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123807 December 13, 2005 Topic: Estoppel in Pais by Admission FACTS Plaintiffs, which are sister companies, contracted several loans from defendant DBP. As securities for said loans, plaintiffs mortgaged to defendant DBP several parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 136639, 136640, 136641, 134249 and 134252, with a total area of 44,321 square meters and their improvements, and the acrylic, spinning and finishing equipments. On June 30, 1986, the accounts of plaintiffs were transferred to defendant APT, but the Remedial Management Group of defendant DBP still handled the accounts for defendant APT. In a letter, dated August 20, 1987, defendant DBP informed plaintiffs-petitioners that the Central Bank, per their debt-equity swap arrangement, credited to its account P4,165,756.29, which amount was used to pay the remaining balance of plaintiffs, including additional charges thereon, amounting to P4,018,940.67 as of August 12, 1987; that the excess amount of P146,815.62 shall be refunded to plaintiffs by way of credit to the savings account to be set up for plaintiff Pacific Mills, Inc. with defendant DBP; and that the Legal Department of defendant DBP was preparing the necessary deed of cancellation of mortgage, which document would be released after the clearance of plaintiff’s accounts with the Transaction Processing department of defendant DBP. Thereafter, in the letter, dated October 5, 1987, plaintiffs, among other things, demanded from the latter to return the excess amount of P146,815.62, with interest. The claim for refund was referred by defendant DBP to the Central Bank for approval. However, per post-audit of plaintiffs’ accounts by the Commission on Audit, there existed an unpaid balance of P4,855,910.67. The statement of account of plaintiffs showed that as of August 12, 1987, the outstanding obligations of plaintiffs, after the debt-equity swap arrangement with the Central Bank, was P5,152,916.98, the amount determined after computation of the interests, advances and the payments made by the plaintiffs from 1985 to 1987. Due to the refusal of defendants to cancel the mortgages on the properties of plaintiffs, the latter instituted the present suit. ISSUE Whether or not the respondent DBP is already estopped from claiming that the obligation of the petitioners is not fully settled when it issued its letter dated August 20, 1987, therein admitting that the obligation was already paid and that there were excess payments made by the petitioners RULING No.
For estoppel to exist though, it is indispensable that there be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is sought to be bound. Nor is this all. It is equally a requisite that he, who would claim the benefits of such a principle, must have altered his position, having been so intentionally and deliberately led to comport himself thus, by what was declared or what was done or failed to be done. (Dizon v. Suntay, 29 September 1972) In estoppel by pais, as related to the party sought to be estopped, it is necessary that there be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual facts. (Laureano Investment and Development Corporation v. CA, 06 May 1997) In the instant case, it cannot be concluded that the private respondents are guilty of estoppel in pais for the requisites are not attendant. There was no false representation or concealment of any material fact on the part of the private respondents. There was likewise no intent to deceive the petitioners because the inaccuracy was admitted by the private respondents. During the time that the letter dated 20 August 1987 was sent by DBP to petitioners, the former had no knowledge that there was an error. The mistake in the computation, when discovered by DBP, was communicated and explained to the petitioners. The letter of DBP dated 20 August 1987, which supposedly declared that the obligations of petitioners have been fully complied with, was corrected by the former after a period of five (5) months only. This five-month period was devoted by DBP in processing all the clearances needed for the closure of petitioners’ accounts. It was during this time that the mistake in the computation was discovered during post audit adjustments. A letter dated 06 January 1988 was sent by DBP communicating to petitioners about the remaining balance still due from the latter. Further, it is clear from the third paragraph that the cancellation of the mortgages constituted in favor of defendant DBP was subject to the clearance or approval of plaintiffs’ accounts by the Transaction Processing Department (TPD). The latter’s approval can only be made after verification of the complete payment of the loans by plaintiffs. There was no clearance issued by TPD since it was found out later on that there was a mistake in the computation of the accounts of plaintiffs. Since there was no clearance, it could not be expected of DBP to release the Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage. The petitioners cannot capitalize on the unpremeditated mistake on the part of DBP in the computation of the accounts. In the same vein, DBP cannot be expected to cancel the mortgages when the accounts of petitioners have not been fully settled.
and the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to respondent PNB. as highest bidder. and (3) the party suffered detriment as a result. MENDOZA v. petitioner mortgaged to respondent PNB three parcels of land.R. In some jurisdictions. in order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel. Respondent PNB extra-judicially foreclosed the real and chattel mortgages. The promise must . COURT OF APPEALS. According to petitioner. he wrote a letter to respondent PNB requesting for the restructuring of his past due accounts into a five-year term loan and for an additional LC/TR line of P2. No. a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: (1) a promise reasonably expected to induce action or forebearance. his house and lot in Quezon City. 116710 June 25.000.DANILO D. and several pieces of machinery and equipment in his Pasig cocochemical plant. 2001 Topic: Estoppel in Pais by Promise FACTS As security for the credit accommodations acquired by petitioner. and for those which may thereinafter be granted. 1981. It is clear from the forgoing that the doctrine of promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of a promise on the part of one against whom estoppel is claimed.000. G. ISSUE Whether or not PNB is estopped denying the 5-year restructuring plan RULING No. (2) such promise did in fact induce such action or forebearance. There is nothing in the record that even suggests that respondent PNB assented to the alleged five-year restructure of petitioner’s overdue loan obligations to PNB. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is an exception to the general rule that a promise of future conduct does not constitute an estoppel. Petitioner failed to pay the subject 2 promissory notes as they fell due.00. they were made to believe that the blank promissory notes were to be filled out by respondent PNB to conform with the 5-year restructuring plan allegedly agreed upon. Petitioner made use of his LC/TR line to purchase raw materials from foreign importers. He signed a total of 11 documents denominated as "Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit" On March 9. Petitioner claimed he was forced to agree to these changes and that he was required to submit a new formal proposal and to sign 2 blank promissory notes.
Only an absolute and unqualified acceptance of a definite offer manifests the consent necessary to perfect a contract. two years after the completion of the port facilities and the commencement of TEFASCO's port operations. Banana exporters in Davao. like Stanfilco and Philippine Packing Corporation have signified their intentions to use the port. Main products to be handled initially will be bananas in the export trade and beer in the domestic traffic. Without the consent of TEFASCO. 7 accepting and approving TEFASCO's project proposal. therefore. those correspondences between the parties only prove that the parties had not gone beyond the preparation stage. For petitioner to claim that respondent PNB is estopped to deny the five-year restructuring plan. was compelled to submit an application for construction permit. If anything. 2002 Topic: Estoppel in Pais by Promise FACTS Sometime in 1975 TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for the construction of a specialized terminal complex with port facilities and a provision for port services in Davao City. 1976 Resolution No. there is no sufficient proof found that the subject 2 promissory notes were completed irregularly. Long after TEFASCO broke ground with massive infrastructure work. But apart from petitioner's self-serving verbal declarations. It will service domestic and foreign vessels. A cause of action for promissory estoppel does not lie where an alleged oral promise was conditional. among which is that they were to become due only after 5 years. As a result. he must first prove that respondent PNB had promised to approve the plan in exchange for the submission of the proposal. which is the period from the start of the negotiations until the moment just before the agreement of the parties Petitioner claims that the 2 subject promissory notes were signed by him in blank with the understanding that they were to be subsequently filled out to conform with his alleged oral agreements with PNB officials. The proposed project expects to get a 31% market slice. TERMINAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES CORPORATION v. Private transactions are presumed to be fair and regular. 135639 February 27. The burden of presenting evidence to overcome this presumption falls upon petitioner. without asking for one. It does not operate to create liability where it does not otherwise exist. Also. the doctrine does not apply to the case at bar. PPA . PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and PORT MANAGER G. On April 21. No such promise was proven.R. so that reliance upon it was not reasonable. the PPA Board curiously passed on October 1. the application imposed additional significant conditions. TEFASCO contracted dollar loans from private commercial institutions abroad and thereafter poured millions worth of investments in the process of building the port. 50 under which TEFASCO.be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so that the Judiciary can understand the obligation assumed and enforce the promise according to its terms. 1976 the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. No.
1976 and its enclosure HELD Yes. TEFASCO repeatedly asked PPA for extensions to pay these additional obligations and for reduction in the rates. TEFASCO sent a series of letters-protest to PPA. The complaint also sought to nullify the February 10. if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon. and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7. PPA Resolution No. But the PPA's response was final and non-negotiable statements of arrears and current accounts and threats of business closure in case of failure to pay them. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7.again issued to TEFASCO another permit under which more onerous conditions were foisted on TEFASCOs port operations. which included provisions that special services income be subjected to "government share" equivalent to ten percent (10%) thereof. resulting to a memorandum. 1976 Resolution No. TEFASCO complied with its obligation which ultimately resulted to the benefit of PPA. for reconsideration of its ultimatum leading to the execution of a memorandum of agreement. The terms and conditions binding TEFASCO are only those enumerated or mentioned in the inter-agency committee report. ISSUE Whether or not PPA is estopped from reneging on its commitments and covenants as exclusively contained in the inter-agency committee report. TEFASCO requested for the structuring of its account of P3. Estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though without consideration.5 million. and the idea has been expressed that such action or forbearance would reasonably have been expected by the promisor. And the PPA accepted the project as completed and authorized TEFASCO . 7 abovementioned. Subsequent exactions were made by PPA. 1984 MOA and all other PPA issuances modifying the terms and conditions of the April 21. and Port Officer in Davao City for refund of government share it had paid and for damages as a result of alleged illegal exaction from its clients of one hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees. The record shows that PPA made express representations to TEFASCO that it would authorize and support its port project under clear and categorical terms and conditions of an envisioned contract. 1988 TEFASCO sued PPA and PPA Port Manager. In the purported permit appeared for the first time the contentious provisions for 10% government share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income and 100% wharfage dues regardless of extent of use of private port facilities and 100% berthing charges on every foreign vessel docking at private wharves loading or discharging commercial or third-party cargoes. 1976 and its enclosure. TEFASCO received a cease and desist order of PPA for TEFASCO. On August 30. PPA Resolution No. issued by PPA General Manager. In this respect. to stop its commercial port operation. the reliance by the promisee is generally evidenced by action or forbearance on his part.
But even assuming arguendo that TEFASCO relied upon a mere privilege granted by PPA.D. It was not a mere privilege that PPA bestowed upon TEFASCO to construct a specialized terminal complex with port facilities and provide port services in Davao City under PPA Resolution No. 7 and the terms and conditions thereof. 1976 and its enclosure. the said documents stand to be the only source of obligations between the parties. the construction and operation of ports are subject to licensing regulations of the PPA as public utility. which is also the cause of consideration for the existence of the contract. the business opportunities for the former and the decongestion of port traffic in Davao City for the latter. recipients of privileges or largesses from the government could be said to have no property rights because they possessed no traditionally recognized proprietary interest therein. unreasonable and unfair for PPA to add new burdens and uncertainties into their agreement of which TEFASCO had no prior knowledge even in the context of regulation. Under these circumstances. It was a two-way advantage for both TEFASCO and PPA. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7. No. Under traditional form of property ownership. With such considerable amount of money spent in reliance upon the promises of PPA under Resolution No. enhance PPA's services. to obtain business opportunities for TEFASCO. the authorization for TEFASCO to build and operate the specialized terminal complex with port facilities assumed the character of a truly binding contract between the grantor and the grantee. on one hand. that is. the instant case did not arise out of pure beneficence on the part of the government where TEFASCO would be compelled to pay ordinary license and permit fees. However. still the terms and conditions between them as written in the documents approving TEFASCO's project proposal should indubitably remain the same. PPA is estopped from reneging on its commitments and covenants as exclusively contained in the inter-agency committee report. That being the case. it was arbitrary. With due consideration for the policy that laws of the land are written into every contract.to operate the same. . 7 and the terms and conditions thereof. PPA Resolution No. It is true that under P. and on the other. But the right-privilege dichotomy came to an end when courts realized that individuals should not be subjected to the unfettered whims of government officials to withhold privileges previously given them. 857 (1975) as amended. Rather. TEFASCO accepted and performed definite obligations requiring big investments that made up the valuable consideration of the project. the arrangement was envisioned to be mutually beneficial.
organized under Philippine laws Wako Enterprises Manila. On the basis of such letter. Yamamoto attempted to recover the machineries and equipment which were. Eventually. INC G. Doce) advised Yamamoto by letter dated October 30. by his claim. a corporation engaged principally in leather tanning. In paragraph 12 of the Letter. 1992 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a complaintagainst them for replevin. For this purpose negotiations were had between the parties.RYUICHI YAMAMOTO v. now known as Nishino Leather Industries. 2008 Topic: Estoppel in Pais by Promise FACTS In 1983. Ryuichi Yamamoto (Yamamoto). Doce (Atty. In the course of the negotiations. by Yamamoto's admission. (NLII). petitioner. NISHINO LEATHER INDUSTRIES. The corporate name of WAKO was later changed to. and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice. Respondents cannot now argue that they did not intend for Yamamoto to rely upon the Letter. 1991. drawing Yamamoto to file on January 15. Yamamoto was expressly advised that he could take out the Machinery if he wanted to so. one of herein respondents. Yoshinobu and Nishino's counsel Atty. No. RTC issued a writ of replevin. as reflected earlier. but he was frustrated by respondents. Inc. Ikuo and Yoshinobu wanted Yamamoto out of the Company. less than 10% according to Nishino. Incorporated (WAKO). That was the purpose of the Letter to begin with. part of his investment in the corporation. provided that the value of said machines would be deducted from his capital contribution. if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon. 10%. estoppel may arise from the making of a promise. Emmanuel G. reducing Yamamoto's investment therein to. relied upon said Letter and such reliance was . its current name NLII. ISSUE May PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL be claimed against the respondents? RULING No. Negotiations subsequently ensued in light of a planned takeover of NLII by Nishino who would buy-out the shares of stock of Yamamoto. Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.R. a Japanese national. Nishino and his brother Yoshinobu Nishino (Yoshinobu) acquired more than 70% of the authorized capital stock of WAKO. Petitioner in fact. even though without consideration. 150283 April 16.
No. Thereafter. thru Yao.000.00. both acting in behalf of Sanshell Corporation. NYCO SALES CORPORATION v. Nyco. a mere offer produces no obligation. ―in conditional obligations. the brothers Santiago and Renato Fernandez (hereinafter referred to as the Fernandezes).further strengthened during their meeting at the Manila Peninsula. endorsed the check in favor of BA Finance. the Fernandezes went to Yao for the purpose of discounting Sanshell's post-dated check for the amount of P60. to grant Sanshell discounting privileges which Nyco had with BA Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as BA Finance). the acquisition of rights. as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired. thus remained part of the capital property of the corporation. Without acceptance. no proof thereof having been presented. BA FINANCE CORPORATION G. 1991 Topic: Estoppel in Pais by Silence FACTS Petitioner Nyco Sales Corporation whose president and general manager is Rufino Yao. shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Yamamoto’s allegation that he agreed to the condition remained just that. namely. subject to his acceptance. which comprised Yamamoto’s investment in NLII. Following the discounting process agreed upon. soonest. Nyco was represented by Rufino Yao.R. Accompanying the exchange of checks was a Deed of Assignment executed by Nyco in favor of BA Finance with the conformity of Sanshell. BUT the aforementioned paragraph 12 of the letter is followed by a request for Yamamoto to give his ―comments on all the above.‖ What was thus proffered to Yamamoto was not a promise. his agreement to the deduction of their value from his capital contribution due him in the buy-out of his interests in NLII. 71694 August 16. BA Finance issued a check payable to Nyco which endorsed it in favor of Sanshell. while Sanshell was represented by the Fernandez brothers. hence on or about November 15. is engaged in the business of selling construction materials with principal office in Davao City. the subject of the discounting was the aforecited check. The machineries and equipment. approached Rufino Yao for credit accommodation. Under the said Deed. Yao apparently acquiesced. They requested Nyco. Sanshell then made use of and/or negotiated the check.‖ There is no showing of compliance with the condition for allowing Yamamoto to take the machineries and equipment. Under Article 1181 of the Civil Code. At the back thereof and of every deed of assignment was . The said check was payable to Nyco. To sanction respondents’ attempt to evade their obligation would be to sanction the perpetration of fraud and injustice against petitioner. thru Yao. but a mere offer. 1978. Sometime in 1978.
was dishonored by the drawee bank upon presentment for payment. Nyco. the sum of P65.00 as well as the costs of suit (Rollo. to have its answer admitted and to be able to implead Sanshell. Such effectively places Nyco under estoppel in pais which arises when one.the Continuing Suretyship Agreement whereby the Fernandezes unconditionally guaranteed to BA Finance the full. However. borrowing money. despite having been served with summons and copies of the complaint. however. Despite repeated demands. Nyco and the Fernandezes. 1979 for the same amount in favor of BA Finance. 1979 and attorney's fees in the amount of P3. ISSUE Whether or not Nyco is estopped from denying liability. Nyco remained silent in the course of the transaction and spoke out only later to escape liability. executing contracts and agreements. or by his silence when he ought to speak out. signing. Furthermore. This cannot be countenanced. 1980. induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief. .67 plus 14% interest per annum from July 1. It was a Security Bank and Trust Company check bearing the number 183157. posing the argument that it never authorized its president.000. which include. the lower court ruled in favor of BA Finance ordering them to pay the former jointly and severally. On May 16. faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness of Nyco . 51-52). by his acts. there was already a previous transaction of discounting of checks involving the same personalities wherein any enabling resolution from Nyco was dispensed with and yet BA Finance was able to collect from Nyco and Sanshell was able to discharge its own undertakings. Nyco is estopped from denying Rufino Yao's authority as far as the latter's transactions with BA Finance are concerned. moved to set aside the order of default. The BPI check. Yao to enter into such transaction with BA Finance RULING Yes. Its corporate By-Laws clearly provide for the powers of its President.536. so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. intentionally or through culpable negligence. Nyco disowns its President's acts claiming that it never authorized Rufino Yao (Nyco's President) to even apply to BA Finance for credit accommodation. Nyco and the Fernandezes failed to settle the obligation with BA Finance. It supports its argument with the fact that it did not issue a Board resolution giving Yao such authority. the very evidence on record readily belies Nyco's contention. failed to file their answer and were consequently declared in default. pp. representations or admissions. however. thus prompting the latter to institute an action in court. inter alia. which was again dishonored when it was presented for payment. indorsing and delivering checks. BA Finance immediately reported the matter to the Fernandezes who thereupon issued a substitute check dated February 19. all in behalf of the corporation.
A statement of account for P376. No.000. Clearly. intentionally or through culpable negligence. 1997 Topic: Estoppel in Pais by Silence FACTS On 23 September 1986 respondent Contractors Equipment Corporation (CEC) instituted an action for a sum of money against petitioner Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation (RICC) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati alleging that in 1985 it leased to the latter various construction equipment which it used in its projects. the Court finds that the agreement does reflect the true intention of both parties. Aller Jr.COURT OF APPEALS G. On 24 July 1986 Mariano R.38.38. 909. nor did it question neither the validity nor the contents of the Agreement.909. or by his own silence when he ought to speak out. Traversing the allegations of respondent. on the contrary. induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief. General Manager of CEC.909. petitioner requested for thirty (30) days to have enough time to look for funds to substantially settle its account.R.00. claimed that after deliberation and audit it appeared that petitioner overpaid respondent by P12.ROBLETT INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v.000. As a result RICC incurred unpaid accounts amounting to P342. As to the argument of the petitioner that the agreement did not reflect the true intention of the parties. 116682 January 2. In fact Baltazar Banlot. Estoppel in pais arises when one. by his acts. ISSUE Whether or not estoppel in pais may lie against the petitioner RULING Yes.00 on the basis of the latter's Equipment Daily Time Reports for 2 May to 14 June 1985 which reflected a total obligation of only P103. Vice President for Finance of petitioner. In reply. 350.18 covering the period above mentioned was received from CEC by petitioner with nary a protest from the latter. Neither did petitioner controvert the demand letter concerning the overdue account of P237. it asked for ample time to source funds to substantially settle the account.. declared that he signed the Agreement with the real intention of having proof of payment. Candelario S. so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Manaligod Jr. representations or admissions.38 and sought settlement thereof on or before 31 July 1986. sent a letter of demand to petitioner through its Vice President for Finance regarding the latter's overdue account of P237. the petitioner did not question its account with plaintiff. .
yet. This is especially true where the agent himself is a party to the instrument. ISSUES 1. Ltd.000.. Petitioner loaned Tabing one hundred thousand pesos (P100. No. Tabing authorizing her to contract a loan from petitioner in an amount not more than three hundred thousand pesos (P300. if he has not acted in the name of the principal. Whether or not the principal is bound by the real estate mortgage executed by the authorized agent in her own name without indicating the principal 2.. Inc. unless in fact it is executed by the agent for and on behalf of his principal and as the act and deed of the principal. otherwise. 48 Phil.000. Neither is it ordinarily sufficient that in the mortgage the agent describes himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney. sent a letter to petitioner expressing the intent to repurchase the properties for two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250. Whether the respondents’ complaint for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure with damages and cancellation of titles be allowed RULING 1.00) and to mortgage her two (2) lots. on behalf of Cayetano. Poizat. It is a general rule in the law of agency that.FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. it will bind the agent only. 2010 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS Respondent Leonor C.00) secured by two (2) promissory notes and a real estate mortgage over Cayetano’s two (2) properties. et al. Cayetano also executed an affidavit of non-tenancy. signed and sealed in the name of the principal. v. For the approval of the loan.. Petitioner foreclosed the mortgage for failure of the respondents and the spouses Tabing to pay the loan. More than five (5) years later. Cayetano executed a special power of attorney in favor of her daughter Teresita C. However clearly the body of the mortgage may show and intend that it shall be the act of the principal. Tabing.000. it must upon its face purport to be made.00) with proposed terms of payment. 536) . if in fact the agent has acted in his own name and has set his own hand and seal to the mortgage.(The Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. in order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real property executed by an agent. LEONOR CAYETANO GR 179909 January 25. without stating that Tabing was executing the mortgage contract for and in behalf of the owner. it is not valid as to the principal. It is not enough merely that the agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage. The mortgage document was signed by Tabing and her husband as mortgagors in their individual capacities.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. the essence of which is the neglect to assert a right over a long period of time. The lease had a term of four years and was set to expire on March 30. On April 22. Instead of impugning the real estate mortgage and opposing the scheduled public auction. whereby it agreed to sell its tire manufacturing plants and other . may prevent recovery of a titled property. 1996. It was only when the negotiations failed that respondents filed the instant case.R. one of which was a 35' x 70' neon billboard located at the Magallanes Interchange in Makati City. it had been held that laches. but for unexplained reasons. the equity principle of laches is applicable in the instant case. In a number of cases. Sime Darby executed a Memorandum of Agreementwith Goodyear. 182148 June 08. Notwithstanding the nullity of the real estate mortgage executed by Tabing and her husband. Even after five (5) years. It bears noting that the real estate mortgage was registered and annotated on the titles of respondents. respondents slept on their rights.2. No. or after the lapse of more than five (5) years from the date of the foreclosure sale. they failed to do so.The Magallanes billboard wasleased by Macgraphics to Sime Darby in April 1994 at a monthly rental of P120. sent a letter proposing to buy back the properties. v. (2) delay in asserting complainant’s right after he had knowledge of the defendant’s conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue. (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit. or of one under whom he claims. Records clearly show that respondents could have filed an action to annul the mortgage on their properties.00. 1998. and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. acting in behalf of Cayetano. Clearly. Tabing. respondents still failed to oppose the foreclosure and the subsequent transfer of titles to petitioner when their agent. and the latter were even informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the scheduled auction. respondents’ lawyer wrote a letter to petitioner and merely asked that the scheduled auction be postponed to a later date. INC.000. INC. G. Its essential elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant. No. SIME DARBY PILIPINAS. 2011 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS Macgraphics owned several billboards across Metro Manila and other surrounding municipalities. They only questioned the loan and mortgage transactions in December 1996. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The complaint for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure with damages and cancellation of titles filed by respondents is hereby DISMISSED. giving rise to the situation complained of. GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES.
the pro-rata value of Sime Darby's leasehold rights over the Magallanes billboard. It thereafter communicated its non-conformity to the assignment. After review. to do that which. In sum. due to Macgraphics' refusal to honor the Deed of Assignment. Goodyear improved its offer to buy the assets of Sime Darby from P1. it appears that Macgraphics first learned of the assignment when Sime Darby sent its letter-notice dated May 3. The doctrine of laches cannot be applied in this case.00. among others. Goodyear sent Sime Darby a letter demanding partial rescission of the Deed of Assignment and the refund of P1. On September 23. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. justified. by exercising due diligence. among others.5 billion to P1. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. From the records. Macgraphics found that consenting to the assignment would entail the commitment of manpower and resources that it did not foresee at the inception of the lease. Bulacan.000. 1996. To the mind of the Court. warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. its leasehold rights and deposits made to Macgraphics pursuant to its lease contract over the Magallanes billboard.239. Laches is the failure or neglect. ISSUE Whether partial rescission of the Deed of Assignment is proper RULING Yes. there was never a delay. on April 23. its application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice. On May 9.assets to the latter for a total of P1. of the assignment by Sime Darby of the receivables in connectionwith its billboard advertising in Makati City and Pulilan. 1996. Sime Darby failed to perform what was incumbent upon it under the Deed of Assignment.65 billion. Sime Darby and Goodyear executed a Deed of Assignment through which Sime Darby assigned. Because laches is an equitable doctrine. thus. The rescission of the Deed of Assignment pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is. 1996. . could or should have been done earlier.5 billion. 1996. The increase of the purchase price was made in consideration. it is clear that by its failure to secure the consent of Macgraphics to the assignment of lease. Just a day after.
2011 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS Following a cadastral survey. Tomagan waived her rights over 2 lots in favor of petitioner Feliciano Gaitero and one lot in favor of Barangay Ysulat. To begin with. however. 181812 June 08. it showed that the disputed area fell outside the boundaries of Lot 9960-A which he claimed.R. KINGS PROPERTY CORP. 2009 . GALIDO G. the Almerias waived their rights over a 158 sq m portion of the disputed area in Gaitero's favor but maintained their claim over the remaining 579 sq m. neither Gaitero nor his mother complained or objected to such inclusion. who owned adjoining Lot 9960-A. when Gaitero saw the subdivision plan covering Tomagan's original Lot 9960 in 1993. No. To settle the dispute. In June 2000. for he who has done inequity shall not have equity.741 square-meter land. Subsequently. Gaitero's claim of laches against the Almerias can be hurled against him. No. intruded into their lot by as much as 737 sq m. ISSUE Will laches. v. Subsequently. When the lot that the Almerias acquired was registered in 1979. Here. He cannot avail himself of the law of equity. notice that the cadastral survey included the disputed area as part of the land that Leon Asenjo claimed. Gaitero did nothing to correct the alleged mistake. anyone who invokes it must come to court with clean hands. Still. benefit one who himself slept on his supposed right? HELD: No.GAITERO v. Yet. 170023 November 27. a land registration court issued an original certificate of title to Rosario O. the Almerias commissioned a relocation survey of their lot and were astonished to find that Gaitero.R. She retained one lot in her favor Lot 9960-A that went to Gaitero adjoined Lot 9964 which belonged to respondent spouses Generoso and Teresita Almeria. a rule of equity. Gaitero's theory of laches cannot vest on him the ownership of the disputed area. Gaitero filed an affidavit of adverse claim on the Almerias' title over the remaining 579 sq m. Tomagan covering a 10. ALMERIA G. if not actual. Tomagan subdivided the lot awarded to her into four. He is by his inaction clearly estopped from claiming ownership of the disputed area. Gaitero had constructive. Tobias Fornier. Worse. laches is a consideration in equityand therefore.
the Eniceo heirs registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City (Registry of Deeds) a Notice of Loss dated 2 April 1988 of the owner’s copy of OCT No. Petitioner alleges that when Maria Eniceo died in June 1975. through due diligence. . a deed of sale covering the Antipolo property was executed between RufinaEniceo and Maria Eniceo as vendors and respondent as vendee. Rizal. ISSUE Whether the adverse claim of respondent over the Antipolo property should be barred by laches RULING No. 535.Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS On 18 April 1966. A certain Carmen Aldana delivered the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. the heirs of Domingo Eniceo. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect. could have been done earlier. respondent filed a civil complaint with the trial court against the Eniceo heirs and petitioner.000. When respondent learned that the Eniceo heirs were planning to sell the Antipolo property. were awarded with Homestead Patent No. 535 . Antipolo. namely RufinaEniceo and Maria Eniceo. 112947 consisting of four parcels of land located in San Isidro. On 5 April 1988. On 10 September 1973. thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it. Rizal (Antipolo property) The Antipolo property with a total area of 14. RufinaEniceo and the heirs of Maria Eniceo (Eniceo heirs). 584-A. RufinaEniceo and Maria Eniceo sold the Antipolo property to respondent for P250. The Eniceo heirs also filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. Respondent’s actions negate petitioner’s argument that respondent is guilty of laches. 535 with Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. when respondent learned that OCT No. to do that which. respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim. 9 who continued to occupy the Antipolo property as owners. thought that the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 535 was cancelled and new TCTs were issued. Respondent discovered in 1991 that a new owner’s copy of OCT No. Respondent filed a criminal case against the Eniceo heirs for false testimony. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time.8882 hectares was registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 535 was issued to the Eniceo heirs. On 16 January 1996. 535 to respondent. 535 was lost. The case was docketed as LRC Case No.
the intestate court issued an order granting Agustin’s petition. warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined the right.R. giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy. unrecorded sales of land brought under Presidential Decree No. however. namely: Ana. Susana. In his petition. Isabelita. (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights. docketed as Special Case No. The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the PNB and Arguna respectively. is not an innocent purchaser for value. Melitona Pahamotang died. the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners. Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time.True. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial to them. 1785 – also of the CFI of Davao City. 1972. The trial court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void but both were valid with respect to the other parties. hereinafter referred to as the intestate court. ISSUE Whether or not petitioners’ failure to assail said orders at the most opportune time constitutes laches RULING No. the complainant having had . without knowledge of the sale and in good faith. 156403. 2005 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS On July 1. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant. Corazon. The petition. Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang. No. 1972. acquire rights to the property. On December 7. or of one under whom he claims. 1972. petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral attack on the foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to annul them. 1792. In the present case.Special Civil Case No. that is. Petitioner. was raffled to Branch VI of said court. to the appellate court. It appears that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case . PNB G. Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor. all surnamed Pahamotang. Branch VI. March 21. PAHAMOTANG v. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) are effective between and binding only upon the immediate parties. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Genoveva. persons who. Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. and their eight (8) children. The registration required in Section 51 of PD 1529 is intended to protect innocent third persons. On September 15.
ISSUE Whether the action in the RTC was barred by prescription and laches RULING Yes. During the same year. an Affidavit of Adjudication in favor of petitioner. The element of delay in questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely lacking. And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches against them. annul the deed and affidavit of adjudication. 7 years after. 5 out of the 8 heirs of HilarionDerecho sold the subject property to Francisco Lacambra under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate properties.In 1993. 1973.(Dolores’ Son) was executed. DE RIGONAN v. he sold the land in favor of Valerio Laude(also a petitioner in the case) and executed a Deed of absolute Sale. Although petitioners finally obtained knowledge of the subject petitions filed by their father. 1980 and January 7. . In1980. 159571 July 15. the land was mortgaged by petitioner to a bank in Cebu. one of the heirs. There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had notified petitioners of the contracts they had executed with Agustin. VDA. brought an action with the RTC to recover the property. subject to a five year redemption clause. it is not clear from the challenged decision of the appellate court when they (petitioners) actually learned of the existence of said orders of the intestate court. 2005 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS In 1921. (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit. February 25. Absent any indication of the point in time when petitioners acquired knowledge of those orders. Dreading foreclosure. 1981 orders of the intestate court. not party to the sale in 1921). and eventually challenged the July 18. declaring the petitioner’s father (Leandro Rigonan) to be the sole heir of Hilarion. whose validity was assailed on the ground of fraud. and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. more than 5 decades after. respondents. their alleged delay in impugning the validity thereof certainly cannot be established.knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit. as the alleged heirs of Hilarion (3 heirs. Dolores. or the suit is not held barred. No. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and was affirmed by CA upon appeal. October 19. 1974. TeodoroRigonan. purchased the lot and immediately occupied it.R. HILARION DERECHO G.
respondents nonchalantly allowed petitioners to continue with their possession and enjoyment of the property. . but their right to enforce the constructive trust had already prescribed as well. giving rise to a situation for which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought. respondents waited more than six decades to file a suit without offering any excuse for the long delay in the assertion of their rights. To grant respondents relief when they have not even offered any justifiable excuse for their inaction would be unjust. and religiously paid the taxes for it for at least a half-century. Third. who has knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and has been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit. They do not at all claim that they were unaware of their co-heirs’ actions. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy. there is no doubt that petitioners will suffer if respondents are allowed to recover the property. It is certainly beyond our comprehension how they could have remained silent for more than 50 years. and then pounced upon them when the latter least expected it.Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. Fourth. (2) delay in asserting the rights of the complainant. which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. Although Ruben Derecho warned Laude not to buy the land because it was still co-owned. This deprivation was the basis of the Complaint filed by respondents. Second. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The four requisites are present in the instant case. On the other hand. after being allowed more than six decades of peaceful possession of the property. and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the complainant is granted a relief or the suit is not deemed barred. Respondents even allowed nine more years to pass before rising from their stupor to institute the Complaint. petitioners were certainly not expecting respondents to reclaim it. They have only themselves to blame if the Court at this late hour can no longer afford them relief against the inequities they allegedly suffered. In order to use laches as a defense. the following requisites must be present: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant. they did not have to wait for sixty-five years to institute this suit. the five co-owners’ act of selling the entire property deprived respondents’ predecessors of the enjoyment of their rightful shares in the inheritance. invested in. not only had laches set in when respondents instituted their action for reconveyance in 1993. since they were legally presumed to know of the invalidity of the sale as to their shares. the former still took no immediate action to prevent Teodoro from selling the entire property or to recover it. Considering the undisputed facts. The former have already developed. First. or of one under whom a claim is made. They could have instituted an action to annul in 1921 or to recover the property in 1928. (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which the latter has based the suit.
ROSA SANTOS-CARREON and ANTONIO SANTOS. petitioner Zenaida. 133895.R. ALBERTO SANTOS. which eventually decided in Zenaida’s favor. Rosa in turn sold her share to Salvador on November 20. The complaint amounts to a declaration of nullity of a void contract which is imprescriptible. 60819. On November 1. CALIXTO SANTOS. Jesus died. claiming to be Salvador’s heir. 1973 were simulated for lack of consideration. When the latter refused to pay. They were executed to accommodate Salvador in generating funds for his business ventures and providing him with greater business flexibility. 1979. ISSUE Whether or not the cause of action of Rosalia Santos and her heirs has already prescribed RULING No. October 2. The elements of laches are: 1) conduct on the part of the defendant. followed by Rosalia who died the following month. G. Shortly after.ZENAIDA M. 113221. Despite the transfer of the property to Salvador. Rosalia continued to lease and receive rentals from the apartment units. No. Jesus and Rosalia executed a deed of sale of the properties in favor of their children Salvador and Rosa. where they alleged that the two deeds of sale executed on January 19. 2001 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS On January 19. 1973 which resulted in the issuance of a new TCT No. Hence. SANTOS v. demanded the rent from Antonio Hombrebueno. respondents’ cause of action has not prescribed. 1959. 27571 became TCT No. 2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights. TCT No. giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy. Six years after or on January 9. 1989. Salvador died. a tenant of Rosalia. 1985. Neither is their action barred by laches. 1959 and November 20. On January 5. the complainant having . Zenaida filed an ejectment suit against him with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. or of one under whom he claims. private respondents instituted an action for reconveyance of property with preliminary injunction against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
paying the taxes thereon and introducing improvements. SIMEON B. Catalino Agyapao in turn sold the land to his son. had unlawfully taken possession of the land. defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino. L-23072 November 29. As we held in the same case of Lacsamana vs. 1962. plaintiffs claiming to be the children and heirs of the original registered owner. the alleged 16 years (date of the sale from Rosa to Salvador on November 20. the concept of laches is not concerned with the lapse of time but only with the effect of unreasonable lapse. gathered its produce and unlawfully excluded plaintiffs therefrom. ISSUE Whether or not defendant-appelle’s contention that defense of laches applies independently of prescription is correct RULING . "sold" anew the same land for P300. On January 22. In this case. acquired the land when his second wife died and sold it to Catalino Agyapao. but since the sale in 1928.R. four years had lapsed.00 to defendant Florendo Catalino. 1973.had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit. Grace Ventura. in the concept of owner. MIGUEL. the defendant Florendo Catalino. had been in possession of the land. the balance was paid after the certificate of title was issued. without their knowledge or consent. vendee Catalino Agyapao and his son. In other words. father of the defendant Florendo Catalino. by herself alone. up to his death on January 9. Of the purchase price was paid and receipted for when the land was surveyed. ET AL. Defendant answered pleading ownership and adverse possession for 30 years. 1989. appellants brought suit in the Court below against Florendo Catalino for the recovery of the land above-described. 3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit. cited above. No. CA. 1985. FLORENDO CATALINO G. and averred that defendant. 1968 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS Bacaquio. v. or the suit is not held barred. more or less twelve years had lapsed. it took respondents about sixteen years to file the case) of respondents’ inaction has no adverse effect on the petitioner to make respondents guilty of laches. On 1 February 1949. or for more than 30 years. and from his death up to the filing of the case for reconveyance in the court a quo on January 5. No formal deed of sale was executed. These elements must all be proved positively. In 1961. who died in 1943. and 4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. but the receipt was lost.
ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4 y e a r s w i t h t h e petitioner actively participati ng therein and without him ever raising t h e jurisdictional infirmity. constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. 147406. laches is not. counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. The vendor. since they knew of the invalidity of the sale. and also his heirs after him. As undue delay is further absent herein. for his part. The regional Trial Court of Bulacan found him guilty. Prescription is statutory. they did not have to wait for 34 years to institute suit. and also because he "bought" again the land in 1949 from Grace Ventura who alone tried to question his ownership. JULY 14. The defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that no action would be filed against him by such passivity. questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case. Sibonghanoy. Laches applies in equity. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay. VANANCIO FIGUEROA v. The petitioner. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC. laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced. Prescription is a matter of time. could have instituted an action to annul the sale from that time. Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Prescription is based on fixed time laches is not. Laches is different from the statute of limitations. notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals . Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack of the governor's approval. In his appeal before the Court of Appeals. for the first time. whereas prescription applies at law. the petitioner.Yes. which is a matter of law. whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. In the case at bar. so that the defendant will be plainly prejudiced in the event the present action is not held to be barred. 2008 Topic: Estoppel by Laches FACTS Petitioner Venancio Cervantes Figueroa was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.R. the principle of laches will not be applicable. No.
. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Ramirez. Petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of the case does not constitute laches.RULING No. that is . the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Sibonghanoy. Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. even on appeal.lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable. and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. the Court held that as a general rule.
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