State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective Author(s): Maria

Edin Source: The China Quarterly, No. 173 (Mar., 2003), pp. 35-52 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20058957 . Accessed: 16/10/2011 16:19
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and Local Agent State Capacity China: CCP Cadre Management Township Perspective* Maria Edin

Control from a

in

Abstract has declined

This in into higher control

study argues the reform the old levels

that the capacity the view against era in China. It examines how

of

the central have

state been

reforms

introduced also how

political

to make of cadre management it more but effective, system of the party-state have and strengthened improved monitoring to hold concurrent leaders successful through promoting township

at higher them between different levels and by rotating administrative levels positions as the capacity areas. Its findings that state capacity, defined and geographical suggest reason to monitor and control lower level has increased. The behind the agents, failure to some implement policies, over control local leaders Chinese party-state such as as burden reduction, own is not and so much conflicting effective in the centre's the ability

inadequate policies.

The

maintains

priorities to be selectively

the beginning of 2000s.

are commonly believed to have weak state vis-?-vis local governments and in China. Whether central state capacity has enterprise conglomerates declined or not in the reform era has been a hot topic of scholarly debate. and Hu Angang both argue that it has been severely Wang Shaoguang undermined decentralization and economic reforms. Wang takes ex by tractive capacity as the key indicator of overall state capacity. He shows Decentralization and marketization ened the authority of the central that the centre is unable to control extrabudgetary funds and its relative to the extent that Beijing has lost share of tax revenues has decreased on effective control over the country's economic life.1 Huang Yasheng, the other hand, argues against this view. Huang finds that the central has increased its political and administrative control over government to co-ordinate economic leaders, and continues governments provincial and implementation.2 This study will approach the issue of policy-making state capacity by examining to control and the party-state's ability
* I wish to thank Frank Pieke, Tak-Wing John Burns and Kevin O'Brien for their Ngo, on earlier versions of this, article. This research project was funded by the helpful comments Swedish International 1995 and 1998. (Sida) between Development Agency capacity Economic California "The rise of the regions: fiscal reform and the decline of central state Shaoguang, in China," in Andrew G. Walder State: (ed.), The Waning of the Communist Decline in China and Hungary of Origins of Political (Berkeley: University and Hu Angang, The Chinese Economy in Crisis: Press, 1995); Wang Shaoguang State Capacity and Tax Reform (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). For the same view, see 1. Wang

also Hao Jia and Lin Zhimin Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and (eds.), Changing State Capacity Power: Vol. Press, III, Unstately (Boulder: Westview 1994); Lynn T. White I Local Causes Economic (New York: M.E. 1998). of China's Reforms Sharpe, 2. Huang Yasheng, "Central-local in China during the reform era: the economic relations and institutional World Development, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1996); and Inflation and dimensions," Investment Controls in China: The Political Relations the of Central-Local Economy During Press, 1996). Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University ? The China Quarterly, 2003

36

The China Quarterly at the its lower-level agents. Its focus is on cadre management has occurred. level, where most of the economic growth township to In the 1990s, the Chinese Communist (CCP) attempted Party its control over the evaluation and monitoring of local leaders strengthen system (gangwei zerenzhi). Samuel Ho through the cadre responsibility was one of the first to describe the assessment of local cadres' economi in southern Jiangsu, in 1994.3 Susan related work achievements cally account of the cadre evaluation at the grassroots level system Whiting's to date. She describes is the most how township and village thorough monitor promoted rural industry because of fiscal and political incentives. was income and tied to both personal industrial performance tax collection In studying and credit allocation, Whiting promotion. criteria of evaluation, economic rewards mainly focuses on the economic conse in the form of bonus, and the intended and unintended economic on her work, the emphasis here will be on the While building quences.4 officials Their political control aspect of cadre evaluation. This study views the cadre to improve system (CRS) not only as a means designed responsibility but also as an instrument of higher level to control government efficiency, relations. By analysing lower-level agents and to regulate central-local this work bridges CRS as an important component of cadre management, in rural areas with that on Commu the literature on cadre responsibility and the nomenklatura. nist Party organization This article describes how market reforms have been introduced into to make itmore effective, as well as the old system of cadre management have strengthened their political how higher levels of the party-state control over local leaders not only through appointment but also through successful leaders to hold concurrent positions at higher levels promoting and by rotating them between different positions within the county. It is to control and argued that state capacity, defined here as the capacity has increased in China, and that the Chinese monitor lower-level agents, than it is Communist Party is capable of greater institutional adaptability credit for. The findings of this study suggest that the reason usually given such as burden reduction, behind the failure to implement some policies, is not so much inadequate control over local leaders as the centre's own the priorities and conflicting policies. The Chinese party-state maintains to be selectively in the beginning of 2000s. effective ability at the of fieldwork conducted The project draws on seven months 1996 to 1999. The field research was and township level between county all very carried out in a number of different (12 counties), places
in Rural in Transition: 3. Samuel P.S. Ho, Rural China Non-Agricultural Development 1978-1990 Press, 1994), pp. 212-15. (Oxford: Clarendon Jiangsu, in reform China: of institutional "The micro-foundations 4. Susan Hayes Waiting, change in the rural industrial and revenue extraction sector," PhD dissertation, property rights For her more recent work on the cadre evaluation of Michigan, 1995, pp. 58-66. University Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of system, see Susan H. Whiting, and "The cadre Institutional Press, 2000) University Change (Cambridge: Cambridge on evaluation the paradox of party rule," prepared for the workshop system at the grassroots: Cadre Monitoring PRC, University and Reward: of California, Personnel San Diego, and Policy Management 6-7 June 1998, revised Implementation 1999. September in the

State Capacity

and Local Agent

Control

37

areas, in Southern Jiangsu, Shandong and Zhejiang province. developed Two townships (the first in Suzhou prefecture in Jiangsu, and the second in Zibo prefecture in Shandong) served as base field sites, and other sites were added to place the information in a comparative perspective. Some 150 interviews were carried out with local cadres and local entrepreneurs, from the Party organization and the personnel involving department personnel bureau at the county level as well as with township leading the findings only apply to the developed cadres.5 While coastal areas of those areas that are assumed to have gained power China, it is precisely vis-?-vis the central authorities, areas allow and a study of developed examination of the claim that marketization and economic growth weaken the central party-state and its organization.

Reforms At

to Improve Government the outset of

Efficiency

a national civil service reform, building system was seen by the new leadership as a precondition for zhidu) (gongwuyuan a cadre responsi economic development and modernization. Establishing is part of that endeavour. bility system to improve government efficiency The Chinese Communist Party has introduced market reforms, similar to those reforms that have swept public administrations in both the devel into the old cadre management world, oped and developing system. on the New Public Manage Market reforms refer to reforms modelled of authority, employment of contracts, ment, and include: decentralization setting of quantitative goals, introducing competition among state bureau incentives to encourage goal fulfilment, and taking crats, use of economic the help of clients to measure government performance.6 These reforms will be discussed in turn below. In an attempt to let the performance of public officials play a greater role and to facilitate measurement of that performance, national regula tions on the evaluation of civil servants were passed in 1993. The principal criteria of evaluation are formulated in very general terms since levels and areas in the country: political they apply to all departments, integrity (de), competence (neng), diligence (qin) and achievements (ji), with an emphasis on actual work achievements. to one hand According should account for 60 to 70 per cent and book, work achievement and diligence should together account for political integrity, competence 30 to 40 per cent of the evaluation.7 On the basis of the evaluation results,
5. For Communist (Uppsala: 6. For a more detailed discussion Power: Local Political of the fieldwork, see Maria and Economic Institutions Edin, Market Development Forces and

in China

Printers, University 2000). a good introduction to the New Public Management model which that advocates in accordance should function the same market with as private government principles see Peter Self, Government The Politics Choice enterprises, by the Market? of Public and Christopher "From old Press, (Boulder: Westview 1993); and Patrick Dunleavy Hood, to new public management," administration Public Money and Management public 1994). (July-September 7. "Guojia tiaoli" on national civil gongwuyuan zanxing ("Temporary regulations in Zhu Qingfang servants"), passed on 14 August 1993, published (ed.), Guojia gongwuyuan

38

The China Quarterly to be excellent or (chenzhi) (youxiu), competent judged Performance criteria are closely connected (bu chenzhi)} incompetent with one of the four criteria above, work achievements (ji).9 While they are very general on a national level, the targets given to local Party and leaders are in contrast very concrete. The CCP Organization government cadres established official for the annual evaluation guidelines Department of local Party and government (kaohe) leading cadres in 1988, which contain very specific performance criteria, such as industrial output, taxes and profits remit of township- and village-run output enterprises,
ted.10

are

but it is primarily the - the of the township government (lingdao ganbu) Party leading - who are affected head secretary and the government by the cadre system. It is only the township leading cadres who are responsibility evaluated by, and held directly accountable the county Party organiza to, in government departments are tion. Other township state cadres working evaluated by the township leaders themselves, whereas they were previ evaluated by the relevant county functional agency. Today, Party ously contracts secretaries and township heads (gangwei sign performance one of the novel features of the cadre responsibility mubiao zerenshu), cadres the county level.11 Township system, with leading cadres thus sign contracts of a similar fashion to those signed by collective-run enterprises to attain In these contracts, leaders pledge and households. township and are held personally certain targets laid down by higher levels, for attaining those targets. There are different contracts for responsible

All

state cadres

at the local

level are evaluated

footnote continued renshi chubanshe, Civil Servants) {Management of National (Beijing: Zhongguo and 149-151. See also "Zhonggong guanyu yinfa dangsheng pp. 543-556 zhongyang tiaoli' de tongzhi" (Circular distributed by zanxing lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo on selection of Party and appointment the Party Central Committee: "Temporary regulations in Canzhao issued on 9 February and government 1995, published guojia leading cadres") on National Civil zhidao shouce zhidu guanli gongzuo {Guidance Handbook gongwuyuan of the Communist Servant System Management) by the Central Committee Party Organization duwu chubanshe, 1997), pp. 161-173. (Beijing: Dangjian Department the work of civil servants and leading to the national 8. According above, regulations or above for two consecutive cadres must have been excellent years, or at least competent guanli 1997), for three consecutive years to qualify for promotion. two consecutive years, it should lead to dismissal. "The cadre management 9. Melanie Manion, transfer and removal of Party and state promotion, (1985), p. 227. 10. Whiting, If the cadre system, leaders," is deemed incompetent for

post-Mao: The China

the appointment, No. 102 Quarterly,

The document in Rural China, pp. 102-103. she cites is Power and Wealth zuzhibu, shixing lingdao ganbu niandu gongzuo difang dangzheng Zhongyang "Guanyu of the annual job evaluation kaohe zhidu de tongzhi" ("Notice regarding implementation in Zhongguo system for leading cadres of local Party and government published organs") of the post-Mao cadre evaluation renshi nianjian (1991). In her section on the development of reform. how the system has evolved since the beginning describes system, Whiting contracts have been described and Lianjiang earlier in Kevin J. O'Brien 11. Performance Vol. 31, No. 2 in rural China," Comparative Politics, Li, "Selective policy implementation in rural P. Brown, cadres and local state capacity (1999), p. 172; and also in George "Budgets, in Flemming and Junzuo Christiansen Jiangsu," Curzon Press, in the 1990s (Richmond: Society Zhang 1998), (eds.), p. 32. Village Inc.: Chinese Rural

State Capacity different fields, tax collection,

and Local Agent

Control

such as industrial development, agricultural development, I and social order. In all areas where family planning contracts were in use. Collective conducted field research, performance contracts are drawn up between the county and township level, signed by either the Party secretary or the township head, depending on the content of of the contract. Economic affairs formally fall under the responsibility of the government head while Party affairs fall under the responsibility the Party secretary. areas and over contracts varies between The content of performance the priorities not only of the central but also of local time, reflecting authorities. Performance targets can be adjusted and new ones added in to changing circumstances. For example, the targets of export response burden and reducing the number of complaint earnings, reducing peasant letters were all added when found urgent by higher levels. Whiting's

work

shows how the actions of local leaders prompted the central authorities to introduce new policies and targets.12 The CCP continues to from the targets but the difference rely on the setting of quantitative era is that a few selected performance targets (kaohe zhibiao) pre-reform in cadre evaluation are given priority. As Whiting points out, it conveys to local

cadres which should receive priority.13 policies soft targets targets are internally ranked in importance: (yiban zhibiao), hard targets (ying zhibiao) and priority targets with veto power (yipiao fojue). Veto power implies that if township leaders fail to attain these targets, this would cancel out all other work performance, however in the comprehensive at the end of the evaluation successful, to be economic nature while priority targets are in year. Hard targets tend more often political. While of hard targets is important both completion for bonus and for political rewards, completion of priority targets consti tutes the basis for personnel decisions. contract with regard to industrial devel To illustrate one performance in one rapidly developing town opment, the targets were the following RMB 700 million, sales income RMB 830 ship in Shandong: output value million and profit RMB 54 million. These originated from the annual economic and social development plan of the county, and were hard targets. The two key industrial projects (gongye zhongdian xiangmu) of this township, both listed in the county annual plan, were also written into contract. They involved investment of RMB 20 million the performance for building facilities to produce 8,000 tons of fire-resistant brick, and to produce graphite-plated investment of RMB 10 million reactors in two of the township's most successful enterprises. The performance contract was the responsibility was signed by, for industrial development of, and the township head.14 Hard targets are, as this example illustrates, typically
12. Whiting, "The cadre evaluation system at the grassroots." 13. Whiting, Power in Rural China, p. 270. and Wealth 14. From document "X zhen 1997 nian gongye waijin mubiao zerenshu" ("Responsibility contract with regard to industry and foreign export targets in 1997 of X township") which was copied down for me by the township mayor. See also interview 2SAal8 with the mayor cum Party-vice on key industrial (1998). The information secretary of this Shandong township

information Performance

40

The China Quarterly drawn from the economic and social development plan. Tax revenues submitted to the county were, not surprisingly, invariably defined as a contract with in the performance hard target specified the township in all the areas studied. government used for key policies Priority targets with veto power are exclusively of higher levels or the county itself. There are two priority targets which are enforced nation-wide, mirroring the importance which the Communist on these policies: Party places family planning and social order (shehui In all the areas where I conducted field research, zh?ari)}5 family planning and social order were made priority targets. One such ance contract with regard to family planning designated the birth ten per thousand, and was signed by the township mayor.16 contract on maintaining social order was 20 pages performance perform quota to Another

long and signed by the Party secretary of that township.17 Serious disturbance of social order will cancel out successful work performance in other fields of government work, and it varies between areas what constitutes such a In one Zhejiang disturbance. county, three situations held the power to crime (where cancel out other successful work performance: economic more than RMB 200,000 are embezzled), violence (resulting in a person's and large-scale demonstrations than 50 people (when more death), gather).18 If areas experience particular problems that are deemed import ant, itmay become a local priority target. Funeral cremation, for example, was was declared an additional priority target in order to reserve land for uses, indicating that land waste was a particular problem of productive that Zhejiang county.19 between cadres at the same administrative party-state Competition level has been introduced under the cadre responsibility hierarchical system. Township leading cadres are placed in an internal ranking order the county on the basis of the evaluation results. It is the Party within is in charge of evaluation of (zuzhibu) which organization department township leading cadres. In some areas, such as in southern Jiangsu and the Party bureau of rural affairs (nongcun gongzuobu) northern Zhejiang,
footnote continued "X qu 1997 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan jihua" ("The 1997 projects are from document and social development of X district"), economic pp. 18-19. plan of national source Rong Jingben et ai, Cong yalixing 15. The Chinese tizhi xiang minzhu hezuo tizhi the Pressurized de zhuanbian: tizhi gaige from xianxiang (Transformation liangji zhengzhi Reform of the Political System at the County System to a Democratic System of Co-operation: that and Township 1998), p. 271 mentions Levels) bianyi chubanshe, (Beijing: Zhongyang should accomplish the two compulsory tasks of imposing the county Party committee family is also referred to as a task to assume and maintaining public order. Birth control planning veto in O'Brien and Li, "Selective p. 172. power policy implementation," "X xian zerenshu" 16. From document mubiao 1999 nian jihua gongzuo shengyu contract with regard to family planning work in 1999 of X county"). ("Responsibility shehui zhi'an zhili mubiao "X xian 17. From document 1999 niandu zonghe guanli contract with regard to management of comprehensive zerenshu" public ("Responsibility in 1999 of X county"). security in charge of evaluation in the Party bureau of rural 18. Interview ZC5 with the vice-director affairs in a Zhejiang (1998). county and one section chief of 19. Interview ZE3 with one section chief of the Party committee in a southern Zhejiang the Party organization (1999). county department

State Capacity

and Local Agent

Control

41

all aspects of of work achievements. When the evaluation co-ordinates Party and government work have been evaluated at the end of the year, as a collective, as a total score is calculated for the township government well as for each individual township cadre. In one county 59 officials were assessed as excellent, 292 as competent, four as basically competent and two as incompetent on the basis of the final score.20 The total number is stipulated in national or local regula of cadres who can be excellent of the total cadre force.21 tions to a limited percentage are used to encourage and Economic incentives goal fulfilment, The bonuses for township cadres are pegged to their work performance. use of bonuses has been well described in the literature.22 It is important to point out that townships are ranked on the basis of total scores as a and bonuses are paid to all township state cadres in accordance collective, It with the score of the collective, thus reducing individual incentives. is a conscious appears that bonus payment strategy on the part of local to supplement, the basic salary for governments through legal means, state cadres. While higher levels have the authority to decide the level of bonuses, they are not financed out of the state budget but paid from the own collective funds, that is to say, income from local township's In this way, bonus payment such as township enterprises. is projects on the condition of local finances.23 Not surprisingly, bonuses dependent were higher, or at least the process was more open, in southern Jiangsu where collective industry dominates than in the other two provinces under In one southern Jiangsu county, all state cadres in a middle-ranking study. in bonus in 1995 on the basis of the township received RMB 4,600 collective bonuses were collectively there determined, ranking. Although were some incentives for the three leading cadres who received 30 per

20. Interview ZE3 with one section chief of the Party committee and one section chief of in a Zhejiang the Party committee (1999). A total of 357 county organization department officials which includes not only leading cadres but also ordinary state cadres. The two groups are compared within their two respective The final score and the final grade are categories. "X qu quguan guanbu entered in the personal dossier of each cadre, see document 1998 nian de kaohe jiegou huizong" of cadres inX district") issued ("The listed result of 1998 evaluation I was shown but was not permitted to copy. which by the Party organization department to national regulations, 21. According the percentage should be, at most, 15% of the total number of cadres, see article 6 in Temporary of National Civil Servants. Local Regulations are often less restrictive, see for example document regulations "Xiangzhen lingdao dangzhen banzi he lingdao ganbu 1998 niandu gongzuo kaohe banfa" ("The methods of work evaluation of township party government set a limit of 30%. offices and leading cadres in 1998") which A. Byrd and Alan Gelb, "Why industrialize? 22. See, for example, William The incentives for rural community inWilliam A. Byrd and Qingsong Lin (eds.), China's governments," Rural Industry: Structure, Development and Reform Press, 1990), (Oxford: Oxford University Foundations p. 374; Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional of Economic Reform of California "The micro-foundations Press, 1999), pp. 49-50; Whiting, (Berkeley: University of institutional in reform China," p. 29. change areas rarely receive any bonus at all, see interview ShBcl 23. Cadres in poverty-stricken with the Party secretary and the mayor of a Shanxi (1999). In one township which township was ranked third in a poverty-designated as a in Shanxi, the township county government was awarded RMB collective the so called bonus was not divided 1,000. However, among 3,000 the leaders but used to finance and the second-ranked expenditure. The first-ranked public expenditure. township was given RMB and used for township RMB 2,000, also given to the collective

public

42

The China Quarterly than the ordinary cadres, in accordance with local regulations.24 bonus for state cadres in a Zhejiang the township, where was lower, amounted to more of collective than enterprises proportion RMB 2,500 in 1997.25 a means The cadre responsibility to is, as shown above, system enhance government but it is also an instrument by higher efficiency, levels tomonitor and control local agents. The next section examines how the central party-state has attempted to strengthen its monitoring of local The average and also has revived old agents using help from the local community, administrative from the pre-reform era to facilitate control over practices local leaders. cent more

Strengthening As

Monitoring

and Control

over Local Agents

system, segments of a local com part of the cadre responsibility munity evaluate their local leaders and thereby provide vital information to higher levels of the party-state. To manage and control its local agents, to a concurrent post at a the centre employs methods such as promotion level and rotation of leaders between different levels and areas conducted in a selective manner. It is argued geographical over local cadres, replicated at all levels, administrative control on means waning and its structure is examined by focusing higher different here that is by no

counties' control over townships. to the monitoring of local cadres. One There exist serious obstacles is that the local offices of monitoring bureaus are important obstacle In order to obtain accurate under the leadership of local governments.26 information and to solve the principal-agent dilemma, central authorities As O'Brien and Li write, local have allied with the local community. agent compliance with state policies cannot be accurately assessed unless villagers, who have the most information about cadre shirking, are drawn evaluation functions and enlisting the help into the process.27 Delegating trend of the masses may be seen as part of the broader decentralization the country, yet it at the same time reinforces central control. sweeping criteria, work achieve Up to this point, only one of the four evaluation has been discussed. to bonuses, The

is of work achievements evaluation Ho and been well described and has related by mainly re for political three criteria are significant The remaining Whiting.28 of local state and promotion wards and also affect the appointment ments,
in a southern of the industrial corporation 24. Interview JAa4 with the general manager in the same ranked township (1996). The leading cadres of the highest township Jiangsu JAI with the vice-director in 1995, see interview of county received RMB 8,580 in bonuses the Party bureau of rural affairs in a southern Jiangsu county (1996). in charge of evaluation in the Party bureau of rural 25. Interview ZC5 with the vice-director affairs in a Zhejiang (1998). county 26. Huang Yasheng, (1995), pp. 837-38. 27. O'Brien and Li, 28. Ho, Rural China China, pp. 104-106. "Administrative monitoring in China," The China 174. Power and Wealth in Rural Quarterly, No. 143

"Selective p. policy implementation," and Whiting, in Transition, pp. 213-14

State Capacity

and Local Agent

Control

43

the role of these three criteria (political agents. One way to understand is to view them as a bottom line of and diligence) integrity, competence evaluation with the potential power to cancel out successful work per formance in other fields under evaluation. The three criteria boil down to the Party line of superiors and to evaluation by peers and "the following is thus a criterion in the masses." Assessment by peers and "the masses" evaluation by higher levels but their assessment also provides information to higher levels and facilitates monitoring. In conjunction with the annual evaluation by higher levels, a demo where and "the cratic appraisal meeting (minzhu pingyi), colleagues masses" gather to evaluate the Party secretary and township head, is held. The term "masses" refers to representatives of the level (qunzhong) below the unit undergoing evaluation. In the case of the immediately leaders and the township-run leading cadres, it is the village All village leaders usually participate in the meet enterprise managers. some areas representation by township-run enterprise man ing, while in agers is limited to the key enterprise managers. they fill in a Typically, of township leaders on a scale rating the work performance questionnaire to incompetent along the four criteria of political integrity, from excellent The rating is conducted anonymously. ability, attitude and achievements. as having little and Li dismiss democratic O'Brien evaluation meetings serve as true that their opinions mainly it is practical effect,29 but while to higher levels and provide information. reference, ratings send signals township describes their effect to be that if many people express a leader at the meeting, the Party organization the democratic department begins to investigate.30 Without exaggerating it is safe to say that the evaluation by effects of these appraisal meetings, to the county authorities which lower levels provides information they may or may not choose to act upon. or the practice of submitting letters of complaint to higher Petitioning, levels (shangfang gaozhuang), is also both a criterion in evaluation of a channel of information that facilitates monitoring local leaders and by letters has been higher levels. The renewed importance of complaint and Li.31 It is relatively recently that reducing the observed by O'Brien a criterion in evaluation number of citizen complaints has become of local leaders: in one Zhejiang it was introduced as late as 1999 county scores because of the increasing emphasis by higher levels.32 Evaluation be downgraded if too many complaints are filed, or if complaints are may One interviewee dissatisfaction with not dealt with evaluation to one vice-director in charge of properly. According in another Zhejiang than 15 per cent of the county, if more

and Li, "Selective 29. O'Brien p. 174. policy implementation," 30. Interview SCA1 with the village Party secretary cum chairman of the board of the cum in Shandong (1998) and interview ZCal with the vice-mayor village corporation village of the industrial office director of the industrial office and the vice-director in a Zhejiang

township (1998).
31. Kevin J. O'Brien and Li Lianjiang, "The politics of lodging complaints in rural China," The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1995), p. 764. 32. Interview ZE3 with the section chief of the Party committee and the section chief of the Party committee in a Zhejiang (1999). county organization department

The China Quarterly of complaints have been sent to the office for complaints at it will negatively affect the evaluation of township leaders.33 higher level, But citizen complaints take on a special importance in evaluation since are intimately connected to the priority target of upholding social they order, reflecting the centre's concern with maintaining stability. In one total number from the masses county, problems with letters of complaint Shandong of social order - a priority target - and as such counted as violation out other successful work performance.34 cancelled Information from citizens no doubt plays a major role in uncovering cadre misbehaviour. One study reports that 80 per cent of the clues about cadre misconduct came from letters of complaint sent by the and financial irregularities to higher levels thus provides necessary information public.35 Petitioning of the party-state but is of course not by itself decisive for government
action.

the central level holds the capacity to control and discipline Whether even in the instances when its local agents is often questioned it has accurate information, and many see an erosion of the nomenklat received ura system in China. The nomenklatura is a list of leading positions over whose the Party exercises full control, inherited from the appointments the basis of control of the CCP. John Burns Soviet model, and constitutes that the political institutions of the People's Republic of China concludes still remain essentially Leninist today.36 Higher levels can conduct evalu because ation of lower levels precisely they are part of a hierarchical exercise party-state Party committees authority over the organization. as well as promotion, of senior personnel, and dismissal appointment transfer one step down the administrative hierarchy, and the lower level to the next level up.37 Principal is accountable control is vested in the of the Party committee, which maintains per organization department that contain information related to decisions sonal dossiers (dang'an) It is this system that confers authority on the regarding appointments. to make personnel district and county Party organization department leaders. decisions involving township

in the party bureau of rural in charge of evaluation Interview ZC5 with the vice-director are considered to pose serious problems in a Zhejiang county (1998). Two situations one is where complaint at the letters are not treated appropriately for the cadre in question: and the other county level so farmers must appeal to the next higher level {yueji shangfang) a mob in order to submit a letter of complaint" "to assemble is, in direct translation (juzhong 3 3. affairs shangfang). 34. Interview SB2 with the vice-director of the planning commission in a Shandong county

(1997).
inRural China: L? and Thomas P. Bernstein, Taxation Without Representation Peasant and Democratization, Resistance, 1985-2000, forthcoming Capacity, Press, ch. 6. University Cambridge 36. John P. Burns, "The People's of China at 50: national political reform," The Republic China Quarterly, No. 159 (1999), p. 580. on the nomenklatura see "China's 37. John P. Burns has written system, extensively Problems Vol. 5 (1987); The Chinese nomenklatura 36, No. of Communism, system," A Documentary Nomenklatura Communist Control Party's Study of Party of System: 35. Xiaobo State 1979-1984 Selection, Leadership central CCP control of leadership No. 138 (1994). See also Manion, (Armonk, NY: M.E. 1989); and "Strengthening Sharpe, selection: the 1990 nomenklatura," The China Quarterly, "The cadre management system."

State Capacity

and Local Agent

Control

45

on the basis of the nomenklatura Some of the methods, system and control over appointments, by higher levels of the frequently employed to induce compliance from local agents are examined below. party-state incentives and rewards good performance involves positive One method successful leaders to hold a concurrent post at a higher by promoting a more direct form of control, is rotation of level. Another method, and geographical levels. leaders between different administrative Under the cadre responsibility system, political rewards are linked to the result of the annual evaluation and the subsequent ranking of leaders. township leading cadres will be awarded with the political Top-ranking to be a model leader (xianjin lingdao) or declared title of advanced leader. As shown above, if a township has failed to attain the priority from it disqualifies the township government targets with veto power, an an advanced unit and the responsible cadre from becoming becoming advanced leader. In one county, leading cadres of the first three ranked in the annual evaluation were entitled advanced leaders in townships local regulations.38 The results are officially announced, to pressure on those involved, during a large meeting thereby putting mark the end of the year and the beginning of the next working year. In the county above, the top 15 per cent and bottom 5 per cent of cadres on In another the list were respectively praised and disgraced at this meeting. a list of the first 100 cadres was both published in the local media county, accordance with and circulated
departments.39

as a government

document

to all relevant

government

To be a top-ranking township leader and to be awarded with the title the chances for promotion. The statistical of advanced leader enhances work performance and promotion relation between needs to be high over time. Meanwhile, Iwant in a quantitative established however, study to point to the practice of promoting successful leaders to hold township as poten concurrent posts at higher levels of the Party and government more at least with regard to than regular promotion, tially important local agents. The difference between regular and controlling monitoring concurrent and holding levels is that the posts at higher promotion leader does not leave his post at the township, but still moves township up one rank in the Party hierarchy, usually from section chief to division vice-chief. While this type of promotion is a positive incentive offered by levels, the incorporation of successful township leaders into higher higher levels strengthens their political control over local leaders. One township Party secretary called it a "political bonus,"40 but it is at the same time also a means for higher levels to secure control of strategically important townships. This combined method of reward and control is thus not

38. Interview ZE3 with one section chief of the Party committee and one section chief of in a Zhejiang the Party committee (1999). county organization department ZD2 with the section vice-chief of the Party committee 39. Interview organization to copy the circulated in a Zhejiang document county (1999) Iwas not permitted department to it as "Shiwei but he referred of the municipality ("A decision yige jueding" Party committee"). 40. Interview SCa3 with the Party secretary of a Shandong (1998). township

46

The China Quarterly used in the areas which higher levels generally applied, but selectively deem to be important. In one county in southern Jiangsu, for example, the township Party of the first ranking township concurrently held the position of secretary of that county.41 As township Party secretary holds Party vice-secretary the rank of section chief (keji) and county Party vice-secretary holds the rank of division vice-chief he was promoted one rank up in the (fuchuji), that benefits both parties. The Party hierarchy. This is an arrangement township Party secretary benefits as he is promoted and is entitled to a wider range of goods, and also because his opportunities to lobby for his and his township's interests at higher levels increases. The county the county can control leadership acquires another channel over which this successful and increases its ability to gain accurate infor township, mation about the township and to extract revenues more effectively. Successful township leaders might also be promoted to higher-level posts in Party or government, such as member of the county Party standing member of the standing committee of the county level committee, or vice-mayor of the county, while still continuing to People's Congress, perform their job at the township level. Incorporation of successful township leaders into higher levels appears common but, as with the case of regular promotion, there is little fairly statistical evidence available today. We do know, however, that the same on two or more levels is also method of holding positions simultaneously used for different groups such as entrepreneurs and village leaders, that moreover it is applied throughout the system at all levels, and that it has To incorporate successful leaders and en precedents. village even more common. This might be explained by the trepreneurs appears fact that these two groups do not fall under the nomenklatura system, which makes itmore urgent for higher levels to incorporate them into the to be able to control them through other channels. One Party party-state of a village also the Party was, for example, secretary conglomerate of a Shandong committee member of the vice-secretary township, Party at the provincial district level, and a member of the People's Congress were all successful that I interviewed level.42 Almost entrepreneurs or the political members of the People's Congress consultative confer ence at higher levels, or held positions com in the township economic historical mittee. are Above the township successful local leaders level, at higher levels.43 Bo Zhiyue has reported at the province incorporated level that provinces with more revenue contributions and faster economic
41. Interview

cum Party vice-secretary the township JAM with of a secretary Party (1996). Jiangsu county cum Party 42. Interview SCal with the chairman of the board of the village corporation (1998). secretary of a Shandong village 43. At the county level, a director of the planning commission said that there was a clear connection between work performance of county leaders and concurrently holding positions at higher areas had In his county levels. level municipality, the two most developed both at the municipal and province level; see interview ZD1 with the director representatives southern of planning township enterprise vice-director of the economic committee commission, bureau in a Zhejiang (1999). county and vice-director of the

State Capacity

and Local Agent

Control

47

in the central committees than growth have gained more representation other provinces.44 To promote local leaders to hold concurrent posts at higher levels was also a method used in the pre-reform era. Teiwes noted in his sample from the 1960s that at least 22 municipal secretaries werecon of them first secretaries, and the majority currently provincial secretarial posts and later assumed concurrent provin acquired municipal cial duties.45 Another more direct form of control of the Communist Party is the method of rotation, both between different administrative levels top-down and between different geographical areas, to facilitate vertical integration of lower levels. The nomenklatura system gives the county Party com mittee authority to appoint officials one level down. Concretely, itmeans that both township leading cadres and cadres who work at county bureaus are under the purview in the county government of the organization and rotate between the county department of the county Party committee, and the township level. Frank Pieke has highlighted this system and how it encourages identification with the county and its pool of leading cadres, or with a particular depart rather than with the township community on the district level, that no county has found, ment.46 David Goodman level leadership cadres under study were native to the county in which they served, although all were native to the district in which they were field material from Shanxi illustrates the pattern working.47 Goodman's and which was also observed described by Pieke from Yunnan, in my field areas. The Party secretary of the first-ranking township in a Shan dong county, for example, had recently been transferred from a position in the county-level Party organization department.48 It is a more direct form of top-down control than in the case of the township Party secretary who became above, since the former was county Party vice-secretary rotated from a post in the county to one in the township. Both examples show how overlapping between different administrative levels is system used by the centre to control lower levels. It is again an old ruling atically era. Oksenberg tactic that has been revived from the pre-reform has on two or described how leaders frequently held positions simultaneously three administrative levels.49 cadres in the above examples were native to the county, but Leadership served in townships other than the ones in which they were born, which
resources 44. Bo Zhiye, "Provincial economic in the PRC," Issues power and provincial & Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), p. 15. 45. Frederick C. Teiwes, Provincial in Mainland China 1956-1966 Party Personnel (New York: Columbia 1967), p. 43. University, 46. Frank N. Pieke, "Configurations of the Chinese administrative countryside: Hongqiao at the Association Yunnan in perspective," for Asian paper presented village, Xuanwei, annual meeting, Studies San Diego, 9-12 March 2000 (revised version). California, 47. David "The localism of local leadership S.G. Goodman, cadres in reform Shanxi," China, Vol. 9, No. 24 (2000), pp. 171-72. His of Contemporary cadres from the county level and above. leadership 48. Interview 2SAal5 with the Party secretary of a Shandong township as the vice-head worked of the county Party organization department 49. Michel in rural China, "Local leaders 1962-65: Oksenberg, bureaucratic and political in Doak Barnett recruitment," (ed.), positions, Politics in Action, of Washington Press, (Seattle: University 1969), p. local Journal sample involved 47

who had previously (1998). individual attributes, Chinese Communist 157.

48

The China Quarterly is also part of another top-down method of the centre. Rotation of cadres areas (ganbu jiaoliu zhidu) also serves to between different geographical reinforce identification with higher levels rather than with the local levels have tried to curb localism Traditionally, higher community.50 (huibi zhidu) which prevents leaders from through the law of avoidance in their native place.51 Some other studies have found taking up positions is on the increase in China, but my research suggests that localism both on the basis of my field data and also from a different otherwise, in these studies.52 One problem here interpretation of the data presented is the unit of analysis: the traditional notion of "native" or "local" is someone from within the province. With a leading cadre this definition, who is born in the province but outside the county in which he holds a as local. The use of the traditional notion of local is conceived position is one reason why scholars have been able to conclude that localism is in the reform era, but it fails to capture the rotation between increasing two administrative the township and the county levels, such as between or between own data the county and the district. Although Goodman's showed that none of the county level leadership cadres was native to the that the county in which he or she served, he still draws the conclusion of local leadership cadres in Shanxi main characteristic is localism.53 as Pieke has pointed out, these leaders are more However, likely to level rather than the local com identify with the next administrative in which they serve. Li Cheng does study provincial leaders but munity even though he concludes that localism is on the rise, his data show that only four provincial Party secretaries served in the province in which they were born in 2000, as compared to six in 1999, seven in 1998, and nine in 1997, which indicates that localism is rather on the decline in the end of the 1990s.54 scattered, suggest that rotation at the admittedly My field material, level is often applied by higher levels and that it became more township county, all township frequent from the 1990s onwards. In one Zhejiang Party secretaries and township mayors were rotated in accordance with

Li,

see O'Brien and 50. For the view that rotation of cadres can in fact reduce accountability, "Selective p. 176. policy implementation," that county Party secretaries and mayors 51. National shall not take regulations stipulate for township up posts in their home towns, but there is no such provision leading cadres, see on Selection of Party and Government and Appointment article 39 in Temporary Regulations

Cadres. Leading elitism and immobilism: and 52. Cheng Li and David Bachman, elite formation "Localism, in post-Mao Vol. 42, No. 1 (1989), p. 86, Cheng Li, social change China," World Politics, Leaders: The New Generation & Littlefield, China's (Lanham: Rowman 2001), p. 63; Zang "Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China," Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6 (1991), p. 524; Ziaowei, "The localism of local leadership and Goodman, cadres," p. 163. "The localism of local leadership 53. Goodman, himself cadres," p. 171-72. Goodman is a rather crude measure of localism but oddly enough points out that native of the province His comparisons level of cadres on a number of still draws his conclusion. between different is very useful but his analysis would benefit from distinguishing dimensions localism. levels also when discussing Leaders: The New Generation, 54. Cheng Li, China's p. 66. between different

State Capacity

and Local Agent

Control

49

local regulations.55 Out of 12 townships in another Zhejiang county, only one Party secretary, and not a single township mayor, was native to the important township township.56 The practice of rotating the two most leaders had been revived in the second half of the 1990s in both cases above. There are variations between areas: some practise it to a lesser extent by only rotating one of the two top leaders or by only rotating leaders of some townships. In one Shandong the county, for example, Party secretary of the first-ranking township head was a native of the Party secretary of the third-ranking township leaders of a middle-ranking data are scattered, they suggest that widespread the township was an outsider while In southern Jiangsu, the township.57 township was an outsider whereas all township were natives.58 Although rotation at the township level is more

than some authors claim. The trend points to increasing of rotation of local leaders in the 1990s, which is substantiated frequency studies carried out at the provincial level. The by the few available of natives in provincial in the 1990s: declined proportion leadership according to Bo, it was at 50 per cent during the 1950s, dropped to less than 20 per cent during the 1960s and 1970s, and began to increase again in the 1980s to decline again in the 1990s.59 Rotation at the township level is not only becoming more frequent, as

suggested here, but it is also notable that it is selectively applied. This is done in three different ways. First, it is primarily the leading cadres of local governments that are rotated and not the ordinary local cadres. leaders are more often rotated than government leaders. Secondly, Party The same strategy has been observed by Oksenberg and Teiwes for the pre-reform era and by Bo for the 1990s.60 Thirdly, and most importantly, this study shows consistently that top-ranking townships more often have leaders who are non-natives than less successful In other townships. the county takes greater care to control strategically words, important townships, either by promoting higher levels or by appointing their leaders to hold concurrent posts at a district- or county-level cadre as their

55. Interview ZD2 with the section vice-chief of the Party committee in a Zhejiang (1999). department county 56. Interview ZE3 with the section chief of the Party committee and the the Party committee in a Zhejiang (1999). organization department county 57. Interview 2S Aa 15 with the Party secretary of a Shandong township who of the county Party organization vice-head (1998); and Interview department in a Shandong township mayor cum Party vice-secretary (1998). In township the Party secretary of a well-performing see township was also non-native, with the Party secretary of a Shandong (1998). township 58. Interview and (1996);

organization section was 2SAal chief of

the former with the county, SCa3

another interview

JAc5 with the Party secretary of a southern Jiangsu township ranked third JAal7 with the Party secretary of a middle-ranking interview southern Jiangsu cum Party vice-secretary 2JAa6 with the mayor of the same (1996) and interview township (1997). Jiangsu township 59. Bo Zhiyue, "Native local leaders and political in China: home province mobility Provincial China, No. 2 (1996), p. 9. See also Zheng Shiping, Party vs State in advantage?" Post-1949: The Institutional Dilemma Press, 1992), pp. (Cambridge: Cambridge University and Huang, Controls in China, p. 116. 220-24; Inflation and Investment 60. Oksenberg, "Local leaders in rural China," Provincial Personnel in p. 187; Teiwes, Mainland "Native local leaders and political mobility in China," China, p. 17; and Bo Zhiyue, p. 4.

The China Quarterly to be a changing ruling tactic on the part of the CCP. sites, where the CCP had Oksenberg reported in 1969 that demonstration a stake in producing positive in leadership had more outsiders results, but that grade one and model unit areas were less likely to have positions outside cadres assigned to them. Leaders from model unit areas were in to backward units.61 Today, the CCP takes greater care to fact reassigned leader. This seems control cally from economi important local leaders, especially strategically them into the higher levels of the successful areas, by incorporating

party-state.

its control over selected As shown above, the CCP has strengthened fit local leaders. The picture presented here from a township perspective Zemin has, much more than his well with national development. Jiang and the rebuilding of the Party organization, emphasized predecessor, as an This strategy can be viewed control over its members. political its control effort by the Party to counter market forces, and to maintain areas and rich entrepreneurs. The methods by which over well-developed of the introduction control involve exercise the party-state political to and responding reforms into cadre management innovative market market prac signals, but, notably, also the revival of old administrative nor era. Neither of markets introduction used in the pre-reform tices the institu thus seem to have undermined economic development strong tional pillars of the Chinese Communist Party, and in some instances they even have strengthened it. may

Conclusion institutions cannot sur authors assert that the Party's Leninist Many that central state capacity is weakened vive marketization, by decentral and that there is an erosion of the nomenklatura ization system.62 In contrast with this view, it has been argued here that state capacity, defined as the capacity to monitor and control lower-level agents, has increased the view that the root problem of policy in China. This study questions its agents. Wang lies in the centre's inability to discipline implementation that "the Chinese political structure has been transformed from concludes and once reputed for its high degree of centralization its the center has difficulty coordinating into one in which effectiveness own agents' behaviour."63 L? Xiaobo and Thomas Bernstein also identify the underlying cause, in this case of the centre's failure to address the over the bureaucracy. problem of peasant burden, as inadequate control was eroded by ineffective increasingly They find that state capacity one that was

"Local leaders in rural China," 61. Oksenberg, pp. 199-200. and Roderick MacFarquhar, 62. See, for example, Merle Goldman economy, "Dynamic and Roderick MacFarquhar inMerle Goldman (eds.), The Paradox of declining party-state," Post-Mao China's Press, 1999); and David Reforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University state in the post-Mao "The Chinese era," inDavid Shambaugh (ed.), The Modern Shambaugh, State Chinese 63. Wang, (Cambridge: "The rise of University Cambridge the regions," p. 109. Press, 2000).

State Capacity control

and Local Agent

Control

51

over its own agencies I and agents.64 While of the party-state I would like to offer a with their analysis of the mechanisms, agree slightly different interpretation on the basis of the data presented here that shows higher levels' capacity to control local agents has not declined. failure is not so As I interpret it, the reason behind implementation much the result of lack of central control but is rather an outcome of the The issue of peasant burden reduction is often centre's own policies. to implement its own the lack of state capacity taken to illustrate and I will also use it as a case in point.65 There is preferred policies, that the centre seems truly concerned with the excess general agreement ive taxes levied on peasants by local agents and with rural instability, but so far it has not been able to remedy the problem. I suggest that this is not primarily because of the centre's lack of control over its inability local agents but because the centre's actions are constrained by its other to reduce peasant burden becomes policy priorities. The political will weaker when balanced against other, more important, policy goals. It will be very difficult for the party-state to reduce peasant burden as long as its primary goal is economic growth, a goal that is bolstered by the current tax system.66 The cadre responsibility system transmits the regressive of higher levels to local agents, but the system cannot cope with goals more than a few state goals simultaneously, especially when those goals conflict. Bernstein and L? in fact offer a similar analysis with regard to to their conflicting goals: they describe how local agents were responsive to meet performance but that this responsiveness didn't targets superiors extend to compliance with regard to burden reduction, in part because extraction from peasants was required to meet other performance goals.67 and Li highlight how policies are selectively O'Brien and implemented, how popular policies such as burden reduction are shunned by local cadres who can evade monitoring from above as long as villagers are not drawn into the evaluation process. My interpretation differs from theirs in that burden reduction is not implemented because it is not suggesting given top priority by the party-state. to In conclusion, reforms have been introduced into cadre management it more effective, make and to counter market forces the CCP has also era that may revived old administrative from the pre-reform practices
64. Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo the L?, "Taxation without peasants, representation: central and the local states in reform China," The China Quarterly, No. 163 (2000), p. 752; and Taxation Without in Rural China. Representation and Li, for example, take peasant burden as an example of a policy 65. O'Brien that has not been implemented in "Selective For the best and most extensive policy implementation." work on peasant burden see the works by Xiaobo L? and Thomas Bernstein cited above and also Xiaobo of peasant burden in reform China," The Journal L?, "The politics of Peasant 1 (1997). Studies, Vol. 25, No. and Hu Angang, 66. For an analysis of this issue, see Wang The Political Shaoguang The Case of China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, of Uneven Development: 1999) and Economy Azizur Khan Rahman and Carl Riskin, and Poverty in China in the Age of Inequality I am in total agreement with the Globalization Press, 2001). (Oxford: Oxford University and Hu; we only differ in what we see as the source of the problem. of Wang analysis 67. Bernstein and L?, Taxation Without Representation also noted that performance industrial targets, for example see Whiting, "The cadre evaluation mutually compatible; in Rural China, ch. 1.Waiting has profits and public order, were not p. 10. system at the grassroots,"

52

The China Quarterly in the 1980s. This study's findings from the township have slackened level lend support to the argument by Huang that the central government has increased its administrative and political control over local leaders.68 to It has been argued here that state capacity, defined as the capacity lower level agents, has increased in China. However, control and monitor it is very important to be precise about what the state has capacity to do, as capacity to control its local leaders does not readily translate into of all their policies. As discussed above, higher levels of implementation the party-state have the system mainly through the cadre responsibility to implement their priority policies. So while the CCP is able to ability in the 1990s, it clearly also governs less.69 State govern effectively withdrawal from some fields allows the state to concentrate on some of to be In sum, the Chinese its key policies. party-state has the capacity that is, to implement its priority policies, and control selectively effective, its key local leaders and strategically important areas.70 This strategy no to local agents over implementation of doubt leaves large discretion and little control over areas which are strategically non-priority policies, It means in its that the centre is severely constrained in less of other policies - to the detriment of peasants implementation areas. To reduce rural poverty and peasant burden, the centre developed its development the issue of poverty needs to modify strategy and move and burden reduction to the top of its agenda. less important.

Controls

in China"; and Inflation and Investment relations "Central-local 68. Huang Yasheng, in China. see Richard Baum and Alexei "The 'state of the 69. For a similar analysis, Shevchenko, Post-Mao The Paradox and MacFarquhar, state'," in Goldman p. 352 Reforms, of China's its priority effective and can implement mainly 70. The idea that the state is selectively control about the selective in fact goes back to the pre-reform period. For a discussion policies see Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary of rural cadres during the Mao period, of California The Political Economy (Berkeley: University of Village Government local leaders were the ones that were favoured how model Press, 1989), p. 102. Oi describes and who risked but also the ones most closely watched scrutiny by outsiders.

China: