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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 2 CHANCERY DIVISION 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Case No. HC/07C02340 Court No: 15 Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Thursday, 12th March 2009

Before MR MANN QC SITTING AS DEPUTY JUDGE NIGEL PETER MOORE and BRITISH WATERWAYS BOARD

Transcribed from the official Tape Recording Ubiqus Clifford’s Inn, Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1LD Tel: +44 (0)20 7269 0370

MR MOORE appeared IN PERSON MR C STONER appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANT

--------WHOLE HEARING ---------

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rises. MANN: You have been provided with the approved judgment now. I understood

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there are no typographical errors or anything of that kind, so this will stand as the authentic judgement of the Court. I have a number of copies. The court will need one, so I will hand that down. If the shorthand writers or anyone else needs them, then here are another three. Please have a coloured copy of the plan of the

[inaudible] in them. There is another one here. STONER: The approved judgment hasn’t yet reached us. MANN: Well it should have done. In which case, these can be taken as the

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approved judgment. STONER: Thank you very much. MANN: It should have been e-mailed to you yesterday afternoon.

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MOORE: Certainly, I didn’t receive any e-mail. MANN: For that then, I will apologise on behalf of whoever is responsible, other

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than myself and make it my responsibility. I have been provided with a draft minute of order, Mr Moore, have you seen that? MOORE: The draft minute of order, My Lord? MANN: Yes.

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MOORE: Yes, I have. MANN: Do you have any observations to make on that?

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MOORE: Yes, My Lord. With respect, but predominantly to issue number one. Because I am finding myself slightly bemused, in terms of the judgment, with what you had said in the course of the judgment and with the fact that it is essentially, issue one is not really being answered. MANN: Well it has, as a matter of fact. Issue one is set out, in fact, in the part

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minute of order but it is also at the back of the approved judgment. And the question the Master raised, order to be determined as issue one, was whether the 1

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rights concerning the Waterway between [Becks’ Mill?] 0:114 and the River Thames, as describe in the Grand Junction Canal, remain in force and unaffected by the provisions of the Transport Act 1968. And the answer to that is that the private right of navigation, which was what the Act created, was repealed by the 1968 Act. MOORE: Yes, My Lord. What my request had been in terms of this issue was that the rights that were described, the rights that were pre-existing, did remain in force and were not repealed. Not in respect of anyMANN: -if you mean the public right of navigation, then that is not affected

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because the private right is the only right which was created by the Act of 1793. The existing public right was not destroyed by the Act of 1793 but continues so far as exercise. MOORE: Well My Lord, yes, I am happy that you did so find that, but that was a large part of my argument respecting this. MANN: Yes, well the public right of navigation will still exist but whether it can

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be used to full advantage is another matter. MOORE: Well, I understand that, My Lord. Obviously this, as we discussed in the hearing was a preliminary, on the preliminary issues, of which this was one. The consequences of that, as to whether it was going to assist me in my case was yet to be determined in the case, as it followed on from these preliminary issues. So it was important that if it found that the rights, including predominantly the public right of navigation, does still exist and those private rights, whether navigational or riparian, as did exist at the time; and as described as pre-existingMANN: What I have done, Mr Moore, is to answer the question. The rights

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concerning the waterway, as described, and the rights concerning the waterway, as described, include the public right. But the one right which it creates, which has been dealt with by the Transport Act 1968, has been repealed. So you have the answer. If you want the answer to be extended, I will have to hear Mr Stoner about 2

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it, to the effect that the public right as described in the Act continues to exist, then so be it. Riparian rights are clearly not rights with which you are concerned for the very reasons that I said in the judgment. And the riparian rights are not described, as I recall it, in the 1793 Act. MOORE: Well, My Lord, with respect, I do disagree on that score. MANN: But the judgment itself deals with the question of riparian rights, as you

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have read. MOORE: I have read that, My Lord, yes. But, as I have attempted to have that issue couchedMANN: Well it was not cast, as I understood it, by the question. Maybe the

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question was deficient? MOORE: If that is so, My LordMANN: If the question had been something like: Whether the rights, that is to

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say the right, if any, created by the Act and/or the public right of navigation and/or the riparian rights, concerning the waterway, as described or otherwise affected by that Act, remain in force and unaffected by the provisions of the Transport Act 1968. That could have been answered in that way. So the answer would have been: Public right not affected, private right repealed, riparian rights not affected. MOORE: Well, that is effectivelyMANN: -and it may be that that is something you can agree with Mr Stoner, I do

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not know, he may not want to agree that but that is the result of the judgment but the question is answered, in my view, the first issue was answered by the answer that I have given. MOORE: My Lord, obviously from what you have added there is something that I would have agreed with, if we are saying, that such an answer was only possible had I phrased the question moreMANN: -well I do not think you mis-phrased it, I think, presumably the Master 3

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phrased it, did he, or? MOORE: -with help, but basically myself, in agreement Shoosmiths, My Lord. Because I was trying to embrace all of the rights, as described. MANN: Well the problem is [inaudible] language and, if possible, I can default it

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on that part. The right, as describedMOORE: -were numerous. MANN: Well, the rights concerning the waterway were not that numerous. The

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rights concerning the waterway concerned how and whether you can go up and down it as a private individual or in the public right, as hitherto. So, as hitherto, if exercising the public right in so far as that public right is still exercisable and continues to subsist. But the private right, which is what we seem to be more concerned about, has gone. MOORE: My Lord, I would disagree that I am, at all, concerned with a private right of navigation. I am concerned principally and, of course, in subsequent trial would be what I would develop from, that there was a reason why the public right of navigation is germane to my case; and I would argue as to the unaffected riparian rights as to they being objectable. The private right of navigation, in so far as there are any that were created by the Act, is not important, for so long as, the public right of navigation is concerned. MANN: Well the answer to the question raised by issue one is fairly dogmatic

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about the private right. It says nothing about the public right and so it, by necessary implication, the public right continues to subsist. In so far as it can be exercised. So there is not a problem is there? MOORE: Well the problem I would say, My Lord, would be in terms of whether or not it is found that I am right on issue one orMANN: -if during the further conduct of this proceeding, you will be arguing that

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the public right gives you the rights that you wish to claim and assert, then this 4

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result does not affect you. If all what you want to do in the further conduct of these proceedings is to assert a private right, then this answer does affect you because it has gone as a consequence of the 1968 Act. I think that that will be common ground. MOORE: I understand that, My Lord. But there is the question of costs in this case as to whether I have succeeded in issue one or not. MANN: Yes, I follow that. But I do not think that Mr Stoner has argued that the

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public right had gone. MOORE: Well he was doing so much. MANN: I do not think he was. You can point to how he put it that it had gone.

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He might have said, during the course of the proceedings, that it would not be exercisable, fully exercised because there will be those new cuts where it could not be exercise because it did not run through those new cuts. MOORE: Well there was a multi-layered argument from Mr Stoner. MANN: Yes, of course there was because that is the way one would have

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expected him to go about it. MOORE: Correct, My Lord, but I can’t say more than I desired to have the answer to issue one, specifically embracing all the… I have had to say, yes, those rights described belonging in Section 43, that were described as pre-existing must, necessarily, be unaffected by the Transport Act; even though there are such rights, as might be private rights, as might have been createdMANN: Yes but the way I have answered the question, leaves those rights in

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existence. The only right that I have said has been repealed by the Transport Act is the right created or conferred by the 1793 Act, which is the private right. MOORE: I beg your pardon, My Lord? MANN: -is the private right.

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MANN: There was never any argument before me that any right, which was not

created or conferred by the 1793 Act, had been repealed. MOORE: Well, my positive arguments before you, My Lord, were to the effect that there always had been a public right of navigation and that that still continues and that there were freedom from charges. MANN: But freedom from charges has got nothing to do with the pre-existing

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rights. It has got everything to do with the private right. MOORE: Well, My Lord, it was described as pre-existing. MANN: No, I think if you read the Section properly. Let us go back to first

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principles, the public right of navigation does not entail paying for that right, unless there is some legislation which requires a payment to be made. So far as the 1793 Act is concerned it created, put it this way, it empowered the canal company to impose charges. So that was a charge super-imposed on the private right, except in relation to those exempted from paying those charges, which were those who had the benefit of the private right, newly created. MOORE: I follow the argument, My Lord, I would dispute that. MANN: I can follow that you dispute it, but if the right created is the right which

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has gone. No other rights have gone, as a consequence of the Transport Act operating on the 1793 Act. That is the substance of the question, how has the 1968 Act operated on any right created or conferred by the 1793 Act, because that is the only way it can operate. MOORE: Yes in most terms, My Lord, I have no argument with your phraseology. I am basically, and probably repeating myself here, saying that it is only by implication agreeing with the positive aspects that I was arguing for. Perhaps I should wait until the question of the costs comes up as to whether that makes any difference because it seems to me, reading through what you had said and listening to you now, what I saw it as to an answer to issue one, is answered in my favour. 6

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Whereas, on the issue of BWs authority, it is against me. MANN: Let us come to it when the question of costs is raised, because I see

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where you are leading and I quite understand that. STONER: My Lord, on the fourth paragraph one, obviously, my proposal was as per paragraph one. I have heard what Mr Moore has had to say, I think it is primarily a cost point not a reform of the order and in my respectful submission, paragraph one not only is, have I lifted that unashamedly, from the end of My Lord’s judgment but the reason for that is that that reflects My Lord’s judgment, in the way My Lord has approached the question. MANN: Yes, there would be no difficulty in supplementing the consequences of

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that finding. STONER: And, obviously, the judgment would have to be considered in the context of these being preliminary issues. MANN: Yes, well I must say, I was a bit baffled by how it could be a preliminary

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issue and the case still continue. STONER: Well the reason, in fact, in paragraph two that I have simply asked that there be a case management conference is that the pleadings were obviously somewhat voluminous in this case but our initial reaction is that it may well be the case, where our initial reaction is that there is nothing left in Mr Moore’s claim. It won’t, as My Lord says, strips it back to its bare bones, it’s that my clients weren’t entitled to serve Section 8 notices on the vessels and seeks a declaratory injunction relief accordingly. We say, in light of these preliminary issues, there is nothing left. And, indeed, that is why we have pushed for the preliminary issues so that all of the other issues fall away. Therefore, we are asking for a CMC so that we can actually reflect that it may well be that the appropriate course for my client is to simply make an application seeking a dismissal of the claim, in judgment on his counterclaim. But that is not a matter 7

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for today, but certainlyMANN: Well, it is something that I could do. I am not inviting you to do it

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because I think it would be proper and sensible for Mr Moore to have the opportunity to reflect on the way this case is going. Especially in light of what he has just said. STONER: Yes, because certainly it is my understanding, looking back at the pleadings that this perhaps is edging onto perhaps a costs point. When one looks at the particulars of the claim, Mr Moore’s pleading is very clear, the original pleadings are plain. He says there was certain public rights of navigation and riparian rights and they have not been affected by the 1793 Act. In public rights of navigation it has always my clients pleading position, that in respect of the public right of navigation that does not extend to a right to permanently moor. Now that is obviously pregnant with, an acceptance that there is a public right of navigation but saying that, that does not assist Mr Moore. MANN: That is, as I understand, you put it at the hearing. There is a concession

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that the public right of navigation exists to that extent but that it does not allow permanent mooring, or anything which could be described as. STONER: And is subject toMANN: -or shall we say, not rightfully the exercise of a riparian right.

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STONER: Yes, and it is subject to on British Waterway regulation being the regulatory authority, as has also been established. But just dealing purely with the terms of the Order I left for… that I respectfully suggest that I understand Mr Moore may disagree, but that is a slightly different matter. But the form of the Order paragraph one accurately reflects My Lord’s judgment and should stand. MANN: Mr Moore, you have heard that. Is there anything you wish to add to the

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debate about paragraph one of the draft minute of order. MOORE: Yes, My Lord. It does I believe need to be slightly clarified and I have 8

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obviously been at fault in being able to specifically say exactly why there are reasons for a public right of navigation that, nothing to do with the actual mooring. Because the Section 8 notices are basically relying on one or both of two basis’. One of them is with the craft being unlicensed and the other is being on an unlicensed mooring. And the issue of a public right of navigation has got nothing

to do with the actual mooring issue at all. It has to do with the need to pay for a licence to be on public waters. MANN: Well I understand your point but that is something I think that you will

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have to take up with the CMC because that will be a basis upon which you will explain to The Master that there is something left in these proceedings. Do you follow what I am saying? MOORE: Yes. MANN: So, whereas I could dismiss the proceedings today, it appears to me, I am

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not going to do that. I am going to defer to the draft minute of order and direct that there be a CMC. If anything arises from that you can bring it back to me but I hope it would not. MOORE: My Lord, there are otherMANN: Well I shall make an order in terms of paragraph one and I shall make an

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order in terms of paragraph two. There was then the question of a small amendment, which I have dealt with at the time. So paragraph three of the draft properly deals with that. The costs thrown away will be paid by the British Waterways Board, but I imagine that will not be very much, if anything at all. There is then the question of costs for the preliminary issues, which you have already started arguing. Do you wish to say anything more about that? MOORE: I don’t think so, My Lord, other than I perhaps wanted to clarify that, in those areas within your judgment, where it appears to me that you have somewhat gone beyond the preliminary issues to determine whether or not the moorings were 9

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legal or not and then come back and said, well in that case, the public rights of navigation etc. aren’t really relevant. If I did not formerly request permission to appeal against such items, within your judgment, that aren’t appearing in the order but are within your judgment. Would that be necessary, is that sustainable? MANN: I hope the order is only that I get to decide the issues directed to be

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determined, that what it is. No doubt, the judgment will be influential later, but I have only decided those questions. MOORE: Well thank you My Lord, that makes that much clearer yes. MANN: So on those questions; it appears to me, that you have not succeeded on

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the preliminary issues. You have succeeded, in so far as it remained an issue in establishing that public navigation rights continue to subsist. But, as I understood it, it was not being contested that those public navigation rights did continue to subsist. MOORE: That is putting me in a slightMANN: I am not intending to put you in a spot, but that is how I understood the

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submissions. MOORE: I am grateful My Lord. I am merely, elucidating[?] the fact that I find myself in a slight quandary as to what my reaction should be in that discussion on it, with the issue one, is in accord as I would see it, with what I have been wanting to argue and yet it has been found against me. MANN: One thing you did want to argue was that no charges could be imposed

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under the Act, as a consequence of the 1793 Act. MOORE: AndMANN: And it follows from the determination that there is no exoneration from

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any charges which the regulatory body can impose because the 1793 Act was being that part of it, and in fact all of it, so far as rights are concerned has been repealed. 10

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So on that part you have lost. MOORE: Well, that would be implicitMANN: It is implicit. But that was what you recon was important to you thought

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was it not. MOORE: It is My Lord. But it is only, I would submit, only implicit in the understanding of which private rights were granted as opposed to confirmed. MANN: The only right which carried the right to exoneration from charges, which

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otherwise would have been imposed under the 1793 Act, was the one that was created. MOORE: And, as I do believe, I did bring out in the hearing My Lord, the initial British Transport Act did acknowledge that this Section was to be free, which in my argument demonstrates that parliament in 1947 did so agree that these should continue. MANN: In 1968, anything that arises from the 1793 Act affecting navigation of

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the Waterway ceased to be effect in statute law. What did not cease was any consequences of the exercise of the public right. MOORE: But, my Lord, in the 1968 Act it said, as regards charges, it confirmed the fact where charges had been previously forbidden, that they should stay so. Which as late as amendment in 2005 remains on the statute books. MANN: It is a very short Section is it not?

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MOORE: Yes. MANN: And what it says is that any rights created by a private Act would be

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repealed. And a right that is created is a right not to be charged in relation to the exercise of the private right. MOORE: There are two separate Sections that we are talking about, My Lord. MANN: Which one are you talking about?

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MOORE: I am talking about in the 1968 Act where it refers to charges, which was 11

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quite a separate issue from the rights of public and private rights of navigation. MANN: Section 57?

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MOORE: I would have to rely on Your Lordship’s memory, My Lord. MANN: That is the regulatory provision, which empowers the company to impose

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penalties and fines of various kinds, which would not affect the private right, exercise the private right. MOORE: No, but it would affect the ability to make charges for the exercise of a public right of navigation. MANN: Well, I do not think so. Because matters of the exercise of the public

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rights is all dealt with in subsequent… in relation to British Waterways Acts, in particular the 1995 Act or is the 1975 Act. Those are the Acts which impose the regulatory regime which now subsists. Anyway I do not think there is going to be profit in this. Maybe that is something you will have to take up at the CMC because it looks to me that you are going to be arguing again that the Section 8 notices were unlawful because they ignored the fact that there is some statutory provision somewhere, which exempts you and the boats that you are interested in, in some way, from having to pay and have licences. Then Mr Stoner will look at the judgment and say, well the private right has gone and the public right of way subsists because I did not seek to challenge that it did subsist. And there will be an argument about whether an Act, which is no longer in force, to the extent that it created private rights, helps you out. That is what will happen at the CMC and I think that is probably right is it not Mr Stoner? MOORE: One thing, My Lord, if as is coming out in this discussion, I am going to be constrained by the findings inMANN: Well the only way in which this will constrain you is that the private right

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has gone. And that means the whole and every incident of the private right, which would include the exoneration of any charges. 12

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MOORE: Including of the rights that had existed previously. MANN: No, only the private right because the judgment does not say that the

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public right has gone. It says quite to the contrary, it says it is still there. All that happened was that parallel rights were created, even in so far as necessary, to make sure that the canal can be used, in particular, by adjoining and neighbouring owners between Becks' Mill and the mouth of the Thames, that is what the judgment is saying and that is how the answer was arrived at. MOORE: Well then in, withoutMANN: -the rest of the issues are perfectly straightforward, you do not have any

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problem with those? MOORE: Obviously, I disagree with issue three but with issues two and four I have got no problem with that whatsoever. I do not even, necessarily, have a problem with issue three either, as I said at theMANN: -well I would not go any further if I was you, it is there and, unless and

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until it is successfully appealed. You can argue about it before the CMC is to whether that stops you from continuing with your proceedings, but it is there, as a determination. So if you start saying to me now that you do not have a problem with it, then that is not going to help you is it? MOORE: Thank you My Lord. But really what I am looking at now, from how I can proceed, if you like in a practical way, is whether or not I need to list point to apply for legal aid in more effective representation to which I am entitled. MANN: You are one of the fortunate few.

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MOORE: I do not know whether it is necessarily fortunate My Lord. MANN: Well it is fortunate to be entitled to have funded legal assistance, because

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most people are being deprived of that, over many years of government cut backs. Certainly, in civil jurisdiction. MOORE: Yes, My Lord. Well obviously apart from anything else, merely this affects 13

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my own [inaudible], if you like. And the question would be whether or not it was necessary to ask leave to appeal and whether, just on the judgment now, and/or the cost issues, in order toMANN: Well I will determine the question of costs now. Do you want to say

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anything about costs now? STONER: My Lord no, I had come prepared through the pleadings but, in my submission, the costs of the preliminary issues should be dealt with today and the court obviously should look at it from the perspective of who has won the preliminary issues. In my submission, there is no doubt that my client has won issues two, three and four. The public right of navigation is in fact also an element of part one, in so far as, as I mentioned earlier, Mr Moore’s originally pleaded case was to identify that there were public rights of navigation and riparian rights and those had not been affected by the 1793 Act. Now, as a consequence of the judgment in the other action of Mr Dowling QC, before last December. The riparian rights issue took a very different form. Obviously, in My Lord’s judgment that doesn’t assist Mr Moore in this case. The public right of navigation point, the core point was, that it doesn’t include a right to permanently moor. To a large extent that had fallen away before the hearing but the clear import of My Lord’s judgment is that therefore, looking at this case, what are the rights that may be relevant. There was the one right and My Lord has determined that and that has gone against Mr Moore. Of course, certain arguments that I advance, My Lord objects in the judgment, that is the nature of litigation but that doesn’t mean that my clients have not been successful and should not be entitled to their costs. They have been brought to court, having served some notices, and a whole array of issues have been placed before them that they are forced to deal with and the 14

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preliminary issues of an expensive exercise. I hope a very useful exercise, but I think there will certainly, if the action does go forward and My Lord has already heard my initial reaction on that, but certainly if the action does go forward it would be on a very much more focused point or points. And the Court should reflect that in an award of costs at this stage of the preliminary issues, in my submission. MANN: Very well. I have heard the submissions of Mr Moore and Mr Stoner

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about costs and the effect so far as the determination that I have made on the issues, if any, which continue to subsist in the litigation as a whole. It appears to me the extent it was an issue whether the public right of navigation continued to subsist notwithstanding the Transport Act 1968 that Mr Moore has won on that point, but that he has lost on all the other points and issues. Issue one took up the bulk of the time and evolves[?] in the argument of his preliminary issues. And although issues three and four were important, they really did not take up an enormous amount of time. Much of the time spent was

examining the historical background of the 1793 Act and the statutory sequences chronologically thereafter which plainly involved an examination of how the private right impacted on a public right and as to why there needed to be a private right in all the circumstances. It is always very difficult to try to calculate out, in a particular or specific way, where costs should fall. But in my judgment, the balance favours an order that Mr Moore should pay the costs of the preliminary issues as to four-fifths, so that he takes the benefit of one-fifth of the costs himself. So, that is the order I would like. STONER: My Lord, inaudible. The only other part of the order I sought. Some of the double-barrelled aspects of the costs was the payment on account in respect of that costs. There is no schedule because this isn’t a summary assessment but those instructing me have provided me with figures. MANN: Have they provided Mr Moore with figures? 15

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STONER: I have not provided them to Mr Moore, in effect, I have received an email of what my fees are. There is a print out of Shoosmiths fees. Those total £44,000. The way they are calculated is from April of last year, so all the costs have been incurred in the action after the Order for these preliminary issues. My Lord, taking account of the fact, for example, my costs, I had a conference down in Brentford and attended a site view and can well understand on a cost judge argument that that was relevant for the action as a whole as well as the preliminary issues but it certainly it very safe to therefore say that the costs of £40,000, that is exclusive of VAT my client is registered for VAT and so can reclaim that VAT. In fact the sum I am instructed to ask for, on account, the usual rule that I would submit would be a starting point of 50% but in fact the sum I ask for, on account, is £10,000. MANN: Is there any pressing need for the British Waterways Board to have these

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costs now? STONER: There is the pressing need in the sense of, well there are two points, the first point in my submission is the CPR does make the point that if the court makes an award of costs, there should be a payment on account. The second point is that, of course, the costs British Waterways are largely public funded. The costs that are incurred in these proceedings are therefore taken away from the running of the Waterways and it is constantly a battle in press cutting and funding etc. and this is a substantial sum so, in that respect, in my submission, my client should have a payment on account. MANN: Mr Moore, I do not think that will be very attractive to you, that idea,

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that you should pay £10,000 despite the clear desire on Mr Stoner’s client’s part to try to accommodate you by reducing the amount that it asks to by a fairly considerable amount. I have not seen the schedules; I do not know what the costs will eventually come to. But I can well understand that they will be quite 16

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considerable. That is the way of things unfortunately with litigation. What do you say about having to pay £10,000 within a period of, well the suggestion is, early April? I would not be minded to make an order of that kind. I would be minded to make an order, if I do make one, that there be no payment, on account, until 28 days after the CMC has taken place? MOORE: Well, My Lord, putting things at its simplest, it doesn’t make a great deal of difference what the time frame is because IMANN: -because you cannot pay it.

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MOORE: Because I cannot pay it, no. So it isMANN: I know what you are saying and I understand it.

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I shall make an order, Mr Stoner, that there be a payment on account which takes into account your client’s offer but which also takes into account that your client will only get four-fifths of his costs. I shall then knock off a bit, so whereas it would have been £8000, it will now be £6000, on account, which is as low as, in my judgment, I can make it consistent with the practice and the practice directions. And that is to be paid by a date 28 days after the determination of the issues on the CMC which will be on a date to be fixed. So I cannot tell you when it will be that you will have to pay but it certainly will not be in the next couple of months. MOORE: My Lord, thank you. It gives me some degreeMANN: -it does not help you very much but it takes into account the special

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difficulties which you have. MOORE: Thank you My Lord, yes. In this respect, if it proved necessary and I needed that as a part of the whole of this to request permission to appeal the judgment. Is that something that comes up in the CMC, or is that something thatMANN: No, if you wish to protect your position for the purposes of appeal, then

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you should ask for leave to appeal the judgment now and if you wish to appeal only part of it then you need to say which part of it you wish to leave to appeal. You 17

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should do it now. MOORE: Well, then may I formally do so My Lord. MANN: Yes, you can. Do you wish to appeal the whole of the judgment or just

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certain parts of it? MOORE: Just that part of it in issue one, regarding the scope of the private rights. MANN: Well, is this what you wish to appeal, that the private right of navigation

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which was granted by the Section 43 of the Act was repealed by the 1968 Act? MOORE: No, My Lord, because I am not concerning myself with private rights of navigation but rather with the rights that were described in Section 43 pertaining to the owner and occupiers ofMANN: Then you do not need to appeal that because I have not made a finding,

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other than that which I have said I have. MOORE: Well the implications of it. MANN: If you appeal the determination under issue one, then there is nothing to

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appeal. Do you see what I mean? The appeal will have no content because I have not determined that the other rights of which you speak have been repealed. I think Mr Stoner will agree with that. So, if you ignore the answer for a moment, what is it that you wish to appeal? MOORE: Well then, My LordMANN: Do you see my difficulty with that? I am trying to help you.

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MOORE: I am very appreciative of thatMANN: -I will give you leave of appeal if you persist but I do not want you to ask

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for leave to appeal the answer for the private right of navigation as repealed, if you think it has been repealed. MOORE: I do not know whether this is appropriate, but you have been helpful, if I ask for leave to appeal say for example on issue three, which is the one that would then effect, in your judgment, the various issues that we have been talking about. Is 18

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that something that I have to follow through if, in a case management conference, it is determined that it is not necessaryMANN: -you do not have to pursue an appeal, but there may be some costs of

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discontinuing an appeal. But if you do it quickly and great costs have not been incurred, but I cannot tell you what would be incurred, I am afraid, and Mr Stoner is better able than me to do that, after reflection. The costs would not be very high, so you can protect your position by asking for leave on issue three, if you like, and then discontinue the appeal before Mr Stoner’s client has incurred costs. And I think Mr Stoner will try to help you because that is his obligation as counsel where there is a Litigant in Person by pointing out to you what costs might be incurred and at which stages or leave it too long before you decide you are not going to go ahead. Is that something you are comfortable with, Mr Stoner? STONER: My Lord, I have always indicated to Mr Moore throughout these proceedings and, indeed, the ones before that if he has any questions, I will do my best to assist. If it assists, whilst I am on my feet, if Mr Moore does seek permission, obviously permission can only be granted if My Lord is satisfied that that part of the judgment is wrong. MANN: Well the judge can grant permission if he thinks that there is a possibility

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that he is wrong. STONER: Yes, well the grounds would be wrong or there was some other reasons, there is no other particular public reason here. So, in my submission, because the court of appeal will have to look at the judgment or the order in fact, of course, it is the Order that is appealed, and say they can only allow an appeal if the order was wrongMANN: I had better explain to Mr Moore what will happen if I refuse leave. He

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would then have to make a paper application to the court of appeal, which would not involve costs, it would just involve your time and running around making an 19

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application. So if you were to ask for leave on three, you ought to try to satisfy me that there is something in the judgment, which is arguably wrong on that question. MOORE: Yes, thank you My Lord. MANN: I would not try too hard because it might mean going back over

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everything we have gone over before. MOORE: Well perhaps just keeping it as short as possible, My Lord, there was nothing really in the content of your judgment leading up to this that actually considered the historical continuity of authority over this particular section and you have not actually examined, in this judgment, you have simply decided that it is a logical sequence from the 1947 Act onwards that British Waterways would be the statutory navigation authority because this section is comprised within their undertakings. And there has been no implant in your judgment here, of the fact that there are other statutory authorities over the navigation that do exist today. MANN: Well, of course-

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MOORE: -so there is a question over, as I have only briefly touched upon it in the hearing, as to what is actually meant by the navigation authority, what is being controlled? Certainly, as I have said in the hearing, this area is within their undertakings. The question of, over what do they have authority? Is something that needs to be ‘particularised’ perhaps is the word. So, which is an area of, My Lord, where the question of public rights of navigation, come into it. Not that, as we have seen from the information that I have produced in the course of the hearing, that there are areas of public right of navigation that fall within BWs undertakings. I am not quite sure of what those other areas are but they are regularised. But it does put, as the various government publications and British Waterways publications have acknowledged, a limitation on the powers that they have on the non-tidal ridges, non-tidal canals. So it is something that has not been properly 20

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explored, My Lord, and as it does affect the case, I believe it is right that those issues are aired. MANN: Thank you. So that is on issue three?

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MOORE: On issue three, yes. MANN: Well I am going to refuse the appeal, Mr Moore. Your base of premise

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is that I have not addressed the issue adequately with sufficiently reasoned judgment [inaudible] by specifically addressing the series of legislation dealing with navigation rights and charging rights. I did, however say, in the judgment, that I was taken through all the Acts very carefully and that I have concluded issue three in the way that I did. But as I say, I looked at the [inaudible] Act, the Port of London Authority Act and all of the legislation very carefully before drawing to that conclusion which I took not to be particularly hotly contested. But it is your right to ask the Court of appeal for leave, as I have refused it, and so be it. Those are my reasons for refusing on that issue. MOORE: Thank you, My Lord. MANN: Thank you. Anything else?

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STONER: My Lord, I think that is it on the order; the only point that perhaps I should reflect on before My Lord formerly makes the order. Paragraph two: I have said the case management conference should be listed for 30 minutes. I rather wonder, in the light of this morning whether 30 minutes might be inadequateMANN: -no, it will not be adequate.

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STONER: So I wonder, in fact, it should certainly be an hour possibly two hours? MANN: Well we have taken an hour discussing various issues.

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STONER: Yes, in fairness to The Master, who is going to asked perhaps toMANN: -I think, in fairness to The Master, it should be an hour and a half CMC.

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So you alter the Minute of Order to that effect, so that Mr Moore has the fullest possible opportunity, within the limits of reasonableness and court time and so on, 21

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to make the points he wishes to make. STONER: One hour, My Lord? MANN: One and half hours. Which I think is pretty well the length of time we

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have [inaudible]. I might be wrong about that. I found it fascinating and deeply interesting and I was considerably enlightened by your submissions; thank you very much. Mr Stoner, I [inaudible]. Thank you very much. rise.

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