East European Politics and Societies 2009 Go Biowska 371 91

East European Politics & Societies http://eep.sagepub.
com/
Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Poland

Ewa Golebiowska East European Politics and Societies 2009 23: 371 DOI: 10.1177/0888325409333191 The online version of this article can be found at: http://eep.sagepub.com/content/23/3/371
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
American Council of Learned Societies
Additional services and information for East European Politics & Societies can be found at: Email Alerts: http://eep.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://eep.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://eep.sagepub.com/content/23/3/371.refs.html
>> Version of Record - Jul 24, 2009 What is This?
Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com by Aras Roxana on October 9, 2012
Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Poland

Ewa Gobiowska
Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan
East European Politics and Societies Volume 23 Number 3 Summer 2009 371-391 2009 SAGE Publications 10.1177/0888325409333191 http://eeps.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com
Since its democratic revolution was set in motion, Poland has enjoyed tremendous progress in its degree of democratic consolidation. For example, significant institutional changes have taken place in the status of Polands ethnic, national, and religious minorities. Yet, institutional protections alone do not fully capture the extent of openness to diversity. More comprehensive depictions of the quality of democracy need to encompass investigations of the democratic citizens hearts and minds. In this article, using data from a recent nationally representative survey, the author examines the extent and sources of Poles tolerance of ethnic and religious difference. She focuses on social tolerance of difference, using questions about acceptance of interethnic and interreligious marriage as the dependent variables. As part of the inquiry, the author compares and contrasts the levels and sources of tolerance of interreligious marriage over time and discusses the political implications of the findings and future research directions. Keywords: ethnic tolerance; religious tolerance; Poland, interethnic marriage; interreligious marriage
n the almost twenty years since the collapse of communism in the former Soviet bloc, institutional seeds of liberal democracy have taken strong root in several Eastern European countries.1 Eastern European countries, including Poland, that have recently completed their accession to the European Union have enjoyed tremendous progress in their transition to democracy as well as in the degree of their democratic consolidation. By one measure, the extent of rights and liberties in the new EU member countries reached the level enjoyed by stable Western democracies shortly after the transition.2 In part because of the pressure from the European Union, the institutional guarantees of important democratic rights and liberties have been explicitly extended to those countries ethnic, national, and religious minorities.3 Yet in countries that have relatively recently emerged from communist rule, the practice of respect for minority rights may not be well entrenched even in the presence of legal instruments that protect those rights and liberties because socialization agents have not had enough time to internalize widespread respect for minority rights. Poland is a good case in point. Since the downfall of communism, significant institutional changes have taken place in Poland in the status of minority groups.4
371
372
East European Politics and Societies
For example, Poland has ratified several international human rights documents that provide minimum standards for minority protection, including bilateral treaties with its neighbors.5 An important law concerning national and ethnic minorities in addition was codified in Poland in 2005, giving ethnic and national minorities recognized by law the right to preserve their culture, customs, and language. Like their ethnic and national counterparts, religious minorities have gained many legal protections since the beginning of Polands transition to democracy. Because ethnicity and nationality on one hand and religious affiliation on the other are significantly correlated, many of the rights afforded the former have been automatically bestowed on the latter. In addition, Polands 1997 Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for separation of the church and state. Thus, minority religions are placed on the same legal footing as Catholicism, the countrys dominant religion.6 While institutional guarantees of important rights and liberties to minority groups are defining characteristics of liberal democracies, institutional protections alone do not fully convey the extent of openness to diversity. More comprehensive depictions of the quality of democracy in a particular country need to encompass, in addition, parallel investigations of the democratic citizens hearts and minds. Such investigations are imperative because laws can best protect minority groups only when majorities are aware of legal protections afforded minority groups and personally make a choice to respect those protections in their attitudes and behaviors. Ascertaining the contours of attitudes toward ethnic, national, and religious difference is important, in addition, because public opinion sets the parameters of acceptable public policy in democratic systems of government.7 It is important, finally, to investigate attitudes toward ethnic and religious groups because widespread feelings of antipathy for minority groups, even in ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries like Poland, may have important implications for electoral campaigns and thus different groups access to political power. I elaborate on this latter point in the concluding section. Because Polands pre- and postwar history is punctuated with intergroup conflict and laws are relatively easier to change than long-standing attitudes,8 it could be expected that acceptance of minority groups in Polish public opinion has lagged behind recent democratic changes in Polands legal infrastructure. Yet we know relatively little from previous empirical research about the extent to which Poles are willing to afford equal treatment to ethnic, national, and religious minoritieswhether residing in Poland or in the greater European Union community.9 Well-specified, multivariate scholarly analyses shedding light on the sources of ethnic Poles attitudes toward ethnic, national, and religious difference are especially rare.10 In this article, using data from a 2006 nationally representative survey of Poles, I set out to examine the extent and sources of Poles tolerance of ethnic and religious difference. I focus on social tolerance of ethnic and religious difference, using questions about acceptance of interethnic and interreligious marriage as my dependent variables. As part of this inquiry, I compare and contrast the levels and sources of
Gobiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance
373
tolerance of interreligious marriage over time, place my research in the context of extant scholarship on attitudes toward ethnic, national, and religious difference in Poland, and discuss the political implications of my findings and future research directions. While many scholars writing on the subject of minorities distinguish between ethnic and national minorities, for ease of exposition, I from now on refer to ethnic minorities when writing either about national or ethnic minorities.
Previous Research
Many students of the attitudinal component of democratization in the post-communist countries have focused on general support for democracy or support for abstract democratic rights.11 In addition, scholarly interest in ethnic and religious minorities in Poland has virtually exploded in post-communist Poland,12 with much writing involving historical and largely descriptive sociological analyses.13 Social scientists studying Poles attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference have been particularly interested in the nature and sources of Polish anti-Semitism.14 While Polish scholars explorations of anti-Semitic attitudes have pointed to a number of correlates of anti-Semitism, they have not established their relative importance because published empirical work to date has consisted of only bivariate and (occasionally) trivariate analyses.15 Systematic empirical evidence concerning Poles attitudes toward other ethnic and religious groups has been more meager. In one of the more comprehensive and multi-faceted analyses to date, Jakubowska-Branicka and her collaborators have tackled the theoretical and empirical problems of tolerance broadly conceived. In keeping with U.S.-based research, these analyses show that large numbers of Poles endorse tolerance as a general, abstract notion while at the same time responding intolerantly in concrete situations.16 For example, an overwhelming majority of Poles endorse the general concepts of religious and ethnic freedoms while at the same time expressing support for a privileged position for Catholicism or refusing to allow Polands ethnic minorities to use their language in public places.17 Like research on anti-Semitism, this exploration of tolerance is also only suggestive with regard to what drives Polish tolerance all else being equal because the empirical portion of the work is limited to bivariate cross-tabulations. In research that serves as the immediate point of departure for this article, finally, I explored religious tolerance of (some of) Polands religious minorities.18 Employing several measures of social distance as my dependent variable, I demonstrated that Poles as a group appear highly tolerant of Jews, Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Protestants. In an exception to this generalization, I showed that the levels of Polish tolerance were low on questions about interreligious marriage involving respondents daughter- or son-in-law. Tolerance of non-Catholic in-laws, in addition, emerged as a separate dimension in my earlier analysis.
374
In my previous research on tolerance in Poland, I only examined social distance responses toward some of Polands religious minorities. Because no questions measuring attitudes toward ethnic minorities were available in the survey at my disposal, I did not directly compare and contrast the extent and sources of religious and ethnic tolerance (albeit I argued that my findings indirectly illuminated Poles tolerance of ethnic minorities because religious affiliation and ethnic group membership tend to be strongly correlated in Poland). In this article, I further explore Poles attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference and their sources, drawing on a more recent data set that includes explicit indicators of both religious and ethnic tolerance. I focus here on attitudes toward interreligious marriage, an aspect of social distance that proved most controversial in my earlier analysis, and juxtapose those with attitudes toward interethnic marriage. My analysis of ethnic tolerance focuses on groups with a relatively significant presence in Poland (Russians, Germans, and Jews),19 some that belong to the broader European Union community (French and Czechs), and a group with which few Poles can be expected to have had much direct contact to date (Chinese). My analysis of religious tolerance zeros in on several of Polands religious minorities (Evangelicals, Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Jews) as well as atheists. The data I describe in more detail below, finally, allow me to compare and contrast Poles attitudes toward Jews described as an ethnic group with their views toward Jews qua a religious group.
Data and Measures

I use data from a nationally representative survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion (CBOS) in Warsaw, Poland. The survey, based on in-person interviews, was conducted in September 2006 (N = 937). The questions that serve as measures of my dependent and independent variables were included in an omnibus survey on sociopolitical topics. More information about CBOS and the methods it uses to conduct surveys is available at www.cbos.pl. My dependent variables are based on a series of social distance questions asking respondents whether they would oppose their daughters or sons decision to marry a member of a particular ethnic or religious group.20 Respondents were asked about their reaction to this possibility with regard to six ethnic (Chinese, Czech, French, German, Russian, and Jewish) and five religious (Catholic, Evangelical, Muslim, Jewish, and Russian Orthodox) groups. They were in addition asked about their willingness to accept their childs marriage to an atheist. Note that the question about a Jewish in-law was asked twice: first in the group of questions asking about marriage to a member of a particular nationality and second in the group of questions asking about marriage to a member of a particular religion. All questions were scored on a 1 to 4 scale anchored with 1 (yes) at one end and 4 (no) at the other. Respondents expressing more moderate levels of opposition or approval to their childs intermarriage (or marriage to a Catholic) were able to pick from one of two middle responses:
375
Table 1 Poles Tolerance of Ethnic and Religious Difference

Yes Would you be opposed to a son or daughter marrying a member of the following nationalities? Chinese % n Czech % n French % n German % n Russian % n Jewish % n Would you be opposed to a son or daughter marrying a member of the following religions? Catholic % n Evangelical % n Muslim % n Jewish % n Orthodox % n Atheist % n Likely Yes Likely No No All Yes
20.3 189 9.6 89 10.0 94 12.3 115 13.7 128 19.3 180
13.7 128 10.6 99 10.7 100 11.0 103 12.9 12 16.2 151
22.5 209 27.8 259 26.9 251 26.0 243 25.1 234 20.5 191
43.5 406 52.1 486 52.4 490 50.8 474 48.3 451 44.0 410
34.0 20.2 20.7 23.3 26.6 35.5
5.9 55 19.0 177 34.8 324 30.5 284 25.2 235 24.1 224
2.6 24 12.1 113 20.4 190 17.4 162 13.1 122 13.0 121
14.0 131 26.6 248 15.7 146 19.0 177 23.5 219 22.0 205
77.6 726 42.3 394 29.2 272 33.0 307 38.3 357 40.8 380
8.5 31.1 55.2 47.9 38.3 37.1
2 (likely yes) or 3 (likely no). The CBOS survey I rely on in this article also included a number of questions I use to measure my predictors. The wording or a description, where more appropriate, of all predictors is included in the appendix.
A Simple Portrait of Poles Willingness to Welcome a Minority Group Member into Their Family
A good place to begin my empirical exploration of Poles attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference is to describe Poles willingness to accept a member of an ethnic or
376
religious minority into their family. As a baseline for assessing the extent of Poles tolerance of religious difference, I also inspect reactions to a possibility of respondents child marrying a Catholic, a member of the dominant religious group in Poland. The data in Table 1 contain the relevant information, with the last column reporting the total percentage of respondents inclined to oppose the intermarriage.21 Several patterns are evident in Table 1. First, overall levels of ethnic tolerance are higher than those of religious tolerance. Second, as in my previous research,22 the extent of tolerance varies with the group to be tolerated. Poles are less comfortable with the idea of their children marrying an ethnically Jewish or Chinese individual and more comfortable with a possibility of their children marrying a Czech, French, German, or Russian. Also consistent with my previous writing on the subject,23 Poles express the most opposition to their child marrying a Muslim, and almost 50 percent are opposed to their childs marriage to a religiously Jewish person. Interestingly, opposition to an atheist child-in-law in this deeply Catholic country is lower than opposition to either a Jewish or a Muslim in-law. Levels of opposition to intermarriage with other religious minorities are also substantial, with about one-third of respondents expressing discomfort about an Orthodox, an Evangelical, or an atheist in-law. The levels of tolerance for interreligious marriage, finally, are lower in the 2006 survey than in the 2001 survey I had scrutinized in my previous article, and this observation pertains to attitudes toward all religious groups included in both surveys (Jews, Muslims, Orthodox, and Protestantsor Evangelicals in the 2004 survey). In the 2001 survey, for example, 36.0 percent and 34.0 percent of respondents, respectively, indicated they would mind it if their daughter or son married a Muslim or a Jew. In the 2006 survey, the corresponding numbers are 55.1 percent and 48.0 percent, respectively. Whether or not this over time disparity reflects a meaningful change in underlying attitudes is not clear because of associated changes in question wording and the cross-sectional nature of the data at my disposal. For at least two reasons, I would speculate that the change may be meaningful. First, the questions asked in the 2006 survey arguably made it harder for respondents to express intolerance because they required them to indicate more fervently that they were against interreligious marriage (respondents had to indicate that they opposed intermarriage rather than, as in the earlier survey, that they minded it). Put differently, if nothing other than the wording of the questions changed, we would expect greater, not lower tolerance in 2006. Second, an apparent rise in intolerance I detect in my data is consistent with Krzemiskis over time analysis of an upsurge in modern anti-Semitism in Poland. While my exploration of Poles attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference reveals a good deal of intolerance, the data I have so far summarized also point to a good deal of variation in attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference, even in the case of the least popular groups. This raises a question of what predicts more or less favorable attitudes toward interethnic and interreligious marriage in Poland. Following the lead of previous research on tolerance in and outside of Poland, I describe my
377
expectations in the next section and empirical tests of these expectations in the subsequent two sections of the article.
Expectations
Previous research suggests that how enthusiastic or tepid Poles feel about ethnic or religious difference in their family might depend on their political and psychological predispositions, assessments of their own and the countrys well-being, and their sociodemographic attributes.
Political Predispositions
Much previous research on tolerance suggests that various political predispositions may influence Poles responses to diversity. The notion of predispositions or antecedent considerations refers to relatively enduring, long-term, attitudinal prisms through which an individual may respond to information in the political environment.24 I include two political predispositions in my analysis: ideological self-identification and general interest in politics as a measure of exposure to Polands normative environment. In line with previous research,25 I expect that Poles who self-locate on or closer to the left end of the ideological self-identification scale will express more tolerance of ethnic and religious difference than Poles who place themselves on the right or closer to the right end of that scale. Willingness to embrace ethnic or religious diversity might also move as a result of exposure to the normative environment currently dominant in Poland. As elites in the United States set changes in racial norms in motion in the wake of the civil rights revolution,26 Polands political elites have taken the lead in reshaping Polands reputation as a hotbed of intolerance and anti-Semitism. Elite attempts to mold Polish appreciation of ethnic and religious diversity have, for example, included an establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Israel and formal proclamations by the former twin Polish heads of state and government (the Kaczyski brothers) that there is no room for anti-Semitism in Poland.27 Thus, I expect, individuals with a greater interest in politics should be more aware of the tolerance norm promulgated by the Polish elites and should as a result exhibit more charitable views toward interethnic and interreligious marriage than individuals for whom politics is of more marginal or no importance.
Psychological Predispositions
While attention to psychological influences on tolerance of ethnic and religious difference has been relatively sparse in previous research focusing on Poland,28 research on political tolerance in the United States demonstrates that psychological
378
variables (including personality traits and predispositions) constitute particularly important sources of political tolerance.29 In this article, I inspect three psychological variables I hypothesize should be linked with ethnic and religious tolerance in Poland. First, I hypothesize that faith in people will be linked with Poles ethnic and religious tolerance, with respondents having greater faith in people expressing more tolerance of ethnic and religious difference than respondents with less faith in people. Second, I anticipate individual differences in ethnic and religious tolerance as a function of ethnic prejudice, with respondents evaluating non-Polish ethnic groups more positively also more willing to support interethnic or interreligious marriage within their family. Finally, I assess the potential role of a general preference people might have with regard to their ideal spouse in their reactions to a possibility of an in-law from a different ethnic or religious group. For reasons that have nothing to do with prejudice or intolerance, to elaborate, some individuals might prefer that their spouse share their nationality or religious faith. In psychological terms, such people might be said to display a form of in-group favoritism bias rather than prejudice. I expect that people who do not care that their spouse share a similar nationality and/or religion will be more accepting of interethnic and interreligious marriage than people who have a principled preference for a spouse of a similar nationality and/or religion.
Assessments of Respondents Own and the Countrys Well-being

While tolerance judgments can be expected to vary as a function of longstanding factorswhether political or psychologicalwillingness to tolerate ethnic and religious difference may also be affected by more fleeting sociopolitical assessments.30 I consider here the potential impact of three variables: individual assessments of their own finances; individual assessments of Polands political, economic, and workplace situation; and individual assessments of the performance of incumbent officeholders. Individual assessments of their own finances as well as the countrys economic and political situation have been linked with anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland.31 The scapegoat theory, pointing to the importance of economic and political distress in understanding the sources of hostility toward out-groups, is in fact the most wellknown theoretical explanation concerning the roots of anti-Semitism.32 While this theory has a lot of intuitive appeal, its empirical tests have produced mixed results.33 In my analysis, I examine a possible connection between egocentric (assessments of respondents own finances) and sociotropic (the extent to which people are happy or unhappy with the performance of the country as a whole) assessments on one hand and ethnic and religious tolerance on the other. I anticipate a positive relationship between sociopolitical assessments and tolerance, with respondents more satisfied with their own finances and/or the countrys situation also more charitable in their views toward ethnic and religious diversity than respondents with a more grim view of the state of their own finances and/or the countrys well-being.
379
Previous research on Poles commitment to the rights of political dissenters,34 finally, suggests that assessments of the performance of incumbent officeholders may be linked with general tolerance of political dissent. In keeping with that research, I anticipate that unhappiness about the work of incumbent officeholders might spill over to support for the rights of political dissenters, with individuals critical of highly visible officeholders scoffing at the idea that [minority] groups are entitled to the same democratic rights and freedoms as anyone else.35
Sociodemographic and Other Variables

Previous scholarship on intergroup attitudes, finally, points to the importance of sociodemographic predictors in understanding the sources of more or less favorable intergroup attitudes. How well educated, old, or religious people are, where they live, and whether they are men or women may mold their reactions to social, political, and religious diversity. In keeping with the bulk of previous research,36 I expect more well-educated, younger, and less religious Poles to be more accepting of interethnic and interreligious marriage than their less well-educated, older, and more religious counterparts. In addition, based on previous research on religious tolerance in Poland,37 I expect a significant link between respondents sex and their ethnic and religious tolerance, with men more tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity. Whether a person lives in a rural or urban area and draws income from farm employment may also be significantly linked with tolerance.38 I expect urban residents and nonfarmers to be more accepting of a religiously or ethnically different in-law than rural residents and farmers. Given the focus of my dependent variables on respondents children or future children, I in addition compare and contrast the views of respondents with children or those with children of school age on one hand and those without children or without school-aged children. Poles with children or those who plan to have them in the future should be more threatened by the prospect of an ethnically or religiously different inlaw than those who do not have children or do not plan to have them in the future. Even more notably, Poles who have children in school, presumably younger children that is, should be even more threatened by interethnic or interreligious marriage than those who have older children. In short, I expect childless Poles, and especially those without school-aged children, to be more accepting of interethnic and interreligious marriage than Poles with children and/or those with school-aged children. Finally, I investigate a possible nexus between ethnic and religious proximity and individual contact with a foreigner working in Poland on one hand and ethnic and religious tolerance on the other. Previous research on race identifies racial proximity as an important contextual influence on American whites racial attitudes, with whites living in areas with a greater proportion of African Americans displaying less favorable racial attitudes than whites living in areas with a smaller presence of African Americans.39 In my analysis of Poles ethnic and religious tolerance, I compare
380
Table 2
The Sources of Poles Tolerance of Ethnic and Religious Difference: Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis
Ethnic Tolerance Scale Predictor Political predispositions Ideological self-identification Interest in politics Psychological predispositions Principled spouse preference Faith in people Ethnic prejudice Assessments of respondents own and the countrys well-being Perceived finances Sociotropic beliefs Approval of government Sociodemographic and other variables Education Age Religiosity Sex Size of town or city Farm employment Having a child Having a child in school Ethnic and religious proximity Contact with foreigners R2 Adjusted R2 F (sig.) *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. r .03 .08** .39*** .08** .29*** B .02 .31 .76 .93 .20 SE .19 .29 .14 .38 .04 .004 .05 .29*** .11** .26*** Religious Tolerance Scale r .11*** .14*** .48*** .07** .31*** B .20 .18 .77 .76 .14 SE .17 .26 .12 .34 .03 .06 .03 .31*** .10** .20***
.05 .08** .07
.58 .31 .19
.25 .16 .12
.12** .10** .09
.10*** .06 .17***
.29 .39 .36
.22 .06 .14 .14*** .11 .18***
.17*** .29*** .15*** .02 .12*** .11*** .03 .03 .02 .07**
.23 .02 .12 .08 .01 .74 .27 .99 .24
.12 .02 .26 .53 .15 .78 .75 .58 .52
.10* .05 .02 .01 .004 .05 .02 .09* .02 .03
.23*** .26*** .25*** .08** .16*** .12*** .07** .04 .02 .15***
.20 .01 .49 .36 .08 .83 .63 1.01 .73 .46 .30 .27
.11 .09* .02 .05 .23 .11** .47 .03 .14 .03 .69 .06 .67 .05 .51 .09** .46 .07 .52 .04
.35 .59 .22 .19 6.15 (.000)
9.33 (.000)
and contrast attitudes of Poles who live in regions (voivodeships) inhabited by a greater number of ethnic and religious minorities to those who live in regions that are most ethnically or religiously homogeneous (i.e., Polish and Catholic). I expect that lesser ethnic and, by implication, religious proximity will be correlated with more positive attitudes toward interethnic and interreligious marriage. Consistent with much research on intergroup contact,40 I expect that Poles who have met a foreigner living in Poland will be more accepting of ethnic and/or religious diversity than Poles who do not know any foreigners living in Poland.
381
What Types of Poles Are More Likely to Accept Ethnic and Religious Difference in Their Family? Bivariate Analysis
In this section, I start my empirical examination of the sources of Poles attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference. I use bivariate correlation analysis to identify those more or less tolerant of interethnic or interreligious marriage involving their child. To this end, I combine the indicators of ethnic tolerance into an additive ethnic tolerance scale and those of religious tolerance into a religious tolerance scale.41 Both scales are coded such that a lower score indicates lower tolerance (or greater opposition to intermarriage). All predictors are coded (recoded where necessary) with an expectation of a positive correlation with both ethnic and religious tolerance. The two columns labeled with an r heading under ethnic and religious tolerance in Table 2 report the bivariate coefficients. With a handful of exceptions, the bivariate correlations are supportive of the hypotheses I delineated above. Interest in politics, my proxy for exposure to elite norms, is significantly correlated with both ethnic and religious tolerance, with respondents more interested in politics more tolerant of both ethnic and religious difference than those with less or no interest in politics. All three psychological variables are linked with ethnic and religious tolerance in the expected directionrespondents with more faith in people, with a weaker preference for an ethnically and/or religiously similar spouse, and lower in ethnic prejudice are more accepting of ethnic and religious intermarriage than Poles with less faith in people, with a stronger preference for an ethnically and/or religiously similar spouse, and higher in ethnic prejudice. The well-educated, the younger, the less religious, residents of more urban areas, and those without farm employment are more accepting of ethnic and religious difference than their poorly educated, older, and more religious counterparts as well as Poles who live in more rural areas and those with farm employment. Poles that have come across foreigners working in Poland, finally, are more tolerant of both ethnic and religious intermarriage than Poles who do not know any foreigners working in Poland. A few variables are linked only with approval of interreligious marriage or only with approval of interethnic marriage. Respondents ideological self-placement, assessments of their own financial situation, sex, parental status, and approval of incumbent officeholders are significantly linked with religious tolerance only. The direction of all relationships, save for the link between approval of incumbent officeholders and tolerance of interreligious marriage, is in keeping with my expectations. Men, childless respondents, those who feel more positively about their finances, and those who self-locate on the left end of the Polish political spectrum are more accepting of interreligious marriage than are women, respondents with children, those who feel negatively about their finances, and those who self-locate on the right end of the Polish political spectrum. Counter to expectations but consistent with my earlier research,42 those more critical of incumbent officeholders are more tolerant of
382
interreligious marriage than those more approving of the performance of Polish incumbents. Sociotropic beliefs are linked only with ethnic tolerance, with respondents more positive about Polands political, economic, and workplace situation also more enthusiastic about interethnic marriage involving their son or daughter. Counter to my hypotheses, finally, there is no significant bivariate relationship between ethnic and religious proximity and having a school-aged child on one hand and ethnic and religious tolerance on the other.
Who Is More or Less Likely to Accept Ethnic and Religious Difference in Their Family? Multivariate Analysis
The bivariate correlation analysis I discuss in the preceding section effectively differentiates between respondents who are or more less willing to accept interethnic or interreligious marriage involving their son or daughter. Because at least some of the bivariate predictors are correlated with each other (e.g., rural residence and farm employment), this analysis cannot establish conclusively which predictors are more causally important in understanding the sources of ethnic and religious tolerance. In this section, therefore, I report the results of two multivariate regression analyses with ethnic and religious tolerance scales as the dependent variables and all the variables I included in the bivariate analysis as predictors. The columns labeled B, SE, and in Table 2 correspond to unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors, and standardized regression coefficients, respectively, for ethnic and religious tolerance. A number of conclusions are in order based on data reported in Table 2. First, standard model fit indicators (R2 and adjusted R2) suggest that tolerance of religious difference is accounted for better than tolerance of ethnic difference. Second, most of the predictors are important in both models of tolerance, whereas a handful matter only in predicting tolerance of ethnic difference or tolerance of religious difference. Greater faith in people, weaker preference for having a spouse of the same nationality or religion, less prejudice directed at non-Polish ethnic groups, and more positive sociotropic assessments are associated with higher acceptance of both interethnic and interreligious marriage. Higher levels of education are marginally important in predicting higher levels of both ethnic and religious tolerance. Respondents without school-aged children are more likely to accept both interethnic and interreligious marriage (though only marginally in the former case). Religiosity and government approval, in contrast, predict religious tolerance only. In keeping with the bivariate results, less religious respondents and those who are more critical of government performance are more likely to embrace a religiously different in-law into their family. The significant effect of perceived finances in the model of religious tolerance washes out in the multivariate analysis. It becomes significant, on the other hand, in the model of ethnic tolerance. More surprisingly, the direction of the effect of perceived finances is inconsistent with my expectations and the weight of previous
383
research because respondents with more positive assessments of their personal finances are less inclined to indicate they would be happy with a nonethnically Polish sonor daughter-in-law.43 Third, the regression results in Table 2 point to a hierarchy of effects, with some predictors more influential than others. Within both models of tolerance, judging from the size of standardized regression coefficients, ascribing greater importance to a spouses similarity in nationality or religion is the best predictor of ethnic and religious tolerance. Ethnic prejudice is the second best predictor of both types of tolerance, competing for first place with the measure of principled beliefs about ones spouses attributes in the model of ethnic tolerance. Approval of government, in addition, is vying for second place with ethnic prejudice in the model of religious tolerance. The size of the effect of different predictors is largely comparable across the two models of tolerance, judging from the size of the respective unstandardized regression coefficients with one possible exception: the impact of faith in people is somewhat stronger in the ethnic than in the religious tolerance model.
Summary, Conclusions, and Discussion

My goal in this article was to follow up on my earlier research on religious tolerance in Poland and in part to extend its analysis to ethnic tolerance.44 In that research, using several different measures of social distance toward Jews, Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Protestants, I investigated the levels and sources of religious tolerance in Poland but could only speculate about the extent and underpinnings of Poles ethnic tolerance. Going beyond my earlier research,45 I more directly established that Poles openness to ethnic and religious difference should be scrutinized separately, that Poles are more resistant to interreligious than interethnic marriage involving their son or daughter, that the levels of religious intolerance seem to have risen over time, and that correlates of ethnic and religious tolerance partially overlap and are in part distinct. The multivariate analysis I performed to establish what variables are more causally important in understanding the sources of Poles attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference demonstrates that their attitudes are to a large extent shaped by their principled beliefs about their spouses attributes and (especially in the case of interethnic marriage) their ethnic prejudice. Those attitudes are also linked with Poles faith in people, their sociotropic beliefs about the countrys economy, politics, and workplace, and, in the case of religious tolerance only, their approval of incumbent officeholders. The demographics, emphasized in much previous research as the sources of tolerance broadly conceived,46 make a relatively poor showing in my analysis once controls for other variables are included in the model. Most surprisingly, the impact of respondents age on both types of tolerance washes out in the presence of controls, the impact of education is only marginally significant, and the
384
link between religiosity and tolerance of interreligious marriages is greatly attenuated. The only other influence on both types of tolerance that is worth mentioning is whether or not respondents happen to have a school-aged child. While principled beliefs about spousal attributes emerge as the most important influence on both ethnic and religious tolerance, it is unclear what to make of this finding because responses to questions measuring such beliefs were asked in the survey immediately after questions about intermarriage. Thus, consistency pressures may have induced respondents to bring their reports of principled beliefs in line with their answers to questions about interethnic and interreligious marriage. With this caveat in mind, a more interesting and critical finding is that ethnic prejudice is the second most important correlate of acceptance of ethnic and religious difference. This is a troubling finding and one that in turn raises a question about what makes some Poles more and others less comfortable with ethnic and/or religious difference in general. This is a question I plan to tackle in future research. One surprising relationship I have replicated in this article concerns the effect of government approval on tolerance of interreligious marriage.47 I expected that people unhappy with the performance of incumbent officeholders, in keeping with the psychological notion of projection, would take out their frustrations with the government on ethnically and religiously different groups. In fact, those more critical of incumbent officeholders were more supportive of interreligious marriage than those more satisfied with regime performance. One reason for this unexpected finding might be that my measure of government approval is actually tapping respondents authoritarianism. If this should be the case, then it would make sense that those more critical of the government (and thus lower in authoritarianism) should be more comfortable with ethnic and religious difference. While I could not test this possibility directly with the 2006 CBOS data I use in this article, approval of incumbent officeholders and authoritarianism are completely unrelated in another recent CBOS survey (data available on request). Another possibility is that the government approval measure may actually be a better measure of my respondents ideological proclivities than the ideological self-identification measure I also control for in my model. If Poles resemble Americans in this regard, their ideological self-identifications do not necessarily correspond to a sophisticated understanding of the meaning behind the ideological labels.48 Their reactions to high-level incumbent officeholders associated with particular ideological stances, on the other hand, may be better reflections of individual ideology than their self-identifications.49 Thus, approvers of government performance in the 2006 CBOS survey I use in this article may have been aware of the oftentimes mixed messages President Lech Kaczyski and his twin brother former Prime Minister Jarosaw Kaczyski were communicating with regard to religious tolerance, including anti-Semitism, in Poland. On one hand, both the president and the thenprime minister were formally touting the principle of tolerance and anti-anti-Semitism, but at the same time their linkages (especially those of former Prime Minister Kaczyski) with the far right in Polish politics and anti-Semitic rhetoric (e.g., on the nationalist, ultra-Catholic radio station Radio
385
Maryja) were well known. Whatever the reason for the independent role that government approval plays in understanding the sources of religious tolerance, it underscores the power of political elites in molding ordinary Poles responses to diversity. The research findings I summarize in this article raise many more questions than could be addressed with the secondary data on which I drew. While the findings I report significantly contribute to our understanding of the sources of ethnic and religious tolerance, the analysis I discuss in this article was also limited by the available measures. Most importantly, the measures of attitudes toward interethnic and interreligious marriage did not clearly indicate whether they were tapping attitudes toward the specified ethnic and religious minorities in general or, where appropriate, attitudes toward the ethnic and religious minorities living in Poland. The question of Poles tolerance of the Polish ethnic and religious minorities is important to address in future research. Future studies of the etiology of Poles ethnic and religious tolerance should also include other predictors of tolerance that were unavailable in the data set I used in this article (e.g., questions tapping perceptions of threat from different ethnic and religious minorities, stereotypic beliefs about ethnic and religious minorities, and measures of respondents psychological security and other psychological predispositions and personality characteristics). Future research on attitudinal correlates of institutional tolerance in post-communist countries like Poland should also carefully investigate the political implications of ethnic and religious (in)tolerance. I elaborate on this point more fully in the next paragraph. There are at least two important reasons why studying ethnic and religious (in) tolerance in post-communist democracies is important. It is possible that ethnic and religious (in)tolerance matter politically because ethnic and religious (in)tolerance may carry over to political tolerance judgments (or willingness to put up with political difference). Previous research investigating the linkages between social tolerance and prejudice on one hand and political tolerance on the other offers equivocal support for the notion that the different forms of tolerance are coupled. Gibson, for example, reports that the link between prejudice and political tolerance is at best anemic and urges more scholarly attention to investigating the relationship between prejudice and intolerance.50 I suspect one reason why prejudice and intolerance do not significantly overlap in Gibsons and other such analyses is because he focuses on the link involving the same targets. While there are good reasons not to expect a significant overlap between social and political tolerance of the same targets (e.g., the fact that the constitutional principles that can be perceived as legitimately applying to the latter type of tolerance need not be seen as relevant to the former type of tolerance judgments),51 a possibility remains that a culture of social intolerance focused on one target may fuel greater political intolerance directed at other target(s). Some previous research in fact reports significant linkages between racial, ethnic, and political tolerance and tolerance of homosexuality. In short, social intolerance, including ethnic and religious tolerance, is important to examine because it may influence political intolerance judgments as well.52
386
Social intolerance may also be politically consequential, even in ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries like Poland, when minority group memberships are not apparent with a naked eye, negative intergroup sentiments are widespread, and political elites choose to exploit such sentiments for electoral gain. Even where the normative environment prizes tolerance, previous scholarship on racial communications in electoral campaigns in the United States demonstrates,53 political aspirants are able to inventively embed negative racial sentiments into their campaigns in an attempt to undermine their political opponents. Given high levels of animosity toward Jews and other ethnic and religious groups that emerge from Polish public opinion surveys and the fact that Jewishness and most other ethnic or religious group memberships in the Polish environment are concealable, it is then not surprising that the ethnic card, typically taking the form of allegations that ones political opponent is Jewish, has been rearing its ugly head in Polish electoral campaigns since the first elections in which communists were ousted from power. In the first semidemocratic presidential election, for example, the then-candidate Lech Wasa was spreading rumors that his opponent, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was Jewish, with many other candidates since playing the Jewish card in Polish electoral politics.54 In the most recent Polish presidential election, the thenpresidential candidate Kaczyskis campaign made repeated attempts whether wittingly or notto unleash ethnic prejudice by raising questions about the ultimately unsuccessful candidates Donald Tusks ethnic background.55 Anecdotal evidence alone of course does not capture the extent of the problem in Polish electoral campaigns. The questions of how often and how the ethnic and religious card has been injected into campaign politics in post-communist Poland and how it may be affecting the dynamics of political competition and access to power in Poland deserve much more systematic attention. These are some of the questions that motivate the next step in my research on ethnic and religious tolerance in Poland.
Appendix
Wording and Description of the Dependent and Independent Variables
I. Measures of the Dependent Variables (all items were scored on a 4-point, yes to no scale): Regardless of whether you have children, would you be opposed if your son or daughter wanted to marry a person of ____________ nationality: a. Chinese, b. Czech, c. French, d. German, e. Russian, f. Jewish Would you be opposed if your son or daughter wanted to marry a person of _________ faith: a. Evangelical, b. Catholic, c. Muslim, d. Jewish, e. Orthodox, f. Nonbeliever (atheist)
II. Measures of the Independent Variables

1. *Ideological self-identification: Respondents presented with a left to right continuum, anchored with 1 on the left, 7 on the right, with 2 to 6 in between, and asked to circle a number on the scale corresponding to their own ideological self-identification
(continued)
387
Appendix (continued)
2. *Interest in politics: How would you describe your interest in politics? I think my interest in politics is, a. Very highI carefully pay attention to almost everything that happens in politics b. HighI pretty carefully pay attention to what happens in politics c. AverageI pay attention to major events only d. Pretty lowI often miss even major events e. NoneI am not really interested f. I would describe it differently 3. Principled spouse preference: Please tell me regardless of what your marital status happens to be, would it be important to you that your spouse were similar in terms of: (both items were scored on a 4-point, yes to no scale) a. Religion, b. Nationality The above two items were combined into an additive scale 4. *Faith in people: Would you say that Poles are generally: a. Kind, b. Neither kind nor unkind, c. Unkind 5. Ethnic prejudice: An additive scale created by combining respondents evaluations of Chinese, Czechs, French, Germans, Russians, and Jews on a 1 (dislike) to 7 (like) scales. Factor and reliability analyses of the six items supported the decision to combine them into a scale. Data available on request. 6. Perceived finances: How would you describe your households economic well-being? a. Bad, b. Rather bad, c. Neither good nor bad, d. Rather good, e. Good 7. *Sociotropic beliefs: An additive scale created by combining respondents assessments of Polands political, economic, and workplace situations, on 1 to 5 scales, anchored with very good on one end and very bad on the other. Factor and reliability analyses of the three items supported the decision to combine them into a scale. 8. *Approval of government: An additive scale created by combining respondents assessments of the performance of Prime Minister Kaczyski, President Kaczyski, Sejm, and Senate, on 1 to 4 scales anchored with very good at one end and very bad on the other. Factor and reliability analyses of the four items supported the decision to combine them into a scale. 9. Education: A 9-point scale anchored with less than grade school and college 10. *Age: Actual age in years 11. Religiosity: Do you participate in religious practices such as masses or religious meetings? a. Yes, typically several times a week, b. Yes, once a week, c. Yes, typically once or twice a month, d. Yes, several times a year, e. Never 12. *Sex: Interviewer recorded respondents sex: 1 = male, 2 = female 13. Size of town or city: Recorded by the interviewer based on information provided in the sample: a. Village, b. Town of up to 19,999 residents, c. Town with between 20,000 and 49,999 residents, d. Town with between 50,000 and 99,999 residents, e. Town with between 100,000 and 499,999 residents, f. Town with 500,000 or more residents 14. Farm employment: Do you or any family members with whom you live work on a farm regardless of whether this employment is the main source of your/their income? a. Yes, b. No
(continued)
388
Appendix (continued)
15. Having a child: Do you have any children? a. Yes, b. No 16. Having a child in school: Are there any children in your household who are between 7 and 19 and who attend a grade school, high school, or a vocational school? a. Yes, b. No 17. Ethnic and religious proximity: Using a variable coding respondents voivodeship (or state), respondents residing in seven voivodeships with the largest concentration of Polands ethnic minority groups were coded as 1 and all others were coded as 0 The following voivodeships were coded as 1: Opolskie, Dolnolskie, Maopolskie, Podlaskie, Pomorskie, lskie, Warmisko-Mazurskie 18. *Contact with foreigners: Do you know any foreigners working in Poland? a. Yes, b. No
Note: Items that were reverse scored in all analyses are marked with an asterisk.
Notes
1. G. Ekiert, J. Kubik, and M. A. Vachudova, Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An Unending Quest? East European Politics and Societies 21:1 (2007): 7-30. 2. Ibid., 10. 3. Bajda, P., M. Syposz, and D. Wojakowski, Equality in Law, Protection in Fact: Minority Law and Practice in Poland, in Diversity in Action: Local Public Management of Multi-ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. A. M. Biro and P. Kovacs, 205-39 (Budapest, Hungary: LGI Books, 2002); Agnieszka Malicka, Ochrona mniejszoci narodowychStandardy midzynarodowe i rozwizania polskie (Wrocaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocawskiego, 2004). 4. Z. Kurcz, Mniejszoci narodowe w Polsce w procesie przemian, in Odmiany Polskich Tosamoci, ed. K. Bondyra and S. Lisiecki, 37-73 (Pozna, Poland: Wydawnictwo Fundacjii Humaniora, 2002); Bajda, Syposz, and Wojakowski, Equality in Law. 5. Bajda, Syposz, and Wojakowski, Equality in Law. 6. E. A. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland, International Journal of Public Opinion Research 16:4 (2004): 391-415. 7. J. L. Gibson, Putting up with Fellow Russians: An Analysis of Political Tolerance in the Fledgling Russian Democracy, Political Research Quarterly 51:1 (1998): 37-68, 41. 8. J. T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); J. T. Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz (New York: Random House, 2006); Dziadul, Rzeczpospolita dziesiciu narodw, www.polityka.pl. 9. Cf. I. Jakubowska-Branicka, Prawa czowieka. Tolerancja i jej granice (Warsaw, Poland: Uniwersytet Warszawski Instytut Stosowanych Nauk Spoecznych, 2002); Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland; I. Krzemiski, ed., Czy Polacy s anty-semitami? (Warsaw, Poland: Oficyna Naukowa, 1996); I. Krzemiski, ed., Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie: Raport z bada (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004); S. Marquart-Pyatt and P. Paxton, In Principle and in Practice: Learning Political Tolerance in Eastern and Western Europe, Political Behavior 29:1 (2007): 89-113. 10. Cf. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 11. E.g., J. L. Gibson, R. M. Duch, and K. L. Tedin, Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, Journal of Politics 54:2 (1992): 329-71.
389
E.g., P. Waldron-Moore, Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition: Evaluating Support for Democratic Institutions, Satisfaction with Democratic Government, and Consolidation of Democratic Regimes, Comparative Political Studies 32:1 (1999): 32-62; E. A. Gobiowska, Poles Commitment to the Rights of Political Dissenters, Polish Sociological Review 2:154 (2006): 231-42. 12. E.g., K. Urban, Mniejszoci religijne w Polsce 1945-1991: Zarys statystyczny (Krakw, Poland: Zakad Wydawniczy NOMOS, 1994); Kurcz, Mniejszoci narodowe; B. Berdychowska, ed., Mniejszoci narodowe w Polsce: Praktyka po 1989 roku (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1998); P. Madajczyk, ed., Mniejszoci narodowe w Polsce: Pastwo i spoeczestwo polskie a mniejszoci narodowe w okresach przeomw politycznych (1944-1989) (Warsaw, Poland: Instytut Studiw Politycznych PAN, 1998); M. Budyta-Budzyska, Mniejszoci narodoweBogactwo czy problem? (Warsaw, Poland: Instytut Studiw Politycznych PAN, 2003); Malicka, Ochrona mniejszoci; L. Adamczuk and S. odzinski, Mniejszoci narodowe w Polsce w wietle narodowego spisu powszechnego z 2002 roku (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2006). 13. E.g., K. Frysztacki, ed., Polacy, lzacy, Niemcy: Studia nad stosunkami spoeczno-kulturowymi na lsku Opolskim (Krakw, Poland: Universitas, 1998); M. C. Steinlauf, Pami nieprzyswojona: Polska pami zagady (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Cykady, 2001); K. Bondyra and S. Lisiecki, eds., Odmiany Polskich tosamoci (Pozna, Poland: Wydawnictwo Fundacjii Humaniora, 2002); cf. Z. Bokszaski, Poles and Their Attitudes toward Other Nations: On the Conditions of an Orientation towards Others, Polish Sociological Review 3:192 (2002): 255-74. 14. E.g., H. Datner-piewak, Struktura i wyznaczniki postaw antysemickich, in Czy Polacy s anty-semitami? ed. I. Krzemiski, 27-64 (Warsaw, Poland: Oficyna Naukowa, 1996); Krzemiski, Czy Polacy s anty-semitami; I. Krzemiski, Polacy i ydziwizja wzajemnych stosunkw, tosamo narodowa i antysemitizm, in Trudne ssiedztwa, ed. A. Jasiska-Kania, 171-200 (Warsaw, Poland, 2001): Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar; Krzemiski, Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie. 15. Krzemiski, Czy Polacy s anty-semitami; Krzemiski, Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie. 16. H. wida-Ziemba, Tolerancja fasadowapostawy Polakw wobec nietolerancyjnych schematow mylowych, in Prawa czowieka: Tolerancja i jej granice, ed. I. Jakubowska-Branicka, 157-207 (Warsaw, Poland: Uniwersytet Warszawski Instytut Stosowanych Nauk Spoecznych, 2002). 17. Ibid. 18. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 19. It is debatable how numerically significant the presence of these groups, especially Jews, is in Poland. The most recent (2002) national census that included a question about ethnicity reports relatively low numbers. Ethnic organizations, in contrast, report considerably higher numbers. 20. E. S. Bogardus, Measuring Social Distances, Journal of Applied Sociology 9 (1925): 299-308. 21. One caveat to keep in mind when interpreting the data in Table 1 is that they are based on responses of all survey participants regardless of what their own ethnic or religious identification may be. The Center for the Study of Public Opinion survey unfortunately contained no measures of respondents own ethnic or religious backgrounds. The levels of tolerance of ethnic and religious groups with a sizable presence in Poland may therefore be overestimated by as much as 1 percent to 3 percent (the estimated size of Polands ethnic minorities) in the case of ethnic tolerance and as much as 5 percent (the estimated size of Polands religious minorities) in the case of religious toleranceassuming that is that members of Polands ethnic and religious minorities would not be opposed to their children marrying within their own group. 22. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 23. Ibid. 24. G. E. Marcus, J. L. Sullivan, E. Theiss-Morse, and S. L. Wood, With Malice toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 25. E.g., Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 26. T. Mendelberg, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
390
27. J. Blikowska and W. Ciela, Antysemityzm czy prowokacja? Rzeczpospolita, 29 May 2006. 28. Cf. K. Korzeniowski, Orientacja demokratyczna vs. autorytarna w spoeczestwie polskim, in Wartoci i postawy spoeczne a przemiany systemowe: Szkice z psychologii politycznej, ed. J. Reykowski, 129-154 (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Psychologii PAN, 1993); K. Korzeniowski, Authoritarianism in Poland in the Years of Transformation 1990-1997, Polish Psychological Bulletin 33:4 (2002): 31-38; Krzemiski, Czy Polacy s anty-semitami; Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 29. E.g., P. M. Sniderman, Personality and Democratic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); J. L. Sullivan, J. Piereson, and G. E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Marcus et al., With Malice. 30. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 31. E.g., Datner-piewak, Struktura i wyznaczniki. I do not use income as a predictor in my analysis for three reasons: (1) it was relatively unimportant in previous research compared to more subjective measures of financial well-being, (2) it was completely unrelated to ethnic and religious tolerance in my bivariate analysis, and (3) a large loss of cases due to listwise deletion of missing data would have occurred if I had kept income in the multivariate analysis. 32. J. L. Gibson and M. M. Howard, Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews, British Journal of Political Science 37:2 (2007): 193-223, 195-96. 33. E.g., ibid.; cf. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 34. Gobiowska, Poles Commitment. 35. Ibid., 234. 36. E.g., Gobiowska, Gender Gap in Political Tolerance, Political Behavior 21:1 (1999): 43-66; Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland.; Gobiowska, Poles Commitment; E. A. Gobiowska, Gender and Tolerance, in Tolerance in the Twenty-First Century, ed. G. Moreno-Riano, 113-37 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); M. Hughes and S. A. Tuch, Gender Differences in Whites Racial Attitudes: Are Womens Attitudes Really More Favorable? Social Psychology Quarterly 66:4 (2003): 384-401; Jakubowska-Branicka, Prawa czowieka. 37. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 38. E.g., Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); C. Z. Nunn, H. J. Crockett, and J. A. Williams, Tolerance of Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); L. Bobo and F. C. Licari, Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect, Public Opinion Quarterly 53:3 (1989): 285-308; wida-Ziemba, Tolerancja fasadowa; Datner-piewak, Struktura i wyznaczniki; Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 39. E.g., M. C. Taylor, How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count, American Sociological Review 63:4 (1998): 512-35; R. M. Stein, S. S. Post, and A. L. Rinden, Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes, Political Research Quarterly 53:2 (2000): 285-303. 40. E.g., G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, UK: Addison-Wesley, 1954); T. Pettigrew and L. Tropp, A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90:5 (2006): 751-83. 41. One question that needs to be addressed here is whether ethnic and religious tolerance are qualitatively different or constitute different manifestations of the same form of tolerance. Correlational, reliability, and factor analyses of all indicators of ethnic and religious tolerance suggest that it is appropriate to consider ethnic and religious tolerance as distinct albeit correlated manifestations of tolerance (results available on request). 42. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 43. This unexpected direction might be an artifact of listwise deletion of missing data that has resulted in a relatively large loss of cases. When I recompute the ethnic tolerance model with mean substitution instead of listwise deletion, the effect of perceived finances is no longer statistically significant (results available on request). The remaining effects are stable across the two estimations, with the only difference that the effect of education becomes highly significant in the estimation based on all respondents.
391
44. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 45. Ibid. 46. E.g., Jakubowska-Branicka, Prawa czowieka. 47. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 48. E.g., P. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter, 206-261 (New York: Free Press, 1964). 49. In support of this notion, Jennings demonstrates that ideological constraint based on ratings of wellknown politicians is higher relative to other measures of ideological thinking. K. M. Jennings, Ideological Thinking Among Mass Publics and Political Elites, Public Opinion Quarterly 56:4 (1992): 419-441. 50. E.g., J. L. Gibson, Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years after Stouffers Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, Perspectives on Politics 4:1 (2006): 21-34; cf. Gobiowska, Religious Tolerance in Poland. 51. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, Political Tolerance. 52. Gobiowska, Gender and Tolerance. 53. E.g., Mendelberg, Race Card; E. A. Gobiowska, Anti-Detroit ads in Michigan Electoral Politics: The Case of Implicit Racial Appeals? (manuscript under review, 2008). 54. K. Gebert, Rola antysemityzmu, in Bitwa o Belweder, ed. M. Grabowska and I. Krzemiski, 242-67 (Warsaw, Poland: MYL, 1991). 55. Tusks opponents emphasized his GermanKaszub roots throughout the campaign and raised questions about his Polishness by, for example, publicizing information that his grandfather served in the German army.
Ewa Gobiowska is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University in Detroit, MI. She has written extensively on political, ethnic, and religious tolerance in the United States and Poland. Her recent publications include Poles Support for the Rights of Political Dissenters in Polish Sociological Review and Religious Tolerance in Poland in International Journal of Public Opinion Research.

East European Politics and Societies 2009 Go Biowska 371 91

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

East European Politics and Societies 2009 Go Biowska 371 91

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

East European Politics & Societies http://eep.sagepub.

Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Poland

>> Version of Record - Jul 24, 2009 What is This?

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com by Aras Roxana on October 9, 2012

Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Poland