, Respondents March 25, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner, Catalino P. Arafiles, seek a review of the July 31, 2001 Decision o f the Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for damages against respondents Philippine Journalists, Inc., Romy Morales, Max Buan, Jr., Manuel C. Villareal, Jr. April 14, 1987, while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonig ht, was at the Western Police District Headquarters along United Nations Avenue, Manila, Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric S ciences (NIA) lodge a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcibl e abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape before the then on duty Patrolman Benito Chio at the General Assignments Section of the headqua rters. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news i tem was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damag es. RULING: In case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the injured par ty may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separate and district from the criminal action. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence. The pertinent provi sion of the Civil Code (Human Relations) namely Articles 19 and 21 provide: Arti cle 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his duce, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to anoth er in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall c ompensate the latter of the damages. A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. The whole item, including display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determin ed. Petitioned denied. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J. AR GOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents, September 10, 2001 -364 S.C.R.A. 792FACTS: Respondents Merlin Argos and Jaja Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of the petitioner Internation al Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. (IFFI). The general managers reported directly t o Hernan Costa, the appointed managing director. Costa and respondents had serio us differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, res pondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a “Release Waive r and Quitclaim”. That same time, Costa issued a “Personnel Announcement” which descri bed respondents as “persona non grata” and urged the employees not to have further d ealings with them. Two Informations were filed against Costa for the criminal ch arge of libel. In addition, respondents filed a civil case for damages against C osta and Petitioner Corporation (IFFI), in its subsidiary capacity as employer. ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents could sue petitioner for damages based on sub sidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil C ode, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner’s employee . RULING: Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of de famation, the injured party may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separ ate and distinct from the criminal action. Such civil action proceeds independen tly of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. I n Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), the Court held that Article 33 contem plates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does no t apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liabil ity, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a c riminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his d uties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature. MARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 120 SCRA 193 FACTS: On December 23, 1956, in the mun icipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus owned and operated by private resp ondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent Felard e Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter’s death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Ya p. Thereupon, information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckle ss imprudence was filed against Felarde Paje. On January 23, 1957, an action for damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents, alleging that the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in drivi ng the passenger bus. While the civil case for damages was in progress, the crim inal action proceeded. The accused Felarde Paje was convicted of the offense cha rged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted and the concl usion is that ‘CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even GUILTY of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT.” As a consequence, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the civil case for damages against them invoking the decision of th e Court of Appeals in the criminal case (Corpus vs. Paje). The trial court dismi ssed the civil case for damages. On appeal the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court dismissing the civil case was affirmed. Petitioners averred tha t the civil action they filed was one of the nature of an Independent Civil Acti ons provided under Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, suc h action should proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall req uire only a preponderance of evidence. ISSUE: Is there a valid independent civil action for damages based on physical injuries in this case? RULING: Section 2 o f Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of independent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only p reponderance of evidence to prosper. However, acquittal based on the finding tha t the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an inde pendent civil action if it is based on the crime.

As held in the prior criminal case (Corpus vs. Paje), reckless imprudence or cri minal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the C ivil Code. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the re sult of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no inde pendent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. The charge against Felarde Paje was not for homicide or physical injuries but for re ckless imprudence resulting to homicide (death of Clemente Maricia) and physical injuries suffered by petitioners. They are not one of the three crimes mentione d in Article 33 of the Civil Code; therefore, no civil action shall proceed inde pendently of the criminal prosecution. Jesus B. Ruiz, petitioner, vs. Encarnacion Ucol & the Court of Appeals, responde nts. August 7, 1987 FACTS: The laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Uc ol. Ucol, in her answer, alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol s because of a case filed by respondent’s husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. When the administrative cas e was dismissed, the petitioner filed his own criminal complaint for libel again st Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol s answer. The lower court acquitted Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonabl e doubt. The trial court as to the civil liability of the accused made no pronou ncement. Instead of appealing, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the appellate co urt certified the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil act ion for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel. RULING: The co ntentions of the petitioner have no merit. Art. 33 of the Civil Code, independen tly of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damage s arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. The civil liability ari sing from the crime charged may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve hi s right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. The Supreme Court did not find any defamatory imputation, which causes dishonor, or discredi t to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libel ous attack against her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty and integr ity and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood. Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to responde nt Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife



Heir of the deceased. Issue: In case of conflict betwe en the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof. with respect to property relations of th e spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Christensen. oppositor-appellant January 31. Juridically. DECEAS ED. is considered valid a nd produces all its civil effects. AZNAR. during the entire period of his residence in this country he had alw ays considered himself a citizen of California. 85 of the Civil Code. Federico contends tha t.” Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact. In view thereof. 1951. he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his deat h. Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN.of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. 992 of the CC. 3 Art. migrated to Cal ifornia. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or vo idable marriage? Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child? Ruling: Petition dismissed Art. VS. On the other hand. . a voidable marriage. The effects of void marriages. allegi ng based on Art. where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same s tatus. though born in New York. the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. CHRISTENSEN. which should pre vail? Related thereto. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived o f voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitima te. Ar t. and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status. Isabel’s father Emilio. the annulment of a marr iage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. However. 1963 FACTS: Edward E. had predeceased his mother Cristina. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpre tation and application of laws. which was in effect at the time. rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good fait h or in bad faith. that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the ma rriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld. Cou nsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied. As such the co nflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be recon cilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalre d by the CFI as “null and void. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. inter alia. hence this petition for certiorari. the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children co nceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate. Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir.” IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. and are also called natural children by legal fiction. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Execut or and Heir-appellees. that under Cali fornia law. The trial court had denied Feder ico’s Motion to Dismiss. In his will executed on March 5. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision sta tes that the marriage be “declared null and void. In 1913. until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter. that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. rights and obl igations as acknowledged natural children. but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. ADOLFO C.” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA.

000 delivered to her. it will form a circular pattern referring to bo th country back and forth. Prior to his death.that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable.000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40. Subsequently. PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY. Violet Kennedy and finally. executo r. Texas.. whom he had divorced. in equal shares. ought to be followed. the law of his domicile. Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which hi s distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and man ner: a.” Christensen being domiciled outside Cali fornia. the executor divided the residuary estate i nto 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by hi s 1st and 2nd marriages. oppositors-appellants. the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate c hildren under Philippine law. Mary Mallen. that finally.000 each or a total of P120. In the project partition. counsel for the heir of Christe nsen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Co de. $240.000. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS. The People’s Bank and Trust Company. Where it is referred back to California. our courts must immediately app ly the internal law of California on the matter. Among the 3 illegitimate children. 1967 FACTS: Amos Bellis. The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration. that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any proper ty possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally. 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife.000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen. ET. paid the entire bequest therein. AL. Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported. was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. born in Texas. Amos Bellis died a reside nt of San Antonio. is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Mari Cristina and Mi riam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children . EDW ARD A. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippin es. and the leg acies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary M allen by the shares of stock amounting to $240. deceased. the national law of the deceased must apply. BELLIS. illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed. .000 each. He had 5 le gitimate children with his wife. On the other hand. inter alia. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christen sen? RULING: The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen sa id in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California. Preparatory to closing its administration. 3 illegitimate children . c. heir-appellees June 6. BELLIS. and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The Ca lifornia conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place wher e personal property is situated. VS. USA. b. the executor submitt ed and filed its “Executor’s Final Account. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives. the Philippines. P120. an executor of the will.

was. albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifet ime. since the pro perties here involved are found in the Philippines. as of now. RULING: It is not dispute d that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the t ime of his death. however. Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since. as explained earlier. under t he terms of the will of Mrs. she was citizen of Te xas but. as matters stand at t his stage. At the time of her death. there are no forced heirs or le gitimates. Nonetheless. whether of fact or of law. cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership propertie s. it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno. on any of these t wo issues. and We. if Texas has conflict rule ad opting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law o f the place where the properties are situated. it should not be presumed differe nt from our appellants. Under the circumstances presently obtaini ng and in the state of the record of these cases. as contended by PCIB. under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimate ly applicable. however domiciled in the Philippines. We reiterate. th e Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis . Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just sta ted. PCIB VS. but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the pri nciple of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent l aws of Texas. that pending such further proceedings. her husband could not have anyway legally a djudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conju gal partnership. RULING: It is nece ssary that the Texas law be ascertained. however of p roofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas. as hereinabove indicated. The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providi ng that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law . reserve said issues for further proceedings and re solution in the first instance by the court o quo. In li ne with Texas law. that which should be proven is the law enforced during the de ath of Hodges and not in any other time. minus what. but would still refer to Texas Law. Hodges. the resulting estate of Mrs. such one-fourth .ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply. ISSUE: Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable. for even if it were assumed that. The parties admit that the decedent. USA and that under the Laws of Texas. since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the wil l and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testame ntary provisions to her husband. position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renv oi. by Hodges in favor of third persons since then. Hodges. the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling. as of the time of her death. Accordingly. was a citizen of the State of Texas. renvoi would arise. of which Magno is the uncontested admi nistratrix. Amos Bellis. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. it is apparent and necessary to know what law should b e applied. have been grat uitously disposed of therefrom. and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively re nounced his inheritance from his wife. To see whether the testament ary provisions are valid. In the absence. therefore.

(The Legend of Malakas and Magan da) When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular. the court believes tha t no harm. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 2003. From then on. He underwent psych ological examination. Hence. “anatomically male but feels. (Genesis 5:1-2) Amihan gazed upon the bambo o reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. taking into account already the legi time of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code. . does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel. then twice. On August 18. On February 23. petitioner. Feeling trapped in a man’s body. this petition. thought and acted like a woman. granting the petition would bring the muchawaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fiancé and the realization of their dreams. Out came tw o human beings. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January 27. one was a male and the other was a female. 2006. stating that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the princi ples of justice and equity. All of a sudden. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely. 174689 Oct ober 22. petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in gra nting the petition. now possesses the physique of a female.share would be her free disposable portion.” and his sex from “male” to “f male. ISSUE: Whether or not the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civ il Code. petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dante s Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birt h certificate in the RTC of Manila. who has always felt. “Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!.” On June 4. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. 2002. alleging that he is a male transse xual.: When God created man. Branch 8. On the contrary.” the voices said. Amihan named the man “M alakas” (Strong) and the woman “Maganda” (Beautiful). the Court of Appeals rendere d a decision in favor of the Republic. thru the OSG. he consulted several doctors in the United States. J. Likewise. Thailand. the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner . drugs and counseling w ith regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of n ame and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex re assignment surgery? FACTS: On November 26. Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. the bamboo cracked and slit open. 2007 CORONA. that is. hormone treatment and breast augmentation. It alle ged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. He made him in the likeness of G od. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. that with his sexual re-assignment. and set aside the decision of the trial c ourt. She pecked the reed once. the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) . 2003. thinks and acts as a female” and that h e had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He created them male and female.

the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition shoul d have been filed with the local . Petitions f or change of name are controlled by statutes. Rather than avoiding confusion. A change of name is a privilege. In sum. form and procedure. In addition. Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. any prejudice t hat he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. not a right. n ot judicial. or even allege. Under the law. In this connection. therefore. he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Ru les 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the C ivil Registry) of the Rules of Court. Authority to Corr ect Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person can change his name or surname without judic ial authority. jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now p rimarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. he must pre sent proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. changing petitioner’s first name for his de clared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first nam e may be allowed: SECTION 4. or (3) The change will avoid confusion. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassig nment. – No ent ry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In sum. (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitio ner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the communi ty. – The p etition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the follow ing cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous. the remedy and the proce edings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature. e xcept for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil regis trar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its imp lementing rules and regulations. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. I t vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Before a person can legally change his given name. However. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil statu s. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through sur gery.HELD: A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT Th e State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purpo ses of identification. until and unless an administrative petitio n for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In particular. Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. It likewise lays do wn the corresponding venue. he failed to show.

includi ng those corresponding to his first name and sex.civil registrar concerned. NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON T HE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. That no correction must involve the change of nationality. (7) legitimations. events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. (8) adoptions. Acts. Mor e importantly. In effect. age . that is. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in the civil r egister shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. and (16) changes of name. . For all these reasons. transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous. to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with so mething else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. events and judicial decrees concernin g the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. assuming it could be legally done. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. 408. this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. or (12) r ecovery of citizenship. a correction in the civil regi stry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. In this connection. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative. The acts. that provided und er RA 9048. such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like. (9 ) acknowledgments of natural children. and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: P rovided. (6) judgments d eclaring marriages void from the beginning. 407. ART. (3) deaths. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: “Clerical or typograp hical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing. which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. Together with Ar ticle 376 of the Civil Code. To correct simply means “to make or set aright. were all correct. (4) legal separations. (14) judicial determination of filiation. (10) naturalization. no reasonable interpretatio n of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on t he ground of sex reassignment.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor. All entries therein. (11) loss. RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of t he Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Under RA 9048. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and corr ectable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. (2) marriages . the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was conc erned. No correctio n is necessary. status or sex of the petitioner. However. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. (13) civil interdiction. it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. Rule 108 now applies only to su bstantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. (5) annulments of marriage. however. copying. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.

the declaration of either parent of the newborn child. marriage.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova. loss or recovery of citiz enship. 5. “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is. marriages. . is immutable. the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of hi s or her birth. The compre hensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal person ality. Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides: SEC. of the mo ther alone. Furthermore. Moreover. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. acknowledgments of illegitimate children and na turalization). naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations. expressly or impliedly.” Thus. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or. the sex of a person is determined at birth. (e) place where the infant was born. by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child. adoptions. Thus. events (such as births. and its various asp ects. the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not inc lude persons who have undergone sex reassignment. In such declaration. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. (c) names. (d) civil status of parents.Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of cert ain acts (such as legitimations. In this connection. (b) sex and nationality of infant. These acts. civil interdiction. In contrast. capacity to have rights in general. legitimation. When words are not defin ed in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the ab sence of a contrary legislative intent. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause. judicial determination of filiation and changes of n ame). status and nationality of a person. such as his being legitimate or illegitimate. an d sometimes even succession. sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. adoption. or his being married or not. Considering that there is no law legally recogn izing sex reassignment. in case the father is not known. annulments of marriage. family relations. in default thereof. such as birth. events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that to uch upon the legal capacity. not ordinarily terminable at his own will. mo re or less permanent in nature. divorce. visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by exami ning the genitals of the infant. In this connection. declaratio ns of nullity of marriages. there bei ng no legislative intent to the contrary. naturalization. sex is defined as “t he sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female. the sum total of capacities and incapaci ties) of a person in view of his age. if not attended by error. Their effects a re expressly sanctioned by the laws. an d (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law. the person above mentioned shall certify to the following fac ts: (a) date and hour of birth. Registration and certification of bir ths. The words “sex. Under the Civil Register Law. nationality and his family membership. Such decla ration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth. ci tizenship and religion of parents or. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: All other matters perta ining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. emancipation.” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other la ws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage. a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations. shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.

Congress. there is no legal basi s for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth cert ificate. the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry. not to make or ame nd it. One of its e ssential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-oper ative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category “female. what proof must be presented and what procedures sh all be observed. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantial ly reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has underg one sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with hi s reassigned sex. one of the most sacred social institutions.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged. this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter. injury or prejudice to anyone.” However. where they may be filed. In our system of government. even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage t o his male fiancé. Thus. while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery. Second. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. To reitera te. what grounds may be invoked. it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislat ion. no law authorizes the change of ent ry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-rangin g legal and public policy consequences.“words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning a re presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the co ntrary. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm. The Court cannot enact a law where no l aw exists. It i s true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall d ecline to render judgment by reason of the silence. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. However. First. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularl y important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. or on anything else. T his is wrong. should it choose to do so. marriage. However.” For these reasons. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law. obscurity or insufficiency o f the law. certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumpt ion of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. among others. to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effe cts of sex reassignment. it is for the legislature. there are various laws w hich apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on emp loyment of women. It w ill allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY The trial court opined that its grant of the pe tition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. . It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branc h of government.

Petitioners question the admission by respon dent Court of Appeals of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against the AIA. Araneta Universi ty Village. Petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondent to remove and dismantle their improvements on the said lot . t he ownerdeveloper of the subdivision project. Respondents Go appealed. Malabon. Quedding and Li Ching Yao was DISMISSED. life is indeed an ordeal. It affirmed the dismissa l of the third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint agai nst Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time peti tioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her property. the Cou rt of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and tha t. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA’s fault was not proved. And it was this surve y that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father’s land. The appellate court. not by the courts. the petition is hereby DENIED.Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happines s. at least for them. contentment and [the] realization of their dreams. petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil Case for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court. Eden Ballatan only discovered the said encroa chment when she constructed her house and which was surveyed by Engineer Jose Qu edding. Metro Manila. 3. Failing to agree amicably. J ose N. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the paramete rs of his father’s land. In short. Petitioners claim that the third-party com plaint should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of juris diction due to third-party plaintiffs’ failure to pay the docket and filing fees b efore the trial court. Ruling: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint again st AIA. The Go’ s filed their “Answer with Third-Party Complaint” impleading as third-party defendan ts respondents Li Ching Yao. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court of appeals erred on question of law a nd gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did n ot dismiss the third –party complaint due to non-payment of any filing of docket f ee.No. the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislat ure. WHEREFORE. however. Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. found that it was the erroneous surve y by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. Poinsettia Street. Judgment was rendere d in favor of the plaintiffs but the third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiffs Go against third-party defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture. However. 125683) Facts: This is a dispute over forty-two (42) squ are meters of residential land belonging to petitioners. Ballatan vs CA (G. the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA). the complaint must be .R. respondents Go had no knowledge that they encro ached petitioners’ lot. Parties herein were own ers of adjacent lots located at Block No. the AIA and Engineer Quedding.

the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another applies to substantive rights and procedural remedies. of connivance and fil es a civil case against them. In real actions . UnderArt 22. An offer would be made by Lim of to pay the balanc e. Harrison Lumber et al. obscurity or inefficiency of the laws. Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposi t the 10. as said deposit is not among the provisional remedi es provided for in the Rules of Court. Reyes petition for certiotrari was denied by the CA. courts can extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court. barring prescription. respondent October 2. GARCIA-RECIO. Art. Issue: Is the order to deposit the downpa yment subject matter of the case proper considering that it is not among the pro visional remedies provided for in the Rules of Court Ruling: While the matter of deposit is not provided for the in the Rule of Court. who had still not vacated the property. 9 of the Civil Code mandates the cou rts to make a ruling despite “the silence. Th e additional filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award. Ten million (10.00 ) was initially paid by Lim upon the signing of the contract. this is a case when there is a hiatus in the law.000. VS.a. to pay attorney’s fees to respondents Go is affirmed. vacates the same and an Absolute Deed of Sale is executed.000. A penalty was to be paid by Reyes.000. if any If the complaint is filed but the fees are not pai d at the time of filing.00 to be paid when the present occupant of the property . RECIO . as third-party defendant. if t he property is not vacated within a designated period. The Dec ision of the Court of Appeals dismissing third-party complaint against Araneta I nstitute of Agriculture is affirmed. The trial court grants thi s motion. a rescission of t he contract creates the obligation to return the thing subject matter of the con tract.00 downpayment with the RTC cashier. the with a remaini ng balance of 18. RODERICK A. In a the original case. Late r. GR 134241 Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer had entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. Reyes would accuse Lim an d Harrison Lumber. hence this petition. 2001 .k. Reyes avers that the trial court erred when it ordered the deposit of the downpayment. it was revealed that the property had already been sold to a third party. the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of th e fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant. petitioner.accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. a. If left alone. As the aggrieved party has no other actions available based on any other provision of contract or law. and a subsequent offer would be made by Reyes to return the downpayment. Harrison Lumber. to be taken against the remaining balance. GARCIA. As the contract between the parties can no longer be enforced.000. Reyes vs. Reyes Motion to set Aside the Order and MotforReconsideration would be denied by the trial court.000. Th e Supreme Court ruled that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals be modifi ed as follows: The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer Quedding. such hiatus would result to the unjust e nrichment of Reyes at the expense of Lim. GRACE J. the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amou nt of damages claimed. GRACE J.Lim.000. This calls for application of equity w hich fills the open spaces of the law.

may be recog nized in the Philippines. it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured. Together with other evidences submitted. he was legally capacitate d to marry petitioner in 1994. hence. In this case. 2. In 1998. in Cabanatuan City. th eir conjugal assets were divided. Although. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and reco gnized in the Philippines. Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent mar riage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacita ting him or her to remarry”. in Rizal in 1987. the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic. before they were married. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreign er. respondent was declared as “single” and “Filip ino”. a Filipino was married to Editha Samson. In their application for marriage license. and in 1996 while in Autralia. a Filipina. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens. issued by an Australian family court. Therefore.FACTS: The respondent. On the other hand. they lived separately. Hence. he married Grace Garcia. o ur courts cannot grant it. before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce. and compliance with the rules on evidence regardin g alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated. adequately established his legal capacity to marry u nder Australian law. RULING: The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Sams on was proven. an Australian ci tizen. Case remanded to the court a quo. responden t claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993. claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. they don’t ab solutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreig n law. not to its a dmissibility. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Ga rcia. the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the forei gn law allowing it. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusi vely showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. herein petitioner. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bi gamy”. sti ll restrict remarriage. . Even af ter the divorce becomes absolute. this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. With the lack of such evidence. absolute divorce t erminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In t his case. However. the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissol ving the marriage. which was va lidly admitted as evidence. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a d ivorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence. appearance is not sufficient. ISSUES: 1. I n 1989. the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. the court may under some foreign statutes. the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates. respondent acquired Australian citizenship. provided it is consistent with their respective laws. In 1992. In 1994. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreig n law governing his status. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been rest ricted. petitioner filed Complaint for Declar ation of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. there are two types of divorce. Since October 1995.

. which later on became final. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Law shall apply. LLORENTE. Be fore the proceeding could be terminated. petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divor ce proceedings before the Nevada Court. Llorente filed a divorce in Califor nia. He filed a petition of p robate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. USA in 1982. The case was remanded to th e court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorent e’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of for eign law. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. resp ondents November 23. Paula filed a letter of a dministration over Llorente’s estate. petitioner. as Presiding Judg e of Branch CX. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. He made his last will and testament stating that a ll his properties will be given to his second marriage. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. 1985 FACTS: Alice Reyes. Complaint is dismissed. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dor n. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus the divorce obtained b y Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but h is National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American cit izen.PAULA T. Upon his visitation of his wife. As state d in Article 15 of the civil code. VS. he left for the US where through naturalization. . MANUEL ROMILLO JR. They had two children and they were divorce d in Nevada. HON. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets? RULING: The petition is granted. LLORENTE. Su ch was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. 1982. which af firmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owne r of whatever properties. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of t he US Navy. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s bu siness is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared wit h right to manage the conjugal property. Lorenzo died. respondents October 8. Furthermore. The child was registered as legitimat e but the name of the father was left blank. VS. RUL ING: Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. his National Law allowed divorce. provided t hat they are validly required in their National Law. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they estab lished residence in the Philippines. Soon after. Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City a nd RICHARD UPTON. where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11. she and the deceased. 2000 FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. he discovered that she was liv ing with his brother and a child was born. may have acquired during their 2 5 years of cohabitation. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals. ALICE REYES VAN DORN. the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a cit izen of the United States. he beca me a US Citizen.

including that issued by the American Airlines constitutes a sing le operation. Petitioner American Airlines filed a motion to dismiss the action for damages filed by the private respondent for the lack of jurisdiction under section 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. under which divorce dissolves marriage. purs uant to his national law. However. AMERICAN AIRLINES. a law student of the University of the East. the motion was denied. Petitioner’s acquiescence to take place of the original designate d carrier binds it under the contract of carriage entered into by the private re spondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. BERNARDO LL. However. respondent February 17. COURT OF APPEALS. . respondents March 9. the contract of carriage between the private responded and S ingapore Airlines although performed by different carriers under a series of air lines tickets. al iens may obtain divorce abroad. Thus. findings of the Court of A ppeals are affirmed. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial court’s decision. VS. Therefore.The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. private respondent is no longer the husband of petitio ner. However. detained him f or about an hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all the other pas sengers have boarded. he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination. 2000 FACTS: Plaintiff Mendoza filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged embar rassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva airport when the American Airlines security officers prevented him from boarding the plane. petitioner. Members of the TATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. He is estopped by his own representat ion before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal propert y. 2000 FACTS: Romeo Jader. From the standards of Americ an law. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA. failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his la st school year. which may be recognized in the Philippines provi ded they are valid according to their national law. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of transportation between the private respondent and private re spondent would be considered as a single operation and part of the contract of t ransportation entered into by the private respondent with Singapore Airlines in Manila? RULING: No. they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contract ed passengers to boost ticket sales worldwide which are inaccessible in some par ts of the world. JADER. HON. petitioner. VS. the divorce in Nevada released p rivate respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. ROMEO A. Case was ordered to be remanded for more investigation for action against damages.

1990. The CA awarded moral damages. From then on. He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. 2008 2:47 pm Offline Junior Member User ava tar Joined: Tue Aug 07. the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages ca nnot be awarded to Romeo Jader. she was not able to report f or work. It opined t hat as a student. Bukidnon where the petitioner Cruz was employed. Along this vein. The decision was affirmed with modi fication. petitioner colla psed and was brought to the hospital. it had its bran ch in Valencia. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficie ncy. ISSUE: Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages. While the Cou rt held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual dam ages in favor of Jader. NLRC February 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with m odification. JURISPR UDENCE Report this post Top Profile Send private message Reply with quote OzqC P ost subject: PostPosted: Thu Jun 05. and pain. the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby n o moral damages can be awarded in his favor. _________________ CONCLUSION. 2007 5:10 pm Posts: 385 Location: Santiago City CRUZ VS. he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. On account of suffering moral shock. wounded feelings and sle epless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam. are in order. If respon dent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar. LAW. 2000 FACTS: The private respondent Norkis Distributors Inc. he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted f or actual damages. the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. RULING: In view of the foregoing issue. besmirched reputation. Thus. serious anxiety. On October 14. On . APPLICABILITY TO SITUATION..In the 2nd semester. he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations. It cannot believe that he suffered shock. his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for g raduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies. he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Cebu. On April to September 1998. mental anguish. especially those appertaining to his academics. while petitioners and her co-employees were busy working. trauma . It is engaged in the business of selling motorcycles a nd household appliances. he a ttended the investiture ceremonies and graduated. the plaintiff’s name appeared. i s a domestic corporation. It was operating in Mandaue City.

On March 18. she received a termination letter dated November 2. RCPI VS. ISSUE: Whether or not there was negligence on the part of petitioner as to ent itle the respondents for damages. Rule 1 Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementin g the Labor Code. they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the private respondent praying for paym ent of separation pay and other money claims before the NLRC Branch of Cayagan d e Oro City. 1991. GLOBE MCKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. The Court has consistently accorded the working class a right to recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted with bad faith. The respondents never received the cablegram from the Mercy Hospital. exemplary and actual damages . admitting respondent wife for a rotating internship in said hospital. Respondents sued for damages. she sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify her status o f employment but as an answer. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is legal. Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed e mployee is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminate d by the employer. they received the cable message from another cablegram compa ny. both parties appealed to the NLRC where the decision was reve rsed and set aside. There is merit in petitioner’s submission that th e award of moral and exemplary damages in her favor is warranted by her unjustif ied dismissal. RULING: The telegraph company’s failure to deliv er the cablegram constitutes gross negligence arising from a breach of contract because the service of the said company is to ensure that cablegrams will be sen t to its recipients. where the moti ve of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from noble. The petition is granted. In fact. RULING: Under Section 8. From the said decision. New York. VS BARRIOS 119 SCRA 461 FACTS: Petit ioner failed to deliver to respondents a cablegram from Mercy Hospital. The respondent couple is entitled to damages. The trial court r endered judgment in favor of respondents for moral. 1990 citing health reasons for the dismissal. The Labor Arbitration Branch ruled in favor of the petitioner. As a consequence of which. COURT OF APPEALS 143 SCRA 657 . Buffalo. the continued employment of such employee is prohibited by law or prejud icial to his health or to the health of his coemployees and there must be a cert ification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nat ure or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months eve n with proper medical treatment. 1990. for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the em ployee.December 28. she was unable to signify her acceptance and the pet ition was given to someone else.

the petitioners are barred from raising the complaint because the decis ion of the trial court is final and executory. RULING: With respect to the firs t issue. and the decision was in favor of Dionela. Pacifico Mabasa owned a parcel of land. The Court affirmed the assailed decision. the award of damages has no legal basis. IS SUES: 1. the decision of the R TC was affirmed. as claimed by the Court of Appeals . the petitioner can ac t only through its employees. a contract is entered into. On the other hand. ISSUES: 1. CUSTODIO AND SANTOS VS. the defendants mentioned of some inconveniences of having a passageway in their property. It was still said to be liable since every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of t he petitioner. When it was appealed to the Court of Appeals. One of its employees had committed an error of send ing libelous messages to a certain Loreto Dionela. RCPI then went to the Supreme Court. Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speak s for itself) was the doctrine applied by considering the presence of facts or c ircumstances surrounding the injury.FACTS: Petitioner was a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receivin g and transmitting messages. W hether or not the award of damages is in order. In contracts. In order for him to enter th e premises of his property. he had to use a portion of the land of the Santos’s as passageway. Brigida Custodio. there was no sufficient publication of the libe lous telegram. 2. COURT OF APPEALS -253 SCRA 483FACTS: A Civil Case was fi led for Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio. Breach of contract was committed then. One may use any law ful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted . As a corporation. praying that it was not li able to the respondent since the criminal act from which the civil liability aro uses was an act of its employee. As a consequence. RULING: Respondent committed brea ch of contract through the negligence of its employees. Whether the grant of right of way to private respondent is proper. the negligence of the e mployee is the negligence of the employer. Lito Santos and Maria Cristina Santos filed the grant of an easement of ri ght of way. with respect t o the second issue. a case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. To hold that the petitione r is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitio ner’s business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the pe titioner of an effective and adequate remedy. However. without the knowledge or consent of the sender . and that the liability of the petitioner arising from Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was erroneous. Whether or not Dionela was entitled to have some indemnifation from the pet itioner due to damages incurred by the latter. Rosalina Mo rato. Whether or not Articles 19 a nd 20 of the Civil Code was violated by RCPI. 2. A case was filed in the Regional Trial Court and the defendants were ordered to give plaintiff permanent access to the property and the plaintiff was ordered to pay indemnity for the use of the passageway. Hence. Libelous messages or matters were inc luded in the message transmitted. the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.

Petitioner made a request that she be transferred to another school. Hence. thus. the woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the man p romised to marry her. but in a letter she relayed that she is withdrawing her request for transfer a nd indicated her intention of remaining at the Araullo High School. In F ebruary 1954. Thereafter. The elements of abuse of one’s rights under Article 19 are the following: (1) there is a legal right or dut y. ANDRADE VS. HERMOSISIMA VS. but merely the result of the valid exercise of author ity. On the other hand. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten years younger than complaina nt. that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily o r unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honest y and good faith. RULING: While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been intended as a declaration of principle. In this regard. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing o r injuring another. the principal referred her back t o the department head. A careful review of t he records reveals that the declaration of petitioner as an excess teacher was n ot motivated by any personal desire on the part of principal Wingsing to cause h er undue misery or injury. no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. and an apprentice pilot. which was f avorably acted upon by the superintendent. 555December 7. 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Virginia Andrade was appointed as a permanent English teacher at the Araullo Hi gh School. Because of this. 629FACTS: The complainant Soledad Ca gigas is thirty six years old. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to plaintiff. as well as for support of said child and mora l . Two days before the regular classes. he opens himself to civil liability.. On appeal. Petitioner started reporting for work . Intimacy developed between them and thus sometime 1 953 after coming from the movies. COURT OF APPEALS -371 S.g. the petitioner wrote to the Assistant Sc hools Division Superintendent Coronel requesting that she be given a teaching as signment. she inquired from Department Hea d Virginia Fermin of her teaching load but the latter instead referred her to Pr incipal Dominador Wingsing.A.C. e. the Court of Appeals reversed the dec ision and dismissed the complaint of petitioner. However. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a p rivate clinic. a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent. it appeared that the complaint of petitioner Andrade failed to meet the second and third requirements.may cause damage to another. which in turn held the principal liable to her for a ctual and compensatory damages. COURT OF APPEALS -109 PHIL. Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for acknowledgement of her child as a natural child of the petitioner. filing an action for dama ges before the trial court. they had sexual intercourse in his cabin.R. The superintendent informed the petitioner that she would be designate d to a non-teaching position in the meantime that arrangements were being made f or her eventual reassignment to other schools where her services may be needed. petitioner discovered that her name has been deleted from the regular monthly pa yroll and transferred to a special voucher list. the “cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid. He later told this to plaintiff. The evidence on other pertinent facts is however conflicting. HON. They liv ed as husband and wife in the house of one Adolfo Dagawan until Rodrigo left and never returned. On appeal of the p etitioner. the CA affirmed the assailed decision however increased the amount fo r actual and moral damages. C. He was a llowed to go home and was then placed under the custody of a town mayor by his p arents. Plaint iff filed an action against Rodrigo and his father Maximo Quinit to recover dama ges for breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo to marry her.damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. when he did not appear before a notary public. she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even befor e they had the benefit of clergy. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible. RULING: It is urged by the plaintiff that said Court had erre d in not awarding moral damages to her. He refused to acknowledge the marriage application. was reversed by the Cou rt of Appeals. P laintiff tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged despite the opposition of the latter’s mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and de fray the expenses of the marriage. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH. The trial court r endered judgment in favor of plaintiff. accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers intimidated him. Rodrigo was agreeable to marry the plaintiff after his graduation but the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to take pla ce sooner. Galang vs. Because of his continued refusal to marry the plaintiff. awarded actual damages and moral damages.A. respondents February 19. However when Rodrigo was not able to secure a marriage license for lack of a residence certificate. RULING: The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the i ntant case because it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrenderin g herself to him because she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed by her love for him. The CFI declared the child a nat ural daughter of the defendant. which on appeal. but Rodrigo’s parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. On the other hand. The father even took them to the house of Dag awan for them to stay as husband and wife. which was provided b y Dagawan for him to sign. but this question has alre ady been settled adversely to plaintiff’s pretense in Hemosisima vs. The plai ntiff convinced him to go to Dagawan’s house where she followed and stayed thereaf ter. ordered Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony. the d efendants sough to establish that he and plaintiff were engaged but his parents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo’s parent s told him to leave the parental home. Because of continued relationships with the plaintiff. vs. -4 SCRA 55FACTS: Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit wer e engaged. petitioner. the latter’s relativ es. She insists that moral damages for breac h of promise to marry are collectible under our laws. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for breach of promise to marry. Court of Appe als. he went back to h is hometown to get such certificate but never returned. 1993 . GONZA LES.

FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagu pan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent wa s a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was alle gedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latte r, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged th at the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not material ize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from t he petitioner. The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the judgm ent of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accorda nce of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whet her or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the pe titioner. RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, sin ce the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that she had ju st let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, si nce she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had a lready looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors f or the marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the resp ondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner. BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant December 26, 19 64 FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, V elez went away and Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco a nd asked the latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended that there is no p rovision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Howeve r, the court did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is tru e that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered fr ustration and public humiliation. ISSUE: Did the court err in ordering the defen dant to pay plaintiff moral damages? RULING: The case at bar is not a mere breac h of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for inv itations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to p ay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted frau dulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, vs. RON ZABARTE, respondent February 26, 2001 F ACTS: The petitioner owed the respondent a money obligation that stemmed from a partnership interest in the State of California. The Superior Court of the State of California rendered a judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent in cons onance with a compromised agreement entered into by the parties. The respondent commenced an action for enforcement of the money judgment in the Philippine cour t. The petitioner filed an answer to the motion. The respondent then filed a mot ion for summary judgment since the former was not able to give a genuine issue. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the summary judgment, affirmed the fo reign judgment and moved for the completion of the judgment’s execution. The Court of Appeals affirmed said ruling. Hence, the petitioner’s appeal to the Supreme Co urt gained ground. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the grant for summary judgment is n ot erroneous. 2. Whether or not there is unjust enrichment. RULING: The lower co urt did not err in resolving the matter through summary judgment because petitio ner was not able to pose a genuine issue to any material fact. It is apparent th at summary judgment is used for the prompt dispositions of actions regarding a l egal issue. The Supreme Court upheld that there is no merit on the issue of unju st enrichment. The petitioner claimed that the foreign judge made him shoulder a ll the liabilities in the case even if there were two other defendants. The Supr eme Court cannot exonerate petitioner for his obligation under the foreign judgm ent because the foreign judgment itself does not mention those other defendants, their participation or their liability to the respondent. It was proved that th e petitioner was the one who chose to represent the other defendants; hence, he cannot be allowed to impugn a decision based on this ground. Unjust enrichment o r solutio indebiti cannot be applied to his case. The doctrine contemplates paym ent where there is no duty to pay and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. The petitioner owed money and the judgment merely required him to pay it. Concepcion vs. C.A. -324 S.C.R.A. 85FACTS: Respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allen Nicolas resided in an apartment leased by owner, Bing Concepcion who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was. Nestor engaged in a busin ess where Bing joined in the venture by contributing capital. Thereafter, petiti oner Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased- husband of Bing, angrily accos ted Nestor at his apartment and accused him of having an adulterous relationship with Bing. To clarify matters, they went to see some relatives of the Concepcio n Family, who allegedly knew about the relationship, however, the latter denied knowledge of such. The two confronted Bing on the matter and also denied the imp utations of the petitioner. As a result, Nestor suffered extreme embarrassment a nd shame. His business venture declined and the husband and wife often had quarr els. Because of the refusal of the petitioner to apologize to the spouses, the l atter filed a civil suit for damages against the former. The trial court rendere d decision in favor of the respondents, which was affirmed by the Court of Appea ls.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis in awarding the damages. RULING: It d oes not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was be less than an invasion of the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philoso phy behind Article 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil l aw. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personalit y must be exalted. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civ ilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. Thus, under this articl e, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for viola tions of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. The violation s mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples an d do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowab le for actions against a person’s dignity. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, m oral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious a nxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral chock, social humiliation , and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recove red if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNILDA, respo ndents February 15, 2001 FACTS: Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage for two lots in favor of petitioner Sergio Amonoy to secure him of his attorney’s fees in a case for the settlement of an estate inv olving six parcels of land. However, the two died before the taxes have been pai d, claims settled and properties adjudicated and the estate was declared closed and terminated, thus, the attorney’s fees of petitioner, secured by the lots were left unpaid. Judgment, in petitioner’s action for foreclosure required the heirs t o pay the attorney’s fees secured by the mortgage, and that failure to pay would s ubject the lots to sale at a public auction. The heirs failed to pay, consequent ly, the lots were foreclosed and an auction sale was held where petitioner was t he highest bidder. Included in those sold was the lot on which the respondents G utierrez spouses had their house. On Amonoy’s motion, an order was issued on the d emolition of the structure. The respondents then filed an action against the tri al court deputy sheriff and Amonoy. The Supreme Court granted a temporary restra ining order (TRO) enjoining the demolition of the respondents’ houses and a copy w as served to petitioner; however, he pursued the demolition of the respondents’ ho use. Thus a complaint for damages against petitioner Amonoy was filed. ISSUE: Wh ether or not liability for damages in favor of respondents was with merit. RULIN G: Although the acts of petitioner may have been justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted in bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that led the suit before the trial court. His acts constituted not only an abuse of r ight, but also an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he re ceived the TRO from the Court. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed wit h the demolition. Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a p rinciple premised on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby,

and malicious mischief c ommitted by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability. COURT OF APPEALS 269 SCRA 283 FACTS: On November 7.liability cannot be obscured. Santiago. and. SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS. Therefore. HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING. the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr. he was with Fiscal Ambrocio. George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going h ome. GEORGE MANANTAN. for instance. vs. the Supreme Court ruled that the p roceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the recover y of damages of the victim’s heirs. which means that the civil case for damage s was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delic t. petiti oner’s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the dama ge caused to another by reason of one’s act or omission. Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicola s. coming from the opposite . at the National Highwa y of Malvar. collided with the Phi lippine Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and wth a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez. THE COURT OF APPEALS. Mexico Pampa nga. Thus. whether done intentionall y or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. the ac quittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. As a consequence. respondents Janu ary 29. In the ultimate analysis. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nat ure as. a jeepney. Guaring died. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. 1987. Isabela. Thus.. The case was remanded to the trial court to de termine the civil liability of the accused. along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael. the civil liability is not ext inguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. VS. petitioner. claiming that the civil case should pursue. but lost in the Court of Appeals where the accused was acquitted bas ed on reasonable doubt. 2001 FACTS: In the evening of September 25. The accused the claimed appealed in the court tha t the civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of h is criminal liability necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liabil ity. in the felonies of estafa. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case must be terminated as a consequence of the termination of the criminal case based on reasonable doubt. where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act o f which the accused was acquitted. The petition ers disagreed on this ground. This w as then appealed to the Supreme Court. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict. Suddenly. This was because it was found out that the deceased was the one who acted negligently. theft. it has been held: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. The trial court ruled in favor of herein p etitioners. much less abated. At that time. JR. 1982. since his civil liability aroused from his criminal liability.

whi ch caused the death of Bonite. ZOSA -162 SCRA 173FACTS: At about 2:00 pm on September 24. So upon this. vs.direction hit the driver side of the car. Trial followed. the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his disc harge. Manantan claimed that he was placed on dou ble jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this contention. Petitioners did not appeal but instead filed a civil case for damages. the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him to indemn ify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas. Florencio Bonite was working as “caminero” of the Bureau of Public Highways at Barri o Vicente Alto. Thus. hit him. (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated . Mr. There fore. the issue was about t he civil aspect of the criminal case. The same judge dismissed the instant case stating that the parties earlier reserve the ri ght to file a civil case. Consequently. the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by preponderance of evidence. driven by Manantan. The following elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy mus t have attached prior to the second. 1968. The heirs of Bonite then filed a crimina l action against Abamonga but Hon. The court further stated that a criminal ac tion is distinct from that of a civil action. Mariano Zosa. Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal liability. RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and stated that it is right of every party to be compensated for damages that they have inc urred by way of the criminal action. BONITE VS. and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured while Nicolas died. Article 29 of the Civil C ode provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. the presiding judge for lack of evidence to prove the accused guilty of the crime charged. The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect o f the lower court’s judgment. The petitioners then raised this case for appeal Certi orari. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. . dismissed the same. plaintiff-appellee. Mana ntan. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts erred in dismissing the case on the basi s that the petitioners did not reserve their right to file a separate civil case . In the c ase at bar. the Supreme Court re versed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back for the trial of the case. there could be no double jeopardy. Orquita City when a vehicle being driven by Eligio Abamonga. ISSUE: Whether or not the acqu ittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability? RULING: The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA.

1994 FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19. arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extingui shes both criminal and civil penalties. RULING: The ci vil liability for non-payment of the goods delivered by petitioner to the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondent becau se the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Ma nsion Biscuit Corporation. however. president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation. quasi-contract or quasidelict. Castillo. which was held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility and ther efore civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgmen t is rendered.A. 195FACTS: Two informations were filed again st Ty Teck Suan. which was dishonored by the bank due to insufficiency of funds. Petition er contended that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal cases did not nec essarily extinguish their civil liability. for having violate d Batas Pambansa Blg. such as law. in payment of the nutr i-wafer biscuits delivered by Mansion Biscuit Corporation to the latter. contract. Bayota s died. This separate civil action may be enforced either against th e executor/administrator or the estate of the accused depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can enforce the civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits in q uestion against private respondent notwithstanding the fact that the latter cont racted the agreement in behalf of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation. he cited in support and invoked the ruli ng of the Court of Appeals in People v. rather. it was the . Where civil liability survives.accused-appellant September 2. This comment was opposed by the counsel of accused-appellant. Rule 11 of the Rules on Criminal Pr ocedure as amended. While the appeal was pending. In his comment. CA -250 S. Corollarily. Petit ioner then filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s ruling absolving defendant from civil liability in the criminal cases. MANSION BISCUITS V. the Solic itor-General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not exti nguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused. the death of the a ccused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability because tire liability is based solely on the criminal act committed. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law for allegedly failing his ob ligation to pay or make good the value of the postdated checks he issued. RULING: Yes. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.C. if the same may also be predicated from another source of obligation other than del ict. Ty Teck Suan was found not guilty of the said criminal charge by the trial court. 1991. it required the Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas’ civil liabili ty arising from his commission of the offense charged. an action for recovery may be pursued but only by way of filing a sep arate civil action and subject to Section 1. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.R.

RTC ruled in this case in favor of the petitioner. exemplary and attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioner and that they acted in bad faith was questioned by the respondents. petitioner vs. defendant. 1989. any claim for tortuous liability must be ventilated in a separate actio n against the proper party. to Mansion Biscuit Corporation. the pet itioner appealed it to the Supreme Court. There was no writ of sequestration on neither the racehor se winnings of petitioner. second. claiming that such was the order of the Philippine Commission on Good Govern ment (PCGG). The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie and due regard for th e requirements of due process. COURT OF AP PEALS. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitution al rights of the petitioner were violated. The issue of the civil liability o f Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to Mansion Biscuits Corporation arising from th e contract of purchase and sale between them could not have been and was not lit igated and resolved in the criminal case inasmuch as they were not parties there in.. and was appealed to the Co urt of Appeals. respondents PCSO and its chairman withheld the prizes of the petition er. The withholding of the prize winnings of petition er without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. to the petitioner’s counsel.. and this was communicated by Carrascoso. A case was filed regarding the said matter before the RTC of Manila . or third places. respondents July 23. Several of his horses won the races on various dates. So. However. even on the pretext of justif iable motives or good faith in the performance of one’s duties. landing first. RULING: When the respondents withheld the prize winnings of the petitioner. A separate civil action must be instituted by Mansion Biscuits Corporation a gainst Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to enforce the contract between them. 1986 to September 18.. of which Ty Teck Suan w as president. EDUARDO M. THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. COJUANGCO JR. However. APPLICABILITY TO SITUATION. PCGG advises defendants that “it poses no more objection to the remittance of th e prize winnings”. but because there was a vio lation of the constitutional rights of petitioner. nor the racehorses for that matter. the latter’s right to the use of his proper ty was unduly impeded. Nece ssarily. the awarding of mora l damages. JURISPRUDENCE Report this post Top Profile Send private message Reply with quote OzqC Post subject: . _________________ CONCLUSION.contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation. but was refused since the matter was brought to the court. 1999 FACTS: Herein petitioner was a businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6. The respondents are liable not because they have acted in bad faith or with malice. which reversed and set aside the rulings of the RTC. Jr. LAW. CARRASCOSO JR. respectively .

al. it was alleged that the petitioners.. . They were dismisse d and terminated. made clear in the pleadings. both students and prof essors were given three (3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing wh y the school should not take administrative sanction against them. Sancho Dames II and Mabini Colleges. causing disrupti on of classes to the prejudice of the majority students. herein petitioners Alcuaz et. were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academ ic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against t he school in the preceding semester. committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the s chool. Inc. The students and the intervening professors were sanctioned. May 20. The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. vs. The subject of the protests is not. In order for the demonstration to be settled. respondent Mabini Colle ge is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of th e academic freedom enjoyed by the school. fanned by the cooperation of the intervening professors. In spite of the agreement. Hon. respondents. an agreement was entered into among others the regulations for th e conduct of protest action. al.PostPosted: Thu Jun 05. The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of adminis trative due process were met by the school and the students were given the oppor tunity to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolut e especially when parties are bound to certain rules under a contract. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitu tional rights of expression and assembly and of due process of law of the studen ts who have been barred from re-enrollment. PSBA -161 SCRA 7FACTS: In 1986. Ariel Non. Inc . 1990 FACTS: Petitioners. HELD: The Supreme Court held that du e process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not entail proceedi ngs and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the courts of justice. some PSBA students. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to r efuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of discip linary regulations. In the school’s administrative process. stag ed demonstrations in the premises of the school. 2007 5:10 pm Posts: 385 Location: Santiago City ALCUAZ VS. students in private respondent Mabini Colleges. With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teacher s. petitioners. The school took adminis trative sanctions upon them in view of their participation in the demonstration. however . PSBA stating. that being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled. 2008 4:20 pm Offline Junior Member User avatar Joined: T ue Aug the respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the inter vening professors during and when the investigation was going on.

collided with a red Ford Escort dr iven by John Macarubo. considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educati onal institutions. It is imbued with public interest. the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating. for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. and P10.petitioners vs. On the other hand. (b) Their academic deficiencies do not warrant non-read mission. JOSE MACAR UBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO. instituted a civil case for damages against petitioners MCL and A rmando Jose in the Regional Trial Court. the spouses Jose and M ercedes Macarubo. in justifying their action.000. The latter. respondents January 18.On July 17. (d) There was no due i nvestigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. filed their own suit fo r damages in the same trial court. without prejudice to his right to transfer. which caused him t o be hospitalized for a week. in turn. ISSUE: Whet her or not Armando Jose. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint again st Juanita Macarubo. privat e respondent Rommel Abraham. bec ame blind on the left eye which had to be removed. 1986. In addition. parents of the deceased John Macarubo. 2000 FACTS: On February 22." ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL). ordering the latter to pay MCL P54. . COURT OF A PPEALS. respondent. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor the “Termination of Contract” theory the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract.00 for lost income. registered owner of the Ford Escort on the the ory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo.00 as attorney s fees. filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. which they can afford to pay for tertiary education.As a result of the collision. MCL filed a third-party co mplaint against Juanita Macarubo. he sustained a f racture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face.12 as actual damages . . represented by his father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM. P24. the owner of Bus 203 is liable for a quasi-delict     . In response. I t provides that every student has the right to enroll in any school college or u niversity upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable regulations. Consequently. represented by his fathe r. It is intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. were seriously injuredMacarubo. Felixberto. Abraham.232. ISSUE: Whether or not the school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners. died after he undergone a surgery. a bus driven by petitioner Armando Jose. stated that 8 of the petitioners ha ve incurred failing grades. The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembl y. .The respondents. on the other hand. (c) The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. The Court of Ap peals rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It cannot be construed to mean tha t a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.000. despite being taken to hospital. (e) Respondent s chool is their choice institution near their places of residence. 1 985. ROMMEL ABRAHAM. the left side of the Ford Es cort s hood was severely damaged while its driver and its lone passenger. and that "the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the enti re period he is expected to complete the course.

sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. then a prejudicial question wo uld likely exists. 55103 and entitled "Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M.000. Metro Manila. the negligence of the employee must first be established. that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the pre sumption of negligence on the part of the employer.00. in fact. 2180 of the Civil Code. is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceeding s in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner. well knowing that he had previously sold the sam e to the said Roberto S. RULING: The Suprem e Court held that there is no prejudicial question on this case. Carlos for P30. docketed as Civil Case No. more or less. 1986. For failure to d ischarge its burden. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land. al. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pendin g resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court.900. In other words. Alano vs.. the said accused defraud Roberto S. in the City of Manila.RULING: It is such a firmly established principle. Dandoy for P87. In the afore mentioned Civil Case. In his answer." conce rns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and damages. located at Bicutan. because how soever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative o f the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. Before the presumption of th e employer s negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees can ar ise. was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising from the same incident. the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the complaints filed against MC L and Armando Jose.00. In this case. 1997 FACTS: On or about June 10. MCL failed to present any evidence to prove that Juanit a Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable fo r John Macarubo s negligence under Art. Court of Appeals October 15. accused claimed that his sign was forged in t he second contract. private respondent filed a complaint against the petitione r seeking the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land made by the pe titioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previ ously sold to them. as well as the third-party complaint filed against Juanita M acarubo. are dismissed. provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. Pasig. National C apital Region. covered by Tax Declaration No. but this was said after the five years of filing of estafa a gainst him in a criminal case. 120-004-00398. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which m ust be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed. MCL s third-party complaint should be dismissed. if both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is inti mately related to the issues raised in the other. Carlos by pretending to be still the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1. as to have virtually formed p art of the law itself. While the allegat ions of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relatio n in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. the failure to prove the employee s negligence during the tr ial is fatal to proving the employer s vicarious liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case No. The case. thereby depriving the s aid Roberto S.000.           . 55103. to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S.172 squar e meters.00. et. In this case. Carlos in the aforesai d amount of P30. Philippine currency. Carlos v. Taguig. Thus. Arturo Alano. privat e respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against driver Arma ndo Jose who. 2180 of the Civil Code. Philippines. Branch 68.

creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. upon petition of the re sidents of Karangalan Village that they be converted and separated into a distin ct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan. dismissed the Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15. respondents June 20. 1996. and filed Petiti ons with the COMELEC its attention to a pending case for settlement of boundary dispute wherein areas of the proposed barangays are included. his admission on th e estafa case meant that he could no longer use or raise said defense to raise a prejudicial question in his case. respondents September 10. The petitioner. Series of 1996. on September 9. THE HONO RABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA. In her Answer to the said petition. 52. Hence. For a c ivil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the susp ension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case.       . The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of peti tioner s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. RULING: The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petit ioner without merit. People o f the Philippines.. 1997 where the creation of Barangay Na pico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein. The C OMELEC. 2 000 FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. the filing of civil case by the Municipality of Cainta. Beltran. filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.there was no prejudicial question since he admitted in the pre-trial that his si gnature is valid on the vouchers and on the second deed of sale. in order to foresta ll the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for J une 22. 1997. 1996. Hence the filing of civil case by the City of Pasig. Pleb iscite for this purpose was set for March 15. petitioner s w ife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal ho me and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Jr. Meynardo L. petitioner. 1999 FACTS: On April 22. Series of 1996. ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of th e petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapac ity is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal c ase for concubinage. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage. Petitioner s motion f or reconsideration was likewise denied. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Petitione r argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his m arriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. 21. it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based. Meanwhile. PROVINCE OF RIZAL. The COMELEC ordere d the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance u ntil after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving th e two municipalities. but also that in the resolution of the issu e or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action. and Hon. The Municipality of Cainta m oved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled. the City of Pasig similarly issue d Ordinance No. the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. vs. 1996. Judge Florentino Tuazon. creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. vs. the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. CITY OF PASIG. By admission of the validity of his signatures and the second deed of sale. however. petitioner.

until and unless such issue is resolved with finality. plaintiff left defe ndant and never live with her. defend ant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against plaintiff Abu ndio Merced. whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the cre ation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. There are two elements of prej udicial question: first. which if resolved. the issue on the validity of the second marriage can be de termined or must . 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico. the petition of the Munici pality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. the plebiscite held on March 15 . After plaintiff had filed civil case. Therefore. In the case at bar. 155FACTS: Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulme nt of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that latter’s relati ve’s force. Pasig City. while the City of Pasig vigorou sly claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napic o are within its territory. Indeed. In the same vein. threatened and intimidated him into signing the affidavit to the effec t that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for five ye ars. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejud icial question. should be annulled and set aside. the resolution of which must be lodged to different courts . Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold the trial in Criminal Case be cause civil case involves prejudicial questions. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the hol ding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending det ermination before the RTC. Neither does the Court agree that merely because a plebiscite had already b een held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico. it can not deny that portions of the same area are i ncluded in the boundary dispute case pending before the RTC. the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City.ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Ka rangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boun dary dispute between the two local governments. to define the terri torial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futil ity. Pre cisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case. Surely. In the case at bar. it must be determinative of the guilt or innocence of t he spouse and second. RULING: The Court agrees with th e position of the COMELEC that the Civil Case involving the boundary dispute bet ween the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial que stion which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the pro posed barangays may be held. Diaz v. RULING: Prejudicial question is one that must be decided first b efore a criminal action maybe instituted or may proceed because a decision there in is vital to the judgment in the criminal case. Merced -109 Phil. a requisite for t he creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly ide ntified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. will determi ne if criminal proceeding would prosper. The immediately after then celebration of the marriage. Elizabeth Ceasar denies the maternal allegations of the complaint and avers that neither she nor her relatives of plaintiff’s previ ous marriage to Eufrocina Tan but plaintiff showed her a letter which he wrote b reaking off is engagement with Tan.

LUNA. 1988 FACTS: On January 23. The prejudicial question is. Donato interposed in her answer the defense that his se cond marriage was void and since it was solemnized without a marriage license an d that force. RULING: Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questio n because a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudici al question on the condition that it must be proven that the petitioner’s consent to the marriage was obtained through intimidation. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent. In the petitioner’s argument that the second marriage should have been decla red null and void on the ground of force. PA Z B. The trial court rendered judgmen t ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3. she again became pregnant. respondents. vs. intimidation and undue influence were employed by respon dent.00 as damages. in consideration of the sum of P50. April 15. COURT OF FIRST I NSTANCE OF MANILA. sued petitioner fo r damages based on the third and last abortion. ABAYAN.00. Less than 2 years later. Whether or not the issue raised in the civil case is a prejudicial question which must be determined before the criminal case can proceed. because determination of the validity of the second marriage is deter minative in the civil action must be precede the criminal action for bigamy. Hence Oscar Lazo. 2. nor con sented to the abortion.00 as attorney’s fee an d the cost of the suit. Her husband did not know of. ISSUES: 1. ARTEMON D. GELUZ vs. Respondent had no previous knowledge of petitioner’s existing marriag e to Rosalinda Maluping. BRANCH XXXII. filed information for bigamy against Leonila Donato with the Court of First Instance. PRESIDING JUDGE.first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy ca n be prosecuted. COURT OF APPEALS 2 SCRA 801 FACTS: Her present husband impregnated Nit a Villanueva before they were legally married. she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. she had herself aborted again by Gelu z. JOSE FLAMINIANO. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. HON. CITY FISCAL OF MANILA. private respondent. Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fe tus. whether or not the second marriage is valid. As she was then employed in the COMELEC an d her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient. violence. 1979. violence and undue influence in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was done involunta rily. The private respondent filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. . the City Fi scal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado Cantor. Whether or not the petitioner lacked the legal capacity to contract the second marriage. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of the second marriage rais e a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. After her marriage.000. P700. HON. DONATO. petitioners. intimidation and violence allegedly em ployed against him by respondent only sometime later cannot be considered releva nt.

In the present case. It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Artic le 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisio nal personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. force and intimidation. respondents October 17. allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth. of course. Eugenio Domingo. She could have not consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumbmark on the deed. In fact. The petitioners stated that the sale was spurious and they are the leg itimate owner of the land being the nearest kin of Paulina. RULING: The Supre me Court reinstated the decision of the trial court.ISSUE: Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child i ncurs injury. This personalit y is called presumptive personality. the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death. Rigonan and Concepcion R. and refused to v acate the same. otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality. the petitione rs asserted that there was abundant evidence at the time of the execution of the sale. Felipe C. She allegedly sold them to private respondents. Court of Appeals. There is a serious doubt th at the seller consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Howeve r. who claim to be her relatives amounting to P850. reversed the decision an d declared the respondents the owner of the properties. his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damag e to the unborn child? RULING: Personality begins at conception. such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them. ISSUE: Whether or not the vendo r has the capacity to act on the alleged sale of her property. The respondent filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against pet itioners. She died an octogenarian barely over a year when the de ed was allegedly executed but before copies of the . The appellate court. The trial court found the deed “fake” and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. On appeal. no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its pa rents or heirs. it is easy to see that if no acti on for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of i njuries it received. th e spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan. Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalu ngan. The petitioners Eugenio Domingo. It is. 2001 FACTS: Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land including the house and warehouse on one parcel. Crispin Mangabat and Samuel capalungan. the child was dead when separated from its moth er’s womb. the deceased was already senile. essential that birth shou ld occur later.00. as distinguished fro m injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child. vs. Th e time of the execution of the alleged contract. however. who claim to be her closest surviving relatives. even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the u nborn child. since no transmis sion to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality. Rigonan. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury o r death pertains primarily to the one injured. petitioners. defects and irregularities. The respondents show n a carbon copy of the deed of sale not bearing the signature of Paulina only al lege thumb mark of the latter and the deed was tainted with alterations.

Paulita Rodriguez and Lourdes Lon. 1989 which were not assailed by the respondents. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA. They initiated the suit to remove a cloud ontheir respective titles of owner ship caused by the inscription thereonof the notice of lis pendens which came ab out as a result of an incident in a special proceeding for guardianshipover the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by respondents Julio Ozamiz. the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. vs. Both parties agreedthat Carmen needed a gua rdian over her person and her properties. there are nine (9) other important documents that were. The RTC rendered its decidion in favor of the petitioners. shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed.deed were entered in the registry. the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28. defendants-appellees October 28.petitioners. Thus. 1989. Carlos Fortich. namely. The general rule is that a person is not inco mpetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical in firmities. the appe llate court reversed it. plaintiffs-appellants. Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. However. Competency and freedom from undue influence. OZAMIZ. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of Carm en Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. MARIO J. She narrated th at Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. as guardians. vs. However. are presumed to continue u ntil the contrary is shown. when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental facult ies so as to prevent the person from properly. respondent Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz filed their “Inventories and Accounts” of Carmen’s propert ies and other assets including the parcel of land bought by the al. then 86 yearsold. Terresa Zarraga. however. weak mind and absent-mindedness. intelligently. 2002 FACTS: Petitioners alleged that petitioner spouses Mario Mendezon a and Teresita Mendezona own a parcel of land which they bought from Carmen Ozam iz. MENDEZONA . ISSUE: Whether or notCarmen Ozamiz was of sound mind th us capacitated to contract with the petitioners regarding the sale of a certain parcel of land. Ma." Thus. executed by Carmen Ozami z. signed by Ca rmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28. 1966 FACTS: Prima Carillo and Lorenzo Licup were claiming portions of their inheritance from their deceased . The respondents sought to impugn only one document. Rob erto and Julio caused the inscriptionon the titles of petitioners a notice of li s pendens thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of titles filed by petitione rs. Paz Montalvan. had become disoriented and could no lon ger take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing hela th. We agree with the trial court’s assess ment that "it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of Carm en Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them. in the absence of pr oof to the contrary. and firmly protect ing her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. JULIO H. The unrebutted tes timony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP. Jose Roz. RULING: A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particul ar time and the condition is presumed to continue to exist. PRIMA G. respondents Fe bruary 6. Jo se Ozamiz. after an illness on July 1987. The respondents alleged that Carmen al.

mother. RULING: Reserva tr oncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and A rticle 811 of the old Civil Code. It is clear. 1950. The property was currently on the name of the appellees. 221 . Marcos argued that she has b een a resident of the are since childhood and has not abandoned her residency. Nonetheless. Imelda Marcos is a resident of the first D istrict of Leyte and could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. Marcos is still a resident of that place and did not actually lack the requirements of those persons who could run a Cong ressional seat. and upon returning to her birth place. and as a consequence. which state: "The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous tit le from another ascendant. Her opponent in that position was Cirilo Roy Montejo. 1950. and consequently. and could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. After several years. Plainti ffs-appellants herein.from Francisca Salak de Paz. had the right to claim the property — 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. T he poll body disqualified her. or a brother or sister. promulgated on June 8. ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos is a resident of the First Distri ct of Leyte. And the Cou rt of Appeals decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal. lived in Ilocos. 23 — when Agustina acquired by operation of la w all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson). Mrs. is obliged to reserve such pr operty as he may have acquitted by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said prop erty came. who acquired them by g ratuitous title from another ascendant. According to M anresa. She then migrated to Manila when her parents decided to live in the said place. if not exercised with in the time for recovering real properties. Montejo claimed the former First Lady placed her residency in the first dist rict of the province at seven monthspreceeding the balloting. the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista. who has been possessing it in the concept of an owner. This is based on the ground that Mrs. that the rig ht or cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24. rendered it all the more doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. Marcos lived in Manila and in Ilocos for a long time and     . from April 24. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue of survivorship can be applied in this case. she ran as a congresswoman in the first d istrict of Leyte. who can bri ng a revindicatory suit therefor. can be lost by prescription. RUL ING: The Supreme Court held that Mrs. as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios." The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court o f Appeals in Special Proceeding No. which entailed tha t she lacked five months of the required residency. therefore. The case started when Montejo asked the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos for allegedly lacki ng the one-year residency requirement mandated by the 1987 Philippine Constituti on. Isabel (Adolfo s mother). COMELEC -248 SCRA 300FACTS: Imelda Romualdez Marcos was born in a tow n in the first Congressional district of Leyte. Marcos vs. she appealed it to the Supr eme Court. as reservatarios. She was married to the then Pres ident Ferdinand Marcos. this right. 1950 when Agustina died.

Mrs. Marcos could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat on the First District of Leyte. Book V. complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. her husband having died in 1998. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code. As laid out by the tenets of their faith. as proved by her visits. and even the provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code. she executed on July 28. Yes. in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute dis graceful and immoral conduct.only went back to her town and lived there for only seven months prior to the el ection but she did not really intended to abandon her birth place. practices and moral standards of her congregation. respondent was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” u nder Book V. Be tha t as it may. which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. Jr. Ther efore. or even in the sound admin istration of justice... a ll clearly demonstrate the State’s need to protect these secular interests. Sec.] But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Trac t Society. Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas Ci ty. Chapter VI. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immor al act that tarnishes the image of the court. may the respondent be held administratively liable ? RULING: There has never been any question that the state has an interest in pr otecting the institutions of marriage and the family. the Declaration allows members o f the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marita l relations. after ten years of living together. This was prov ed by the frequent visits that she had in that place. 2000. the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal impedimen ts. As a ma tter of practice. Sec. and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the Dec laration. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. s he was already a widow. Cons equently. without the benefit of marriage more th an twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another wom an. presiding judge of Branch 253. Chapter VI. 1991. e. Marcos is said to hav e her domicile of her choice and of origin in Leyte. for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor. the Jehovah’s congregation requir es that at the time the declarations are executed.g. Mrs. the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental .” For Jehovah’s Witnesses. Caoibes. court interpreter in sa id court. thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. the provisions by which respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged. for living with a man not her husband. respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. She admitted that she s tarted living with Luciano Quilapio. Title I. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999. Jr. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Co de. Title I. she did left Leyte but had shown that her choice of residence was Leyte. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding wi thin the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is al lowed. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR 22 June 2006 FACTS: In a sworn-letter comp laint dated July 27. the marital status of the declarants and their respective spou ses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the declarations are executed. In fact. ISSUE: By invoking the religious beliefs. Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed. a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.

1959. but the Stat e’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which re spondent’s faith finds moral. and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state tha t will also protect the freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise C lause as a source of right by itself. Bellosillo and Vitug. it is not the State’s broad interest i n “protecting the institutions of marriage and the family. the par ties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children. we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstance s. if it does not. The State cannot plausibly assert that un bending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compel ling interest. In other words. the government must do more than ass ert the objectives at risk if exemption is given.” in the words of Jefferson. as echoes of the words of Messrs. endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. In the area of reli gious exercise as a preferred freedom. Carmona. J. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption. RODOLFO S. because our Constitution itself holds the right to religiou s freedom sacred. to deny the exempti on would effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union of two individuals who hav e managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately twenty-five years]” and have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and the family. respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. Confo rmably thereto. On January 2 5. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order t hat freedoms . 200 4 FACTS: The petitioner and the respondent were married on March 5. in thei r concurring opinions in our Decision. The State has never sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner. with the knowledge of the respondent. ANCHETA. In the absence of a showing that such state int erest exists. the Solicitor General failed to do. however. cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. Eight children were born from their marriage. in fact. ANCHETA. including the parcel of la nd located at Bancal. the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. In the case at bar. Incidentally. 1994. petitioner. it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted.including religious freedom . MARIETTA B. vs. respondent March 4. Thus. for only the gr avest abuses.may be enjoyed. the respondent vacated the resort Munting Paraiso. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred po sition in the hierarchy of rights — “the most inalienable and sacred of human rights . 1992. man stands accountable to an aut hority higher than the state. The petitione r. To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s applicat ion of the compelling interest test. Thus. The State’s asserted intere st thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of proper ty with a plea for support and support pendente lite. attempt to enforce that prohibition. the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibi tion. in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim.rights in our Constitution. dated August 4. 2003.” or even “in the sound admi nistration of justice” that must be weighed against respondent’s claim. man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. On April 20. thenceforth resided in the . T his. it is not enough to contend that the state’s in terest is important. which must be compelling. the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing th e concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Cavite with the resort Munting Paraiso Training C enter. On December 6. Hence. 1994.

A judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time eithe r collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final orde r in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked unless barred by laches. 2000. the respondent knew very well that she w as residing at Munting Paraiso. notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordi nary remedy of new trial or reconsideration. and allowed the responden t to adduce evidence ex-parte. 2) Whether or not a judgment based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment may be had in the instant case. which reads: Article 48. the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. and ultimately secu re a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. On June 22. Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of . Ancheta III. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dis missing the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. when in truth and in fact. the petitioner filed a verified petition against the r espondent with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite. On July 7. No judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. On July 7. the Court sheriff submitted a Return of Service to the co urt stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petit ioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso. On February 14. M etro Manila. She further contended that there wa s no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from psych ological incapacity. the Court shall order the prose cuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to tak e steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 3) Whether or not the presumption of m arriage can be appreciated in the case at bar. RULING: The Court ruled that the petition states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assail ed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner. The petit ioner failed to file an answer to the petition. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. A ccording to the petitioner. Venancio Mariano B. the respondent filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default”. respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological in capacity. the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case. the order of the trial court in favor of the respond ent was null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person and due to the ex trinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. The trial court gran ted the motion and declared the petitioner in default. According to the petitioner. Ancheta III on June 6. The petitioner alleged that the respondent committed gross misrepresent ations by making it appear in his petition that she was a resident of Las Piñas. he. 1995. Metro Manila. The petitioner also alle ged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son.” On June 21. alleged in his petition that th e petitioner was residing Las Piñas. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of A rticle 48 of the Family Code.said property. the respondent and Teresita H. or appeal are no longer available t hrough no fault of the petitioner. Rodil were married in civil rights. 1998. 1995. 1995. 1995. On June 5. 1995. nevertheless. “where she may be served with sum mons.

Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which prov ides: Sec. The Constitution is committed to the policy of stre ngthening the family as a basic social institution. if in his opinion. the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any coll usion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 6. hence he could be liable only for homicide. 1984 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the court finding accused Elias Bo rromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing h im to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead. (Tolentino vs. hence. and if there is no collusion. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal sepa ration. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal sep aration fails to answer. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that he and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married because there was no marriage contact executed in t heir wedding. accused Elias Borrom eo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife. should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should s tay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPIN ES. declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation. The family law is based on t he policy that marriage is not a mere contract. ELIAS BORROMEO. incapacitating such party t o fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good. Hence. who cl aims that the other suffers psychological imbalance. defendantappellant October 31. to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence su bmitted is not fabricated The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable socia l institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not jus t the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed. in all cases for annulment. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Other t han the stand of appellants counsel against the existence of marriage in order t o lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client. but a social institution in whic h the State is vitally interested.Court (now Rule 9. plaintiff-appellee. solid and happy families. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint. in the absence of any counter . the proof adduce d is dubious and fabricated. not parricide. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric. vs. ISSUE: Was there a valid marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased-victim? R ULING: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage. The prosecuting a ttorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment t hrough the presentation of his own evidence. Paras). their preservation is not the concern of the family member s alone. the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inves tigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits.

At the time of his death. claiming to b e the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased. the wi dow of Tomas Corpus. Yangco was an acknowledged natural chil d or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus. Perido. Jose Rivera. Paz Yangco. p etitioner. . filed a petition for the is suance of letters of administration over Venancio’s estate. RULING: It is disputably presumed that a man and a woman deporting themselve s as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage and that a child born in a lawful wedlock. filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the supposed share in Yangco’ intestate estate. Ramona had begott en five (5) children with Tomas Corpus. 107 6. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco. but it is a new relati on. 1975. Consequently. Yangco. JOSE RIVERA. as a legal heir. Tomas Corpus. therefore. a prominent and wealthy resident of th at town named Venancio Rivera died. every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Corp us. as legal heir in Yangco’s esta te. two (2) of whom were the aforementioned Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. Yangco died in Manila on April 20. absolute or from bed an d board. Teodoro R. the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. th e wife of Miguel Ossorio. Since Teodoro R. On July 28. is legitimate. an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. COR PUS V. t he decedent’s estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. CORPUS 85 SCRA 567 FACTS: Teodoro R. in Yangco’s estate. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles. Yangco had no forced heirs. RIVERA. 1951. the Supreme Court held that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother. vs. Docketed as SP No. IS SUE: Whether or not Tomas Corpus has a cause of action for recovery of the suppo sed hereditary share of his mother. (3) Amelia Corpus. thus: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. 1990 FACTS: On May 30. Marriage is not only a civil contract. On October 5. Luis R. 1 939. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die interstate but in fact left two holographic wills. this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. He alleged in his complain t that the dispositions in Yangco’s will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alie nation rendered it void and that the 1949 partition is invalid and. (2) his half sister. The presumption in favor of the matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. Corpus and Ramon L. The reason i s that such is the common order of the society. there being no divorce. himself a legitimate child. Rivera. his nearest relatives were: (1) his half brother. respondents February 15. The reason for this presumption is well settled in Perid o vs. Who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Jose A. V. Pablo Corpus and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpu s. to be in fact married. and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being. the children of his half brother. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. Juanita died in October. 1944. 1975. Juanita Corpus. they would be living in constant violat ion of decency and law. Juanita Corpus.presumption or evidence special to the case.

all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. it being known whether or not the absentee is still l ives. he had no personality to contest the wills and his oppos ition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. Hence. was sufficient. Thus every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of m arriage the legitimacy of children. who authenticated the wills as h aving been written and signed by their father. 8th MCTC. JURISPRUDENCE Report this post Top Profile Send private message Reply with quote OzqC Post subject: PostPosted: Th u Jun 05. Zamboanga del Norte. single and divorced. Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. complainant. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed s ince the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1 986. 9th Judicial Region. JR. except for those of succ ession. Jr.ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Rivera was the legitimate son of the deceased Venanci o Rivera. after an absence of seven years. can not be invoked by respondent. the law presumes a man and woman cohabiting with each other as being married. RULING: Article 390 of the Civil Code which provide that. 2008 4:36 pm Offline Junior Member User avatar Joined: Tue Aug 07. respondent October 25. Based on this unrefuted legal presumption. vs. ABADILLA. Manukan. RULING: In case of doubt. Th e testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera. Respon dent’s contention is that his first wife left the conjugal home in 1966.. TABILIRAN. in the absence of proof to the contrary. Even in the absence of any certificate of ma rriage or other documentary proof of the existence of marriage. being a mere stranger. BLYTH B. JUDGE JOSE C. By respondent’s own . Presiding Judge. APPLICABILITY TO SITUATION. Manukan and Jose D alman. That besides both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein in his former marriage to B anzuela was honestly divulged. And since then and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. LAW. That he represented himself as “single” because that is what best fits to him s ince the words to choose from were widow. _________________ CONCLUSION. 200 7 5:10 pm Posts: 385 Location: Santiago City MA. the absent shall be deemed dead for all purposes. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s marriage to Pris cilla is valid. 1995 FACTS: Respondent had been scandalously and openly living with Priscilla B aybayan as early as 1970 and begot three children all surnamed Tabiliran even wh ile respondent’s marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting.

. he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana s body. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). ET. 1997 FACTS: On January 7. DE MIJARES. Thus. as the next of kin in the Philippines. Misamis Oriental. VILLALUZ ( Retired). On that ni ght. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla in 1970. he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. HON. her ful l blood brothers and sisters. complainant got ma rried to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano. Cagayan de Oro City. SR. respondent fetched complainant from her house and reached       . TOMAS EUGENIO. petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. unless e xpressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144. respondent June 19. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code. PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respond ent sheriff. respondent’s actuation of cohabiting wit h Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immortal conduct.allegation. his first wife left the conjugal home in 1966. An exchange of pleadings followed. The respondent had no right to presume therefore that his first was already dead for all-purposes. makes no distinction betwe en a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and ano ther who are husband and wife de facto. Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority . Re gional Trial Court. The SC said. vs. it is said. 1990 FACTS: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas. single. swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mut ually by spouses. AL. in the absence of such qualification. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse. herein private respondents filed a petition for ha beas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forci bly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan. 1994. 294 of the Civil Code. petitioner. it makes mocker y of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. the Va rgases contended that. who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interferring with their (V argases ) duty to bury her. Despite her desire to esc ape. the term "sp ouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liabi lity in cases of theft. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code. in fact. Presiding Judge. and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. when referring to a "spous e" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. only 4 ye ars had elapsed. respondents May 17. ALEJANDRO M. Invoking Arts. At the time the petition was filed. The Penal Code article. the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualificatio n. Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Branch 20. hence.. But this view cannot even apply to the f acts of the case at bar. it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age. they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. ISSUE: Whe ther or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas. VELEZ. As her common law husband. Vitaliana s brothers and sisters contend otherwise. complainant vs. RULING : There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code.

He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant. contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened Several months after that fateful encounter. The marriage con tract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and. and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. “Get that marriage contra ct and have it burned. when she discovered another i ncriminatory document against respondent. the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar . Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. Garcia Vda. RULING: The Court finds itself in full accord with the f indings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. they have been living separately because as complainant r ationalized. which means that the said court was not the pr oper forum to settle said matters. On 28 May 1992. H erein petitioner filed for its dismissal. a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the con sequence of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites. such that. CA March 5. complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wr ong number". respondent married a nother woman. ISSUE: Whether or not a sham marria ge is a valid marriage. Worse. the complainant executed against respo ndent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification". Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste. Consternated. What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words. to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger". Since then. the decision of the cour t annulling his marriage to his first wife. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. after making a false statement in his a pplication for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Re spondent s subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. in Cavite. Vall ejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guar dianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. De Chua vs. when he married Lydia Geraldez. that he solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Upon the death of Roberto. had not yet attained fin ality. thereafter. was offered by compl ainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage ." Complainant leaves in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. dated May 10. 1995. he even said. claiming that she was the sole survivi ng heir of the decedent being his wife. 1995 she filed the instant Compla int for Disbarment against him. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordi nary lawyer. Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the     . Infuriated. on June 6. Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. 1998 FACTS: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. complainant lost no time in gathering evid ence against respondent. On August 7. Librada Peña. it does not speak well of respondent s sense of social propriety and moral valu es.the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract. four months after his marriage to petitioner. Lydia Geraldez. a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince. and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil statu s as SINGLE. she answered t he phone. 1994.

The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of m arriage. violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntar y one and as such the same cannot be . F ailure to present it as an evidence would make the marriage dubious. 1978. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of the second marriage raise a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided before the cri minal case can proceed. passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. private responde nt filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on Septem ber 26. This was latter appealed to the appellate court. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herei n failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife o f the decedent. Maluping. Leonila of Roberto L. filed information for bigamy against herein petitioner. A valid. the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Ab ayan. and whether or not the petitioner lacked the legal capacity to contra ct the second marriage? RULING: Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho v . original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. The Information filed was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. On September 28. 1979. Transfer Certificates of Title. petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s con sent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress. p assports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when th e petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concer ned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge all eged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged mar riage. this being a violation of the best evidence rul e. and a resident of Davao Ci ty. It was Donato’s second one. and even denied her petition. intimidation and undue influence were employed by private r espondent. ISSUES: Whether or not the issue raised in the civil cas e is a prejudicial question which must be determined before the criminal case ca n proceed. violence. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented. together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia. Petitioner Dona to interposed in her answer in the civil case for nullity the defense that his s econd marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and t hat force. Residence Certificates. Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married . DONATO v. 1979. LUNA 160 SCRA 14 FACTS: On January 23. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriag e of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. Relova. Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating th at he was married and was born in Cotabato City. Respondent had no previous knowledge of petitioner’s existing marriage to a certain Rosalinda R. but it decided in favor of herein respondents. Donato with the Court of First Instance. Cantor. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitio ner failed to produce. before the petitioner’s arraignment.

herein respondent Karl He inz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with herein peti tioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to o ne Eduardo A. conse quently. the ceremony having been performed on June 25. threats and int imidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime lat er when he was required to answer the civil action for annulment of the second m arriage is totally irrelevant. vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. ISSUE: . vs. respondents August 19. her marriage to respondent is VOID. Maxion. SEMPIO-DIY (as presi ding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KA RL HEINZ WIEGEL. accordingly. 1986 FACTS: In an action filed before the erstwhile J uvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City. it is clear that when she married respondent she was validly married to her first husband. There is likewise no need of introd ucing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her husband at the time they married each other. LILIA OLIVA W IEGEL. lilia while admitting the existence of s aid prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void. for them such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents an d purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contra cted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel). and theref ore valid until annulled. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage void or was it merely voidable. Civil Code). lilia while admitting the e xistence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null a nd void. respondents August 19. petitioner. 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL. th e marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art 85. Maxion. RULING: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vit iated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so. the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar . petitioner. Since no annulment has yet been made. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. The argument of petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force. 1986 FACTS: In an action filed before th e erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEG EL. the ceremony having been performed on June 25 . 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.the basis for conviction. herein respo ndent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage wit h herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. she and the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage. she and the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the fir st marriage.

the marriage of petitioner and re spondent would be regarded VOID under the law. Zenaida Beso. Civil Code). for them such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judi cial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage wi th respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel). despite of him bei ng married twice with Ongkiko which alleges to be invalid for having been celebr ated without a marriage license. and was told that all the copies of the contract were taken by her fiancé. After the wedding. Brillante s. Jr. the complainant filed charges against the judge for solemniz ing their marriage outside of his jurisdiction and for negligence in not retaini ng a copy and not registering their marriage. BRILLANTES. responde nt judge is not legally capacitated to contract his subsequent marriage with De Castro. JR. Manila. his first marriage with Ongkiko not having been judicially declared null and void for lack of a marriage license. Since no annulment has yet been made. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is legally capacitat ed to contact a subsequent marriage without having secured a judicial declaratio n of nullity of his marriage. sh e was informed that their marriage was not registered. DAGUMAN January 28. respondent March 29. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. it is clear that when she married re spondent she was validly married to her first husband. the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art 85. She therefore wrote to th e judge to inquire. there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. her marriag e to respondent is VOID. Branch 20. and therefore valid until annu lled. consequently. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her husband at the time they married each other. RULING: Under Article 40 of the Family Code of the Philippines. accordingly. Thus. which was attended by three witnesses. complainant’s live-in partner and of whom he has two children. LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA. is charged by complainant with gross immortality and ignorance of impropr iety for having been cohabiting with and subsequently married Yolanda De Castro. Hence. ISSUE: . complainan t. vs. Metropolitan Trial Court.. His subsequent marriage with De Castro was cele brated without having obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first ma rriage with Ongkiko. RULING: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force commi tted against both parties because assuming this to be so. 2000 FACTS: Judge Juan Daguman solemnized the marri age of the complainant. BESO VS. 1995 FACTS: Respondent Judge Francisco R. and her fiancé at the judge’s residence in Cal bayog City.Whether or not the marriage void or was it merely voidable. the compla inant’s husband abandoned her without reason and when the complainant went to the City Civil Registrar of Calbayog City to inquire about her marriage contract.

The judge therefore committed non-feasance in office. complainant. by his carelessness.00 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of th e law. 1995 FACTS: Marilou M oreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. the judge realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under the present government policy. Judges m ust not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. But the respondent denied the a llegations. When she v isited the office of the respondent. conside ring that the judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Metropolitan Trial Court. The respondent assured her that the marriage c ontract will be released ten (10) days after the date of celebration. as affirmed by the Supreme Court. none of the instances mentioned were present. Branch 72. vs. the judge. In fact.000. Article 8 of the Family Code states that a marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: at the point of death. RULING : Judge Daguman solemnized the marriage of the complainant outside of his jurisd iction. His claim that the comp lainant’s fiancé took all copies doesn’t deserve consideration for lack of proof. in remote places in accordance with Article 29. JUDGE JOSE C. As a jud ge. Metro Manila. The judge was fined P5. He s hould have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the documents. he does not have the authority to solemnize a marriage in Calbayog City. he is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. MARILOU NAMA MORENO. she found out that the local Civil Registra r failed to issue marriage license. she claimed that the respondent conniv ed with the relatives of Marcelo to deceive her. In the case. respondent July 14. RULING: The Supreme Court recommended that Respondent be held lia ble for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and tha t the appropriate administrative sanctions be . Pasig. Bernabe of the Metropolitan Tri al Court. BERNABE. 1993 before the respondent judge. ISSUE: Whether or not re spondent judge may be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing without the mar riage license. lost the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate of the complainant and her fia ncé.Whether or not the judge solemnized marriage outside of his jurisdiction. The office found out that respondent displayed his ignorance of the law. or upon the request of b oth parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. Also. The judge further claime d that he believed he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that i t may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married. and the memorandum he issued was referred to the court administ rator office for evaluation. Samar only. Complaint alleged that she and Marcelo Moreno were married on October 4. who recommended the matter for dismissal for failure of the complainant to app ear on hearings. Margarita-Taran ganPagsanjan. The investigation then was referred to executive Judge Villarama Jr. Branch 72. Thus. the judge was prompted more by u rgency to solemnize the marriage of complainant to her fiancé because the complain ant was an overseas worker. . Moreover. who.

Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross mi sconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he sole mnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga. or (3) upon re quest of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not effect the validity of the marriage. JUDGE HERNANDO C. NAVARRO. a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the foll owing instances: (1) at the point of death." RODOLFO G. it will be dealt with severely. The Revised Penal Cod e provides that "priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect. 227).imposed against him. RULING: The Court held that even if the s pouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse was already dead . complainant. and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario. which was solemnized at the respondent’s residence which do es not fall within his jurisdiction. What are the effects of the irre gularities in formal requisites of the two marriages? 2.O. vs. inter alia. he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the Family Code of the Philippines (E. the Family Code of the Philippines). . the Court suspended Judge Domagtoy for a period of six (6) months and was given a warning that once he repeats these offenses again. In this case. As a judge. despite the knowledge tha t the groom is merely separated from his first wife. criminally and administratively liable. None of th ese were complied with therefore there is an irregularity. Absence of sai d requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning (Article 35 [3]. it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab init io and that. (2) in remote places. On the charge regardi ng illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requis ites of marriage are. which provides of a marriage is a valid marriage license. the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly. respondent July 19. Wherefore. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the resp ondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not comply w ith the requisites in the Family Code. 1996 FACTS: Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against MCTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy. he is still considered married to his first wife. Complementarily. Tagadan was not able to p resent a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive de ath thus. DOMAGTOY. a valid marriage license except in the cases p rovided for therein. Judges are enjoined to show more than just a cu rsory acquaintance of the law and other established rules.O . 209. as amended by E. or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony s hall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law. Careful study of the records reveals that indeed respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage withou t a marriage license.

respond ent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hottempered. being incurable and continuing.A. for the wedding of their eldest child. although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad." At the time the Complaint was filed. for the brain operation of their fourth chi ld.. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirm ing the trial court’s . a nagger and extravagant. Fely continued to live with her A merican family in New Jersey. respondent Crasu s learned. under these circumstances.A. Jr. 36. (4). in relation to Articles 68. For the wedding of Crasu s. the youngest then being only six years old. In the case at bench. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. (5) and (6). She had been openly using the surname of he r American husband in the Philippines and in the U. Fely came ba ck to the Philippines with her American family. Sometime in 1985. leavi ng all of their five children.S." In 1984. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled i n a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants. and there was no more possibility of rec onciliation between them. of the Family Code of the Philippines. staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in C ebu City.S. "WHERE A MARRIAGE BE TWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER T O REMARRY. S uch incapacity. except those prohib ited under Articles 35(1). Fely A da Micklus. It would be the height of unfairness if. In 1987. 70. This Court cannot see why the benef its of Art. the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citiz enship and thus has become an alien as well. in 1992.S. THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHI LIPPINE LAW. given her total incapacity to hono r her marital covenants to the former. 2005 FACTS: After the celebration of their marriage. an d 72.RP V. U. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spous e eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien. shall also be valid in this country. Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U. with whom she eventually had a child.. Barely a year after Fely left for the U. Fely r eturned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990.. through the letters sent by Fely to their children. plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant. respo ndent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed div orce papers. Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. IYOY 21 Sept. and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. he disregarded the said request. to th e care of respondent Crasus. is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Jr. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines i n accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized. for unknown reasons. that Fely got mar ried to an American. constitutes a ground for declara tion of nullity of marriage under Article 36.A. Calvert. Crasus. it had been 13 years since Fel y left and abandoned respondent Crasus.). 37 and 38." The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted prov ision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still be ing married to his or her alien spouse. a nd valid there as such. ISSUE: Should the divorce obtained abroad by the Filipino wife be recognized as valid? RULING: Article 26 of the Fa mily Code provides: "Art. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint tha t Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family. and in 1995.S.A.

status. in Rizal in 1987. may be recognized in the Philippines. Respondent also contend ed that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Austr alia in 1989 and hence. In mix ed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner. Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. the Australian family cour t issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. vs. Fely was still a Filipino citizen. and in 1996 while in Australia. A s it is worded. refers to a special situation wherein o ne of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. provide d it is consistent with their respective laws. Article 26. Whether or n ot the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson were proven. In 1989. hence. In 1998.a. the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a f act and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. our courts cannot grant it. Although the exact date was not established. respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino. paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar. herein petitioner. in Cabanatuan City. Thus. RECIO . an Australian citizen. ISSUES: 1. d o not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Therefore. In this case. even when she was already living abroad. before they were married. They live d together as husband and wife in Australia. before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce.” A divo rce obtained abroad by two aliens. petitioner. the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object p roperly because he objected to the fact that it . Although. they lived separately. In 1994. respon dent acquired Australian citizenship. their conjugal assets were divided. On the other hand. a Filipino was married to Editha Samson. In 1992. In their application for marriage lic ense. and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be de monstrated. Fely herself admitted i n her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Cr asus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984. and legal capacity. At the time she filed for divorce. GARCIA-RECIO. claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. a Filipi na. respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993. Whether or n ot respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Henc e. condition. she alleged that she had b een an American citizen since 1988. REDERICK A. the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce. appearance is not sufficient.declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 2001 FACTS: The respondent. Philippine laws.k. he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. Article 26. RULING: The Philippine l aw doesn’t provide for absolute divorce. 2. petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on t he ground of bigamy. Rederick Recio. Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “valid ly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. paragraph 2. GARCIA. he married Grace Garcia. respondent October 23. and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. then and even until now. By its plain and literal interpretatio n. a. GRACE J. she was still bound by Philippi ne laws on family rights and duties. after which she marr ied her American husband in 1985.” Since October 1995. GRACE J. In the same Answer. she was still a Filipi no citizen. the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic. i ssued by an Australian family court.

From denial of that motion. in Hongkong in 1972. H e also prayed that he be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. He would have no standing to sue in the case be low as petitioner s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the sa me being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. A s he is bound by the Decision of his own country s Court. there are two types of divorce. MANUEL V.” This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restr icted. and whose decision he does not repudiate. which may be recognized in the Philippine s. The marriage the petitioner and responde nt can’t be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay Ci ty. U. She later married Theodo re Van Dorn in Nevada. ISS UE: Whether or not the divorce decree granted by U. petitioner. and RICHARD UPTON.     . t he court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.. on the ground of incompatibility. married Richard Upton. In this case. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. JR. it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured. Even aft er the divorce becomes absolute. they don’t abs olutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law. between Filipina wi fe and American husband. In 1983. They established res idence in the Philippines and had two children. he is estoppe d by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. the court may under some foreign statutes. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. In 1982. the wife sued for divor ce in Nevada.S. absolute divorce te rminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. pursuant to his national law. court. Together with other evidences submitted. However. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree.S.. stil l restrict remarriage. With the lack of such evidence. ROMILLO. as Presiding Judge of Branch CX. Thus. respondents October 8. which validly exercise d jurisdiction over him. HON.A. Th e defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that cause of acti on was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had ack nowledged that the couple had no community property. an American. not to its ad missibility. Upton sued her asking that she be ordered to ren der an accounting of her business which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. 1985 FACTS: Alice Reyes. held binding upon the latter. she went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Howev er. adequately established his legal capacity to marry un der Australian law. which was val idly admitted as evidence. RULING: It is true that o wing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code.was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. ALICE REYES VAN DORN. vs. the di vorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law. In th is case. a Filipin a. Case remanded to the court a quo. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of big amy. private respondent is no l onger the husband of petitioner. provided they are valid according to their national law.

it necessarily follo ws that such initiator must have the status. VICTOR. 1980. and privat e respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling. as private respondent does. with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. or more than five months afte r the issuance of the divorce decree. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL. petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil. since the purported complainant. promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. that. petitioner. vs. seq. Division 20 of the Schonebe rg Local Court. RULING: Under Article 344 of the Re vised Penal Code. the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as earl y as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". 1986. observe respect and fidelity. were married in the Fede ral Republic of Germany. 1979.   . which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic). On January 15. and the coupl e lived together for some time in Malate. of the Civil Code cannot be just. After about three and a half years of marriage. and render support to private respondent. Article 344 of t he Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still su bsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohib ition. Thereafter. was born on April 20. followed by a separation de f acto between them." ISSUE: Whether the criminal case s filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. with mutual recriminations between the spouses. HON. and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING. LUIS C. Petitioner. on the other hand. a foreigner. The custody of the child was g ranted to petitioner. She should not be di scriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.To maintain. capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. such connubia l disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding ag ainst petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. et. petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife s obligations under Article 109. Hence. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA. 1989 FACTS: On Septemb er 7. Manila where their only child. The petition is ancho red on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery. 1987. On June 27. under our laws. while still married t o said respondent. a Filipino citizen. filed an action for lega l separation. seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Isabell a Pilapil Geiling. does not qualify a s an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national l aw prior to his filing the criminal complaint. support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23. a German national. 1983. HON. respondents June 30. Corollary to such exclusive gra nt of power to the offended spouse to institute the action. marital discord set i n. H e claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. Federal Republic of Germany. The records show that under German law said court was loca lly and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissol ution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable l aw of that foreign jurisdiction. On Octobe r 27. Petit ioner should not be obliged to live together with. 1986. private respondent filed two complaints fo r adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that. The marriage started auspiciously enough.

survived by the above named children. Petiti oner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and damages against Privat e Respondents Felix and Lourdes.In the present case. Said divorce and it s legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private responde nt is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the mat ter of status of persons. petitioner. but the de fendants refused. Trias. On July 4. is admitted. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived wi th them. Lourd es and Felix. claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Kalibo Aklan. it was ruled th at when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigat ion. FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) an d LOURDES TRINIDAD. His right as a co-owner would. had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. so he w as not substituted as a party. Inocentes. To prove the fact of marr iage. Patricio Trinidad and An astacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children. the Federal Republic of Germany. Lourdes and Felix. and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had bee n in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land. one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad. said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. The Court he ld that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and. Arturio Trinidad. In 1970. When Patricio died in 1940. the trial court rendered a decis ion in favor of the petitioner. 1998 FACTS: On August 10. the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witn ess to the matrimony. born on July 21. vs. the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce i n his country. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 19 41. ARTURIO TRINIDAD. the rev ersed the assailed decision and resolution. the couple s public and open cohabitation as husband and w ife after the alleged           . being no longer the husband of pet itioner. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940. both surnamed Trinidad. plaintiff de manded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father. before plaintiff s birth. On October 28. claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. before the Court of Fir st Instance. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inoce ntes Trinidad. 1989. in turn. Felix died without issue. leaving the four (4) parcels of lan d to his three (3) children. In Pugeda vs. all situated at Barrio Tigayon. Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his p arents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription agai nst him had set in. Inocentes. 1943. namely. depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). 1982. ISSUES: Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his pa rents marriage and of his filiation? RULING: The partition of the late Patricio s real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent s estate. Private respondent. COURT OF APPEALS. respondents April 20. thus. who was the original owner of the parc els of land. he left four (4) parcels of land. 1978.

who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. two witnesses were presen ted by petitioner: Isabel Meren. Metr opolitan Trial Court. A lthough a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation. and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. 1991. how ever. which the respondent claims to have married in Los Angele s on December 4. although he admits having five children with her. Upon the request of On gkiko’s parents. Petitione r submitted in evidence a certification that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17. The totality of petitioner s positive evidence clearly prepond erates over private respondents selfserving negations.wedlock. This fact. complainant. Preponderant evidence me ans that. deaths and marriages were either lost. In the case at ba r. the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon an d former board member of the local parent-teachers association. Aklan. Manila. When respondent married De Castro. who testified that she was present during the n uptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5. 1942 in New Washington. LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA. and J ovita Gerardo. She also attended petitioner s baptismal party held at the same house. 1995 FACTS: This i s a complaint for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against the jud gerespondent. Although the marriage contract is consi dered the primary evidence of the marital union. petitioner s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. 1965. the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adv erse party. they were again married in June of the same year and neither part y applied for a marriage license. he presented in ev idence two family pictures. To prove his filiation. Ongkiko allegedly abandoned him 17 years ago a nd left their children in his care. Respondent denies having been married to Zenaida Ongkiko (first wife). Branch 20. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in whic h Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child s father and mother. burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. 1956. as a whole. JR. as she lived only thirty meters away. In place of a marriage contract. respondent March 29. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such u nion. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man a nd a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful c ontract of marriage. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25. vs. Gerardo. his baptismal certificate and Gerardo s testimony. Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respe cting marriage. 1943. The respondent was co-habiting with the complainant’s live-in partne r (Yolanda De Castro). On July 21. is not fatal to petitioner s case. petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births. he believed that he wa s single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. i t is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree. used to visit I nocentes and Felicidad s house twice or thrice a week. as other forms of relevant evidenc e may take its place.. Gerardo dropped by Inocentes house when Felicida d gave birth to petitioner. BRILLANTES. ISSUE:                     .

Aft er the solemnization. However. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for hi s illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations. Petitioner assured and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him. to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobi a was not recognized. embarrassment and sufferings. MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. been married twice. Following the rule that all marriages are valid unless annulled by a compe tent court. among others. it remains valid. he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. 1992 FAC TS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of t he Law. The Family Code applies in the case although the respondent argu es that his first marriage was made prior to the Code’s effectivity. will the subsequent issuance of a marr iage license render a marriage solemnize without it valid? RULING: . in its Report and Recommendation. there must be a judicial declara tion of nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a s econd marriage. Orobia without the requis ite marriage license. he examined the documents submitted to him by the petition er and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage lic ense so he refused to solemnize the marriage. in fact. Furthermore. The respo ndent is dismissed from the service. and the delivery of the provisions for t he occasion. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. upon Orobia’s death. He attributed the hardships and embarra ssment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. due to the earnest pleas of the parties. OCCIANO. Respondent averred. respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license an d admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. The case was referred by the Office of the Ch ief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator. found respondent gui lty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territo rial jurisdiction. the marriage between respond and Ongkiko is valid although they don’t have a marriage license. that before s tarting the ceremony.Whether or not the marriage entered into by the respondent and Zenaida Ongkiko w as void ab initio RULING Under the Family Code. among others. but they never did. And witho ut any a judicial decision annulling their marriage. which caused her so much hardsh ips.) Commodore Dominador B. respondent April 11. the influx of visitors. ISSUE: Assuming that the marriage was conducted within the te rritorial jurisdiction of the respondent. Moreover. petitioner’s right. Since the marriage is a nullity (because the marriage was also celebrated outside the respondents territorial jurisdiction). the retroactive application of the Code doesn’t impair any vested right of the respon dent. for solemnizing the marriage between petit ioner and her late groom (Ret. the respondent can’t invoke that their marri age was void ab initio because they have. JUDGE SALVADOR M. via a sworn Letter-Complaint. The Office of the Court Administrator. which required the respond ent to comment on the complaint.

respondents September 22. petitioner. his baptismal certificate and the affirmation of the cohabitation of his parents is enough evidence to pr ove the marriage of his parents. The Appellate court did not decide in favor of Arturo and reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that he was not able to present suf ficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other. 1978.Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requis ite marriage license. FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD. plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Co urt of First Instance and action for partition of four (4) parcels of land. In People vs. includin g the procurement of the marriage license. Patricio Tri nidad. Angelia M. The refusal of the defendants. In fact. Except in cases provided by law. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. respondents Apri l 20. 1970 in Pasig. He w as claiming that he was the son of the deceased Inocentes Trinidad. 1998 FACTS: On August 10. the father of the deceased. and that subsequ ent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to th e marriage. 1994 FACTS: On June 24. He failed to present the marriag e contract due to the destruction of such records. which preceded the issuance of the marriage license. In this respect. CA STRO. Respondent judge d id not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Metro Manila. vs. the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. Malvar. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the pr ocessing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage. to the demand of Arturo to the partition of the land into three (3) equal parts caused Arturo to file a case which was decided i n his favour. which he left to his three children namely.000. ARTURIO TRINIDAD. Castro and Edwin F. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contract ing parties on June 24. Lourdes and Felix. the Supreme Court held that a marriage .00 with STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely). Lara. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. the failure to present it does n ot prove that no marriage took place because there are other evidences that coul d have the same bearing as a marriage contract. it is the marriage license that giv es the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. His act of presenting witness es who were present during the nuptial of his parents. vs. 1970. respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. City Court Judge of Pasay City. Inocentes. CO URT OF APPEALS. the marriage was celebrated without t he knowledge of Castro’s parents. Lourdes. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. I SSUE: Whether or not the failure to present a marriage contract would mean that there was no marriage that transpired. owned four (4) parcels of land. . is void. RULING: While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage. (Respond ent is fined P5. petitioner. and Felix.

the spouses lived separately. it was only in March 1971. 1983. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage. BRANCH XLI. However. petitioner. including the names of the applicants. and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29. Sy and private respondent Fern ando Sy contracted marriage on November 15. PAMPANGA. However.The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marri age was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus. their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. when Castro discovered she was pregnant. Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted par ricide against her husband. Sinc e then. Thereafter. that the couple decided to live together. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion an d pursuant to Section 29. The above Rule authorized the cu stodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search. Tondo. their son Frederick transferred to his father s resid ence at Masangkay. FILIPINA Y. 1987. lived with hi s father. he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the i ssuance of a marriage license. On October 19. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. Castro gave birth. SY. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. a certificate of due s earch and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue ma rriage license no. THE HONORABLE RE GIONAL TRIAL COURT. upon motion of petitioner. the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without ju st cause. vs. The baby was adopted by Castro’s b rother. RULING: At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24. the couple parte d ways. SAN FERNANDO. 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Filipina Y. Filipina filed a petition for legal separation. Later. Manila on May 15. the date the marriage license was iss ued and such other relevant data. and their two children were in the custody of their mother. In May 1988. 1396182 to the contracting parties. the law gover ning marital relations was the New Civil Code. civil regis trars are public officers charged with the duty. As custodians of public documents. ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonal evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to th e celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. of maintaining a re gister book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licen se. with the consent of Cardenas. containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal part nership. absence to the par ties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. 1971. Filipina   . On September 15. The trial court also granted custody of the child ren to Filipina. a particular docum ent does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not be found in a registrar. inter alia. Cardena. and FERNANDO SY. that they have been living separately for more than one year. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Both were then 22 years old. and from then on. 198 3. 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lo urdes in Quezon City.1988. 1970. Their union was blessed with two children. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registra r. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains an d approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agre ement executed by the spouses. On February 11. Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. respond ents April 12.

A marriage li cense is a formal requirement. she went to the dental clinic a t Masangkay. 1992. F ilipina got mad. and (3) refusal to have sex with her. Moreover. in her petitio ns for separation of property and legal separation. and Fernando s infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. And prior to their separa tion in 1983. they were living together harmoniously. and started spanking him. RULING: The d ate of celebration of their marriage on November 15.testified that in the afternoon of May 15. the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. the marriage contract shows that the         . Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son. and punched her in the different parts of her body. do not constitute psychological incap acity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The Regional Trial Court of Manila convic ted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. there was no marriage license. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando. (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part. granted the peti tion on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. and released her only when he thought she was dead. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando. the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that t he alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sh eryll to petitioner. and iss ued a decree of legal separation. Filipina also claimed that her husband start ed choking her when she fell on the floor. and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more tha n one year. Pampanga denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration o f absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. Petitioner later filed a new action for legal sepa ration against private respondent. as cited by petitioner. James Ferraren. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband. on the following grounds: (1) repeated physic al violence. Tondo. Pampanga. Manila. perform ing the marital act only to satisfy himself. At that instance. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginnin g for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony. She said it was not t he first time Fernando maltreated her. (2) sexual infidelity. She also cites as ma nifestations of her husband s psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitu al alcoholism. On August 4. Pampanga. Moreover. and 2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marr iage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. 1988. choosing to live with his mistress instead. In addition. 1973. P etitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the tr ial court in finding that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent s pu rported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites o f law. F ilipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor. took the computer away from her son. owned by her husband but operated by his mistress. is admitted both by p etitioner and private respondent. (3) attempt by respondent against her life. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent. or almost ten yea rs from the date of the celebration of their marriage. It reiterated the finding of the trial c ourt that the couple s marital problems surfaced only in 1983. t o fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando. and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Filipina alleges that suc h psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebrati on of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. The pieces of evidence on record showed that o n the day of the marriage ceremony. evidenced by a M edical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. and their son Frederick to respondent. While she was talking t o her son.

respondent February 2. RULING: Yes. 2001 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao on June 20. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Cavite. for purposes of remarriage. The marriage of Carino and Susan Nicdao is void since it was solemnized without the required marriage licen se. before a party can enter into a second marriage. neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. Carino died due to d iabetes on November 23. almost one year after the ceremony took place o n November 15. yet. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respo ndent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriag e was solemnized. Susan Yee claimed that she had no knowledge of Carino’s marriage with Susan Nicdao. The remaining issu e on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain th e Court. there must be a prior jud icial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage. Under the Family Code. save marriages of exceptional character. This is clearly applicable in this case. Susan Yee filed a case to collect one half of the sum of the death benefits received by Susan Nicdao. are void ab initio. 1992.1974. ISSUE: Whether or no t the first marriage contracted by Carino is void ab initio. 19 69 without a license and without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage . SUSAN YEE CARIÑO. The marriage license was issued on September 17. though void. those solemnized without a marriage license. At the time she married Carino. vs. 1973. Both spouses of Carino claimed and collected monetary be nefits and financial assistance from various government agencies as death benefi ts.he married Susan Yee on November 10. . numbered 6237519. petitioner. 1992 under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medic al and burial expenses. was issued in Carmona. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO. The fi rst marriage contracted by Carino is void ab initio.marriage license.

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