.

156 (Alcidamas).

e. g. lliady iv.

BOOK
Of
course

III.

3

1406*

we must use some epithets, since they lift our above the usual level and give it an air of distinction. style But we must aim at the due mean, or the result will be worse than if we took no trouble at all we shall get some
;

T

5

thing actually bad instead of something merely not good. That is why the epithets of Alcidamas seem so tasteless
;

he does not use them as the seasoning of the meat, but as
the meat
itself,

so

numerous and swollen and aggressive
*

1

are they. For instance, he does not say sweat but the 20 but to the moist sweat not to the Isthmian games
, ;
,

not laws world-concourse of the Isthmian games not at a run the laws that are monarchs of states
;
; 1

,

but
,

but

his heart impelling

of the

Muses
;

,

not a school him to speed of foot of the Muses had but Nature s school
;

he inherited
achiever

and so

frowning care of heart
* ,

,

and
,

25

and

not of popularity but of universal popularity and he dispenser of pleasure to his audience
it

concealed

not

forest trees \ and

with boughs but with boughs of the he clothed not his body but his
,

bodys nakedness
imitative
(this
is

and
1

an epithet,

and his soul s desire was counterone and the same time a compound so that it seems a poet s effort), and
at
J

30

thus so extravagant the excess of his wickedness 2 see how the inappropriateness of such poetical language imports absurdity and tastelessness into speeches, as well
.

We

as the obscurity that

when the sense

for this verbosity obscure and plain, you only spoil its clearness by piling up words. The ordinary use of compound words is where there is
all
is

comes from

35

no term

for a

thing and

some compound can be
;

easily

formed, like pastime (\povorpifitiv) but if this We done, the prose character disappears entirely.

is

much now see 1406

the language of compounds is just the thing for writers of dithyrambs, who love sonorous noises ; strange words for writers of epic poetry, which is a proud and

why

stately affair

;

and metaphor
3

for

which
2

(as has been already
tff,

said)

is

iambic verse, the metre widely used to-day.
3

with the

MSS.
tit., p.

Baiter-Sauppe, op.

156 (Alcidamas).

iii,

c. I, 1404** 13.

I4o6

b

RHETORICA
(4)

5

There remains the fourth region

in

which bad taste

may may
poets.
if

be shown, metaphor. Metaphors like other things be inappropriate. Some are so because they are

ridiculous

they are indeed used by comic as well as tragic Others are too grand and theatrical and these,
;
;
?

ro

they are far-fetched, may also be obscure. For instance Gorgias talks of events that are green and full of sap and says foul was the deed you sowed and evil the harvest

,

you reaped
again,

l
.

That

is

too

much
a

like poetry.

Alcidamas,
the

called

philosophy
,

fortress

that

threatens

power

of law
life
3
:

human
15

2
,

and the Odyssey a goodly looking-glass of and talked about offering no such toy to
fail,

all these expressions poetry carry the hearer with them.

for the reasons given, to

The

address of Gorgias to

the swallow, when she had let her droppings fall on as she flew overhead, is in the best tragic manner.
said,

him

He

Nay, shame, you could not call as a girl, you could and so it was a good gibe to address her as what she was once and not as what she is.
.

O

Philomela

bird,

Considering her as a her act shameful considering her
;

;

20

The
slight.

Simile also

is

a metaphor

;

the difference

is

but 4

When
a simile
5

the poet says of Achilles that he

Leapt on the
this
is
;

foe as a lion, 4

when he says
since

of

him
are
of

the lion leapt

,

it is

a

metaphor

here,

both

transferred

to Achilles the

name
;

courageous, lion Similes are
.

he has

useful in prose as well as in verse but not often, since they 25 are of the nature of poetry. They are to be employed just as metaphors are employed, since they are really the same

thing except for the difference mentioned. The following are examples of similes.
1
2

Androtion said

Baiter-Sauppe, op. cit., p. 131 (Gorgias). Ib., p. 1 56 (Alcidamas). This metaphor apparently strikes Aristotle as far-fetched and incongruous, and as reflecting the surface only it makes a peep-show of the great epic of human life. It would probably obscure his point to render a fair mirror of the life of man since mirror is now one of the most familiar and edge-worn of metaphors.
:

,

3

4 a Cp. I4o6 8 supra. Cp. Iliad, xx. 164, vpro transferred-by-metaphor
l
.

AeW

&$.

BOOK
of Idrieus that he
at
flies

III.

4

l

I4o6

was like a terrier let off the chain, that you and bites you Idrieus too was savage now that he was let out of his chains. 1 Theodamas compared Archidamus to an Euxenus who could not do geometry a proportional 2 simile, implying that Euxenus is an Archidamus who can do geometry. In Plato s Republic those who strip the dead are compared to curs which bite the stones thrown at them but do not touch the thrower 3 and there is the simile about the Athenian people, who are
;

30

compared to a ship s captain who is strong but a little deaf; and the one about poets verses, which are likened to persons

4

35

who

when the lack beauty but possess youthful freshness freshness has faded the charm perishes, and so with verses
to children

when broken up

pap but go on crying; and the Boeotians to holm-oaks, because they were ruining one another by civil wars just as one oak causes another oak s

who

into prose. 5 take their

Pericles

compared the Samians

Demosthenes said that the Athenian people were like sea-sick men on board ship. 7 Again, Democrates compared
fall.

6

5

the political orators to nurses
8

who swallow
s

the bit of food
lips

themselves and then smear the children
spittle.

with the

Antisthenes compared the lean Cephisodotus to frankincense, because it was his consumption that gave one
pleasure.

10

All these

ideas
;

similes or as
will

metaphors

may be expressed either as those which succeed as metaphors

obviously do well also as similes, and similes, with the But the explanation omitted, will appear as metaphors.
proportional metaphor must always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate terms. For instance, if a drinking9
5

bowl

the shield of Dionysus, a shield called the drinking-bowl of Ares. 10
is

may

fittingly

be

5
1

Such, then, are the
2 3

ingredients

of

which

speech

is

A

Baiter-Sauppe, op.
rule-of-thrce
v.

5 Cp. ib., x. 601 B. Cp. Roberts, Ancient Boeotians, pp. 15, 1 6. 7 Baiter-Sauppe, op. cit., p. 254 (Demosthenes). 8 Ib., p. 320 (Democrates). 9 i. e. metaphor or simile pera^opd used as being the more general and inclusive term (cp. beginning of chapter). 10 Timotheus (ap. Athen. 433 D).

Plato, Rep.,

/., p. 245 (Androtion). simile, an analogical simile. 4 E. 469 Ib., vi. 488 A.

6

:

I407

a

RHETORICA
composed.
1

foundation of good style is correctness of under five heads, (i) First, the proper 20 use of connecting words, and the arrangement of them in

The

language, which

falls

the natural sequence which some of them require. For instance, the connective piv (e.g. fteV) requires the
eyo>

correlative 8e (e.g. 6 brought in before the

8e).

The answering word must be
;

25

4

first has been forgotten, and not be from it nor, except in the few cases widely separated where this is appropriate, is another connective to be introduced before the one required. Consider the sentence, But I, as soon as he told me (for Cleon had come begging and praying), took them along and set out. 2 In this

sentence

many connecting words are inserted in front of the one required to complete the sense and if there is a long
;

interval
3

before

set

out
style

,

the result

merit, then, of

good

lies in lies

is obscurity. One the right use of connecting

words.
special
is

(2)

The second

in calling things

by
(3)

their

own
third

names and not by vague general

ones.

The

to avoid ambiguities ; unless, indeed, you definitely desire to be ambiguous, as those do who have nothing to say but

35

are pretending to mean something. Such people are apt to put that sort of thing into verse. Empedocles, for instance, his circumlocutions by long imposes on his hearers these
;

are affected in the
listen to diviners,

same way as most people are when they whose ambiguous utterances are received

with nods of acquiescence

Croesus by crossing the Halys will ruin a mighty realm. 3
Diviners use these vague generalities about the matter in their predictions are thus, as a rule, less
likely to be falsified.

hand because
the

We

are
,

more

likely to

be

right, in

game

of

*

odd and even

we guess at oracle-monger is more likely
odd
than
if
1

we simply guess even or the actual number and the
if
;

to be right

if

he simply says
ptv for

TO
6

f
e\\T)i>ieii>,

to use

good, pure, correct Greek
xxxii. 119)
fie
.
.

.

2

Bywater (Journal of Philology,
,

would read
(

e-yw

eyo>

the apodotic particle

(e. g.

6

.

.)

being mentally supplied

after nvrovs.
3

Or

o-vi/SeV/uov

the sense will be

may be omitted after n7ro8o^^o-o ue^oi;, before the apodosis
53, 91.

when

Cp. Herod.,

i.

BOOK

III.

5

1407

that a thing will happen than if he says when it will happen, and therefore he refuses to add a definite date. All these ambiguities have the same sort of effect, and are to be avoided unless we have some such object as that mentioned.
1

5

fourth rule is to observe Protagoras classification of (4) for these dis nouns into male, female, and inanimate tinctions also must be correctly given. Upon her arrival
;

A

she said her say and departed
is

(f\

6

eAfloGo-a

KOL SiaAex^ 6

"

to express plurality, fewness, and (5) A fifth rule wxero). 2 unity by the correct wording, e. g. Having come, they

10

struck
It is

me

J

(ot 5

eAflovres ZTVTTTW /ie).

a general rule that a written composition should be 3 This cannot be to read and therefore easy to deliver. easy so where there are many connecting words or clauses, or

where punctuation

To punctuate
cannot
tell

is hard, as in the writings of Heracleitus. Heracleitus is no easy task, because we often

whether a particular word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he says, Though this truth is always men under stand it not 4 where it is not clear with which of the two
!

15

,

clauses the
tion.

word always should be joined by the punctua
*

that the sentence does not
to

Further, the following fact leads to solecism, viz. work out properly if you annex
suit
fail

two terms a third which does not Thus either sound or colour will
properly with some verbs
see
1

them both. 5 to work out
if,

20

6
:

*

perceive
is

will

apply to both,

will

not.

Obscurity

also caused

intend to insert a

number
;

of details,

when you you do not first make
,

after telling

I meant, if you say, and the other thing, to set out rather than something of this kind I meant to set out after then this, that, and the other thing occurred. telling him

your meaning clear

for instance,

him

this, that,

*

;

25

6

The
1
i.

following suggestions

will

help to give

your language

are equally destructive of clearness. write singular, dual, and plural endings correctly. Or, easy to understand cp. SvatypaaTos. 4 Heracleitus, fragm. i (Diels). 6 Mr. W. D. Ross s view of the construction and meaning of this He reads roSe in passage is followed in this and the next sentence.
e.
2
i.

e. to
*

8

:

place of
6
i.

TtiSf.

e. will

be unsuitable

if

you have used either

iScoy

o

1407
impressiveness. do not say circle
*

RHETORICA
1

(i)
,

but

Describe a thing instead of naming it that surface which extends equally
: .

3

To achieve conciseness, do the of the description. instead When opposite or use its if it is name mentioning anything ugly unseemly, the description that is ugly, and describe it if it is the name
from the middle every way
put the

name

ugly. (2) Represent things with the help of meta phors and epithets, being careful to avoid poetical effects. (3) Use plural for singular, as in poetry, where one finds

that

is

Unto havens Achaean, 2
though only one haven is meant, and Here are my letter s many-leaved
35 (4)

folds.

3

Do

not bracket two words under one
with

article,

but put one
4

article

each

;

e. g.

rijs

yvvaiKos
;

rrjs

?;/ierepas.

The
5

reverse to secure conciseness
(5)

e. g.

rrjs
;

?;^erepas

ywaiKo s.

Use plenty
;

of connecting words
*

conversely, to secure

conciseness, dispense with connectives, while still preserving a G connexion e. g. and having having gone and spoken I4o8 7 I And the gone, spoke respectively. (6) practice of
,
,

Antimachus,

too,
it

ing attributes of Teumessus

to describe a thing by mention as he does in talking does not possess
is

useful

;

There

is

a

little

wind-swept knoll

8
.

.

.

A
5

You may
either to

subject can be developed indefinitely along these lines. apply this method of treatment by negation

subject requires.
1

good or to bad qualities, according to which your It is from this source that the poets draw
, ,
,
.

inflation bombast grandi oyKos sometimes means pomp Cp. Longinus, On the Sublime, iii. loquence rather than dignity A neutral rendering like 4, and Demetrius, On Style, pp. 294-5. seems best. impressiveness amplitude grandeur 2 2 Fragm. Adesp. 83, Nauck 3 more literally, here are the tablet s Euripides, iph. Taur. 727 folds with many doors 4 our wife that wife of ours
,

,

,

,

.

(

:

.

.

.

6

Twpsvdits

K<u

7 [Either this form or that in note 6 will stand, 7rup(vQe\s SteXe x^jp. but not 7Topv6e\s SiaAex&iV, having gone spoken ]. 8 Antimachus, Thebais, fragm. 2 Kinkel, Ep. Gr. Fr., p. 277. The it would be well significant part of the passage is not given in the text
;
:

known

in Aristotle s day.

BOOK

III.

6

1408*

expressions such as the stringless or lyreless melody, This device is thus forming epithets out of negations.

popular in proportional metaphors, as when the trumpet note is called a lyreless melody 1
.

s

7

be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to its subject.

Your language

will

10

Correspondence to subject means that we must neither speak casually about weighty matters, nor solemnly about nor must we add ornamental epithets to trivial ones
;

commonplace nouns, or the effect will be comic, as in the works of Cleophon, who can use phrases as absurd as

15

To express emotion, you will employ queenly fig-tree in the language of anger speaking of outrage the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word when
.

O

;

speaking of impiety or foulness

;

the language of exulta

tion for a tale of glory, and that of humiliation for a tale of pity and so in all other cases.
;

This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of your story their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact
:

20

that

behave as you do when things are as you and therefore they take your story to be describe them Besides, an emotional speaker true, whether it is so or not.
others
;

always,
is

makes

his

audience

feel
;

with him, even when there
is

nothing

in his

arguments
this

which

why many

speakers
25

try to

overwhelm

their audience

Furthermore,

by mere noise. of way proving your story by
of
its

dis

playing these signs
2 personal character.

genuineness
class of

Each
its

expresses your men, each type of dis

position, will

have

own

truth appear. Under as boy, man, or old man

appropriate way of letting the I include differences of age, class
;

of sex, as

nationality, as Spartan or Thessalian.

man By

or

woman

;

of
I

dispositions

here

those dispositions only which determine the character of a man s life, for it is not every disposition that 30 does this. If, then, a speaker uses the very words which
1

mean

The Greek word

for

melody

is

appropriate to the lyre and not to

the trumpet. 2 No lacuna.

I4o8

a

RHETORICA
are in keeping with a particular disposition, he will re produce the corresponding character; for a rustic and an

35

educated man will not say the same things nor speak in the same way. Again, some impression is made upon an audience by a device which speech-writers employ to nauseous excess, when they say Who does not know or It is known to everybody. this? The hearer is ashamed of his ignorance, and agrees with the speaker, so
*

as to have a share of the
b

knowledge that everybody

else

I4o8

possesses. All the variations of oratorical style are capable of being used in season or out of season. The best way to counteract

any exaggeration
puts in

is

the well-worn device

by which

the speaker

some criticism of himself; for then people feel it must be all right for him to talk thus, since he certainly knows
what he is doing. Further, it is better not to have every thing always just corresponding to everything else your hearers will see through you less easily thus. I mean for
instance,
this
if

5

your words are harsh, you should not extend
else
in

harshness to your voice and your countenance and
keeping.
If

have everything
ficial

you do, the
;

arti

character of each detail becomes apparent whereas you adopt one device and not another, you are using art all the same and yet nobody notices it. (To be sure, if mild sentiments are expressed in harsh tones and harsh sentiments in mild tones, you become comparatively unif
io

convincing.)

Compound

words, fairly plentiful

epithets,

15

and strange words best suit an emotional speech. We forgive an angry man for talking about a wrong as heavenand we excuse such language when high or colossal the speaker has his hearers already in his hands and has stirred them deeply either by praise or blame or anger or affection, as Isocrates. for instance, does at the end of his l and in that they Panegyric, with his name and fame 2 Men do speak in this strain when they are brooked deeply stirred, and so, once the audience is in a like state of
;
.

feeling,

approval of course follows.
is

This
is
2

is

why
ib.,

such

language
1
<f)rj(j.r]v

fitting
[Jivr)iJir]V)

in

poetry, which
1

an inspired thing.
9^

fie Kcil

Paneg,,

86.

olnves eYXj/trav,

BOOK

III.

7

I4

o8 b

This language, then, should be used either under stress
of emotion, or ironically, after the of the passages in the Phaedrus. 1

manner of Gorgias and

20

8

The form of a prose composition should be neither metrical nor destitute of rhythm. 2 The metrical form destroys the hearer s trust by its artificial appearance, and at the same
it diverts his attention, making him watch for metrical recurrences, just as children catch up the herald s question, does the freedman choose as his advocate? with

time
1

2

-

Whom

,

the answer

4

Cleon

!

On
;

language
will

is

too unlimited

the other hand, unrhythmical we do not want the limitations

of metre, but

some

limitation

we must

have, or the effect

be vague and unsatisfactory. Now it is number that limits all things and it is the numerical limitation of the
;

form of a composition that constitutes rhythm, of which metres are definite sections. 3
Prose, then,
it

is

to be rhythmical,
verse.

will

become not prose but

but not metrical, or It should not even

30

have too precise a prose rhythm, and therefore should only
be rhythmical to a certain extent.

Of
lacks
is

the various the

rhythms, the heroic has dignity, but tones of the spoken language. 4 The iambic
:

common

language of ordinary people, so that in talk iambic lines occur oftener than any others 35 but in a speech we need dignity and the power of taking
very

the

The trochee is too the hearer out of his ordinary self. much akin to wild dancing we can see this in tetrameter
:

5 1409* verse, which is one of the trochaic rhythms. There remains the paean, which speakers began to use in the time of Thrasymachus, though they had then no name

Cp. Plato, Phaedrus, 238 D, 241 E. with an illustration, in the Politics, iii.

is attributed to Gorgias, b I2;5 27. 2 Cp. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition, pp. 254-6. 3 Reading rp^/iora, with Bywater. 4 Or, read (with Victorius) a-ffjLvos KO\ ov XSKTIKOS KCU dpfiovias deopevos and translate * is stately and not suited to ordinary speech and demands musical quality (musical delivery or ("needs" rather than "lacks")

1

Irony

2,

accompaniment) 5 Or, which is a tripping rhythm
.

*

,

if

rpoxalos

is

equivalent to the

rpo^fpo? of

some MSS.

i4og

a

RHETORICA
to give
it.
1

The paean
the

is

a third class of rhythm, closely
;

5

I0

two already mentioned it has in it the ratio of three to two, whereas the other two kinds have the ratio of one to one, and two to one respectively. Between the two last ratios comes the ratio of one-and-ahalf to one, which is that of the paean. Now the other two kinds of rhythm must be rejected in writing prose, partly for the reasons given, and partly because they are too metrical and the paean must be adopted, since from this alone of the rhythms mentioned no definite metre arises, and therefore it is the least ob At present the same form of paean is trusive of them. the at beginning as at the end of sentences, employed whereas the end should differ from the beginning. There are two opposite kinds of paean, one of which is suitable to the beginning of a sentence, where it is indeed actually used this is the kind that begins with a long syllable and
akin to both
; ;

ends with three short ones, as

and
TTCU
j

Aio9.

3

The

other

syllables

paean begins, conversely, and ends with a long one, as
6e

with

three

short

yav

vbara r

COK eo.vov

This kind of paean makes a real close a short syllable can give no effect of finality, and therefore makes the rhythm
:

appear truncated.
:

A

sentence should break off with the

long syllable the fact that it is over should be indicated not by the scribe, or by his period-mark in the margin, but by the rhythm itself.

We
1 2
"

have now seen that our language must be rhythmical

Cp. Baiter-Sauppe, op. d., p. 164 (Thrasymachus). O Delos-born, or if perchance Lycia (thoucallest thy birthplace). Golden-haired Archer, Son of Zeus. After earth and its waters, night shrouded the Ocean from sight. This line and the two which precede it are given as fragments of the Paeans of Simonides in Bergk 4 iii, p. 398 Simonides, fragm. 26 b
! {

.

,

;

BOOK
particular shape,

III.

8
in

1409"

and not destitute of rhythm, and what rhythms,

what

make

it

so.

9

of prose must be either free- running, united by nothing except the connecting parts like the words, preludes in dithyrambs or compact and like the strophes of the old poets. The freeantithetical,

The language
its

with

;

25

running style

is

the ancient one,

e. g.

Herein

is

set forth

the inquiry of Herodotus the Thurian. 1 Every one used not many do so now. By freethis method formerly
;

running

style

I

mean the kind

that

has no natural

stopping-places, and comes to a stop only because there is 30 no more to say of that subject, This style is unsatisfying just

because it goes on indefinitely one always likes to sight a stopping-place in front of one it is only at the goal that men in a race faint and collapse while they see the end of the course before them, they can keep going. Such, then,
:

;

kind of style the compact is that which is in periods. By a period I mean a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance.
is

the free-running

;

35

Language of

this

kind

is

satisfying

and easy to

follow.
;

just the reverse of indefinite and moreover, the hearer always feels that he is grasping something and has reached some definite conclusion
It is satisfying,
it is
;

because

whereas

unsatisfactory to see nothing in front of you and get nowhere. 2 It is easy to follow, because it can
it

is

easily be
in

remembered
all

periodic form

and this because language when can be numbered, 3 and number is the
;

5

easiest

of

things to

remember.

That

is

why

verse,

is measured, is always more easily remembered than prose, which is not the measures of verse can be numbered. The period must, further, not be completed until the sense is complete: it must not be capable of

which

:

1

Herodotus,
/n)re KT\.

w?
or
2

i. I, init. HpoSdrou AXiKapi/r/oWo? la-Topirjs arrodegis fjdf, Aristotle intends to indicate the first complete sentence,

more than
3
i.

that.

Omitting clvm.
e. is

recognized as consisting of a countable

number

of parts or

divisions.

I

4 09

b

RHETORICA
breaking off abruptly, as iambic lines of Sophocles

may happen

with the following

to

Calydon s soil is this; of Pelops land 1 (The smiling plains face us across the strait}. 2 By a wrong division of the words the hearer may take the meaning to be the reverse of what it is for instance, in the passage quoted, one might imagine that Calydon
:

the Peloponnesus. 3 Period may be either divided into several members The period of several members is a portion of or simple.
is

in

A

speech
15

(i)

complete

in

itself,

(2)

divided into parts, and
;

as a whole, that is (3) easily delivered at a single breath member not by fresh breath being taken at the division. 4

A

one of the two parts of such a period. By a simple The period, I mean that which has only one member. curt nor neither should be and the whole members, periods,
is

long.
20 his

A member which
;

is

too short often

makes the

listener

stumble he

is still

mind has

fixed for

expecting the rhythm to go on to the limit it and if meanwhile he is pulled back
;

by the speaker s stopping, the shock
him, so to speak, stumble.
If,

is

bound

to

make

on the other hand, you go
just as people

on too

long, you make him feel left behind, who when walking pass beyond the boundary

before turning

25

back leave their companions 5 behind. So too if a period is too long you turn it into a speech, or something like a dithyrambic prelude. The result is much like the preludes that Democritus of Chios jeered at Melanippides for writing
instead of antistrophic stanzas
1

2 Euripides, Meleager^ N. p. 525
,

;

cp.

Demetrius,

On Style,
first

pp. 98,

222.
i. e. by coming to an abrupt stop no pause in its middle. making 3

2

at the

end of the

line

and

KroAoz/

:

limb of a period, clause of a sentence.

With these words the sense may cocr/rep /mi 77 irfpiodos. not with divisions left to the speaker as in the period quoted, but when taken as a continuous whole But Aristotle s meaning seems to be that the colic period must not merely consist of parts that are evavaTTVfvo-ra. Unless the whole thing is so, you get the over-long period, open to the objections mentioned presently. 6 TOVS o-i /we/HTraroui/ras their fellow-peripatetics/ There may be a humorous allusion to occasions on which Aristotle s slower-footed pupils in the Lyceum had got out of earshot of their strenuous teacher who refused to turn when he had reached the recognized limit of the walk.
Omitting
be
.
1

4

:

BOOK
He
Is like to

III.

9
s

I4

og

b

that sets traps for another man fall into them first;
it

feet

And
Which
;

long-winded preludes do harm to us
worst. 1
2

all,

But the preluder catches
applies likewise to

long-membered

orators.

Periods 30

whose members are altogether too short are not periods at all and the result is to bring the hearer down with a
crash.

The

periodic

style

which

is

divided into

members
*

is

of two kinds.

simply divided, as in I have often wondered at the conveners of national gatherings and
It is either

the founders of athletic
in

contests

3
;

or

it

is

antithetical, 35

each of the two members, one of one pair of where, is put along with one of another pair, or the opposites same word is used to bracket two opposites, as They aided I4lo a
both parties
not only those
:

who

stayed behind but those

who accompanied them

for the latter

they acquired new

territory larger than that at home, and to the former they left territory at home that was large enough 4 Here the
.

accompanying So in the example, Both to enough and larger those who want to get property and to those who desire to enjoy it 5 where enjoyment is contrasted with getting
,

contrasted words are

staying behind and
.

5

,

.

Again,

it

men

fail

often happens in such enterprises that the wise and the fools succeed they were awarded the
;

prize of valour immediately,
;

the sea not long afterwards land and march through the sea,
;

and won the command of 7 to sail through the main

by bridging the Hellespont
;

10

and cutting through Athos 8 nature gave them their 9 some of them country and law took it away again 10 in in others were saved perished misery, disgrace Athenian citizens keep foreigners in their houses as
;

Democritus, Xto? povo-tKos (Diog. Laert. ix. 49). Cp. a note in Mullach, Democriti Abderitae Operum Fragmenta, p. 91, and also see Hesiod, Works and Days, 266. 2 i. e. long-winded framers of long-membered periods possibly with a play on long-limbed lanky 3 i. Isocrates, Paneg., 4 Ib. 35, 36 (with variations, as often elsewhere, from the
; * ,
.

1

originals).
6

Ib.,
9

41.
105.

Mb.,
10

7

48.

Ib.,72.

8

Ib.,

89.

Ib.,

Ib,

149-

M

2

a

I4io
servants, while
15

RHETORIC A
the
city of

Athens allows her
; .

allies

by

l and to possess thousands to live as the foreigner s slaves 2 There is also what in life or to bequeath at death

some one
*

said about Peitholaus

court,

20

These men used to sell and now they have come to All these passages have the structure described above. Such a form of speech is satisfying, because the significance
.

and Lycophron in a lawyou when they were at home, 3 you here and bought you

of contrasted ideas

is

easily felt, especially

when they

are

thus put side by side, and also because it has the effect is by putting two opposing it of a logical argument
;

conclusions side

by

side that

Such, then,

is

the

you prove one of them false. Parisosis nature of antithesis.

is

35

making the two members of a period equal in length. is making the extreme words of both members This must happen either at the beginning like each other. If at the beginning, the or at the end of each member. resemblance must always be between whole words at the end, between final syllables or inflexions of the same word or the same word repeated. Thus, at the beginning
Paromoeosis
;

aypbv yap

eAa/3ei>

apybv

Trap

avrov

4

and
bwpt]Toi r
eTTe Ao^ro

irapdpprjTOL r* tTTttrjcnv.

5

At
30 OVK

the end
o>?7$?](ray

avrbv Traibiov reroKerai, aAA avrov airiov ytyovtvaif

5

and
V TrAetVrai?

6e (ppovTfoi

KCLL

tv eAa^tarats

e

An
1

example of inflexions of the
181.
2

same word
OVK

is
coi>

atos

Ib.,
3

Ib.,
t

1

86.

Cp. Baiter- Sauppe, op. cit. p. 346. Aristophanes, fragm. 649, Kock, Comicorum Atticorum FragA field he took from him, a fallow field. menta, i, p. 553. * Iliad, ix. 526, Yet might they by presents be won, and by plead ings be pacified 6 Auct. Inc. With OVK, the meaning will be they didn t imagine that he had borne the child, but that he was the cause of its having been borne\ Presumably a humorous remark in a paternity case. Bonitz
4
.

av avrov ov iraiftiov KT\. conjectures 7 Inc. In the midst of plenteous cares and exiguous hopes 8 Inc. Is he worthy to have a copper statue, when he is not worth a copper ?
:
u>i]dr)s

.

BOOK
Of the same word
(T&

III.

9

a

I4io

repeated,
KaKo>9

6

avrov KOL
syllable,
TL b*

G)VTa eAeyes

/cat

vvv ypa^eiy

1

/cd/ccSs.

Of one

av

Tra0s btwov,

et

avbp

eiSey apyov

2
;

35

to have all these and homoeoteleuton. i4io b 3 (The possible beginnings of periods have been pretty fully enumerated in the Theodectea^ There are also spurious
antitheses, like that of

It is possible for the same sentence features together antithesis, parison,

IO

We
on to

Epicharmus There one time I as their guest did stay, And they were my hosts on another day. 5 may now consider the above points settled, and pass say something about the way to devise lively and
;

5

taking sayings. Their actual invention can only come but this treatise through natural talent or long practice

may

indicate the

way

it is

done.

We may

deal with

them
10

will begin by enumerating the different kinds of them. we all find that it by remarking naturally agreeable to get

We

ideas easily: words express ideas, and there words are the most agreeable that enable us to Now strange words simply puzzle us get hold of new ideas. words convey only what we know already it is ordinary

hold of

new

fore those

;

;

from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the poet calls old age a withered stalk 6 he conveys
,

a

new

idea,

a

notion of

lost

new fact, to us by means of the bloom which is common to both
,

general
15

The
are

similes of the poets

do the same, and

things. therefore, if they

good similes, give an effect of brilliance. The simile, as has been said before, 7 is a metaphor, differing from it only in the way it is put and just because it is longer it is less
;

attractive.
1

Besides,
.

it

Inc.
Inc.

When
?

he was alive you spoke
it

does not say outright that this is evil of him, and now you write

evil
2

of him

a

fyu>v,

have been very shocking to you if you had seen 3 Reading px at with the MSS. Cp. Berlin Aristotle, vol. v, p. 1499 a 6 Epicharmus, fragm. 49 in Lorenz s Leben und Schriften des Koers TOKO. p.ev tv Epicharmos, p. 273 eycov fjv, TOKO. 5e Trapa r^vois one time in their midst was I, another time beside them I

Would

man
4

idling

-

rr\vu>v

l

.

Cp. Demetrius, Style, pp. 80, 216. 6 Odyssey, xiv. 213, stubble.

On

7
iii,

c.

4

init.

RHETORICA
that
20
,

and therefore the hearer

is

less interested in

the idea.

see, then, that both speech and reasoning are lively in proportion as they make us seize a new idea promptly.

We

people are not much taken either by obvious arguments (using the word obvious to mean what is plain to everybody and needs no investigation), nor by those which puzzle us l when we hear them stated, but only by
this reason
25

For

those which convey their information to us as soon as we hear them, provided we had not the information already;

mind only just fails to keep up with. These two kinds do convey to us a sort of information but the obvious and the obscure kinds convey nothing, cither at
or which the
:

once or later on.

It
is

is

these qualities, then, that, so far as
is

the meaning of what
acceptable.
antithetical
30

said

concerned,
style
is

make an argument
it
is

So

far

as

the

concerned,

the

form that appeals to
to all the rest
2

us, e.g.

peace

common

was a war

judging that the upon their own

where there is an antithesis between war and peace. It is also good to use metaphorical words but the metaphors must not be far-fetched, or they will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect.
private interests,
;

The words,
for
35

events ought

prospect.
thesis,

ought to set the scene before our eyes to be seen in progress rather than in So we must aim at these three points Anti
too,
:

;

a

Metaphor, and Actuality.

I4ii

Of the four kinds of Metaphor the most taking is the Thus Pericles, for instance, said that proportional kind. the vanishing from their country of the young men who had
the spring were taken out of the year Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not have the Athenians let Greece lose one of
fallen in the
:
*

war was

as

if

5

her two eyes

\

4

When

Chares was pressing

for leave to

be

examined upon Olynthiac war, Cephisodotus was indignant, saying that he wanted his examination to take place while he had his fingers upon the people s
his share in the
1

Cp.

ii,

c.

23,

1400

34.

Byvvater
z

s

conjecture dyvooupev seems
i,

right here. 2 Isocrates, Philippus, 73. 4 Baiter- Sauppe, op. f//., p.

Cp.

c. 7,

1365^2,

33.

250 (Leptines).

BOOK
throat
l
.

III.

10
the Athenians to
2
.

1411*

The same speaker once urged

march to Euboea,

with Miltiades decree as their rations

10

Iphicrates, indignant at the truce made by the Athenians with Epidaurus and the neighbouring sea-board, said that they had stripped themselves of their travelling-money for
3 the journey of war.

people s big stick
Pericles

,

Peitholaus called the state-galley the and Sestos the corn-bin of the^Peiraeus 4
.

*

countrymen remove Aegina, that eyesore And Moerocles said he was no more a Peiraeus. the of rascal than was a certain respectable citizen he named, whose rascality was worth over thirty 5 per cent, per annum to him, instead of a mere ten like his own G There is also the iambic line of Anaxandrides about the way his daughters
bade
his
.

15

put off marrying

My

7 daughters marriage-bonds are overdue.

20

Polyeuctus said of a paralytic man named Speusippus that he could not keep quiet, though fortune had fastened him
in the pillory of disease
.

Cephisodotus called warships
.

<

Diogenes the Dog called taverns painted Aesion said that the Athenians the mess-rooms of Attica
millstones
.

8

25

had emptied

their

town

into Sicily

:

this

is

a graphic

meta

9 Till all Hellas shouted aloud may be regarded phor. as a metaphor, and a graphic one again. Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold too many

10

parades parade

.

Isocrates used the

at

the

national

festivals.
:

same word of those who 11 Another example
It is fitting that

30

12 occurs in the Funeral Speech should cut off her hair beside the

Greece
fell

tomb of those who

at

Salamis, since her freedom and their valour are buried in the same grave/ Even if the speaker here had only said
1 i. e. while he was still in command of his mercenaries, and so could coerce the people. 2 Baiter-Sauppe, p. 220 (Cephisodotus).

219 (Iphicrates). 318 (Peitholaus). 6 To be precise, 33^%. Baiter-Sauppe, p. 275 (Moerocles). 7 Anaxandrides Kock, Com. Att. Fragm., ii, p. 162. 8 9 Ib., p. 318 (Aesion). Baiter-Sauppe, p. 220 (Cephisodotus). 10 If (KKhrjo-ius is retained, the meaning Ib., p. 220 (Cephisodotus). will be to their turn of mobs into assemblies take care not many
Ib., p.
4

3

Ib., p.

5

;

.

11

Isocrates, Philippe s t 12.

12

Epitaphhts (by Lysias

?),

60.

I4

na
that
35 their
it

RHETORICA
weep when valour was being buried in would have been a metaphor, and a graphic grave, but the coupling of their valour and her freedom
was
right to
it
*

b

I41l

one

;

presents a kind of antithesis as well.
,

The

course of

my

words said Iphicrates, lies straight through the middle of l this is a proportional metaphor, and the Chares deeds phrase straight through the middle makes it graphic. The
:

5

is

expression to call in one danger to rescue us from another a graphic metaphor. Lycoleon said, defending Chabrias, even that bronze statue of his that did not respect They

intercedes for

him yonder
it
;

moment, though
intercedes
10

metaphor, however
for

him
of

This was a metaphor for the a vivid would not always apply Chabrias is in danger, and his statue that lifeless yet living thing which
.

2

;

Practising in every metaphorical, for practising a quality implies increasing it. 5 So is God kindled our reason to be a lamp within our souls for both reason

records his services to his country.^

way

littleness

mind

4

is

,

and
15

light reveal things.

So

is

we

are not putting an end
,

so

So is 9 A country pays a heavy signs reckoning in being condemned by the judgement of mankind 10 for a reckoning is damage deservedly incurred.
are

them 7 for both literal and the of such a peace as this apply making postponement to future action. So is such a saying as This treaty is a far nobler trophy than those we set up on fields of battle they celebrate small gains and single successes it celebrates bur 8 for both trophy and treaty triumph in the war as a whole
to our wars, but only postponing
;

;

;

of victory.

,

is got by using the proportional type of metaphor and by being graphic (i. e. making your hearers see things). We have

It

has already been mentioned that liveliness

still
1

to explain

what we mean by

their

seeing things
2

,

and

Baiter-Sauppe,0/. /.,p. 191 (under Lysias). Ib., p. 249 (Lycoleon). 3 Or, the great deeds of his country (Chares glory being regarded as the glory of Athens). The translation given above would be easier if the conjecture virep T/)S- TrdXecoy were followed.
4

I

socrates,

Paneg^
firl
7

151.

one
3

TOU eldovs Auct. Inc.
dn-6

^Practising

being a kind of
TO ytvos,
I

increasing

,

the present

metaphor

is

from species
;

to

genus
8

9

Reading

/cm on.

socrates, Paneg,, 172. 10 Auct. Inc. cp. I socrates,

(Poetics, c Ib., 180.

21),

De

Pace, 1201

BOOK
what must be done to
I

III. ii

b

I4il

effect this.

By making them

see
25

things using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity. Thus, to say that a good man is
1 both the good is certainly a metaphor four-square man and the square are perfect but the metaphor does not suggest activity. On the other hand, in the expression
;

mean

;

with his vigour in

and so and in

in

bloom 2 there is a notion of activity But you must roam as free as a sacred victim 3
full
; ;

Thereat up sprang the Hellenes to their

4

feet,

30

where
for
it

up sprang gives us activity as well as metaphor, at once suggests swiftness. So with Homer s common
:

all such practice of giving metaphorical life to lifeless things of effect the are activity they distinguished by passages

convey.

Thus,
to the valley rebounded the boulder
5
;

Downward anon
remorseless

and

The
and

(bitter)

arrow flew
7
;

;

Flying on eagerly

35

and
Stuck
in the earth, of the heroes 8
;

still

panting to feed on the

flesh 1412**

and

And
In
all

point of the spear 9 through his breastbone.

the

in

its

fury drove

full

because

these examples the things have the effect of being active shameless they are made into living beings behaviour and fury and so on are all forms of activity.
;

And the
1

of proportional metaphors
* 4

poet has attached these ideas to the things by means as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is
:

5

Simonides, fragm.
Ib., 127.

5,

Bergk

4
.

2

Isocrates, Philippus,

10.

The received text of Euripides has not Euripides, Iph. AuL, So. but dopi, spear in hand Bounded the pitiless boulder with Odyssey, xi. 598, J. E. Sandys thunder of doom to the plain , A. S. Way. 6 Iliad, xiii. 587 OTTO 5 eTrraro niKpos oia-ros ; cp. 592. 7 Here too an arrow is spoken of. Iliad, iv. 126. j 8 Iliad, xi. 574. Spears are falling short of their mark.
iV
.

5

;

9

Iliad, xv. 542.

RHETORICA
the shameless
too,

man

to his victim.

In his famous similes,
:

inanimate things in the same way and crested with white, host following host Curving without ceasing. 1
treats
;

he

activity

10

Here he represents everything as moving and living and is movement. 2 Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not
obviously so related just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart. Thus Archytas said that an arbitrator and an altar were

the same, since the injured fly to both for refuge. 3 Or you might say that an anchor and an overhead hook were the

15

same, since both are in a way the same, only the one And secures things from below and the other from above.
to speak of states as levelled 4 is to identify two widely different things, the equality of a physical surface and the
*

equality of political powers. Liveliness is specially conveyed by metaphor, and by the further power of surprising the hearer because the hearer
;

expected something
20

different, his acquisition of the

new

idea

impresses him all the more. His mind seems to say, Yes, to be sure I never thought of that The liveliness of is due to the remarks meaning not being just epigrammatic
.
;

what the words say

as in the saying of Stesichorus that the cicalas will chirp to themselves on the ground 5 Wella new constructed riddles are attractive for the same reason
:

.

;

idea
25

conveyed, and there is metaphorical expression. So with the novelties of Theodorus. 6 In these the thought is
is

startling, and, as

Theodorus puts

it,

does not

fit

in

with the

you already have. They are like the burlesque words that one finds in the comic writers. The effect is produced
ideas

even by jokes depending upon changes of the

letters of

a

word
1 2

7
;

this too
xiii.

is

a surprise.

You

find this in verse as well

Iliad,
iii, 3
4 c

799.
b
,

Ocean waves

rolling to the shore.

7

I4io 32. 3 Diels, Vors. i, p. 326. 5 Cp. Isocrates, Philippics, 40. Cp. ii, c. 21, supra. Cp. Spengel, Artiuni Scriptores, p. 103. Plays upon words are meant, here and eight lines lower down.
c.

10,

BOOK
as in prose.

III. ii

I 4 i2

a

The word which comes
his
feet

is

not what the hearer

imagined: thus

Onward he came, and
1

were shod with
{

his

30

chilblains,

where one imagined the word would be sandals But the should are be moment the words clear the uttered. point
.

Jokes made by altering the

letters

of a

word

consist in

meaning, not just what you say, but something that gives a twist to the word used e. g. the remark of Theodorus
;

2 about Nicon the harpist Thracian parr et crv ( you 3 slavey ), where he pretends to mean OpdrTtis (TV ( you harp-player ), and surprises us when we find he means

35

So you enjoy the point when you see it, the remark will fall flat unless you are aware that though Nicon is a Thracian. Or again /3ovAet avrov vrepo-at. 4 In
something
else.
:

b

I4i2

both these cases the saying must fit the facts. 5 This is also true of such lively remarks as the one to the effect
that to the Athenians their empire (apxy) f the sea was not the beginning (apxrj) of their troubles, since they gained
5

by

it.

Or
was

(a/>x?/)

the opposite one of Isocrates, that their empire the beginning (apx ?i) f their troubles. 6 Either

way, the speaker says something unexpected, the soundness of which is thereupon recognized. There would be nothing
clever in saying
1

empire

is

empire

.

Isocrates

means more

Probably from some burlesque hexameter poem. Opt nTei at in both cases. The readings given conjecturally above are suggested by Mr. Greenwood, following Professor Lane Cooper s article in the American Journal of Philology, January 1920. For a possible colloquial use of dparrot as play the harp (or rather strum with a pun here on strumpet ), cp. the <pXarro#par passage of the Frogs, 1296. There may be a further pun here on the sense confound you (#parrco = you are confounded (Opdrret o-v) 3 See preceding note. You wish [or, do you wish] to persecute him a pun on and Trcpaai (aor. infin. of nepdco). The same play-on-words is found, I think, in Aeschylus Persians, e.g. line 178 laovav yf^v oi^erat Trepo-ai #e Xcor/ fain to ravage-in-the-Persian-way viz. o-ayrjvevo-ai) which should be (
Auct. Inc.
2

The MSS. have

*

,

,

:

,

,

compared with E\evav ....
687.

eXe i/a?, cXai/Spos, eXeVroXiy in
/3ouX7)

Agamemnon
(

avrbv nepcrm, may counsel (or, the Council) destroy him ; or a play, again, on ftovXy But Opo/ca suggests that Ilepo-ai is the real point. (dative). 5 i. e. a Or, there must be a proper enunciation significant stress
,

Others have detected here a play on

must be

on the ambiguous word ^parret in the one case and But cp. I4i2 b II and 13. nepaai in the other. 6 Cp. Isocrates, Philippus 61 Pan eg. 119; De Pace 101.
laid
;

RHETORICA
than that, and uses the word with a new meaning. So too with the former saying, which denies that ap^ in one sense
10

was apx 7 m another sense. In all these jokes, whether a word is used in a second sense or metaphorically, the joke is good if it fits the facts. For instance, Avdo-^tros (proper l OVK where name) avaa-^ros you say that what is so-and-so
?

in
is

one sense

is

not so-and-so in another
fits

;

well, if the

man

unpleasant, the joke

the

facts.

Again, take

Thou must not be Thou should
st."

a stranger stranger than

Do
15

not

3

the words

thou must not be

,

&c v amount

to

saying

that

Here again is same kind also

the stranger must not always be strange? the use of one word in different senses. Of the
is

the much-praised verse of Anaxandrides
for you. 4

:

Death is most fit before you do Deeds that would make death fit
This amounts to saying are not fit to die or it
,
(

it

is

a

fit

thing to die

when you

is

a

20

not

fit

for

you
a-re

,

i.

e.

what you the same

doing.

when The type

thing to die when death is death is not the fit return for
fit

in all these

of language employed is examples but the more briefly and
;

sayings can be expressed, the more for antithesis impresses the new idea more taking they are, and They should always firmly brevity more quickly. have either some personal application or some merit of
antithetically such
25

expression,
place

Thus
dull
:

if they are to be true without being common two requirements not always satisfied simultaneously. a man should die having done no wrong is true but
5

G is the right man should marry the right woman both also true but dull. there must be No, good qualities

together, as in
for
30
.

it

is

fitting

to die

when you

are not

fit

death The more a saying has these qualities, the livelier it appears for instance, its wording is metaif,
:

Baring is past bearing. Kock, Com. Fragm., iii. 209. The above rendering retains the second evos. 3 Retaining and regarding the sentence as a question. 4 Anaxandrides Kock, Com. Att. Fragm., ii, p. 161.
2
f]
:

1

5
op6a>s

Xeyfcrdai.,

c

Kock, Com. Att. Fragm.,

implying the use of the mot juste. iii, p. 447 fragm. adesp. 206.
;

BOOK
phbrical,

III. ii

b

I4i2

metaphorical

in

the

right
it

way,
gives

antithetical,

and balanced, and at the same time
activity.

an idea of

1 Successful similes also, as has been said above, are in a sense metaphors, since they always involve two relations

like the proportional
*

metaphor.
,

Thus

:

a shield,

we

say, 35

the drinking-bowl of Ares 2 and a bow is the chordless 3 This way of putting a metaphor is not simple lyre
is
J

.

,

as

it

would be

if

we

called the
c

bow

a lyre or the shield a
:

drinking-bowl. There are simple similes also we may say that a flute-player is like a monkey, or that a short-sighted

man

s

eyes are like a lamp-flame with water dropping on

simile flame keep winking. 4 it, since both eyes and succeeds best when it is a converted metaphor, for it is

A

possible to say that a shield is like the drinking-bowl of Ares, or that a ruin is like a house in rags, and to say the that Niceratus is like a Philoctetes stung by Pratys
simile

5

made by Thrasymachus when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratys in a recitation competition, still going about unkempt and unwashed. It is in these worst when that fail they fail, and succeed poets respects
best

10

when they succeed,
Those

i.

e.

when they give the resemblance
5
;

pat, as in

legs of his curl just like parsley leaves

and
Just like

Philammon struggling with
similes
;

his punch-ball.

6

These are

all

and that similes are metaphors has

been stated often already. 7
8 Proverbs, again, are metaphors from one species to another. in Suppose, for instance, a man to start some undertaking

15

hope of gain and then to
1

lose

by

it

later on,

Here we have

iii,
z

cc.

4 and 10.
16,

Timotheus, fragm.
(fropniyg

Bergk

4
.

.

attributed to Theognis in Demetrius, de Eloc., 85. Probably Theognis tragicus; cp. Demetrius, On Style, p. 228. 4 But see Bergk , fragm. adesp. 127, vol. iii, p. 728. 4 Or, that a short-sighted man is like a sputtering lamp, since both wink if ^aKafo/iciw can be taken as middle. 5 Kock, Com. Att. Fragm., iii, fr. adesp. 207, p. 448.

3

Cp.

iii, c.

4

fin.

axopdos

:

*

,

6

Ib.,

iii, fr.

208, p. 448.

7
iii,

cc. 4, 10,

n.

8

Cp. Poetics,

c.

21.

RHETORICA
once more the man of Carpathus and his hare V says For both alike went through the said experience.
It
is

he.

has

now been explained

secured and

why

it

fairly completely how liveliness has the effect it has. Successful

20

hyperboles are also metaphors, e.g. the one about the man with a black eye, you would have thought he was a
basket of mulberries
;

here the

black eye

is

compared
*

to

a mulberry because of its colour, the exaggeration lying in the quantity of mulberries suggested. The phrase like soand-so may introduce a hyperbole under the form of a
simile.

Thus
like

Just
25 is

Philammon struggling with
l

his punch-ball

equivalent to you would have thought he and struggling with his punch-ball
;

was Philammon

Those
is

legs of his curl just like parsley leaves

equivalent to his legs are so curly that you would have thought they were not legs but parsley leaves Hyper boles are for young men to use they show vehemence
. ;

of character
30

;

and

this

is

why angry

people use them more

than other people.

Not though he gave me
.
.

as much as the dust or the sands 2 of the sea But her, the daughter of Atreus son, I never will marry, Nay, not though she were fairer than Aphrodite the
.

Golden, Defter of hand than Athene
b

3
.

.

.

I4i3

speech.
It

(The Attic orators are particularly fond of this method of 4 ) Consequently it does not suit an elderly speaker.
should be observed that each kind of rhetoric has
appropriate style.
its

12

own
5

The
5

that of

spoken oratory,

style of written prose is not nor are those of political and

forensic speaking the same.

Both written and spoken have
the latter
is

to be
1

known.

To know
3

to

know how

to

Hares, introduced with good intention into the island, increased
Iliad, ix. 385.
dycavia-TiKT]
:

to a plague.
i. e. 388-90. hyperbole. of the actual strictly, the oratory of debate of the law-courts and the assembly; the combative struggles controversial style.

2

Iliad,

ix.

4

5

more

,

BOOK
are

III. 12

b

I4i3

speak good Greek. To know the former means that you not obliged, as otherwise you are, to hold your tongue when you wish to communicate something to the
is

general public. The written style

the

more

finished

:

the spoken better
10

admits of dramatic delivery alike the kind of oratory that reflects character and the kind that reflects emotion. Hence
actors look out for plays written in the latter style, and poets for actors competent to act in such plays. Yet poets whose 1 plays are meant to be read are read and circulated
:

Chaeremon,

for instance,
;

who

is

as finished as a professional

speech-writer and Licymnius among the dithyrambic poets. Compared with those of others, the speeches of professional

T

5

sound thin in actual contests. Those of the on the other hand, are good to hear spoken, but orators, look amateurish enough when they pass into the hands of a reader. This is just because they are so well suited for an actual tussle, and therefore contain many dramatic touches, which, being robbed of all dramatic rendering, fail to do their own proper work, and consequently look silly. Thus of and unconnected constant words, strings repetitions of words and phrases, are very properly condemned in written speeches but not in spoken speeches speakers use them In this repetition freely, for they have a dramatic effect. there must be variety of tone, paving the way, as it were, to
writers
:

20

dramatic effect
deceived you,

;

e. g.

This

is

the villain

among you who

who
.

you completely
the
actor

cheated you, who meant to betray This is the sort of thing that Philemon

to do in the Old Men s Madness of Anaxand rides, whenever he spoke the words Rhadamanthus

used

25

and Palamedes 2 and also in the prologue to the Saints whenever he pronounced the pronoun I 3 If one does not deliver such things cleverly, it becomes a case of the man who swallowed a poker 4 So too with strings of unconnected words, e.g. I came to him; I met him;
,

.

.

1

/Soordfoprat
2

:

are carried about as
t

pocket-companions

.

Kock, Com. Att. Fragm.
10.
Ib.,
ii,

ii,

p.

139; Anaxandrides, rcpovropavia,

fr.
3 4

p.

140; Anaxandrides,

Evo-e/Sciy.

Lit.,

the

man who

carries the

beam

.

b

I4i3
I

RHETORIC A
besought

him

.

30 delivered with the

Such passages must be acted, not same quality and pitch of voice, as
in

though they had only one idea

them.

They have

the

further peculiarity of suggesting that a number of separate statements have been made in the time usually occupied by one. Just as the use of conjunctions makes many state

ments

into a single one, so the omission of conjunctions acts

in the reverse

way and makes
;

a single one into many.
:

It

thus makes everything I talked to him 1414** him facts the hearer thinks
;
!

more important I entreated him
*

e.

g.

I

came

to

what

a lot of

I

said

1
.

This

is

he paid no attention to anything the effect which Homer seeks when he

writes,

Nireus likewise from

Syme (three well-fashioned ships did bring), Nireus, the son of Aglaia (and Charopus, bright-faced
king),

Nireus,

the
2

comeliest

man

(of

all

that

to

Ilium

s

strand). If

many
name

mentioned- many times
his
is

things are said about a man, his name must be and therefore people think that, if
;

5

mentioned many times, many things have been said about him. So that Homer, by means of this illusion, has made a great deal of Nireus, though he has mentioned him only in this one passage, and has preserved his memory, though he nowhere says a word about him afterwards.

Now
is

the style of oratory addressed to public assemblies The bigger the throng, really just like scene-painting.
:

10

the more distant is the point of view so that, in the one and the other, high finish in detail is superfluous and seems The forensic style is more highly finished; better away. the style of language addressed to a single judge, with whom there is very little room for rhetorical artifices, since he can take the whole thing in better, and
still

more

so

is

judge of what
is
1

is

less intense

to the point and what is not the struggle and so the judgement is undisturbed. This
;

c has TroXXa 8oKfl U7repi5eu> oaa tl-nev, the hearer seems to survey a But this is not number of things that the speaker has said quite
.

A

the usual meaning of vTTfpopav. 2 Iliad, ii. 671-3. Cp. Demetrius,

On

Style, pp. 100-3, 222, 223.

BOOK
is

III. 12

I

4 i4

a

the same speakers do not distinguish themselves in all these branches at once high finish is wanted least where dramatic delivery is wanted most, and here the speaker

why

;

15

must have a good voice, and above all, a strong one. It is ceremonial oratory that is most literary, for it is meant to be read and next to it forensic oratory. To analyse style still further, and add that it must be
;

for why should agreeable or magnificent, is useless it have these traits any more than restraint liberality*, or any other moral excellence? Obviously agreeableness will be produced by the qualities already mentioned, if our
; ,

20

been correct. 1 For what other reason should style be clear and not mean but appropriate ? If it is prolix, it is not clear; nor yet if it is
definition of excellence of style has
,

curt.

Plainly the middle way suits best. Again, style will be made agreeable by the elements mentioned, namely by a good blending of ordinary and unusual words, by the rhythm, and by the persuasiveness that springs from appropriateness.

25

This
2

concludes

our discussion

of
3

style,

both

in

its

applications to the general aspects and in its special have now to deal with various branches of rhetoric.

We

Arrangement.

you must prove

You must state your case, and 3 cannot either state your case and omit to prove it, or prove it without having first stated it since any proof must be a proof of something, and the only use Of of a preliminary statement is the proof that follows it.
has two parts.
it.

A speech

You

;

these

4 part is called the Statement of the case, the second part the Argument, just as we dis

two parts the

first

5 The between Enunciation and Demonstration. tinguish For narration surely is part current division is absurd. of a forensic speech only: how in a political speech or a

35

speech of display can there be narration in the technical 6 sense ? or a reply to a forensic opponent ? or an epilogue in 1414*
closely-reasoned speeches
1

?

Again, introduction, comparison
2

Cp.
iii,
*

iii,

c.

2

init.
4

Hi, cc.
5

2-11.
sc. in dialectic.

3 6

c. 12.
,

sc. in rhetoric.

is

Or peroration except that the eViXoyoy, or conclusion of a speech, usually a longer affair than what we now understand by peroration
.

RHETORICA
of conflicting arguments,
in political

policies.

speeches when there They may occur then
;

and recapitulation arc only found is a struggle between two
;

so

may

even accusation

and defence, often enough
of a political speech.
?
;

but they form no essential part Even forensic speeches do not always

need epilogues not, for instance, a short speech, nor one in which the facts are easy to remember, the effect of an 1 epilogue being always a reduction in the apparent length.
It

follows, then, that the only necessary parts of a speech

are

the

essential features of a speech;

These are the Statement and the Argument. and it cannot in any case
Refutation of the Opponent is part of the so is Comparison of the opponent s case with

have more than Introduction, Statement, Argument, and
Epilogue.
:

10

arguments your own, for that process is a magnifying of your own case and therefore a part of the arguments, since one who does this proves something. The Introduction does
nor does the Epilogue it merely nothing like this reminds us of what has been said already. If we make
;

such distinctions we shall end, like Theodorus and his followers, by distinguishing narration proper from postnarration
15

and
2
.

pre-narration

,

and

(

refutation

from

final
if

refutation
it

But we ought only

to bring in a

new name

indicates a real species with distinct specific qualities ; otherwise the practice is pointless and silly, like the way

Licymnius
*

3

invented
4
,

names
,

in

his

Art of Rhetoric
.

Secundation

Divagation
is

Ramification

The
20
;

Introduction

the

X beginning of a speech, corre- 4

spending to the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flutemusic they are all beginnings, paving the way, as it were, for what is to follow. The musical prelude resembles the
introduction to speeches of display as flute-players play 1 A good effect where a speech may seem too long bad, where it seem too short already. may 2 Cp. Spengel, Artium Scriptores, p. 99, and Plato, Phaedrits, 266,
;
;

267.
3
4

Cp. Spengel, op. cit., p. 88. But the reference in Or, Acceleration
.

firovptaa-is

seems

to

be to

subsidiary arguments which speed on the speech like a favouring breese. Secundation or Proflation may serve to suggest the

metaphor.

BOOK

III. 14

I

4 I4

1

first some brilliant passage they know well and then fit it on to the opening notes of the piece itself, so in speeches of he display the writer should proceed in the same way
;

should begin with what best takes his fancy, and then strike up his theme and lead into it which is indeed what
;

25

(Take as an example the introduction to Isocrates there is nothing in common between the eristics 2 and Helen.) And here, even if you travel far from your subject, it is fitting, rather than that there should be sameness in the entire speech.
is

always done. the Helen 1 of
*

usual subject for the introductions to speeches of 30 Thus Gorgias display is some piece of praise or censure. writes in his Olympic Speech, You deserve widespread

The

admiration, men of Greece praising thus those who started the festival gatherings. 3 Isocrates, on the other hand, censures them for awarding distinctions to fine athletes but
,

4 Or one may begin giving no prize for intellectual ability. with a piece of advice, thus ought to honour good men and so I myself am praising Aristeides or ought
:

We

35

We

honour those who are unpopular but not bad men, men whose good qualities have never been noticed, like Alexander
to

son of Priam.

Here the orator gives advice. Or we may 14.15 as begin speakers do in the law-courts that is to say, with to the audience to excuse us if our speech is appeals
;

about something paradoxical,
Choerilus in the lines

difficult,

or hackneyed

;

like

But now when allotment of

all

has been

made

5
. . .

Introductions to speeches of display, then, may be composed of some piece of praise or censure, of advice to do or not to do something, or of appeals to the audience and you
;

5

must choose between making these preliminary passages connected or disconnected with the speech itself.
Isocrates, Helena, 1-13. e. the disputatious dialecticians to whom Isocrates refers in the introduction to his Helena, 3, 4 : Protagoras, Gorgias, c.
2
i.
1

3

Baiter-Sauppe, op.
4

tit., p.

129 (Gorgias).

P^rpm the epic poem (Perseis) on the Persian war by Choerilus of Samos. The context is given in Kinkel s Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, pp. 266, 267. The apology is for a theme as hackneyed as the Persian war had become.

5

Isocrates,

Paneg.

1,2.

N

2

a

I4i5

RHETORICA
Introductions to forensic speeches, it must be observed, have the same value as the prologues of dramas and the the dithyrambic prelude introductions to epic poems
;

I0

resembling the introduction to a speech of display, as
1 and thy gifts, and thy battle-spoils 2 In prologues, and in epic poetry, a foretaste of the theme is given, intended to inform the hearers of it in advance instead of keeping their minds in suspense. Anything vague puzzles them so give them a grasp of the beginning, and they can hold fast to it and follow the argument. So we find-

For

thee,

.

.

-

:

15

Sing,

O

goddess of song, of the Wrath

3
.
. .

Tell me,

O

Muse, of the hero
there

4
.
.
.

Lead me to tell a new tale, how to Europe Out of the Asian land /
.

came great warfare

.

20

The tragic poets, too, let us know the pivot of their play not at the outset like Euripides, at least somewhere in the 6 preface to a speech like Sophocles
;

if

Polybus was

my

father
is

7
. . .

;

and so

in

Comedy.

This,

then,

the

most

essential

property of the introduction, to show what the aim of the speech is and therefore no
function and distinctive
;

introduction ought to be employed where the subject long or intricate.
25

is

not

The
in

other kinds of introduction employed are remedial purpose, and may be used in any type of speech. They

are concerned with the speaker, the hearer, the subject, or Those concerned with the speaker the speaker s opponent.
1

dramatic prologues (cp. I4i4 b 20 and 1415*9). Reading (with the Old Latin Translation, cp. the Scholiast, Rabe, p. 230) eV 8e
2

Bergk

4
,

iii,

p. 728, fragm. adesp. 124.

sc.

TrpoXoyois, in place of eV de rois Xoyoir. 4 3 Iliad, i. i. Odyssey, i. i.

cp. Kinkel, op. cit., p. 267. rendering seems necessary if the manuscript reading is retained, the TrpoXoyo? being regarded for the nonce as the beginning But Spengel s conjecture not of a play but of a dramatic speech, rw TTpoXoy&j, dXAa ye TTOV cotTTrep ^,o(pOK\fjS is attractive. coo-Tj-fp Evpinidys
?;
6

5

Choerilus

Some such

ei>

7

Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 774.

BOOK

III. 14

I

4i 5

himself or with his opponent are directed to removing or But whereas the defendant will begin exciting prejudice.

by dealing with

this sort of thing, the prosecutor will take quite another line and deal with such matters in The reason for this is not far 30 the closing part of his speech. The seek. when he is going to to defendant, bring himself

on the stage, must clear away any obstacles, and therefore must begin by removing any prejudice felt against him. But if you are to excite prejudice, you must do so at the
close, so that the

judges

may more

easily

remember what

you have

said.

The appeal to the hearer aims at securing his goodwill, or at arousing his resentment, or sometimes at gaining his serious attention to the case, or even at distracting it for
gaining
it

35

is

not always an advantage, and speakers will

often for that reason try to

make him laugh. use any means you choose to make your hearer receptive among others, giving him a good impression of your character, which always helps to secure his attention.

You may
;

He will be ready to attend to anything that touches himself, and to anything that is important, surprising, or agreeable and you should accordingly convey to him the impression that what you have to say is of this nature. If you wish to
distract his attention,

;

you should imply that the subject does not affect him, or is trivial or disagreeable. But observe, all this has nothing to do with the speech itself.
It

5

merely has to do with the weak-minded tendency of the
is

hearer to listen to what

beside the point.
is

Where

this

tendency
the main

is

absent, no

introduction

summary statement of your subject, body of your speech. Moreover, calls for attention, when required, may come equally well in any part of a
;

wanted beyond a to put a sort of head on

least

speech in fact, the beginning of it is just where there is slackness of interest it is therefore ridiculous to put this kind of thing at the beginning, when every one is
;

10

listening with most attention. in the speech where such an
4

appeal

Choose therefore any point is needed, and then say
it

Now

I

beg you to note
as myself
;

this point

concerns you quite

as

much

or

b

I4i5
I

RHETORICA
will tell

you that whose

like

you have never yet
This
is

l

heard
15

for

terror, or for

wonder.

what Prodicus

slipping in a bit of the fifty-drachma showlecture for the audience whenever they began to nod . It
called
is plain that such introductions are addressed not to ideal The use of intro hearers, but to hearers as we find them.

ductions
universal

to

excite

prejudice or to

dispel

misgivings
2
.

is

My
20

lord, I will not
all this

say that eagerly
?

.

.

or

Why
looks
;

3

preface

Introductions are popular with those whose case is weak, or weak it pays them to dwell on anything rather than
facts

the actual

of

it.

That

is

why

slaves,

instead of

answering the questions put to them, make indirect replies with long preambles. The means of exciting in your
25

hearers goodwill and various other feelings of the same kind have already been described. 4 The poet finely says

May

I

find in

Phaeacian hearts, at
r>

my

coming, goodwill

and compassion

;

and these are the two things we should aim at. In speeches of display we must make the hearer feel that the eulogy includes either himself or his family or his way of life or
30

something or other of the kind. For it is true, as Socrates says in the Funeral Speech? that the difficulty is not to praise the Athenians at Athens but at Sparta The introductions of political oratory will be made out of
*

.

the

same materials
is

as those of the forensic kind,

though

the nature of political oratory

makes them very

rare.

The

35

already, and therefore the facts of the subject case need no introduction but you may have to say some thing on account of yourself or your opponents or those present may be inclined to treat the matter either more or You may accordingly less seriously than you wish them to. have to excite or dispel some prejudice, or to make the
;

known

;

1

Auct.
ii,

3
4
6

Inc. Sophocles, Antigone, 223. Cp. Euripides, Iph. Taur., 1162.
cc.
i

2

ff.

5

Odyssey,
D.

vi.

327.

Cp. Plato,

Menexenus, 235

BOOK
matter

III. 14

b

I4i5

under discussion
l
:

than before

introduction.

seem more or less important for either of which purposes you will want an You may also want one to add elegance to
will

your remarks, feeling that otherwise they
air,

have a casual

a eulogy of the Eleans, in which, without I4i6 any preliminary sparring or fencing, he begins straight off
like

Gorgias

with
15

Happy

city of Elis

2
!

In dealing with prejudice, one class of argument is that whereby you can dispel objectionable suppositions about It makes no practical difference whether such yourself. a supposition has been put into words or not, so that this Another way 3 is to meet any distinction may be ignored.
of the issues directly
that
:

5

to

deny the alleged

fact

;

or to say

you have done no harm, or none to him, or not as much as he says or that you have done him no injustice, or not much or that you have done nothing disgraceful, these are the sort or nothing disgraceful enough to matter
;
; :

of questions on which the dispute hinges. replying to Nausicrates, admitted that he

Thus

Iphicrates,
10

had done the deed

alleged, and that he had done Nausicrates harm, but not Or you may admit the that he had done him wrong. 4 but it with other balance facts, and say that, if the wrong, deed harmed him, at any rate it was honourable or that, or something if it gave him pain, at least it did him good else like that. Another way is to allege that your action was due to mistake, or bad luck, or necessity as Sophocles said he was not trembling, as his traducer maintained, in order to make people think him an old man, but because he
;
;

*5

could not help it he would rather not be eighty years old. 5 You may balance your motive against your actual deed
;

;

saying, for instance, that you did not mean to injure him but to do so-and-so ; that you did not do what you are
falsely
1

charged with doing

the

damage was

accidental

I

to amplify (magnify) or depreciate. Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, p. 130 (Gorgias). 3 c b c a Reading rpoTro?, with A here and in I4i6 14. [In I4i6 I A has which should be retained.] For the connexion, or confusion, , between TOKOS and rpdn-os see Bonitz s Index, pp. 767, 772. 4 Baiter-Sauppe, op. cit-, p. 219 (Iphicrates). c sc. but he was.
2
,

RHETORICA
20

should indeed be a detestable person intended this result. Another way

25

had deliberately open when your calumniator, or any of his connexions, is or has been subject to the same grounds for suspicion. Yet another, when others are subject to the same grounds for suspicion but are admitted to be in fact innocent of the charge e. g. Must I be a profligate because I am well-groomed ? 1 Then soand-so must be one too. if other Another, people have been calumniated by the same man or some one else, or, without being calumniated, have been suspected, like your self now, and yet have been proved innocent. Another way is to return calumny for calumny and say, It is monstrous
if

I

is

:

30

statements when you cannot trust the Another is when the question has been So with Euripides reply to Hygiaenon, already decided. in the action for an exchange of properties, accused who, him of impiety in having written a line encouraging perjury
to trust the

man s

man

himself.

My

tongue hath sworn

:

no oath

is

on

my

soul. 2

Euripides said that his opponent himself was guilty in bringing into the law-courts cases whose decision belonged to the Dionysiac contests. If I have not already answered for my words there, I am ready to do so if you choose to
prosecute
35

Another method is to denounce what an calumny, showing enormity it is, and in particular that it raises false issues, 4 and that it means a lack of confidence in the merits of his case. The argument from
there/
evidential circumstances
is

me

3

available for both parties
is

:

thus

&

I4l6

in

the Teucer^ Odysseus says that Teucer

closely

bound

to

Priam, since his mother Hesione was Priam s sister. Teucer replies that Telamon his father was Priam s enemy, and that he himself did not betray the spies to Priam.

Another method,

some
5
1

suitable for the calumniator, is to praise at great length, 6 and then attack some merit trifling important failing concisely or after mentioning a number
;

Reading

et,

on

Kadiipios, /^ot^o s.

2

3
4

Euripides, Hippolytits, 612.
(trial) to

5 6

Baiter-Sauppe, Or. Att., Pt. ii, p. 216. Or, that it leads from one prosecution
Sophocles, l^encer,

another

.

Nauck 2
KT\.

,

p.

256.

Reading

TO

eVmfoiWi

BOOK
the question.

III. 15

1416

of good qualities to attack one bad one that really bears on This is the method of thoroughly skilful and

unscrupulous prosecutors. By mixing up the man s merits with what is bad, they do their best to make use of them to

damage him.
There
is

apologist.

another method open to both calumniator and Since a given action can be done from many
10

motives, the former must try to disparage it by selecting the worse motive of two, the latter to put the better construction

on

as his

Thus one might argue that Diomedes chose Odysseus 1 companion because he supposed Odysseus to be the best man for the purpose and you might reply to this that it was, on the because he was the only hero so contrary, worthless that Diomedes need not fear his rivalry.
it.
;

16

We may
Narration.

now

pass from the subject of calumny to that of
15

oratory is not continuous but There must, of course, be some survey of the intermittent. The actions that form the subject-matter of the speech.

Narration in ceremonial

speech is a composition containing two parts. One of these is not provided by the orator s art, viz. the actions them
selves, of
is

which the orator

is

in

no sense author.

The

other

part provided by namely, the proof (where proof 20 is needed) that the actions were done, the description of
his art,

their quality or of their extent, or even all these

three
is

why things together. desirable to make the whole narrative continuous
case thus
therefore,

Now

the reason

sometimes
is

it

not

that the

expounded
from one

is

hard to keep
he
is

in

mind.
is, e.

Show,
g. brave,

set of facts that

your hero

and from other

sets of facts that
is

able, just, &c.

A
25

speech thus arranged

comparatively simple, instead of and You will have to recall elaborate. being complicated well-known deeds among others and because they are
;

well-known, the hearer usually needs no narration of them none, for instance, if your object is the praise of Achilles

;

;

we

all

know

the facts of his
facts.
1

life

apply those

But

if

what you have to do is to your object is the praise of
x.

Cp. Iliad,

242-7.

RHETORICA
Critias,

you must narrate
l
.

his deeds,

which not many people

know
30

of

.

.

Nowadays it is said, absurdly enough, that the narration should be rapid. Remember what the man said to the baker who asked whether he was to make the cake hard
or soft:

What, can

t

you make

it

We
35

are not to

make

Here, again, does not either in in concise consist or Tightness rapidity but in the in mean that ness, is, happy saying just so much
;

narrations, just as long introductions or long arguments.

make long

right 1* Just so here. we are not to

the facts plain, or will lead the hearer to believe that the 1417** thing has happened, or that the man has

as will

make

caused injury or wrong to some one, or that the facts are or really as important as you wish them to be thought
:

the opposite facts to establish the opposite arguments. You may also narrate as you go anything that does
e. g. I kept telling him to do his duty abandon his children or discredit to your e. But he answered me adversary, that, wherever he g. find there he would find other children himself, might the answer Herodotus 2 records of the Egyptian mutineers.

credit to yourself,

and
5

not

;

,

Slip in anything else that the judges will enjoy.

The defendant

will

make

less

of the narration.

He

has

10

to maintain that the thing has not happened, or did no harm, or was not unjust, or not so bad as is alleged. He must therefore not waste time about what is admitted fact, unless

that the thing was must Further, we speak of events as past and gone, except where they excite pity or indigna tion by being represented as present. The Story told to
this bears

on

his

own

contention

;

e. g.

done, but was not wrong.

Alcinous
T

3

is

an example of a brief chronicle, when

it

is

5

4 Another instance is repeated to Penelope in sixty lines. the Epic Cycle as treated by Phayllus, and the prologue to the Oenens!"

The
1

narration should depict character

;

to

which end you

2 4
}

There may be a lacuna here in the Greek text. 3 Cp. Herodotus, ii. 30. Odyssey, ix-xii. Odyssey, xxiii. 264-84 and 310-43. 2 Euripides, Oeneus, fragm. 558, 559, Nauck pp. 536, 537.
,

BOOK
must know what makes
it

III.

16

I

4 i7

a

do
;

so.

One such

thing

is

the

indication of moral purpose the quality of purpose in dicated determines the quality of character depicted and is
itself

determined by the end pursued.

Thus

it

is

that

mathematical discourses depict no character; they have nothing to do with moral purpose, for they represent

any end. On the other hand, the do depict character, being concerned with moral questions. This end will also be gained by

nobody

as pursuing
1

Socratic dialogues

20

describing the manifestations of various types of character, e. g. he kept walking along as he talked which shows the
*

,

and rough manners. Do not let your words seem inspired so much by intelligence, in the manner now current, as by moral purpose e.g. I willed this aye, it was my moral purpose true, I gained nothing by it, still it is better thus. For the other way shows good sense, but this shows good character; good sense making us go after what is useful, and good character after what is noble. Where any detail may appear incredible, then add the cause of it of this Sophocles provides an example in the Antigone where Antigone says she had cared more for her brother than for husband or children, since if the latter

man

s

recklessness

:

;

;

25

;

-,

perished they might be replaced,

30

and mother in their graves my Lie dead, no brother can be born to me. 2
father
If you have no such cause to suggest, just say that you are aware that no one will believe your words, but the fact remains that such is your nature, however hard the world

But since

may

find

it

to believe that a

man deliberately

does anything
Relate the

35

except what pays him.
Again, you must

make

use of the emotions.

familiar manifestations of them,

yourself and your opponent

;

and those that distinguish he went away for instance,
.

scowling
1

So Aeschines described Cratylus as These details with and hissing shaking his fists fury of what they take the truth the audience carry conviction
at
.
:

me

1

2

Cp. Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Sophocles, Antigone^ 911, 912.

p. 108,

RHETORICA
know
as so

much evidence

for the truth of

what they do
:

not.

Plenty of such details
5

may

be found

in

Homer

Thus did she say
in

:

but the old

woman

buried her face

her hands

l
:

a true touch

people beginning to cry do put their hands
first

over their eyes.

Bring yourself on the stage from the
character, that people

in

the right
;

may regard you in that light and the same with your adversary but do not let them see what you are about. How easily such impressions may be
;

10

conveyed we can see from the way in which we get some inkling of things we know nothing of by the mere look of the messenger bringing news of them. Have some narra
tive in
let

many different parts of your speech there be none at the beginning of it.
political
;

;

and sometimes

In

narration
If there

oratory there is very little opening for nobody can narrate what has not yet happened.
narration at

is

recollection of
15

which

is

plans for the future.

all, it will be of past events, the to help the hearers to make better Or it may be employed to attack

some one

character, or to eulogize him only then you will not be doing what the political speaker as such, has to do. If any statement you make is hard to believe, you must
s
s

guarantee its truth, and at once offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected. 2
Jocasta, in his Oedipus; keeps guaranteeing the truth of her answers to the inquiries of the man who is 20 seeking her son and so with Haemon in Sophocles. 4
;

Thus Carcinus

The duty

of the

Arguments

is

to attempt demonstrative 17

These proofs must bear directly upon the question proofs. in dispute, which must fall under one of four heads, (i) If

you maintain that the
25 in court is to

act

was

prove this. did no harm, prove this.
1

not committed, your main task (2) If you maintain that the act If you maintain that (3) the act

Odyssey, xix. 361.
for
.

Or possibly, and then arrange your reasons systematically those who demand them But cp. the Scholia (Rabe, p. 248).
3 4

2

Carcinus, Oedipus, N. p. 798. Cp. Sophocles, Antigone, 635-8, 701-4.
,

2

BOOK
was
as
less

III. 17

1417

than

is

alleged, or (^justified, prove these facts, just

you would prove the act not to have been committed if you were maintaining that. It should be noted that only where the question in dispute falls under the first of these heads can it be true Here that one of the two parties is necessarily a rogue. be if the as it cannot might pleaded, ignorance dispute were whether the act was justified or not. This argument must therefore be used ! in this case only, not in the
others.

30

In ceremonial speeches you will develop your case mainly by arguing that what has been done is, e.g., noble and useful. The facts themselves are to be taken on trust
;

proof of them
set

only submitted on those rare occasions when they are not easily credible or when they have been
is

down

to

some one

else.
35

In political speeches you may maintain that a proposal is impracticable or that, though practicable, it is unjust, or will do no good, or is not so important as its proposer thinks.
;

Note any falsehoods about
like

irrelevant matters

they will look

proof that his other statements also are

false.

Argument
argument

a

I4i8

by example is highly suitable for political by enthymeme better suits forensic.
deals with future events, of which
it

oratory,

oratory can do no more than

Political

Forensic oratory deals quote past events as examples. with what is or is not now true, which can better be demon
strated, because not
in

contingent

there

is

what has now already happened.

Do

no contingency not use a con

tinuous succession of

enthymemes

:

intersperse

them with
There

5

other matter, or they will spoil one another are limits to their number
Friend, you have spoken as

s effect.

much

as a sensible

man would

have spoken. 2
*

as

try
1

Nor should you much says Homer, not as weir. to make enthymemes on every point if you do, you
;

1

Reading

xpqrrreoi/
*

dwelt upon , 2 Odyssey,

with A c Other time must be given to
.

MSS.

l

give xprw(rre

oi>,

must be

.

iv.

204.

RHETORICA
10 will

be acting just like some students of philosophy, whose conclusions are more familiar and believable than the

premisses from which they draw them.

And

avoid the
;

enthymeme form when you
it

will

either

kill

are trying to rouse feeling the feeling or will itself fall flat

for
all

:

simultaneous motions tend to cancel each other either

com

15

Nor should you go after the enthypletely or partially. meme form in a passage where you are depicting character the process of demonstration can express neither moral
character nor moral purpose. Maxims should be employed in the Arguments and in the Narration too since these

20

do express character: I have given him this, though I am quite aware that one should Trust no man Or if are to the emotions I do not you appealing regret it, though I have been wronged if he has the profit on his side, I have justice on mine.
"

".

:

;

Political oratory

is

a

more
it

difficult

task than forensic

;

deals with the future, whereas the pleader deals with the past, which, as Epimenides of Crete said, even the diviners already know. (Epimenides
so, since

and naturally

25

did not practise divination about the future only about the obscurities of the past.) in forensic Besides, oratory
;

you have a basis in the law and once you have a startingpoint, you can prove anything with comparative ease.
;

Then

leisurely digressions versary, talk about

again, political oratory affords few chances for those in -which you may attack your ad
yourself,

or

work on your hearers

emotions

fewer chances, indeed, than any other affords, unless your set purpose is to divert your hearers attention. 1
;

30

Accordingly, if you find yourself in difficulties, follow the lead of the Athenian speakers, and that of Isocrates, who

makes regular attacks upon people in the course of a political speech, e.g. upon the Lacedaemonians in the 3 Panegyricus? and upon Chares in the speech about the allies.
In ceremonial oratory, intersperse your speech with bits of episodic eulogy, like Isocrates, who is always bringing some
b without quitting egurrfi I4o8 36. e^iVrT/Tm would mean cp. h your proper ground cp. eKrozaov/, I4i4 29. 2 3 Isocrates, Paneg., 110-14. Cp. Isocrates, De Pace, 27.
1
,

;

BOOK

III. 17

a

I4i8

one forward for this purpose. 1 And this is what Gorgias meant by saying that he always found something to talk 2 For if he speaks of 3 Achilles, he praises Peleus, about. then Aeacus, then Zeus and in like manner the virtue of valour, describing its good results, and saying what it is
;

35

like.

4

you have proofs to bring forward, bring them and forward, your moral discourse as well if you have no b then fall back upon moral discourse after all, I4i8 enthymemes,
if
; :

Now

it

is

more

fitting for

a good

man

to display himself as

an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner. Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones
:

their logical

cogency

is

more

striking

:

the facts about two
are put

opposites always stand out clearly
side

when the two

by
*

side.
5

to the Opponent is not a separate division of the speech it is part of the Arguments to break down the opponent s case, whether by objection or by counter;

The Reply

5

syllogism.
in court, if

Both

in political

speaking and when pleading

you are the first speaker you should put your own arguments forward first, and then meet the arguments on the other side by refuting them and pulling them to
If, however, the case for the other side pieces beforehand. contains a great variety of arguments, begin with these,

Messenian assembly, when he demolished the arguments likely to be used against him If you speak later, you must first, before giving his own. 6
like Callistratus in the

10

by means of refutation and counter-syllogism, attempt some answer to your opponent s speech, especially if his
arguments have been well received.

For just as our minds refuse a favourable reception to a person against whom they are prejudiced, so they refuse it to a speech when they 1 Isocrates has episodic passages on Theseus (Helena 23-38), on Paris (Helena 41-8), on Pythagoras and the Egyptian priests (Bttsiris 21-9), on the poets (Busiris 38-40), and on Agamemnon (Panathenaicus, 72-84).

15

Baiter-Sauppe, op.

cit., p.

Reading

Xe ya (rather
:

130 (Gorgias). than Ae -ycoi/).

More

briefly

and
.

in like

manner

the value

and goodness of that

great virtue Courage Omitting the comma after eWiV.

Baiter-Sauppe, op.

cit., p.

218 (Callistratus).

b

I4i8

RHETORICA
have been favourably impressed by the speech on the
other side.

You

should,

therefore,

make room
;

in

the

minds of the audience for your coming speech and this will be done by getting your opponent s speech out of the So attack first that either the whole of it, or the way. most important, successful, or vulnerable points in it, and
20

thus inspire confidence in what you have to say yourselfFirst,

champion
I

Never,

will I be of Goddesses l ween, would Hera
.

.

.

.

.

.

:

where the speaker has attacked the

silliest

argument
:

first.

So much for the Arguments. With regard to the element of moral character there are assertions which, if made about yourself, may excite dis25 like,

appear tedious, or expose you to the risk of contradic and other things which you cannot say about your Put such opponent without seeming abusive or ill-bred.
tion
;

remarks, therefore, into the mouth of some third person. This is what Isocrates does in the Philippus* and in the The latter Antidosis? and Archilochus in his satires. himself father as the his represents attacking daughter in
the lampoon

Think nought impossible at Nor swear that it shall not
30

all,

befall

4
.

.

.

and puts into the mouth of Charon the carpenter the lampoon which begins

Not

for the

wealth of Gyges.

5
.

.

.

So too Sophocles makes Haemon appeal to his father on behalf of Antigone as if it were others who were speaking. 6 Again, sometimes you should restate your enthymemes in the form of maxims e. g. Wise men will come to
*

;

35

terms
1 2

in the

hour of success

;

for

they

will

gain most

if

Euripides, Troades, 969 and 971. Isocrates, Philippus, 4-7. 3 Ib., Antidosis, 132-9, 141-9. 4 4 Archilochus, fragm. 74, Bergk ii, the daughter, Neobule. 5 4 Ib., fragm. 25, Bergk ii, p. 390. 6 Sophocles, Antigone, 688-700.
,

p.

403.

The

father

is

Lycambes

;

,

BOOK
they do
1
-

III. 17

I

4 i8

b

If we ought

Expressed as an enthymeme. this would to come to terms when doing so will enable
run>

us to gain the greatest advantage, then to terms in the hour of success.
18

we ought

to

come

Next as to Interrogation. The best moment to employ this is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in absurdity. Thus Pericles questioned Lampon about the way of cele
2 brating the rites of the Saviour Goddess. Lampon declared that no uninitiated person could be told of them.

1419**

Pericles then asked,

Do you know them
Why,

*

yourself?

Yes

,

answered Lampon.
be,

said Pericles,

how can

that
5

when you are uninitiated ? Another good moment is when one premiss of an argu ment is obviously true, and you can see that your opponent must say yes if you ask him whether the other is true. Having first got this answer about the other, do not go on to ask him about the obviously true one, but just state the con
clusion yourself. Thus, when Meletus denied that Socrates believed in the existence of gods but admitted 3 that he

talked about a supernatural power, Socrates proceeded to ask whether supernatural beings were not either children

10

of the gods or in

some way divine?
c

Yes

,

said Meletus.

replied Socrates, is there any the existence of children of the gods
,

Then

existence of the gods themselves ? 4 is when you expect to show that your opponent is contra dicting either his own words or what every one believes.

one who believes in and yet not in the Another good occasion

A

fourth

is

when

it

is

impossible for him to
If

meet your
True,
,

question except by an evasive answer.
,

he answers

and yet not true or Partly true and partly not true or True in one sense but not in another the audience thinks In other he is in difficulties, and applauds his discomfiture. for if your opponent cases do not attempt interrogation gets in an objection, you are felt to have been worsted.
,

15

;

1

2

Cp. Isocrates,

Archidamus>

50.
<s

sc.

Derneter.

3

utf
4

Reading with Madvig flprjKoros ds c duipovtov with Roemer and A
.

dcupoviov, instead of

Cp. Plato, Apology, 27
645-10

c.

O

RHETORICA
You cannot
of

the audience
also

ask a series of questions owing to the incapacity to follow them and for this reason
;

you should
possible.
20

make your enthymemes

as

compact

as

In replying, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer. In meeting questions that seem to involve you in a contradiction,
offer the

explanation at the outset of your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his con For it is not difficult to see the drift of his clusion.

argument

in

advance.

various means of refutation, us from the Topics}
25

This point, however, as well as the may be regarded as known to
in

When

your opponent

drawing

his conclusion puts

it

in

the form of a question, you must justify your

answer.

Thus when Sophocles was asked by Peisander whether he had, like the other members of the Board of Safety, voted
for setting

did you not think
3

this

up the Four Hundred, he said Yes. Why, it wicked ? Yes. So you committed wickedness? Yes said Sophocles, for there was
,

nothing better to do. Again, the Lacedaemonian, when he was being examined on his conduct as ephor, was asked

35

whether he thought that the other ephors had been justly Yes he said. Well then asked his put to death. did not the same measures as they ? opponent, yon propose Yes. Well then, would not you too be justly put to death ? Not at all said he they were bribed to do it,
,

,

,

;

and
b

I

did

it

from conviction
after

.

Hence you should not ask

I4ig

drawing the conclusion, nor put the conclusion itself in the form of a further question, unless there is a large balance of truth on your side.

any further questions

As to jests. These are supposed to be of some service in con
Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness
troversy.
in
5
;

which he was

2

right.

Jests

have been

classified in thc-

Poetics?

Some
that
vi\\.

not

;

sec

are becoming to a gentleman, others are you choose such as become you. Irony
z

1

Topics,
3

Not

in the existing Poetics.

Baiter-Sauppe, op rif. Cp. 1372* I.

}

p.

131 (Gorgias).

BOOK
better befits

III. 18

I

4i9

b

a gentleman

man

jokes to

amuse

than buffoonery the ironical the to buffoon amuse other himself,
;

people.

19

The Epilogue

has four parts.

You must

(i)

make

the

10

audience well-disposed towards yourself and ill-disposed towards your opponent, (2) magnify or minimize l the leading facts, (3) excite the required state of emotion in your hearers,

and

(4)

refresh their memories.

(1)

Having shown your own
of your

truthfulness

and the im15

opponent, thing is to in your censure and hammer him, yourself, 2 You must aim at one two of points. objects you must make yourself out a good man and him a bad one either in

truthfulness

the

natural

commend

How this is to be yourselves or in relation to your hearers. managed by what lines of argument you are to represent
people as good or bad
(2)

The

do next is facts must be admitted before you can discuss how important they are just as the body cannot grow except from some thing already present. The proper lines of argument to be used for this purpose of amplification and depreciation have
;

has been already explained. 3 facts having been proved, the natural thing to to magnify or minimize their importance. The
this

20

4 already been set forth. (3) Next, when the facts

and

their

importance

are

clearly understood, you must excite your hearers emotions. 25 These emotions are pity, indignation, anger, hatred, envy,

emulation, pugnacity. The lines of argument to be used 5 for these purposes also have been previously mentioned. (4) Finally you have to review what you have already
said.

Here you may properly do what some wrongly
in the introduction

recommend doing
you should do
in
in

repeat your points

frequently so as to

make them

your

What 30 easily understood. introduction is to state your subject,
;

order that the point to be judged may be quite plain in the epilogue you should summarize the arguments by which

your case has been proved.
1

The

first

step in this reviewing
3
i,

2 4

amplify or depreciate (extenuate). Or, mould your audience to your
ii,

will.
ii,

c. 9.

c. 19.

5

cc. I-II.

O

2

b

I4i9
process
is

RHETORICA
you have done what you under took to do. You must, then, state what you have said and why you have said it. Your method may be a comparison and you may of your own case with that of your opponent either the have both handled the same ways you compare
to observe that
;

35

opponent point or make your comparison less direct said so-and-so on this point I said so-and-so, and this is why
:

My

;

!42O

a
I

said

it

\

Or with modest
I
if

irony,
.

e. g.

He certainly said

so-

and-so, but

said so-and-so

Or

How

vain he would

have been
put
it

in

he had proved all the form of a question,
or

this instead of that!

Or

What

has not been proved

by me?

What

lias

my. opponent proved?

You may

proceed, then, cither in this way by setting point against point, or by following the natural order of the arguments as

!42O spoken,

b

first

giving your own, and then separately,

if

you

wish, tho.se of your opponent. For the conclusion, the disconnected style of language is appropriate, and will mark the difference between the oration

and the peroration. 1

I

have done.
!

You have

heard me.
~

The
1

facts are before you.
:

ask for your judgement.

Aoyos, eVt Aoyo?
tlie

speech

and

after-speech, the

words of your speech

and

words

iJiat

length may vary; the note on 1414^ I above. 3 Cp. Lysias, Eratosthenes,

7ri\oyos is vaguely a conclusion, and its cp. its use at the beginning of this chapter, and also
it.

end

fin.

INDEX
54
a

99

b

=

i354

a

I399
b
1 1 ff.

b.

oa
I

2o b

=

1400
;

accusation and defence, 58

;

68 b

man s rivals)
i, 8,

b 87 9, 31-33; 88*

i

ff.

15.

Achilles, 59 2; 63*19; 78 3i; 8o b 29; 96 a 26; 96 b 12, 15, 16; b a b b i i8; 6 2i,24; i6 2y; i8 36. b a acting and actors, 3 31 ff. 4 23 b a b 4 22; 5 23; I3 n, 25, 28. actions, voluntary and involuntary,
; ;

a

b

|

amplification

68 b 6ff.

actuality (vividness of style), b b 36; ii 24ff. ; I2 32.

lo b
!

Amphiaraus, 89* 16. and depreciation (maximizing and minimizing, heightening and lowering, ex tolling and belittling, augmenta tion and lessening), 68* 10, 27 a 76*34; 3 i6; 8*4; I3 b 345
;

b

analogical
tional)

Aegina and Aeginetans, 96*20;

n a 15.

Aenesidemus, 73* 22. Aeschines (Socraticus), I7 b i. a Aeschylus quoted, 88 7. Aesion quoted, 11*25. Aesop and Aesop s Fables, 93*
93
b
10, 23.

i

(reciprocal, propor a metaphor, 7*14; li i See ff, metaphor b Anaschetos, I2 12. b Anaxagoras, 98 16. Anaxandrides quoted, i i a 19 2b

&c.

.

;

1

17
1

;

I3

b 26.

3

1

;

;

Agathon quoted, 92
ages of
(2)

man

:

(i)

7 2*9. a youth, 89 3
;

b

|

ff.

;

prime

old age, 89 i4 ff. Happy old b 6i b 27 ff. age, 6o 2i b Agesipolis (v. 1.), 98 32. agonistic style see under comba
;
:

of b

life,

9o 29

a

Androcles, o* 10. b Androtion, 6 27. anger, 54*17; 78*31 ff. antecedent and consequent, 92*
19
ff.
;

ff.

;

(3)

b Antigone of Sophocles, 73 9

i

i

75* a b 2o; I7 3o; i8 33. Antimachus quoted, 8*2. b Antiphon (the poet), 79 1 5 85* 9

34; I5

b

;

;

tive

.

agreement
73
b 8.

(covenant),

6o a

1

5

;

;

Antisthenes quoted, 7 a 9. b b antithesis, 9 33~io 5;
31
;

io b 28-

b a Ajaxvi Theodectes, 99 28 o 28.
;

agriculture, 81*24.

Alcaeus, 67*9. b Alcibiades, 9o 29.

Alcidamas, mentioned and quoted, a b a b 73 i8; [97 n]; 98 10 ff. 6 b i ff., i8ff.; 6 nff.
;

23. Aphrodite, b Apollo, 98 34 ( the god at Delphi ). b apophthegms, 89*16; 94 34 12*21.
;

I2 b 32. ob

appropriateness (propriety, deco b rum) of style, 4 4 ff. 8* 10 ff.
;

Alcinous, 17* 14.

arbitration

)(

litigation, 74

20.

Alcmaeon, 97 3. Alexander (Paris), 63*19; 97 b 2i; b 98*22; 99*3; i 2i,36; 15*1. his (or Alexander (the Great) Philip s) supremacy implied in
:

b

Archelaus, 98*24. Archibius, 76* 11. b Archidamus, 6 3O.
Archilochus, 98 12 Archytas, 12* 12.
Ares, drinking-bowl
1,6.

b

;

i8 b 27

ff.

99 i3. b Alphesiboea, 97 a Ainasis, 86 20.
ambition
7i
b
;

b

Areopagus, Court of, 54* 23 98
;

b

27.

6.

of,

7* 17;

13*

ambiguous language, 7* 32

ff.
;

b (love of honour), 63 2

29 79* 35 (ambitious philo b sophers) 7o 24 (the ambitious
;

Argos, penalty at, 75* 5. argument, the universal classes of, b 9i 29 ff. The many argument, lines of.

INDEX
arguments, or inferences, sug gested in bk. ii, c. 23 are drawn from the following special topics (or lines of argument, common a places) opposites, 97 7 modi fication (/rTcorris a wider term than case or inflexion ) of the key- word, 97 a 2o; correlative
: ;
1

tween the Rhetoric and the Ethics will be found chiefly in bks. i, cc. 5-10, and ii, cc. 1-7; (2) between the Rhetoric and
the Politics in bk. i, cc. 4, 5, 8 (3) between the Rhetoric and the Poetics in bk. iii, cc. i-u. arrangement (rais) of a speech in certain divisions, I4 a 3o ff. art should not be measured by b practical success, 55 10 ff.
;
;

,

ideas, 97

12

;

27

;

a fortiori, 97 23 considerations of time, 97 b turning our opponent s
;

a

b

against himself, 98 3 definition of terms, 98* 1 5 ambi a guous terms, 98 28; logical a a induction, 98 division, 98 30 33 previous decision or uni versal consent, 98 b 2o; taking separately the parts of a subject, a a 99 7 the consequence, 99
; ;
; ; ;

words

a

should be concealed, 4 b 36
8.

;

I7

b

The Greek word
:

art

is

specially

used of a rhetorical
17
?;

?tX V]

handbook e. g. 2 a So Toi s vvv r

n

;

a inconsistency, 99 29; rational a correspondence, 99 33 results to antecedents (identity of effect
;

to

identity

of

cause),

99
b

b
5
;

inconsistency (again), 99 14 from possible motive to actual b inducements motive, 99 19 and deterrents, 99 b 32 things which are supposed to happen and yet seem incredible, o a 6
; ; ;

present-day writers on rhe a 56 17 (the term rf\voypdis found in the Rhet. ad A/., but not in \\\zRhet.}. Rhetorical terms can, therefore, with special appropriateness, be regarded as technical terms or terms of art and the manifold arts courses of our universities also
toric
<&o?

=

l

,

;

have linguistic roots

in

academic

o 15 inconsistency (again), possible reasons for prejudice o 23; cause to effect, o a 3o a neglect of a better course, o 37
.

a

Athens. Artaxerxes the Third, 93 b 2 ( the present king ). artificial speech to be deprecated,
4
b

19

;

and

artificial

;l

b wise, 8 22. assault and battery, 72 a 22

rhythm
;

like

2 :i 18.

inconsistency (again), b mistakes, o 9 meanings which be attached to may proper
;

ob 4

b Aristeides the Just, 98 a 9 I4 37. his gentle rebuke to Aristippu; Plato when seeming to speak too dogmatically, 98 b 30.
;
,

b names, o 17. Universal lines of argument, $8 a 10 ff. 9i b 29 ff.
;

asyndeta (words not bound to gether by connective particles), 8 a i; i3 b i9,33J 2 a 7Athenian speakers, i8 a 3o(cp. I3 b i); praising Athenians before an Athenian audience, 67 b 9;

aristocracy, 65

b

30

ff.
.

Athens and Epidaurus, n a i2. Athens and Salamis, 75 b 3o. Attic neighbour 95 a 21.
,

I5

b

32.

see Harmodius ( Aristophanes in the Babylonians

Aristogeiton
b
5

:

,

3o.
Q.8

Attic speakers, I3 b I (cp. i8 a 3o). b audience, three kinds of, 58 I ff. b authority of well-known men, 2 9.

Aristophon,
Aristotle:

a
5.

Autocles quoted, 98 b 26.

his

references

to

Analytics, 56 9 a a 3 35 3 *3; b 2) (3) 56 1 9 b a a 4 39 4 7, 28 Poetics, 72 2 6 (eV TOt? TTfpt TTOl^O-fCOS ), a (4) Politics, 66 22 (5) Topics, a b b a 5 6 i2; 5 8 28; 9 6 4; 9S 28;
57
a
(

own works,

his b
;

3o; 57 23; Methodics,
;

(i) b

baker
i

;

;

I

s question and its answer, i6 b 3i. a ball, games at, 7i 2. a 66 a 38 67 a 5. benefits, 6i 28 ff.
;

;

1

^

\

|

Bias, 89
birth,

b

24.

;

|

good,
:

6ob

3o

ff.

;

b 9o 16

ff.
1

!

body

its

excellence

is

health, 6 1

3.

99 75 ^35; 3 32; 19^4,Matter for comparison (i) be

a

a

\

1

Boeotians, 7*3, 5. boorishness, 17*23.

INDEX
brutality, 75*7. b

Choerilus quoted, I5 a

4.

Bryson, 5 buffoonery
a

9.

b (scurrility), I9 8.

Cimon, 9o
circle,

b

3t. b

Callias, 5 19. 5, Callias

In 56 b 3l and 82* anybody quilibet so Cleon 78*35; 7*27; 8 b 26

=

periphrasis for, 7 27. classes : different classes have different ways of expressing

,

:

(unless in this last passage the

demagogue
sius
i

is

meant)

;

i3; Hippias Socrates 56 b 3i, 34; 82 a 6. Calliope, 5*33. a a Callippus, 99 i6; o 5. Theauthor * of an Art of Rhetoric not, it would seem, to be identified with the Callippus mentioned in
;

b

Diony-

themselves, 8 26 ff. clearness essential to good style, b 4 2. Cleon see Callias . b a Cleophon, 75 3i; 8 i5. cleverness (natural ability), 62 b 24; b b 63*35; 9 28; io 8.
:

a

climax
tion),

(building up,

accumula

65
:

a 16.

colours

Of

the Colours or

com
;

mon

73*19.

Callisthenes, 8o i2, 13. a b b Callistratus,64 l9; 74 26; i8 io. calmness (mildness, patience, pina b cability), 66 2 ; 8o 5 ff. calumny: see prejudice
.

b

opinions concerning Good and Evil (Hobbes), 62 a 15 ff. b Of the Colours of 63 5 ff.
;

Honourable
able
|

and
;

Dishonour
,

66 a 23 ff. Of the Colours b concerning Pleasure 69 33 ff.
,

Calydon,

b Carcinus, o 10

b 9 i2.

combative (debating)

b style, I3 4ff.
ff.

;

I7

b 18.
a
,

Comedy: diminutives used with
comic
tales,
effect,

b

5

30

;

comic
tell

I3 17. Carpathian and hare b Carthaginians, 72 28. case, grammatical [or inflexion, a b word-modification], 64 33 97 a 20; io 28.
;

poets as evil-speakers

and

b 84 10. commerce and commercial treaties, 6o a i2ff.

categories, 85

b

common-places:
lines of
.

see

argument,

5;
,

Caunian love
causes
:

2b

3.

seven causes of

human

action,

69

a

6.

censure (blame): 6Vao? )( e68 a 36 ovddos )( (jLiov, a a 74 22 \|/oyos )( ZTTCIIVOS, 6j 34 6S a 33;
;

;

Universal and special a b common-places, 58 10 ff. ; 9i 29 ff. comparison of cases and argu b ments, I9 35 ff. composition a written composi tion should be easy to read and
:

deliver, 7

b ii.

a a Cephisodotus, 7 9; ii ceremonial oratory see
:

6, 23, 28.

compound words,
6 a 6. conciseness

4 29;
b

b

b
5

35

;

epideic-

tic

.

a ii b 6. Chabrias, 64 2i b b Chaeremon,o 25 (quoted); I3 i3change, pleasure which attends
;

of style, 7 28, i6 b 35; 19*21. conclusion see peroration
:

38;

.

it,

7i

a 26.

character (of speaker, speech, and hearer) in its bearing on rhetori cal persuasion, bk. ii, cc. I- 18 b a b 56 i ff.; 88 3off.; 95 14 ff.
;

confidence, 83 i4ff. conjunctions (connecting words), b a b 7 i2, 39; I3 337 2i
;

a

Conon, 99

a

5

;

ob

19.
*

constitutions

:

see

government

.

;

8 ii,25; I7 i6; i8 38; i8 23. b a a a Chares, 76 io; 7; ii 2; i8 32. b Charidemus, 99 3. Charon the contented carpenter l) (in Archilochus), i8 3i.

a

a

a

b

n

contempt, 78 i4. a contracts, 76 33 ff.
contrary objection from a con b trary statement, 2 4 ; argument from contraries, 92 a 9a Corax, 2 l7. a Corinthians, 63 l5a cottabus, 73 23. counsel political counsel aims at a utility, 62 17 ff.
:
:

b

Chians, 98
:

b

12.

children of possession children. 6ob 20, 38 ff.

good

Chilon, 89 4; 98^14.

b

INDEX
courage, 66 I ff. b cowardice, 66 13
Cratylus, i/ a craving, 69
rtAoyoy). a
b I.
I ff.

a

;

68 b

18.

b diminutives, 5 28 ff. a Diogenes the Cynic, Ii 24.

(ope

Diomedes, 96 Diomedon, 97 a
a

b

15

;

99

b 28.

25.

Creon, 75 34b b Critias, 75 34; i6 29. Croesus, 7* 39. b cupping-glass, 5 3. b Cycnus, 96 17. b Cydias, 84 32.
Darius, 93 i. death is an evil
b

Dion, 73 2o. b Dionysius (the despot), 57 3l, 34 a b 85 io; 9o 29. Dionysius the a Brazen 5 32. Dionysius ( =
,

;

anybody
Dionysus,
5

),

l

b

13.
a a
;

the gods have so judged it, or they would die b (saying of Sappho), 98 28. decision objections from previous b decisions, 2 9 ff. b a defence, national, 59 22; 6o 6ff. degeneracy of clever and steady
;
:

to different, 8 a 29. see foreign . distinction of style b b I3 i4. dithyrambic poets, 6 i
: ;

16 i6 32 7 (Dionysia). a Diopeithes, 86 14. dispositions, style that corresponds 23
;

a

Anonymous dithyrambic
quoted, b divagation, I4
a I5 ii.

poet

18.

stocks,
ff.

b

9<D

27
of,

ff.

degree, topic
;

63

b
5

ff.

;

74 24

b

97

b i2ff.

diviners, their calculated vague b ness, 7 i. divisions of the speech, I4 a 3i ff. b Doclonis, 9 4.

deliberative (political, parliamen a tary) oratory, 58 36ff. (i, cc.

dog praised
l

in
a

poetry and proverb,

a

15

ff.

:

a cp. ii 24.

3-8

incl.)

;

rare in, I5 b 33 ff. ; narration also rare in, I7 b 12 ff. more difficult than forensic, i8 a 22 character of arguments in, I7 b 34ff. its style should resemble scene; ; ;

introductory matter

Dorieus, 57 19. Draco the lawgiver 21. dramatic turns of fortune, 71
...
,

10.

draughts, 7i

a
3.

painting, I4 8 h delivery, 3 20 ff.

a

ff.
;

ecclesiast, 54 7. b education, 65 34.

b

I3

b

Respect paid
a

9

ff.

to educated

men, 84
]

34.
a

Delphi, 98 32.

b

Demades,

b i

33a

Egypt and Egyptians, 93 33; Elea (men of), o 6.
b

I7

a
7.

democracy, 6o 25-30; 65 29-32. Dernocrates quoted, 7*7. Democritus of Chios, quoted, 9 b
26.

element, 58 35;
I

a

62 a
i7

2o; 96^ 21;

a

29

(letter)
ofj,
*

;

3

a

Elis

(men
:

i6 a 2,

3.
.

demonstration, 3 15 b Demosthenes, 97 7
the policy of

a

;

I4 37.

a

;

Demades on
(post

Demosthenes

hoc propter hoc\ I b 34; com parison of the Athenian people to sea-sick passengers, 7 a 6. see amplification depreciation description by negatives, Antimachus means of making style
:
.

emotion see passion b Empedocles, 73 14 7*35. emulation, 88*31 ff. b encomium, 67 28. b 62 a i8; 63 a end, 58 2off. b 1 6. 63 b enigmatic sayings, 94 35.
; ;

5

;

a enmity, 82

i ff.

enthymeme a
|

rhetorical
6;

demon

impressive
a

:

8a

3.

desire, 7o 17 ff. a a b dialectic, 54 i 55 9; 55 16,20; a a 56 36; 59 !!, 12; 2 s.
;
1

dicast
2 4-

(juryman, h 3o; 54 7a

judge),

54 l8,

a

dice, 7i 3. b dictator, 93 22.

diction: see Style

and language

.

a sort of syllo b gism, 55 6-i3; o 38; a rhe a torical syllogism, 56 b 5 94 3i ff. two kinds of 2off. 95 enthymemes, 96 b 23 ff. apparent b o ff. enthymemes, 35 Cp. also a b a 54 i5, 5 4 22, 57* 14-17, 94 26. b a envy, 54 25; 87 2i ff. ephor, a Lacedaemonian s defence of his conduct as, I9 a ji.
stration, 55
a
;

a

l)

;

;

;

INDEX
epic cycle, its treatment a lus, i7 15.

by Phayl-

Euthydemus,

I

a

27.

epic poems, opening lines of, 15* 15 ff. epic poets find uncommon words 6b
3. very handy, Epicharmus, 65* 16 (climax)
;

Euthynus, 92 12. b Euxenus, 6 30.
Evagoras, 99
,

b

a

4, 6.

io b

Evenus quoted, 7o a 10. a b a example $6 5, 12; 68 29: 93
24 ff. the stocks of exceptional men genius continue their yield for a while and then decline, go b 26 ff.
:

4 (false antithesis quoted). a 12. Epidaurus,

n

epideictic (ceremonial, occasional, b

declamatory)
8
ff.;

59*15
ff.
;l
;

66 a 23

oratory 58 2, materials for, a amplification in, 68
:

ff.

;

23; I 4 i8 ff, 38; 14*22; I5 28 ff.; i6 b i;; i; b 3i ff. i8 33. epilogue see peroration a Epimenides, i8 24.
ll
;
k

b

exhortation, 58 8ff. expediency see interest a eye as the seat of shame, 84 36 the two eyes of Greece, Athens
:
.

b

;

:

.

and Sparta,

episodes, 18*33. epithet (any word or phrase not qualifying a proper noun a simply a single adjective), 5 10 ; b a b 7*31 8 n. 5 2o; 6 ioff. b a 74 27 ff. equity, 72 18 ; 73* 18
;
; ; ;

6; setting things before the eyes of hearers and b readers, Ii 23 ff.
a b fables, 93 30; 93 9fffact past and future, topic of,

n

u

92

b

;

74 i ff. 75 3i. Cp. Vinogradoff s History ofJurisprudence, ii, pp. 63 ff, and Eth. Nic.,
;

b

a

15 ff. fallacious arguments, some causes il of: i i, (i) 10; language, (2) confusion of parts and whole,

137*31 b Ergophilus, 8o
i

ff

11.
,

and the eristics 7i a 7; b 2*4, 14; I4 28. ethical means of persuasion: see character
eristic
.

passionate exaggera 3; (4) a sign or single b i instance, 9 (5) an accident, b b I i5; (6) the consequence, i 20 (7) post hoc ergo propter b hoc, i 30 (8) omission of time
i
;

a

24

(3)

tion,

i

b

,

;

;

;

Euboea,
Eubulus,

Euctemon, 74
eugenics, 9O
b

ii a 10. a 76 9b

36.
ff.

16

euphemisms, 67* 32 ff. Euripides and the Syracusans, b 84 1 6 lawsuit with Hygiaenon, i6 a 29; use of everyday langu
;

I 35 (9) confusion of the absolute with a the particular, 2 4. a a farmers, small 73 8 8i 24. favour see kindness a fear, 82 2l ff.
;
:

and circumstance,

b

;

:

.

fever, 57

passion b i5; 7o 17. fickleness of youth, 89 a
feeling
:
.

see

b

6.

b age, 4 26

;

prologues, i5
b

a 20.
;

Quoted:
7>28

234); 7i 32 94 29 ff. (Medea, (Antiope) b 2 95 ff-) 94 i (Sthenelus] 94 b 3 b (Hecuba, 864) 94 1 5 ( Troades,
a
;
5

7o 3 (Orestes,

(Andromeda]
b

figure (form, fashion) of wording or sentence, i a 7; 8 b 2i.
a b food-supply, 6o i2 (cp. 59 22). foreign (distinguished) air of style, a a b 4 3 6; 5 8; 6 i5. forensic (legal, judicial) oratory Also bk. i, c. 3 and cc. 10-15.
:

;

;

l

Thyestes] 23 ( Troa a 990) ( Telephus) 5 28 b b 5 23 (Orestes, 1587); 7 34 b (Iph. Taur., 727) 9 10 (Meleager\ but Aristotle attributes the

97

S a

l

)

->

^^(Hippolytus, 989);
(

:

17

;

ob

des,

;

;

I4 ii, 38; 54 29; 55 2o; a b I 4 5; I5 2, 8. foretaste of a theme in poetry,

b

a

a

;

I5 I2. b fortune, good, 6i 39
foul language, 5

a

ff.

;

69 32

a

;

I i Sophocles) 30 (Iph. AuL, 80); I5 b 2i (Iph. Taur., a l6 31 1162); (Hippolytus, a i8 b 2i 612); I7 i5 (Oeneus} (Troades, 969).
;

line to

b

b

9

ff.

fox

and the hedgehog,
a

fable of the,
ff.

,

b 93 2 3 ff

free-running style, 9 24

INDEX
b friendship, 6i 36 (friend defined) 8ob 35 ff. (ii, c. 4) ; 8i b 34 (forms of friendship). Friendlessness, 86 a io; possession of few friends, many friends, good friends, 6o b b a b 20; 6i 35; 86 io; 88 5. frigidities of style (viz. things in bad taste that fall flat and are
;

i Helen, 99 2 36. a Heracleidae, 96 14.
;

a

b

Heracleitus, 7 14. Hercules, the pillars b heredity, 9o 25 ff.

b

of,

88 a

10.

Hermes,
a

i

a

20, 21.
;

a frost

b
),

b b Herodicus, 6i 5 o 19. Herodotus quoted, 7 a 39

;

a 9 28

;

5

34ff.

funeral speech,

anonymous,

H
a

a

3i.

I7 7. heroic (viz.

hexameter) rhythm,
l7.

Gelon, 73 23. b genders, 7 7.
generalization, spurious, 95 b a geometry, 55 29; 4 i2. Glaucon of Teos, 3 b 26.
S.

a

b Hesione, i6 2. hexameter poems, writers a Hiero, 9i 10.

Hesiod quoted, 88 a

of,

4 35-

a

good,
its

general principles and a relative varieties, 62 2i ff.
its
:

goodness, 63* 5 ff. a Gorgias 4 26 (his poetical proseb style) 5 37 (compound words) 6 b 9 (extravagant metaphors) 6 b 15 (irony) 8 b 20 (irony) I4 b
; ; ;

Himera, 93 b n. b Hipparchus, I i2. b Hippias, 56 34 (for anybody a Hippolochus, 68 17. historical examples, 93 a 29. historical researches, 6o a 36.

).

Homer, 63

;

;

31 i8 a

(Olympic

Speech);

i6 a

I

government,
gratitude greatness
9ff.
:

of Elis) 35 (his unfailing fund of b talk); I9 4 (earnestness to meet jest, jest to meet earnestness). forms 6o a 2i ff.
;

(encomium on the men

i9; 75 3o; 98 13 i6 b 12-15. Ouoted : 62 b 35 (//.i.255); 6^6\Jl. \\. 160); a a 63 8 (//. ii. 298) 65 12 (//. ix.
;

a

b

b

n b 32;

;

of,

;

see

kindness
a

.

)(

smallness, 59 23

;

93*

Greece, her mourning for those who fell at Salamis, n a 3i ff. See also eye b greed, low, 83 26. Greek to use clear and correct a Greek, 7 20 ff.
.

:

592); 65 3o (Oil. xxii. 347); b b 7o 5 (Od. xv. 400) 7o 1 1 (//. b xviii. 109) 7o 28 (//. xxiii. 108 Od. iv. 183); 7i b i6 (Od. xvii. b b 78 5 (//. xviii. 109) ;8 218) b 32 (//. i. 356); 78 34 (//. ix. a a 648) 79 5 (//. ii. 196); 79 7 a i. 8o Od. 24, 25 (cp. (//. 82); xiv. 29-31) 8o 23 {Od. ix. 504) 8o b 29 (//. xxiv. 54) 87 * 34 (//. a xi. 542) 95 14 (//. xii. 243) ; a 6 b 24 (cp. 95 1 6 (//. xviii. 309) a //. xx. 164, 442, 445); io 3i
;

a

;

;

;

;

;

l)

;

;

;

;

;

Haemon
cles
,

:

the
b 20.

Haemon

of

Sopho
b

I7
7 a

Halys,

398,

b happiness, 6o

Harmodius and
18
b
;

62 10. 14 ff. a Aristogeiton, 68
;

97 28; i ii. a hatred, 82 I ff. b 6i b 3 health, 6o 2i
;

a

33 (Od. xi. 598) ii b 37 (//. 587) iv. 126) I2 a i (//. xi. 574); I2 a a 3 (//. xv. 542); I2 9 (//. xiii. a a 799); I 3 3i(//.ix. 385); I4 3 a i6 (//. i. i); (//. ii. 671); I5 b a I5 17 (Od. i. i) I5 27 (Od. a vi. 327) I7 i4 (cp. Od. xxiii.
(//. ix.

526)
;

;

i

b i

;

ii b

35

(//. xiii.

;

;

;

ff.

;

62 b
;

14.
;
.

hearer, 54 32 58 37 a 8 b 6; I5 26, 34;
;

b

a

ff.

4
b

a

8, ii

I5

6,

1623.

I

18,29. b Hector, So 28 b Hecuba, o 22.

;

96 17

;

97

b

I7 264-84, 3io-43); i8 a 8(6V/. iv. xix. 361) b homoeoteleuton, io 2. b a homonyms, i i2; 4 38; b b honour, 58 28 ff. 6o 22 a 34; 66 35. horse and the stag, fable
;

b

5

(Od.

204).

;

;

J2 b 12. 6i a 28,

of the,

hedgehog and the
93 23
b
ff.

fox, fable of the,
11.

Hegesippus

(vv.
b

Hegesipolis,

Agesipolis), yS

32.

93 i3ff. without housewiferie nesse 6i a 7 (note). Hygiaenon, 16*29.
,

b

sordid-

INDEX
hyperbole, I3 b 2; 6 7 6.
a

19

ff.

Cp. also 63*

iambic
Ida,
i

metre, b rhythm, 8 33
b 22. 6b b

4
ff.

a

31

;

iambic

b Antid.}-, i8 35 (Archidainus}. a b issues, legal, 5 4 30 ; $8 32 74* a a b 2ff.; i6 8 ff. i; 9 ff. ; i;

and

;

;

25

ff.

Isthmian games, 6 a
27, 29.
13.

Idrieus,

21. Italiots (Italian Greeks),

98

b

i5.

Ilium, 96

imagination (impression, fancy), a L a b 7o 28,3o; ;o 33; 7i 95 ?8 a 8 ii. 9; 3 i7; 4 b impressiveness of style, 7 26 ff. incommensurability of diagonal of a square with its side, g2 a 18. a b a incontinence, 66 15 83 23 84
;
;

Jason of Thessaly, 73* b (the hero),o 14.
jests, a
i ff.

26.

-Jason

72 i9 3 b Jocasta, I7 i8. judge: the judge decides
;

b

ff.

some
ff.

live issue, 58 b 3
:

ff.

;

9i
.

b 8

20.

independence of

life,

6o b

juryman juryman
.

see

dicast

s

oath,

indigenous (aboriginal),
86 9
()

14. 6o b

75
;

b

17

;

76
;

a

i9;
I,
i).

30.

indignation, feeling of righteous,
ff.

justice,

58

b

25

62 b 12
(in

66 b

Rhetorical

tion, 95 26.

a

9;
b

I

b

3

;

I

7

a

indigna b 13 ; I 9
a

9

and Genuine
;

cc.
)(

10-14

book

75

b 6.

counterfeit justice,

induction, 56 I ff. ; 93*27; 94 13; 9^33inflexions see case injustice, bk. i, cc. 10-14. b insolence, 78 15, 23. inspired poetry an inspired thing,
:

.

key-note, I4 24; i5 8. b a kindness, 8i 35; ^5 15 ff. a kingship, 66 2. a knuckle-bones, game of, 7i

b

a

2.

:

.

Lacedaemon,
a
;

Lacedaemonians,
b

interes rest (expediency), 58 b 22ff. ; b b b 6 18 ff. 63 7; 75 i3; ?6
2"

Laconian, 6i io; 67*29; 67 b b a 10 94 345 9 M, 18; ii s;
;

29;
interest (on

I

money),
a

n a i8.

9

a

3

i.

intermarriage, 75 10. b interrogation, i8 39 ff. introduction (proem), 54 b i8; I4 b b 2, 12,19; I5 24, 35, 39; ^34. a b b Iphicrates.65 28; 67 17 97 27 a a a a 9 8 s, 17 99 34l 5 i9l ii ii b i i6 a 10. b 82 b 2i; 8 b 2o; irony, 79 31, 32
; ;

Lampon, 19* 2. Lampsacenes (men
cus), 98
b
1

of

Lampsaand ex everyday

6.

language,
pressive,

appropriate 8 a 1 6 ff.
;

n

;

;

;

;

b I9 8
b

;

2o a

2.

irrelevance,
I5
5, 6.

54
b

a

i5,

22; 54 27
b

b

;

Ismenias, 98 3. a Isocrates, 68 20
4; 99
b

language, 4 24. b laughter and things ludicrous, 71 a b 35; i5 36; I9 3ffb law special or general, 68 7 b particular and universal, 73 4. How laws are to be used in accusation and defence, 75 a Unwritten law, 68 b 9 25 ff.
:
;
;

b

;

io; I4 33 3i, 34. Speeches quoted or mentioned 68 a 4 (Evag. and Panath.} 8b a b 1 5 (Paneg.} 9 34 and io i -17 lo b 29 (Philipp.} (Paneg.} a b 30 (Philipp.}\ ii ii ff. ii b 28 ff. (PMlipp.} (Paneg.} I2 b 6 De (Philipp., Paneg., b b I 4 27 Pace} (#*/.); I4 33
;
:

b

g2

10

;

i8 a

99*

2,

;

;

n

\

;

73 5; 74 19 ff-; 75 i5 ff. b 75 7leading men at Thebes take to and the State philosophy, b prospers, 98 19. lecture to pop in a bit of the fifty- drachma show-lecture (the
J

b

a

a

:

;

;

fifty-shilling-lec extra-special ture, as distinguished from the

,

ordinary shilling-lecture)
16
legal oratory
:

,

I5

b

a (Paneg.}-, i8 31 (Panef.}\ i8 b 26 (Philipp. 32 (De PMC)
;

18"

see

forensic

.

INDEX
and lawgiver, 54* 29 b 6o a i9. 15; 59 2 3 a Leodamas, 64 19 o a 32.
legislation
;

54

b

2,

5,

;

metre, 6i mildness

a
:

b a 35 ; 8 21 I9 19. see calmness
.

Leptines quoted, b Leucothea, o 6. b liberality, 66 2, 7,
a
;

n a 5.
15,

;

Miltiades,

na
b
;

n.
i8; 74
b 7

mistakes, 72

(errors of

Libyan, 93 31. b b b Licymnius, 5 6 I3 14 I4 17. b literary style (written prose), I3 b 4 ff. literary people, 98 15. a a litigious people, 73 35Cp. o
;

judgement) argument from mis b takes, o 9. b Mixidemides, 98 26.
Moerocles,
i
il

i

16.
b

monarchy, 65 38. b money, love of, 63 2
14.
b

b

;

64

i

;

89^

19.

Locri, 95

a

i.

moral purpose, 55 2o, 21; a 15; 74 i3; I7 25;i

66 a
of

ludicrous: see

laughter
ii b 6.
;

.

more

and
a

less,
ff.

the

topic

Lyceum, 85*27.
Lycoleon quoted, b Lycophron, 5 35 b Lycurgus, 98 18.
lyre,

6 a 7; io a
a

18.

motives for wrong-doing, 68 b 28 ff. good and bad motives may be suggested for one and
;

degree, 93 9

Lysias quoted, 99

a chordless, I3 I. b a 19 2o
;

8.

madness

:

great wits to
;

madness
2,

near allied, 9o b 29. b magnanimity, 62 12
)(
smallness"

the same act, i6 9 ff. b mule-race, 5 24. Mysian prey 72 b 33. mysteries, their etymological con a nexion with mouse i 14.
,

b

,

66 h

17

;

Mytilenaeans, 98

b

13.

of

spirit,

b mindedness, 66 19. b 66 b 2, 18, magnificence, 62 13 b 19; )( meanness, 66 19. Applied
;

petty-

name used
7 b 28.

instead of description,
b

(by
20.

some

writers) to style,
a

I4

H

narration, 54

17
;

;

I4

a

37
;

;

14

14
.

;

maintenance, public, 6i 36. Mantias the orator 98 2.
*

See also statement a a natural nature, 69 35 7o 4
16.

l6 b

,

b cords), 62 24. messenger, an inkling of the he brings, I7 b 9.

of Carcinus, o b 10. b Melanippides, 9 26. Melanopus, 74 25. Meleager, 79 15 99 25. Meletus, 19*8. a memory, 6i 34 (memorial
;

Medea

Marathon, 96 14. mat in the Lyceum, 85* 28. mathematical discourses, destitute of moral character, I7 a 19. a a maxims, 93 25 94 19 ff.; 95 a 6 b a a b 3; 3 35; I8 i7; iS 3 4 95
;

;l

acquired, 65 29. a Xausicrates, i6 10.
)(

a

necessary

)(

contingent actions,
.

57*23

ff.
:

;

.

see description negatives b Nicanor, 97 7. a Niceratus, I3 7a Nicon, I2 34.

Nireiis, I4

a
3.

nobility

:

see

birth,

good

.

re

sonorous) poets of the writers of dithyrambs, 6 h 2. nouns and verbs, 4 b 26 ff.
noisy
(or,

news

number,

grammatical
b
9.

inflexions

denoting, 7

Messenian speech, 97 a ii; Messenian assembly, i8 b u.

mess-rooms

of Attica,

n a 24.
;

b b 6 b 5 ff metaphor, 4 32 5 20 a b 12 lo b 13 20; 7 7 31; I2 a ioff., 18 ff. Metaphor, in
;

,

;

oaths, 77 S ff. a obeisance, 6i 36. a a objections, 2 35 ff. 3 31. obscurity of style, one cause
;

a

of,

its

sense, is Aristotle s or analogical proportional
:

modern

7

b 21

ff.

metaphor
1

cp 7 14
12"

a

;

8 :l 8

;

I i

a

obvious (enthymemes), io b 22. o a 28 i6 Odysseus, 99 29
*

;

;

2,

I

;

1 1

22;

5.

I

3,

INDEX
b Odyssey, 6 12. b a Oeneus, 97 20 I7 i6. deliberate purpose the offences a test of a criminal offence, 74 II.
;
:

oligarchy, 65

b

33.
b
;
;

Olympia, 65* 25 67 18 98 33. Olynthiac War, 11*7. detached onlooker (spectator, observer, critic) at an epideictic b b speech, 5& 2, 6; 9i i7.
see colours opinions, common opposites, 97* 7. oracles, 7* 37. a Orestes of Theodectes, i 35.
*
:
.

a paean, 9 2 ff. b pain, 85 10 ff.
h

painting, 71

6.

Palamedes, I3 27. a Pamphilus, o 5. a Pan, i 1 6.
b pancratiast, 6i 26. viz. contradiction paradox,

b

of

Periander, 75 31. b a a 7 I ff. Pericles, 65 I 9o 31 ii a 2, 15; 19*2. a With short mem period, 9 35 ff. 1 bers^ 31 with long members b (of the speakers themselves), 9 b 30 with a single member, 9 17; period-mark (a sort of full periodic (com stop), 9* 20 a pact) style, 9 26. see witness, false . perjury b peroration (epilogue), I9 10 ff. b b cp. notes on I4 I and 2o 5. persuasion modes of persuasion (or belief, assurance), 54* 13 ff. a i b b 66 a 54 2i; 55 35ff.; 5 b a 22ff. 7ff.; 14* 3 9ff. 75 b b 36 ff.; I7 2i ff.; i8 8ff. Cp. suasions or note on 54* 13 persuasives might perhaps be ventured in English. b Phalaris, 93 9 ff. Phayllus, 17* 15. 11 Philammon, I3 13, 14. b actor the I3 25. Philemon,
; ; ; ; ; ;

b

*

:

:

:

;

;

;

;

:

,

common

opinion, 99* 23.

parallel, illustrative, 93* a Paralus, ii 14. b parenthesis, 7 21 ff.
.

30

ff.

Philip (of Macedon), 97 3i. Philocrates quoted, 8o b 8.
Philoctetes, I3
b
:

b

a

7.

Parians, 98* n. Paris : see Alexander a I2 b 32. parisosis, io 24
;

parliamentary oratory
liberative
.

:

see

*

de

Philomela, 6 17. Greek word the philosophy philosophy is in 94* 5 used in the vague sense (common in culture , intel I socrates) of

paromoeosis, 10*25. passion (emotion), 54* 17; 56*14, a b b 96 19, 24; 69 i5; 78 2off. a 33 8 10 (passionate, emotional, a I7 36. language), 16, 24; b 11 (anger), passion 89* 9, 6g 10, 27; 90*11. known to diviners even (a past, i8 a bon mot of Epimenides)
; ;

The lectual training study ^iXcVo^oy, or lover of wisdom , was regarded as a lifelong
,
.

*

student.

;

Phocians, 98* I. a 16. a i Pindar, quoted 64 28 themselves call purveyors pirates a or providers 5 25b b I3 3i. pitch (of voice), 3 29
; : ;

:

Pittacus,
pity,

89*16
b

23-

54* 17,
25.
:

2 b i2. b 25; S5 i2fT.
;

;

4

:l

pastime
patience
,
:

,

6 a 36. see calmness
a
;
97"

14; I9
.

22. Patroclus, 59 4 Peace the * Common 99 b 13. Peiraeus, 1*28; 11*15. Peisander, 19* 27, b Peisistratus, 57 3i. a ii a 13. Peitholaus, io 17 Penelope, 17* 14. b pentathlos (all-round athlete), 6i
, ;

see calmness . placability b b Plato, 67 8 and is 3i (Menex., a 10 2 35 D) J (disputed 76

whether the philosopher or the comic poet); 98 a i5ff. and b 8-12 (Apology, 27 C-E) 98 30 6 b 32-8 rebuke) (Aristippus (Republic, v. 469 E, vi. 488 A, x. 8 b 20 (Phaedrus] 601 B) 17*
19"
;

;

;

;

10, 26.

21

(

Socratic dialogues
here).

:

they

26 (quotation). Pentheus, Peparethus, 98* 33.

ob

may be grouped

plays as pocket-companions,

13** 12,

INDEX
pleasantries (smart, lively, pointed b I2 a 18 ff. sayings), io 7 The pleasure pleasure, 69 33 ff. experienced in learning some b io b 10 ff. thing new, 7i 4 ff.
ft".

;

;

Plexippus, 79 i5. b b 4* 28 4 poetry, 71^7 ; 3 25 a a b 4 5 33; 6 i2,so; 6 i, 10. The old poets 9* 26, Homer * is the poet 65*11, 30, &c. in 7i b 3i Euripides is so called. see delibera political oratory
;

b

a proverbs, 76 2 (proverbs as evi b dence) 95 20 (as maxims) a I3 15 (as metaphors). Particu lar or proverbs (in prose 62 b 38, draw evils verse)
;

;

:

;

men together ( misery acquaints a man with strange bed-fellows
a
;

,

;

,

,

;

Tempest, Act ii, Sc. 2) 63 7, to break the pitcher at the door ( labour lost many a
,

:

tive

.

&c.) the verse-quotations in the same passage may also be regarded as proverbial 66 a
slip
,
: ;

polities: see Pol us, ob 20.

government
a

.

38,

benefits of all kinds
;
^

on
\

all
is

occasions

7i

a

28,

sweet

Polycrates,

I

34

;

i

b

16.

a Polyeuctus, ii 21. b Polyneices, 73 10. possible and impossible, topic of a 92 8 ff. post hoc ergo ptoptcr hoc, topic b of, i 3o ff.
;

variety 15-17,
like

,

gratae vices
,

7i

b
,

to
,

beast
(

mate delights mate like beast knows jackdaw to jackdaw
age
;

crabbed
,

,

birds
b 33,

of

a

feather

&c.)

72

Mysian

post-narration, I4 i4. b post-refutation, I4 15. Potidaea, 96* 20. power, characteristics

b

a
of,

91
a

j

20

ff.

b praise, 58 i2 22.
a

it.;

67

h 2i,

27; 74

. Pratys, I3 a prejudice (calumny, slander), 54 a a 16; 82 2; I5 27 b prelude, I4 22, 24. b pre-narration, I4 i5. b Priam, i6 2.

e. an easy prey, a (i. a helpless victim); 73 3, wicked ness needs but a pretext 76* 5. never show an old man kind a a ness 76 7 (and 95 19), Fool who slayeth the father &c. b 8i (and 88 a 17), 17 potter two of a ( against potter b trade ) to pick a 83 25, to rob the corpse s pocket ,

prey

;

;

,

;

;

prizes,

66 b

34; 3

b

32

;

probability,

57*32;

76

Ma

b

35-

i8;

2b

a 84 36, shame dwells 88 a 7, kin can the eyes even be jealous of their kin * a a 95 2 and I2 23, cicalas chirp a 95 14, ing on the ground the one best omen is our

dead
in

;

;

;

;

13 ff. b Prodicus, I5 16. b b prodigality, 67 2; 9o i. proem see introduction
:

a perhaps the half-line in 95 16, may be reckoned a proverb as
.

country

s

cause

:

this line,

and

professorial dogmatism, alleged b against Plato, 98 30. b a I4 prologue, 20; I5 9. b a a proof, 57 4ff. 3 ioff.; 3 ISSee also persuasion
;
.

well as a maxim; 95 War- God showeth no

a

the 16, favour
; ;

95

a

21,

an Attic neighbour
to
( )
;

99 26,
the salt the lean
salt
,

a

buy the marsh with
to take the fat with

o a 12-15,

fisl1

need

proper, applied to terms (whether nouns or verbs) that are current and ordinary, 4 b 6. proportional : see metaphor
.

and
,

oil*;

olive-cakes need a the doglcss i 19-21,

house

and
(

Hermes

open-handed 2 b 3, Shares )
!

;

propositions (premisses), $8 1 8 ff.; a b mere 59 8 ff. 9i 25 ff.proposition (thesis, theory, ima b ginary case), 9i 14. propriety see appropriateness a b prose, 6i 35 4 14, 33. a b Protagoras, 2 25 7 6.
;

a

A

a Caunian love I3 1 7, hare and the Carpathian
;

the
;

29,

the

man who
b

b I3 carries the
*
,

:

.

the beam ( stiff as a poker man who swallowed a poker ).

;

;

prudence, 66 3, 20 78 9. a b 9 20, punctuation, 7 13
;
;

a

INDEX
puns,

punishment, 69 o b i7 ff
.

b 12.
;

I2 a 33

ff.

:

see

rhythm, 3 30 b riddles, 94 35
ridicule
:

b

;

8 h 2i
;

ff.
ft",

5* 37

significant

.

see

b Pythagoras, 98 16.

laughter

.

queenly fig-tree

,

8*15.

Salamis, 75

b

Samos and
b ramification, I4 18. * see strange rare words a 10. rations (metaphorical use), read easy to read (of a written b composition), 7 n. b recapitulation, I4 2. b a a recitation, 3 23 ; 4 23 I3 9. recrimination, 16*27. b a 2* 30 ff. ; refutation, o 27 ; 3 b ff.
:

3o; 96*13;
a

na

32.
;

.

n

:

93 23, 32 7 i. a b Sappho, 67 8 98 13, 28. * sayings, smart : see pleasantries . scene-painting or, more strictly, a drawing in light and shade, a large chiaroscuro sketch, 14*
;

b

the Samians, 84 b 32
;

;

25 I4 l5. reply to an adversary a 1 9 20 ff.
;

science (and sciences), 54* 3 10, 13, 15, 17, &c. Sciron, 6*8.
sculpture, 7i 7. b Scythians, 67 10.
b

?

;

59

b

s

questions,
ff.

retaliation, 73 10 ff. a retort, 98*3 ff. ; I9 2 b revenge, 69 12.
;

a

82 b 10
ff.

secundation, I4 i7. a b self-control, 6i 7 ; 62 12
13
its
;

seats, chief, 61* 35. b

;

66 b

I,

revenues, 59 24

b

;

96* 11.
b
27.
art,

90*14.

Rhadamanthus,
Rhetoric
is

i3

self-criticism
a
i,

(show
;

of,

useful

an

54*11;
56
35;

relation to dialectic, 54 b

9;

56*25,

31;

55 to

b

ethical
25, b

and
;

26
9

59

ff.

political studies, 56* to logic and sophistic, to eristic, 2 a 4 enthy;
;

device in speaking), 8 b 3. b b self-love, 7i 20, 21 89 36. (In Aristotle <f)i\avTos is not neces sarily a term of reproach cp. Eth. NIC. ix. c. 8, and Pol. ii,
:

c. 5,
j

!263 2-5.

b

Selfish

is

not

memes, the substance of rhe
torical persuasion, are neglected by current text-books in favour

of non-essentials, the enthymeme a

54*11-16;
rhetorical
political

a sepulchres, 6i 35. Sestos, ii* 14. b shame, 83 12 ff.

an ancient word in English). senate (at Lacedaemon), 98 b 15.

demonstration and a kind of
syllogism,
forensic
less

shoes, parts

55*6-8;

oratory neglected in favour of which lends itself to

worthy methods, 54 22~9; use and abuse of rhetoric, 55* 21 ff. no separate name for the unscrupulous rhetorician, b 18-21 definition of rhetoric, 55 b rhetoric deals with the 55 25 regular subjects of debate, which admit of al ternati ve possibilities, b its three divisions, 56 35 ff. a 58 36ff. subjects of political the whole rhetoric, 59*3off. study of rhetoric is concerned
; ;

b

of, 92* 30-2. b Sigeans (men of Sigeum), 75 3i. b significant names, o i7 (puns to us to-day to the Greeks, as to John of Gaunt, much more than
;

that).

b b signs , 57 i ff. ; i 9. similar causes likely to have simi
lar results, 60*5. b a similes, 6 20 ; 7 13, 14; b I2 18; 33.

;

iob i615
;

Simonides quoted,
25; 67
26.
b
i

63
8;

a

;

9

;

9i

a

5

b2 3

65*
;

ii b

;

;

slander

with appearances, 4* I ff. rhetoricians (public speakers), 18* b Athens ); 30 ( at I3 I J Attic ) ; 4* 17 ( who excel in ( delivery ). Ambiguity of the

see prejudice . slapdash, casual, random way of a b speaking, 8 12 I5 39. b slighting (contempt), 78 10 ff. b 8 b b 67 Socrates, 9o 31 93 4
: ;
;

;

;

98*24; 98 32; 99*7

b

;

I5

b

3i;

term, 55

b

2o.

17*21 ( the Socratic dialogues a or discourses ); I9 8. [In

INDEX
b 56 31 and 34

Socrates
a

means

anybody

.

j

b solecism, 7 18.

Cp. 9i 4, where the corresponding adjective is used of vulgar, rude, outlan barbarous dish, persons, Goths.
b
.

strange (rare, unfamiliar, foreign) b 6 7 ff. io b expressions, 4 28 b 12. Cp. Poetics I457 3, 4.
1 ;
;

strength,

6o b

27
:

;

6i b
b
i

1

style (diction)

4

style defined);

4

a

83 2. (good prose 28 and 4 b 4
5
ff.
;

b

Solon, 75 35; 98^ 17. soothsayers: see diviners a b b sophist, 55 2o; 4 38 I9 14,
;

(prose style are distinct).
style
:

and

poetical style of Qualities
:

iii,

c.

2 (general
;

meta

phor

&c.
Sophocles, 98 4 (his Teucer], i l6 a 19 (his A^mooj/ <rv\\oyos) 15 (his reply to an imputation). Quotations, or references to b passages, 73 9 (Antig., 456); a o b 17 75 34 (Antig., 456)
;
;

a

b

c. iii, 5 particularly) (correctness) iii, c. 6 (impressiveness) ; iii, c. 7 (appropriate
;

ness
of

:

including the expression

emotion and character and a due correspondence to subjectII (liveliness); iii, c. matter) b b 9 33 ff 4 19 (antithesis) iii, c. 9 (naturalness )( artifice) run of the sentence )( (free
;

;

(Oed. Tyr., (Fragtn.}\ 20 (Antig., 223); i6 b 774); i 17*30 (Antig., (Teucer} b 911); I7 2o (cp.
i$>

a I5 2i

;

\

635-8,701-4); i8 3 688 ff.) 9 b 9 (? by Euripides). The sayings in 74 b 36 and
;

b

antithetic compactness). taste ( frigidity ) of style
c.

Bad
;

iii,

Appropriate style for each kind of oratory, whether
3.

I9 26 are usually attributed to another Sophocles. sordidness (meanness), 6i a 7 ; 66 b b 16; 88 26, 31.
sense, 5 7. b speech, characteristic of man, 55 I (the human voice is the most imitative apt at representation of all our organs, 4 a 22). speech (oration), divisions of a, bk. iii, cc. 13-19. a speech-writers, 8 34.
)(

a

written (literary, epideictic) or the oratory of debate (political or forensic), iii, c. 12. The reason why oratorical prose at
first

took a poetical colour, 4
a

:l

sound

b

2 5-

suggestion, 68 2 ff. the surprise-joke surprise which takes you in, I2 a 28. old men are suspicious suspicion
:
:

82 a 2. spring, loss of the spring from a the year, 65 a 32 2. of the, and fable the horse, stag b 93 13 ff. Stasinus quoted, 76 a 7 95 a 19. statement (of a case), I4 a 35 ff. a 68 a i8; io a 33. statues, 6i 36
;

Speusippus, b 14 spite, 78

H

a

22.

;

n

synonyms, 4 39
Syracusans, 84

of evil, 89 b 22. a b b syllogism, 55 8 55 16 56 i ff. ; a b a 7i 9; 96 5 (argu 57 7ff. 2 a 5 ff. ment, reasoning) a Counter-syllogism, 2 31 : cp. i8 b 6. a b 2.
;
;

;

;

5

b 16.

;

taste,

;

stature,
1 8.

b women, 6o 22

an advantage
;

in

men and
a

bad see frigidities and non-technical technical modes of persuasion, 55 b 35 ff.
: .

:

6i

6;
b
;

6i b

b Telamon, i6
a
;

cp.

art

above.
3.

Stesichorus quoted, 93 b 9
I2 a 22.
Stilbon, 9_8 4. stock-subjects
b

94 35

Telephus, 5 28. b Tenedos, 75 30

;

i

b
19. a
a
;

of
ff.

eulogists
:

of

Athens, 96- 12 stocks (breeds of
flourish
ff.

and
2.

men) how they then decay, 90 b

9 tetrameters, trochaic, 4 3i b a Teucer, 98 4; i6 i. a 8 Teumessus, 3. b Theagenes of Megara, 57 33.

I.

25 b Strabax, 99

Thebes, 97 9; 9^ 3 a Themistocles, 76 i. Theodamas, 6 b 30.

b

b

^9-

INDEX
Theodectes, 97 3 (Alcwaeon] a b 98 6 (Law) 99 8 (Socrates]; b b 99 i (Law) 99 28 (Ajax) o a 28 (Ajax) 1*35 (Orestes). The Theodectea is mentioned
; ;

b

;

;

b b b 4 22 8 7. voice, 3 27 vulgarity of outlook (lack of intelli gence arid refinements 95 b 2
;
;

;

(cp. 4

a

8).

in Io b 3.

b (i) the rhetorician, o a b 16; I2 25, 34; I4 l45 (2) the b actor, 4 22. a b Theseus, 63 18 97 2i 99* 3.

Theodoras,

war and peace, 59 b 2i, 33 ff. b ways and means, 59 23. b weakness of will, 68 b 14 72
;

;

;

92 24.
wealth and the wealthy, 62 b i8; 9o b 32ff. 87^3
;

b

13

;

Thettaliscus, 98 5. a Thirty (Tyrants), the, o 18, 34 1*34thought (as distinguished from a wording and arrangement), 3 a 36; 4 i9. b Thracian, I2 2. a b a i Thrasybulus, o 33 o 19 34. a b a Thrasymachus, o 20 4 14 ; 9
; ;

b

6o b

20

;

9i

a

16 (the newly rich)

;

and 87*24
;

(men of ancient wealth) 91* 17 (to be newly-enriched means no education in riches] 6i a 23
;

;

;

2; I Timotheus, the dithyrambic poet,
7 17 topics: see argument, lines of. For Aristotle s Topics see Aristotle torture (the question ), 76 b 31 ff.
;

a 3 8.

(wealth consists in using things rather than in owning them). b well-born, character of the, 9O b 1 6 ff. Cp. also 6o 30 ff.

a

a I3 i.

.

mixed (doctored), 4 21. Cp. 2 Maccabees xv. 38, 39, for another literary application of the wine-and-water metaphor. b wisdom, 66 b 3 7i 28. Practical
wines,
;

b

wisdom (prudence, good
intelligence),
b 64 i2fT.
1
;

sense,

tragedies and 6 b 16; I5 a 19. travel, books of travel (round the a world), 6o 34.
;

b tragic poets, 3 22

66 b
b

3,

20; 78
wit

a
9, 13,

6.

travel- money (metaphorical use), ii a 10.

is well-bred insolence, 89 1 1. witnesses, various kinds of, 75* 26 ff. False witness, 75 a 12
;

76

a

20.

trespass (encroach) on state-owned a land, 74 5. trochaic tetrameters, 4 a 31 8 b 36 a 9 i. b trochee, 8 36. b Tyndareus, sons of, 97 23. tyranny (autocracy, absolute and
;

women,

their bodily and mental a excellences, 6l 5 ff. ; their poor

;

condition at Sparta, 6i a 9fT. their inferiority to men, 67 a
;

17-

wonder, 7i

b usurped power) and tyrants, 57 b a 31 ff.; 66 6 72 2.
;

universal classes of argument, 9i b
29.

7l 10 ; 7i 28. 31 Greek word (the Qavpa^fiv implies both the feel ing that a thing is remarkable as being at once fine and mys terious and also the curiosity that makes men want to under

a

b

b

Wonder

unwritten laws and principles of b b a 73 5 justice, 68 9 74 19 b a 17,35; 75 775
;
;

;

i5>

variety, 7i 25 ff. virtue and vice,
a

a

;

b I3 22 ff. described and

stand and explain it) is regarded by Plato (Theaet. 155 D) and Aristotle (Metaph. 982* 12 ff.) as the origin of learning and For the inference, philosophy. and new knowledge, drawn from the surprise which a work of
art
ft"

excites,

cp.
of, 5

Poetics
c.

I448
;

b

analysed, 66 23 ff. vividness (vivacity) of style: see Lifeless things are actuality
.

9 words, beauty

iii,

2

com
6 a 3$
;

pound words,
:

b

35rT.,

vivified

Homer,

U

by
1)

metaphor,
32
ff.

as

in

a strange words, 6 7. world the world s imputation of

INDEX
self-interest

as

the

master-

characters
doing,
i,

of,

i,

c.

12

;

wrong
b 99 6
;

motive, 17*35. worse to put the worse, or the better, construction on any Men are no i6 b II. thing, better than they should be, S2 b
:

cc. 10-14.

Xenophanes,
ob
5.

77
;

a

19,

23;

Xerxes,

b 93 2

6a

7.

4-9. written
(

youth, 89* 3

ff.

speeches
),

or
a 18
;

discourses
b

literature

Zeno, 72

b
5.

4

wrong-doers and

I3 4. their victims,

zeugma, 7 19-21. Zeus (at Olympia), 98^34.

b

DE RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
BY

E

S.

FORSTER, M.A.

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF ORIEL COLLEGE

PREFACE
THE
text used for this translation
as revised

by

C.

Hammer and

that of L. Spengel published under the title of
is
i

Avagiptvovs Ttyvr] PrjTopixrj in Rhetorcs Graeci, vol. Though the division of the (Leipzig, Teubner, 1894). chapters corresponds with that of Bekker, the numbering
begins only after the Introductory Letter, which
first
is

Bekker

s

Teubner Text fragments of a at Hibeh found were published in 1906 by Messrs. papyrus Grenfelland Hunt (Hibeh Papyrus, Pt. I, No. 26, pp. 114-38).
These fragments cover the following passages in Bekker s b b a text: I422 25- b 9; 15-22 35-1423* 37 I 4 24 2i- i7; b b a 1 7-25; 1426*31 -"30; 36-1427* 2. The 39-1425* 15; papyrus is dated by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt in the first half of the third century B. c. and is thus seventeen cen turies older than any of our MSS., which belong to thefifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As might be expected, therefore,
il
"

chapter. Since the date of the

;

;

it

these

exhibits a large number of divergences, but very few of are such as to make any important differences of

meaning; the readings of the papyrus have, therefore, only been noted where they materially affect the translation.

The authorship of the Rhetor ica ad Alexandrwn has been the subject of considerable discussion. The suggestion that it is to be attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus,
a slightly older contemporary of Aristotle, was first made by Petrus Victorius on the strength of a statement of
Quintilian (Inst. Orat.,
iii.

4.

by Spengel,

who,

in

an

This view was adopted extremely arbitrary manner,
9).

altered the text at I42i b 7 and I432 h 8 in defiance of all the MSS., in order to reduce the number of genera of oratory from three to two, so as to harmonize with Quintilian s

account of Anaximenes.
unlikely in

These emendations are not only themselves, but are contradicted by the whole

PREFACE
arrangement of Chapters 1-5 and 34-7, where the author clearly deals with three genera, each with two species, and In view of these facts the inquiry as an extra species. MS. reading has been retained in these passages.
Aristotle in the RJietorica (1358*36 ff.) recognizes the three genera and is stated by Quintilian (lust. Orat.,
iii.

Now
4.

i)

to

have been the

first

to

do so

;

the question
in

therefore arises whether the Rhet.

ad Alex, can be the work
(article
it

of Aristotle himself.

Mr. T. Case

on Aristotle

Encycl. Brit., of Aristotle of a somewhat

uth

ed.) argues that

a genuine work earlier date than the Rhetorica.
is

Against

this

it

may

ad

Alex,

shows a

be urged that the doctrine of the RJiet. development as compared with the

RJietorica in the addition of a species which the latter does 1 riot recognize. Further, it is difficult to conceive that any

one who reads the two treatises side by side can come to
the conclusion that the writer of the Rhet.

ad

Alex,

is

identical with the author of the vastly superior RJietorica.

Amongst
tion to
tJie

others

who have

discussed the question of the

authorship of the Rhet.

ad Alex., Mr. E. M. Cope (Introduc

Rhetoric of Aristotle, pp. 413 ff.) is on the whole inclined to think that the treatise may possibly be the work

of Anaximenes, but he thinks that the

name of Anaximenes
should be replaced by Heitz (O. Miiller-

on the title-page of Spengel s edition the more modest Anonymus
"

"

.

Heitz, GescJi.

der griecJi.

Lit.,

ii,

p.

287) and Susemihl (GescJi.

der griecJi. Lit. in der Alexandrinerzeit, ii, p. 451) agree in the opinion that the Rhet. ad Alex, is the work of a writer of
the early third century E. c. Hammer (Rhet. Graec., vol. i, pp. iv-v) considers the question undecided, but, while he
implies that there
is

much
that

to be said for the view of Heitz

and Susemihl,

states

he has retained the name of

Anaximenes out of deference to Spengel. The editors of the Hibeh Papyrus are of opinion that the new discovery goes far to overthrow Susemihl s position and weaken his objec
tions to the previously accepted conclusions of Spengel
.

They do
1

not,

however, offer any proofs
in the
3

in

favour of the

Unless indeed Aristotle
inquiry
.

Rhetorica deliberately ignored the

species of

PREFACE
Anaximenean authorship
changes
in

or

make any

allusion to Spengel

s

passages in ments of the papyrus. They are of opinion that a fourthcentury date for the treatise maybe regarded as established,

the text, and unfortunately neither of the which these occur is included in the frag

though this, they say, does not prove that its author pre ceded Aristotle. It is to be noted that an exactly contem
porary papyrus found at Hibeh (No. 16) is probably a frag ment of Theophrastus Trepl vSaros. We shall probably not be far wrong if, accepting a date
slightly anterior to

Peripatetic

writer

300 B. c., we attribute the work to a contemporaneous with Theophrastus.

The

treatise has certainly

many

points of contact with the

and assumes and supplements Aristotle s classifica tion it is written from a more practical and less philosophic in and the rather than of Aristotle. Socrates standpoint spiritof
RJietorica
;

My
both
in

best thanks are clue

to the

Editor of the

series,

Professor

W. D. Ross, who

has read through the translation

MS. and in proof, to my colleague Professor W. C. Summers, who has read it in MS., and to Professor W. Rhys Roberts, who has read it in proof; all of whom have made
valuable suggestions and corrections.

E. S. F.

TUE UNIVERSITY, SHEFFIELD.
Nov.
14, 1923.

Bekker
20 a 6

Hammer.

2II
22 a l 22 b l

25*1

=

Bekker

Hammer.

Bekker

Hummer.

33i

CONTENTS
[Introductory Letter to Alexander.]

CHAP.
1.

The genera
species
tive,

of oratory deliberative, epideictic, forensic. The of oratory persuasive, dissuasive, eulogistic, vitupera
(i)

2.
3.

accusatory, defensive, inquisitive, persuasion and dissuasion. The subjects of deliberative oratory.
(2)

Deliberative oratory

:

4.

(3)

Forensic oratory

Epideictic oratory: eulogy and vituperation. accusation and defence.
:

5.
6.

Inquiry.

Elements
(1)

common

to every
just,

branch of oratory

:

Appeals to the

the lawful, the expedient, the noble, the

pleasant, &c.
(2)
(3)

Amplification and minimization.
Proofs.
postulates,
iterations,

(4) Anticipations,

elegances of speech,

length of speech, explanation.
/.

Proofs:
(1)

(i) Direct,

(2)

Supplementary.

Direct:
(a) Probabilities.

3. 9.

(b)
(c)

Examples.
Infallible signs.

10.

(d)
(e)
(f)

Enthymemes.
Maxims.
Fallible signs.

11.
12.

13.
14.

(g)

Refutations.

The
(2)

differences

between the various kinds of direct proof.
:

15.
1

6.

Supplementary (a) Opinion of the speaker. (b) Testimony. (c) Evidence given under torture.
(d) Oaths.

17.

18. Anticipation. 19. Postulates.

20.
21.

Iteration.

Irony.

22.

Elegance of speech and length of speech

CONTENTS
CHAP.
23.

The composition

of words.

24. Statement. 25. Clearness in speaking. 26. Antithesis.
27. 28.

Parisosis.

Paromoeosis.

29.
30.

The Proem.
Narration.

31.
32.

The arrangement
Confirmation.

of material.

33.
34. 35.

36.
37.

Methods of Anticipation. Methods of Persuasive and Dissuasive Oratory. Methods of Eulogistic and Vituperative Oratory Methods of Accusation and Defence. Methods of Inquiry.
:

38. Miscellaneous precepts

the epilogue.

DE RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
[Aristotle to Alexander.

Salutation. 1

1420*5

that you have often sent persons to me to urge upon me the project of noting down for you the principles of public speaking. It is not through indifference that I have 2 put off doing so all this time, but because I was seeking

You write

10

how

to write
else

on

this subject

with more exactitude than
therewith.
;

any one

who has concerned himself

It

was

only natural that I should have such an intention for just as you are desirous to have more splendid raiment than
other men, so
glorious skill in
far

you ought

to

strive

to attain to a

more
15

speech than other men possess. For it is more honourable and kingly to have the mind well

ordered than to see the bodily form well arrayed. verily it is absurd that one who in deeds excels all

For

men
20

should in words manifestly fall short of ordinary mortals, especially when he knows full well that, whereas among those whose political constitution is democracy the final

appeal on all matters is to the law, among those who are under kingly rule the appeal is to reason. 3 Just as their
1 It has been universally admitted by the editors that the Introductory Letter to Alexander is unsatisfactory, and from the time of Erasmus onwards it has been usually pronounced to be a forgery. E. M. Cope (Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 401) says that never did a spurious document more manifestly betray itself by want of skill and Paul Wendland, however, inappropriateness in the composition. in Hermes, xxxix (1904), pp. 499 fF., argues that the Letter in the form in which it has come down to us is the original Letter of Introduction written by Anaximenes, adapted by a later forger who wished that the work should obtain currency under the name of Aristotle. 2 see Wendland, Or perhaps all these years , a very late use of , 1. c., p. 500 and his note. 3 It is impossible in a translation to bring out the double meaning of word and reasoning which is present in Xdyor.
*
xp<>ws

I420

a

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
public law always directs self-governing communities along the best path, so might reason, as embodied in you, guide

25

along the path of their advantage those who are subject to your rule. For law can be simply described as reason
defined

by

the

common

consent

of

the

community,

Furthermore. I think that regulating action of every kind. you are well aware that we praise as good men and true
those
30 b
5

who employ

guidance, while
act in

we abhor

reason and prefer always to act under its as savage and brutish those who
]

!42O

any matter without reason. It is for this cause too that we punish wicked men when they show their wicked ness and admire the good when they display their virtue. Thus we have discovered a means of preventing possible wickedness, while we enjoy the benefits of existing goodness.

10 In this

way we escape annoyances which threaten us and secure advantages which we did not previously possess. Just as a life free from pain is an object of desire, so is wise
reason an object of contentment. Again, you must realize that the model set before most

either the law or else your life and the expression of your reason. In order therefore that you may excel all 15 Greeks and barbarians, you must exert yourself to the
is

men

utmost*,
2

so

that

those

who spend

their

lives

in

these

pursuits, using the elements of virtue in them to produce a beauteous copy of the model thus set before them, may not

direct themselves towards ignoble ends but

make
of

it

their

desire to partake in the same virtue. ^o Moreover, deliberation is the most
activities.

divine

human

Therefore you must not waste your energies on

subordinate and worthless pursuits, but desire to drink at the very fountain-head of good counsel. For what man of
25 to

sense could ever doubt that, while it is a sign of foolishness act without deliberation, it is the mark of true culture to

accomplish under the guidance of reason anything that It is plain to see that all the greatest reason commands?
politicians of
1

Greece resort to reason

first

and then to deeds,

TOVTO (DOV). those who make your probably wrong in interpreting
fact
2

i.e.

life
ire pi

and reason

their guide.

Buhle

is

rnvrit as in legibus ferendis.

SALUTATION

i42O

b

and further that those who have won the highest repute among the barbarians have employed reason before action, knowing 30 full well that the consideration of expediency by the light 1421**
of reason is a very citadel of salvation. Yea, it is reason which we must regard as an impregnable citadel, and not look on any fortress built by man as a sure safeguard. But I hesitate to say another word, lest I should seem to

be writing for

effect,

are fully known I will therefore say no more, after mentioning only one topic,
in

bringing forward proofs of facts which as though they were not generally admitted.

5

namely, that reason

enlarging on which one might spend one s whole life, is the one thing wherein we are superior

to all other animals, 1

we who have received the highest honour which heaven can bestow. For all animals display
like,

10

the appetites and desire and the

but none save

man

Now it would be most strange if, when it possess reason. is by virtue of reason alone that we live happier lives than
other animals, we should through indifference despise and renounce that which is the cause of our well-being. Though you have long been exhorted thereto, I urge you to embrace with the utmost zeal the study of reasoned For just as health preserves the body, so is educa speech.
all

15

tion

recognized preserver of the mind. Under its guidance you will never take a false step in anything that you do, but you will keep safe practically all the advantages
the

20

which you already possess.

physical sight is a pleasure, to see clearly with the eyes of the soul is a thing to be admired. Again, as the general is the saviour of his is so reason, allied with education, the guide of life. army,

Moreover,

if

These, then, and like sentiments at the present moment.

I

think

I

may

well dismiss

25

In your letter you urge me not to let this book fall into other hands than yours, and this knowing full well that,
just

as

parents

love

their

supposititious children, so those

own offspring more than who have invented some
it

thing have

more
is

affection for

than those to

whom
p.

the
in

30

discovery
1

merely imparted.

For men have died
I.e.,

Omitting with most editors (and Wendland, olv (lyfycoTTcoy, and putting a comma after
. .

502) TOVTO

.

a

I42i

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
defence of their words, 1 as they would die for their offspring. For the so-called Parian Sophists, because what they teach
is

not of their

own

production, in their gross indifference

feel
35

no affection and barter it away for money. Wherefore I exhort you to watch over these precepts, the children of my brain, that while they are yet young they may be
2
11

corrupted

by no man,, and. sharing in your well-ordered when life, theycome to man s estate, may win unsullied glory. 4 Following the lesson taught by Nicanor, we have adopted from other authors anything on the same subjects which
was particularly well expressed in their treatises. You will find two such books, one of which is my own, viz. the 7 Oratorical Art which I wrote for Theodectes, while the
r>

40 b

I42l

other

is

the

treatise

of

Corax. 8

The

other

9

points

connected with public and forensic exhortations have all been dealt with specially 10 in these treatises. So in these
5

commentaries written

expressly for you you will find 11 material for amplifying these two treatises. Farewell.]
1

Reading ourco for roi rcov as suggested by Spengel. Omitting xp?/,unoi (read by most MSS. after /i^Sero?, 1. 36). 3 It seems unnecessary to change the MS. reading cuajpaTov to a-yq/xiro? 4 SeeHeberdey,/^/^V/r/////Vr Th. Gom-pcrz (Vienna, 1902), pp. 412 ff. 5 for which useful books i.e. according to Wendland, I.e., p. 505, is but TO? Toiovrots would be expected and should perhaps be read somewhat similarly used for roiovro in 142^37. is here, according to Wendland, substituted by the adapter of
2
.

,

;

<ip.6v

the Introduction for AptororeXoi;? of the original. 7 On this early oratorical work of Aristotle see Rhet. I4io b 2 Cope, Introd. (1867), p. 57 Diels, Ueber das dritte Buck der Aristot. Rliet. and Mayer, (Proceedings of the Berlin Academy, 1886), p. 12
;

;

;

Theophrastus irepl Xefcos, Prolegomena, pp. xxxvii-xlvii (where argued that part of this work is preserved in the Atwnynii re^i
7roAiT//cof
8

it
/;

is

roC-

Xoyou).
this
i,

For

work

see Rhet. i4O2 a 17

;

Bereds.,
!l

pp. 19, 20;
.

and Wendland,

I.e.,

Cicero, Brutus, 12 pp. 509-13.

;

Blass, Att.

i. e. according to \Vendland, those which I have not adopted from them 10 i.e. by different methods from those employed in the present treatise and in the prevalent mode of rhetoric (Wendland). 11 Daher wirst du beide aus meiner Schrift Wendland paraphrases berichtigen und erganzen konnen.
:

CHAPTER
I

h
i

I42i

Public speeches
deictic,

fall
1

into three classes, deliberative, epi-

and

forensic.

They

are of seven kinds, being

em
10

ployed
thing
their
in

in persuasion, dissuasion,
2

eulogy, vituperation, accusa
in relation to

tion, defence, and inquiry either
else.

by itself or

Such

are the different kinds of discourses

someand

number. We shall employ them in public harangues, lawsuits about contracts, and in private conversation.
15

shall treat of them most conveniently if we take them each separately and enumerate their qualities, 3 their uses, 4

We

and their arrangement. 5 And first let us discuss persuasion and dissuasion, since they are used most of all in private conversations and in public harangues. To speak generally,
an exhortation to some purpose or speech persuasion or action, while dissuasion is the prevention of some purpose
is

20

or speech or action.

Such being the

definition of these

words, he

who persuades must show

that those things to

which he exhorts are just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant, and easy of accomplishment. Failing that, when he
is
is

25

exhorting to that which is difficult, he must show that it He who practicable and that its execution is necessary.

dissuades,

by pursuing the opposite course, must exert a hindering influence, showing that the proposed action is neither just nor lawful nor expedient nor honourable nor
pleasant nor practicable if he cannot do that, he must 30 urge that it is toilsome and unnecessary. All actions can have both these sets of attributes applied to them, 6 so that
;

a

man who
7

can urge neither of these two sets of fundamental
is

qualities qualities

at a loss for anything to say.

It is for these

therefore

that

those

who

seek to persuade or
to define

dissuade must look.

I will

now attempt
.

them one

TO p.ev drjuqyopiKov, TO ft eViSeiKTiReading with all MSS. rpla Kov } TO de SLKUVIKOV. Spengel omitted TO 6 fmdciKTiKov in order to reconcile the division here given with that ascribed to Anaximenes by Ouintilian
1
"yfvr)

.

.

(Inst. Graf., iii. 4. 9, Anaximenes iudicialem ei contionalem generates partes esse uoluit, septem auleni species^ cr-V.) and thus support his theory of the Anaximenean authorship. A similar division into three b eiSj; is given by all MSS. in i432 S, where see note. 2 For the meaning of inquiry (e|eVa<m) see below I427 b 12. 3 4 6 Chapters 1-5. Chapters 6-28. Chapters 29-38. G i.e. every action is just or unjust, lawful or unlawful, &c. 7 i.e. justice, lawfulness, &c., or injustice, unlawfulness, &c.

b

I42i
35

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
by one and show whence we
discourses.
shall

supply them
all

for our

That which
majority of

is

just

is

the unwritten custom of

or the

men which draws
is

a distinction between

what

is
1

honourable and what

base.

We may take

the honouring of parents, doing good
4

to one

a

I422

returning good to one s benefactors. duties are not enjoined upon mankind by written laws, but they are observed by unwritten custom and universal
practice.

examples and These and similar
s friends,

as

So much
a

for just actions.

common agreement made by the community, which ordains in writing how the citizens ought to act
is

Law

under every kind of circumstance.
5

Expediency is the safeguarding of existing advantages, or the acquisition of those not already possessed, or the riddance of existing disadvantages, or the prevention of

harm which threatens

to occur.

divide up expediency according as the mind or external possessions. beauty, and health are expedient
10

For individuals you can it applies to the body or For the body, strength,
;

wisdom, and justice. wealth, and property.
expedient.

for the mind, courage, External possessions are friends,

The

contraries

of these are
as

in

For a community such things

concord,

strength for war, wealth, a plentiful supply of revenue, and In excellence and abundance of allies are expedient. a word we look upon anything of this kind as expedient
15

and the contrary as inexpedient. Honourable things are those from which good repute and creditable distinction Pleasant things are those which will accrue to the doers. are those which are accomplished cause joy. things Easy with the least expenditure of time, trouble, and money. Practicable things are all those which admit of performance.
Necessary things are those the execution of which does not depend upon us but takes place as it were by some necessity
divine or human. Such, then,
ful,
is

20

the nature of things just, law

expedient, honourable, easy, practicable, and necessary. It will be easy to speak about such subjects by the use of

the arguments mentioned above and
1

by arguments analogous
i.

Sauppe reads TOWVTO for ToiVo, but see note on 1421

CHAPTER
to

i

1422*
25

them and by arguments opposed to them and by employing judgements pronounced by the gods or by men or by judges of repute 1 or by our opponents.
have already described the nature of that which is following are cases where there is an analogy to just. As we consider it just to obey parents, is just which that on the same principle it behoves sons to imitate the actions

We

The

:

3

of their fathers
return to those

;

or again,

*

As

it

is

just to

do good

in

It is by this method that we must get analogies to justice. Then we 2 ought to make the example itself clear by taking the con As it is just to punish those who do us a wrong, 35 trary case so it behoves us to do good in return to our benefactors You will discover what is just in the judgement of men of Not only repute by a consideration such as the following do we hate and do harm to our enemies, but the Athenians 40 also and the Lacedaemonians judge that it is just to punish
.
: . * :

from harming those

who do good to us, so it is who have done us no ill

just to abstain

their enemies.

By
is

following this system you will often
is

discover what

just.

We
lawful.

have already defined the nature of that which

1422**

When

it

serves our purpose

we must introduce the
5

legislator himself

and his law and any case of analogy to For example, As the lawgiver punishes thieves with very serious penalties, so we ought to inflict heavy chastisement on those who deceive, for they steal
the written law.
or again, Just as the lawgiver away the understanding made the nearest relatives the heirs of those who die
;

has

childless, so I ought in the present case to have authority over the possessions of a freed man for since those who set him free are dead and I am the nearest relative of the
;

10

their freedmen.

assuming control over an example of the way in which an analogy to that which is ordained by law is obtained. The following is an illustration of what is contrary to that
I

deceased persons,

am

justified in

This

is

which
1

is

lawful:

If the

law prohibits the distribution of
ev
a>v

15

Reading

VTT

avQpauw

r/

VTT

Kpirou with the

Hibeh Papyrus

(quoted hereafter as n).
2

avro TO Trapadfiy/ua (MSS.).

h

I422

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
public property, it was clearly the judgement of the lawgiver for that all who divide up such property arc doing wrong
;

if

the laws ordain that those

who govern

the state well and

justly should be honoured, they clearly regard those who make away with public property as deserving of punishment.
20

nature of the lawful is thus clearly shown by taking cases of the contrary. It can be demonstrated from previous Not only do judgements by a consideration such as this
:

The

hold that the lawgiver made this law to cover such cases as these, but on a former occasion, when Lysithidas gave an
I

explanation similar to that which I am now putting forward, the jury voted in favour of this interpretation of the law. By this method we shall often be able to demonstrate what
is

lawful.

25

The
defined.

nature

of the

expedient
addition

itself

We
1

must,

in

to

has already been the subjects already

mentioned, introduce the expedient, wherever it is available, into our arguments and often bring it to light, pursuing
the

same method which we employed

for the lawful

and the

30 just.

The
:

expedient

following would be instances of analogies to the As in war it is expedient to station the bravest

men

in the front rank, so in the state

the wisest and justest or again, As people
;

men

it is advantageous that should be the leaders of the

35

it is expedient for the healthy to be on their guard against disease, so too in communities which

to provide against following this method you will be able to make many analogies to the expedient. The expedient will also be clear if you take contrary cases such
live
in

harmony

it

is

expedient

possibilities of faction.

By

If it is advantageous to honour good would be expedient also to punish the wicked 40 or again, If you think it inexpedient that we should make a I423 war unaided on the Thebans, it would be expedient to make the Lacedaemonians our allies and then make war on the Thebans. This is the method by which you will demonstrate the expedient by arguing from the contrary. You can discover what has been judged to be expedient by

as the following
citizens,
it

:

;

1

by

Reading /^era rcoy Trpoeip^eVo)! (i.e. SiKainv \V. Kroll in R/i. Miis., Ixxi (1911), p. 161.

and

i-o/jLip.nv ),

suggested

CHAPTER
judges
l

i

1423
:

The

by considerations such as the following Lacedaemonians, when they had conquered the
of repute

5

Athenians, thought it expedient not to enslave their city, and on another occasion the Athenians and Thebans, 2 when
it

was within their power to depopulate Sparta, thought it expedient to allow the Lacedaemonians to survive/ By pursuing this method you will have plenty to say
10

You must just, the lawful, and the expedient. the in same the methods of the case employ honourable, the the the and the easy, pleasant, practicable, necessary. shall thus have abundant material on these topics also.
about the
2

We

Next let us determine the number, the character, and the names of the subjects which we discuss in the councilchamber and in the popular assembly. If we have a clear
knowledge of these, the actual circumstances will provide us with something appropriate to say on each occasion when we are giving advice. If we have long been familiar with
the characteristics

15

common to each class of subject, we shall be able to always apply them readily in practice. We must therefore distinguish the various subjects about which all
men hold public deliberation. To sum the matter up, there are seven subjects on which we shall speak in public. 3 For whether we are addressing the council or thefpeople, we must necessarily deliberate and
speak about either sacred rites or laws or the political con stitution or alliances and contracts with other states or war
or peace or the provision of resources. These, then, are the subjects about which we shall deliberate and address the
20

25

people.

Let us take each of them separately and see
in

how

they can be treated

a speech.
in

There are three ways
;

which we must deal with the

for we shall urge either that they 30 subject of sacred rites ought to be retained in their existing form, or that they 4 ought to be changed so as to be more magnificent or else
less
1

sumptuous.
Reading with

When we
n
UTT
fi>S6u>v

are maintaining that the existing
KpirSav.
II.

2

Adding

/xera

Qr)paia>v

after A^i/atot with

8
4

b Cp. Rhet. I359 2o ff., where a somewhat different list Reading with II en\ TO p-eyaXoTrpfTrearTepov p-eraorTaTtov rj

is
.

given.

Q

2

I423

a

RHKTORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
form should be retained, we should derive material from
the argument of justice, urging that it is regarded by all men as unjust to transgress the customs of our forefathers,

35

and that
sacrifices

all

the

oracles

command men

to

make

their

that

it

according to the usages of their forefathers, and is of the utmost importance that the religious

observances should be continued which were prescribed by those who originally founded cities and set up temples to
the gods. On the ground of expediency we shall urge that, 1423^ if the sacrifices are offered according to ancestral usage, it will be expedient either for individuals or the community

payments of money which will be by creating for if heavy-armed troops, a feeling of self-confidence horsemen, and light-armed soldiers join in a religious
at large in view of the

involved, and that

it

will benefit the citizens
;

procession, the citizens, priding themselves on such things.
T

would

feel

greater confidence in themselves. o
is

It

can be

honourable, if it results in on the ground of pleasure, the spectacle of splendid festivals because a variety in the sacrifices to the gods is introduced
;

urged on the ground of what

and on the ground of practicability, if into the spectacle has characterized the celebration. excess neither defect nor
;

10

Thus when we are speaking in support of the existing state of affairs, we must pursue our inquiry by the above or similar methods and treat the question under discussion as
the nature of the subject permits. When we are advising a change to greater magnificence in the celebration of sacred rites, we shall have a plausible

1

5

pretext for altering ancestral usages, if we urge that an addition to existing rites involves not their destruction but their extension again, that it is reasonable to suppose that
;

the gods are more favourably disposed to those who honour them more again, that even our fathers used not to perform
;

their sacrifices always in the same way, but regulated their service to the gods, both as a community and as private

individuals,
20
;

according

10

the

occasion

and

their

own

prosperity again, that this is a principle which we follow in all other matters in the government of our cities and our
private

establishments.

You must

also

mention

any

CHAPTER
advantage
in

2

1423"

brilliance

result to the city

or enjoyment which is likely to from the alteration, following the methods

which we have described above.
are urging a reduction of the scale of our in the first place direct our remarks to rites, the circumstances of the moment and show in what respect

When we

sacred

we must

25

we must show
rejoice,

the citizens are less prosperous now than formerly. Next that it is reasonable to suppose that the gods

not

in

the costliness of the sacrifices, but in the piety
;

who offer them again, that both gods and men deem those who do anything beyond their means to be
of those
guilty of great folly next, that public expenditure is not 30 merely a personal question but depends on prosperity and
;

adversity.

These and others of the same kind are the

arguments which we shall offer on the subject of sacrifices. But in order that we may know how to give some indica tions and offer rules as to the conditions of the ideal sacrifice,
let

35

us define

it

thus

:

the best sacrifice of

all is

one which

is

pious towards the gods, moderate in costliness, likely to bring advantage in war, and splendid from a spectacular
It will be pious towards the gods, if ancestral 1424** point of view. usage is not violated it will be moderate in costliness, if
;

the accompaniments of the ceremony are not all wasted it will be splendid from a spectacular point of view, if gold and such things as are not actually consumed are used lavishly
;

;

and
in

it

will

be advantageous for war,

if

horsemen and infantry

full

panoply accompany the procession.

By

following
5

these rules

we

shall best provide for the service of the gods.

From what
speak

has been said

above we shall know how to
rites

in public

about the performance of sacred

of

every kind. Let us next deal similarly with laws and the political constitution. Laws may be briefly described as common

10

agreements made
ordain in writing circumstances.
In democratic

by the community which

define

and

how

the citizens should act under various

ought to provide for the less appointment by important and the majority of the offices (for thus faction will be avoided), while the
lot to

states legislation

I424

a

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
most important magistrates should be elected by the votes of the multitude. In this way the people, having the power
bestow honours on whomsoever they like, will not be jealous of those who obtain them, while the more prominent men will be encouraged to practice virtue, knowing that it
to
will

15

be to their advantage to have a good repute among their fellow-citizens. Such are the laws which ought to be

20 laid

down regarding

elections in
to

a democratic state.

It

would be a lengthy task
the administration.

go

into detail

about the

rest of

But, to put the matter briefly, care must be taken that the laws may prevent the multitude from
entertaining designs against the possessors of property and may instil into the wealthy citizens an eagerness to l in undertaking public burdens. The laws spend money
will

25

ensure this

if

certain distinctions are set aside

by law

for

the owners of property in return for their expenditure in the service of the state, and if the laws sho\v more consideration
for the tillers of

the

soil

and the

sailors
;

2

among

the poorer

classes than for the rabble of the city
30 willingly

so that the rich

may

serve the state, and the people may prefer work to dishonest means of gain. In addition stringent laws must be

down forbidding the distribution of public lands and the confiscation of the property of deceased persons, and heavy penalties must be imposed on those who commit these
laid
35

Also public land in a good position in front transgressions. of the city must be set apart for the burial of those who arc
killed in war,

and

their children

public expense until character of legislation in a democratic state.
40

must be supported at the they grow up. Such must be the

1424^ magistracies impartially to
citizenship
;

In oligarchical states the laws ought to distribute the all who possess the rights of

most of them should be bestowed by

lot,

but

the most important should be assigned oath and with the strictest precautions.

5

the penalties inflicted the citizens ought to be very heavy, for the people are not so much annoyed at being debarred from holding office as
1

by Under an oligarchy on those who offer affronts to any of

secret vote under

2

Reading with Reading

H

\eirovpyias barravav
f,

v<aniK<n

Blass

s

suggested restoration of

11.

CHAPTER
citizens

2

they are angered at being affronted. Differences between ought to be settled as quickly as possible and not be allowed to continue. Nor ought the lower classes to be
allowed to collect from the country into the city for the result of such assemblages is that the populace unites and overthrows the oligarchy. Speaking generally, in democratic
;

10

ought to hinder the populace from entertain in oligarchical on the property of the rich ing designs states they ought to check the possessors of political rights from insulting those who are weaker than themselves and from imposing upon the citizens. From what I have said you will not fail to perceive what aims the laws and
states the laws
;

ought to keep in view. Any one who wishes to speak in favour of a law must show that it affects all equally, that it harmonizes with the
political constitution
rest

15

of the

laws,
in

particularly show that it will conduce to virtue
that
it

and that it is promoting concord

beneficial
;

to

the

city,

failing this,

he must
20

among

the citizens, or

will benefit the public

revenue or the good repute of

the city as a whole, or that it will strengthen the power of If the state, or that it will confer some similar advantage.

you are speaking against a law, you must consider whether and next, it does not apply equally to all the citizens
;

from agreeing with the other laws, it is and further, whether it will con actually opposed to them duce to none of the benefits which we have mentioned, being
whether, so
far
;

25

on the contrary harmful. These considerations will provide us with abundant arguments for making proposals and speaking about laws and the political constitution. We will now proceed to deal with alliances and contracts Contracts must necessarily be regulated with other states. by public arrangements and agreements. Alliances must
be formed on occasions when one party is too weak by or else men itself, or when a war is expected to break out
;

30

must enter into an
war.

alliance with another state because they

think they will thus prevent certain people from making These and a number of similar circumstances are the reasons which induce states to

make

allies.

When

you wish to support the formation of an alliance,

35

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
you must make it clear that the occasion for doing so exists, and show if possible, that the proposed allies are just men, and that they have previously conferred some benefit upon the state, and that they are possessed of considerable power, and
that they are situated near at hand.
4

If all these

advantages

are not present, you must collect in your speech any of them When you are trying to prevent an alliance, 1425** which do exist. it is open to you to show in the first place that it is
or again, that the proposed unnecessary at the moment allies are not just men, or that they have wronged us on a
;

5

previous occasion. Failing that, you can object to them on the ground that they live too far away and are not in a

With these position to help us at the proper moment. and similar arguments we shall have abundant material for speaking against and in support of the formation of alliances. Again, on the subject of peace and war let us use a similar
10

method
for

to obtain our chief kinds of argument.

making war on another

state are as follows

The pretexts when we
:

have been the victims of aggression, we must take vengeance on those who have wronged us, now that a suitable oppor
tunity has presented
itself;

or else,
to

when we
;

are actually

war on our own behalf or on behalf of our kindred or benefactors or else we must help our allies when they are wronged or else we must go to war
being wronged, we must go
;

15

to gain

some advantage

for

the city, in respect either of

glory, or of resources, or of strength, or of something similar. When we are exhorting any one to go to war we must
collect as

many

show
20

that those

of these pretexts as possible, and afterwards whom we are exhorting possess most of the
in warfare.

advantages which bring success

Now men

are

always successful either by the favour of the gods, which we call good fortune, or through the number and strength of
their troops, or

through the abundance of their resources

25

wisdom of their general or the excellence of their From these, or through their superiority of position. then, and similar advantages we shall select and demonstrate those which are most applicable to the circumstances, when
or the
allies,

our advice

favour of war, belittling the points of superiority possessed by the enemy and exaggerating those
is

in

CHAPTER
which we ourselves enjoy. war which is likely to take
pretexts to
If

2

show

are trying to prevent a first of all find place, that the alleged grievances either do not

we

we must

exist at all or else are small

and

insignificant

;

next we must

3

not expedient to go to war, dwelling on the disasters that befall men in warfare; and further, that the

show that

it is

advantages which conduce to victory (which have just been enumerated) are possessed by the enemy rather than by us. These are the means which we must employ to avert a war

which is likely to occur. When we are trying to stop a war which has actually started, if those to whom our advice is offered are stronger than their foes, the first point on which we must insist is that sensible men ought not to
wait until they have a fall, but should make peace while they are strong also, that it is characteristic of war to ruin
;

35

many

even of those

who

are successful in

it,

but of peace

4

to save the vanquished and to allow the victorious to enjoy the possessions which they have gained in warfare. must also dwell upon the numerous and incalculable

We

vicissitudes of warfare.

Such are the methods by which

we must exhort

to peace those

who

are victorious in war.
5

Those who have already met with failure we must urge to make peace on the ground of actual events, and because they ought to learn from their misfortunes and not be exasperated by those who have already injured them, and because of the dangers which have already resulted from not making peace, and because it is better to sacrifice a part
of their possessions to an enemy stronger than themselves than to be conquered and lose their lives as well as their property. And, to put the matter briefly, we must realize
that

10

the universal custom of mankind to abandon mutual warfare, either when they think that the demands of
it

is

the

enemy

are just, or
strife.

when they
therefore,

are at variance with their

allies,

or weary of war, or afraid of their enemy, or suffering
If,

from internal
all

you

collect

these and

similar

arguments

those

applicable to the circumstances, you will material for speaking about peace and war.
Lastly,
it

from amongst which are most have no lack of
15

remains

for

us to treat of the provision of

I425

b

RHETORIC A AD ALKXANDRUM
First, then,

20 resources.

we must
is

belonging to the city

inquire whether any property neglected, neither bringing in any
:

revenue nor being dedicated to the gocls

I

mean,

for

example, any public lands which are neglected and might bring in revenue to the city if they were sold or leased to
J5

private persons
If this

;

for this
is

is

a very

common

source of income.
rate

expedient

lacking,

we must impose taxes on

able property, or order the poor to give their personal service in time of danger, the rich to pay money, and the craftsmen to provide arms. In a word, when we are treating

of ways and means,
30 citizens equally

we must say that they affect all the and are permanent and ample, while the

exact opposite

From

true of our adversaries proposals. what has now been said we are acquainted with the
is

subjects on which we shall speak in public, when we are seeking to persuade or dissuade, and their component parts,

which
35

will

supply us with the material of our orations.

Next

in order let us set forth

and treat of the

eulogistic

and

vituperative kinds of oratory.

speak -generally, the eulogistic kind is the amplifica- 3 purposes, deeds, and words, and the attribution of qualities which do not exist; 1 while the
tion

To

of creditable

vituperative kind is the opposite of this and consists in the minimizing of creditable qualities and the amplification of

those which are discreditable.
40

Deeds worthy of

praise are

those which arc just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant, a I426 and easy of execution. The nature of these qualities and the sources from which we can obtain abundant material

about them have already been stated. 2 He who is eulogizing must show in his speech that one of these praiseworthy
deeds
5 it

is connected with a certain person or his acts, because has either been brought about by his personal exertions, or has been produced through his agency, or has resulted from a certain action of his, or has been done for some

have come to pass except under certain circumstances which are clue to him. Similarly he who
object, or could not
is

censuring must show that the contrary of this
1

is

true

a Cp. Rhet. I4o8 1-5.

2

I42i

b

35

ff.

CHAPTER

3

1426

The following arc of the person whom he is censuring. health is the result of of the results action bodily examples
;

of a fondness for gymnastics a man falls into ill-health as 10 the result of not caring for exercise, or becomes wiser as the
;

result of studying philosophy, or lacks the necessities of life

as the result of his

own

carelessness.
:

actions done with an object dangers with the object of being crowned
citizens, or neglect

The following are men endure many toils and
by
their fellow- 15

everything else with the object of pleasing Instances of things which can only those whom they love. take place under certain circumstances are the following:
victories at sea can only take place

when there

are sailors to

win them, and drunkenness can only occur as the result of drinking. By pursuing this method on the lines already
laid

down you

will

have abundant material

for

eulogy and

30

vituperation.

Generally speaking you will be able to amplify and minimize under all such circumstances by the following

method

:

first,

by showing,
bad
results

many good

or

person s actions. This is second method is to introduce 1 a judgement already passed a favourable one, if you are eulogizing, and an unfavourable
one,
it

as I explained just now, that have been caused by a certain one kind of amplification. A

if you are censuring and then set side by side with what you have to say and compare the two together, making as much as possible of your own opinion and as little as possible of the other judgement the result will be that your own opinion is magnified. A third plan is to compare that about which you are speaking with the least thing which falls under the same category for the former will then appear magnified, just as persons of moderate
; ;

25

height appear taller than they really are when they stand 30 side by side with persons of unusually small stature. The
following
is

another safe method of amplification

:

if

a certain

thing has been considered a great good, then its contrary, if you mention it, will appear to be a great evil, and similarly, 35 if a thing is considered to be a great evil, its contrary, if yoti
1 Finckh s emendation, adopted by Sp.-H., of p.eya seems unnecessary.

(pepeiv for

peruke

1426*

RIIETORICA
mention

AD ALEXANDRUM

40

You can also it, will appear to be a great good. magnify good and bad actions by showing that the doer of them acted intentionally, proving that he had long pre meditated doing them, that he purposed to do them often, that he did them over a long period, that no one else ever tried to do them, that he acted in company with others with whom no one else ever acted, or following those whom
one e se ever followed, or that he acted wittingly or designedly, and that we should be fortunate, or unfortunate,
l

b I426 n

5

we all did as he did. You must also prove your point by drawing parallels and amplifying as follows, building them as it were, one on the top of another If a man cares for his friends, it is natural to suppose that he honours his parents, and he who honours his parents will also desire to
if
1
:

benefit

his

fatherland.

prove that a

man

is

Generally speaking, if you can the cause of many good or bad things,

You must also these things will appear to be important. examine the topic on which you are speaking and see whether
10 it

appears to have more weight when divided into parts or when treated as a whole, 2 and you must treat it in the manner in which it appears to have more weight. By pursuing these methods you will be able to make the most

frequent and effective amplifications. You will minimize good and bad actions in your speeches by following the opposite method to that which we have

15

The best thing is to prescribed for amplification. a man s action has produced no result at all, or,

show that
if

that

is

impossible, only the smallest and most insignificant results. From these instructions we know how to amplify or mini

mize any point which we are bringing forward,^ when we are These materials for amplification eulogizing or censuring. 4 of oratory, but they are most are useful in other kinds
20 effective in
5 eulogy and vituperation. provided with ample material on these
1

We
topics.

shall thus be

The method
Reading with

of
II

Epicharmus
norepov p.elov
e

,

cp. Rhet. 1365* 16

;

G.A.

2

(foaivfrat TO 7rpdyp.ct diaipovfjifvov

72^30.
rj

/cn$d-

\ov \yo[j.evov.
3 4 5

Reading with

n

K(j6e/jco/^fi/

for

e

Sp.-H. s flddcriv is a misprint a Cp. Rhet. !36S 26, 27.

for

CHAPTER
4
in

4

1426

Let us next similarly define the kinds of oratory employed accusation and defence, [which are concerned with forensic 1 business, ] and the elements of which they are composed and
the uses to which they are to be put. The oratory of accusation is, to put the matter briefly, the exposition of
errors
25

and crimes

;

defensive oratory

of errors and crimes of which a

man
2

is

Both

styles,

then,

having

these

is the disproving accused or suspected. qualities, he who is

his opponents with deliberate their acts are unjust and that must declare wickedness, and to the detrimental interests of the mass of citizens illegal when he is accusing an adversary of folly, he must declare his acts to be both inexpedient for the actual doer of them and disgraceful and odious and impracticable. These and similar arguments are those which should be directed Accusers should also against the wicked and foolish. observe against what kinds of offences the punishments ordained by the laws are directed and for what offences Where the law has laid down a juries impose penalties. definite punishment, the accuser must make it his sole object to prove that the offence has been committed. When the 3 jury has to assess the penalty, first the charges must be proved then the errors committed by one s opponents must be amplified, and, if possible, it must be shown that the offence was committed wittingly, and not with ordinary intent but after every possible preparation. If you cannot do this, and think that your opponent intends to show that he has some

accusing,

when he charges

30

;

35

40
1427**

;

5

how made
any claim

a mistake or that he intended to act honourably in

met with misfortune, you must deprive him of pardon by telling your hearers that evil-doers, in stead of declaring that they have made a mistake after they have acted, ought to be careful before they act and further
the matter but
to
;

that,

he
1

is

he has made mistakes or met with misfortune, more deserving of punishment for his misfortunes and

even

if

10

These words are omitted by

n

and are probably an interpola

tion.
2

Reading with n and the best MSS. ravras for ras avrds. Reading with II orav S oi diKaaral ri/ncoo i, Trp&rov avdyKTj 67rielai va. At this point n breaks off: it probably continued
/zei>

KT\.

a

I427

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
has done neither of these things. Moreover the legislator has not let those who make mistakes go free, but has made them liable to punishment, in order to

mistakes than one

who

15

J prevent any one else from making mistakes. You must also point out that if they listen to one who makes this kind of defence, they will have many persons doing wrong deliber

ately

;

for if

they are successful, they will simply do what

they are unsuccessful, they will declare that they have met with ill -fortune, and they then will be excused from punishment. By such arguments must
they
like, while, if

20

accusers deprive their adversaries of any claim to pardon, and by means of the amplifications already described their acts must be shown to have caused many evils. These are

the component parts of which the oratory of accusation

is

made
is

up.

Defensive oratory consists of three methods. man who defending himself must either prove that he committed
;

A

25

30

none of the acts of which he is accused or if he is forced admit them, he must try to show that what he has done is lawful and just and honourable and expedient for the if he cannot prove this, he must attribute his acts to state an error or to misfortune and show that the harm which has resulted from them is small, and so try to gain pardon. You can define a crime, an error, and a misfortune thus
to
;
:

35

you must regard as a crime a wicked deed done deliberately, and you must urge that the heaviest penalty be exacted for such deeds a harmful act done in ignorance must be called an error while the failure to accomplish some good in tention, not through one s own fault but owing to some one
;
;

else or to luck,

is

to be accounted a misfortune.

The com

mission of crime you must declare to be confined to wicked men, while error and misfortune in action are not peculiar
to oneself but are
40 are

1427**

common to all men, including those who judgement upon you. You must ask for pardon if you are forced to admit that you have committed faults of this kind, pointing out that your hearers are as A man who is liable to error and misfortune as you are. his defence must all for which observe the offences making Reading iravres, with most MSS. and Bekker, for
sitting in
1

CHAPTER
the laws
penalties.

4

1427

have

laid

clown punishment and juries assess

When

must show

the law fixes a definite punishment, he that he has not committed the offence at all,

But when the jury or that he has acted legally and justly. is empowered to assess the penalty, he must not follow the

same course and deny that he has committed the offence, btit rather he must try to prove that his action has caused little harm to his adversary and that it was done involuntarily. If we follow these and similar methods, we shall have abundant material in cases of accusation and defence. It
remains for us
still

5

10

to deal with the style of oratory

em

ployed
5

in

an inquiry.
l

Inquiry

may

be summarily described as the elucidation

of intentions, acts, and words which are contradictory to one He who is another or to the rest of a man s mode of life.

making an inquiry must try to discover whether either the statement which he is examining or the acts or intentions of
the subject of his inquiry are in any respect contradictory to one another. The method to be pursued is as follows
:

15

he must consider whether

the past the person in question, after having been originally the friend of another man, next became his enemy and then again the friend of the same
in

person, or whether he has done anything contradictory or of a discreditable tendency, or is likely in the future, if
occur, opportunities contradicts his former acts.

20

should

to

act

in a

Similarly,

manner which you must observe
is

whether,

in

making some statement now, he

speaking

in

contradiction of his former words, 2 and likewise whether he has formed any intention which contradicts his former
3 words, or would do so

25

opportunities should arise. By a similar process you must deal with the contradictions which occur in the mode of life of the person whom you are ex
if

amining
1

in respect of his

other and highly esteemed habits

There

is

Quintilian (hist. Orat. exquirendi quod e
2

no one word which exactly translates the term iii. 4. 9) has to use the Greek word,
eracrr<K()i>

*

species

dicit

.

Omitting with Buhle f) repeats the previous clause.
3

a n

.

.

.

elpi]p.fi ots (1.

23

f.),

which merely

(MSS.).

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
life. If you thus pursue this branch of oratory, there no method of examination which you will leave untried.

of

is

30

All the various branches of oratory having now been dis tinguished, we must employ them, when it is fitting, either

each separately or

in

common with
in

one another by mingling

their different qualities.

between them, but
35

For there are very great differences actual practice they have much in

common. In this respect they resemble the various classes of human beings, who are partly similar and partly dis
similar in their appearance and in their perceptions. Having thus distinguished the various kinds of oratory, let us next

enumerate the requisites which are and explain how they must be used.

common

to

all

kinds

40
a

First, then, the just, the lawful, the expedient, the 6 honourable, the pleasant, and similar topics are, as I stated at the beginning, 1 common to all the various kinds of oratory,

I428

fication

but are chiefly used in persuasive oratory. Secondly, ampli and minimization are necessarily useful in all kinds

of oratory, but

5

vituperation. necessarily be employed in every department of oratory, but are particularly useful in accusation and defence, since

eulogy and Thirdly, there are the proofs, which must

most use

is

made

of

them

in

these need

most

refutation.

Further we must deal with

10

2 anticipations of arguments, postulates, reiterations, pro lixity of speech, and moderate length of speech, brevity, and method of statement. For these and similar expedients are

useful in

all

the various branches of oratory.

The
15

just, the lawful,

and the

like I
;

I will now explain the other terms, beginning with the proofs. Proofs are of two kinds some are derived directly from actual words, acts, and persons, others are supplementary
;

and explained their application 4 amplification and minimization.

I

have already defined 3 7 have also dealt with

to
20

words and

actions.

Probabilities, examples, infallible
fallible signs,

signs,

enthymemes, maxims,
ff.

and refutations

are proofs derived from actual words, persons, and actions.
1

1421* 24

? 3

Omitting
J42i
b

u aoretoXoyt ai, inserted by Spengel without
4
ff.

4

i2

MS. authority.

b

,6ff,

CHAPTER
Testimonies,
1

a

7

I428

and evidence given under torture are supplementary proofs. We must understand the nature of each of these kinds of proof, and whence we are to derive material for them, and how they differ from one another.
oaths,

a Probability when one s hearers have examples in of what is being said. For instance, if any one were to say that he desires the glorification of his country, the prosperity of his friends, and the mis
It is

25

their

own minds

and the like, his statements taken would together appear probable for each one of his hearers is himself conscious that he entertains such wishes on these and similar subjects. We must, therefore, always carefully notice, when we are speaking, whether we are likely to find our audience in sympathy with us on the subject on which we are speaking for in that case they are most likely to believe what we say. Such, then, is the nature of a probability.
fortunes of his foes,
;

30

;

can divide probabilities into three kinds. One kind 35 consists in the inclusion in one s speech, when accusing or defending, of the feelings which are naturally found in

We

example, certain persons happen to despise or fear a certain other person, or have often done this very 40
if,

mankind

for

action, or, further, if they feel pleasure or pain or desire, or have ceased from desire, or if they act under the influence

b

I428

of wine, or have experienced in mind or body or one of the senses any of the feelings whereby we are all affected.

These and similar

feelings,

being

common

to all

human
5

Such, then, are the nature, are well known to our hearers. natural feelings which are wont to affect mankind, and for
these

we say

Another

that a place ought to be found in our speeches. division of probabilities falls under the heading of

habit (which is what we do from custom), a third under that of love of gain. For we often for the sake of gain choose to J0
act in a

way which does

violence to our nature and character.

these definitions before us, when we are seeking to persuade or dissuade, we must show in regard to the subject in question that the action to which we are exhorting our

With

hearers, or which

we
mv

are opposing, has the effect which
\eyovrns,

we

Emitting
by Spengel.

8a

inserted

without

MS.

authority

I428

b

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
declare that it has. Failing that, we must show that actions similar to that of which we are speaking either generally or

15

Such must be our invariably turn out as we say they do. in of relation to actions. As probabilities application
regards persons you must show, if you can, when you are accusing any one, that he has often committed the act in or, if that is impossible, question on previous occasions
;

ao that

he has done similar
it

acts.

You must

that

was

to his advantage to

commit these

also try to prove acts for most
;

men, themselves preferring what is to their advantage, think that others too always act from this motive. If, therefore, you can derive an argument of probability directly from your adversaries,
25 infer
it.

this is the

method by which you must
;

Failing that, you must take similar persons and adduce their customary procedure for example, when the

man whom you
;

are accusing

is

young, argue that he has

30

committed acts such as persons of that age are in the habit of committing for your accusations against him will be believed on the ground of this resemblance. Similarly you will gain credence if you can show that his companions have the character which you declare him to have; for owing to his association with them it will appear likely that he has the same pursuits as his friends. Such must be the

employment

who
it

of the argument from probabilities by those are accusing. Those who are speaking in their own defence must make their chief object to show that none of the acts of which they

are accused has ever been
35 or

either by themselves by any person who resembles them, and that it was of no advantage to them to commit such acts. But if you have manifestly done the same deed

committed

by any

of their friends or

H

on a previous occasion, the fault must be attributed to your youth, or some other excuse must be introduced to provide a reasonable pretext for your having done wrong on that occasion. You must declare also that it was of no benefit to you to have acted thus at the time and that it would not If no act of the 40 have been of any advantage to you now. 2 9 d kind alleged has ever been committed by you, but some of your friends happen to have done such deeds, you must

CHAPTER

7

1429*

plead that it is not just that you should be slandered because of them, and you must show that others of your associates are honest men you will thus throw doubt on
;

If they point out that the crime of which you are accused. other persons, who resemble you, have committed the same

5

crimes as they allege against you. you must declare that it is absurd if the fact that other people can be shown to have

done wrong is to be regarded as a proof that you have committed any of the deeds of which you are accused. If, then, you deny that you have done the deed with which you are charged, you must thus make your defence by arguing for you will then make the charge from probabilities appear improbable. If, however, you are obliged to admit the charge, you must point out the resemblance of your acts to the usual practice of mankind, by stating as emphatically as possible that the majority of men, nay all men, act under these and similar circumstances exactly as you have done. If you cannot do this, you must take refuge in pleas of misfortune or error, and try to obtain pardon by citing the passions which are common to all mankind and make us lose our reason love, anger, drunkenness, ambition, and the is the method by which we shall make the most like. Such skilful use of the argument from probability.
;

ro

15

20

8

Examples are
and are similar

actions which have taken place in the past to, or the contrary of, those about which we
is
it

are speaking. They must be used when your statement not credible and you wish to establish its truth when

does not gain credence from the argument of probability the object being that your hearers, learning that another
;

25

action similar to that of which
carried out in the

way

you are speaking has been in which you declare it to have been
;

done,

be more ready to believe what you say. Examples are of two kinds for some things turn out

may

according to our expectations, others contrary to them. The former cause credit, the latter discredit. For instance,
if

3

some one declares that the
in

and

rich are juster than the instances certain just actions on the part of rich

poor men,

such examples are

accordance with our expectation,

R

2

I429

a

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
juster than poor people.

35 for

think that rich people are on the other hand, some one shows that certain rich individuals have acted unjustly in order to get money, thus employing an example which is contrary to expectation, he would cause the rich to be
If.

one can see that most

men

distrusted.

Similarly, if any one brings forward an example of what seems to be in accordance with our expectation
for instance, that

1429

on some occasion the Lacedaemonians or

Athenians employing a large number of allies utterly de feated their enemies he then disposes l his hearers to take Such examples are in accordance to themselves many allies.
5

with our expectation, 2 for every one is of opinion that large numbers are of no small importance for winning a victory.
If, on the other hand, a speaker wishes to prove that numbers do not bring victory, he must give as examples occasions when the unexpected has happened, pointing out, for instance, that the Athenian exiles first seized Phyle with fifty men and then fought a battle against the far more numerous party in the city, who had the Lacedaemonians as their allies, and were thus restored to their own city; or again, that the Thebans, when the Lacedaemonians and practically all the Peloponnesians invaded Boeotia, confronted them alone at Leuctra and conquered the might of the Lacedaemonians or again, that Dio the Syracusan sailed to Syracuse with three thousand hoplites and defeated Dionysius, whose forces were many times as great and likewise the Corinthians, when they went to the assistance of the Syracusans with nine
;

10

15

;

20 triremes,

defeated the Carthaginians, 3 although they were blockading the harbours of Syracuse with a hundred and fifty

To sum ships and held all the city except the acropolis. the matter up, these and similar instances of unexpected successes often serve to discredit counsels which are based on
25

ordinary probability. Such, then, is the nature of examples. Examples of both kinds must be employed, when we are
Trpor/jeVm with A and B. Sp.-H. bracket this clause; if it is retained, TO TrXf/tfos, read by F Ob, must be kept after TroXe/uots in 1. 5. 3 This expedition under Timoleon in 341 B.C. is the latest in date of the various historical instances given in this treatise and is therefore of importance for fixing the date of the treatise.
1

Reading

2

2

CHAPTER

8

I429

b

urging what may be reasonably expected to happen, in order to show that the suggested course of action usually turns out in a particular way and, when we are predicting
;

order to give instances in which where they seemed to be have results accrued satisfactory 1 If your adversaries use this device, you 30 least expected. must show that their instances were the results of good luck,

some unexpected

result, in

and declare that such things happen rarely, whereas your examples are of common occurrence. This, then, is the method of employing examples. If, on the other hand, we wish to cite instances where the unexpected has happened, we must collect as many of them as possible and show by
enumeration that the unexpected happens quite as often as

35

must use not only examples derived in the expected. For instance, this way but also those based on contraries.

We

you can show that a certain state has acted selfishly towards its allies and that their friendship has thus been dissolved, and 1430* then say, We on the other hand, if we behave fairly and
impartially towards our allies, shall keep their alliance or again, you can show that certain others for a long time
;

have gone to war without due preparation and have conse quently been defeated, and then say, If we were to go to war properly prepared, we should have better hopes of
success.

5

You

will

be able to derive a number of examples
;

from past and from present events for actions are generally For this reason partly like and partly unlike one another. therefore we shall have no lack of examples and no difficulty in contradicting those brought forward by the other side. now know the different kinds of examples and

10

We

how we
them
9
in

are to

employ them and whence we are

to derive

abundance.

Infallible Signs exist where the direct contrary of that with which the speech is concerned has occurred, and where the speech is self-contradictory. For most listeners

15

conclude from the contraries which occur in connexion with
a speech or action that there is nothing sound in what is being said or done. You will often discover infallible signs

The punctuation Xeywcri TOVTO, sense here.

1

xp>)

seems

to be

demanded by

the

I430

a

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
by considering whether your adversary
s

20

speech

is

self-

contradictory or whether his action itself contradicts his words. Such is the nature of infallible signs and the

method by which you
them.

will obtain the greatest

number

of

25

Enthymemes arise where contraries occur not only ofio the speech and action in question but of anything else as well. You will often discover them by pursuing the method
l and by considering prescribed for the oratory of inquiry whether the speech is self-contradictory in any respect, or

whether what has been done is contrary to justice or law or expediency, or to what is honourable, practicable, easy,
or probable, or to the character of the speaker or the nature Such are the enthymemes which 30 of the circumstances. The must be chosen for use against our adversaries.

35

must be employed on our own behalf, and we must prove that our actions and words are the contrary of those which are unjust, unlawful, inexpedient, and of the habits of wicked men in a word, of those things which are considered evil. We must speak in support of each of these pleas as briefly as possible and express our This then is the way selves in the fewest possible words. in which we shall obtain a large number of enthymemes and the best method of employing them.
contraries of these

2 There are two kinds of !43O opinion on general matters. which with current opinion and those those maxims, agree When which are paradoxical. you are using the former, there is no need to bring forward any reasons for your state

40 b

A

Maxim

is,

briefly,

the expression

of an

individual

II

ment, for what you say
r

incredulity.

is well known and does not excite But when you are uttering a paradox, you
;1

must state your reasons briefly, so as to avoid prolixity and not arouse incredulity. The maxims which you quote must be applicable to the circumstances, in order that your words may not seem inept and far-fetched. We shall form a large number of maxims either from the peculiar nature of the circumstances or by means of hyperbole or by drawing
1

Cp. I427

b

2

i;

ff.

3

b Cp. Rhet. I394 8

Cp. Rhet. 1394*21-3. 10, 27 ff.

CHAPTER

ii

I43 o
10

b

The following are examples of maxims derived parallels. from the peculiar circumstances of a case: I do not
regard
if
it

as possible for a

man

to

become a
;

clever general
It is

he

is

without experience

in affairs

or again,

char

acteristic of sensible

men

to profit

by the examples

of their

predecessors and so try to avoid the errors of evil counsel. Such then are the maxims which we shall form from the pecu

Maxims such as the following circumstances of a case. Thieves are in my opinion worse formed by hyperbole than plunderers for the former carry ofT property secretly, the latter openly. By this method we shall form a
liar

15

are

(

:

;

number of maxims by hyperbole. The following are Those who appropriate maxims based on parallels money seem to me to act very like those who betray cities for both are trusted and wrong those who have trusted or again, My opponents seem to me to act very like them
:

20

;

;

tyrants
fullest

;

for tyrants

which they have themselves

claim not to be punished for the wrongs inflicted, while they demand the

35

wrongs of which they accuse punishment others and my adversaries, if they have themselves some
for the
;

thing which belongs to me, do not restore it, while, if I have received something which belongs to them, they think that they ought to have it restored to them and the interest on
it

as well/

By
is

following this

method then we

shall

form a

number

of

maxims.
]

a Sign of another thing, but one thing taken 30 not a sign of something else taken at random, nor is everything a sign of everything else but the sign of a thing is that which usually occurs before, or simultaneously That which has happened is a sign not only with, or after it.
thing
is

One

at

random

;

of what has happened but also of what has not happened and similarly what has not happened is a sign not only of what does not exist but also of what does exist.
;

35

One sign causes belief, another knowledge the latter is the best kind of sign, while that which produces the most
;

plausible opinion
1

is

second best.
opposed

To
to

put the matter briefly,

i.e. a fallible sign as b cp. Rhet. I357 1-5, 10 ff.

rcK^piov, an infallible sign,

H30

b

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
an abundance of signs from anything which has been done or is said or seen, taking each separately, and
shall obtain

we

40 also a

I43i

from the greatness or smallness of the resultant disadvantages or advantages. We shall also derive them from testimonies and evidence * and from our own supporters or
;

5

those of our enemies, or from our enemies themselves also from the challenges issued by the parties and from times and seasons and from many other things. From these sources then we shall have an abundance of signs.

A

Refutation

is

that which cannot be otherwise than as 13

we say

10

it is. It is based on what is by nature necessary, or necessary as urged by us, and on what is impossible by nature or impossible as urged by our adversaries. An example of something which is naturally necessary is the

statement that

living creatures require food

,

and the

like.

What
that
tell

necessary as urged by us is such a statement as those who are scourged confess what their tormentors
is

them

to

confess

.

15 stole

naturally impossible is a sum .of money, which he could not possibly carry, It will be an impossibility as urged and went off with it
.

Again, an instance of what is the statement that a small child

by an adversary,
certain date

if,

for

example, he declares that on a

a contract at Athens, whereas we can that our hearers at that time we were absent in to prove some other city. It is from these and similar materials

we made

that
jo

we

shall

form our refutations.

have now briefly described all the proofs which are derived from actual words and from acts and from persons. Let us now consider how they differ from one another.
probability differs from an example in this, that the 14 hearers have themselves some notion of the probability,

We

A

2

-

while examples (are supplied from our

own

Examples
1

differ

from

infallible signs

because they

experience. 2 can )
infallible

be derived from contraries and from similars, while
Either /an
e<

TU>V

nuprvpitov or Kai

C

K

ra>i/

p.apTVpovp.ei>ajv

should

Spengel suggests p-aprvp^v for /unprvptajv. Sauppe first indicated a lacuna here Spengel supplies Trap de TTapa5eiyp.tiTa duxpepfi r&v TKfju]pi<DV on TO. TO. (icr(pepop.(v.
;

probably be deleted
2

:

r/fi&>i>

fj.ev

Trapadfiyp-ara.

CHAPTER

14

1431*

signs can only be constructed from contrarieties of word and deed. Again, an enthymeme always has this dis- 30

from an infallible sign, that an infallible sign is a contrariety which is concerned with a word or an action,
tinction

while an

enthymeme

selects
;

also contrarieties connected

with other kinds of things in other words, it is impossible for us to obtain an infallible sign unless there is some
contrariety in respect of actions or words, whereas speakers can provide themselves with enthymemes from a variety of 35
sources.

from enthymemes in that enthy memes can be constructed only from contrarieties, whereas maxims can be enunciated both in connexion with con
differ

Maxims

trarieties

and
all

and also by themselves. Signs differ from maxims the other proofs already mentioned, because, while the others engender an opinion in the minds of those who
all

4

a clear knowledge
selves to provide

hear them, certain of the signs cause those who judge to have also because it is impossible for us our
;

most of the other proofs, while

it is

b easy to 143 i

obtain
differs

a

large

number of

signs.

Further, a refutation

from a sign, because some signs cause those who hear them merely to entertain an opinion, whereas every refutation teaches the truth to the judges. Thus from

what has been said we know the nature of the proofs which concern words and actions, and the sources from which we are to derive them, and how they differ from one another. Let us next deal with each of the supplementary proofs.
opinion of a speaker is the declaration of his own belief about things. He ought to show himself to be experienced in the matters about which he is speaking, and point out that
the truth concerning them. contradicting ought first and foremost to show that his adversary has no experience of the matters on
it

5

The

10

is

to his
is

advantage to

tell

One who

which he
that
is

nevertheless giving his opinion 1 if however impossible, he ought to show that even persons of experience often make mistakes and if this is inadmis
is
; ;

15

sible,

his
is

it is contrary to the advantage of opponents to tell the truth about these matters. Such the use which we shall make of opinions expressed by
rt]v

he must say that

do

H3i

b

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
speakers, both when we are ourselves expressing when we are contradicting others.

them and

20

Testimony is a confession made voluntarily by one who That which is testified must be either likely or unlikely or of doubtful credit similarly the witness must be
knows.
:

trustworthy or untrustworthy or of doubtful good faith. When therefore the evidence is likely and the witness
35

testimony needs no further support, unless you wish briefly to introduce a maxim or enthymeme for adorn ment s sake. But when the witness is under suspicion, you
truthful, the

30

must prove that such a person would not give false evidence show gratitude or from motives of revenge or gain. You must also make it clear that it is not to his advantage to bear false witness for the benefits which he gains, you will urge, are small, while detection is a serious matter, and, if he
to
;

is

found out, the laws punish him not only by fining him but
credit.

also

by damaging his reputation and destroying his By these methods then we shall cause witnesses

to

be

believed.

35

When we are contradicting evidence, we must cast prejudice on the character of the witness, if he is a bad man, or inquire into the evidence, if it is improbable, or else contra
dict
all

that

both the witness and the evidence by bringing together We must is most discreditable to our adversaries.
is

also consider whether the witness
is

a friend

to

him

for

whom he giving evidence, or whether he can in any way be associated with his deed, or whether he is an enemy of the man against whom he is bearing witness, 1 or whether he
40 is poor.

witness either to
for gain.

For such men are under suspicion of bearing false show favour or from motives of revenge or

We

shall also

say that the legislator laid down

the law about false testimony to apply to persons of this kind and that it is absurd that, whereas the legislator did
a

I432

not trust witnesses, those should believe them
in

who

are sitting

judgement after having sworn to judge according to the laws. By these methods then we shall cause witnesses to
It is possible also to disguise
1

be discredited.

evidence by a proceeding

Cp. Rhet.

CHAPTER
such as the following
*
:

15
,

I432

a

Bear witness

you

say,

in

my
5

favour, Callicles By the gods, I will not/ he replies, for the accused committed these crimes, though I tried to

In this way, though he has given false prevent him. evidence in his refusal, he will not be liable to punishment This then is the way in which we shall as a false witness.
treat evidence,
If

when

it

is

to our advantage to disguise

it.

our opponents try to do anything of this kind, we shall expose their wickedness and order them to give their evidence in writing. With these instructions then before
us 16

10

we know how

to deal with witnesses

and evidence.

of one

Evidence given under torture is a confession on the part who knows but is unwilling to state what he knows.
therefore
it

When

is

evidence,

we must say

to our interest to strengthen such that individuals take their proofs
in their

from evidence under torture
cities in their

most serious affairs, and most important business, and that evidence under torture is more trustworthy than ordinary testimony. 1 For it is often to the interest of witnesses to lie but those who are under torture gain by telling the truth, for doing so will bring them the speediest relief from their
;

15

sufferings.

When you

wish to discredit evidence given under torture,
20

you must say in the first place that slaves who are being tortured become hostile to those who have delivered them up to be tortured and for this reason tell many lies against their masters. Secondly, you must say that they often make confessions to their torturers which are not the truth,
order to end their torments as quickly as possible. 2 You must also point out that even free men have often before
in

25

now

lied against

themselves under torture to escape the
;

suffering of the moment that slaves should wish

it

is

therefore

much more

likely

to

avoid

punishment by lying
are enduring

against their masters, rather than,

when they

great bodily and mental pain, deliberately refuse to utter a falsehood in order to save other people from suffering. By

3

these and similar arguments we shall cause evidence given under torture to be believed or disbelieved.
1

b Cp. Rhet. I376 34

ff.

2

Cp. Rhet. 1377*3-6.

a

I432

RIIKTORICA AD

ALEXANDRUM
17

35

An Oath is an affirmation without proof accompanied by an invocation of the gods. When we wish to amplify the power of an oath l we must say that no one would desire to commit perjury, because he would fear punish ment from heaven and disgrace in the eyes of men we must also point out that, while it is possible to escape the
;

notice of men,

40

When our it is impossible to elude the gods. in we take an oath and wish to belittle it, opponents refuge we must point out that those who do evil deeds are the very
men who do not scruple to commit perjury for a man who thinks that the gods take no notice of him when he does wrong, also thinks that he will not be punished even if he forswears
;

1432

By pursuing a method such as the above in the matter of oaths we shall have no lack of material about them.
himself.
5

have now briefly carried out our purpose of dealing the various kinds of proof and have shown not only the force of each of them, but also how they differ from one another and how they ought to be employed. We will now
with
all
2 proceed to explain the other expedients which belong to all three kinds of oratory and are useful in speeches of
;j

We

io

every kind.
Anticipation is the the ill-feeling which

anticipating the adverse criticisms of our audience and the arguments of those
is

method by which we felt against us by

shall counteract 18

who
i~

are going to speak against us.

We shall

anticipate the

by such a statement as, Perhaps some of you are astonished that, young as I am, I attempt thus to speak in public on important matters or again,
;

criticisms of our audience

Let no one oppose me through resentment, because I am going to offer you advice on subjects about which certain
other people hesitate to speak openly before you. In matters then which are likely to annoy your hearers you must by anticipations of this kind bring forward reasons,

20

which
1

will

show

that

you are

justified in offering advice,

Reading with Spengel orav fieV avrov. i. e. the four (r;^/u.cmj TrpoKardX^^/?, (urry/iara, TruXiAXoy/a, elpa) vela. Cp. 1428*8. 1439*34 and note. Reading with all MSS. T/KWJ/, which was emended by Spengel to a in order to support his ascription of the treatise to Anaximenes see note on 142^7-9.
:

;

CHAPTER

18

1

I432

pointing out the dearth of public speakers or the greatness of the dangers or the public expediency, or giving some other such reason whereby you will remove the ill-feeling

which
just as
in

threatens

you.

If

your audience

still

cries

out

much

the

against you, you must address form of a maxim or enthymeme,
1

them

briefly 25
for

saying,

absolutely absurd that they should have come together to take the best counsel about the political situation and then think that they can take good counsel

example, that

it is

without deigning to hear what the speakers have to say or again, you may say that it is only fair that they should
;

either themselves get

up and

offer
offer,

some advice, or
and then vote
in

else listen 30

favour of to course recommends Such must be them. that itself any the method of employing anticipation in public speaking,
to those

who have

advice to

and

this is

how

outcries

must be

faced.

In

forensic

speeches we

shall

use similar methods of

If an outcry is raised against us 35 anticipation to the above. at an early stage of the proceedings, we shall meet it in this

manner

:

Is

it

not absurd that, while the legislator ordained

that each party should be allowed to speak twice, you who are sitting in judgement upon us should have sworn to pass sentence according to the law, and then refuse even to listen
to a single speech ? And that, while he took such measures 40 to secure that you should give your vote in accordance with
a your oath after hearing all that was to be said, you should I433 be so indifferent to his injunctions that, without even listen

ing to the beginnings of the speeches, you already think that Or you can put the you know all the facts perfectly?

matter differently and say, How absurd it is that the law giver should have ordained that, if the votes were equal, the defendant should win the case, whereas you hold so strongly
to the contrary opinion that you do not even listen to the defence offered by those who have been slandered and that,
;

5

whereas he granted this advantage in the voting to de fendants because they run greater risks, you, while you show no hostility towards the accusers who run no risks, alarm

10

by these outcries those who in terror and danger are defending
1

Reading

Stort,

suggested by Bekker, for

fiio.

H33

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
themselves from the charges brought against them. must be your method of meeting those who raise an
against
interrupt

Such
outcry

15

If they you at the beginning of your speech. you when your speech is well advanced, then, if those who do so are few in number, you must rebuke them and tell them that it is only just that they should listen to

at the moment, in order that they may not prevent the from forming a correct judgement, and that, when they have heard you, then they can do what they please. If the

you

rest

majority raises an outcry against you, you should blame yourself and not your judges for, if you find fault with
;

20

them, you only
their pardon.

yourself and say

angry, whereas, if you blame that you are in the wrong, you will gain You must also beg your judges to give a
:

make them

favourable ear to your speech and not at this early stage to show what view they take about the facts on which they are
to give their secret vote. ruptions in a summary

as

In general, we shall meet intermanner with maxims and enthymemes, pointing out that our interrupters are setting them

selves in opposition to justice or the laws or the interests of the city or what is honourable for such methods as these are
;

best calculated to

make one s

hearers stop interrupting.
to

30 We now know from what has been said above how

employ
to

anticipations in dealing
interruptions.
will

with an audience and

how

meet

be said by one
35

next show you how to anticipate what is likely to s opponents. You can say Perhaps he will bewail his poverty, which is not my fault but has been
I
;

:

caused by his

own way

of

life

;

or again,

c

I

hear that he

If we are speaking intends to say such and such a thing. what our thus first, we must opponents are likely anticipate For even to say and so destroy and invalidate their pleas.

4

though the arguments which you forestall and discredit are quite forcible, they will appear much less weighty to those who have already heard them. If we are speaking after our opponents and they have
b

I433 anticipated what we intend to say, it is necessary to counter act their anticipations and destroy them by speaking as
1

Omitting

ev

TO>

Xeyety with Spengel.

CHAPTER
t

18

1433"

follows,

my
his

opponent has not only told you many lies to discredit, but further, well knowing that I shall refute charges, he has anticipated my plea and discredited it
5

My

beforehand, in order that you may not give it the attention which you otherwise would, or else that I may not employ it at all, because it has already been torn to pieces by him.
I

hold, however, that
lips,

you ought to hear
if

my own

not from his, even

my arguments from he has tried to tear my
10

arguments to pieces by saying things which I declare to be a strong sign that he has no sound plea to offer. Euripides
has

made

a clever use of this device in the following lines of
:

his Philoctetes

E en though he thinks to have destroyed my pleas Escaping charge of wrong, yet will I speak From mine own lips mine arguments shall come, Let his words show what kind of man he is. 1
;

use of anticipations in relation both to our judges and to our opponents.
to

We know

then from the above

how

make

15

IQ

Postulates in oratory are the

make from
unjust.

their hearers.

It is just to

demands which speakers of them are just, others that ask they should listen to what you

Some

are saying and lend a favourable ear. It is also a just 20 demand that they should give one the assistance which the

laws allow and never vote against the laws and that they should make allowances for misfortunes. Any demand

which

contrary to the law Such are the postulates.
is

is

unjust, otherwise

it is

2

just.
25

different kinds in

unjust,

we may

have distinguished their order that, knowing the just from the use them on the right occasion, and that it

We

not escape our notice if our adversaries make any From what has been said unjust demand from the judges.

may

we
20
It

shall

have an adequate knowledge on
is

this subject.

Iteration

a means of briefly reminding one s hearers. must be employed both at the conclusion of a division of 30

a speech and at the final conclusion. In recapitulating we use iteration in the form either of a division or of the
1

Fr.

794 (Nauck).

2

Spengel deletes the words f av

8*

/*//,

dtKaiov.

b

*433

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
recommendation of a
or of an enumeration.
is.

certain course or of asking questions
I will

35

show you of what nature each an example of its use in the following I cannot say what these men would form of a division have done, if they had not manifestly deserted us long ago and were not convicted of having served against our city and Such is of having never fulfilled any of their promises.
of these

The

is

:

the use of iteration in an argument.
follows in the form of an enumeration
40 they were the first to a I434 first to attack us when
:

It
I

can be used as

have shown that

break the treaty of alliance and the we were at war with the Lacedae

enslave

monians, and that they displayed the utmost eagerness to our city. Such is the use of iteration in an

an example of its use in reminding your audience under the form of recommending
enumeration.
following
*
:

The

is

a certain course of action
5

You must remember

that ever

entered into friendship with these men we have never suffered any reverse at the hands of our enemies.
since

we

Eor they have often helped us and prevented the Lacedae monians from devastating our territory, and they have continued to this day to contribute large sums of money. Thus shall we remind our hearers by recommending a
10 iteration in

The following is an instance of the form of a question I should like to hear from them, why it is that they do not pay us the tribute which they owe. For they cannot have the face to say that
certain course of action.
:

15

need of money, when they can be shown to be such receiving large sums of money annually from their land, nor yet can they say that they spend much on the administration of their city for they clearly spend less than all the other islanders. Such will be our use of iteration
they are
in
;

in

the form of a question.

Irony
saying
20

is
it,

to say something and pretend that you are not 21 or else to call things by the names of their
It

contraries.

may

take the

following form
:

in

a

brief

I think that I reminder of what has already been said need hardly say that these men, who pretend that they have done the state many services, are shown to have done it

CHAPTER
much harm, whereas
are

21

I434

a

shown

any

we, whom they declare to be ungrateful, to have often helped them and never to have done Such is the way briefly to remind your 25 one any injury.
it.

hearers of something under the pretence of omitting Secondly, the following is an instance of calling things

by

have clearly done great harm to their allies, while we worthless mortals have In obviously been the cause of many benefits to them. this way we shall briefly remind our hearers and employ
Contrary names.

These noble

citizens

30

iteration at the

end of the divisions of our speeches and at

their final conclusion.

22

We will next explain how one can speak pleasingly and prolong a speech to the length which one desires. We can speak pleasingly in the following manner, by
in

introducing, for example, whole enthymemes or half of one 35 such a way that our audience can guess the other half;
also include

we must

maxims.

To some

of these

we must

give a place in every division of the speech, but the actual words must be varied and a similar phrase must never be In this way 40 applied repeatedly in the same connexion. your speech will have a pleasing effect. When you wish to lengthen your speech, you must divide I434b

up your subject and in each division explain the nature of contents and their particular and general application and If we wish to make our state the grounds of your pleas. discourse still longer, we must employ a number of words
its

5

in

dealing with each topic.
iterate

you must

and make

In each division of the speech your iteration brief while at the
;

conclusion of your speech you ought to recapitulate as a whole all that you have dealt with in detail, and treat the
subject generally.
sufficient length.

In this

way your speech

will

be of a

10

If you wish to speak briefly, you should include your whole subject in a single word and that word the shortest which is applicable to the subject. You must also employ few

conjunctive particles and connect as many things as possible 1 Such must be your choice of words you must together.
;

1

Cp. Rhet. I4o7 38

b

f.,

where the example given

is

nopfvfals

I434

b

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
the brief iterations in the separate the divisions of speech and only employ iteration in your
final conclusion.

15

make your language must do away with

serve

a

double purpose, 1 and you

This

is

the

way

in

which we

shall

make

our speeches brief. If you wish to speak at moderate length, you must pick out the most important divisions of your speech and make
20

You must also use words of medium subject. the not and longest or the shortest, and not employ a length a on number single topic but observe moderation. large the one hand do away entirely with neither on You must conclusions in the intermediate parts of your speech, nor on
them your
the other hand introduce

25

them in every division but you must make special iterations at the end of those parts to which you wish your audience to pay particular attention.
;

On these principles,

then,

we

shall regulate the length of our

speeches, whenever we wish to do so. If you wish to compose a speech which will be pleasing, you must take care as far as possible to adapt the character
30 this, if

You will achieve of your speech to that of your audience. you observe their character, whether noble or petty or ordinary.

On these points, then, you will have adequate knowledge from what has been said above. We will now treat of the putting together of words for this too is essential.
;

35

place, then, words are of three kinds, simple, 23 and metaphorical. composite, Similarly there are three ways in which words can be put together firstly, you can end one syllable with a vowel and begin the next with a vowel secondly, you can begin a word with a consonant and end the previous word with a consonant thirdly, you can put consonants and vowels in

In the

first

:

;

;

juxtaposition. There are four orders in which words can be arranged. 2
1

ib.

36,

where the example
TTJS r]p.fTepas.
is

is

rrjs

prepay ywaiKos

in preference

to

rrjs
2

yvvdiKos

rasas

strange here, since

describing a thing in one or

many
is

words cannot be called any kind of order or
b certainly the sense of rdrrfiv in I438 14
ff.

arrangement

,

which

CHAPTER
First,
;

23

H34

1

you can either put similar words side by side or or again, you can use the same words else disperse them or else change them into others thirdly, you can describe
; ;

4

a thing in one or many words fourthly, you can name in 1435* their proper order the subjects of which you have under

taken to
I

treat, or else

will

next show what

transpose them. is the best method of statement

which you can employ.

24

,First of

of

you must make your statement by means a twofold division, and, secondly, you must discourse
all,

lucidly.

The

fold

division.

following are the various forms of this twoFirst, one can say that one can oneself

5

do one thing and another; secondly, that this man cannot do a certain thing, but that man can thirdly, that this
;

can do a certain thing and something else; fourthly, that neither can one do a certain thing oneself nor can any one else do it fifthly, that one cannot do a
;

man

certain thing oneself, but that

sixthly, that one can do one thing oneself, but the other person cannot do something else. You can see each of these cases in the
j

some one

else

can

1

10

An illustration of the case where one following examples. I have not only can oneself do one thing and another is
:

achieved this for you, but also, when Timotheus intended to make an expedition against you, I prevented him.

15

The
is
is

an example of the case where one man following cannot do a thing but another man can This man then
is
(
:

unable to go himself on an embassy for you, but here a man who is a friend of the Spartan state and would

tions

be better able than any one else to carry out the negotia which you wish carried out. The case where a man
:

can do a certain thing and something else as well can be thus illustrated Not only has he proved himself a
strong
as

man

in war,

any

other citizen.

but he can also give as good advice The following is a case where one
:

20

cannot oneself do a thing and nobody else can Having but a small force I cannot 2 myself conquer our adversaries,
1

Reading on avrbs
11.

p.ev

ov dvvarai, erepoy 8e dvvaTai

(W. D.

R.), cp.

below,

24-6. (Spengel).

S 3

I435

a

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
The following is an nor could any other citizen do so. instance in which another man can do a thing, but one

25

cannot do

it

oneself:

c

Yes, he
is

am

weak.

The

following

is physically strong, but I an illustration of the case

where one can oneself do one thing, but some other person I cannot do something else can steer, but this man This then is how you will employ cannot even pull an oar.
:

30

forms of twofold statement, following the same course in every subject. We must next consider how you are to
treat

your subject lucidly.
call

First, then,

anything of which you speak by

its

35

care not to put proper name, avoiding ambiguity. 1 to put the soone Be careful vowels next to another. 35 Consider how you called articles in the proper place.

Take

put words together, so that there may be neither confusion nor transposition for if your discourse has these qualities
;

it

40

use an introductory particle, the employ corresponding particle afterwards. The follow is an I ing example of the use of a corresponding particle
is

obscure.

When you

:

would come, (/xeV) I435 but ( ) you, though you promised to come, did not do so 2 You were both or again, when the same particle follows
indeed
to the place to
I

b

came

which

said I

;

:

(KCH)

the cause of that
for particles
;

and

(KCU)

the cause of this.

So

much
5

from these examples you must

infer the

use of others.

Words must be put together so as to avoid confusion or The following is an example of such con transposition.
fusion
this
:

It is

a terrible thing that this
^

man
it is

should strike

man

(TOVTOV TOVTOV TVTTTCLV).
;

Here

not clear which
:

man
It is
10

struck the other

but you will

make

a terrible thing that this
(TOVTOV VTTO TOVTOV

man

man
1

7rre0-#cu).

it clear if you say should be struck by this This is an example

Professor
e

of elision
/jLvfipa
2 3

Rhys Roberts suggests that the writer has in view cases which give rise to ambiguity, such as Theognis 112, where
fjLvrjiJ-a.

xovai or

c^ovcri

are possible.

Cp. Rhet. 1407*20-3.

confusion, which cannot be brought out in translation, is due both accusative and it is not clear which is the subject and which the object of the infinitive. This passage is discussed by Professor Rhys Roberts in C. R. xxvi (1912), p. 177.
to the fact that TOLTOV, TOVTOV are

The

CHAPTER
where there
is

25

I 435

b

The
this

following

is

a confusion in the arrangement of words. an instance of care taken to put the article
:

This man (ovros 6 avGpuHros) is wronging In this case the insertion rbv avQptonov) (TOVTOV of the articles makes the diction clear, while their omission 15
in the right

place

man

make it obscure the much then for the articles.
will
;

reverse

is

sometimes

true.

So

Never put vowels in juxtaposition, unless it is impossible make your meaning clear otherwise, or unless a breathingl space or some other division occurs. The following is a case where ambiguity must be avoided the same words are sometimes used in several senses, for example we speak of a threshold (0809) of a door and of a way (680?) along which people walk in such cases we must always add that which gives the word its distinctive meaning.
to
: ;

20

If

we

follow these rules

we

shall

be clear

in

our use of

words, and we shall make statements by means of the twofold method of division already described.

26

Let us now deal with
larities
2
;

antitheses

,

parisoses

,

and simi-

25

for

we

shall
3

need these

also.

An
The

antithesis

occurs

when both the wording and the

sense, or one or other of them, are opposed in a contrast.

following would be an antithesis both of wording and sense It is not fair that my opponent should become rich 30
:

by possessing what belongs to me, while I sacrifice my In the following property and become a mere beggar. sentence we have a merely verbal antithesis Let the rich
:

and prosperous give to the poor and needy and an anti thesis of sense only in the following I tended him when he was sick, but he has been the cause of very great misfortunes to me. Here there is no verbal antithesis, but the two actions are contrasted. The double antithesis (that is, both of sense and of wording) would be the best to use but the other two kinds are also true antitheses.
;
* : :

35

27

Parisosis

4

(parallelism

of structure)
.

occurs

when a

sentence has two equal
Reading"
2 3

members

The

equality can be
5.

avairvfvais (avawTv^is MSS.). here used for the more technical Trapo/iot coo-ty, cp. I436 a 4 b a Cp. Rhet. I409 32-1410*23. Cp.fiAet. I4io 24.
6fjLnioTT]s is

I435

b

KHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
small to few great things, and an equality of magnitude can be united with an equality of number. either Parisosis takes a form such as the following,

40 that of a

many

I436

through lack of resources or through the magnitude of the These things are neither like nor opposed to one war another, but merely equal to one another.
.

5
*

Paromoeosis
parisosis
;

:

(parallelism of sound) goes further than 28

not only equal but also similar, being composed of similar words, in the If you must imitate the wording, following, for example
for
it
:

makes the

members

you should simulate the

2

feeling.
;

Above
this

all

you should
the closest
syllables,

make
in
(

the last words

similar

for

gives

10 similarity.

Words

are similar

which have similar
the same
.

which most of the

letters are

;

in

numbers

deficient, in

might

sufficient

example, For whatever

for

lies

outside the scope of art, the inspiration of the

moment

will

15

be your guide. Enough then of these topics. For we are acquainted with the nature of the just, the lawful, the honourable, the expedient and the other qualities, and the sources from

20

which we can derive them in abundance. Similarly we know the nature of amplifications and minimizations, and how we can provide them for our discourses. In like manner we are acquainted with the methods of anticipation, the postulates which we demand from our hearers, itera
tions,

25

methods of pleasing, the means of regulating the length of our speeches, and all the ways of putting words together for purposes of statement. And so knowing from what has been said the qualities which are common to every kind of oratory and their uses, if we accustom and
practise ourselves according to the prescribed preparatory exercises, we shall attain to great facility both in writing and

speaking.
It is by taking the component parts separately that you can most accurately distinguish the methods of speaking. I will next treat of the manner in which the words must be

organically arranged in the various kinds of oratory, and
1

a Cp. Rhet. i4io

2

The

24. text is corrupt, but

something

like this

may

be the meaning.

CHAPTER
which
treated.
I

28

a

I436
30

parts

must be
first

put

first

and how they must be
;

deal therefore
to all
all

common

with proems for the proem is seven kinds of oratory and it can be fittingly

applied to

subjects.

29

described in a general way as a pre s one and a declaration of the subject in of audience paration a summary manner for the benefit of the ignorant, in order
that they

The Proem 1 can be

and

may

with what the speech is concerned It also exhorts them to follow the argument.

may know

35

pay attention and tries, as far as is possible in a speech, to Such is the preparation influence their minds in our favour. at which the proem must aim. I will first show how the proem must be employed in The following arc 40 public speaking and persuasive oratory. b in of the which to lay your subject before I436 way examples I stand before your hearers and make it clear to them you to advise that we should go to war on behalf of the
:

*

Syracusans,

or,

I

stand before you to demonstrate the
,

This, then is inadvisability of our helping the Syracusans. the way to summarize your subject. shall know how to exhort our hearers to pay atten-

We

5

mind to what arguments and tion, Do we not facts we pay most attention when deliberating. the when of deliberation attention closest subjects pay the
if

we

ourselves call to

or are important or alarming or else nearly concern us when those who address us claim that they will show us
;

that the measures which they are urging us to adopt are
just

i

and honourable and expedient and easy and honest

;

when they beg us to listen with attention ? Just as, therefore, we ourselves attend to others, so if we take those
or
2 of the points above mentioned which are most applicable to the subjects of which we are treating and lay them before our hearers, we shall make them attend to what we

are saying. These, then, are the our hearers to pay attention.
b Cp. Rhet. I4i4 19 1415* 3. c. (cp. 1. i. e. the importance, the measure which we propose.
1

ways

in

which we exhort

15

2

8),

or the justness,

c. (cp.

1.

9

f.),

of

b

I436

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
We
is

shall secure their goodwill

if

we

first

consider what

20

towards us, whether they are well If they are disposed or whether they are indifferent. it is superfluous to talk towards well us, actually disposed
in fact their attitude
ill

or

about goodwill

;

if,

however,

we wish

to talk about

it

at all,
:

we must do
That
I

am

l in the following way so briefly, using irony well disposed towards the state, and that you

have often acted expediently by following my advice, and that I observe a just attitude towards public affairs, prefer
25

ring a personal sacrifice to reaping any advantage at the expense of the state, these are, I think, statements which
it is

unnecessary for

me

to

make

to

you who know well the

truth of them.

My

efforts shall

30

is the method by must remind those who are speech you well disposed towards you of their goodwill. When your hearers are neither prejudiced against you nor well disposed, you must say that it is right and expedient

ing you that you will you follow my counsels.

be directed rather to show be well advised, if on this occasion too
This then

which

in a public

that they should give a favourable ear to those citizens who have not yet given a proof of their quality as speakers.

your audience by praising them, custom to judge the speeches which they hear with fairness and discrimination. Further, you must employ minimization and say, I stand before you not
flatter

You must

then
it

saying that

is

their

35

through any confidence in my own cleverness, but because I think that the advice which I am about to offer is beneficial to the state. By such methods you must secure the goodwill
of those
If

who

are neither well nor

ill

disposed towards you.

you

are

the

representation must Misject on which you are speaking or your actual words. of this kind can date either from the present 40 representations If then one is under suspicion of wrong 1437* or from the past.

object of misrepresentation, the mis be connected with yourself or the sub

5

doing in the past, one must employ anticipation in address I am well aware that a ing one s audience and say prejudice exists against me, but I will prove that it is groundless.
*
:

2

1

2

Cp. 1434* 17 b Cp. I432 ii

ff.

ff.

Hammer

s

^

is

a misprint for ptv.

CHAPTER
You must

a

29

I437

then make a brief defence in your proem, if you have anything to say on your own behalf, or raise objections For to the judgements which have been passed upon you. whether you have been publicly or privately misrepresented, judgement must either have been passed upon you or be

impending
laid

in the

immediate

future, or else those

who have
10

the charge against you are unwilling to submit the matter to judgement and you must say that the judgement passed upon you was unfair and that you have been the
;

If this is impossible, you must say victim of party plots. that your previous misfortunes were sufficient, and. that it is

with, that

now that the matter has been judged and done no further prejudice should be raised against you on the same grounds. If you are expecting to have judge ment passed upon you, you must say that you are ready to submit the misrepresentations now to the judgement of your present audience adding that, if you are proved to have wronged the state, you consider yourself worthy of death. If your accusers do not press their charges against you, you must use this very fact as an indication that their mis representations of you are groundless for it will seem hardly
only
fair,
;

T

5

;

likely that those

you
it

are bringing true accusations against 20 can be unwilling to submit the matter to judgement.

who

You must always denounce
to be outrageous
less evil.

misrepresentation and declare and universal and the cause of end You must also point out that many have before

now been

ruined through unjust misrepresentation.
it is

You

must show moreover that

foolish that

men, when they

are consulting about matters of public interest, should allow 25 themselves to be disturbed by the misrepresentations of
individuals instead of listening to the advice of all and then considering what true policy requires. You must also

promise to prove that the advice which you have under taken to give is just and expedient. Such then is the method which those who have been misrepresented in the
past must

adopt

in

public

speaking

in

order to refute

3

misrepresentation. In reference to the present time the first thing which creates a prejudice against speakers is their age. If a man

a

I437

RHETOR1CA AD ALEXANDRUM
who is quite young or quite old is speaking in public, his hearers feel annoyance for they think that the former to have ought not yet begun to speak, while the latter
;

35

ought before now to have ceased speaking. Secondly, a is created against a man, if he is a frequent speaker, for it looks as if he were a busybody or again, against a man who has never spoken before, for it looks as
prejudice
;

in thus speaking in public to his usual custom. contrary Such, then, are the ways in which prejudices in reference to the present are likely to be
if

he had some private motive

created against a public speaker.
40 the b

Excuses must be made by a young man by urging dearth of advisers and the special suitability of the
;

I437

speaker for instance, if the question concerns the superin tendence of the torch-races or the gymnasium or arms or

5

in such matters a young man has no small must also urge that, if he has not yet the wisdom of years, he has at any rate that wisdom which comes from natural endowments and diligent application. He should also point out that, whereas unsuccessful advice

horses or war

interest.

He

reflects

ferred

when
a
is

only upon its unhappy proposer, the benefit con the policy succeeds is shared by the whole

community.
urged by
old

Such then are the excuses which must be young man. Excuses must be made when an

10

speaking by pointing out the dearth of advisers and his extensive knowledge of the subject. Furthermore he may urge the magnitude and unusual character of the
crisis

man

speaking wide experience and urge that it would be wrong that one who was formerly in the habit of speaking should not express his opinion on this One who is not in the habit of speaking must occasion.
too frequently, he
his
5

and the

like.

When a man may point to

is

in the habit of

urge the magnitude of the every one who has a stake

crisis

and that

it is

essential that

community should express Such then are the his opinion on the present situation. means by which we shall attempt to break down the preju
in the

dices raised against the persons of public speakers. Prejudice is created against the subject matter of a speech when the speaker advises the rupture of peaceful

CHAPTER
relations with
1

29

I437

b

or

who

able

those from whom we have received no injury are stronger than we, or when he advises a discredit- 20 peace or urges a reduction of the expenditure on
or

sacrifices

makes some other such

proposal.

On

such

subjects, first, one should employ anticipation in addressing one s hearers secondly, one ought to lay the blame upon necessity and fortune and the times and expediency, and
;

say that it is not those who are giving advice but the circumstances which are to be blamed for such proposals.

25

Such are the methods by which we shall speakers from prejudices which are due to
matter.

free

political

their subject

actual speech in a public harangue creates a pre judice when it is too lengthy or old-fashioned, or lacks If it be long, this must be attributed to the probability.

The

abundance of material; if it be old-fashioned, it must be pointed out that such a style is opportune at the moment if it is improbable, you must promise that you will prove it to be true in the course of your oration. These then are the considerations which will have a place in our
;

30

public speeches.

Next, what arrangement shall we employ

?

If there

be no
3?

prejudice against either ourselves personally or our speech or our subject, we shall lay down our proposition at the very beginning, and we shall afterwards exhort our hearers
to

pay attention and give our words a favourable hearing. any prejudice has been created against us in previous speeches, we shall anticipate the judgement of our audience and, after briefly defending and excusing ourselves from the prejudices thus caused, shall then state our proposition and
If

40

exhort our hearers to give us their attention. This, then, the way in which public speeches should be constituted.

is

1438*

30

which have happened minds of our hearers, or arrange under divisions and explain events which are occurring at the moment, or else predict what is likely to occur
either narrate events
in

Next we must

the past or recall

them

to the

5

in the future.
1

When
Prof.

therefore

we

are reporting the details
suggests,
(rvnpov\ei(r)
\v)fiv.

(CMOP

Reading, as all read

Rhys Roberts

a

I43

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
of an embassy, we must make a lucid statement of every thing that was said, in order that our speech may carry

weight

(for

it

will

be a report and nothing
its
;

else,

and no

10 unsuccessful,

way in) next, our object will be to make our hearers think that the failure of the negotiations was due to some other cause and not to our negligence whereas, if we have met
if
;

other style will find

we have been

15

with success, they must be made to suppose that the result has been due not to chance but to our zealous efforts. This they are ready to believe, if, not having been present

they observe the zeal displayed in our omitting nothing but accurately reporting every detail. So. when we are describing the results of an embassy, we must for the reasons which I have stated
speech
in

at the negotiations,

report everything just as it happened. When we are ourselves describing in a public speech 20 some past event or explaining the events of the moment or

predicting what will happen in the future, we must do each of these things briefly, clearly, and convincingly. must be clear, in order that our hearers may grasp the events

We

which we are describing, and concise, in order that they may remember what we have said and we must speak
;

25

convincingly, in order that they may not reject our state ments before we have supported them with proofs and
justifications.

30

The clearness of our explanations will be due to the words which we use or to our facts to the latter, if we do not present them in an inverted order, but mention first those which have occurred or are occurring or are going to occur first, and arrange the subsequent events in their proper
;

and do not desert the subject about which we have undertaken to speak, and deal with some other subject.
order,

concerned.

Thus, then, we shall speak clearly as Our actual words will be

far as

our facts are

clear, if

we

describe

actions as far as possible in words which are appropriate to 35them and if we employ usual words and do not put them
3

an inverted order but always arrange together those which naturally follow one another. If we observe these rules, our narrative will be clear.
in

CHAPTER
We
shall

30
all facts

I438

be concise

if

we omit

and words the
4

mention of which is not essential, keeping only those the Our omission of which will render our speech obscure.
narrative will then be concise.

We

shall

speak convincingly

if,

in

support of facts which

are improbable, we bring forward reasons which will make the events which we describe seem likely to have taken
place.

We must omit anything the occurrence of which seems too improbable. If you are obliged to mention such things, you must make it clear that you have definite knowledge of them, and you must pass lightly over them,
weaving them into your speech by the figure of pretended omission 1 and promise to show their truth as your speech
*

5

,

progresses,

making the excuse

that

you wish

first

to

demon

strate the truth or justice (or the like) of your previous This is the way in which we shall remedy 10 statements.

incredulity in our hearers.

In a word,

by employing

all

the above-mentioned devices
expositions,

we
31

shall

make our

reports,

and predictions

clear, brief,

and convincing.

There are three different methods in which we shall arrange them. If the actions about which we are speaking are few in number and well known to our audience, we shall
include the narration of
this part of

15

them

our speech

may

our proem, in order that If not in itself be too short.
in

the actions which

we

are recounting are too numerous and

not familiar to our audience, we shall present them in every case in a connected form and show that they are just,

expedient, and honourable, in order that we may not only make our tale plain and unembellished by simply relating

20

may also win the attention of our hearers. If the which we are recounting are unimportant and un familiar, we ought to insert the report or exposition or This we shall prediction of them bodily in the proem. do by recounting them from beginning to end and including nothing extraneous but merely relating the bare facts. We
facts

but

facts

25

shall thus

know how
1

to arrange narratives of facts in our
a

proem.
Cp. i434 19-25.

b

I438

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
Next comes confirmation, whereby we confirm that the 32 facts which we have already mentioned are of the nature of which we have undertaken to prove them to be, by adducing
proofs and by considerations of justice and expediency. When therefore you include them in your speech, the proofs which are best suited to public orations are those

30

based on the customary course of events and examples and supplementary enthymemes and the opinion of the orator
35

;

but any other proofs which present themselves may also be employed. They must be arranged in the following way
:

first,
is

the opinion of the orator must be mentioned, or, if that not clone, the customary course of events must be indi

showing that what we are asserting, or something similar, is what usually occurs. Following on this we must 4 cite examples, and any point of similarity must be introa I439 duced to support what we are saying. The examples which we take must be closely akin to our subject and the
cated,

In the absence of nearest in time or place to our hearers. we must employ the most striking and best known that we can find. Next we must cite maxims.

such examples

5

we introduce probabilities and must we end with enthymemes and maxims. examples in then which we must introduce proofs This is the manner
Also, in the parts where

where
If

facts are

concerned.

our statements of facts are believed as soon as they are made, we must omit all proofs and confirm the facts
jo

which we have already stated by appeals to justice and lawfulness and expediency and considerations of what is
honourable, pleasant, easy, possible, or necessary. Where an appeal to justice is possible, it must be given the first
place,

and we must explain our statements
l

in relation to

justice or a
15

resemblance to justice or its contrary 2 or what has been judged to be just. 3 You must also cite examples

You
in

similar to the cases of justice which you are instancing. will also be able to produce numerous examples of
is

what

regarded as just under special circumstances
is

4

and

the actual city in which your speech
1

made, and
3

in other

a Cp. I422 28

2

ff.

4

For

this

meaning

of Idia cp. 142 i b 3.

Cp.

ib.

34

ft.

Cp.

ib.

38

ff.

CHAPTER
states.
When>

32

H39
we have said what maxims and brief
20

a

we have

to

following this method, say, adding at the end

enthymemes of different kinds, if this division of our speech is long and we wish it to be remembered by our hearers, we shall give a concise iteration if, however, it is short and
;

still

fresh in their

memory, we
:

shall bring the division itself

and begin another one. The following is an In what I have already said I of what I mean example think that the justice of our helping the Syracusans has been sufficiently demonstrated I will now attempt to
to a close
;

25

You will next treat show the expediency of our doing so. the question of expediency by a similar method to that which we employed above in the case of justice, and at the end of that division add an iteration or definite conclusion, and then bring forward some other considerations with which you 3 have to deal. This is the way in which you must connect one division with another and keep up the thread of your When you have employed every possible means speech. to enforce your advice, you must in addition to all this show in a summary manner with the help of enthymemes and maxims or figures * that it is unjust and inexpedient and 35 dishonourable and unpleasant not to adopt your suggestion, and in a summary way you must contrast with this the justice, expediency, honourableness, and pleasure of doing what you are recommending. When you have made a sufficient use of maxims, you must end your exhortations with a definite conclusion. This then is the way in which we shall confirm the proposals which we make. The next I439 b
division of our treatise will be concerned with the anticipa tion of contrary arguments.

33

Anticipation is the method by which you anticipate and demolish the objections which can be brought against your You must minimize the arguments of your opspeech.

5

ponents and amplify your own, as you have already learnt to do from the instructions about amplification. 2 You must
set a single
1 i.

argument against another when yours
figures

is

the

e.

the four rhetorical
ff.

TrpoKaraAq^iy, atT^/zara, TraXtXXoyt a,

ftpcoffia.
2

b Cp. I432 ii

H39

b

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
stronger, and several against several and one against many and many against one, using every possible kind of contrast, and magnify your own arguments and weaken and minimize those of your adversaries. This is the manner in which we shall employ anticipations. Having done this we shall conclude with an iteration using the forms of argument or enumeration or recommendation of a certain course or 1 questioning or irony which we have already mentioned. If we are urging that help should be given to some 34 one, whether to private individuals or to states, it will be fitting briefly to mention any friendship or cause for grati tude or pity which already exists between them and the assembly which you are addressing. For they are most

10

15

All
20

willing to help those who stand in such relations to them. men feel an affection for those from whom, or from
friends,

they think they themselves, or those for whom they care, have received or are receiving or are going to receive some deserved kindness. They feel gratitude
towards those from whom, or from whose friends, they think they themselves or those for whom they care have received,
If are receiving, or will receive some undeserved benefit. in their we must of this kind are minds, any feelings present

whose

25

briefly dwell

We

shall

upon them and so move our hearers to pity. have no difficulty in arousing as much pity as we

if we realize that all men pity those whom they suppose to be closely connected with themselves or think You must prove that to be unworthy to suffer misfortune.

wish,

30 pity,

35

the condition of those for whom you wish to excite and show that they either have been or are in an evil If plight, or will be so unless your hearers assist them. this is not possible, you must show that those on whose behalf you are speaking have been deprived of advantages which all or most other people enjoy, or else have been or are without some advantage, or never will obtain it unless those whom you are addressing take pity on them now. These are the ways in which we shall incline our audience
this
is

to pity. In dissuasion

we

shall
1

employ the contrary method, using
Cp. i433 si
b
ff.

CHAPTER

34

I

439

b

the same kind of proem and narrating the facts and giving the proofs and showing our hearers that what they are

attempting to do
ful,

is

unlawful, unjust, inexpedient, disgrace- 1440*

unpleasant, impracticable, burdensome, and unnecessary. The arrangement of our speech will be similar to that used
in persuasion. Such, then, is the way in which those who are employing dissuasion on their own account must arrange

their speech.

Those who are opposing the advice given by others must proem the views which they intend to oppose and then add one by one the other parts of the proem. After the proem the speaker must first
in the first place state in their

5

bring forward separately each of the points in the previous speech and show that the recommendations of his adversary are not just or lawful or expedient or the like. This you will do by proving that what he says is unjust or inexpedient
or bears a resemblance to injustice or inexpediency, or is the opposite of the just or expedient or what has been judged to be so. You must treat the other points in a similar manner. This, then, is the most effective method

10

I

5

of dissuasion.

If this course

is

impossible, you must try

to dissuade your audience by taking some point which your adversary has omitted for example, if he has shown that a certain course is just, you must attempt to prove that
:

it is

or whatever else
side,

discreditable or inexpedient or toilsome or impracticable you can or if he has expediency on his
;

you must show that his suggestion is unjust and whatever else you can as well. You must amplify your own contentions and minimize those of your adversary, employ ing the method already prescribed for persuasive oratory. You must also introduce maxims and enthymemes, as in persuasion, and refute anticipations, and in conclusion

20

employ
to

iteration.
25

In addition to this

we must show, when we are seeking our hearers, that friendship exists between persuade

them and those whom we are urging them to help, and that they owe a debt of gratitude to those who are asking for but when we are trying to prevent help their assistance from being given, we must show that they are worthy
;

64B-1Q

I440

a

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
objects

shall of indignation or envy or hostility. we are in whom of those a sentiment seeking 30 implant hostility to dissuade by showing that either they themselves, or those
for

We

whom they care, have received undeserved ill-treatment at

shall arouse the hands of the other party or their friends. indignation, if we show that they, or those for whom they

We

themselves care, have been wrongfully treated with contempt 1 We shall or injustice by the other party or their friends.
35

create a feeling of envy, to put the matter briefly, against

have enjoyed unmerited prosperity, or to be likely to do so in the future or to so, or never to have been without some advantage, or not to be
those
to

whom we show

be now doing

;

suffered

or never to have so now, or to be never likely to be so some misfortune in the past, or not to be doing so now, or to be never likely to do so in future. This, then, is
;

the method by which we shall implant envy or hostility or while we shall create feelings of friendship, 40 indignation and gratitude, pity by the methods which we indicated in
;

b 2 We shall give these sentiments i44O treating of persuasion. their place and arrangement according to the various methods already mentioned. We now know the nature of persuasive oratory and its component parts and how it must be employed.
5

Let us next set before ourselves the consideration of 35 eulogistic and vituperative oratory. Here too we must first of all state our propositions in the proem, and refute

10

by the same method as in persuasive must also exhort our hearers to give us their oratory. methods attention by the already described under public speeches and in particular by saying things which will cause astonishment and attract remark, and showing that the subjects of our speech and those who usually incur praise or blame have acted in the same manner. Speeches of
misrepresentation

We

this

kind are usually

made

not in order to fight a case but

for display.
First,
1

we

shall
l<n

arrange the proem on the same principle
*/

Reading

fKtivwv

TWV
<pi\a>i>

(coni.

Hammer)

for

rj

TMV

<$i\u>v

eteivois (or
2

K.fivu>v).

Cp. I439 i5ff-

b

CHAPTER
as in persuasive

35

1440
15

and dissuasive speeches. After the proem, distinguish those good qualities of our subject which are outside the sphere of virtue and those which fall within it, as follows those which fall outside the sphere of

we must

:

virtue

we

shall divide into

good

birth, physical strength,

personal beauty, and wealth, while

we

shall divide virtue
20

into wisdom, justice, courage, and noteworthy habits of 1 The qualities which pertain to virtue are proper life. subjects of eulogy those which fall outside virtue must be
;

to congratulate rather than praise are strong and handsome and well-born and Having made these distinctions we shall give wealthy. the genealogy of the subject of our speech the first place after
disguised, for

we ought

those

who

the

proem

:

for this

is

the

first

discredit

upon men and
;

also

thing which brings credit or shall upon animals.

We

25

therefore be justified in giving the genealogy of a man or any other animal and when we are praising any one s
feeling or action or speech or possession,
in

we

shall

be

justified

beginning our eulogy by mentioning the distinguished qualities which he possesses.
is the way to treat a man s genealogy if were good men and true, you ought to mention them all from the earliest times down to the subject of your eulogy and give a brief account of some glorious achievement performed by each of his forefathers. If it is

The

following

:

his ancestors

30

only his earliest ancestors that were good men while the rest failed to do anything remarkable, you must mention the former in the manner already described and omit the
undistinguished

members

of the family, excusing yourself 35

by

saying that, his ancestors being so

numerous, you do

not wish to weary your audience by speaking of them, and that every one knows that men who are born of a good
stock usually resemble their forefathers. If his early ancestors were undistinguished but those who come nearer

you must dwell upon his it would be tedious to 40 speak at length about his early forefathers, and you must 1441* show that the immediate ancestors of those whom you are
his

own time were men of

repute,

descent from the latter and say that

1

Cp. Rhet.

1

T

387*1 4 2

ff.

a

I44i

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
adding that eulogizing were good men that their ancestors must have been good
;

it

is

quite clear
true, for

men and

5

hardly likely that such excellent and worthy persons If there is nothing can have been born of bad parents.
it

is

distinguished in the ancestry of the subject of your eulogy, you must insist on his personal nobility and suggest that all

those

who have
,

a natural predisposition for virtue are

well

born

and you must censure those other orators who dwell
glories,

upon ancestral
10

pointing out that

many men

of

distinguished ancestry have proved themselves unworthy of their forefathers. You must also insist that your task on
the present occasion
ancestors.
is

to praise the

man

himself, not his

must be made of genealogies to discredit one whose ancestors were men of evil repute. Such then is the place which genealogy must occupy in eulogy and vituperation. If the subject of your eulogy owes some distinction to 1 good luck, (you must attribute his success rather to his
similar use
efforts

A

own
15

than to fortune.
describe
earliest

You must next
beginning from his
principle that

his

habits

and way of
this
;

life

years),

observing

one

ages and For not speak example, in great length. children it is generally considered that orderliness and selfcontrol are due not to themselves but to those who have charge of them, and so they must be dealt with briefly.
befits his various

you say what
at

do

too

When you
cluding
20
2

with an

have thus described his early years, after con enthymeme or maxim at the end of this

division of your speech,

you

will,

when you come

to the

early

manhood of

subject, viz.
1

the subject of your eulogy, state your his achievements or character or habits, and
nTovTa has been

kept.

The MS. reading TVX^V vnrjpt;*, rot TO Some words have probably fallen words stand no sense can be made unless
and even so

p.uvoi>

dia<pv\(

out after imrjpgf.
tac/>u\arroi/ra

As

the

is

emended,

it is obvious that in the rest of the sentence the author has passed to a new subject, namely, a description of the achievements of the person eulogized arranged according to the stages of his life. The words in brackets represent a conjectural restoration of the sense. (Since writing the above I find that Sauppe also marks a lacuna at

this point.)
2

Reading

6pi<ras

with the best

MSS.

CHAPTER
down

35
laid
1

a

I44i

you must amplify them on the principle which we

at the beginning in treating of eulogistic oratory, explaining that it was at this age that such and such a

glorious deed was done by him whom you are eulogizing, or through his agency or owing to some habit of his, or that You must also he inspired it or supplied the motive.

25

compare the notable achievements of other young men and show that his actions far surpass theirs, relating the least important of their deeds and the most important of the achievements of the subject of your eulogy. You must
set

30

deeds of others which are notable but

less

important

which you are relating, and so the importance of the latter. You must also exaggerate always amplify his achievements by conjectures of the Yet one who at this early age became so following kind great a philosopher, if he had been older would have
side

by

side with those

:

advanced yet further
endures the
the
love
toils

man who so stoutly 35 or again, of the gymnasium, will gladly welcome
;

A

of toil which philosophy demands.

By con

jectures of this kind we shall amplify his good qualities. When we have dealt with the events of his early man

hood and put

2

maxims and enthymemes

section, after either briefly iterating

at the end of this b what we have said, or I44i

4 3 bringing it to a final conclusion, we shall next treat of the achievements of the subject of our eulogy after reaching full

manhood, and
shall

after

amplifying this topic

setting forth his justice first and by the method already described we

5

proceed to deal with his wisdom, if he possesses this quality ; having similarly dealt with this we shall set forth
if he possesses any, and after going through the process of amplifying this also, when we have reached the end of this section and described all his various qualities,

his courage,

and summarize what we have said and bring the whole speech to a conclusion with a maxim or an It will be suitable in eulogies to treat the enthymeme.
shall repeat
1

we

r

o

Cp. 1426* 3

ff.

Reading rdgcopfv with some MSS. 3 Finckh s Trepan for ire pi or Trapu of the MSS. is not satisfactory, and the whole phrase is probably corrupt, though the sense is clear. 4 Adding fiie Ji/zez/ after ird\iv as suggested by Sauppe.

2

b

I44i

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
various points
at

considerable

length
to

and

to

employ

a

dignified diction.

15

compose our accusations when we are dealing with wicked men. But we must not scoff at the man with whom we are finding fault, but we must for statements have more effect than scoffs, describe his life to our hearers and causing annoyance to conviction bringing
;

We shall use the

same method

those with

whom we are
man

finding fault

;

for scoffing

is

directed
state-

against outward appearance and circumstance, while
20 nients

about a

are the picture, as

it

were, of his habits

and character.
actions

Be on your guard

by disgraceful names, so

against calling disgraceful as not to violate conventional

feeling, but express such things by indirect hints and explain the facts in words which are really applicable to different

actions.
25

In

finding fault
in

you must employ irony and

laugh

at the points

in private,

and

on which your adversary prides himself; the presence of a few listeners, you should

seek to discredit him, but before the multitude you should abuse him by levelling only ordinary accusations against

You must employ the same methods of amplification and minimization in finding fault as in eulogy. From what has been said we shall know how to practise these kinds of
him.
oratory.
30
It

remains
1

for

us

to

deal

with

the

oratory

of 36

accusation
shall

Let us next discuss how we and inquiry. and compose arrange these in the forensic type of

35

other kinds, the action which is to be the shall exhort our subject of our accusation or defence. hearers to attention by the same means in the defensive

oratory. as in the

We

shall therefore first set forth in the

proem,

We

in the persuasive style. as Again, regards the goodwill of the audience, when are they well-disposed towards the subject of our speech and he is not the object of prejudice because they are

style as

we employed

irritated against
a

him or

his action or his speech,

we must

I442 secure their goodwill by

method described dealing with the other kinds of oratory. When they are neither well nor ill-disposed towards him in connexion with either
the
in
1

Omitting

KGU TO uTroXoy^n/coV, inserted

by Spengel,

CHAPTER
the
past
or
his action

36
or

1442

the present, or when his personality or his words are the object of prejudice,

we

5

must bring forward reasons for goodwill towards him, 1 sometimes blending them together and sometimes taking

them separately. Such, then, is the method by which we must conciliate goodwill. Those who are the objects neither of goodwill nor illwill 2 we must briefly eulogize, while we must dispraise their adversaries. We must praise them 3 in connexion
with the qualities which most nearly concern our hearers, 10 calling them, for example, patriotic, true to their friends,
grateful,

compassionate

;

while

we

shall dispraise
will

an adver

sary by indignation of our audience, such as unpatriotic, untrue to his friends, thankless, pitiless, and the like. must also

applying to

him

epithets which

arouse the

We

conciliate the jury

by

gence which they mention any point in which our client

praising their justice and the intellimust also bring to their task.

15

We

is

at a disadvantage

compared with his opponents, whether in word or deed or anything else which concerns his suit and we must further
;

introduce the considerations of justice, legality, expediency, and the like. It is by these means that we must win good
will in the

minds of the jury

for

one who

is

the object of 20

neither kindly nor unkindly feeling.

When bur client is an object of prejudice, if the prejudice dates from the past and is concerned with what he has said, we know from what has already been remarked how to If it dates from the present time, it must remove it.
4 necessarily be concerned with the man s personality if he is represented as unfit to bring the case in question, or his character as contradicting the charges he brings or con
25

with the accusation brought against him. It would be a case of unsuitability if too young or too old a man pleaded on behalf of another of contradiction, if a strong man accused a weak man of assault, or if a violent man
sistent
;

brought a charge of violence against a self-controlled man,
1

2
4

Adding with some MSS. Reading avrovs.
Deleting the

comma

fvptveiav Tropio-Ttov after ibius. 3 Reading avrovs. after at
"

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
30 or if

a very poor man went to law against a very rich man, accusing him of defrauding him of money. These are cases where there is a contradiction between the accusations and

bring them. There will be consistency with the where a strong man is prosecuted for assault by a charge
those

who

weak man
put on
35

or one

who

his trial for theft.

has the reputation of being a thief is In a word, there will seem to be

consistency with the charge in the case of persons who cause an opinion to be formed about them which corresponds with their character. Such, then, will be the misrepresenta tions which arise at the moment against a man s personality.

Prejudice will be raised against a

man

s

action

if

1442 law with

his

own

friends or guests or relatives, or
;

he goes to on petty

or discreditable pleas

for these things bring disrepute

upon

the parties in a

suit.

5

I will now show how we are to get rid of the above mentioned prejudices. I maintain that there are two principles which hold good in all cases. First, when you think your opponents are likely to impress the jury, anticipate them and make the impression yourself. Secondly, when
it is

a question of acts,

you should,

if

possible, turn the

upon your adversaries,

or, failing that,

blame upon some one else,

urging as an excuse that you have been dragged into the suit against your will and under compulsion from your op10

ponents. Against each particular prejudice you must urge such excuses as these a young man, for example, should allege a lack of older friends to fight the case on his behalf,
:

or the enormity or

number

of his opponent

s

misdeeds, or the

short limit of time allowed, 1 or some other such excuse. If are on s some one else behalf, you must say you speaking that you are pleading his cause from motives of friendship
for
15

him or hatred of

his

opponent, or because you were

present at the events in question, or for the public good, or because your client stands in need of friends and is a victim
of injustice.
If his character

agrees with the charge brought

against him or is in contradiction to the accusation which he brings, you must make use of anticipation and say that it is

not just or lawful or expedient to judge from an opinion or
1

Reading

J)

^fycOos aSiK^urcoz/

r)

7r\TJ6os

i)

TrpoQeo-niav

x/)oi>ov

(Spengel).

CHAPTER
way

36
is

1442
the 20
s

Such, then, suspicion before listening to the facts. in which we shall get rid of prejudices against a personality ; those which concern his action we

man

shall

repudiate by transferring the blame to his adversary, or by accusing the latter of libel or injustice or greed or con
as an excuse the indignation of and showing that he could not possibly obtain This is how we shall get rid of justice in any other way. personal prejudices in the law courts those which concern
tentiousness, or
1

by alleging

our client

25

;

a

man

s

public

life

we

shall refute

by the various methods

2 prescribed for the kinds of oratory already dealt with. shall arrange the proems of forensic speeches in the

We

as those of public orations, and on the same we shall include the narration of facts in the proem principle and either show them to be trustworthy and just in detail or else insert them bodily by themselves. 3 Next will follow confirmation, by means of proofs if the

same manner

3

facts are disputed by our opponents, or, if they are admitted, by considerations of justice, expediency, and the like. Of proofs we must put testimony first and admissions made under torture, if there are any. Next we must confirm our statements, if they are credible, by maxims and enthymemes,

35

they are not entirely credible, by considerations of a probability, and afterwards by examples, signs, infallible I443
but,
if

and fallible, and refutations, and lastly by enthymemes and maxims. If the facts are admitted, we must leave proofs alone and make use of justification as already
described. 4

Such, then,

is

the

method of confirmation which

5

we

we shall next state the arguments which we can urge against our opponents, and anticipate 5 wh$t they are likely to say. If they deny the facts, we must amplify the proofs which we have already stated and criticize and minimize those which they are likely to bring
forward.
1

employ. After such confirmation

shall

If

they admit the actions but intend to show
(friXovsiKtas,
z

10

2

5

Reading ra
,

Putting a comma after b Cp. I436 37 ff-,
11.

not after opyfy (so Bekker). 4 b Cp. I438 24Cp. 1439*7 ff.

rrpay/zara for TO Trpay/Lia, cp. lo, II below.

above

1.

3

and

evvofjLn /cat

I443

a

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
that they are legal and just according to written laws, we must attempt to show that the laws which we bring forward, and laws similar to them, are just and right and to the

15

common advantage of the state, and that this is the opinion generally held about them, while the contrary is true of the laws which our opponents are bringing forward. If it is im
possible to say this, you must remind the jury that they have to give their verdict not on a point of law but on a point of fact, and that they have sworn to vote according to the

established law, and

pass laws
20

now

If it purpose. travenes laws which appear to be bad, 1 we must say that here we have not law but the negation of law for law is
;

you must tell them that they must not but upon the proper days fixed for that so happens that what has been done con

laid

down
if

for the public benefit,

but this law
will

is

harmful to

25

be acting in of vote contravention this law, but will illegally they be legislating to prevent the use of bad and illegal ordinances.
the state.

We

must say that they

not

You

can also point out that no law forbids the conferring of a public benefit and that it is a benefaction to the state to annul bad laws. Regarding laws, then, of which the

meaning

is

clear,

we

shall easily

be able, by such methods

30 of anticipation, to speak against any of them with which we are concerned. When there is ambiguity, if the jury understand a law in a sense which favours you, you must

give
tion

it

that interpretation

;

but

if

they give

it

the construc

which your opponent puts upon it, you must tell them that this is not what the lawgiver meant but that he 2 interpreted it as you do, and that it is to the advantage of
35

the jury to put the construction which you do upon it. If you cannot twist the law round, point out that it cannot

mean anything but what you say it means. 3 this method you will have no difficulty as
which to deal with laws.
Generally speaking,
1

If

you follow

to the

way

in

if

they admit the facts and intend to
Bekker and
6 vopos.

Reading with

E and G and

Spengel
o evavrios

doKovvTfis dvai
2

vo/Jiovs.

came
3

Reading with Kayser Xeyeiv ^vvarai in from the previous line. Reading aXX 6 o-v for 6 a-v (Spengel).

probably

CHAPTER

36

I4

43

a

base their defence on pleas of justice and legality, you must employ these methods to anticipate what they are likely to

4

But if they admit the facts but claim to be pardoned, say. b must you deprive your opponents of such arguments in the I443 First, you must say that their conduct following manner. is all the more reprehensible and that it is only when they have been found out that they admit their mistake in so
If, therefore, you pardon the defendant, you You can absolve every one else from punishment. how who their If those admit mistakes, say, you acquit will you be able to condemn those who do not do so?

acting, adding,

will

5

You must
is

urge that even if he has made a mistake, there no reason why I should suffer through his mistake
*
.

Furthermore, you must say that the lawgiver shows no pity for those who make mistakes, and so the jury in giving their verdict according to the laws should not do so either. Such then, as we have stated at the beginning, are the means by which we shall refute their appeals for pardon,
and, speaking generally,

10

we

shall anticipate

by the method

already mentioned anything which our opponents intend to say with a view either to proof or justification or pardon. Next we must recount 1 the charge, the whole story of the case being summarized, and, if possible, in a few words
instil into the minds of the jury a feeling of hostility or indignation or envy towards our opponents and of goodwill How this is done we or gratitude or pity for ourselves.

15

have already stated in dealing with public speaking and persuasion and dissuasion, and we shall again allude to it
finally in treating of the defensive style of oratory.

20

This,

then,

way in which we shall compose and arrange our speech when we are the first to speak and are the accusers
is

the

in a forensic case.

are defending a case, we shall frame our proem way as when accusing, and we shall make no mention of the accusations, of which our opponent has
in

When we

the same

25

informed our hearers, but after the proem we shall set forth and refute the opinions which he has put into their minds

and throw discredit on
1

his witnesses

and the testimony given

avaXoyia-Tfov

(CFOP).

1443

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
under torture and the oaths,
to you.
in the

If the facts are credible,

manner already described we must put our defence

30 against
if

them

into the form of a pretended omission, and,

the witnesses

trustworthy, ment of fact

who have been examined under torture are we must have recourse to argument or state or any other strong point which we can bring

If your adversary accuses you by against them. bringing a charge which accords with your advantage or habitual

practice,

you must defend
;

that the crime with which

35

with your advantage or, has not been the custom either of yourself or of persons like you to do such things, or to do them in such a manner.

you can, by showing you are charged does not accord failing that, you must urge that it

yourself, if

This

When

how you will refute the argument of probability. he employs an example, 1 you must first show, if you can, that it does not resemble the crime with which you are charged, or, failing that, yourself bring forward another
is

40

example

to

the
If

probability.

contrary which has occurred against he employs a sign, 2 you must refute it by

giving reasons why it implies the exact opposite, while you must show that his maxims and enthymemes are either
a 3 I444 paradoxical or ambiguous. His fallible signs you must prove to be signs of a number of other things and not only of the charge which he is bringing against you. This, then,
is

the

way

in

which we

shall

cause our adversary

s

con

5

by either interpreting them in or a contrary sense reducing them to ambiguity. If, on the other hand, we admit that we have done the
tentions to be discredited
acts with
justice

10

which we are charged, we shall base our plea on and legality and try to prove that our acts are juster and more legal. If this is impossible, we must resort to pleas of error or misfortune, and try to win pardon by showing that the harm which has resulted is small, pointing out that
is

common to all men, while wrongdoing is peculiar to the wicked. You must urge that it is right and just and expedient to pardon errors for no man knows whether it may not fall to his lot to commit such an error. You must
error
;

1

Cp. 1429*21

2

ff.

Cp. I43o

a

8

14.

Cp.

CHAPTER
also point out that

36

H44
15

your opponent claimed pardon when he

committed an

error.

Next will come the anticipations which your adversaries have made in their speeches. Anticipations of other kinds we shall easily be able to refute by an appeal to the facts but if they misrepresent us by saying that we read our speeches or practise them beforehand, or that we are plead ing for the sake of some reward, we must meet such
;

20

accusations with irony and say with regard to the writing of speeches that the law does not forbid a man to read out

a written speech any speak without notes
certain actions,
it

more than
;

it it

forbids his opponent to

for,

while

allows a

man

prohibits the doing of to make a speech in any way
:

he

likes.

You must

also say

My

opponent considers

25

that the wrongs which he has committed are so serious that he does not think I am doing justice to the accusation

which I am bringing against him, unless I write out and take a long time to think over my speech. Such then is the l in which we must the meet way misrepresentation of having
written out our speech. If our opponents declare that we learn and rehearse our speeches, we shall admit it and say 30 who, according to you, learn what we are going to say,
:

We

are not litigious, whereas you, who declare that you do not know how to speak, have been convicted of bringing

vexatious suits

and we

shall

in the past and are doing so now against us draw the conclusion that it would apparently
;

therefore be better for the citizens,

if

our opponent also

learned to be an orator, for then he would not be such a scoundrel and pettifogger. shall meet the accusation

We

that

we

are paid to plead in court

by

a similar argument

35

admitting it and speaking ironically and pointing out that our accuser and every one else does so. You must distinguish

between the

different

plead vengeance, others for honours. You must show that you 40 are yourself pleading as a favour, and say that your opponent pleads for no small payment for he is going
;

men

in court for

kinds of pay and say that some money, others as a favour, others for

to law that he
1

may make money by
avavrr]T^ov
is

unrighteous means,

Hammer s

a misprint for a

I444

b

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
must follow the not in order to avoid having to pay it, if any one accuses us of teaching others how to plead and of composing speeches to be delivered in court.

We

same method

5

point out that every one else, as far as lies within power, helps his friends by instruction and advice. Thus you will have an answer in such cases in accordance
his

You must

with the rules of rhetoric.

You must
10

occur in cases of this kind
distinction in

not be slow in any questions and answers which but you must make a clear
; *

your answers between admissions and denials. The following are examples of admissions Did you kill my
:

son

*

?

Yes,

I

did
;

kill

him,

when

he,

unprovoked, raised a

sword against
Yes, but he
i

me

first

or again, assaulted me

;

Did you thrash my son? or again, Did you break my

5

head?
house at

Yes, when you were forcing your way into my Such admissions are made in reliance on night.

the legality of your action. Denials, on the other hand, aim Did you kill my at diverting the course of law, for example
:

son

?

-

No,

it

was not

I,

but the law that killed him.

This

20

is the kind of answer which you must always make when one law enjoins, while another forbids, a certain course of action. Out of all these various methods you will gather

the means to meet your adversaries. Next will follow an iteration by .way of brief reminder of what you have said. It is useful on all occasions and

should therefore be employed
of speech.
25

in

It is

very suitable

in

every part and in every kind accusation and defence and

In my opinion we ought also in persuasion and dissuasion. here not only to remind our audience, as in eulogistic and vituperative speeches, of what has been said, but we ought
also to dispose our judges to be favourable towards our selves and unfavourable to our opponents we shall make
;

30 this the last part of

our speech.
in

It is

possible to refresh
either

your hearer
enumerating

s

memory
the

a

summary manner

by

by making

points which you have mentioned, or a division, 1 or by asking additional questions

which will bring the most credit on yourself and the most discredit on your opponents, or, if you like, you
1

Cp. I433 33ff-

b

CHAPTER

36

b

I444

can use the form of a simple question. 1 The nature of these methods we know from what has already been said.
shall win a favourable hearing for ourselves and an unfavourable one for our opponents if, as in persuasion and dissuasion, we show briefly how we ourselves (or our friends)

We

35

have benefited or are benefiting or intend to benefit those

who

are

now seeking

to

wrong us

care), or else

our judges (or those for

point out to them that now is gratitude for our good services
;

whom they they care) and 40 the opportunity to show us 1445* and also, when it is possible,
(or those for

whom

;

This we shall do by showing that induce them to pity us. a close tie binds us to our hearers and that we are suffering

undeserved misfortune, having been unfairly treated in the past, or being so now, or being likely to be so in the future, unless they help us now. If such arguments are inapplicable,

5

we must

describe the advantages of which we have been, or are being, or are likely to be deprived, if our prayers are or show that we never have been, rejected by our judges
;

or are not now, or are never likely to be in enjoyment of some benefit, unless they help us. For it is by these 10

means that we
audience.

shall

win pity and gain the goodwill of our

We

shall cause a prejudice

and feelings of envy against

our opponents by employing the opposite method and pointing out that our hearers, or those for whom they care,

have received undeserved ill-treatment, or are receiving it, or are likely to receive it at the hands of our opponents or
their friends
;

15

for

by such arguments they

will

be induced to

entertain feelings of hatred and indignation against them.

Where

this

is

impossible,

we

shall collect together all the

arguments by which we can create in our hearers a feeling of envy against our opponents for envy is very near to hatred. They will be objects of envy, to put the matter if we can show that they have met with undeserved briefly, prosperity and that no close ties bind them to our hearers, and point out that they have unjustly received, or are or that receiving, or are about to receive many benefits
;
;

20

1

On

the
ff.

difference

between

eparav and Trpoo-epamzj/

see

Rhet.

a

I445

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
they have never in the past been without some advantage, or are not without it now, or likely to be so in the future
;

25

or that they have never met with some misfortune, or are not now meeting with it, or likely to do so, unless the judges

punish them now. peroration of our
disfavour for
instructions given

By

these

means then we

shall in the

speech win favour for ourselves and

our opponents, and by following all the above we shall be able to arrange speeches for accusation and defence according to the rules of rhetoric.

30

The

inquisitive kind
in

of oratory generally occurs, not 37
;

it is connexion with the other styles useful in with contradictions. However, especially dealing

separately, but
in

35

we may know the arrangement of this kind of speech also, when we have to inquire into the words or manner of life or deeds of men or the administration of a
order that
city, I will describe
it

also in a
this

conducting an inquiry of

kind

summary manner. When we must begin in the

same way

refuting a prejudice; and so, after first adducing plausible pretexts so as to make our action appear reasonable, we shall then proceed to conduct our as
inquiry.

when

following are suitable pretexts in political 40 assemblies, that we are adopting such a course not from b I445 party-spirit but in order that it may not escape the attention
:

The

of our hearers, or again, that our adversaries molested us In private suits our excuse will be a feeling of hatred first.
or the bad character of the subjects of our inquiry or our friendship towards them or the object of making them
it In again. public trials our pretexts will be legality, justice, and the After first treating of these and similar general interest.

realize

what they are doing and not do

5

subjects we shall next in order set forth and inquire into each utterance or deed or intention of our opponents,

10

showing that these are opposed to justice and legality arid private and public expediency, and examining them all to see whether in any respect they contradict one another or
the practice of good citizens or probability. But, not to be tedious by going into details, the more we can prove to our

hearers that the conduct of the subjects of our inquiry

is

CHAPTER

37

I

445

b

opposed to honourable pursuits, acts, words, or habits, the We greater will be the discredit which attaches to them. ought to conduct our inquiry not in a bitter but in a gentle for words if thus spoken will appear more persuasive spirit to our hearers, and those who utter them will be less likely
;

15

to bring prejudice upon themselves. 1 When you have care into and fully inquired everything amplified the results, you 20 must conclude with a brief iteration and remind your hearers

able to

of what you have said. By arranging them thus we shall be all the various kinds of oratory according to employ the rules of rhetoric.

38

Both

in

possible to

speaking and writing we must try as far as make our words accord with the principles laid

25

down above, and accustom ourselves to practice each principle readily, and we shall have many clever expedients to enable us to make speeches according to the rules of art
in private and public suits and in conversation with others but an orator ought to be careful not only about his words but also about his personal behaviour, regulating it accord
;

30

for the manner ing to the principles already laid down of a man s life contributes to the persuasive influence which
;

he exercises and to the establishment of a good reputation. In the first place you must divide up your subject-matter according to the general system of division in which you

35

have been instructed, and decide what you must treat of Next you must first, secondly, thirdly, and fourthly.
prepare your hearers to receive you, as I have described in dealing with the attitude to be taken towards your audience
in proems. You will dispose them well towards you, if you are true to your promises and if you keep the same friends 40 a all your life and show yourself unchanging in your other I446

and always following the same course. They will you, if you treat of great and noble deeds and such as promote the public good. Their goodwill having been won, when you come to practical suggestions they will accept as expedient to them selves those which procure the avoidance of evils and the 5
habits
listen attentively to
1

Reading with

E G and

Buhle avrovs

for avrovs.

I44 6&

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
provision of benefits, and reject those which involve the

contrary results. In order that your exposition

may

may command
10 if

credit,

you ought

to

be quick and lucid and make your practical

suggestions as follows. You will perform your task quickly, you do not try to do everything at once, but take the first point first and then the next. You will speak lucidly,
if

15

you do not suddenly leave your subject and go on to other points before you have finished it. You will command credit, if you do not act contrary to your usual character, and further if you do not pretend that the same persons are
your enemies and your friends. As regards proof, where we have sure knowledge, we
shall prefer to follow its

action, but,

guidance in prescribing plans of where we lack knowledge, we shall take the
;

20

for it is safest in ordinary course of events as our guide such cases to act with a view to what usually happens. When we have adversaries to contend with, if it is a

question of words, we shall obtain confirmation in support in suits about of our case from the actual words uttered
;

contracts we. shall do so

by dealing with them

in

accordance

with unwritten and written laws with the support of the best possible testimony and within definite limits of time.
25

regards our peroration we shall remind our hearers what has been said by a summary repetition of the facts while we shall remind them of our past deeds by reference
of
;

As

to our present deeds, when we are undertaking identical with, or similar to, former actions.

actions

Our hearers
30 course of action

will

be well disposed to us, if we follow a which will result in their thinking themselves

well treated in the past, present, or future. shall add if our to we deal with transactions are which actions, weight
likely to

We

produce great credit
is

for the state.

35 his

which an orator must regulate while he must practice the art personal behaviour of oratory according to the principles already laid down.
the
in
;

Such then

manner

1

[Sacrifices
1

must be conducted on the principles already
of this treatise occurs only in certain

The concluding paragraph

CHAPTER
indicated
;

38

I446

a

they must be reverent towards the gods, moderate in costliness, splendid from a spectacular point of view, and likely to bring advantage to the citizens. They will be reverent towards the gods, if we sacrifice according to I446 b ancestral custom they will be moderate in costliness, if the
;

accompaniments of the ceremony are not used up as well as the money actually expended they will be splendid from a
;

spectacular point of view, if they are magnificently appointed they will be beneficial to the citizens, if horsemen and
;

Our infantry in full panoply accompany the procession. dealings with the gods will be devoutly performed if carried
out thus.
shall establish friendly relations with those who are of like character to our own and have the same interests, and with whom we are obliged to co-operate in matters
for such friendship is most likely to be must make those men our allies, who are permanent. most righteous and are possessed of considerable power and live near at hand those who are the contrary must be our enemies. We must undertake war against those who are

5

We

of great importance

;

We

10

;

The trying to injure the state or her friends or her allies. of the must be secured either state protection by personal service or by the help of allies or by mercenaries the first
;

15

method
third.

is

preferable to the second,

and the second

to the

As
first

regards the supply of resources, we must provide them and foremost from our own revenues and possessions,

secondly by taxes on rateable property, and thirdly by personal service on the part of the poor, and the provision
of

arms by the craftsmen, and

of

money by

the wealthy.
20

form of democracy is that under which the laws bestow the posts of dignity on the best citizens, and the people are not deprived of the the worst form is that under rights of electing and voting
for political constitution, the best
;

As

which the laws deliver up the wealthy to the insolence of MSS. and appears to be an alternative version of 1423^36 ff. It is obviously out of place in its present position and has been justly suspected by the editors of being spurious both for this reason and also because of the nature and ill arrangement of its contents.

U

2

b

I446
the mob.
25

RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM
on
Oligarchies are of two kinds, being based either political partisanship or on a property qualification.

Alliances must be formed

themselves to protect their or hold the enemy in check.
with

when the citizens are unable by own territory and strongholds

An alliance must be dispensed
allies

when

it

is

unnecessary or when the proposed

30 are too far distant and unable to arrive at the opportune

moment.
good citizen is one who provides the state with useful friends and few and feeble foes, and who procures for her
35

A

the greatest revenue without confiscating the property of a single private citizen, and who, while conducting himself
righteously, exposes those
state.

who attempt any

injury to the

always bestow presents either in the hope of benefit or in grateful return for previous services. themselves ing
Service
or fear.
a
is

Men

always given either
:

for gain or

honour or pleasure

I447

All dealings are carried out either by choice or unwillingly for all acts are done either under compulsion or through persuasion or fraud or on some pretext. In war one side gains the upper hand either through luck,
superiority of numbers or strength or resources, or advantage of position, or excellence of allies, or skill on the
or

5

part of a general.

It is

generally held that
it

men

should

abandon
b

their allies either because

is

I447

or because they have brought the To act justly is to follow the
state, to

war

expedient to to a close.

do so

common

customs of the
s

obey the laws, and

to abide

by one

personal

promises.

5

Physical advantages are good condition, beauty, strength, mental advantages are wisdom, prudence, and health Wealth and friends are courage, self-control, and justice. and alike mind to advantages body. The opposites of lack of wealth and friends are these qualities and the
;

disadvantageous.
is

To

a state a multitude of

good

citizens

an advantage.]

INDEX
2o a-47 b

=
Conjunctions, use of, 34 b Consonants, 34 36, 37.
b
13.

Accusation, one of the genera of b b 28 a 4 oratory, 2i 10 4i 30,
;
;

33;44 24; defined, b methods, 26 30 ff. b Admissions, 44 10 ff. 20* Alexander, 5.

b

26 b

25

;

its

Alliances, a subject of deliberative a b oratory, 23 24 ; motives of, 24 b how to 30, 46 9 ff., 26 ff. b speak in favour of, 24 35 b against, 25 I ff. a Ambiguity, avoidance of, 35 33, b i8.
;
ff>

Constitution, political, a subject of deliberative oratory, 23 a 23 a b 24 8 ff. 46 20. b Contracts, lawsuits about, 2i 13 a a 46 22 between states, 23 25 b 28.
; ;
;

;

;

24

Contraries, examples based on, 2 9 b 37; 3i a 26; in enthymemes a a 30 235 3i 3ib Convention, respect for, 4i 2i. b 2. 2i Corax,
,

Amplification, rhetorical, 26 19 a a a ff. 27 2, 20 28 2, 14 32 34 a b a a 36 i7; 39 6, 7, 91 4o 2i; 4i b a 33, 37, 43 9; 45 2o. 5, Anticipation of arguments (TT/JO28 a 8 40 a 25 42 b 5 K<iTd\r]\lfis), a b a 43 7, 30, 40, i4J 44 i6 ff. b use of, 32 b 14, defined, 32
;

a

;

;

;

b Corinthians, 28 18. b b b Courage, 4o 19; 4i 7; 47 4. a Crime, defined, 27 3i.

;

;

;

;

Defence, one of the genera of b a b oratory, 2i io; 2S 4; 43 23; b b 44 24 oratory of, defined, 26
;

n

;

27;
36.

its

a methods, 27 22

ff.

;

4i

b

;

ff.;

39 3

b

ff.

27 ff. Appetite, common to a animals, 2l 10.
Antithesis, 35
Aristotle,
b

b

man and

the

2o a

5.

a Article, the definite, use of, 35 35,

i3

ff.

a a Athenians, Athens, 22 4o; 23 6; b a 29 i, 8; 3i i7. b Attention, how to secure, 36 5 ff. b b 38 2i; 40 i8;
;

Deliberation,deliberative (or politi a b cal) oratory, 2o 20, 24; 2i i, b the subjects of, 23 a 1 3 ff. 7 see also Public Speaking. a Democracy, 2o 19 the best form b 20 worst form of, the of, 46 a b 46 23 ; elections in a d., 24 12 ff. ideals of legislation in a d.,
;

;

;

;

;

a 24 20

ff.

b Barbarians, 2O 15, 28. Blame, see Vituperation, b Boeotia, 29 14. a Brevity of speech, 28 9 be obtained, 34b 10 ff.
Callicles, 32
a

Denials, 44 16. Desire, common to a animals, 2i 10.

b

man and
b

the

;

how

to

of Syracuse, 29 15. b Dionysius, 28 17. Display, oratory of, see Epideictic Oratory. Dissuasion, one of the genera of
a 2i b 9; 39 b 36 4 4, b defined, 2i 2i; b topics of, 2i 28 ff.

Dion

4.

oratory,

;

19. Carthaginians, Censure, see Vituperation. a Children, qualities of, 4i 16. b 46 3i ff. Citizenship, good, Clearness, see Lucidity. a Conciseness, how obtained, 38 38 ff. b Confirmation, of facts, 38 29 ff. b a 42 32 ff. of statements, 46 22.
;
;

28 b

15;

44 25;

b

a Education, value of, 2i 17, 24. b Election by vote, 24 a 14, b I 46
;

22.

Enthymemes a

28 20 32 26 a b a 33 255 34 355 38 345 39 5, b a 42 38; 19,34; 4o i9, a a b 4i; defined, 3O 23 43 2,
,

a

b

;

;

39/n

5

;

INDEX
their material, 3o a 24
fallible signs, 3i a
ff.
;

)(

in

28

;

)(

maxims,
a
;

3i

a

35-

Honourable, the, 2i 37; 23 10, b 26 a i 27 a 26, b 40 3o a 27 5 a a a b 33 2; 36 i 4 3 8 i9; 39 10,
; ; ; ; ;

b

a

to arouse, 4o 34 if. a i7; 45 i2ff. b Epideictic oratory, 2i 8. the plea Error, defined, 27* 33 a a of, 29 is; 44 8fT. Eulogy, one of the genera of a b b oratory, 2i 9; 26 2o; 28 4;

Envy, how
43
b

37 ; a topic of persuasion and b dissuasion, 2 i 25, 29; defined,

22 a

15.
ff.
;

;

a Hostility, how to arouse, 4o 28 b 43 i7ff.

Hyperbole, 3o
Indignation,
ff.;

b

9, 15, 18.

42 9 44 27 defined, materials of, 25 b 39 ff. methods of, 26 a 19 ff. Philoctetes of, Euripides, the

40
25

b

5

ff.

a

b

;

;

;

how

b

to arouse,

4o 32

a

36

;

;

43

b

i7-

quoted, 33 II ff. Evidence, of slaves under torture, 28 a 23; 42 b 375 43 b 28, 31; a methods of defined, 32 12
;

b

a Inexpedient, the, 22 15. one of the genera of Inquiry b a b oratory, 2i 10 3O 25 ; 4i 31 ;
,
;

defined, 27 a 45 3off.

b 12

;

its

use, 27

b

17

;

supporting, 32 ing, 32* 19 ff.
1

a

;

i3 ff, of refut see also Testi
; ;

Interruptions, a 33 24ff.
b
,

how

to b

deal with,
b
;

mony. Examples
a

b 28 a 19 38 33, 39 a b 39 i, 14; 43 i, 37, 39; de a a fined, 29 2i; their use, 29 22 ff. two kinds of, 22 a 27 ff. based on contraries, 29 b 37 )(
,
;
;

;

infallible signs, 3i a a babilities, 3i 24.

4i 24; 36 2i; 39 14 Irony a 44 2i, 36; defined, 34* 17 ex a amples of, 34 19 ff. b 28 a 8 Iteration 34 7, 16, 25; b a a 20 36* 39 22, 29, 12 4o 24 b b b 41 I 44 2i 45 2O; examples b b its use, 33 29. of, 33 33 ff.
;

,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

27;

)(

pro
;

a Expediency, the Expedient, 2i I b a a 2 3a 4o; 391 2 6 i 27 26, a b a 30*27; 36 is; 38 i9, 31; 39 a a 26, 9, 27, 36; 40 io; 42 i9, b b 35 45 Io a topic of persua sion and dissuasion, 2i b 24, 29 a defined, 22 4 ff. for individuals
9>

Just, the, Justice, 23 34 a b a 27 26, 39; 28 ii ;
a a
;
;

a

;

;

5

I

;

;

22 a

7

;

for
to,

analogies

states, 22 b ff.

22

a

11

;

33 27 9, 36 14 a a 39 9, 12 ff, 24, 36; 4o io ff, b b a b a i9; 4i 4; 42 i8, 34; 43 39; a b b 44 6;45 5,9;47 i,6; a topic of persuasion and dissuasion, b 2i b 24, 28 defined, 2i 35 a analogies to, 22 28 ff.
;
;

^

25 40 a 3o 27 19, 30

b

;

;
;

30

Forensic oratory, 2i b 8 26 b 23 b b 4i 32 42 28 see also Defence and Accusation.
; ; ; ;

Lacedaemonians, 22*40

Friendship, appeals

to,

4o 26,

a

39

b

17

ff.

;

40.
of,

Genealogies, use
secure
16
b

4o 24
;

b

23* I, 4, b a 8; 29 i, 11, 12, 15; 34 i, 7. a distribution Lands, public, of, 24 b 32 exploitation of, 25 20. a a a a Law, 2o 20 3o 27 33 27 43 a II ff. ; 47 b 2 defined, 2o 25 ; 22 a 2 ; 24 a 9 a subject of de
; ; ;
;
;

;

;

ff.

Goodwill of an audience, how
ff.

to
;

ff.

i7l 44 35ff-; Gratitude, appeals to, 39 b 17, 21 a b a ff.; 4o 27, 40; 43 i?; 45 ib Greece, Greeks, 2o 15, 27.

43

b

Gymnasium, 37
Gymnastics,
b Habit, 28
8.

b 2.

26 a

9; 41*35.

Happiness of man, due
2i a 13.

to reason,

24 23 23 b 36 )( unwritten, 2i analogies to the ; written 1., 22 b 4 ff.; how to speak in favour of a 1., 24 15 against, b 24 21 ; see also Legislation. b b Lawful, the, 22 i 27* 25 40 b a a 26, 39; 28 12; 36 i4; 39*9; a 10 ff. 4o 42* 18 43* 39 44* 6 45 b 5,9; a topic of persua sion and dissuasion, 2i b 24, 28; its nature demonstrated from the contrary, 22 b 19 ff.
;

liberative oratory,

a

a

8; written a ff. 46 24 ;

lj

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX
Lawsuits about contracts, 2i b
Legal, see Lawful.
of, in a demo a b 24 i2ff., io; in an oligarchy, 24 a 39 ff-, b I2 b Leuctra, the battle of, 29 14. Lot, appointment to office by, 24-

13.

Legislation, ideals
cratic state,

tion, 2I b 8

Eulogy, Vituperation, Accusa Defence, Inquiry (g. v.),
ff.

1

3

b

i

Lucidity,

how

46

a ii.

obtained, 38

a

26

;

b Lysithidas, 22 22.

Parian Sophists, 2i a 32. b Parisosis 35 39 ff. Paromoeosis 36 a 5 ff. a Particles, use of, 35 38. Pay, pleading for, 44* 35 different kinds of pay, 44*37. Peace and war, a subject of de
1 , ,
;

Magistracies, methods of election a b i. to, 24 12 ff, Man, alone possessed of reason, 2I a I2.
b Maxims 28 a 20 32 26 33* 25524 a 37;39 a 4, 5, 19, 34, 38;
, ;
;

liberative oratory, 23 a 25 ments about, 25* 8 ff.

;

argu

Peloponnesians, 29
a

b

13.

4o 23

a b b 41* 20, 39, 10 42 38 a b a 43 2, 4i defined, 3O 4o; two kinds of m.s, 3o b i their em b ployment, 3o 2 ff. examples of m.s, 30 b 10 ff. enthy)(
; ;
; ; ;

Peroration, 45 26; 46*2$. Persuasion, one of the genera of b a a oratory, 2i 9 ; 28 I 36 39 b b 40* 3, 22 44 25 defined, 2i 20 topics of, 2i b 24 ff. Philoctetes of Euripides, quoted,
; ; ;
;

;

;

;

memes
signs
,

,

3i

a

31*35;
39.

)(

fallible

Mercenaries, 46 1 6. b Metaphorical words, 34 34. a Minimization, rhetorical, 26 19 ff, b 28 a 2, 14; 32 a 39; 36* i3 ff. b b I0 , 4oa 22 !7 4i 27; 39 a 43 io.
;
5
5>

b

;

Misrepresentation, see Prejudice.
a Narration, of events, 38 3
ff.

33 ll ff. b Phyle, 29 9. b Pity, appeals to, 39 17, 26 ff. a b 4o 4o; 43 17; 45*2. Pleasant, the, Pleasure, a topic of b persuasion and dissuasion, 2i a b b 27 25, 29; 23 io, 7; 26*1 a 40; 39* 10, 37 defined, 22 17. b Pleasingly, how to speak, 34 34, a b 27; 36 2o. Political Oratory, see Deliberation. Postulates 28 a 8 36* 20 de
;

b

;

;

,

;

;

;

42

b

b fined, 33 17 b p.s, 33 i8ff.

;

just

and unjust

30

;

arrangements of facts

in,

38 14 ff. Necessary, the, a topic of persua a a b sion, 2i 27; 23 n; 39 io;
a defined, 2i i9.

b

Nicanor, 21*38.
a Oath, 28 22 43* 28 ; defined, a treatment of o.s by 32 33 orators, 32* 34 ff. ; of jurors, a 32 2. b Oligarchy, two kinds of, 46 24
; ;

Praise, see Eulogy. b Prejudice, how to deal with, 36 29 ff. ; 42* 21 ff. ; how to arouse, b 45 12 ff. Probabilities , 28* 19 ; 39 a 4 ; 42 b b 391 43 37, 40; their nature, b a 38 25 ff. ; their use, 38 II )(
;

examples 3i 24. b b 39 Proem, the, 38 16, 24, 28 b a b 37; 4o 6, 6, 14, 23; 42 28, b b 3o;43 23, 27;45 37; defined
,
;

a

;

*

a legislation in an o., 24 39 ff. Omission, pretended the figure b of, 38* 6; 43 30b Opinion, defined, 3l 9,

36* 33 ; its uses, 36* 38 ff. a Prolixity of speech, 28*9; 34 I ff. Proofs (Trio-re is means of per
=--

a a 3i suasion), 28 4, 16 ff. ; b b 21, 5; 32 4 ; 38*25^30, 33,

35; 39
b
3,

a
;

Oracles, 23 35. a Oratory, the subjects of, 23 13 ff. ; three kinds Deliberative,
:

a

Epideictic, Forensic (q. v.}, b and seven 32 8 21^7, 8 Dissuasion, Persuasion, genera:
;

direct, 38 17 46 i3 b supplementary, 28* 22 3i 7. Public lands, see Lands, public. a Public speaking, 2i b 12 36 39
;
;
;

b 38; 7, 8, a i6

42 345 43
a

b

a
;

;

;

see also 32 liberative Oratory.

38

a

2,

19,

b

;

De

INDEX
a Reason, 2o 22, a 2i a 7 peculiar to man, 2i II ; the cause of man s happi a ness, 2i i4; the guide of life, 2I a 24. Refutation 28* 21 (e Xeyxoj), a a ex defined, 3i 6 ff. 43 2 a amples of, 3i 10 ff. )( fallible

25, 28, 30,

b

12, 26,

Taxes, imposition
18.
a
;

of,

25

b

25

;

46

b

28

;

;

Testimony, 28 22 31* 2 ; 42 36 b b a 43 28 46 24 defined, 3i 20
; ;

b

;

;
;

*

,

;

;

;

how how how

to support t., 3i 23 to contradict t, 3i b 33
to disguise
a
i,
t.,

b

ff.
ff.

;

32 3
b

a

ff.

;

see

;

also Evidence.

signs, 3i

b 2.

Thebans, 23
subject
of
oratory,
b

7

;

Resources, public, a
deliberative

Theodectes, the
of,

29 i2. Oratorical Art

23

a

26
ff.

;
;

2i b 2.
a

about, 25 b provision of, 46 16 ff. Rhetoric, see Oratory. Rites, sacred, see Sacred

arguments

19

rites.

Timotheus, 35 14. b Torch-race, 37 I. Torture of slaves to obtain evi dence, see Evidence.

Unnecessary, the, a topic of

dis

Sacred

a subject of deliberative oratory, 23 a 23, 29 ff. the ideal sacrifice, 23^ 34
rites, Sacrifices,
;

b suasion, 2i 30.

Virtue,

4o

b

16

;

its

divisions,

46 36 ff. a Sailors, 24 28.
ff.
;

a

40

b

1 8.

Scoffing, futility of, 4i
(i) Signs 20 43 a I,
, ;

b

15

ff.

fallible

b 2

;

defined, 3o
;

(crijuem), b
;

2S a

30

;

material, 30^ 38 )( l a maxims refuta 3i 39 }( b tions 3i 2.
, ,

their

Vituperation, one of the genera of b 26 b 20 28 a 4 Oratory, 2i 9 b b 40 5 ff defined, 2i 38; ma b terials for, 26 a 7 4i 13 ff. a b Vote, election by, 24 14, 2 right b a I, 9, 23; of, 46 22; of jury, 3 3
; ;

;

.

;

;

;

(2)

infallible
a
I,

(Te/e/z/;/ua),

28 a
;

43 18, 34b a Vowels, 34 35, 37; 35 34,

a

b i6.

20; 43
their
I

b

use,
,

40-; defined, a

3

i9;
;

)(

memes
3
a 2 7
.

3i

a

3O 14 enthy,

a

War and

Peace, see Peace
b
b
;
;

and

28

)(

examples

War. b Wisdom, 4o
b

Slaves, evidence of, under torture, see Evidence. b Sophists, the Parian, 2i 32. a a 28 7 Sparta, 35 17.
;

4i 5 19 47 5. Witness, see Testimony. Words, arrangement of letters in,

Statement

,

methods
21.

of,

(fp/uqi/fm), a b

28 a 10
23
;

;

35

4

ff,

36**

Syracusans, Syracuse, 29 b a 20; 36 2, 3; 39 25.

b i6 }

composite, 34 34 b 34 12, 20; meta b order of, 34 b phorical, 34 34 b a 38 ff. 35 5 ff. 3 6 36 simple, b a w.s used 34 33l usual, 3i 35 in several senses, 35 b 19.
;

34 34 length
;

b

;

of,

;

;

;

;

18,

Youth, rhetorical excusefor, 37 a

39.

DE POETICA
TRANSLATED BY

INGRAM BYWATER

PREFACE
THE following translation is a reprint of that printed in Professor By water s Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (1909). To this I have added a short table of contents, a few notes, and an index.
W. D. ROSS.
August 1924

CONTENTS
(A) Preliminary discourse on tragedy, epic poetry, and comedy, as the chief forms of imitative poetry.

CHAP.
1.

The

poetic arts distinguished (i)
,,
,,

2. 3.

(2)
(3)

by the means they use. by their objects. by the manner of their imita
its

tions.
4.
5.

Origin and development of poetry and

kinds.

Comedy and

epic poetry.

(B) Definition of a tragedy, and the rules for its construction. 6. Definition, and analysis into qualitative parts. 7-11. The plot. 7. Arrangement and length of the play. 8. Unity of action. 9. The poet must depict the probable and the universal.
10.

Simple and complex

plots.

Peripety, Discovery, and Suffering. 12. The quantitative parts of a tragedy. 13-14. How the plot can best produce the emotional effect of tragedy. 13. The tragic hero.
11.
15.
14. The tragic deed. Rules for the character of the tragic personages use of stage-artifice.
;

note on the

16-18. Appendix to discussion of plot. 16. The various forms of discovery. 17-18. Additional rules for the construction of a play. 19. The thought of the tragic personages. 20-22. The diction of tragedy. 20. The ultimate constituents of language. 21. The different kinds of terms. 22. The characteristics of the language of poetry. (C) Rules for the construction of an epic. 23. It must preserve unity of action. 24. Points of resemblance and of difference between epic poetry and tragedy. (D) 25. Possible criticisms of an epic or tragedy, and the answers to

them.
(E) 26, Tragedy artistically superior to epic poetry.

DE POETICA
I

subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only o general but also of its species and their respective of the structure of plot required for a good capacities

OUR

the art

in

;

of the constituent parts of a poem and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with

poem;

of the
;

number and nature

10

the primary facts.

Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by
a difference of
krtfti in

15

their means, or

by

differences in the

objects, or in the
I.

manner of

their imitations.

Just as colour and form are used as means

by some,
20

who (whether by art or constant practice) imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by
others
;

means

so also in the above-mentioned group of arts, the with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and

harmony
binations.

used, however, either singly or in certain com combination of harmony and rhythm alone is

A

the means in flute-playing and lyre-playing, and any other arts there may be of the same description, e. g. imitative
piping.
in

25

Rhythm
s

alone, without
;

harmony,
he,

is

the

means

the dancer

imitations

for even

by the rhythms,

of his attitudes,

may

represent

men s

characters, as well as

what they do and suffer. There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without harmony, in prose or b in verse, and if in verse, either in some one or in a plurality I447 of metres. This form of imitation is to this day without a name. We have no common name for a mime of Sophron I0 and we should or Xenarchus and a Socratic Conversation still be without one even if the imitation in the two
;

b

I447

DE POETICA
instances were in trimeters or elegiacs or some other kind of verse though it is the way with people to tack on poet
of a metre, and talk of elegiac-poets and epicpoets, thinking that they call them poets not by reason of the imitative nature of their work, but indiscriminately by to the

name

15

reason of the metre they write in. Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be put forth in a metrical Homer form, it is usual to describe the writer in this way
;

20

and Empedocles, however, have really nothing in common apart from their metre so that, if the one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a physicist rather than a
;

should be in the same position also, if the poet. imitation in these instances were in all the metres, like the Centaur (a rhapsody in a medley of all metres) of

We

25

Chaeremon and Chaeremon one has to recognize as a poet. So much, then, as to these arts. There are, lastly, certain other arts, which combine all the means enumerated, rhythm, melody, and verse, e.g. Dithyrambic and Nomic with this difference, how poetry, Tragedy and Comedy that the three kinds of means are in some of them all ever, employed together, and in others brought in separately, one after the other. These elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation.
; ;

I448

a

The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are necessarily either good men or bad the diversities of human character being nearly always deriva
II*

2

primary distinction, since the line between It virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind. follows, therefore, that the agents represented must be
tive

from

this

5

own level of goodness, or beneath it, or we in the same way as, with the painters, such as are; just the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves.
either above our
It is clear

that each of the above-mentioned arts will admit

of these differences,

and that

it

will

become

a separate art

by representing
10
;

objects with this point of difference.

Even

in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such diversities are possible and they are also possible in the nameless

CHAPTER
its

2

1448

art that uses language, prose or verse without

harmony, as

means

;

Homer s
;

than we are
of

Cleophon

personages, s are on our

for

instance, are better
level
;

own

and those

Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Diliad, are beneath it. The
is

same

true

of

the

Dithyramb

and the Nome:

the

15

personages

presented in them with the difference exemplified in the ... of ... and Argas, and in the Cyclopses of Timotheus and Philoxenus. This difference it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also the one

may be

;

would make
than the
III.

its

personages worse, and the other

better,

men

of the present day.
is

3

A

third difference in these arts

in the

manner

in
20

which each kind of object is represented. Given both the same means and the same kind of object for imitation, one may either (i) speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as Homer does or (2) one may remain the same throughout, without any such
;

change

;

or

(3)

the

imitators

story dramatically, as things described.

represent the whole were though they actually doing the

may

As we said at the beginning, therefore, the differences in the imitation of these arts come under three heads, their
means, their objects, and their manner. So that as an imitator Sophocles will be on one side akin
to
25

Homer, both portraying good men

;

and on another to

and doing.
for plays

Aristophanes, since both present their personages as acting This in fact, according to some, is the reason

being termed dramas, because

in a

play the person

Hence too both Tragedy and ages act the story. are claimed by the Dorians as their discoveries
;

Comedy Comedy

30

by the Megarians by those in Greece as having arisen when Megara became a democracy, and by the Sicilian
their country,

Megarians on the ground that the poet Epicharmus was of and a good deal earlier than Chionides and

Magnes; even Tragedy
Peloponnesian
Dorians.
*

also

is

In

claimed by certain of the support of this claim they

point to the words

comedy and

drama

.

Their word

35

1448*
for

DE POETICA
the

outlying hamlets,
call

Athenians
got the

name

comae, whereas thus assuming that comedians not from their comoe or revels, but from their

they say,

is

them demes

strolling

from

hamlet to

hamlet,

lack

b I448 keeping them out of the city. Their word also for whereas Athenians use prattein. they say, is
dran>

of appreciation to act

,

So much, then, as to the number and nature of the points of difference in the imitation of these arts.
It is clear that
5

two
is

causes, each of

the general origin of poetry was due to 4 them part of human nature. Imitation

natural to

man from

childhood, one of his advantages

over the

lower animals

being

this,

that he learns

is

the

most

imitative creature in the
imitation.

world, and

at

first

by

And
:

it is

of imitation.
10

The

also natural for all to delight in works truth of this second point is shown by

experience
to see,

we

of them

though the objects themselves may be painful delight to view the most realistic representations in art, the forms for example of the lowest animals
:

and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a to be learning something is the greatest of further fact
15

pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the
;

same time learning
that the

man

there

is

gathering the meaning of things, e. g. so-and-so for if one has not seen the
;

thing before, one s pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring
20 or

some

similar cause.

as also the sense of

Imitation, then, being natural to us harmony and rhythm, the metres being

obviously species of rhythms it was through their original aptitude, and by a series of improvements for the most part

gradual on their first efforts, that they created poetry out of their improvisations.
25 to

Poetry, however, soon broke up into two kinds according the differences of character in the individual poets; for

the graver among them would represent noble actions, and those of noble personages and the meaner sort the actions
;

of the ignoble.

The

latter

class

produced invectives

at

CHAPTER
first,

4

1448

just as others did

of no such

poem by

know panegyrics. of the pre-Homeric poets, though any

hymns and

We

there were probably
instances, however,
e. g.

many such writers among them may be found from Homer downwards,

;

his MargiteSy

and the similar poems of others.

In this

30

poetry of invective its natural fitness brought an iambic metre into use hence our present term iambic because iambs or invectives against one it was the metre of their
; ,

another.
of

The

result

them

writers
position,

of heroic

Homer s

was that the old poets became some and others of iambic verse. however, is peculiar: just as he was in
35

the serious style the poet of poets, standing alone not only through the literary excellence, but also through the

dramatic character of his imitations, so too he was the first to outline for us the general forms of Comedy by producing
not a dramatic invective, but a dramatic picture of the Ridiculous his Margites in fact stands in the same relation
;

to our comedies as the Iliad

and Odyssey

to our tragedies. 1449*

As

Tragedy and Comedy appeared in the field, those naturally drawn to the one line of poetry became writers of comedies instead of iambs, and those 5 naturally drawn to the other, writers of tragedies instead of epics, because these new modes of art were grander and of more esteem than the old.
soon, however, as
If
it

be asked whether Tragedy

is

now

all

that

in its formative elements, to consider that,

need be and decide it
it

theoretically

and

in relation to the theatres, is a

matter

for

another inquiry.
It certainly began in improvisations as did also Comedy the one originating with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs, which still survive as institutions in many of our cities. And its advance after
;

10

that was

little

by

little,

through their improving on what

ever they had before them at each stage. It was in fact only after a long series of changes that the movement of

Tragedy stopped on its attaining to its natural form. (1)15 The number of actors was first increased to two by Aeschylus, who curtailed the business of the Chorus, and

made

the dialogue, or spoken portion, take the leading part

H49

a

DE POETICA
in the play.
(2)

A

third actor

and scenery were due
its

to

20

Tragedy acquired also carding short stories and a ludicrous
Sophocles.
(3)

magnitude.

Disits

diction,

through

passing out of a late point in

its
its

satyric stage,

it

assumed, though only at
;

progress, a tone of dignity and its metre then from trochaic to iambic. The reason for changed their original use of the trochaic tetrameter was that their

poetry was satyric and more connected with dancing than it now is. As soon, however, as a spoken part came in,
nature herself found the appropriate metre. we know, is the most speakable of metres, as
the fact that

The
is

iambic,

25

shown by

we very often fall into it in conversation, whereas we rarely talk hexameters, and only when we depart from the speaking tone of voice. (4) Another
change was a plurality of episodes or acts. As for the remaining matters, the superadded embellishments and the account of their introduction, these must be taken as said, as it would probably be a long piece of work to go through
the details.

30

As for Comedy, it of men worse than

is (as

has been observed
;

l

)

an imitation 5

the average

worse, however, not as

regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or
35

deformity not productive of pain or harm to others the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.
;

the successive changes in Tragedy and their authors are not unknown, we cannot say the same of

Though
;

Comedy
I449 not
b

its

as yet taken
in
its

early stages passed unnoticed, because it was up in a serious way. It was only at a late

progress that a chorus of comedians was they used to be mere officially granted by the archon
point
;

volunteers.

It

had

also already certain definite forms at

the time
gins.

when
it

Who

or a plurality
5

the record of those termed comic poets be was who supplied it with masks, or prologues, of actors and the like, has remained unknown.

The

invented Fable, or Plot, however, originated in Sicily,

CHAPTER
;

5

I449

b

with Epicharmus and Phormis of Athenian poets Crates was the first to drop the Comedy of invective and frame
stories of a general

and non-personal nature,

in other words,

Fables or Plots.

Epic poetry, then, has been seen to agree with Tragedy to this extent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects 10
in

and which is due to its action having no fixed limit of time, whereas Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun, or something near that. This, I say, is another point of difference between them, though at first the practice in this respect was just the
that
;

a grand kind of verse. It differs from it, however, it is in one kind of verse and in narrative form

(i) in

(2) in its length

15

same

in tragedies as in epic

poems.

They

differ also (3) in

their constituents,

peculiar to

some being common to both and others Tragedy hence a judge of good and bad in
;

is a judge of that in epic poetry also. All the of an parts epic are included in Tragedy but those of are not all of them to be found in the Epic. Tragedy

Tragedy

6

Reserving hexameter poetry and
tion hereafter, 1 let
;

Comedy

for considera- ao

us proceed

now

to the discussion

of

Tragedy before doing so, however, we must gather up the A tragedy, definition resulting from what has been said. then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also,
as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with
25

pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work in a dramatic, not in a narrative
;

with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions. Here by

form

;

and by the kinds are worked out with separately I mean that some portions verse only, and others in turn with song.
;

language with pleasurable accessories rhythm and harmony or song superadded

I

mean

that with

30

I. As they act the stories, it follows that in the first place the Spectacle (or stage-appearance of the actors) must be some part of the whole and in the second Melody and
;

Diction, these two being the
1

means of their
f.
;

imitation.

Here
in the

lost

For hexameter poetry Second Book.

cf.

chap. 23

comedy was treated of

645-10

X

1449"

DE POETICA
(

I mean merely this, the composition of the and by Melody what is too completely understood But further the subject repre to require explanation. sented also is an action and the action involves agents, who must necessarily have their distinctive qualities both of character and thought, since it is from these that we a I45O ascribe certain qualities to their actions. There are in the natural order of things, therefore, two causes, Thought and

by

Diction
;

35 verses

,

:

;

Character, of their actions, and consequently of their success or failure in their lives. Now the action (that which was

done) is represented in the play by the Fable or Plot. The Fable, in our present sense of the term, is simply this, the combination of the incidents, or things done in the story
;

5

whereas Character
qualities to

what makes us ascribe certain moral the agents and Thought is shown in all they
is
;

say when proving a particular point or, it may be, enunciating a general truth. There are six parts consequently of every
tragedy, as a whole (that is) of such or such quality, viz. a Fable or Plot, Characters,, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, and Melody two of them arising from the means, one from
;

10

the manner, and three from the objects of the dramatic imitation and there is nothing else besides these six. Of
;

these,

its

formative

elements,
use, as

then,

not a few of

the
say,

dramatists have

made due

every play, one

may

15

admits of Spectacle, Character, Fable, Diction, Melody, and Thought. II. The most important of the six is the combination of the incidents of the story. Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action the end for which we live is a certain kind of
;

activity, not a quality.
is

Character gives us qualities, but
that

it

in

our actions

what we do

we

are

happy

or the

20 reverse.

In a play accordingly they do not act in order to they include the Characters for portray the Characters the sake of the action. So that it is the action in it, i.e. its
;

Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of the tragedy and the end is everywhere the chief thing. Besides this, a tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be

;

CHAPTER

6

I450
25

a

one without Character. The tragedies of most of the moderns are characterless a defect common among poets of all kinds, and with its counterpart in painting in Zeuxis
for whereas the compared with Polygnotus in is devoid of the of Zeuxis work character, strong

as

;

latter is
it.

And

again may string together a series of characteristic speeches of the utmost finish as regards Diction and Thought, and yet fail to produce the true tragic effect but 30
: ;

one

have much better success with a tragedy which, however inferior in these respects, has a Plot, a combination

one

will

of incidents, in it. And again the most powerful elements of attraction in Tragedy, the Peripeties and Discoveries, are further proof is in the fact that beparts of the Plot.
:

A

35

ginners succeed earlier with the Diction and Characters than with the construction of a story ; and the same may

be said of nearly all the early dramatists. maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and soul, so to

We

Tragedy is the Plot and that the Characters b compare the parallel in painting, where the !45O most beautiful colours laid on without order will not give one the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch
speak, of
;

come second

of a portrait. We maintain that Tragedy is primarily an imitation of action, and that it is mainly for the sake of the
it imitates the personal agents. Third comes the element of Thought, i.e. the power of saying whatever can be said, or what is appropriate to the occasion. This

action that

5

is

Politics

what, in the speeches in Tragedy, falls under the arts of and Rhetoric for the older poets make their
;

personages discourse like statesmen, and the moderns like rhetoricians. One must not confuse it with Character.
Character
in

a play

is

that which reveals the moral purpose

of the agents, i.e. the sort of thing they seek or avoid, where that is not obvious hence there is no room for Character
in

a speech on a purely indifferent subject.
is

the other hand,

shown

in all

Thought, on they say when proving or

10

some particular point, or enunciating some universal proposition. Fourth among the literary elements 1 is the Diction of the personages, i.e., as before explained,
disproving
1

I449 34X 2

b

b

I45o

DE POETICA
the expression of their thoughts in words, which is practically the same thing with verse as with prose. As for the two

15

remaining parts, the Melody
able accessories
attraction, to
is

is

the greatest of the pleasur

of Tragedy.
art of poetry.

The
all

the least artistic of

Spectacle, though an the parts, and has least
tragic effect
is
;

do with the

The

quite

and possible without a public performance and actors is a the more matter of the besides, Spectacle getting-up
20 for

the costumier than the poet.

Having thus distinguished the parts, let us now consider 7 the proper construction of the Fable or Plot, as that is at once the first and the most important thing in Tragedy.

We
25

action that
;

it down that a tragedy is an imitation of an complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude for a whole may be of no magnitude to speak of. Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end.

have

laid
is

A

30

35

that which is not itself necessarily after which has naturally something else after and anything else, an end is that which is naturally after something itself, it either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it. A well-constructed Plot, therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes beginning and end in it must be of the forms just described. Again to be beautiful, a living creature, and whole made up of parts, must not only present every a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of

beginning

is

;

;

;

:

a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order, and therefore impossible either (i) in a very
it

minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as or (2) in a creature of vast approaches instantaneity
;

size
a

one, say, 1,000 miles long

as in that case, instead of

I45i the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder. Just in the same way, then, as a beautiful whole made up of parts, or a beautiful living
creature,
5

must be

of

some

size,

the eye, so a story or Plot must be of a length to be taken in by the memory.

but a size to be taken in by some length, but of

As

for the limit of

CHAPTER

7

I

45 r

its length, so far as that is relative to public performances and spectators, it does not fall within the theory of poetry. If they had to perform a hundred tragedies, they would be timed by water-clocks, as they are said to have been at one

however, set by the actual nature of the the longer the story, consistently with its 10 being comprehensible as a whole, the finer it is by reason of its magnitude. As a rough general formula, a length
period.
limit,

The
this

thing

is

:

c

which allows of the hero passing by a series of probable or necessary stages from misfortune to happiness, or from
happiness to misfortune magnitude of the story.
,

may

suffice

as a limit for

the
15

8

The Unity
in its

of a Plot does not consist, as

some suppose,

having one man as its subject. An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity and in like manner there are many actions
;

one man which cannot be made to form one action. One sees, therefore, the mistake of all the poets who have
of

20

written

a Heracleid, a Theseid, or similar poems they suppose that, because Heracles was one man, the story also of Heracles must be one story. Homer, however, evidently
;

just in the

understood this point quite well, whether by art or instinct, same way as he excels the rest in every other In writing an Odyssey he did not make the poem respect.
,

cover
to get

all

that ever befell his hero

it

befell him, for instance, 25

also to feign madness at the time of the call to arms, but the two incidents had no

wounded on Parnassus and

necessary or probable connexion with one another instead of doing that, he took as the subject of the Odyssey, as also
of the Iliad, an action with a Unity of the kind we are The truth is that, just as in the other imitative 30 describing.
arts

one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action,
a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence
is

no

real part of the whole.

35

a

I45i

DE POETICA
From what we have
function
is

be seen that the poet s 9 to describe, not the thing that has happened, but
said
it

will

a kind of thing that might happen,
or

i.

e.

what

is

possible as

The distinction between necessary. being probable 1451** historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse you might put the work of Herodotus into
verse,
still be a species of history it consists the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry
it
;

and

would

really in this, that

5

is

something more philosophic and of graver import than
statements are of the nature rather of

history, since its

universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such

a kind of
is

to

man will probably or necessarily say or do which the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters by a singular statement, one as to what, say,
;

Alcibiades did or had done to him.

In

Comedy

this

has
is

become
already

clear

by

this

time

;

it

is

only when their plot

of probable incidents that they give it a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any
5

made up

1

names that may occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about particular persons. In Tragedy, still adhere to the historic names and for however, they
;

this reason

:

what convinces

is

the possible

;

now whereas

are not yet sure as to the possibility of that which has happened, that which has happened is manifestly Nevertheless possible, else it would not have come to pass.

we

not

20

in Tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being inventions and there are some without a single known name, e. g. Agathon s Antheus,\i\ which both incidents and names are of the poet s So invention and it is no less delightful on that account.

even

;

;

25

aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories on which tragedies are based. It would be absurd, in fact, to do so, as even the known stories are only known to a few, though they are a delight none the less
to
all.

that one must not

from the above that the poet must be more the poet of his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch
It is evident

CHAPTER
as he
is

9

1451*

and

it

is

a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, actions that he imitates. And if he should come

to take a subject from actual history, he is none the less a poet for that since some historic occurrences may very 30 well be in the probable and possible order of things and it
;
;

is

I

them that he is their poet. Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst. call a Plot episodic when there is neither probability nor
in that aspect of

sort

Actions of this 35 necessity in the sequence of its episodes. bad poets construct through their own fault, and good

ones on account of the players. His work being for public performance, a good poet often stretches out a Plot beyond its capabilities, and is thus obliged to twist the sequence of
incident.
a Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete I452 Such action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear.

incidents have the very greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in con

sequence of one another there is more of the marvellous in them then than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if
;

5

there

is

an appearance of design as
falling

it

were

in

them

;

as for

instance the statue of Mitys at

Argos

killed the author of

Mitys death by

a public spectacle ; for not without a meaning.

down on him when a looker-on at incidents like that we think to be

A

Plot, therefore, of this sort

is 10

necessarily finer than others.

10

Plots are either simple or complex, since the actions they represent are naturally of this twofold description. The action, proceeding in the way defined, as one continuous

15

whole, I call simple, when the change in the hero s fortunes takes place without Peripety or Discovery and complex, when it involves one or the other, or both. These should
;

each of them arise out of the structure of the Plot
as
to

itself,

so

be the consequence, necessary or probable, of the antecedents. There is a great difference between a thing

20

happening propter hoc and post hoc.
II

A

Peripety

is

the change of the kind described from one

u

i452

DE POETICA
opposite, and that too are saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of events as it is for instance in Oedipus here the opposite state of things is produced by the Messenger,
state of things within the play to
in
its

the

way we

25

:

;

who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to remove
to his mother,

his fears as

reveals the secret of his birth. 1
is

And

in

Lynceus:

2

just as he
his

Danaus
30

at

being led ofT for execution, with side to put him to death, the incidents
it

preceding this bring

about that he

is

saved and Danaus

put to death. Discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either
fortune.

A

iove or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil The finest form of Discovery is one attended by
Peripeties,
like that which goes with the Discovery in There are no doubt other forms of it what we
;

Oedipus.

35

have said may happen in a way in reference to inanimate things, even things of a very casual kind; and it is also possible to discover whether some one has done or not done something. But the form most directly connected with the Plot and the action of the piece is the first-mentioned.
This,,

b

I452

with a Peripety, will arouse either pity or fear
is

actions
;

of that nature being what Tragedy

and

it

to represent will also serve to bring about the happy or unhappy

assumed

5

ending. The Discovery, then, being of persons, it may be that of one party only to the other, the latter being already known or both the parties may have to discover themselves.
;

Iphigenia, for instance,

the letter

3
;

was discovered to Orestes by sending and another Discovery was required to reveal

to Iphigenia. parts of the Plot, then, Peripety and Discovery, are 10 on matters of this sort. third part is Suffering; which

him

Two

A

we may define

as an action of a destructive or painful nature,

such as murders on the stage, tortures, woundings, and the like. The other two have been already explained.

The
*5 in

parts of

Tragedy

to be treated as formative elements 12

From the whole were mentioned in a previous Chapter. 4 the point of view, however, of its quantity, i. e. the separate
1

(9.

T. 911-1085.
6.

2

By

3

Theoflectes.

Iph. Taur. 727

ff.

4

Ch.

CHAPTER
sections into

12

b

I452

which

parts

Prologue, these two are distinguished into Parode and Stasimon common to all tragedies, whereas songs from the stage and Commoe are only found in some. The Prologue is all that 20
:

divided, a tragedy has the following Episode, Exode, and a choral portion,
it is
;

precedes the Parode of the chorus

comes
that

in

an Episode all that between two whole choral songs the Exode all
;

;

In the choral song. the whole of the Parode is the first statement portion chorus a Stasimon, a song of the chorus without anapaests or trochees a Commas, a lamentation sung by chorus and
follows
after

the last choral

;

;

actor in

concert.

The
in

formative elements
tioned
;

parts of Tragedy to be used as the whole we have already men

25

the above are its parts from the point of view of its quantity, or the separate sections into which it is divided.
13

The next
these: (j)
avoid, in

What

points after what we have said above will be is the poet to aim at, and what is he to

constructing his Plots ? and (2) What are the conditions on which the tragic effect depends ? assume that, for the finest form of Tragedy, the Plot

We

3

must be not simple but complex

;

and

further, that

it

must

imitate actions arousing fear and pity, since that is the distinctive function of this kind of imitation. It follows,
therefore, that there are three forms of Plot to be avoided,
(i)

to

good man must not be seen passing from happiness misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness.
not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply is the most untragic that can be has no one of the requisites of Tragedy it does not
first

A

The
it

situation

is

35

odious to us.

The second

;

;

appeal either to the human feeling in us, or to our pity, or a to our fears. Nor, on the other hand, should (3) an I453 extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into
misery.

Such a story may arouse the human
will

feeling in us,
;

but

it

not

move
;

us to either pity or fear

pity

is 5

occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that ol one like ourselves so that there will be nothing either or There remains, piteous fear-inspiring in the situation.
then, the intermediate kind of personage, a

man

not pre-

I 4 53

a

DE POETICA
eminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some

10 error

of judgement, of the

number of those
;

in the

enjoyment

of great reputation and prosperity e. g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the men of note of similar families. The perfect Plot,
accordingly, must have a single, and not (as some tell us) a double issue the change in the hero s fortunes must be
;

15

not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in

any depravity, but

in

some great

error on his part

;

the

man

better, not worse,

himself being either such as we have described, or than that. Fact also confirms our theory.
accepting any tragic story that the finest tragedies are always houses, on that of Alcmeon,

20

Though the poets began by came to hand, in these days on the story of some few

Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or any others that may have been involved, as either agents or The theoretically best sufferers, in some deed of horror.
tragedy, then, has a Plot of this description. The critics, therefore, are wrong who blame Euripides for taking this line in his tragedies, and giving many of them an unhappy
It is, as ending. best proof is this

25

we have
:

said, the right line to take.
in the public

The

on the stage, and

perform

ances, such plays, properly

worked

out, are seen to be the
if

most truly tragic

;

and Euripides, even

his execution

be

faulty in every other point, is seen to be nevertheless the After this comes 30 most tragic certainly of the dramatists. the construction of Plot which some rank first, one with

a double story (like the Odyssey) and an opposite issue for It is ranked as first only the good and the bad personages. the poets merely weakness of audiences the the through
;

35

But the follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate. rather to is It not that of Tragedy. pleasure here belongs Comedy, where the bitterest enemies in the piece (e. g.
Orestes and Aegisthus) walk off good friends at the end, with no slaying of any one by any one.

I

453

b

The

tragic
;

fear

Spectacle

but

and pity may be aroused by the 14 they may also be aroused by the very

CHAPTER
structure and

14

1453

which is the better incidents of the play in fact should be Plot The and shows the better poet. way so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and pity at the incidents which is just the effect that the mere recital of the story in Oedipus would have
;

5

on one.

To produce

this

Spectacle is less artistic, Those, however, who make use of the Spectacle to put before us that which is merely monstrous and not pro ductive of fear, are wholly out of touch with Tragedy; not

same effect by means of the and requires extraneous aid.

10

every kind of pleasure should be required of a tragedy, but

only

its

own proper

The

tragic pleasure

has to produce it fore, that the causes should be included in the incidents of
;

pleasure. is that of pity and fear, and the poet by a work of imitation it is clear, there

his story. Let us see, then, what kinds of incident strike one as horrible, or rather as piteous. In a deed of this description the parties must necessarily be either friends, or

15

Now when enemy enemies, or indifferent to one another. does it on enemy, there is nothing to move us to pity either in his doing or in his meditating the deed, except so far as
the actual pain of the sufferer is concerned and the same is true when the parties are indifferent to one another.
;

Whenever the tragic deed, however, is done within the family when murder or the like is done or meditated by brother on brother, by son on father, by mother on son, or
son on mother
after.

20

these are the situations the poet should seek

The
are, e.

they

traditional stories, accordingly, must be kept as g. the murder of Clytaemnestra by Orestes and

of Eriphyle by Alcmeon. At the same time even with these there is something left to the poet himself; it is for him to devise the right way of treating them. Let us

25

explain more clearly what we mean by the right way The deed of horror may be done by the doer knowingly
.

and consciously, as

in the old poets,

and

in

Medea s murder
3

of her children in Euripides. 1 Or he may do it, but in ignorance of his relationship, and discover that afterwards,
1

Med.

1236.

b

I453
as

DE POETICA
does the

Oedipus
;

in
it

outside the play

but

Here the deed is Sophocles. may be within it, like the act of

35

Alcmeon in Astydamas, or that of the Telegonus in A third possibility is for one meditating Ulysses Wounded} some deadly injury to another, in ignorance of his relation These ship, to make the discovery in time to draw back.
the

exhaust the

possibilities,

be either done or not
unknowingly. The worst situation
is

must necessarily and either done, knowingly or
since the deed

when

the personage

is

with

full

H54

5

knowledge on the point of doing the deed, and leaves it undone. It is odious and also (through the absence of hence it is that no one is made to act suffering) untragic thus except in some few instances, e. g. Haemon and Creon in Antigone* Next after this comes the actual A better situation perpetration of the deed meditated. than that, however, is for the deed to be done in ignorance, and the relationship discovered afterwards, since there is nothing odious in it, and the Discovery will serve to astound us. But the best of all is the last what we have in Cresphontes? for example, where Merope, on the point of slaying her son, recognizes him in time in Iphigenia^ where sister and brother are in a like position and in Helle^ where the son recognizes his mother, when on the point of giving
; ;
;

;

10

her up to her enemy. This will explain why our tragedies are restricted (as we said just now) 5 to such a small number of families. It was
accident
rather than
art that
this kind

subjects to

embody

led the poets in quest of of incident in their Plots.

They

are

still

obliged, accordingly, to have recourse to the

families in

On
15

which such horrors have occurred. the construction of the Plot, and the kind of Plot

required for Tragedy, enough has

now been

said.
at.

In the Characters there are four points to aim

First 15

and foremost, that they
element of character
in

shall

be good.

There

will

be an

what a
1

the play, if (as has been observed) 6 personage says or does reveals a certain moral
2 *

4

Perhaps by Sophocles. Authorship unknown.

1231. a I453 19

1.

By
6

Euripides.
b 8.

I45o

CHAPTER
purpose
;

a

15

I454

and a good element of character, if the purpose is good. Such goodness is possible in every in a woman or a slave, though the of even type personage, one is perhaps an inferior, and the other a wholly worthless The second point is to make them appropriate. being.
so revealed

20

The Character
appropriate
in

before us

may

be, say,

manly

;

but

it

is

not

The
the

third

is

a female Character to be manly, or clever. to make them like the reality, which is not
35

as their being good and appropriate, in our sense The fourth is to make them consistent and of the term.

same

the same throughout; even if inconsistency be part of the man before one for imitation as presenting that form of character, he should still be consistently inconsistent.

We

have an instance of baseness of character, not required for the story, in the Menelaus in Orestes of the incongruous and unbefitting in the lamentation of Ulysses in Scylla^ and 2 in the (clever) speech of Melanippe; and of inconsistency in Iphigenia at Aulis? where Iphigenia the suppliant is
;

3

is

The right thing, however, utterly unlike the later Iphigenia. in the Characters just as in the incidents of the play to
endeavour always after the necessary or the probable so that whenever such-and-such a personage says or does such-and;

35

such a thing, it shall be the necessary or probable outcome of his character and whenever this incident follows on that, it
;

be either the necessary or the probable consequence of it. From this one sees (to digress for a moment) that b the Denouement also should arise out of the plot itself, and I454 not depend on a stage -artifice, as in Medea* or in the story of the (arrested) departure of the Greeks in the Iliad. 5
shall

The

artifice

must be reserved

for

matters outside the play

beyond human knowledge, or events yet since to come, which require to be foretold or announced There it is the privilege of the Gods to know everything.
for past events
;

5

should be nothing improbable among the actual incidents. If it be unavoidable, however, it should be outside the
tragedy, like the improbability in the Oedipus of Sophocles. But to return to the Characters. As Tragedy is an imita1

A
11.

=

dithyramb by Timotheus.
I2II
ff.,

2

(Euripides).
6
1.

3

1368

4
ff.

1317.

ii.

155.

b

I454

DE POETICA
tion of personages better than the ordinary man, we in our way should follow the example of good portrait- painters,

10

who reproduce the distinctive features of a man, and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer than he is. The poet in like manner, in
portraying
as such,

men quick

or slow to

15

must know and at the same time as good men, as Agathon and Homer have represented Achilles. All these rules one must keep in mind throughout, and,
infirmities of character,
further, those also for

anger, or with similar how to represent them

depend on the

art

may

often

make

such points of stage-effect as directly of the poet, since in these too one mistakes. Enough, however, has been

said on the subject in one of our published writings. 1

20

has been explained already. 2 As 16 for the species of Discovery, the first to be noted is (i) the least artistic form of it, of which the poets make most use

Discovery

in general

through mere lack of invention, Discovery by signs or marks. Of these signs some are congenital, like the lance-

head which the Earth-born have on them

3
,

or

c

stars

,

such

as Carcinus brings in his Thyestes\ others acquired after birth these latter being either marks on the body, e. g.
scars, or external tokens, like necklaces, or (to take
25

another

sort of instance) the ark in the Discovery in Tyro.* these, however, admit of two uses, a better and a

Even
worse
;

the scar of Ulysses

is

an instance

through

it is

made

in

6 by the swineherds.

A

one way by Discovery using signs as a means of
as indeed are all such as imply re
in
all

the Discovery of him the nurse 5 and in another
;

assurance
flection
;

is less artistic,

whereas one bringing them
Bath-story?
is

of a sudden,
after these

30 as in the

of a better order.

Next
;

are (2) Discoveries made directly by the poet which are e. g. Orestes inartistic for that very reason Discovery of
;

is

himself in Iphigenia whereas his sister reveals who she 8 by the letter, Orestes is made to say himself what the
:

35

9 poet rather than the story demands.
1

This, therefore,
2

is

not

In the lost dialogue

On
7

Poets.
4

3 6 9

Authorship unknown. Od. xxi. 205-25. Ib., 800 ff.

By

Euripides.
8

I452 29. 5 Od. xix.

a

386-475.
ff.

Od.

xix. 392.

Iph. Taur. 727

CHAPTER

16

H54

b

far removed from the first-mentioned fault, since he might have presented certain tokens as well. Another instance
is

the

shuttle s voice
is

in

the Tereus of Sophocles.

(3)

A

third species

Discovery through memory, from a

man s

Thus I455 a consciousness being awakened by something seen. in The Cyprioe of Dicaeogenes, the sight of the picture and in the Tale of makes the man burst into tears
;

Alcinous? hearing the harper Ulysses

is

reminded of the past
result.
;

and weeps

;

the Discovery of
is
2
;

them being the
;

(4)

A
me
5

fourth kind

Choephoroe but Orestes

One

Discovery through reasoning like me is here there is no one

e. g.

in

The

like

;

he, therefore,

must be here.

Or
;

that which
it

Polyidus the Sophist suggested for Iphigenia
natural for Orestes to reflect
:

since

was

My
3

sister

was

sacrificed,

and

I

am

to be sacrificed like her.
:

Or

of Theodectes
myself.

I

came

to find a son,

that in the Tydetis and am to die
10

women

on seeing the place the inferred their fate, that they were to die there, since
that in

Or

The Phinidae-.

they had also been exposed there. (5) There is, too, a composite Discovery arising from bad reasoning on the
side of the other party. An instance of it is in Ulysses the False Messenger 3 he said he should know the bow which
:

but to suppose from that that he would again (as though he had once seen it) was bad reasoning. (6) The best of all Discoveries, however, is that arising from the incidents themselves, when the great

he had not seen

;

15

know

it

surprise comes about through a probable incident, like that 4 in the Oedipus of Sophocles ; and also in Iphigenia for it
;

was not improbable that she should wish to have a letter taken home. These last are the only Discoveries inde Next after pendent of the artifice of signs and necklaces. them come Discoveries through reasoning.
17

20

time when he is constructing his Plots, and on the Diction in which they are worked out, the engaged
the

At

poet should remember (i) to put the actual scenes as far as In this way, seeing everything possible before his eyes. with the vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will
1

25

Od.

viii.

521

ff.

(cf. viii.

2

83

ff.).
4

11.

168-234.

8

Authorship unknown.

Iph. Taur. 582.

I455

a

D ^ POETICA
devise

what

is

appropriate, and be least likely to overlook

incongruities.

This

is

Carcinus, the return of

shown by what was censured Amphiaraus from the sanctuary

in
;

it

would have passed unnoticed, if it had not been actually seen by the audience but on the stage his play failed, the
;

incongruity of the incident offending the spectators. (2) As far as may be, too, the poet should even act his story
30

with the very gestures of his personages. Given the same natural qualifications, he who feels the emotions to be
described will be the most convincing distress and anger, for instance, are portrayed most truthfully by one who is
;

Hence it is that poetry feeling them at the moment. demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him the former can easily assume
;

the required mood, and the latter may be actually beside himself with emotion. (3) His story, again, whether already

made
out

or of his

own making, he should

first

simplify and
it

re duce to a universal form, before

proceeding to lengthen

by the insertion of episodes. The following will show how the universal element in Iphigenia^ for instance, may be

5

A certain maiden having been offered in sacrifice, and spirited away from her sacrificers into another land, where the custom was to sacrifice all strangers to the Goddess, she was made there the priestess of this rite.
viewed
:

Long come

after that the brother of the priestess
;

happened

to

the

fact,

however, of the oracle having for a certain

outside the
arrested,

reason bidden him go thither, and his object in going, are Plot of the play. On his coming he was

and about to be

sacrificed,

when he

revealed

10

it, or (as suggested by Polyidus) by the not improbable exclamation, So I too am doomed to be sacrificed, as my sister was and the

who he was

either as Euripides puts

;

This done, the next thing, after the proper names have been fixed as a basis for the
disclosure led to his salvation.
story,
is to work in episodes or accessory incidents. One must mind, however, that the episodes are appropriate, like the fit of madness l in Orestes, which led to his arrest, and the purifying, 2 which brought about his salvation. In plays,
1

i

5

iph. Taur.

281.

2
ff.

Ib.,

1163

ff.

CHAPTER
;

17

in epic poetry they serve then, the episodes are short to lengthen out the poem. The argument of the Odyssey is

certain man has been abroad many is Poseidon on the watch for him, and he is ever years; all alone. Matters at home too have come to this, that his

not a long one.

A

substance

is

suitors to his wife.

being wasted and his son s death plotted by Then he arrives there himself after his
;

ao

grievous sufferings: reveals himself, and falls on his enemies and the end is his salvation and their death. This being all
that
is

proper to the Odyssey, everything else in

it

is

episode.
18
(4)

There
is

is

a further point to be borne in mind.

Every
;

part Complication and in part Denouement the incidents before the opening scene, and often certain

tragedy

in

also of those within the play, forming the Complication

;

and the rest the Denouement. By Complication I mean all from the beginning of the story to the point just before
the change in the hero
s

25

fortunes

;

by Denouement,

all

from

the beginning of the change to the end. In the Lynceus of Theodectes, for instance, the Complication includes, together 30 with the presupposed incidents, the seizure of the child

and that in turn of the parents and the Denouement all from the indictment for the murder to the end. Now it I456 a is right, when one speaks of a tragedy as the same or not the same as another, to do so on the ground before all else of their Plot, e. as having the same or not the same Yet there are many Complication and Denouement.
;

7

i.

a good Complication, fail in the Denouement. But it is necessary for both points of con b struction to be always duly mastered. (5) There are four I455 32 that being the number of the distinct species of Tragedy constituents also that have been mentioned l first, the complex Tragedy, which is all Peripety and Discovery second, the Tragedy of suffering, e. g. the Ajaxes and Ixions third, the Tragedy of character, e. g. The Phthiotides* and 1456*
: ;

dramatists who, after

;

Peleus?
1

The

fourth

constituent

is

that

of

Spectacle

,

2

This does not agree with anything actually said before. 3 Probably Sophocles Peleus is incorrect. By Sophocles.

I456

a

DE POETICA
exemplified in The Phorcides? in Prometheus f and in all The poet s plays with the scene laid in the nether world. aim, then, should be to combine every element of interest,
if possible, or else the more important and the major part of them. This is now especially necessary owing to the

unfair criticism to which the poet
5

is

Just because there have been poets before him strong

subjected in these days. in the

several species of tragedy, the critics now expect the one man to surpass that which was the strong point of each one
10

of his predecessors.

(6)

One should

also

remember what

has been said more than once, 3 and not write a tragedy on an epic body of incident (i.e. one with a plurality of
stories in
it),

entire story of the Iliad.

i

5

every part is ever, on the same story the result
is

to dramatize, for instance, the In the epic owing to its scale treated at proper length with a drama, how-

by attempting

;

is

shown by the
its

fact that all

who

very disappointing. This have dramatized the fall

and not part by part, like Euripides, or the whole of the Niobe story, instead of a portion, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or have but ill success on the for that and that alone was enough to ruin even stage a play by Agathon. Yet in their Peripeties, as also in their
of Ilium in
entirety,
;

20

simple plots, the poets I mean show wonderful skill in a tragic situation .aiming at the kind of effect they desire
that arouses the
(e.

feeling in one, like the clever villain g. Sisyphus) deceived, or the brave wrongdoer worsted.

human

25

is probable, however, only in Agathon s sense, when he speaks of the probability of even improbabilities coming to pass. (7) The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors it should be an integral part of the whole,

This

;

and lake a share

in the action that which it has in Sophocles, rather than in Euripides. With the later poets, however, the songs in a play of theirs have no more to do with the Plot

of that than of
are
30

any other tragedy.

Hence

it

is

that they
intro-

now

singing intercalary pieces, a practice

first

duced by Agathon. And yet what real difference is there between singing such intercalary pieces, and attempting
1

3

A

By

Probably a satyric Aeschylus. loose reference to i449 b 12, I455 b 15.

2

drama by Aeschylus.

CHAPTER
to
fit

19

I

45 6

a

in

a speech, or even a whole act, from one play
?

into another
J

9

The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains to consider the Diction and Thought. As for the Thought, we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric, 1 as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry. The Thought of the personages is
in everything to be effected by their language in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like), or to maximize or minimize

35

shown

things.

It is clear, also,

that their mental procedure must

be on the same

lines in their actions likewise,

whenever

they wish them to arouse pity or horror, or to have a look of importance or probability. The only difference is that with the act the impression has to be made without ex
planation; whereas with the spoken word it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his language. What, indeed, would be the good of the speaker, if things appeared in the required light even apart from anything he

5

says?

As
this
e.

head

regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry untfer is the turns given to the language when spoken
;

prayer, simple 10 statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution
g.

the difference between

command and

and the professors of that

art.

Whether the poet knows
15

these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously What fault can one see in criticized on that account.

of the wrath, Goddess ? which Protagoras has criticized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a

Homer s Sing

command.
another
art,

Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to and not to that of poetry.
20

20

Diction viewed as a whole is made up of the following parts the Letter (or ultimate element), the Syllable, the Conjunction, the Article, the Noun, the Verb, the Case, and the Speech, (i) The Letter is an indivisible sound of

The

:

1

Cf. especially Rhet. 1356* I.

Y

2

I4

56

b

DE POETICA
a particular kind, one that may become a factor in an Indivisible sounds are uttered by the intelligible sound.
brutes also, but no one of these is a Letter in our sense of the term. These elementary sounds are either vowels, semi

25

vowel is a Letter having an audible vowels, or mutes. semi sound without the addition of another Letter.

A

A

vowel, one having an audible sound by the addition of e. g. S and R. another Letter mute, one having no
;

A

but becoming audible by an addition, that of one of the Letters which have a sound of some

sound

at all

by

itself,

30 sort of their

own
:

;

e.g.

G

and D.

The

Letters differ in

various

ways

as produced

different regions of the

by mouth as
;

different conformations or in

aspirated, not aspirated, or
;

sometimes one and sometimes the other as long, short, or of variable quantity and further as having an acute, grave,
;

or intermediate accent.

The

details of these matters
(2)

we

must leave
35 significant

to the metricians.

composite sound, made a sound for GR, without an having (a vowel or semivowel) as much a is as A, GRA, with an A. The just Syllable
;

Syllable is a nonof a mute and a Letter up

A

various forms of the Syllable also belong to the theory of metre. Conjunction is (a) a non-significant sound (3) a J 457 which, when one significant sound is formable out of several,

A

neither hinders nor aids the union, and which, if the Speech thus formed stands by itself (apart from other Speeches), must not be inserted at the beginning of it e. g. ^r, 677, roi,
;

6e.
5

Or (b) a non-significant sound capable two or more significant sounds into one e. g.
;

of combining d/^t, Tre/n, &c.

10

a non-significant sound marking the be or ginning, end, dividing-point of a Speech, its natural place either at the extremities or in the middle. being (5)
(4)

An

Article

is

A

Noun or name is a composite significant sound not involving the idea of time, with parts which have no significance by themselves in it. It is to be remembered that in a compound
we do not
by themselves; in the
5o>/>oz;

think of the parts as having a significance also name Theodorus for instance, the
,

i

ft

is a composite (6) sound idea of the time, with parts significant involving which (just as in the Noun) have no significance by them-

means nothing

to us.

A

Verb

CHAPTER
selves in
*

20

I457

a

Whereas the word man or white does not imply when, walks and has walked involve in addition
it.

to the idea of walking that of time present or time past. Case of a Noun or Verb is when the word means of (7)

A
;

or

to

and
*

a thing, and so forth, or for one or many (e. g. man 20 men ) or it may consist merely in the mode of
{

;

utterance,

Walk

!

Walked ? and question, command, &c. are Cases of the verb to walk of this last kind.
e. g. in
*

Speech is a composite significant sound, some of the parts of which have a certain significance by themselves.
(8)

A

It may be observed that a Speech is not always made up of Noun and Verb it may be without a Verb, like the defini- 25 tion of man but it will always have some part with a
;
;

certain significance
*

by

itself.

In the Speech

*

Cleon walks

,

Speech is said to be one in two ways, either as signifying one thing, or as a union of several Speeches made into one by conjunction. Thus the Iliad is one Speech by conjunction of several and the definition of man is one through its signifying one
is
;

Cleon

an instance of such a part.

A

3

thing.

21

Nouns

are of two kinds, either

(i)

up either of a significant and a non-significant part (a distinction which disappears in the compound), or of two significant parts. It is possible also to have triple, quadruple, or higher compounds, like most of our amplified names e. g. Hermocaicoxanthus and the like. Whatever its structure, a Noun must always be either (i) the ordinary word for the thing, or (2) a strange word,
;

non-significant parts, like the word latter case the word may be made

yfj,

simple, i.e. made up of or (2) double; in the

35

1457**

or (3) a metaphor, or (4) an ornamental word, or (5) a coined word, or (6) a word lengthened out, or (7) curtailed, or (8)

By the ordinary word I mean that in in use a country and by a strange word, one in use general the same word may obviously be at once So that elsewhere. strange and ordinary, though not in reference to the same
altered in form.
;

5

people

;

o-Cyvvov, for instance, is

an ordinary word

in

Cyprus,

and a strange word with

us.

Metaphor

consists in giving

b

I457

DE POETICA
the thing a name that belongs to something else the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds
;

10

of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in Here stands my ship 1 for lying at anchor is the standing of a particular kind of thing. That from species to genus
c

j

2 Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought where ten thousand which is a particular large number,

in

*

,

,

is

put in place of the generic

species to species in
in
15

That from a large number 3 and life with the bronze the Drawing
.
,

Severing with the enduring bronze uses draw in the sense of sever and
,

3
;

where the poet
in that of

sever

draw both words meaning to take away something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four
terms so related that the second (B)
;

is

to the

first

(A), as

the fourth (D) to the third (C) for one may then meta in Now and lieu B in lieu of D. of and B, phorically put

D

ac

then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup

(B)

Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the shield of Dionysus (D+A), and the shield as the cup of Ares * (B + C). Or to take another
is

in relation to

As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day (A). One will accordingly describe evening (B) as the old age of the day (D + A) or by the Empedoclean
instance
:

equivalent
25
6
///<?

;

and old age (D) as the evening
It

5

or

(B

+ C).

may

be that some of the
their

sunset of terms thus
for all that

related have

no special name of
is

own, but
the
;

same way. but to cast sowing forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless act (B), however, stands in just the same
they will be metaphorically described
in just

Thus

to cast forth seed-corn

called

relation to

its

object, sunlight (A), as

seed-corn (C).
30

around a
1
"

Hence the expression in the poet, 7 god-created flame (D + A). There is
185, xxiv. 308.
2

sowing (D) to the sowing
also an-

Od.

i.

//.

ii.

272.

4 6

Empedocles, KaQappoi (cf. fr. 143, Diels). 5 Timotheus, fr. 22, Wilamowitz. Alexis, fr. 228, Kock. 7 unknown. PI., Laws 770 A. Authorship

CHAPTER

21

1458*

other form of qualified metaphor. Having given the thing the alien name, one may by a negative addition deny of it

An

one of the attributes naturally associated with its new name. instance of this would be to call the shield not the cup
,

of Ares wine
.

as in the former case, but a
.

cup that holds no

which, being quite given by the poet himself; e.g. (for there are some words that seem to be of this origin)
.
.

A

coined word
a people,

is

a

name

unknown among

is

cpw-ycs for horns,

and

aprjrrip for priest.
it
;

1

A

word

is

said to 35

be lengthened out, when an extra syllable inserted
for IIri\tibov.
;

has a short vowel
e.g.
iro Arjos

made
it

long, or 1458*

for TroAew?, rir^iadeco

It is said to
6o>,

be curtailed, when
in
fj.(a

has lost
It
is
5

a part e. g. K/H, is an altered word, the poet s making

and
e.

1

ov//

ytVercu ap-tyoTtptov oty?

when
;

part

is left

as

it

was and part

of

g. SefirepoV for 6ef tor, in Sef irepoz- Kara

The Nouns themselves
long)
are
either

(to

whatever class they
feminines,

may

be

masculines,

or intermediates

All ending in N, P, 2, or in the two compounds (neuter). All ending in the 10 of this last, ^ and E, are masculines.
invariably

long vowels,

H

and

12,

and

in

A among

the

may be long, are feminines. So that there is an equal number of masculine and feminine terminations, as * and E are the same as 2, and need not be counted.
vowels that

There

no Noun, however, ending in a mute or in either of the two short vowels, E and O. Only three (/xeOu, KO /UJU, T. The intermediates, or in in I, and five ireTrepi) end
is

15

neuters, end in the variable vowels or in N,

P,

2.

22

The perfection of Diction is for not mean. The clearest indeed
ordinary words
for things,

it

to be at once clear and

is

that

but

it is

mean, as

made up of is shown by

the
the 20

the Cleophon and Sthenelus. On the other hand use the and Diction becomes distinguished non-prosaic by

poetry of

of unfamiliar terms,

i.e. strange words, metaphors, length ened forms, and everything that deviates from the ordinary modes of speech. But a whole statement in such terms

will

be either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle,
1

if

made up

25

//.

i.

ii.

2

Emp.

fr.

88, Diels.

3

//. v.

393.

I458

a

DE POETICA
The very
in

of metaphors, a barbarism, if made up of strange words. nature indeed of a riddle is this, to describe a fact

an impossible combination of words (which cannot be done with the real names for things, but can be with their
metaphorical substitutes) another with fire \ l and the
;

e.g.
like.

I

saw a man glue brass on

30

The corresponding

use of

certain admixture, strange words results in a barbarism. of unfamiliar terms is These, the accordingly, necessary.

A

strange word, the metaphor, the ornamental equivalent, &c., will save the language from seeming mean and prosaic,

while the ordinary words

in

it

will secure the requisite clear-

I458

b ness -

What helps most, however, to render the Diction at once clear and non-prosaic is the use of the lengthened, curtailed, and altered forms of words. Their deviation from
the ordinary words will, that in general use, give
their

by making the language unlike
it

having much
it

in

common

a non-prosaic appearance and with the words in general use
;

5

will give

the quality of clearness.

It is

not right, then, to

modes of speech, and ridicule the poet for condemn e. g. the elder Euclid, who using them, as some have done said it was easy to make poetry if one were to be allowed to lengthen the words in the statement itself as much as
these
;

a procedure he caricatured by reading 10 tlbov Ma/oa0o>ya6e fiabi&i Ta, and OVK. av y epa/iez-o? roz; t too apparent use of these licences \\{3opov as verses.

one

%

likes

A

has certainly a ludicrous effect, but they are not alone in that the rule of moderation applies to all the constituents
;

even with metaphors, strange of the poetic vocabulary words, and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses
;

15

them improperly and with a view to provoking laughter. The proper use of them is a very different thing. To
realize the difference

one should take an epic verse and see
are introduced.

how

it

reads

when the normal words

The
the

same should be done too with the strange word,
;

metaphor, and the rest for one has only to put the ordinary words in their place to see the truth of what we are saying. The same iambic, for instance, is found in Aeschylus and Euripides, and as it stands in the former it is a poor line
;

1

Cleobulina,

fr. I,

Bergk.

CHAPTER
substitution of a strange for

22

1458
20

whereas Euripides, by the change of a single word, the

what

is

by usage the ordinary
Aeschylus having said
1

word, has

made

it
:

seem a

fine one.

in his Philcctetes

fyay&aiva

rj

IJLOV

o-apKdj eo-0it TroSo s,
eo-0iei

Euripides has merely altered the

here into OoivaTai. 2

Or suppose
vvv 5e

^
//

&v dAiyoj

re KCU

ovnbavbs KCU

3

aeiK?jy

25

to be altered,
VVV
<$

by the

substitution of the ordinary words, into
T
Kttl

f(*)V [JLLKpOS

a(T0l}tKOS K

Or the

line T

into
bi(f>pov

jjio^6iip6v
5

Karadtls
r]io re?

fjLLKpdv re

TpaTT^av.

3

Or

rjiovts

poowo-iv

into

Kpa&vcnv.

Add

to this that

Ariphrades used to ridicule the tragedians for introducing expressions unknown in the language of common life,
rcoz^ O.TTO

(for

0,770

6d)/xcir0

)j

cre^ez^,

eyco 8e z^i^

A^iAAecos

AxiAAeW), and the like. The mere fact of 1459* their not being in ordinary speech gives the Diction a nonbut Ariphrades was unaware of that. prosaic character
(for we/ol
;

It is a great thing, indeed, to

poetical forms, as also of

a proper use of these compounds and strange words.
5

make

But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. and It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an
;

intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.

Of

the kinds of words

we have enumerated
in place in the

it

may be

observed that compounds are most

strange words in heroic, and metaphors in Heroic poetry, indeed, may avail itself of them

dithyramb, iambic poetry.
all.

But

in 10

iambic verse, which models itself as far as possible on the spoken language, only those kinds of words are in place

which are allowable also in an oration, i. e. the ordinary word, the metaphor, and the ornamental equivalent.
1

Nauck,

4

2 Od. ix. 515. 7\ G. F*, p. 81. Ib., p. 618. 5 Od. xx. 259. //. xvii. 265. Soph., O. C., 986.

3

H59

a

DE POETIC A
an account of Tragedy, the imitating by means of action on the stage.
Let
this, then, suffice as

15

art

As
that
I.

for the

poetry which merely narrates, or imitates by 23

means of
it

language (without action), it is evident has several points in common with Tragedy. The construction of its stories should clearly be like
versified
;

ao

drama they should be based on a single action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to produce its
that in a

own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living creature. Nor should one suppose that there is anything
like

them
to

in

our usual histories.

A

with one action, but with one period and
in that

history has to deal not all that happened

several events
35

one or more persons, however disconnected the may have been. Just as two events may
e. g.

take place at the same time,

and the battle with the Carthaginians

the sea-fight off Salamis in Sicily, without

converging to the same end, so too of two consecutive events one may sometimes come after the other with no

one end as their
epic poets, one
3

common issue. Nevertheless most may say, ignore the distinction.

of our

Herein, then, to repeat what we have said before, we have a further proof of Homer s marvellous superiority to the rest. He did not attempt to deal even with the Trojan
1

35

though it was a whole with a definite beginning and end through a feeling apparently that it was too long a story to be taken in in one view, or if not that, too complicated from the variety of incident in it. As it is, he has singled out one section of the whole many of
in
its

war

entirety,

;

the other incidents, however, he brings in as episodes, using the Catalogue of the Ships, for instance, and other episodes to relieve the uniformity of his narrative. As for the other
or else of epic poets, they treat of one man, or one period an action which, although one, has a multiplicity of parts b I459 in it. This last is what the authors of the Cypria* and Little Iliad- have done. And the result is that, whereas the Iliad
;

1

145

1

a

"

23

ft".

Authorship unknown.

CHAPTER

24

]

459

b

or Odyssey supplies materials for only one, or at most two tragedies, the Cypria does that for several and the Little

Iliad for
a

Philoctete$)
,

Beggar
Troy.

for an Adjttdgment of Arms, eight a Neoptolemus^ a Eurypylus, a Ulysses as a Laconian Women, a Fall of Ilium, and a De
: ;

more than

5

parture of the Fleet

as also a Sinon, and a

Women

of

24

II.

Besides

this,

Epic poetry must divide into the same
;

it must be either simple or complex, species as Tragedy a story of character or one of suffering. Its parts, too, with

the exception of Song and Spectacle, must be the same, as requires Peripeties, Discoveries, and scenes of suffering just like Tragedy. Lastly, the Thought and Diction in it
it

10

must be good

Homer
poems

first

;

in their way. All these elements appear in and he has made due use of them. His two

are each examples of construction, the Iliad simple and a story of suffering, the Odyssey complex (there is Discovery throughout it) and a story of character. And

15

they are more than

this, since in

Diction and Thought too

they surpass

other poems. There is, however, a difference in the Epic as compared with Tragedy, (i) in its length, and (2) in its metre, (i) As
all

to

its

length, the limit already suggested
for the

J

will suffice

:

it

beginning and end of the work to be in in one view a condition which will be fulfilled if 20 taken the poem be shorter than the old epics, and about as long For the as the series of tragedies offered for one hearing.

must be possible

extension of

its

length epic poetry has a special advantage,

makes large use. In a play one cannot represent an action with a number of parts going on simultaneously one is limited to the part on the stage and connected with the actors. Whereas in epic poetry the narrative form makes it possible for one to describe a number of simul taneous incidents and these, if germane to the subject,
of which
it
; ;

25

increase the

body of the poem.
give
it

This then

Epic, tending to
interest

grandeur, and

a gain to the also variety of
is

and room

for episodes of diverse kinds.

Uniformity

3

I46o

a

DE POETICA
of incident

by the satiety tragedies on the stage. (2)
it

it

soon creates

is

apt to ruin

As

for its metre, the heroic
;

has

been assigned
a narrative

from experience

were any one to attempt

35

poem in some one, or in several, of the other metres, the incongruity of the thing would be apparent. The heroic in fact is the gravest and weightiest of metres which is what makes it more tolerant than the rest of
strange words and metaphors, that also being a point in which the narrative form of poetry goes beyond all others. The iambic and trochaic, on the other hand, arc metres of

movement, the one representing that of life and action, the I46o other that of the dance. Still more unnatural would it appear, if one were to write an epic in a medley of metres, Hence it is that no one has ever as Chaeremon did. 1
a

written a long story in any but heroic verse nature herself, as we have said, 2 teaches us to select the metre appropriate
;

to such a story.
5

Homer, admirable

as

he

is

in

every other respect,

is

especially so in this, that he alone among epic poets is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the

poem. The poet should say very little in propria persona, as he is no imitator when doing that. Whereas the other are in forward poets perpetually coming person, and say but and that here and as there, little, imitators, Homer only
10

after a brief preface brings in forthwith a

some other Character

man, a woman, or no one of them characterless, but

each with distinctive characteristics.
marvellous is certainly required in Tragedy. The affords more opening for the improbable, however, Epic, the chief factor in the marvellous, because in it the agents are not visibly before one. The scene of the pursuit of
15

The

Hector would be ridiculous on the stage the Greeks halt ing instead of pursuing him, and Achilles shaking his head
to stop

them

3
;

but in the

poem

the absurdity

is

overlooked.

The
by

marvellous, however, is a cause of pleasure, as is shown the fact that we all tell a story with additions, in the

belief that

we

Homer more
1

are doing our hearers a pleasure. than any other has taught the rest of us the
b I447 2i.
2 3

Centaur,

cf.

1449*24.

//. xxii.

205.

CHAPTER
art of

24

I

4 6o

a

framing

paralogism. B, is or happens,
is

the right way. I mean the use of *o if is or Whenever, happens, a consequent,
lies

in

A

men s notion
is

is

that, if the

B

is,

the

but that
but

is

a false conclusion.

Accordingly,
else,

if

A also A
is

untrue,

there

something

B,

that

on the

assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right thing then is to add on the B. Just because we know the
truth of the consequent, we are in our own minds led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the antecedent.

Here

is

an instance, from the Bath-story
is

A
in

likely impossibility

vincing possibility.

Odyssey^ always preferable to an uncon The story should never be made up of
;

in the

25

improbable incidents there should be nothing of the sort it. If, however, such incidents are unavoidable, they should be outside the piece, like the hero s ignorance in
like the report of the

Oedipus of the circumstances of Laius death not within it, 30 Pythian games in Electra? or the man s having come to Mysia from Tegea without uttering
;

a word on the way, in The Mysians? So that it is ridiculous to say that one s Plot would have been spoilt without them, If since it is fundamentally wrong to make up such Plots.
the poet has taken such a Plot, however, and one sees that he might have put it in a more probable form, he is guilty of absurdity as well as a fault of art. Even in the Odyssey

35

the improbabilities in the setting-ashore of Ulysses 4 would be clearly intolerable in the hands of an inferior poet. As I46o b it is, the poet conceals them, his other excellences veiling
their absurdity.
in places

Elaborate Diction, however,

is

required

where there is no action, and no Character only or Thought to be revealed. Where there is Character or on an over-ornate Diction tends the other hand, Thought,
to obscure them.
5

25

As
the

number and nature by viewing The poet being an
xix.
xiii.

regards Problems and their Solutions, one may see of the assumptions on which they

proceed
(i)

maker
1 4

the matter in the following way. imitator just like the painter or other of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances
2

164-260.
ii6ff.

Soph. El. 660

3

ff.

Probably by Aeschylus.

I46o

b

DE POETICA
represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to

10

have been, or as they ought to

be.

(2)

All this he does in

language, with an admixture, it may be, of strange words and metaphors, as also of the various modified forms of

words, since the use of these
is

is

conceded
is

to

be remembered,

too, that there

in poetry. (3) It not the same kind of

T

5

There

correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other art. is, however, within the limits of poetry itself a possi

bility of

two kinds of

error, the

one directly, the other only

If the poet meant to accidentally connected with the art. describe the thing correctly, and failed through lack of power of expression, his art itself is at fault. But if it was

through his having meant to describe

way
legs
20

(e.

g. to

make

the horse in

it in some incorrect movement have both right

thrown
of,

a matter

forward) that say, medicine or

the

technical

error

(one

in

some other
is

special science), or
be,

impossibilities of whatever kind they his description, his error in that case

may

have got into

not in the essentials

of the poetic art. These, therefore, must be the premisses of the Solutions in answer to the criticisms involved in the

Problems.
I.

As

Any

to the criticisms relating to the poet s art itself. impossibilities there may be in his descriptions of

25

But from another point of view they are justifiable, they serve the end of poetry itself if (to assume what we have said of that end) 1 they make the effect of either that very portion of the work or some other portion more astounding. The Pursuit of Hector is an instance in If, however, the poetic end might have been as well point.
things are faults.
if

or better attained without sacrifice of technical correctness
in such matters, the impossibility is not to be justified, since the description should be, if it can, entirely free from error. One may ask, too, whether the error is in a matter directly

3

or only accidentally connected with the poetic art since it is a lesser error in an artist not to know, for instance, that
;

the hind has no horns, than to produce an unrecognizable picture of one.
>

I455

a

J

CHAPTER
II.

25
criticized as

1460*
not true to

If the poet s description

be

fact, may urge perhaps that the object ought to be as described an answer like that of Sophocles, who said that

one

he drew
were.

men

as they ought to be, and Euripides as they

If the description, however, be neither true nor of 35
it ought to be, the answer must be then, that it accordance with opinion. The tales about Gods, for

the thing as
is in

instance,

may be

as

wrong

as

Xenophanes
;

1

thinks,

neither

true nor the better thing to say

accordance with opinion. Of may perhaps say, not that they are better than the e. truth, but that the fact was so at the time g. the descrip

but they are certainly in other statements in poetry

one

;

tion of the

arms
2
.

:

their spears stood upright, butt-end

the ground
then, as
it

;

for that

upon was the usual way of fixing them

is

still

with the Illyrians.

As

for the question

whether something said or done in a poem is morally right or not, in dealing with that one should consider not only
the intrinsic quality of the actual word or deed, but also the person who says or does it, the person to whom he says or

5

does

it,

whether he does
a greater evil.
III.

the time, the means, and the motive of the agent it to attain a greater good, or to avoid

Other criticisms one must meet by considering the language of the poet: (i) by the assumption of a strange word in a passage like ovpijas IMV irp&Tov* where by ovpijas Homer may perhaps mean not mules but sentinels. And
saying of Dolon, 6s p r) rot ing may perhaps be, not that Dolon
in
eI6"os
/zei>

J0

s

mean body was deformed,
erjv

KaKo s, 4 his

but that his face was ugly, as

eve 187/9 is

the Cretan word for
5

handsome-faced.
not
it

mix

So, too, faportpov 8e Ke pcue may the wine stronger as though for topers, but
,

mean mix
*

15

quicker

.

(2)

Other expressions
;

in

Homer may be

explained as metaphorical e. g. in aAAot jueV pa 0eot re KCU G avtp$ fvbov (airavTcs) T7ari>v\Loi, as compared with what he tells us at the same time, r] rot 6V es jrcbiov TO TpuiKov aOprj7 the word a?raz;res, all is (Ttifv, avk&v avpC-yytov fre opabovf
,

,

metaphorically put for
1 5

many
//. x.
ii.

,

since
3

all
//.

is

a species of
4

//. ix.

Fr. 10-12, Diels. 6 202. Cf.

2

152.
r.
7

i.

50.

//.

x.3i6.

//. x. i,

//. x.

11-13.

I46i

a

DE POETICA
many known
.

20

So

also his
;

otr;

5
.

a^opos
(3)

standing

alone

Thasos suggested, in the mode the difficulty in SiSojucr 8e oi, 2 and in ro ptv ov Kara7rv0erai 3 o/z/3/)w. (4) Other difficulties may be solved by another
punctuation
25 irplv {JidOov
;

metaphorical, the best change, as Hippias of of reading a word will solve
is

l

A

e.

g. in

Empedocles,
a>pd

cux/m 6e Qvr\r* tyvovro, ra
4

aOavara

T

irplv

KCK/j^ro.

Or

(5)

by the
e

assumption of an equivocal term, as in TrapuyyKtv
5
z>vf,

TrXeco

where TrA&o (6) by equivocal. and custom of language. Wine-and-water we call wine it is on the same principle that Homer speaks of a Kvrjius voTVKTov Ka.(T(TLTtpoio, 6 3. greave of new-wrought tin worker in iron we call a brazier and it is on the same
is
;
.

Oi

an appeal to the

A

;

principle that

Ganymede

is

described as the
wine.

wine-server

7 30 of Zeus, though the

Gods do not drink

This

latter,

however,
also

may

a

word

be an instance of metaphor. But whenever seems to imply some contradiction, it is

standing
p

necessary to reflect how many ways there may be of under it in the passage in question e.g. in Homer s rjj
;

s one should consider the possible *(r\TO xa^Keor eyxs whether by taking it in this senses of was stopped there
*

35

sense or in that one will best avoid the fault of which

b

I46i

Glaucon speaks They start with some improbable pre and sumption having so decreed it themselves, proceed to draw inferences, and censure the poet as though he had actually said whatever they happen to believe, if his state
: ;

ment

conflicts

with their

own

notion of things.

This

is

how Homer s
5

been treated. Start ing with the notion of his having been a Lacedaemonian, the critics think it strange for Telemachus not to have met
silence about Icarius has

him when he went to Lacedaemon. Whereas the fact may have been as the Cephallenians say, that the wife of Ulysses was of a Cephallenian family, and that her father s name
was Icadius, not
Icarius.

So

that

it is

probably a mistake

of the critics that has given rise to the Problem. Speaking generally, one has to justify (i) the Impossible
1

//. xviii.

489=0*.
7

v. 275.
4

2

Cf.

Soph.

EL

i66 b

I 5

;

//.

ii.

15.

3 6

//. xxiii. 327. //. xxi. 592.

//.

Fr. 35. 14-15 Diels. 8 xx. 234. //. xx. 267.

//. x.

251.

CHAPTER
by

25

1461*
10

reference to the requirements of poetry, or to the better, For the purposes of poetry a convincing or to opinion. impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility
;

and if men such as Zeuxis depicted be impossible, the answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the artist ought to improve on his model. (2) The Improbable one has to justify either by showing it to be in accordance with opinion, or by urging that at times it is not improbable for there is a probability of things happening also against
;

probability.

(3)

The

contradictions
first

found

in

the poet

s 15 s

language one should

test as

one does an opponent

confutation in a dialectical argument, so as to see whether he means the same thing, in the same relation, and in the

he has contradicted either or what a man of sound himself he said has something sense assumes as true. But there is no possible apology
sense, before admitting that
for improbability of Plot or depravity of character, when they are not necessary and no use is made of them, like the 20

same

improbability in the appearance of Aegeus the baseness of Menelaus in Orestes.

in

Medea l and

The
kinds
:

objections, then, of critics start with faults of five the allegation is always that something is either (i)

impossible, (2) improbable, (3) corrupting, (4) contradictory, The answers to these or (5) against technical correctness.

objections must be sought under one or other of the abovementioned heads, which arc twelve in number.

2

5

26

question may be raised whether the epic or the It may be argued tragic is the higher form of imitation. that, if the less vulgar is the higher, and the less vulgar is

The

always that which addresses the better public, an art It addressing any and every one is of a very vulgar order.
a belief that their public cannot see the meaning, unless they add something themselves, that causes the perpetual
is

30

movements of the performers
rolling about,
if

bad

flute-players, for instance,

quoit-throwing
if

pulling at the conductor,

Tragedy, then,

is

to be represented, and the subject of the piece. Scylla this order to be in an art of said to be
is

is

1.

663.

b

I46i
fact just

DE POETICA
;

what the later actors were in the eyes of their predecessors for Mynniscus used to call Callippides the because he thought he so overacted his parts and 35 ape a similar view was taken of Pindarus also. All Tragedy, 1462**
, ;

however,
address

is

said to stand to the Epic as the

newer to the

older school of actors.
a cultivated

one, accordingly, is said to audience, which does not need the
;

The

5

accompaniment of gesture the other, an uncultivated one. If, therefore, Tragedy is a vulgar art, it must clearly be
lower than the Epic.

The answer

to this

is

twofold.

In the

first

place,

one

may

urge

(i)

that the censure does not touch the art of
;

the dramatic poet, but only that of his interpreter for it is quite possible to overdo the gesturing even in an epic recital, as did Sosistratus, and in a singing contest, as did

Mnasitheus of Opus. (2) That one should not condemn all movement, unless one means to condemn even the dance,

10

which is the point of the on Callippides and in the present day passed on others, that their women are not like gentlewomen. (3) That Tragedy may produce its effect even without move
but only that of ignoble people
criticism

ment or action in just the same way as Epic poetry for from the mere reading of a play its quality may be seen. So that, if it be superior in all other respects, this element of inferiority is no necessary part of it. In the second place, one must remember (i) that Tragedy
;

15

has everything that the Epic has (even the epic metre being admissible), together with a not inconsiderable addition in
the shape of the Music (a very real factor in the pleasure of the drama) and the Spectacle. (2) That its reality of in the as is felt read, as well as in the presentation play

play as acted. (3) That the tragic imitation requires less T462 space for the attainment of its end ; which is a great advantage, since the more concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one with a large admixture of time to
b

dilute

it

and the

effect of
(4)

consider the Oedipus of Sophocles, for instance, expanding it into the number of lines of

the Iliad.

That there
is

is

less

the epic poets, as

proved by

unity in the imitation of the fact that any one work

CHAPTER

26
;

1462
5

the result of theirs supplies matter for several tragedies a if single story, it being that, they take what is really

seems curt when briefly told, and thin and waterish when on the scale of length usual with their verse. In saying that there is less unity in an epic, I mean an epic made up of a plurality of actions, in the same way as the Iliad and Odyssey have many such parts, each one of them in itself of some magnitude yet the structure of the two Homeric poems is as perfect as can be, and the action in them is as If, then, Tragedy is superior nearly as possible one action. in these respects, and also, besides these, in its poetic effect
;

10

(since the

two forms of poetry should give

us,

not any or

every pleasure, but the very special kind
it is

we have mentioned),
,-

clear that, as attaining the poetic effect better than the
it

be the higher form of art. for these two for Tragedy and Epic poetry the number and nature arts in general and their species of their constituent parts the causes of success and failure in them; the Objections of the critics, and the Solutions in
Epic,
will

So much

;

;

answer to them.

INDEX
Accent, 56 33.
Achilles, 54
a

b

b

14.

i

Actors, 49 16, 5: 5o 19; 51 b 37; 56*26; 59 26; 6i 3 4 b Aegeus (Eurip.), 6i 21.
.

b

b

Aegisthus, 53 37a a Aeschylus, 49 16 56 17
;

a

Cleophon, 48* 12 58 20. b Clytaemnestra, 53 23b Comedians, 48* 37 49 i. b Comedy, 47* 14, 27 48* 17, 30 f., b 22 b 36; 49*2, 4, 10, 32, 38, b 5i l2; 53*36.
;
;

a

;

;

;

58
56

b

20,
1

22.
b Agathon, 5i 2i
;

54

b

14

a

;

8,
i

Aj axes,

24, 30.
a

$6 I. b Alcibiades, 5i u. a Alcinous, Tale of, 55
a

2.

Alcmeon, 53 2o; 24, a Amphiaraus, 55 27. b Analogy, 57 9, 16.
Anapaests, 52

b

33.

Anthens,

5i

b

24. 2i.

b

Antigone, 54 I. b Ares, 57 2i f., 32. a 48 15. Argas, lK Ariphrades, 58 3i. a Aristophanes, 48 27. b a Article, 56 2i 57 6. Aspirated, 56 32. b Astydamas, 53 33. a Athenian, Athenians, 48 36, b 49 7.
;

a

16, 32 b b 55 33l 59 9, *5b Complication, 5 5 24+ 56*9. a Compound (word), 57 l2, 32, 34; a 59 5, 9.Conjunction, 56^ 21, 38. Consistency, 54*26 f. b Crates, 49 7. Creon, 54* I. Cresphontes, 54* 5. Cretan, 61*14. a Cyclopses, 48 15. b 6; Cyprus, 57 Cyprioe (Dicaeob a genes), 55 i Cypria, 59 2, 4.
;
;

Commas, 52 18, 24. Complex (plot), 52*12,

b

b

;

Danaus, Dancing, 47* 27 6o a i 62* 9.
;

52* 28.

;

48

a

9

;

49
b

a

23;
;

b

i
;

Barbarism, 58 24 + b a Bath-story, 54 30 6o 26. b Beauty, 5o 37.
.

a

;

b Callippides, 6i 35
b
;

;

62 a
a

9.

Carcinus, 54 23 55 26. a b Case, 56 2i; 57 18, 22. b 28. Catharsis, 49 b Centaur, 47 21. b Cephallenians, 6i 6. b a Chaeremon, 47 21 6o 2. b a Character, 47*28; 48*2, 24; 5o + b 8f.j 54 a i6 + ,27, 2,5 + b b a a i3: 56 i; 59 9, 15; 6o n, b 3,5. a Chionides, 48 34. a Choephoroc, 55 4. b Choral, 52 16, 21 f. a a b Chorus,49 I7, i 52 19 + 56 25. b Clearness, 58* 18, 34, i, 5.
;
>i9

54* 37 55 24 + 56*9. Dicaeogenes, 55* i. b Diction, 49*19, 33f. 50*9, 14, a 13; 55 22; 56*34, 29, 36, b 8 + , 20; 58* 18, 21 59*3, b b i2, 16; 6o 3, 5. a Diliad, 48 i3. a Dionysius, 48 6. b Dionysus, 57 21 f. a 52*16, 29 + Discovery, 5o 34 b io f. b a a 54 4, i9 f 55 16,

Denouement,

;

;

])

;

;

,

;

.

;

b

34; 59
;

b

n,

15a

Dithyrambic poetry, 47 a a 48 14 49* 1 1 59 9*
;

14,

b

26

;

,

Dolon, 61* 12. Dorians, 48* 30.

Double plot, 53 a i3, Drama, 48* 28 56*
;

31.

15

;

59*

19.

Dramatic, 48

*

35, 37.
b

;

;

Earth-born, 54 22. Electra, 60*31. b Elegiacs, 47 1 2, 14.

INDEX
Elocution, 56

Empedocles,47

b 10. b

Imitation, 47
b

a

Epic, 47*13, 14; 49 b a 16 55 16; 56 11; 18 + 60*13; 6i b 26; 62 a
5>

b

iS; 57

24;6i
a

a

24.

b

9

+

l

;

8,

;

M,

b

2, 12,

4, 15

f.

Epicharmus, 48 33 49 6. a b b Episode, 49 28 52 16, 20; 55 b o. I3 + 23; 59^5 f., 3
;

a

b

;

i>

,

Episodic, 5i 33 f. b Eriphyle, 53 24b Euclid, 58 7. a b 28 b Euripides, 53 24, 29, 55 b b 9; 56*17,27; 58 2o; 6o 34 6l b 20.
;
;

b

1 8, 29; 4& 24, f., 35; b a b 49 io, 24; so i6, 3,24; 51* b a b 28; 52 2, 31, 33 53*12; a b a b 54 27, 8; 59 i5, 17; 6i 26; b 62 I, 4 a 7 : Iphigenia^ 55 Iphigenia b (Eurip.), 52 6 f. Iphigenia a b 32 (Eurip.), 54 7, 55** 18, b a 3 Iphigenia at Aulis, 54 32. a i. Ixions, 56
3>

a

i6, 22, b 8

b

i3, 15, 21,

;

.

:

;

:

Laconian Women, 59 b
a Laius, 6o 30. a a
;

6. b

Eurypyhis, b Exode, 52 i6,
Fear, 49
b I2. b

b 59 6.

21.
a b
a

27; 52 26,
.

i;

53

4f,

Language, 47 22 48 u; 49 25, b 28; 56^37, 6. b Letter, 56 2o + a b Lynceus, 52 27 55 29. a a Lyre-playing, 47 15, 24 48 10.
.

;

;

a Feminine, 58 8 + a a Flute-playing, 47 15, 24; 48 9 6i b 3i.

Madness, 55 a Magnes, 48
;

a

3334.
b
.

Ganymede,

b Glaucon, 6i

6i a 30.
i.

Haemon
29.

(Soph.), 54
;

a 2.

Margites, 4 8 30, 38. a a Marvellous, the, 52 4 6o 12 + a Masculine, S8 8 + a Mask, 49 36, b 4. b Medea, 53 29: Medea, 54 b i. a Megarians, 48 3i. a Melanippe, 54 3i.
;

.

a Harmony, 47 22 +

b 48 20

;

49

b

Mel eager, 53 a
b

20.
b

Melody, 47 25; 49
10, 14,

Hector,

6o a

Hegemon,

b 26. 15, a 48 12.
a

a Helle, 54 8.

Hermocaicoxanthus, 57 a Heradeid, 5i 2O.
Heracles, 5i
a

35.

Herodotus, 5i 2. Heroic (verse), 48 b 33; 59 a 10 f., b a 3 2, 34; 6o 3. a b Hexameter, 49 27, 21. a 22. 6i Hippias, b a History, 5i 3, 6 f 59 2i. b a Homer, 47 18 48 ii, 22, 26, b a b a 28f., 34; 5i 23; 54 i55 59 b a 31, i2; 6o s, 19. Hymns, 48 b 27.
.

22. b

Menelaus, 54 29; 6i 2i. a Merope, 54 5. b a Metaphor, 57 2, 6, 30; 58 22 + b a b i3, 17; 59 6, 10, 14, 35; 6o b 12 6i a 16 + 31. b Metre, 47 8, 13, 15, 17 f., 20, 22 a 21, 31 f.; 49 2i, 24 f.; $& b a 38; 59 i8, 32 f., 35; 62 i5. b Metricians, 56 34. b Mime, 47 10.
, ; , ;

b 16. a

33, 35; 5

a

b

48"

a Mitys, 52 8

f.

;

;

Mnasitheus, 62 7. a Music, 62 16. b a Mute, 56 26, 28 58 b Mynniscus, 6i 34. a Mysians, 6o 32.
;

a

14.

Iambic, 48 31, 33; 49 2l,25; 5i b b a 14; 5 i9; 59 io, 12, "37. 1 Iambs 48 b 32 49 a 4.
,

b

a

Names, 51*10,13,15,20; 55*13.
Narrative, 49
33, 36.
b Neoptolemus, 59 6. a Nicochares, 48 i3. a Niobe, 56 i7. b 26 Nomic b
1 1,

26

;

59 17,

a

b

26,

;

Icarius,

6i b
b

4, 8.

Iliad, 48
8.

38;

13,16;
Iliiim,

a 57 2 9
of,
4.

5^29;
;

54

b 2

a
;

Little Iliad, 5 9b 2,

59

b

3,

I4;6 2 b 3
5.

56

,

Fall

a Illyrians, 6i

59

b

poetry, 47

;

48
16

a
15.

6.

Noun, 56*21; 57
a 58 8

a

10,

+

,

*i;

+

.

INDEX
Odyssey, 49*1 51* 24, 29; 53*33 b b a b 55 i?; 59 3, I5;6o 35;62 9. a Oedipus, 53 11, 20: (Soph.), 53 b a 31: Oedipus (Soph.), 52 24 + b b a a 53 75 54 8; 55 i8; 6c 30 62 b 2.
;
; ; ;

47 22 b 48 2i; 49^29. a Riddle, 58 24 +

Rhythm,

a

f.,

26

b
f.,

25

;

.

Ridiculous,

the,

48

b

36

;

58

b
14.

37;

49 34,

a

Orestes, 53 2o, 37; (Eurip.), 52 b b h 6; 53 24j 54 3i; 55 a 5, 7, b a l4; Orestes (Eurip.), 54 2g.
Painter, 48 5 a b Painting, 5o 26, Parode, 52 17 + a Parodies, 48 13.
;
.

a

Salamis, 59 25.
a Satyric, 49 2o, 22,

a

a

6o b 8.
i.

Scenery, 49 18. b a Scylla, 6i 32 Scylla, 54 31. a b Sicily, 48 32 49 7.
:
;

a

Pauson, 48 6. a Peleus, 56 2. a a Peripety, 5O 34 52 15, 22, 33, b b a h 38, 95 55 345 56 i95 59
;

a

10.

(plot), 5i 335 5^ 12, 14, a a b 3i; 53 i3l 56 2o; 5 9 9, 14: a nouns, $7 31. Sinon, 59 7. a Sisyphus, 56 22. Socratic conversation, 47 b n. b b Song, 49 29, 31; 52 2i-3; 59^

Simple
b

b

a

Phallic songs, 49 a Philoc teles, 58 b 22
a

10.
1 1.
;

59

b
5.

Philoxenus, 48 15. a Phinidae, 55 10. Phorcides, 56* 2. Phormis, 49^6. Phthiotides, 56* I. b Pindarus, 6i 35. b a a Pity, 49 27; 52 38; 53 3, b b i2; s6 i. a b ii Pleasure, 48 i&; 53 36, a 62 a 16, b i3/ 59 2i a b Plot, 47 9; 49 5,9l
;

a a Sophocles, 48 26 49 i9; b a 3i; 54 8, 36; 55 i8;
;

53

b

Sophron, 47

b

10.
b a

a Sosistratus, 62 7.

Spectacle, 49 33 5o 10, 13, 16, h a b a 20; 53 i + 56 2; 59 io; 62
;

b

;

1 6.

5,

f.

;

32, 34, 38,

"32;

5i

a
5,
1

b

6,

i3,
b
9>

nf., 19. 37, a b b 29; 53 i2, 4; 54 i2,i4, i; a b a a 8; 56 8, 28; 6o 3 3 55 22, a b b Poetry, 47 8; 48 4, 23 f.; 5o i8; b b h a 5i 6, 10 54 i6; 55 33l 56 18 6o b 14; 6i b io f. a a Polygnotus, 48 5 5o 27.
33
f.,

3; u

52

a

Stage, 52 18; 53 27 ; 55 28; b 6oa 15. 59 2t b Stasimon, 52 17, 23. a Sthenelus, 5S 2i. a b Suffering, 47 28; 52^11; 55 3t; b 59 9, ii, 14a a Surprise, 54 4 55 17 60*25.
;
;

b

a

a

;

.

Syllable,

56"

21,
b

34,36;

58

a

2.

;

Telegonus, 53 33.
h Telemachus, 6i
5.

;

;

Polyidus, 55 Portrait-painters, 54 9a b Probability, 5i 12, 28, 38, 9, 13,
31,

a

b 10. 6, b

55

a

6o a 27

35; 52 2o, 24; 54 34>36; b a b i7, 19, io; 56 24, 4;
;

a

a

Telephus, 53 2i. b l^ereus, 54 36. a Tetrameter, 49 22. a Theatres, 49 9. a b Theodectes, 55 9, 29.
Theseid, 5i
;

a

a 20.
; 5

6i b 15.
,

b b Problems, 6o 6 + 22 6i 9. b b Prologue, 49 4 $2 16, 19. a Prometheus, 56 2. a a b Prose, 47 29 48 ii; 5o i5;
;

b a b Thought, 49 38 + 5o 3O, 4 b 56*34 + 59 i2, 16; 6o b 5. a

"5

;

;

5i

b i.

Protagoras, 56

b

15.

Quantitative parts, 52

b

15, 26.

Thyestes, 53 n, 21: Thyestes, b 54 23a Timotheus, 48 15. Traditional stories, 5l b 24; 53 b 22. b Tragedians, $8 32. a a a Tragedy, 47 13 49 5 5o 32 b a a 52 3i; 53 19,23, 351 59 i5; 62 a II.
;

;

;

Rhapsody, 47
b

b 22. a

Rhetoric, 5o 6; 56 35-

Tragic, 5o 3 o; 52 29; a b 30; 56 2i; 6i 26.

a

b

53

a

27,

INDEX
Trimeters, 47 n. a b Trochaic, 49 21 59 37. b Trochees, 52 24. b Troy, Women of, 59 7. a Tydeus, 55 9.
;

b

Verb, 56 21 57* 14, 19, 22 + a b b Verse, 47 29, 48*11; 49 25 10 f., 30, 35; 5o b i4; 51^1 f.,
;

b

.

;

28: 59*17. b Vowel, 56 25

;

58
of,

a
I,

ii, 15.
b

Words, kinds
Ugly, 49 34, 36. b b Ulysses, 54 26; 6i 7: (in Scyllti), a U. Wounded^ 53 b 34 54 30 U. Ihe False Messenger, 55 a 13. a a Unity, 5i i, 16 57*28; 59 19. b b b Universal, 5o 12; 5i 7 + 5S I.
:

57

i-f, 33

+

;

a

;

Xenarchus, 47 b 10. a Xenophanes, 6i I.
Zpuxis, 5o
a

;

;

27

f.

;

6l b 12

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B 407 .56 1910 v.ll SMC Aristotle. The works of Aristotle 47086883