Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition

© Duncan Richter 2009

This is an unfinished draft of a new translation of Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Please feel free to make use of it, but in return please inform me (at richterdj@vmi.edu) of any mistakes that you find. Thank you.

Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition


This book aims to do two things: to provide a new and improved translation of Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and to provide students of that work with directions to useful secondary sources. These directions, analyses, and comments are provided in brackets, to show that they are not part of Wittgenstein‘s text. The book is not intended to stand alone as a complete guide to the Tractatus, but I have made it as user-friendly as possible. It is meant as a kind of handbook and so can only hope to be a starting point, not the last word on Wittgenstein‘s treatise. We should probably begin with some information about Wittgenstein‘s life and times. This is especially important as we need to know what he had read (and been told) if we are to know what he is reacting to and talking about in the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein Wittgenstein was born into an immensely wealthy family in Vienna, Austria in 1889. His engineering studies took him to Berlin, Germany and Manchester, England, but also led to an interest in mathematics which, in turn, led to an interest in the foundations of mathematics. Having sought the advice of the German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (18481925), Wittgenstein went to Cambridge University to study with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in 1911. In 1912 he formally enrolled as a student at the university. Just two years later one of the leading philosophers at Cambridge, G. E. Moore, traveled to Norway to take dictation from Wittgenstein, who had gone there to escape distractions. Later that year (1914) Wittgenstein joined the Austrian army, in which he served throughout the First World War. He finished his book in 1918, while on leave, and published it (in German) in 1921 as Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. The English

translation, now called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was published the following year. After this Wittgenstein quit university life and worked as a school teacher, an architect, and a gardener, before returning to Cambridge in 1929. In his work from then on he criticized many of his earlier ideas. Schopenhauer Perhaps the first source of these ideas was Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Wittgenstein read Schopenhauer‘s The World as Will and Representation as a teenager and accepted much of it as true. Peter Geach, in the Philosophical Review, lxvi (1957), p. 558, writes that: ―Wittgenstein himself stated in conversation that when he was young he believed Schopenhauer to have been fundamentally right (though, not surprisingly, he could make nothing of the ―objectification of the Will‖).‖ What this means we will see below. It is not known whether Wittgenstein read Schopenhauer‘s The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but there are striking parallels between (some of) what Schopenhauer writes there and (some of) what Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus. Given Wittgenstein‘s interest in Schopenhauer it seems overwhelmingly likely that he would have read this early work, which Schopenhauer demands his readers read first in order to understand The World as Will and Representation properly (see WWR Volume I, pp. xiii-xiv). Magee observes (pp. 311-312) that ―No one disputes that Wittgenstein was soaked in Schopenhauer. The point is, though, that he was not soaked in anyone else: there was no other philosopher of the past whose work he knew even passably well.‖ Given this exclusive soaking, undertaken quite voluntarily, and Schopenhauer‘s demand that his readers also read The Fourfold Root, we may assume that Wittgenstein did indeed read The Fourfold Root at some time. So what did Schopenhauer believe? He presents his views as a kind of synthesis of the best of Western and Eastern ideas, both ancient and modern, about the ultimate nature of reality and how one ought to live. The world, he says, is re2

Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition

presentation or idea. When I talk about things around me, for instance, I mean things I am aware of, but all that I am really ever aware of is a) things as they are presented to me by my senses, and b) other ideas or phenomena in my mind. So what I mean by ―the world‖ is really contents, or potential contents, of my mind. The world is a kind of appearance of which I am conscious, an appearance in my consciousness. In this sense the world is little more real than a dream. Its ending when I die will really be no great loss (although, of course, it will seem so to me as the subject whose object is this world). This is the world as representation. On the other hand, Schopenhauer argues (following Immanuel Kant), the very idea of representation or appearance (or phenomena) implies the idea of something that is represented, something that exists in itself, not just in the mind. Kant argued that we cannot have knowledge of any such thing, as this would require, impossibly, knowledge without the mind, but Schopenhauer does not quite see it this way. After all, one of the phenomena or appearances in this world is me. Surely I can know what I am. Technically, Schopenhauer admits, I cannot, but he does think that one has something like knowledge here, some kind of insight. Intuitively I know what I am, and what I am is will. Hands are the will to touch, hold, and grasp made flesh; eyes the will to look and see; tongues the will to taste; and so on. Put together, the human being, like all animals, is the will to live. Our primary drives are reproduction and survival. One problem here is how I can know what anyone else is underneath or behind the appearances. There is a certain plausibility to the idea that I should know what I am even if, strictly speaking, such knowledge is impossible (because the knowing subject can only ever know objects as they appear to it, i.e. appearances, not the subject itself as a subject). But why should I know what you are, except as you appear to me? Schopenhauer‘s answer is that the alternative is crazy. If reality in itself is my will then I am something like God. It is madness to think that I am significantly different from anyone else, or anything else, in the world. So if I am will, the only sane thing to believe is that everyone and everything else is

too. And not my will, but simply will. The ultimate nature of reality is the will to live, a blind and fundamentally pointless striving to reproduce and survive which manifests itself in the various kinds of things we see around us in the world: human beings, oak trees, clouds, flies, dogs, and so on. This, what appears in these forms, is the world as will. Schopenhauer believed that Kant had proved time, space, and causality to be features, not of reality in itself or the world as will, but of phenomena only. Our minds cannot experience the world except as made up of causally interactive objects in time and space so these are, inevitably, features of the world as representation, the world as it appears to us. But that is all they are. The will, as thing in itself, is not in space or time, and it neither causes nor is caused by anything else. Nor is the phenomenal world, the world as representation, itself caused, or in time, or in space. Asking where the world is, or at what time it began, or what caused it, makes no sense. True reality, including, so to speak, the real me and you, is eternal. Not being separated by time or space, the real you is the real me. Behind the veil of phenomena, all is one. It follows, as Schopenhauer sees it, that egoism is an enormous mistake. Those who care only about themselves care only about something that is hardly real at all. They are also bound to be disappointed, because the self they love so much is doomed to die. The altruist, however, in caring about all people equally, evaluates her own importance accurately. And if I love not my life but life itself then death will be nothing much to fear, as life will always go on. Attachment to worldly goods and one‘s own life is false and morally bad, while stoical (or Buddhist) detachment and altruism is correct and morally good. As well as compassion, Schopenhauer values art, because it has the power to detach us from our worldly concerns and somehow communicate to us things ―under the aspect of eternity.‖ A still life, for instance, shows us fruit or flowers without reference to questions of ownership, time, or place. And music seems almost to occupy a different realm altogether. Wittgenstein believed much, perhaps even most, of this, at least for a while. He denied that he ever believed that the

Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition

world is will, but he did initially accept the idea of the world as representation. He also seems to have shared much of Schopenhauer‘s ethical outlook. For instance, he did not have to fight in the war (he had a hernia) but volunteered to do so anyway, asking to be posted to the front in order to test his fear of death. If he feared death (on Schopenhauer‘s view) then he had a wrong view of the world. He gave away his fortune, some to artists and the rest to other members of his family. Throughout his life he took art very seriously (especially music) and lived abstemiously. All this is in line with Schopenhauer‘s ethics.

Frege Young Wittgenstein, then, was a Schopenhauerian idealist. Until he encountered the works of Russell and Frege. Schopenhauer‘s work is notable for its commitment to ethics, but there is, arguably, a certain sloppiness to it that might be regarded as unethical. His rejection of solipsism, for instance, is based more on common sense and wishful thinking than rational argument. Frege is rather different. According to Joan Weiner: ―What Frege has to offer us is a model of philosophical virtue. Almost everyone who has grappled with Frege‘s writings has been moved by Frege‘s intellectual honesty.‖1 Another virtue of Frege‘s is intellectual humility. Schopenhauer‘s concerns might be summarized as life, the universe, and everything, but Frege was much less ambitious. His philosophical starting point was the unglamorous but undoubtedly challenging work of trying to get at the foundations of arithmetic. Common sense and wishful thinking might lead many of us to think that there is no need to inquire into the precise nature or basis of mathematics, but Frege was not satisfied with this lack of rigor and attempted to demonstrate that arithmetic could be reduced to logic. This project resulted in some failure, which Frege faced up to, but also to the great1

Joan Weiner Frege in Perspective Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 12. 5

Frege says (p. computer programming is based. 6 .‖ There is no such series or boy to refer to. Frege developed a way of representing propositions and arguments that has ever since provided the basis for symbolic logic.g. but only in the context of a proposition. 1997.) The Frege Reader Blackwell.est advance in logic since Aristotle (384-322 BCE). never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation. Wittgenstein studied Frege‘s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Basic Laws of Arithmetic) during his first year in Manchester (1908-1909) and requested a copy of the same book in 1919 when he was a prisoner of war. ―the least rapidly convergent series‖ (Beaney2 p. We might say that these words have a meaning (what Frege calls sense) even though there is nothing that they mean (what he calls reference). and might differ even with the same person and the same word from one time to another. According to Frege. The internal images evoked by words vary from person to person. words with a sense may lack a reference. though.‖ which has become Frege‘s best known work. such as his 1918 essay ―Thought‖ (which attacks idealism) and the 1892 ―Sense and Reference. See the ―Key to Abbreviated References‖ for full details on works cited only by the author‘s name. among other things. belongs to mankind‘s ―common store of thoughts. e. He is known to have read other works of Frege‘s too. the subjective from the objective. but we know this precisely because we understand the sense of these words. on which. These principles are thought to have influenced Wittgenstein considerably.‖ which it transmits 2 Michael Beaney (ed. Sense. never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object. In his book The Foundations of Arithmetic. He first met Frege in 1911 and the two corresponded at least until 1920. x) that he has followed ―three fundamental principles: always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical. 153) or ―the only living boy in New York.

trans. Psychology is concerned with the origins of our ideas. Reference is ultimately all that matters for logic and science. Frege believes.‖) Objects are. Austin. They are such things as Julius Caesar. Frege argues that what true sentences refer to is ―the True. or ‗dead‘ and deceased‘. Even there. Frege argues that the sense of a word is not a mental image. the sentence as a whole must also refer to something. Against empiricists. the number one. 37). which the relevant sign designates. in short. only with concepts and ideas themselves. and we can grasp it by thinking of the difference between direct and indirect speech. let us never confuse these two things. p. whatever we refer to in language. 7 . all that matters to those concerned with truth (sense matters here too. But it is real.‖ the words ―My cat‖ refer to my cat. but not quite as ultimately). p. to use one 3 Gottlob Frege The Foundations of Arithmetic. its reference is that which is true: ―the True.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition from one generation to another (ibid. Evanston.. J. The reference of a word or phrase is more objective still: it is the object itself.. not ideas. They are public. 4 Ibid. the tone of certain words. their subjective nature and physiological underpinnings. Logic (and mathematics) is concerned with none of this. sensible and different for each person) and objective concepts (shared and in principle non-sensible) ―stands or falls with that between psychology and logic. According to him. These objects are particulars. (Controversially. They are determinate or definite. or between non-fiction and fiction. though. 1980. 154). The distinction between sense and reference cannot strictly be defined according to Frege.‖ Frege writes. but. It is a matter of objects. L. and the True.‖ In the true sentence ―My cat is unusually long. and again it may be true.3 The distinction between subjective ideas (something like mental pictures. vi. though reference does so more obviously. Northwestern University Press. perhaps. ―A proposition may be thought. He shows that mental images are irrelevant to everything except. §27 (p. Illinois. and with truth.‖4 Both sense (because it is shared) and reference belong to the latter category. are there different images associated with the words ‗but‘ and ‗and‘.

Frege‘s response is memorable: ―What a mercy. 1993. we still need to know what to do with it. Frege points out. take into account its place in the context of a sentence. then. only raw experience. 8 . §7. Sense experience alone does not tell us how to conceptualize our experience or make judgments about it. Frege also rejects John Stuart Mill‘s idea that arithmetic is an empirical science based on observation. three things together in a triangle create a certain impression. We should always. But. Without judgment there is no knowledge. not a matter of natural fact. their definitions. 1.‖6 This is why it is a mistake to consider the meaning of a word in isolation. When an image is associated with a word. 158. and 2 + 1 would not be 3!‖7 Mill‘s view also raises the problem of how we could get the numbers 0. no true or false. and those things can be moved so that they make the impressions associated with the numbers two and one. Mill treats number as a physical property of observed physical objects. nor whether these are cards or color patches or scraps of paper or pieces of trash or what. that not everything in the world is nailed down. we should not be able to bring off this separation. Frege argues.of Michael Dummett‘s examples?5 Many words have no mental image associated with them. But 5 See Michael Dummett Frege: Philosophy of Language Harvard University Press. p. It does not tell us whether we have 104 cards or 2 packs or 1 pile. For instance. p. 6 Dummett. for if it were. ―No image can portray the role of the word in the sentence. 7 Ibid. and 777864 in this way. Mill defends this idea on the grounds that numbers are defined by reference to the fact that groups of things exist which strike the senses a certain way and which can be divided into lesser groups. 85. And if we know the image.. if I observe a pack of cards. it might vary from person to person. am I to say that what I observe is one (pack) or 52 (cards)? It is arbitrary which I say. a matter of convention. we separate the psychological from the logical because the former is private and therefore irrelevant to shared efforts to discover truth. often. So. Judgment involves concepts and.

Following Frege. For anything at all (call it x) and any class at all (call it y) we can ask whether x belongs to y. and so on. Russell defines the number two as the class of all couples (see Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p. the number three as the class of all trios. and a class belongs to the class of classes. which is potentially more trouble than it is worth. truth and falsity. Even if it is not. the most immediate influence on Wittgenstein‘s thinking before he left to go to war was Bertrand Russell. Some of the ideas contained in these works also show up in the more accessible Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919) and The Problems of Philosophy (1912). One problem with this kind of definition. Principia Mathematica (co-written with Alfred North Whitehead. Russell‘s definition of number. knowledge. As far as the Tractatus goes. is that it brings with it the notion of a class. He reconsidered issues and developed new solutions to problems so often that it is difficult to say precisely what Russell thought without specifying the year in which he adhered to that particular view. or else empiricism (not only with regard to arithmetic) is false. such as the class of classes. since it involves judgment. Russell‘s most important works were The Principles of Mathematics (1903). though. and classes are involved in Russell‘s attempt to define numbers. So either everything is hopelessly subjective and there is no knowledge. looks circular. A barber is neither a spoon nor a class. and Theory of Knowledge (written in 1913). A spoon. This was developed in order to avoid paradoxes that arise when talking about classes. Russell‘s interests were extremely broad and his mind very active. One of Russell‘s most important ideas for Wittgenstein is the theory of types. again. but a barber does not. But what 9 . belongs to the class of spoons. but. Russell Finally. 18). And this is just what it can appear to do. he concedes. Some classes belong to themselves. it will still be of very little value if it catches us up in paradox. though.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition then there would be no mathematics. a barber does not. for instance. 1910-1913).

In the simple theory. Otherwise we could not talk meaningfully about two. directly aware of. These would be the basic units of reality (―logical atoms‖). We are acquainted with.g. and in ―Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types‖ (1908) he proposed the ―ramified‖ version. properties of properties. sense data in sensory perception and in introspection. In The Principles of Mathematics (1903) he proposed his first. Reference to infinity is certainly useful in mathematics. shyness is nice or red is a property of objects). Paradoxes in logic are no better than circles in definitions. and means that it is nonsense to talk about a class being a member of a class in the way that an object (a spoon or a barber. on Russell‘s view. Russell was very much an empiricist. then there must be at least one couple. Unlike Frege. In the ramified theory there are also types of properties (properties. Particulars include existents and complexes ―such as this-before-that. If it is to be meaningful. e. say) can be a member of a class. A related idea is the axiom of infinity. i. and knowledge of them would have to come from direct acquaintance. there are types of objects (real objects. If the number two is the class of all couples. and so on). then it does.e. The basic idea of the theory of types is that classes are not objects. It is quite possible. etc. unanalyzable things. The objects with which we are acquainted include particulars and universals. simple version. It looks as though we are stuck in a circle. even though we cannot know whether such a thing exists. it seems that we must believe in a class of infinitely many things.. then it does not belong to itself. The theory of types aims to rescue us from this problem.about the class of classes that do not belong to themselves? If it belongs to itself. If it does not belong to itself. which postulates the existence of an infinite collection or set. 10 . This makes for a simpler ontology (theory of what there is). according to Russell. Russell developed two versions of the theory. that a complete analysis of the world would show that all there is can be divided into a finite number of logically indivisible. classes of objects. classes of classes.

‖ which is a description (if it were a name. This paper was originally published in the Aristotelian Society Proceedings 1910-1911.(Penguin Books. this would imply that it referred to a subsistent entity. I can then refer to these objects by name even though I am not directly acquainted with them. Russell analyzes these words as a disguised description. despite its lack of reference to 8 ―Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.‖ 9 They are general ideas. So it is not always obvious what is a name and what is a description. and so on. 201. any object. since there is no such person any more. but we can believe in them on the basis of objects with which we are acquainted. as I might believe that the sounds.‖8 Existents include such things as the ‗this‘ and ‗that‘ referred to here.‖ Chapter X of Mysticism and Logic. For instance. can be named.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition this-above-that. Thus ―The King of France is bald‖ turns out to be false. I could also call my dog Ishmael. independently of the meanings of all other words. 1953) p. the-yellowness-of-this. But I might also use the apparent name ―Ishmael‖ as shorthand for ―the narrator of Moby Dick. a name being ―a simple symbol. according to Russell). If all I smell are smells. ―The King of France‖ looks like a name. then I do not directly sense threedimensional solid objects. such as beardedness. But I can still believe in the existence of such objects. 174. Some are disguised descriptions. According to Russell. all I hear are sounds. not every apparent name is really a name. 11 . Universals include ―all objects of which no particular is a constituent. if I want to I can call a particular point in my visual field Ishmael. directly designating an individual which is its meaning. 10 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.‖10 However. and so on. and having meaning in its own right. all I see are sights. we may well believe that sense data with which we are acquainted are caused by physical objects that are beyond our immediate experience. 9 Ibid. not meaningless. but. We are not acquainted with physical objects or other people‘s minds. Harmondsworth. For instance. smells. physical or otherwise. diversity. and so on (the sense data) that I experience are caused by three-dimensional objects around me. p.

What the sentence is really doing. but none. and Routledge. Frege. However. And in general.g. 1997) is designed to provide a lyrical and poetic English version of the book. 1974). I think. Pears and B. I will leave (to some extent) for later in the text and (to a much greater extent) for others to determine. F. F. is ideal for scholarly purposes. at 3. without the mistakes and with greater fidelity. but it does not help those who care about understanding the precise meaning of each sentence. The obvious choice is Ogden‘s translation. b) is bald. this translation is arguably too readable. Pears and McGuinness have been accused of over-translation (see. at 6. Unfortunately. xvii) and leading the reader to interpret the text in one way when the original German is at least equally open to another interpretation. Daniel Kolak‘s translation (McGraw-Hill. which is also more readable than Ogden‘s.3411. as Black points out on p. 1981) and by D. Wittgenstein seems to have been impressed by this theory of descriptions. McGuinness (Routledge & Kegan Paul. Exactly what he made of the ideas of Schopenhauer. My translation is closer to Ogden‘s but. 2007. Neither of these is perfect. since Wittgenstein himself helped with the project. 152). Ogden (available in various editions. and Russell. At times it goes against Wittgenstein‘s explicit directions (e. The Translation Three other translations of Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus are currently available. Barnes & Noble Books. Hence the popularity of Pears‘ and McGuinness‘ version of the text. that translation is neither completely accurate nor completely in accordance with Wittgenstein‘s suggestions (although he did approve the whole). though.g. including Cosimo Classics..any real person. at 12 . according to Russell.g. however. which might make the reading experience more pleasant and in some ways closer to what Wittgenstein wanted. I hope. At times it is simply wrong (e. is claiming that there is a person who matches the description: a) is King of France.43). K. Far more popular with scholars are the translations by C. 2003. e. Stokhof p.

‖ I translate darstellen as ‗present‘ and vorstellen as ‗represent. Against this kind of view is the ―new.54) and so cannot be understood. to Wittgenstein‘s express wishes regarding the translation.‘ Darstellen has to do with representation and performance. I have translated it as ―state of things. He suggested possibly the Latin status rerum (state of things).. according to whom most of the sentences of the Tractatus have no meaning (as Wittgenstein implies at 6. There are numerous readings of this general kind. Further Reading The literature on the Tractatus is growing at a rate that is genuinely alarming for those of us who try to keep up with it. I have made a point of being consistent when it comes to the translation of certain key terms. The mainstream view is that each part of the book can be understood.‖ ―austere. one might regard the bulk of the Tractatus as a continuation of Russell‘s philosophical project but the ending as a Schopenhauerian graft that does not quite take). Wittgenstein did not like ―state of affairs‖ for Sachlage.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition least in some places. but that the parts do not necessarily form a consistent or coherent whole (for instance. as in theatre. etc.‖ or ―resolute‖ stance of Cora Diamond and James Conant. but they tend to fall into three groups. but White is a good recent example. McManus is probably the closest there is to a book-length treatment of the whole Tractatus along these lines. Each interpretation is different. is generally translated as The World as Will and Representation. Vorstellen has to do with presentation or putting forward (as). which surely influenced Wittgenstein‘s thinking.‖ reserving ―state of affairs‖ for ―Sachverhalt. Vorstellung. To do it to yourself is to imagine. The third view is that there is something to be said for. and learned from.‖ which Ogden has as ―atomic fact. It might be worth using ‗representation‘ here just in case some reference to Schopenhauer is ever intended by Wittgenstein‘s use of vorstellen. Schopenhauer‘s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. each of these other two kinds of view and that a middle way between 13 .

Oxford University Press. For additional information about Wittgenstein‘s intellectual background see Nordmann. Other books worth mentioning here are Mounce (probably the most painless introduction to the Tractatus there is). Brenner and John F. Oxford University Press. Hacker (one of the most admired and influential books ever written on Wittgenstein). Norman Malcolm Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. and Brian McGuinness Young Ludwig: Wittgenstein’s Life. 2005. William H. Janik. and Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin Wittgenstein’s Vienna. 1992 (one of the best and clearest books available on Wittgenstein‘s work as a whole). New York. 14 . 1984. Other works are pointed to in the text that follows. 1973. Simon and Schuster. trans. and Joachim Schulte Wittgenstein: An Introduction. 1889-1921. Holley. For more on Wittgenstein himself I recommend Monk. State University of New York Press. McGinn is a good example of this kind of reading.them should be sought. Schroeder (not exclusively about the Tractatus but admirably lucid).

Indeed. since it was not his idea originally and he seems to have accepted it slightly reluctantly. and whereof one cannot speak.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [The title was suggested to Wittgenstein for the English translation of his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung by G. E. See Monk p. Moore.] The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows – so I believe – that the formulation of questions about these problems is due to misunderstanding the logic of our language. can be said clearly. Perhaps he liked the fact that this title echoes Spinoza‘s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. in the absence of any better ideas. that Wittgenstein considered a Latin title to be more appropriate than any English one he could think of. and perhaps he liked the idea of replacing talk of theology and politics (or theological politics) with a discussion of logic and philosophy. But we should probably not read too much into the title.—Its end would be reached if it gave pleasure to one person who read it with understanding. It is a pretty literal translation of the German into Latin. meaning something like ‗Logico-Philosophical Treatise. 15 .] Foreword This book will perhaps only be understood by one who has himself already at some time thought the thoughts that are expressed herein – or at least similar thoughts. 65). though. One could put the whole sense of the book perhaps in these words: What can be said at all. I did not understand it until I had myself independently discovered most of what it contained. thereof one must be silent. –It is therefore not a textbook.‖ (Autobiography p.‘ It is interesting. [Compare Bertrand Russell on Gottlob Frege: Of Frege‘s Begriffsschrift Russell writes ―I possessed the book for years before I could make out what it meant. 206.

self-underminingly. The point of this delay of self-refutation. note 48. So the limit can only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense. or rather – not to thinking. And. the supposed improvement seems to be subject to the very fault that has been so carefully explained in connection with the first formulation. 82. secondly.The book would thus draw a limit to thinking. Bertrand Russell. Literally they mean ‗simply nonsense. But there is a double paradox in this replacement. I will mention only that I owe a large part of the stimulus to my thoughts to the great works of Frege and to the work of my friend Mr. and therefore I give no sources. because it is all the same to me if what I have thought has already been thought by another before me. but rather to the expression of thoughts: Because in order to draw a limit to thinking. but on reflection we realize that we are no better off. they sit there. There has been some disagreement about this. 269) comment on these last two paragraphs: What we have here is the careful replacement of a form of words that seems to try to do something that cannot be done.‘ not ‗simple nonsense.‘ which would be einfacher Unsinn. First. and the sustaining of this acquaintance is the mystical outlook. the inappropriate form of words is left on the page: the words were not just omitted after the first draft. We think for a moment that we have avoided paradox. Morris and Dodd (p. Indeed what I have written here makes no particular claim to novelty. we would have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we would thus have to be able to think what cannot be thought). seeming to explain their own impossibility. [The last words of that sentence are einfach Unsinn.] I do not want to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers. p. but it is cleared up in Nordmann. is to give us time to achieve acquaintance with the world as a limited whole. we suggest. 16 .

before he began work on what was later called the Prototractatus (see Proops p. is that people go off and waste their time studying these people when they could and should be studying Kant instead.‖ Proops emphasizes the importance of the Notes on Logic (1913) and Notes Dictated to G. Like G. meaning his and Russell‘s. E. both on Wittgenstein‘s own ideas and on his understanding of Frege‘s. because it was only in the next year that Wittgenstein wrote his Notes on Logic. xxi and McGuinness pp. much of which was copied directly into the Tractatus. On p. even as early as 1913 Wittgenstein wrote about his work in a noticeably less collaborative way. xix Proops quotes several instances of Wittgenstein‘s writing in 1912 of ―our problems. 17 . and sees Russell‘s influence at work in these cases.e. 111 (dated March 1919).‘ of the ‗great Schleiermacher. 35-47).Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition [This has been taken by some commentators to indicate that Wittgenstein‘s thinking is closer to Frege‘s than it is to Russell‘s. as Proops notes. Proops thinks. Proops thinks that Wittgenstein misunderstood Frege on some points. Moore (1914) largely because Wittgenstein referred (in May 1915) to the latter as ―essentially … definitive‖ only a few months. In 1919 he referred to the problems dealt with in the TLP as ―our problems‖ (i. though. However. that Wittgenstein was very familiar with Arthur Schopenhauer‘s work and that on p. but to the solutions as his alone (see Proops p.‖ ―our theory. xix). he says that the TLP ―upsets all our theory of truth. Ian Proops argues that Russell was more influential than is often thought. Perhaps Wittgenstein was simply trying to encourage more people to read Frege.‘ and of the ‗sagacious and discerning Herbart. Anscombe.‖ and so on.‘‖ The effect. of classes. M. of numbers and all the rest. He referred to that work as a summary of what he had done at Cambridge up to that point. Schopenhauer says. And the Prototractatus is quite close to the Tractatus proper. if Brian McGuinness is correct. It might be worth bearing in mind. In Letters p. criticizing Russell‘s theories. This. his and Russell‘s). is significant. E. 173 of Schopenhauer‘s Fourfold Root he complains about references to ―the works of ‗Hegel‘s gigantic mind. since he seems to hold Frege in greater esteem.

130). 1918. and this value will be the greater the better the thoughts are expressed. Since these are the subjects that he presented the book as being all about (ethics to Ludwig von Ficker. I am therefore of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved. 18 . moving from logic to ethics and philosophy in general.] If this effort has a value then it consists in two things. First in that thoughts are expressed in it. serve the same function. On the other hand the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. Vienna. – Here I am aware of falling far short of what is possible.But this is not much to go on. And if I am not wrong in this. The more the nail has been hit on the head. in the Tractatus as in those earlier works. then the value of this work now consists secondly in that it shows how little has been achieved by the of solving these problems. we should keep an open mind as to whether remarks copied from the Prototractatus or Notes on Logic have the same point. – May others come and do it better. L. W. Simply because my ability to accomplish the task is too slight. becoming ―more and more lapidary and general‖ and that his method for dealing with them had ―changed dramatically. Wittgenstein‘s work changed more drastically in the next two years. philosophy in general to the readers of the Tractatus’ foreword). especially given that in the same letter in which he said that he regarded the Moore notes ―essentially as definitive.‖ Wittgenstein also wrote that his problems were changing.‖ As Monk notes (see p.

Thoughts are imperceptible. Given the rootedness of this word in German folk tales where solving a ‗riddle‘ is often a matter of life and death..‖ distinguishing him from all the most famous philosophers from Aristotle to the early Russell. Albany. n. not of things. and so on. We may see the sun rise. p. F. (WR I: 82). explaining on p.‖] 1. 49.m2. this suggests that an answer to the question. 17) says: ―In the first book of The World as Will … Schopenhauer says that the problem of philosophy is to say ‗what‘ the world is. 19 . not something that can be referred to by a name. ―If what is the case might not have been. (In the Tractatus these are states of affairs. in Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Existential Investigations (SUNY Press. Black takes Wittgenstein‘s references to ―the world‖ to mean the universe. will have existential implications. ―A fact is a thought that is true‖ (Beaney. n. will have an effect on our lives.m.1 The world is the totality of facts. p. The propositions n. n.2. combinations of objects.1.‖ Julian Young (p. the emphasis placed on them in my presentation. etc. then logically prior to whatever is the case is whatever might either have been or not have been the case. See Black pp. but we do not in the same sense see that the sun rises. the propositions n. n. [Gordon C. etc. rather than merely satisfying the curiosity of armchair investigators.3. are remarks on proposition no. [Black (p. 27-28. 1997).Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 111 The world is everything that is the case. 342). 27) says that this distinction is ―the outstanding innovation of Wittgenstein‘s ontology.m1. n. Sometimes he says that it is to solve the ‗riddle‘ (Rätsel) of what the world is. notes that. Frege has a notion of fact that is worth bearing in mind here. The universe is implicitly not a thing. That the sun is 11 The decimal numerals given as numbers of the individual propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions. Bearn says. remarks on proposition no. 29 that this use is more common in German than it is in English.

Russell describes his Logical Atomism. is a thought. the text of lectures given in early 1918. note 70.‖ Wittgenstein‘s reply was that: ―The meaning of these two sentences are one and the same but not the conceptions (Vorstellungen) that I associated with them when I wrote them down. while sense can be common property. 1989. His view is that these two sentences (i. See p. quoted in Nordmann p. individual or private.‖ This is in Gottlob Frege ―Briefe an Ludwig Wittgenstein‖ in Brian McGuinness and Rudolf Haller (eds) Wittenstein in Focus – Im Brennpunkt: Wittgenstein. 168 that perhaps the meaning that is the same is precisely no meaning at all.‖ but this cannot be right.e. Thoughts are not external. Russell had not seen or heard from Wittgenstein since August 1914. Vorstellungen (conceptions or ideas) are purely. psychological ideas. p. Nordmann suggests on p. ―A third realm must be recognized‖ (see p. individual. While Frege does indeed distinguish between what he calls (as Nordmann goes on to quote) ―the actual meaning of the sentence‖ and ―the conceptions someone associates with the sentence. but neither are they private. Russell‘s idea of a thing is also surely relevant. indeed necessarily. 160). For Frege. pp. subjective. Amsterdam: Rodopi. as ―very largely concerned with explaining certain ideas which I learnt from my friend and former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein‖ (Collected Papers Volume 8 p.‖ this is not the distinction he makes between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). perceptible objects. 124. Nordmann comments that: ―Frege takes this to agree with his own distinction between sense and reference.rising. ―The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. The sentence ―The sun is rising‖ expresses this thought. ―The world is everything that is the case‖ and ―The world is the totality of facts‖) have no sense but are able nevertheless to make sense. 3-33. 337). Some of 20 . Frege asked Wittgenstein how ―The world is the totality of facts‖ differs from ―The world is everything that is the case. 22. 154 in Beaney‘s reader for Frege‘s explicit distinction between Vorstellung and both Sinn and Bedeuntung.

Whitehead and Russell on p. ‗Thing‘ and ‗relation‘ are on the same level. 37 of Principia Mathematica.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition them will be what I call ―particulars‖—such things as little patches of colour or sounds. Sullivan ―The Totality of Facts‖ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2000. 49). and has been taken as such by numerous commentators.11 The world is determined by the facts. while others read him as being a kind of idealist (for instance.1 sounds like a statement of metaphysical realism. The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis. points out (p. 120). Ostrow quotes Wittgenstein later saying to Desmond Lee that the opening of the Tractatus says that: ―The world does not consist of a catalogue of things and facts about them (like a catalogue of a show)…..] 1. 23. 161).03 for more on the chain analogy. Volume I. in 1930-31 Wittgenstein is reported to have said that. momentary things—and some of them will be predicates or relations and so on. [Peter M.119). Frascolla says (p. 21-22) notes that 1. In his Notebooks Wittgenstein wrote that ―Properties and relations are objects too‖ (16/6/1915). p. as Ostrow notes (p. As Sullivan notes. a solipsist). 175) that this ―remark runs straight into the vicious circle principle‖ if ―these being all the facts‖ is itself meant to be one of the facts that determine the world. Ostrow (pp.‖ See 2.64 suggests that Wittgenstein rejected the realism-idealism dichotomy. pp. 175-192. The work that might be thought to be done by something called ―relations‖ is (already) done by what Wittgenstein calls ―objects. 79) that the point about the chain is that there are no such things as ―relations‖ that relate or connect things/objects. Yet 5. On p.1272 Wittgenstein calls the concept of an object a pseudo-concept. What the world is is given by description and not by a list of objects‖ (WLC p. and by these being all the facts. The objects hang as it were in a chain‖ (WLC p. At 4. And. ―‘Objects‘ also include relations: a proposition is not two things connected by a relation. not the atom of physical analysis‖ (ibid. 21 .

[Black (p. 39) says that it might be better to speak of the holding of a fact than the existence of a fact. 1.2 The world divides into facts.135. Frascolla (p. 41-45) quite convincingly that Sachverhalte should be understood as facts rather than possibilities. 5.‖ but 2. at 2.2211)‖ (pp. A Sachverhalt is ―the objective counterpart of an unanalysable contingent truth (see. (This objection is Black‘s. 39-40). 1. 22 .] 2 What is the case. Stenius (p.). auditory complexes. for instance.) Black argues (pp. 31) says that ―a Sachverhalt is something that could possibly be the case. is the existence of states of affairs.] 1. the fact. ix): ―states of affairs are to be identified with the phenomenal complexes belonging to the various sense realms (visual complexes.06 and 4. at least most of the time. Most of the time he uses it to mean an actual combination of objects. which would be odd in that case. 4. He prefers ‗atomic fact‘ for Sachverhalt.0124 talks of possible Sachverhalte.‖ On p. but he also sometimes uses it to mean a combination that does not exist (e.13 The facts in logical space are the world. However. etc.define the vicious circle principle thus: ―Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection. 1.11. Black notes.12 Because the totality of facts determines what is the case and also all that is not the case.g.21 Each can be the case or not be the case and all else stay the same.3). [Cf.‖ Presumably Wittgenstein had this in mind when he wrote 1. Wittgenstein uses Sachverhalt in seemingly inconsistent ways.

and the reader should postpone deciding the extent to which these do represent genuine metaphysical commitments until it is decided how such claims are to be interpreted. Russell writes: ―Whatever may be an object of thought. 43). then. is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. In The Principles of Mathematics. and to deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be false‖ (p. 85. 66): ―Wittgenstein‘s conception of a simple object was. since now facts are not necessarily actual. E. rightly or wrongly. individual. a chimaera. or anything else that can be mentioned.‖ Hacker‘s reference is to G. Frascolla notes that Wittgenstein‘s distinction between facts and states of affairs is weakened by his introduction of the term ―negative fact‖ (at 2. I call a term. whereas a minimal fact is an actual combination. 176193. second. I suspect. though. Wittgenstein himself did not intend to develop a metaphysics in these opening sections. itself a development of Moore‘s notion of a concept. or may occur in any true or false proposition. pp. (Items. a state of affairs is merely a possible combination of objects.] 2. an heir to Russell‘s notion of a term in The Principles of Mathematics. I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit. a moment. these opening paragraphs are meant to be as vacuous as possi23 . It is at any rate safe to say that. … A man. things. a number.06). and entity. This. it is not necessary that it be thought of as one obtaining state of affairs: several obtaining states of affairs can constitute a fact.‖ On p.) [Hacker (p. and in an important sense. is sure to be a term. a relation. a class. White (p. Moore.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 84 Frascolla writes: ―states of affairs and facts differ in two ways: first. when a fact is spoken of. or can be counted as one. ―The Nature of Judgment.‖ Mind viii (1899). 26): ―It is … important to bear in mind how little we are told about the objects.01 The state of affairs is a combination of objects.

Objects are unchanging (see TLP 2. 142 Pears concludes: ―However. the bearer of a name. it is really safer to accept his professions of agnosticism about the nature of the objects of the Tractatus. 120) that: ―‘An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities. in Nelson Goodman‘s sense of the word).‖ Frascolla (p. The Notebooks.‖ Bearn adds that it is therefore misleading to call Wittgenstein a realist with respect to objects and equally misleading to call him an anti-realist in respect of them. things)‘. is here used for such things as a colour.‖ According to McGuinness (pp. 7 note 8): ―What makes it so difficult to understand Wittgenstein‘s concept of an object is. 78. ix): ―The conjecture I put forward is that … objects are to be identified with repeatable phenomenal qualities (qualia. So our ‗acquaintance‘ with them ―is not an experience or knowledge of something over against which we stand. i. where he might have been expected to make up his mind and choose between them.‖ See Frascolla p. ‗What kind of thing did he take objects to be?‘ is often made to appear simpler than it really is. and in the Tractatus.027) and whatever we can 24 . precisely that its role is closer to the idea of the meaning of a name than it is to our ordinary notion of what a name refers to.552].‖ On p. See Bearn p. thought. Commentators usually ask whether he took them to be material points (point-masses) or sense-data. a point in visual space etc. and does not even formulate the question to which of the two categories objects belong. and to take the evidence to show no more than that he allowed for the possibility that they might include relations.e. I want to claim. and language. Thus it is not properly experience or knowledge at all [see TLP 5. 72-73) objects are the form of the realms of world. Objects etc. which record exploratory work. 55. 89): ―The question. canvas both possibilities.‖ On p. 113 she writes: ―Objects are the meanings of the indefinable constituents of a proposition…‖ Pears (p.ble: this is as much as can be said about the world without begging any questions as to its detailed nature. he does not do so. McGinn (p. …‖ Frascolla finds this interpretation confirmed by Wittgenstein‘s remark (WLC p.

given what he writes at 6. Bearn makes this point on p. to be given in experience. 14 of Hintikka. and by the different meanings of the word "exist". 14) identifies Wittgenstein‘s objects as ―objects of my experience. That is." The discussion there sounds like a discussion of Plato's idea of universals. Page 31 of the Blue Book refers specifically to the Tractatus and the idea that a fact is a "complex of objects. We have immediate experience of physical reality (which still remains to be defined). He points out (p. 60. they are what is given in immediate experience. and sweetness are elements or individuals.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition experience could always be otherwise (see TLP 5.643).‖ He quotes Frank Ramsey: ―Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe in anything not given in experience…. 7) that Moore's notes on Wittgenstein's lectures (1930-33) report that Wittgenstein spoke of colors as if they were Russellian individuals. is the formal [definitory] property to be a genuine entity‖ (quoted on p. (And perhaps he already thought this way in the Tractatus.011 It is essential to the thing that it can be a constituent part of a state of affairs. from item # 004-21-02 of the Ramsey archives of Pittsburgh). not only of the contents of our own minds. roundness.)] 2.54. Talk of facts as combinations of objects. Hintikka (see p. 25 ." So Wittgenstein came to think of 2. Wittgenstein writes. On p. 15) calls these objects phenomenological entities but denies that they are mere phenomena. Hintikka (p. but they are not only the contents of our consciousness. so we cannot experience objects. Fahrnkopf argues that Wittgenstein's objects include universals. He certainly seems to be talking about the universal redness rather than a particular red sense-datum here. springs from the following confusion: "We are misled by the substantives "object of thought" and "fact".01 as a mistake. 8 Fahrnkopf points out that in the Blue Book Wittgenstein characterizes his Tractatus view as being that redness. For to be mine.

(It is impossible for words to appear in two different ways: alone and in propositions. see Russell‘s Logical Atomism (p. So they cannot be within the world.0122 The thing is independent in so far as it can occur in all possible states of things. If I can conceive of an object in the context of a state of affairs then I cannot conceive of it without the possibility of this context.) As we cannot conceive of spatial objects at all without space. so far as our 26 . What is accidentally the case. It has that sort of selfsubsistence that used to belong to substance.0121 It would.‖] 2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs then the possibility of the state of affairs must be already prejudged in the thing. depends on the non-accidental. on its own. 179): ―Particulars have this peculiarity. (Something logical cannot be merely possible.2. and all possibilities are its facts. but this form of independence is a form of connection with the state of affairs. among the sort of objects that you have to take account of in an inventory of the world. facts (see 6. so we can conceive of no thing without the possibility of its uniting with other objects. If things can occur in states of affairs then this [possibility] must already be in them. [Bearn (p. appear as an accident if there were later to be a state of things suitable for a thing that could [already] exist for itself.) [On objects being independent. 2. 49) writes of this passage: ―Objects (things) are the nonaccidental. for if they were within the world they would be accidental.41). a form of dependence. except that it usually only persists through a very short time. as it were. the world. Logic deals with every possibility. that each of them stands entirely alone and is completely self-subsistent. or temporal objects without time.

That is to say. or wave packets. (Each such possibility must be in the nature of the object. although his focus is on what ―internal properties‖ might be. 62) concern an object‘s involvement in states of affairs that 27 .] 2. 47).‖ He refers to 4.‖ Presumably he is making use if Russell‘s notion of knowledge by acquaintance. cannot be ruled out a priori. [On p. 31) that objects‘ external properties ―are their forming particular combinations with other objects. while external properties (see p.‖ Stokhof (pp. too. I need not of course [be acquainted with] its external – but I need to be acquainted with all its internal properties. 61) says that internal properties are what an object ―necessarily can‖ be.01231 In order to be acquainted with an object. however short-lived this may be.) A new possibility cannot be found later. or whatever).] 2. the existence of these combinations being the holding of particular contingent facts. 46-47) notes that Wittgenstein‘s reference to dependence here ―strongly suggests that [objects] cannot be conceived of as material atoms (elementary particles. since for such objects the very possibility of an independent existence. [McManus says (p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition experience goes. Frascolla (p. each particular that there is in the world does not in any way logically depend upon any other particular. it holds that no logical property prevents their independent occurrence. 59 of Letters to Ogden Wittgenstein says: ―to know here just means: I know it but I needn‘t know anything about it.0123 If I am acquainted with the object then I am also acquainted with all the possibilities of its occurrence in states of affairs.123 in connection with this.‖ Much the same goes for sense data: ―For such objects. even if other properties would‖ (p.

but I cannot conceive of the thing without the space. 50) points out a possible echo of Kant CPR A 24/B 38 here.02 Objects are simple.0131 The spatial object must be in infinite space. 2.0124 If all objects are given then therewith all possible states of affairs are also given.013 Each thing is. I can conceive of this space as empty. is devoted exclusively to setting out the radical idea that objects are essentially dependent."] 28 . 2. He gives one object‘s being taller than another as an example of an external property. The note must have a pitch. color-space around it. etc. from 2.) The speck in a visual field of course need not be red.] 2. in a space of possible states of affairs. 2.0141 The possibility of its occurrence in states of affairs is the form of an object. but it must have a color: it has.02. in that they are not merely a content but also a form.014 Objects contain the possibility of all states of things. Leibniz Monadology 1. Fahrnkopf (p. so to speak. (A spatial point is an argument-place. the object of the sense of touch a degree of hardness. 2.01 to 2. where simple is defined as meaning without parts. 42) writes: "The middle of the very first page of the text through the beginning of the third page. [Cf.happen to obtain. [Black (p. as it were.] 2.

is to make evident the fundamental distinction between complex and object. while the latter is based on the demand that sense be determinate.0211. One starts from the need for the world to have substance. The sense of a proposition. Each concludes that there must be simple objects. by 3.0201. 28).24. White (pp. What is contingent is whether it is true (or false).0201-2.24.24. Consequently. a proposition about a nonexistent complex is false. 27) says that this remark must be compared with 3. [Ostrow (p. 38-40) notes an important difference between the argument from 2. there must be a contact between language and the world which is prior to the truth or falsity of what we say. Therefore they cannot be composite. But in order to be true (or false) a proposition must already possess a sense. The ―central purpose‖ of 2.] 2.233. the relationship being such that the name just stands for the object independently of description. 21): ―whether a proposition has sense cannot be a contingent matter. must be independent of whether it is in fact true or false. in short.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. Such a contact is to be found in the relationship between a simple name and a simple object. [Mounce presents Wittgenstein‘s reasoning here as follows (p. not nonsensical.0211 If the world had no substance then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 2. but. Complexes cannot be treated as entities or objects. a proposition about a nonexistent object is nonsense.0212 and that running from 3. According to 2. 2.‖ 29 .0201 Each statement about complexes can be analyzed into a statement about their components and into those propositions that completely describe the complexes. he says (p.

whether another proposition describing that complex was true. Because these [material properties] are presented only by propositions -.0212 It would then be impossible to draft a picture of the world (true or false).‖ but this seems too casual.a form -. 124: ―My suggestion is that to declare that our talk ultimately rests on an immediate ‗seeing‘ of ‗colourless objects‘ is one step away from recognizing that the ‗project‘ of explaining the ‗possibility‘ of ‗meaningful‘ talk leaves us nothing to say or think: our ‗experience‘ of the pure and simple here is the experience of empty words. McManus p. 42): ―The meaning of a name is the object it denotes.‖ ―roughly speaking. 2. Nordmann (p. 102) has ―By the way: …‖ Black (p. i. But if a name is supposed to stand for a complex object. the decomposition or non-existence of that complex is a real possibility.. the name will be meaningless. 64) seems to think that ―in a manner of speaking. if there is no such object.e. So to ascertain that the original proposition does have a sense. one would have to check whether the complex in question did in fact exist. 2.‖ and ―in passing‖ would all be acceptable translations of beiläufig gesprochen.‖] 2.‖ 30 . and the sentence in which it occurs will have no sense.023 This fixed form consists precisely of the objects.Schroeder (p. Hence.‖ ―incidentally.in common with it. 2. 2.0232 Incidentally: objects are colorless.are only produced by the configuration of objects.0231 The substance of the world can determine only a form and not any material properties. [The most literal translation would be something like ―By the way: objects are colorless.022 It is obvious that even a world quite different from the actual one must have something -.

i. but these are external differences between red and blue. moments of private time. is that if two objects are really simple then the difference between them cannot be given by definitions.differentiated from one another only by the fact that they are different. those complexes which have a spatial quale among their constituents do have a spatial location. 120) Wittgenstein gave colours as an example of what he meant by ―objects.123 for more on external properties.0233 Two objects of the same logical form are -. so too it makes no sense to say it has a color. 80) offers this account: ―To put it all in a nutshell.5302.‖ See 4. ―What color is red?‖ does not.0232 is an odd statement. although some of them are visual places. as we shall see shortly) do have a position in time.‖ 2. namely colors. ―he is explicit that it makes sense to say that two objects have all their properties in common. ―Red‖ and ―blue‖ refer to exactly the same kind of thing. [Anscombe (p. Wittgenstein‘s] simple objects can have.e. the only difference between them is that they are different colors. in Russell‘s jargon. ―What color are those pants?‖ makes sense. of course.e. and they do not have any position in phenomenal time. although some of them are phenomenal times. are those of actually occurring in certain facts. 152) says that Wittgenstein‘s point. 111): ―The only ‗external properties‘ his [i. they do not occupy any visual place. In what sense could colors be colorless? Frascolla (p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Given that in his later Cambridge lectures (WLC p. as she sees it.apart from their external properties -. although some of them are colours.] 2.‖ Just as a color has no time or place. Anscombe says.] 31 . where. Of course different things are red than are blue. Apart from these. objects do not have any colour. and likewise all those complexes which have a temporal quale among their constituents (all concrete complexes. On the other hand. McGinn (p.‖ See 5.

025 It is form and content. and refer to it thereby. not simply having a color. and then one can distinguish it straightaway from the others by means of a description. the configuration is the changing. and color (coloredness) are forms of objects. and does not fit other uses of the same word made by Wittgenstein. time. Wittgenstein talks about Färbigkeit as something that can be reduced. § 47. [Bearn notes (p. the unstable. the persistent. for instance. and then it is altogether impossible to pick out one of them. or else there are several things that have all their properties in common. Part I.] 2. Pears and McGuinness have ―being coloured‖ but this is less literal than my translation. Frascolla suggests that he means ―something like colour intensity‖ (p.024 Substance is what persists [besteht] independently of what is the case.421 also talk of things being one.0271 The object is the fixed.2.] 2. because otherwise it really would have been distinguished all along. 2. 80).027 The fixed. 2.0251 Space.621 and 6.026 Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the world. [On the translation of Färbigkeit (―coloredness‖) see Frascolla pp. 2. the persistent. does not fit the interpretation of 2. 2. In the Remarks on Colour.02331 Either a thing has properties that no other has. 32 . Because if a thing is not distinguished by anything then I cannot distinguish it. and the object are one. 75) that 5.0232 offered above (by Frascolla). 80-81.

[Black (p. but a collection that holds together in a determinate way. Their fitting into one another is how they hold together. The same point applies to the combination of objects in a state of affairs.‖ Anscombe (p.031 In a state of affairs the objects relate to each other in a definite way. 66) compares this with 2.‘ say) that holds its components together. 33 .] 2.‘ Higher up that page he doubts whether the distinction is necessary. that which holds them together. is not just a collection. See 5. 37) argues that ―in the elementary proposition there must be nothing corresponding to bracketing.032 The way that the objects hang together in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 2. except their fitting into one another.03 In a state of affairs. the meaning of the proposition must be such that it needs no ‗collecting‘ or ‗punctuating‘ of terms in the way done by brackets. 2. That they hold together in a determinate way shows something about their logical form. 19): ―A state of affairs.461-5.0272 The configuration of objects forms states of affairs. Black (p. like a chain. But logical form is not a further fact about them.4611.15 and notes the contrast between ‗form‘ and ‗structure. 66) says the point is that there is nothing else in a fact (a ‗bond. But what holds together the links of a chain? Nothing.033 The form is the possibility of the structure [or: Form is the possibility of structure].] 2. the objects hang one in another like the links in a chain.‖ That is. [Mounce says (p. 2.

67) notes that we cannot ask ―Is it possible that…?‖ in relation to the ―possibility‖ that Wittgenstein refers to here. it would appear to be the reverse: rather than seeking to understand objects in terms of some prior philosophical category. possibility of structure). we might say. the Tractatus is suggesting that it is only through their possibilities of occurrence that those fundamental categories emerge. 34 . 2.06 The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. is a fact. but also content. An existing state of affairs. See 2 and 2.‖ or ―sense datum‖ to try to make sense of what he has in mind. as is said of substance at 2. ―It is constitutive of the object to occur in an atomic fact.034 The structure of a fact consists of the structures of the states of affairs. 25) argues that objects are not just form (i. Wittgenstein will not allow us to rely on any such categories as basic. 25. This makes interpretation problematic.‖ ―universal.[Ostrow (p.) On pp. 1.12 expresses the same thought.025. but not only in this fact… [T]he object is this thing taken against the background of all the rest of its possibilities of combination with other things.062. The object is.12. 2. as clarificatory. [Cf.e.‖ Black (p.‖ (All quotes from p. Black (p. 26-27 he says: ―While we will no doubt be tempted to bring to bear notions like ―particular.‖ Otherwise the object would ―be understood as dissolving simply into a possibility – as if we could understand the condition of the world apart from any consideration of how things actually stand. Indeed. 70) says that 1.05 The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.] 2.] 2. a primitive notion.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world. the realization of that possibility set.

) [Cf. 1956) p. Heinrich Hertz The Principles of Mechanics (New York: Dover Publications. 2.062 The existence or non-existence of a state of affairs cannot be inferred from the existence or non-existence of another.061 States of affairs are independent of one another. 34): ―It is. 13.21.12. 1.‘ Wittgenstein returned to the problem presented by this argument again and again throughout his life. one judges something real.11 A picture represents a state of things in logical space.] 2. their non-existence a negative one. some version of the ancient problem of the nature of ―what is not‖ that confronts us at the close of the 2.] 2. so in judging something unreal one judges nothing. the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. it would seem. but judging nothing. see Anscombe (p. one is not judging at all. [Cf. 1: ―We form for ourselves pictures or symbols of external objects…‖ Hertz is concerned with the question how scientists can represent nature in such a way as to allow for making predictions. one judges something. in judging something. Plato‘s Theaetetus 189A: ‗In judging. 4.12.] 2.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition (We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact. Ostrow (p. 1. footnote): ―cf. [Cf. 35 . [Cf.06s.‖ On this.1 We make pictures of facts for ourselves.‖] 2.063 The total reality is the world.

202.131 In a picture. 2. the world is understood always against a larger – logical – backdrop of what is not the case.13 and says that.] 2.203.14 A picture consists in its elements relating to one another in a specific way. 38): ―positive and negative fact stand on the same level. and represents [darstellt] a possibility of such facts.15 The elements of a picture's relating to each other in a specific way represents matters relating to each other just so. 36 .13 In a picture. which already is a general concept. a contrast between two uses of a picture.‖ Ostrow also (pp. Ostrow (p. Facts should not be reified. For a mathematician talks of picturing in cases where a painter would no longer use this expression.201. 36-37) that it is a mistake to see Wittgenstein (rightly) as rejecting Frege‘s idea that a proposition is a kind of name only to then wonder how a picture represents a state of affairs.‖ He also says (pp. His conclusion is that a picture presents [vorstellt] existent and non-existent atomic facts.12 A picture is a model of reality.[Ostrow (p. 35) compares this with 1. the elements of the picture stand in for objects. 185 Wittgenstein says: ―I have inherited this concept of a picture from two sides: first from a drawn picture. 80-81) compares this remark with 2. 2. 2. and 2. [In Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle p.141 A picture is a fact. 2. it would seem. a choice made from among the facts that it could be used to depict. second from the model of a mathematician. They are uses of pictures.‖] 2. ―From the start. the elements of the picture correspond to objects. 2.

Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Let us call this connection of the elements of a picture its structure. 81: ―Indeed perceptions through sight ultimately refer to touch. 2. 5. [Ostrow (p. though. 35) notes that a ruler does not use itself.] 2. 81).1512 It is like a ruler laid against reality. and its possibility the form of representation of the picture [i. the form of the picture's picturing]. [Cf.1513 On this view the picturing relation that makes it a picture also belongs to the picture.‖] 2. Schopenhauer Fourfold Root p. although he prefers ‗form of depiction. 185) saying to Waismann later that he might as well have called propositions measuring-rods as pictures.‘ Black rejects.] 2. and is accepted by Black (p. and sight can be regarded as an imperfect touch extending to a distance and making use of the rays of light as long feelers. He quotes Wittgenstein (Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle p. Pears and McGuinness‘s ‗pictorial form.e.151 The form of representation is the possibility that things are related to each other in the same way as the elements of the picture. We must apply it. [Cf.15121 Only the outermost points of the dividing lines [on the ruler] touch the object to be measured. [‗Form of representation‘ is what Ogden has.1511 This is how a picture is tied to reality: it reaches right up to it.557. 37 .‘] 2.

it amounts to no more than the claim that depicting the world is possible because the world has the possibility of being depicted. [Ostrow (p.rightly or falsely -. 24).04. etc.] 2.‖ Cf. a color one everything colored.171 A picture can picture every reality whose form it has.‖ And yet: ―the strategy of taking recourse in talk of an isomorphism is empty. 38 . A spatial picture [can represent] everything spatial. [The feelers here are antennae.is its form of representation. ―the things which a butterfly has‖ in Wittgenstein‘s words (Letters to Ogden.17 What a picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to picture it in its way -.] 2. [See 2.161 In the picture and the depicted there must be something identical so that one can be a picture of the other at all. 2.2. 4. p.16 A fact must have something in common with what it depicts in order to be a picture. 2.] 2.1514 The picturing relation consists of the coordination of the elements of the picture with the things [pictured].151 and 2.033.1515 These coordinations are as it were the feelers of the picture elements. 39) says of standard interpretations that: ―Wittgenstein‘s answer to the question of how the picture – and hence language – can always be about the world is thus supposedly to be: they share a form. with which the picture touches reality.

that is. following Burton Dreben. must have in common with reality in order to be able to picture it at all -rightly or falsely -. at bottom.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition [McGinn (p.173 A picture presents its subject from the outside (its standpoint is its form of presentation).‖ She here inserts a footnote quoting Philosophical Grammar pp. [Ostrow (p. But that only means that I am here extending the concept of ‗having in common‘ and making it equivalent to the general concept of projection. that is. is projected onto reality. Otherwise the concept of pictorial form would seem to have been pointless – Wittgenstein could just have referred to logical form through39 . 2. it exhibits it.] 2.18 What every picture. 2.172 But a picture cannot picture its form of representation. even though they do not appear to be (see 4. suggests that the point of the notion of logical form is to ease us into the idea that written propositions are pictures of reality. whereby it represents a possible state of affairs whose internal structure is mirrored in the internal structure of the picture that represents it.‖] 2.174 But a picture cannot place itself outside its form of representation.011). which is why pictures present their subjects rightly or falsely. 162-3. the form of the reality. of whatever form. 2.172. 47). to say no more than that there is a rule of projection whereby the picture. [Cf. which is essentially structured. where Wittgenstein writes: ―what I said really boils down to this: that every projection must have something in common with what is projected no matter what is the method of projection. 93): ―To say that there is agreement in form between a picture and reality is.is the logical form.1513 and 2.

[Cf.] 2. 2.171.19 A logical picture can depict the world. then the picture is called a logical picture. 144145) that 2.] 40 . 2. A picture of a traffic accident.18. 2. different amounts of cash in each person‘s pockets.181 implies that it makes sense to speak of cases in which the pictorial form is the logical form.] 2. would have to be able to represent different amounts of gas in each vehicle.181 If the form of representation is the logical form.out. on the grounds that the nature of the generalization in question would be unclear.2 A picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures. means that ―in every picture the combinatorial possibilities of its elements must match the combinatorial possibilities of the corresponding objects. [Cf. On the same page.182 Every picture is also a logical picture. and (see note 2 on pp. together with 2.‖ which in turn means that it is very difficult to think of examples of pictures.) [Schroeder (p. for instance. Ostrow rejects Friedlander‘s suggestion that logical form is more general and additional to the pictorial form. (On the other hand. It is hard to see how anything could be a picture in this sense without being a complete recreation of what is pictured.] 2. and so on. for instance. 58) says that this.17. not every picture is a spatial one. whereas Friedlander treats them as corresponding to very different dimensions of the picture.

with Russell‘s view in the Principles. 2. 2.22 A picture presents what it presents.224 From the picture alone nothing can be known about whether it is true or false. 2. [Hacker thinks this ―bipolarity principle‖ is both rooted in an intuition (and hence rather indefensible) and hugely important.21 A picture either agrees with reality or does not. according to which truth and falsity are indefinable properties belonging to propositions. 41 . p. 59-60. note 157). 59).221 What a picture presents is its sense. McManus argues against this view on p. 2. independently of its truth or falsehood. by its form of representation. the latter being complexes which he found it difficult to define (see ―The Nature of Truth‖ (from 1905) in Russell‘s Collected Papers Volume IV. true or false.] 2. 503.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 2. it is correct or incorrect.203 A picture contains the possibility of the state of things that it presents. 2.223 In order to know whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.] 2. 59. [This contrasts.222 Its truth or falsehood consists in the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality. quoted in Proops on pp. says Proops (p.201 A picture pictures reality by presenting a possibility of the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. 2.202 A picture presents a possible state of things in logical space.

323. note 24) cites the first sentence of this remark as an example (others are in 3.02 A thought contains the possibility of the state of things that it thinks. because we would then have to think illogically.031 It used to be said that God could create everything. only nothing that would be contrary to the laws of logic.225 An a priori true picture does not exist. 3. since ―imagine‖ comes from ―image.‖] 3. 24) that there is meant to be a kind of pun here.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.2. – We could not say of an ―illogical‖ world how it would look. 3 A logical picture of facts is a thought. What is thinkable is also possible.] 3. 5.03 We cannot think anything illogical.02) of straightforwardly empirical claims that could not possibly be interpreted as nonsensical (as 6. which is why he uses ―imagine‖ for the English translation.] 3. p. [Wittgenstein says (Letters to Ogden. 4.003.032 One can no more in language present ―the logically contradictory‖ than one can in geometry present through its 42 . and 5.001 ―A state of affairs is thinkable‖ means: we can imagine it [literally: we can make [for] ourselves a picture of it].4731. 4. 3. 59. [Cf. even if they are false.54 might seem to suggest they be).002. [McManus (p. 3.

or give the coordinates of a point that does not exist.05 We could only know a priori that a thought were true if its truth could be known from the thought itself (without any object of comparison).1 In a sentence a thought is expressed perceptibly. etc.‖] 3. [Ogden‘s ―through the senses‖ is surely wrong.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition coordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space. in itself imperceptible by the senses. [Cf. but not one that went against the laws of geometry.‖ Cf.11 We use the physically perceptible token (audible or written.‖ Black (p. 3. 328 in Beaney): ―The thought. gets clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence. 2.04 An a priori correct thought would be one such that its possibility implied its truth.‖ Pears and McGuinness have ―an expression that can be perceived by the senses. 3.202.) of the proposition as a projection of a possible state of things. [Anscombe says (p.0321 We could well present spatially a state of affairs that went against the laws of physics. which may be explained thus: ‗The drawing of straight 43 . 69.] 3. note 1) that ―Wittgenstein‘s use of ‗projection‘ is a metaphorical extension of the mathematical use. 3. 99) notes that this is ―somewhat laboured. We say a sentence expresses a thought. and thereby we are enabled to grasp it. Frege ―Thought‖ (p.‖ and suggests ―In a sentence the thought expresses itself perceptibly. The method of projection is the thinking of the proposition‘s sense. unless it means ―through the senses and into the mind.

given his account of judgement statements and his comments on the metaphysical subject. but mistaken‖ (p. pp. puts the meaning of the passage thus: ―Thinking the sense into the proposition is nothing other than so using the words of the sentence that their logical behaviour is that of the desired proposition.1121 (although that passage is ambiguous). Given Wittgenstein‘s comments on use.lines through every point of a given figure. and that how thinking would give meaning to words is mysterious. who nonetheless supports a mentalistic reading of the Tractatus. And the rule is the law of projection…‘ (T 4. Winch points to the ambiguity of the German ‗Die Projektionsmethode ist das Denken des Satz-Sinnes‘. 2000. or as explaining what thinking the sense of the proposition is. K. 3-18. McGuinness. refers to Peter Winch‘s rejection of the mentalistic reading as ―ingenious. Thought and World in Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus‖ in Winch. I think that we have a strong case for reading proposition 3.0141).M.) Other problems with the ―mentalistic‘ reading of this passage are that Wittgenstein explicitly denies that psychology has any special connection to philosophy in 4. it leaves the me44 . so as to produce a new figure each point of which corresponds to a point of the original figure. 5: The mentalistic misreading of the Tractatus relies heavily on proposition 3. 69-70. pp. 119135.11 of the Tractatus: ‗The method of projection is the thinking of the sense of the proposition‘ (T 3.11). Thinking and Meaning in the Tractatus.11 of the Tractatus according to its latter interpretation. 1–23.‖ P. but without specifying what this method is. On this see Schroeder (p.‖ Philosophical Investigations 22 (2). pp. p.S Hacker (1999) ―Naming. given his comment that ‗there is a general rule by which the musician is able to read the symphony out of the score…. namely the method of projection. The German can be understood either as explaining what the method of projection is.‘‖ N. 128). 61 especially). namely thinking the sense of the proposition. This is for three reasons: it is a forced reading of the German. Verbin ―Religious Beliefs and Aspect Seeing‖ Religious Studies 36. (For Winch‘s view see ―Language. pp.

she sees Wittgenstein‘s idea thus (pp. Instead.12 and 3. The mentalist thesis is supported also.‖ Diamond notes also that Winch takes the very passage from the Prototractatus that Hacker cites to support his. p. and it fails to take into account Prototractatus 3. 2006. 45 . What those constituents are I don't know. . as on Malcolm‘s view.‖ See Cora Diamond ―Peter Winch on the Tractatus and the unity of Wittgenstein‘s philosophy. are thoughts. which identify the method of projection with the manner of applying the propositional sign. . . Does a Gedanke consist of words? No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. and applying the propositional sign as thinking its sense. Against mentalists such as Hacker and Norman Malcolm.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition thod of projection unexplained. Cambridge Letters. It would be a matter of psychology to find it out. according to its proponents. 155-156): ―we make pictures.13.11. I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. . The letter would appear to rule out any view like Malcolm‘s. . ontos verlag. the elements of those thoughts would not have the same relation to reality as do words.‖ in Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works edited by Alois Pichler and Simo Säätelä. pp. On p. interpretation of Tractatus 3. these representations.11 and Hacker‘s view that thinking a sense is something one does in one‘s mind. opposite. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. 148 she writes: ―If the meaningfulness of sentences were mediated by intrinsically meaningful thoughts. 141-171. by the following passage from a letter written by Wittgenstein to Russell (Wittgenstein. Cora Diamond has noted Wittgenstein‘s writing in this letter that the constituents of a thought (or Gedanke) ―have the same sort of relation to reality as words. 125. Frankfurt am Main. She rejects both Winch‘s view that the notion of a method of projection is not being explained in 3. in that they are in logical space. using methods of depiction in space.): . these pictures.

60)] 3. it is the propositional sign plus something else that makes it meaningful: namely. (―The content of a sentence‖ means the content of a significant [meaningful. but not what is projected. The logical notion of depiction then explains (in PT 3. A proposition is not an entity distinct from the propositional sign: rather. but not its content.13) what Wittgenstein means by the application of the propositional sign: it is used as a picture.] 3.12 and 3. which itself is a basically projective notion: to use a perceptible sign as a picture is to use it as a projection of a possible situation. but the possibility of expressing it is.‖ (p. or meaning. [Schroeder explains Wittgenstein‘s distinction here thus: ―A propositional sign is a declarative sentence. And a proposition is a propositional token in its projective relation to the world. but not it itself. Thus the possibility of what is projected belongs to it. and thereby as a projection.02.In that they are thoughts. In that they are pictures in a space. sinnvollen] sentence.12 I call the token through which we express a thought a propositional token. they think this or that sense. a mental act of thinking.) The form of its sense is contained in a sentence. 46 . and which Diamond treats Hacker as having neglected. which sounds odd.13 To a sentence belongs all that belongs to the projection. they think this or that situation. comes from 3. The sort of projection involved in our use of propositions is thus tied to the notion of picturing. Its sense is therefore not yet contained in a sentence.‖ The idea of a thought thinking. the possibility of the representing picture in the space has internal to it the possibility of the represented situation in that space.

1431 – are far from helpful.‖] 47 . [See 2.. In fact.142 Only facts can express a sense. no essential difference appears between a propositional token and a word. – (In the same way that a musical theme is not [just] a mixture of notes.143 and 3. (This is how it was possible for Frege to call a sentence a complex name. people might not take the propositional sign to be the complex object whose parts were those bits of furniture. e.] 3. There is no mode of expression that would obviate the potential confusion between viewing the propositional sign as a complex object and viewing it as a fact. p. not a mixture. 24) that the main point is that a proposition is a structure. A propositional token is a fact. the thought is a bad one. the words. 3.g.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 3.) [White (p.143 The usual form of expression in writing or printing disguises a propositional token‘s being a fact. a set of names cannot.141 A proposition is not a mixture of words. 53): ―The next two paragraphs – 3. relating to each other in a definite way. although one can see what led Wittgenstein to say what he says here.) A proposition is articulated. There is no good reason to suppose that if we used bits of furniture to form propositional signs. Because in a printed sentence. [Wittgenstein says (Letters to Ogden.14 A propositional token consists in its elements.] 3.

) Fahrnkopf discusses a nominalistic interpretation of this passage and a realistic one. Thus relations are not real. books) instead of written signs. and this latter passage is concerned only to make the point that a propositional sign is a fact. and whatever 'aRb' tells us might just as well be expressed by.1432 is a comment on 3.143. the relation between a proposition and its sense is an internal one. On p.g. Copi's and Anscombe's) take the key point to be that 'R' would have no place in an ideal symbolism. on pp.3. we could say ―Not: ‗The complex sign ‗the painting hangs on the wall‘ says that the painting stands in the relation of hanging to the wall‘ but rather: That the painting stands in the relation of hanging to the wall says that the painting is hanging on the wall.‖ Mounce (p. 25): ―In other words. 29 Fahrnkopf writes: "according to Wittgenstein's decimal notation. Nominalist readings (e. then. The reciprocal spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition. some entity over and above it. not a name. 3.1431 The essence of a propositional token becomes very clear if we think of it as made up of spatial objects (such as tables.‖ (If you understand ―The painting hangs on the wall‖ then it does you no good at all to be told the longer version that is the alleged meaning of this complex sign. [Mounce says. whether in the empirical or some quasi-empirical world. On my interpretation.1432 is only to contrast symbolizing facts with names. this is also the context of the remark in the "Notes on Logic" which corresponds to 3. 3. Thus. it is not to be found in something that corresponds to that arrangement. and the nominalist tone of this passage--which could have been avoided altogether had Wittgenstein specified that the relation 48 . chairs. say. that it might help to substitute some actual relation for aRb.1432 Not: ―The complex sign ‗aRb‘ says that a stands in relation R to b‖ but rather: That ―a‖ stands in a certain relation to ―b‖ says that aRb. 24-25.1432. 'ab' or 'ba'. the purpose of 3. The sense of a proposition is to be found in an arrangement of physical signs.

3. but not name them. (Names are like points. 108) says that. (―A‖ is the same sign as ―A‖.201 I call these elements ―simple signs‖ and the proposition ―completely analyzed.‖] 3. 3. 55): ―Both the German word Sinn and the English equivalent ‗sense‘ can also mean direction (as in ‗sense of rotation‘).3.) [Schroeder (p. 3.2 In propositions thoughts can be so expressed that the objects of the thought match the elements of the propositional token.] 3. The object is its meaning.‘] 3. 35) that in the Notebooks Wittgenstein wrote on 16/6/15 that relations and properties are objects.144 One can describe states of things.‖ [Black (p. since we have no way to know when we have reached a complete analysis. this remark does not usefully define ‗simple sign.) [See PI § 39 and 40. Cf. having sense.202 The simple signs used in a proposition are called names. are like arrows." Fahrnkopf also points out (p. whereas propositions.203 A name means an object.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition in which 'a' stands to 'b' consist in their respective relations to 'R'--is in any case minimized by the realization that the status of 'R' as a name is implied in many other contexts in the Tractatus.] 49 .

v. March 1985. 6): Many commentators have been puzzled by Frege‘s doctrine that concepts must have sharp boundaries. will. 50 . See also Notebooks p. See Basic Laws of Arithmetic 1903. This doctrine is. be not nonsensical [unsinnig] but simply false. Bearn discusses this on pp. 3. refutes the existence of a concept that lacks sharp boundaries. and the Logocentric Predicament‖ (Nous Vol. 1. 51-53. Either Fx or not Fx. the Tractatus. 3-15. §56 and §62. [This connects with Frege. pp.] 3.21 The configuration of the simple signs in a propositional token corresponds to the configuration of objects in a state of things. A proposition. 3. not what it is.24 A proposition that deals with a complex stands in an internal relation to a proposition that deals with a component of the complex. Thomas Ricketts ―Frege. 62. in which there is mention of a complex. that a concept is determinately true or false of each object.23 The requirement of the possibility of simple signs is the requirement of the definiteness of sense. A complex can only be given through its description.22 In a proposition a name stands for an object. I can only speak of them. the logical law. Signs stand for them. and this will match it or not match it.221 I can merely name objects. an immediate consequence of Frege‘s views of first-level variables as unrestricted over objects. 19. I cannot express them. however. 3. 2. if this complex does not exist. A proposition can only say how a thing is. p. No.3. As Frege understands it.

) The abbreviation of the symbol of a complex in the form of a simple symbol can be expressed by a definition. Two signs. (Nor any sign that has meaning on its own.123 for the meaning of ‗internal. one primitive and one defined by primitive signs.‖ White suggests reading Notebooks pp. One cannot analyze names through definitions.‘ See 4. [See 4. 3. (The notation for generality indeed contains a prototype. cannot signify in the same way.241 for the meaning of ‗definition.‖ Determinacy.‘ White (p. means specificity.26 A name cannot be analyzed further by a definition: it is a primitive sign. White says.25 There is one and only one complete analysis of a proposition.] 3. or why he is demanding it. ―without necessarily maintaining that Wittgenstein would subscribe to the detail of what he was saying in these notes.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition One can see that a propositional element signifies a complex by a vagueness in the propositions in which it occurs. with considerable unclarity as to what Wittgenstein meant by ‗determinacy of sense‘. We know by this proposition that something is not yet definite [determinate].251 A proposition expresses what it expresses in a definite. and the definitions show [weisen] the way. 3. 3. independently. 59-71 to shed light on what is going on here. even though language can be.24 is extraordinarily compressed.261 Every defined sign signifies via the signs through which it can be defined. The world cannot be indefinite.) 51 . clearly specifiable way: a proposition is articulated. 21): ―Proposition 3.

The application of a sign is here linked with its meaning.‖ in D. What signs slur over.‖ To teach someone the meaning of a name we must use the name in sample sentences. p. 61) suggests that ‗Erläuterungen‘ be translated as ―illustrative examples. The former applies only to meaningful propositions. Elucidations [Erläuterungen] are propositions which contain primitive signs. note 49). S. [James Conant argues that the distinction between zeigen and erläutern is important (see James Conant ―What ‗Ethics‘ in the Tractatus is Not. which is something that can only be done by grasping the meaning of the name.[The ―Nor any‖ in the last sentence is Wittgenstein‘s translation. See Letters to Ogden p. 2005. 59. [White (p. I use ‗show‘ only for zeigen.‖ P.263 The meanings of primitive signs can be explained through elucidations. §2 of Schopenhauer‘s Fourfold Root (p. They can thus only be understood if one is already acquainted with the meanings of these signs.] 3. 36. 2) he talks of the different applications of the principle of sufficient reason and says that the principle acquires a different meaning in each such application. their application speaks out. since merely pointing to the object does not define how the name is to be applied. ―We must then leave it to chance whether the other catches on to the meanings of those sentences. 39-88.] 3. In Chapter 1. not for erläutern. pp. McManus also mentions this issue in footnote 8. M. i. p.262 A sign‘s application shows [zeigt] whatever is not expressed in the sign itself. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr (eds) Religion and Wittgenstein’s Legacy Ashgate. Hacker argues that Tractarian elucidations (Erläuterungen) are confusedly meant to be both ostensive 52 . Z. 82.e. while the second can apply to nonsense.

as Wittgenstein indicates elsewhere. Vol. 1975. But (see Anscombe p. Cf.‖ Names and only names are primitive signs. 3. along with 3. 336. but they must exist.‖ Mind. An expression marks a form and a content.221. It is the common characteristic feature of a class of propositions. (The proposition itself is an expression. 84.‖] 3.] 3. 601-609). 95: ―It is like a word of two meanings. Anscombe concludes that elementary propositions are not simple observation statements. 2. pp.31 Every part of a proposition that characterizes its sense I call an expression (a symbol). only in the context of a proposition does a name have meaning. are not primitive signs.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition definitions and true assertions about the world (see his ―Frege and Wittgenstein on Elucidations. See. 5. 27) what elucidates a name need not be an elementary proposition. 2. 3.3751 it follows directly that ―This is a red patch‖ cannot be an elementary proposition.021. for instance. provides the best evidence for thinking that the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are simple observation statements. Schopenhauer Fourfold Root p.0211. [Wittgenstein here echoes Frege in Foundations § 62.311 An expression presupposes the forms of all propositions in which it can occur. What they are he cannot say.3 Only a proposition has sense. and 4.5562.261. No. 26) suggests that this passage. Anscombe (p. 53 . and that this explains why Wittgenstein did not refer to observation in connection with them. Oct.) The expression is all that is essential for the sense of a proposition that propositions can have in common with each other. And from 6.23. only from the context can we infer what is meant. Logical signs. such as ―This is a red patch.

3. he thinks of logical form as being a kind of formalization of the rules of language and these arise out of its use.315 If we convert a component of a proposition into a variable. but only on the nature of the proposition. 30): ―In the Tractatus. mean by the parts of that proposition. This class still depends in general on what we.) 3. they do not underlie and guarantee its intelligibility. logical form is something which. But if we convert into variables all those signs whose meaning is arbitrarily determined then a class like this will still always remain. then there is a class of propositions which are all the values of the resulting variable proposition. however. (Even a variable name. as it were. [Mounce (p. In the Investigations.312 It is thus presented by way of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes. underlies the rules of language and guarantees its intelligible usage. Moreover in this form the expression is constant and everything else is variable.‖] 54 . 3. by arbitrary agreement. the expression a proposition. This however is now dependent on no agreement. It corresponds to a logical form – a logical prototype.313 An expression is thus presented by way of a variable whose values are the propositions that contain the expression. is the view that meaning is not some special entity or psychological process.‖ 3. Common to both works. Every variable can be taken as a propositional variable.314 An expression has meaning only in a proposition. (In the limiting case the variables become constants.) I call such a variable a ―propositional variable.

not 3.317. I take a proposition to be a function of the expressions contained in it.501.‖ whereas in ―102‖ it means ―-and 2. The fixing of the values is the variable. 128) says the procedure referred to is that described in 3.‖ Cf.11.) in common with one another – they signify then in different ways.317 Fixing the values of a propositional variable is specifying the propositions whose common characteristic the variable is.321 Two different symbols can thus have the same sign (written or audible etc.316 What values a propositional variable may accept is fixed. The fixing will therefore deal only with symbols. [So ―2‖ would be the sign. 55 .‖ Frege did not regard a proposition as a function. 3.315.] 3. 5.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 3.32 A sign is what is sensibly perceptible of a symbol. In ―23‖ the sign ―2‖ means ―twenty-. 3. And the only thing essential to the fixing is that it is only a description of symbols and tells nothing of the symbolized.318 Like Frege and Russell. The fixing is a description of these propositions. [Schroeder (p. and Russell distinguished between a proposition and a propositional function. Black (p. [Cf. How the description of the propositions occurs is unessential.] 3. not with their meaning. 71) says that what Wittgenstein writes here is ―quite inaccurate.] 3. but it would be a different symbol in first 23 and then 102.

as the sign of equality. Because the sign is indeed arbitrary. we must use a symbolism that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using signs that signify in different 56 . It is a disgrace to the human race that it has chosen to employ the same word ―is‖ for these two entirely different ideas—a disgrace which a symbolic logical language of course remedies‖ (p.325 In order to avoid such errors.322 A common characteristic of two objects can never be indicated by our symbolizing them with the same signs. that signify in different ways. or for two words. to be applied in a proposition in ways that are the same externally. the is of ―Socrates is a man‖ expresses identity. ―to exist‖ as an intransitive verb like ―to go‖. 3.) [Russell in Logical Atomism: ―The is of ―Socrates is human‖ expresses the relation of subject and predicate. Thus the word ―is‖ appears as the copula.323 In colloquial language it is common for the same word to signify in different ways – and thus belong to different symbols --.] 3. See also PI §558 and §561. 172). and as the expression for existence. One could thus also choose two different signs and where would then be what was common in the symbolization? 3.324 Thus the most fundamental confusions (of which the whole of philosophy is full) easily arise. we speak about something [an object]. ―identical‖ as an adjective. (In the proposition ―Green is green‖ – where the first word is a person‘s name and the last is an adjective – these words do not simply have different meanings but they are different symbols. but also about something happening [an event].3. but by two different ways of symbolizing.

328 If a sign is not used then it is meaningless. (The concept-script of Frege and Russell is one such language. In Letters to Ogden.5563. I. to know the symbol.‘] 3. 134) points out that the true meaning is ‗not used.326 In order to recognize the symbol in the sign one must look to the meaningful [sinnvollen] use. 5. (If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning. only the description of the expressions being presupposed. A symbolism then that obeys logical grammar – logical syntax. 57 . Black (p. 3.327 A sign determines a logical form only together with its logico-syntactical use. p.‖] 3.] 3.) [Cf. it seems. it must be able to be established without anything thereby being said of the meaning of a sign. or ‗sensical‘) use is. 59. though admittedly it does not yet exclude all errors. [To know the (meaningful. we must observe how the sign is used in accordance with the laws of logical syntax.33 In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role.e. Thus ―significant‖ here means as much as ―syntactically correct‖. That is the point [Sinn] of Occam‘s razor.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition ways in what appears to be the same way.) [Ogden has ‗not necessary‘ and Pears and McGuinness have ‗useless‘ for nicht gebraucht. Wittgenstein writes: ―The meaning of this prop[osition] is: that in order to recognize the symbol in a sign we must look at how this sign is used significantly in propositions. significant. then it has meaning.

looking over the whole thing (but at it. 137). p. while Pears and McGuinness have ‗turn to‘ and Ogden has ‗get a further view – into Russell‘s …‘ ‗Hinüber‘ means ‗over‘ and ‗in‘ means ‗in. getting insight. 135). rather than (per impossibile) stating what the difference between the symbols is (for instance.[McManus calls this and the following remark about Russell obscure. as Black suggests. So talk of functions of functions is not like talk of 58 . P. confused. while individuals are objects. helps explain‖ this obscure criticism of Russell. then the sentences in which they are treated this way will be devoid of meaning. following Wittgenstein. Propositional functions are symbols. and if they are treated as being real objects. On p. Ramsey. or that it is not. But the need of some doctrine of types is less doubtful than the precise form the doctrine should take‖ (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p. but also getting an overview.. ―The supposition that a class is. a member of itself is meaningless in just this way‖ (ibid. [Black (p. whose names have real signification.‘ so we are seeing into Russell‘s theory. Russell himself was not completely happy with it: ―Now the theory of types emphatically does not belong to the finished and certain part of our subject: much of this theory is till inchoate. F.] 3. by discussing the different kinds of things to which they refer). 77 he writes: ―That we should simply strive to make more apparent the difference between different symbols. not to something on the other side). objects to this theory. Classes are logical fictions. 146) suggests ‗get a comprehensive view of‘ for sehen wir in Russell’s ‘Theory of Types’ hinüber. The theory of types is explained in the introduction.331 From this remark we get a comprehensive view of Russell‘s ―Theory of types‖: Russell‘s error is shown by his having to speak of the meaning of a sign when putting together his rules for signs. and obscure.

But the range of arguments to a function of functions is a range of symbols. And this range of symbols. all symbols which become propositions by inserting in them the name of an individual. referring to itself. In short. if anything is to count as nonsense in the grammar that is to be justified.‖] 3. 55: ―Grammatical conventions cannot be justified by describing what is represented.). That is to say. but depends on our methods of constructing them and requires more precise definition‖ (Ramsey ―Predicative Functions and the Axiom of Reducibility‖ in Klemke. 3. 9) says that Wittgenstein explained his objection to Russell more clearly in Philosophical Remarks p. a theory of types is entirely unnecessary. because a functional sign already contains the prototype of its argument and it cannot contain itself. 358. But then it will be evident that one cannot construct a proposition which refers to itself. but different propositions. 56) puts Wittgenstein‘s objection to Russell‘s theory of types this way: ―one cannot in a correct symbolism construct a proposition which refers to itself without making it evident that the contained proposition has a different function from the proposition which contains it.‖ White (p. pp. given such a misguided attempt. it will be evident that what one has is not one proposition. because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (this is the whole ―Theory of types‖). ―For the range of values of a function of individuals is definitely fixed by the range of individuals. Mounce (p.332 No proposition can express something about itself. originally in Chapter 1 pp. Any such description already presupposes the grammatical rules. For. p. 59 . then it cannot at the same time pass for sense in the grammar of the propositions that justify it (etc. is not objectively fixed. 355-368. actual or possible. an objective totality which there is no [getting?] away from. 32-49 of his The Foundations of Mathematics).333 A function can therefore not be its own argument.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition functions of individuals.

ψu = Fu‖. Ostrow believes. 67) compares this remark with 3.‖] 3. Thus Russell‘s Paradox is laid to rest. [Black (p. but that in itself signifies nothing. Only the letter ―F‖ is common to both functions.1432: ―Wittgenstein‘s aim is once more to bring out how our hold on a notion of logical form is parasitic on how we speak. [Winch (p.‖ Ostrow (p. which for all we‘ve said might mean anything or nothing. 9): ―It is important that Wittgenstein writes wie (―how‖) rather than was (―What‖). The appearance dissolves when we realize that our stipulation about the inner ‗F‘ is silent about the outer ‗F‘. and assume that by that stipulation ‗F(F(fx)‘ makes the paradoxical assertion that not applying to itself does not apply to itself. 149) says of this reference to Russell‘s paradox that Wittgenstein ―presumably [means] the variant concerning functions (rather than classes) that are not themselves included in the set of their own values. The what will already have been settled once the how is established. the outer the form ψ(φ(fx)).Let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument.334 The rules of logical syntax must be self-evident if one only knows how each one of the signs signifies. there would then therefore be a proposition: ―F(F(fx))‖ and in this the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meanings. This becomes clear immediately if instead of ―F(F(u))‖ we write ―( φ) : F(φu) . 183-184): ―The appearance of paradox arises when we assign to the inner function ‗F(fx)‘ the meaning that fx does not apply to itself. on what it makes sense to say.‖] 60 .‖ Russell‘s belief that a theory of types is needed suggests that he confusedly thinks something like the opposite of this. Sullivan (―The Totality of Facts‖ pp. because the inner has the form φ(fx).

The essential are those which alone enable the proposition to express its sense. Every right sign-language must allow of translation into every other by means of such rules: This is what they must all have in common. (This stems from the essence of the notation.342 In our notations there is indeed something arbitrary.341 The essential in a proposition is thus that which all propositions that can express the same sense have in common. And it is like this in philosophy generally: the particular proves unimportant time and again. And likewise in general the essential in a symbol is that which all symbols that can fulfill the same purpose have in common. 3. but this is not arbitrary: if we have determined something arbitrarily then something else must be the case. 3.) 3. 3. It would then follow that no composition at all is essential for a name. but the possibility of each particular gives us an insight into the essence of the world. but it is always important that this is a possible way of symbolizing.343 Definitions are rules for translation from one language into another.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 3.3411 Thus one could say: The actual name is that which all symbols that signify an object have in common. 3.34 A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. 61 . The accidental are those features that come from the particular way of producing the propositional sign.3421 A particular way of symbolizing may be unimportant. 3.344 That which signifies in a symbol is the common feature of all symbols that can take its place following the rules of logical syntax.

42 Although a proposition may determine only one place in logical space. at the same time the whole of logical space must already be given by it. without having any 62 . The proposition reaches through the whole logical space. would introduce ever new elements – in coordination. etc.g. 4 A thought is a meaningful proposition. 3. The existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the existence of the constituent parts alone.) (The logical scaffolding around a picture reaches through the whole logical space. 4.3442 The sign for a complex is not arbitrarily resolved by analysis in such a way that its resolution would be different in each sentence structure. (This shows [gekennzeichnet] the way that a specific possible notation can give us general insight.) 3. e. 3..3. logical product.g.411 Geometrical and logical place agree in that both are possibilities of existence.002 Man possesses the ability to construct languages. express the common feature of all notations for truth-functions thus: It is common to them that they all— e.3441 One can. 3.5 An applied. (Otherwise negation.4 A proposition determines a place in logical space. —can be replaced by the notation ―~p‖ (―not p‖) and ―p v q‖ (―p or q‖). propositional sign is a thought. by the existence of the meaningful proposition. 4.001 The totality of sentences is language. thought. 3. logical sum. whereby every sense can be expressed.) 3.41 The propositional sign and the logical coordinates: That is the logical place.

Indeed so much so that from the outer form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thoughts they clothe. The unspoken.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition inkling how and what each word means. then. Frege says his Begriffsschrift is a tool invented for ―certain scientific purposes‖ and that it ought not to be condemned ―because it is not suited to others. (They are of the same kind as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.‖ He makes no claim. It is humanly impossible to gather the logic of language immediately from it. Language disguises thought. 156 in Reck (ed. 205). p. [Russell on ordinary language (from Logical Atomism): ―It is exceedingly difficult to make this point clear as long as one adheres to ordinary language. silent agreements for understanding ordinary language are enormously complicated.003 Most sentences and questions that have been written about philosophical things are not false but rather nonsensical.] 4. 63 . a certain feeling that our primeval ancestors had.) From Frege to Wittgenstein. See Weiner. because the outer form of the clothes is made for a wholly different purpose than to let the form of the body be known. Most questions and propositions of philosophers are based on our not understanding the logic of our language. xi. because ordinary language is rooted in a certain feeling about logic. p. and as long as you keep to ordinary language you find it very difficult to get away from the bias which is imposed upon you by language‖ (p. that it is better than ordinary language for ordinary purposes. – As one speaks without knowing how the particular sounds are produced. Ordinary language is a part of the human organism and not less complicated than it. So we cannot answer questions of this kind at all. but only ascertain their nonsensicality.) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are really no problems. Weiner gives the reference to Frege as Begriffsschrift.

the True. A proposition is a model of reality as we think it is.) Russell‘s merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its true form. but standardly isn‘t.] 4. 25-27. [―Wirklichkeit‖ might equally be translated as truth here. never actually coinciding with nature. See Stokhof pp. as pretended Ideas. [Mauthner was skeptical about the ability of language to convey truth because.‖] 4. and points out that in Philosophical Grammar §211 Wittgenstein says he had something like this theory of Russell‘s in mind when he postulated a complete analysis in the Tractatus. like a thousand other abstracta of a similar kind. See Nordmann pp. 38) that Wittgenstein is thinking of Russell‘s theory of descriptions here. it only pictures reality.01 A proposition is a picture of reality. in that they are drawn from innumerable things and relations. For Mauthner. Schroeder writes (see p. especially with the sentimental and tenderhearted.‘] 64 . which he regards as dishonest.0031 All philosophy is ―critique of language. says in the Fourfold Root p. language is conventional and based on metaphor. 117121.[Schopenhauer. ―the Good. so it can never really grasp the real world. he thought. although they are simply three very wide and abstract concepts. Its meaning is very close to the English ‗actuality.‖ (Though not in Mauthner‘s sense. and the Beautiful‖ are much in favour. and are consequently very poor in substance. 169 that: ―Moreover. and empty. pretentious. in the midst of something of a rant about the state of German philosophy.

015. Ogden has ‗pictorial nature. [Black (p.‘ I use ‗imagery‘ because that is how Wittgenstein translated the same word in 4. nor our written signs for sounds (letters) to be a picture of our spoken language.012 It is obvious that we perceive a proposition of the form ―aRb‖ as a picture.‘ Pears and McGuinness have ‗pictorial character. But so too do written notes seem at first glance not to be a picture of music. above this.‖ So something odd is going on here. 163) says that the bit about pictures even in the ordinary sense ―can hardly be defended.‘ Frascolla (pp. According to Moore. [‗Pictoriality‘ is suggested by Black (p.‖ On the same page. 163) for Bildhaftigkeit.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 4. And yet these symbolisms prove to be pictures – even in the ordinary sense of the word – of what they present.013 And if we delve into the essence of this imagery then we see that it is not disturbed by apparent irregularities (like the use of ♯and ♭in musical notation). nevertheless. Wittgenstein said that he merely wished to stress a similarity between the grammar or use of ‗proposition‘ and that of ‗picture. only in another way. Because even these irregularities picture what they are meant to express. ―he still … thought it ―useful to say ‗A proposition is a picture or something like one‘‖ although … he was willing to admit that to call a proposition a ―picture‖ was misleading. 17-18) also notes the perplexing nature of what Wittgenstein writes here and in 4. 263 to the effect that Wittgenstein admitted that when he wrote the TLP he had not noticed that the word ‗pictures‘ was vague. that propositions are not pictures ―in any ordinary sense‖. 4.] 4. but that.] 65 .011 At first glance a sentence – as it exists printed on paper perhaps – seems not to be a picture of the reality with which it deals. Here the sign is obviously a likeness of the signified. he quotes Moore Papers p.012.

their two horses and their lilies. which literally means something more like Ogden‘s ‗logical structure. musical notation. are ―literally‖ one. 49) comments: ―The more artificial the technique of representation. 114. a musical thought. two horses. The fairytale in question appears to be the story ―Golden Children‖ by the brothers Grimm.‘ Since Wittgenstein contrasts structure and form. [This is all Wittgenstein‘s translation. ―two youths. And the rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of the musical score. and sound waves. 163) for logische Bau. herein lies the internal similarity between these things which at first sight seem to be entirely different. It is the rule of translation of this language into the language of the gramophone record. White (p.0141 In the fact that there is a general rule by which the musician is able to read the symphony out of the score. note 26. They are all in a certain sense one. and refers to logische Bau nowhere but here. 75.4. The logical form is common to all of them. in a fairy-tale sense. (As in the fairytale with the two youths.‖] 4. But 66 . Black argues that ‗form‘ is more appropriate than ‗structure‘ in this case. all stand to one another in that internal picturing relation that holds between language and world. and that there is a rule by which one could reconstruct the symphony from the line on a gramophone record and from this again – by means of the first rule – construct the score. See Letters to Ogden p. the more attenuated the idea of the picture having something in common with what it depicts seems to become: there seems to be little in common between the groove on the gramophone record and the symphony. and two lilies mirror each other and yet.) [‗Logical form‘ is suggested by Black (p. Nordmann says. See Nordmann p. note 47 and Hacker p. In this story. 26.014 A gramophone record.

02 should be read as following 4. 3.01. not 4.01 and some related remarks. White (p.‖ Cf. which depicts the facts it describes. Volume 39 Issue 1.01 here.] 4.] 4. of all the imagery of our language.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition no matter how attenuated. Wittgenstein is claiming that there is a minimal logical form that must be shared by the picture and what it depicts: they must possess the same ‗logical multiplicity‘. Egyptian Hieroglyphs. 17) says that the numbering system of the Tractatus means that 4.‘ He bases this claim on the fact that it does not make much sense otherwise.] 67 . So Wittgenstein has not made a mistake after all. let us consider hieroglyphic writing.016 In order to understand the essence of the proposition. [The clause ―of all the imagery of our language‖ is Wittgenstein‘s translation. The Philosophical Forum. Proops argues. without losing the essence of picturing. pp. [For clarification of the nature of hieroglyphic writing see Bjørn Jespersen and Chris Reintges "Tractarian Sätze. And from it came the alphabet.015 The possibility of all similes. [Proops (pp. when he says ‗this. 103-105) argues that Wittgenstein is in fact referring back to 4.] 4.02 refers to 4. Wittgenstein inserted other material without noticing that he needed to change the wording of 4.02 We see this from our understanding the sense of a proposition without its being explained to us. and in the Prototractatus 4. and the Very Idea of Script as Picture".11.016. rests on the logic of picturing. 1-19. Presumably.02.

4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: Because I am acquainted with the state of things it presents if I understand the proposition. And I understand the proposition without its sense having been explained to me. 4.022 A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows what is the case if it is true. And it says that this is the case. 4.023 Reality must be fixed by a proposition except for a yes or a no. Therefore it must describe reality completely. A proposition is a description of a state of affairs. As the description of an object goes by its external properties, so a proposition describes reality according to its internal properties. A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding and therefore one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features of reality if it is true. One can draw conclusions from a false proposition. 4.024 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. (One can therefore understand it without knowing whether it is true.) One understands it if one understands its constituent parts. 4.025 The translation of one language into another does not proceed by one‘s translating each sentence of one into a sentence of the other, but only by translating the constituent parts of sentences. (And the dictionary translates not only substantives but also verbs, adjectives, and conjunctions, etc.; and it treats them all the same way.) [Cf. PI §§1-23.]


Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition

4.026 The meanings of simple signs (words) must be explained to us for us to understand them. We make ourselves understood, though, with sentences. 4.027 It is of the essence of a sentence that it can communicate a new sense to us. 4.03 A sentence must communicate a new sense with old terms. A sentence communicates a state of things to us, so it must be essentially connected with the state of things. And the connection is just that it is its logical picture. A sentence says something only insofar as it is a picture. 4.031 In a sentence a state of things is as it were put together by way of a test. Instead of, This sentence has such and such a sense, one can say, This sentence presents such and such a state of things. [Nordmann (pp. 108-114) discusses various possible translations of this remark, and their various implications. It is ambiguous in the German, the first sentence allowing for the interpretation that a sentence puts together a situation experimentally, or as an experiment, or for the sake of experiment, or in order to be put to the test.]

4.0311 A name stands for a thing, another for another thing, and they are connected with each other, so the whole – like a tableau vivant – represents a state of affairs. 4.0312 The possibility of a proposition is based on the principle of the representation of objects by signs. My fundamental thought is that the ―logical constants‖ represent nothing. That the logic of facts does not allow of representation. [Mounce (p. 12) says of this ―fundamental idea‖ that: ―logic … reflects, on Wittgenstein‘s view, by showing not by

saying. This indeed is the central doctrine of the Tractatus. Logic differs from all the other sciences because the other sciences say something about the world whereas logic only shows something.‖ There is no representation, but there is reflection, in other words. J. Mark Lazenby The Early Wittgenstein on Religion, Continuum, 2006, p. 63: ―Wittgenstein‘s placement of his fundamental idea in a commentary of [sic] a commentary of a commentary on a ‗more important‘ proposition, is a literary device: an attempt to force the reader to think about the value of this idea in particular, and the value of philosophical truth in general.‖ Schroeder (pp. 85-86): ―It is not clear … why Wittgenstein should call this claim his ‗fundamental thought‘. After all, its import seems entirely negative. Perhaps it would have been more accurate to call it a ‗ground-clearing‘ thought. Rather than laying the foundation of Wittgenstein‘s own philosophy of logic, it disposes of alternative views held by Frege and Russell.‖ Hintikka (p. 19): ―The Tractatus is nothing more and nothing less than Russell‘s 1913 theory [as set out in Theory of Knowledge] sans logical forms as objects of acquaintance.‖ 4.0312 and 5.4 can be seen as evidence of this. This leaves Wittgenstein with a question as to what holds a proposition together if not logical forms conceived as objects of acquaintance? ―Wittgenstein‘s answer was: A proposition is held together, not by any additional ―tie‖ or ―glue‖ but by the forms of its constituents.‖ See 2.03.]

4.032 Only insofar as it is logically articulated is a proposition a picture of a state of things. (Even the proposition ―ambulo‖ is composite, because its stem with another ending, or its ending with another stem, gives another sense.) [―Ambulo‖ is Latin for ―I walk.‖]


04 In a proposition there must be exactly as many things to differentiate as there are in the state of things it presents. pp. Linda Wessels. there will be possible circumstances we will not be able to describe. the unsinnig. He offers us the analogy with presentations of grammar: pupils learning to master their mother tongue require an altogether different presentation of the rules of grammar than philologists do‖ (Janik p. perhaps multiplicity is too. 1993. If the multiplicity of the symbolic system is smaller than that of what it represents. sinnlos. the problem is more familiar -. (Compare Hertz‘s Mechanics on dynamic models. Cambridge University Press.‖ 71 . We can therefore form expressions whose syntactic appearance is like that of perfectly meaningful claims. it is relative to the audience. Alberto Coffa The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. but from them we are led to some form of chaos. In particular.) [J. ed. and perhaps including. Both must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity. ―Hertz proceeds from the view that even within science it is necessary to construct different representations of the same data depending upon whom you want to talk to. Alfred Nordmann ―Another New Wittgenstein: The Scientific and Engineering Background of the Tractatus. These confusions were roughly of the sort displayed by Russell's paradox: The language we use has a greater multiplicity than what it talks about. Good philosophy attempts to say what can be shown. based on confusions concerning language. 51). Wittgenstein) had consisted of attempts to say things that cannot be said. If the multiplicity is greater. bad philosophy attempts to say what cannot even be shown. the utter nonsense. If simplicity is relative. All of philosophy (up to. Most philosophy had been bad philosophy." Janik notes that Hertz treats simplicity as relative rather than absolute.it is called 'philosophy'. 156-157: "The motivation for the requirement that an appropriate symbolism have the same mulitiplicty as what it symbolizes is that the other two alternatives have evident drawbacks.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 4.

no.g. He finds that a certain high ideal of precision proves not only unnecessary but actually inappropriate. it would not suffice – we would not know what was being generalized. 10.041 Of course one cannot in turn picture this mathematical multiplicity itself. thought. the idealist explanation of seeing spatial relations by reference to ―spatial spectacles‖ is inadequate because it cannot explain the multiplicity of these relations. If one wants to attain a precise measurement of the length of a room. e. what is needed for a sharp delineation of truth-conditions is not an analysis in terms of material points or data points. 4. A)‖ – it would not suffice – we could not fix the identity of the variables. i. Should we want to indicate it by an affix ―α‖ – something like ―f(xα)‖ – it would still not suffice – we would not know the scope of the generality-sign. measurements in angstroms are less and not more precise than measurements in meters and centimeters. 72 . vol.0412 On the same grounds. One cannot get outside it to make a picture. fx‖. 377: In the Notebooks Wittgenstein struggles with the question of what is required to sharply delineate truth-conditions. one is far more likely to obtain a definite measurement and fixed value if one doesn‘t treat macroscopic objects on subatomic scales […]. that one distinguishes just as much in the proposition as one means to distinguish in the state of affairs. Similarly.] 4. because they do not have the necessary mathematical multiplicity. p.. All these ways of symbolizing do not suffice. but merely that sentence. what we express with ―(x) fx‖ by placing an affix before ―fx‖ – something like ―Gen. pp. 3. 4.. 356-384. Indeed. and state of affairs have the same multiplicity.0411 Should we want to express.F (A. Etc. Should we want to try it by the introduction of a mark in the argument place – something like ―(A.Perspectives on Science 2002. A).e.

2.062 Can‘t one make oneself understood with false propositions as one has till now with true ones? Just as long as one knows that they are meant to be false. [Cf. One could then say. etc. No! Because a proposition is true if things are as we say they are by means of it. then ―p‖ in the new sense is true and not false. he fails to make the relation between sense and truth and falsity perspicuous. [McGinn (p. in that it is a picture of reality.063: ―[Wittgenstein‘s] aim is to show that insofar as Frege holds that true and false propositions designate distinct but equivalent entities. the True and the False..05 Reality is compared with a sentence.‖ but adds that Wittgenstein might have been thinking of Meinong or Husserl rather than Kant. Wittgenstein believes that Frege fails to make it clear that each proposition with sense essentially has two poles—a true pole and a false pole—each of which excludes the other. 4. between signs and the signified. 491 saying that ―The categories of Kant are the coloured spectacles of the mind. 44) on 4. and things are as we mean.g.061-4. 73 .061 If one does not notice that a proposition has a sense independent of the facts.06 Only thus can a sentence be true or false.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition [The idealist sounds rather Kantian here. 177) quotes Russell‘s ―Philosophical Importance‖ p. that ―p‖ signifies in the true way what ―~p‖ signifies in the false way. In treating the Bedeutung of true sentences as an equivalent and distinct object from the Bedeutung of false sentences.‖] 4.] 4. and if by ―p‖ we mean ~p. Black (p. with the same rights. then one can easily believe that true and false are relations.223. e.] 4.

a negative one. so that the truth-value of the proposition can be thought of as a verb. In order though to be able to say whether a point be black or white. and mistakenly attribute to him a technical meaning of ‗assumption. I must first know when one calls a point black and when one calls it white. in order to be able to say ―p‖ is true (or false). I must have determined under which conditions I call ―p‖ true. 4. etc. 105-106) says that Wittgenstein‘s reference to ―the Fregean Annahme‖ (assumption) is really a reference to what Russell says about Frege in Principles of Mathematics Appendix A. to a proposition without sense however nothing whatsoever corresponds. meaning the checking of an imaginary box next 74 . to the fact that a point is white (not black). The point at which the simile breaks down now is this: we can indicate a point on the paper without knowing what white and black are.4.‘ Assumption in this sense means something like the assertion of a proposition as either true or false. but one and the same reality corresponds to them. the verb of a proposition is not ―is true‖ or ―is false‖—as Frege believed— but rather that which ―is true‖ must already contain the verb. If I indicate a point on the sheet (a Fregean truth-value) then this corresponds to the assumption that is proposed for judgment. The propositions ―p‖ and ―~p‖ have opposite senses. etc. because it signifies no thing (truthvalue) whose properties are called false or true. [Anscombe (note 1 on pp. Because it shows that the sign ―~‖ corresponds with nothing in reality.0621 But it is important that the signs ―p‖ and ―~p‖ can say the same thing. and thus I determine the sense of the proposition. She argues that Russell and Wittgenstein get Frege (in ―Function and Concept‖) wrong. That negation occurs in a proposition is still no characteristic [or sign: Merkmal] of its sense (~~p = p).063 A picture toward the explanation of the concept of truth: a black spot on white paper. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive fact. one can describe the form of the spot in that one can answer for each point on the sheet whether it is white or black. §477.

but it is just a reference to truth-conditions. ready to be asserted as a proposition. The emphasis is on logic. Proops (p. the horizontal stroke merely marking a potentially assertable proposition. 56): ―The Annahme is treated as the notational embodiment of the ―showing‖ aspect of the proposition (picking out a situation while saying nothing about it). an actual proposition rather than mere content. We might then wonder what needs to be added to it to make it an assertion. Proops (pp. not epistemology. But this content must already have sense. but he never said this of ―is false‖ and he rejected this earlier view of his in ―Sense and Reference. I cannot even consider asserting something unless it is already a proposition. 40-42 he gives reasons for rejecting Anscombe‘s account of what ―verb‖ means for Wittgenstein/Frege here. Proops (p. 41. 152-153 notes that Wittgenstein‘s talk of determining the conditions under which I call a proposition true sounds like verificationism to some people.‖ Anscombe notes that Frege did say that the verb of the proposition is ―is true‖ in the Begriffsschrift. See comment on 4. as it were. 37-38) with a yardstick: ―Could we not ask: What has to be added to that yardstick in order for it to assert something about the length of the object? (The yardstick without this addition would be the ‗assumption‘ [Annahme]. as if in readiness for objects one yard long (Proops assumes. as Frege explains elsewhere. when in fact.‖ Anscombe pp.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition to ―is true‖ or ―is false. it is the vertical stroke (the judgment stroke) that does this. pp. but does not actually say of its own accord that this or that object is one yard long. 50-57) notes that Wittgenstein links talk of the ‗assumption‘ in his Notebooks (January 11th 1915. an unasserted proposition marked only by a horizontal stroke stands. On pp. but does not assert itself. Similarly. while the assertion sign is treated as embodying the proposition‘s ―truth-claiming‖ or 75 . that it has no finer gradations marked).)‖ A yardstick marks a certain length. what Wittgenstein appears to be calling an assumption. note 122) points to Begriffsschrift § 2 as a likely source of Wittgenstein‘s belief that Frege‘s assertion sign (|-) marks something as an assertion. for the sake of argument.442 for Proops on this.

that the proposition designates the True that we achieve something with the essential bipolarity of a proposition.―saying‖ aspect (saying of the possible situation thus picked out that it actually obtains).‖] 4. The problem for him is that he thinks that when one makes a judgment. Having a sense means being true or false.‖ McGinn (p. one ―advances from a thought to a truth-value‖ (see Beaney p. 57): ―In the end. This is what Wittgenstein means when he says that Frege believes the verb of a proposition is ―is true‖ or ―is false‖: it is only when we assert. because the sense is the very thing asserted. assertion cannot give it one.022 on saying and showing. but as the denial of a crucial presupposition of the coherence of the notion of logical assertion. since Frege would agree with it. Anscombe says (and she argues that Wittgenstein agrees).‖ (See 4. then. is wrong. but it is only by placing the name of a truth-value in the context of a judgement stroke that we move from naming an object to expressing something with the bipolarity which Wittgenstein takes to be the defining feature of sense. 58-59) says that this is an attack on Frege. He makes it seem as though it is merely contingent if we construct a proposition with sense and find that it has a truth-value. And the same goes for negation. 159). the thought that a proposition cannot assert its own truth is best seen not as a direct criticism of any view that Frege or Russell actually hold. I have wanted to suggest that Wittgenstein‘s critique of the assertion sign is best seen as part of an attack on the coherence of such a conception of the proposition. but a potentially confusing one. she says. Frege. by means of the judgement stroke. so there cannot be propositions that have a sense but are neither true nor false.064 Every proposition must already have a sense. 50): ―The judgement stroke is not itself a function. Wittgenstein. is attacking this idea. [Anscombe (pp.] 76 . etc.) Proops (p.

112 The end of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. but not standing alongside the natural sciences.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences). he will invariably try to resemble not a turbid. [Schopenhauer Fourfold Root p. That one can again negate the negated proposition shows already that what is negated is already a proposition and not merely the preliminary to a proposition.0641 One could say: The negation is related already to the logical place that the negated proposition determines/defines. 185-186) criticizes this remark for being incompatible with the more sophisticated 6. Philosophy should make clear and distinct thoughts that. The result of philosophy is not ―philosophical propositions‖ but the clarification of propositions. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.) 4. 4: ―In general the real philosopher will always look for clearness and distinctness.] 4. are. the depth revealing itself precisely through the clearness. 4.1 A proposition presents the existence and nonexistence of states of affairs. without it. as it were. The negating proposition determines a logical place with help from the logical place of the negated proposition.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The negating proposition determines another logical place than does the proposition negated.‖ 77 . [Black (pp. but rather a Swiss lake which by its calm combines great depth with great clearness. impetuous torrent.341. in that it describes it as lying outside this place. (The word ―philosophy‖ must refer to something either over or under. 4. Philosophy is not a subject but an activity. unclear and indistinct.

‖ 78 . a genuine thought as opposed to a random succession of images.James Conant and Cora Diamond. 46: ―Wittgenstein gives voice to an aspiration that is central to his later philosophy. Routledge. 2004. is the logical structure into which the mark enters. but consists rather in the practice of an activity – an activity he goes on to characterize as one of elucidation or clarification – an activity which he says does not result in philosophische Sätze. which philosophers held so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only they got entangled mostly in inessential psychological investigations and there is an analogous danger for my method. 32): ―Psychology is irrelevant to philosophy or logic because it is not a psychological process that gives sense to logical form. To say that early Wittgenstein aspired to such a conception of philosophy is not to gainsay that to aspire to practice philosophy in such a manner and to succeed in doing so are not the same thing. Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.‖] 4.‖ pp. in our attaining clarity in our relation to the sentences of our language that we call upon to express our thoughts. well before he becomes later Wittgenstein. but rather in das Klarwerden von Sätzem. Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought-processes. in propositions of philosophy. on the contrary. in their ―On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely. that can make it. 46-99 in Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss (eds. p.112 of the Tractatus that philosophy is not a matter of putting forward a doctrine or a theory. for example. what makes it a genuine correlation.1121 Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than is any other natural science. it is only logical form that can give sense to a psychological process. Thus the psychological activity involved in correlating a mark with an object is in itself entirely meaningless.) Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance. What gives it a meaning. [Mounce (p. when he writes in §4.

4. § 59 of Prolegomena. by way of the thinkable. outside logic. 86) as people who seem to have fallen into the danger identified here by Wittgenstein. along with propositions. but it cannot present that which it must have in common with reality in order to present it—logical form. 4.115 It will refer to the unsayable in that it presents clearly the sayable. In order to present logical form. 79 .113 Philosophy limits the disputable territory of natural science.116 Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly.12 The proposition can present the whole of reality.g. [Echoes here of Kant‘s talk of limiting reason in.] 4.1122 Darwinian theory has no more to do with philosophy than has any other hypothesis of natural science. therefore. that is to say outside the world. At B xxx of the Critique of Pure Reason he says that he has had to suspend knowledge in order to make room for faith (Ich musste also das Wissen aufheben. It should limit the unthinkable from inside. we would have to be able to put ourselves. 82-86) identifies ―Carnap and his school‖ (p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Anscombe (pp. 4.114 It should delimit the thinkable and therewith the unthinkable. whether Wittgenstein is implying that he limits the thinkable in order to make room for some faith in the ineffable. e. um zu Glauben Platz zu bekommen) and the references in Prolegomena to the limits of reason relate to this idea. We might wonder..] 4. Everything that can be said can be said clearly. 4.

Things are only ever like or unlike in some or other particular respect.] 80 . 107) notes that this ―makes clear that it is the genuine proposition that shows logical form.] 4. Propositions show the logical form of reality. McManus argues. say. There is. we can only latch on to something that might impose a superficially intelligible (pseudo-) requirement by staying ‗within logic‘: that is. What is like what then depends on how we look at things. outside any presupposed frame of reference with which to characterize the world. They display it.[McManus (pp. it is reflected in them.‖ a job taken by some commentators to be done by the (pseudo-) propositions of logic. What expresses itself in language. 94-95): When we imagine ourselves identifying a logical form that a proposition must possess in order to represent a particular possible fact. [Ostrow (p. nor sharing of the same form as such. we cannot express through it. What is reflected in language. by using a proposition that picks out the thus-and-so of the imagined logical form—an object‘s being in a particular spatial location. about which we now find that we cannot ask the sort of question of con-formity which we set out to ask. ‗outside logic‘. it seems. on how we choose to categorize or characterize things. no similarity as such. Our quest for a genuine requirement must drive us. cannot be presented by it. Our ‗indication‘ of the logical form now becomes an inarticulate pointing at a bare that.121 Propositions cannot present logical form. and with it. that its logical form is such that it must be represented using a proposition that captures an object‘s being spatially located. But now the ‗requirement‘ exposed is that possible facts that are characterized like this must be … characterized like this. But such an identification takes for granted that we understand how this state of affairs must be represented.

1213 Now we understand too our feeling that we have a correct logical apprehension only if everything is right in our sign-language. On that idea. Schopenhauer on music: We could ―just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will‖ (WWR. §52.‖ He explains the distinction as a consequence of Wittgenstein‘s belief that meaning-relations are inexpressible. the same applies if one follows from the other. where Wittgenstein talks about being understood only by someone who has already had similar thoughts. 262-3). What this is cannot be said or translated into concepts. pp. cf. unanalyzable. The listener must simply hear the music and agree that it expresses the inner nature of the world. Hence Wittgenstein‘s saying-showing terminology is to be understood almost literally‖ (ibid. 17) calls the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown ―one of the most puzzling features of the Tractatus. If two propositions contradict each other then their structure shows this. precisely because they are simple. shows.‘ Pears and McGuinness have ‗point of view. [Cf. Music.e. i. v. [For Auffassung here I have ‗apprehension.] 4.‘ although ‗comprehension. the nature of the thing-in-itself.1211 Thus the proposition ―fa‖ shows that it is about the object a. like the phenomenal world. Nothing can be said about the simple objects that correspond to the names that are the elements of meaningful language.‘ and ‗view‘ would also be all right.1212 What can be shown cannot be said.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 4.‘ ‗conception. 1.). And so on. two propositions ―fa‖ and ―ga‖ show that they are both about the same object.‖ We can only show them. the preface. as it were. Hintikka (p. ―We can only point to them and say ―this‖ or ―that. 4. Ogden has ‗conception.‘ It means ‗taking in‘ or ‗gathering‘ in both the 81 . Nor can it be demonstrated or proved that music does this.

which is very widespread among philosophers. cannot be asserted through propositions.) (Here the shifting use of the word ―object‖ corresponds to the shifting use of the words ―property‖ and ―relation.‖) 82 . ―internal relation. (In the sense in which we speak of facial features. (Instead of structural property I say also ―internal property. (This blue color and that stand in the internal relation of lighter and darker eo ipso. In PI § 4 Wittgenstein talks of Augustine‘s Auffassung of language. Hence.] 4. It is unthinkable that this pair of objects not stand in this relation.‖ On p.literal and the metaphorical.‖] 4. psychological sense. formal properties are not really properties at all and cannot be talked about. [Black (p.1221 We can also call an internal property of a fact a feature of that fact. however.) The holding of such internal properties and relations.) 4. the expression ―in a certain sense.123 A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it.‖ I introduce these expressions in order to show the basis of the confusion between internal relations and proper (external) relations.‖ instead of structural relation. in the first sentence. and in the same sense of formal relations and relations of structures. 57 McManus says that ―the intent of the qualification ‗internal‘ seems to be that it taketh away what the word ‗relation‘ giveth. by 3 and 4.122 We can talk in a certain sense of formal properties of objects and states of affairs or of properties of the structure of facts. but rather it shows itself in the propositions which present the states of affairs and deal with the objects in question. 195) points out that.

Frege argues against this kind of idea in ―Thought‖ (see Beaney. 4.124 The holding of an internal property of a possible state of things will not be expressed through a proposition. through an internal property of this proposition. where he seems to suggest that the logical order of colour-space will be revealed through the logical analysis of colour terms (see TLP 6. because this presupposes that it makes sense to assert either property of either form. Cambridge blue shows itself ―quite literally. However. [Black (p.‖ This implies that we can literally see a necessary truth or feature of reality. 325-345). by means of which the logical order of our colour concepts is presented.1251 Here now the vexed question ―whether all relations are internal or external‖ disappears.125 The existence of an internal relation between possible states of things expresses itself linguistically through an internal relation between the propositions that present them. 34 in connection with this. but rather it expresses itself in the proposition that presents the state of things. 90) writes that the internal relation between dark. 4. it is not clear that he held this view at the time of writing the Tractatus. E. 198) says that this might be a reference to G. 4.] 4. it is clear that Wittgenstein thinks that the colour-wheel is itself a part of the symbolism. pp.‖ McGinn also discusses Remarks on Colour p.‖ which attacks the views of Brad83 . Moore‘s essay ―Relations. Schroeder (p.1241 One cannot distinguish forms from each other by saying that the one has this but the other has that property. It would be equally senseless to ascribe a formal property to a proposition as to deny it. Oxford blue and light.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition [McGinn (p.3751). in the sense that the ordered colour samples of the colour-wheel constitute an instrument of our language. 182): ―In the later philosophy.

etc. Rather it shows itself in the sign of this object itself.ley and others on internal relations. McGinn says that ―This remark and the one following (4. 84 .‖ ―(y): aRx. Because of their defining characteristics. yRb. idealist views on relations certainly were a concern of Russell‘s. a numeral that it signifies a number.) Formal concepts cannot. in the way that proper concepts can. xRy.1252 Series which are ordered according to internal relations I call formal series. Russell had argued against the intelligibility of internal relations and held that all relations are external. (If b stands in one of these relations to a then I call b a successor of a. Hegelian. The sign for the defining characteristics of a formal concept is therefore a characteristic feature of all symbols whose meaning falls under the concept.) That something is an instance of a formal concept cannot be expressed through a proposition.‖ etc. formal properties are not expressed through functions. xRb. be presented by a function.‖ ―(x): aRx. which runs through the whole of the old logic.‖ (p. 178)] 4. The series of numbers is ordered not by an external but rather by an internal relation. (I introduce this expression in order to make clear the basis of the confusion of formal concepts with proper concepts. Equally the series of propositions: ―aRb. we can now also speak of formal concepts.1252) make a clear reference to Russell. (A name shows that it signifies an object.126 In the sense of which we speak of formal properties. The expression of a formal property is a feature of certain symbols.) 4.

‖ Anscombe (p. 28. Richard L. But ―Because of their marks.122 and note that ―the sense in which we speak of formal properties‖ might be no sense at all.‖ (p. reprinted in Klemke. 82: ―Wittgenstein clearly had Frege‘s predicament about the concept horse in mind when he spoke about ‗formal concepts‘… Frege‘s concept and object are just such formal concepts. 2001. 1955. 122) and Black (p. 47-49 of Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh (eds. p. 199) of saying ‗is an instance of a formal concept‘ rather than the more literal ‗falls under a formal concept as an object belonging to it.e. Black says that Merkmale should be translated as ‗marks. formal properties…‖ sounds obscure to me.‘ as Ogden has it. [In the third sentence here I take Black‘s suggestion (p. Cf. According to Mendelsohn (p. ―No concept is an object‖] in the symbolism. 81): ―there is just no way of coherently expressing this principle [i. 4. Michael Dummett (―Frege on Functions: A Reply. but Mendelsohn objects. he says.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition The expression of a formal concept is therefore a propositional variable. Mendelsohn The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege Cambridge University Press. pp. See also Joan Weiner pp. which he wants to uphold. 2005.‖ Frege is thus committed to the view that the principle. 81)] 85 . p. 96-107. It is Black also (same page) who suggests ‗numeral‘ instead of ‗numerical sign‘ as Ogden has it. Predicates and concepts must have analogous properties. 198) seem to agree on this point. p. 268-283.) Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in TwentiethCentury Philosophy Oxford University Press. 269) argues that Frege could have avoided the appearance of paradox if he had talked only about kinds of expression and not the things for which expressions stand. is meaningless. in which only this characteristic feature is constant. See Letters to Ogden. as ―an immediate consequence of Frege‘s general view that the structure of language mirrors the structure of the world.‘ since it means criteria or defining properties.‖ Philosophical Review 64. pp. Wittgenstein says that the term ―Merkmal‖ (characteristic) here is taken from Frege‘s terminology.

‖ ―number. Thus one cannot introduce as primitive ideas the objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself. thus as a proper concept word. (It is equally nonsensical [unsinnig] to say ―there is only one 1. They all signify formal concepts and are presented in the concept-script by variables. For example in the proposition ―there are two objects. say ―There are objects. nonsensical [unsinnige] pseudo-propositions arise..‖ etc. not by functions or classes. The same goes for the words ―complex. (As Frege and Russell believed.‖ etc.g. it is expressed in the concept-script by a variable name. such that …‖ by ―(x. 4. or the concept of number and specific numbers. 86 ..y)…‖. 4.‖ ―fact.g.‖ as one says ―There are books.‖ ―there is only one zero. the concept of a function and also special functions as primitive ideas.‖ And it is nonsensical [unsinnig] to speak of the number of all objects.‖ ―item. a formal concept is already given.‖ as it would be nonsensical [unsinnig] to say: 2+2 is at 3 o‘clock equal to 4. Thus one cannot (like Russell) introduce. e.4.) 4.‖ and all such are nonsensical [unsinnig].1272 Thus the variable name ―x‖ is the proper sign of the pseudo-concept object.12721 With an object that falls under it. Wherever it is used otherwise. e.) is used rightly. Because each variable presents a constant form. and which can be conceived as a formal property of these values.‖ Just as little can one say ―There are 100 objects‖ or ―There are 0 objects. which all its values possess.) Expressions like ―1 is a number.127 A propositional variable signifies a formal concept and its values [signify] the objects that fall under this concept.1271 Each variable is the sign of a formal concept. Wherever the word ―object‖ (―thing.‖ ―function. Thus one cannot.

1273 If we want to express in the concept-script the general proposition: ―b is a successor of a. it contains a vicious circle.‖ then we need for this an expression for the general term of the formal series: aRb. (x):aRx. Therefore there are in logic no pre-eminent numbers. … Perhaps W. because the concept ‗term for this formal series‘ is a formal concept. 4. but not in the sense of too numerous to count].g. wanted to stress that ‗is a logical form‘ is not an authentic predicate such as ‗is a star.2 The sense of a proposition is its agreement. He goes on: ―It is nonsense to speak of counting logical forms. which might then be counted. … The general term for a formal series can be expressed only by a variable. and disagreement.‘‖] 4.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 4. with the possibility of the existence and nonexistence of states of affairs. a list could be made of distinct logical forms.128 Logical forms are unnumbered [number-less.y):aRx. xRy. and therefore there is no philosophical monism or dualism. 206) suggests ‗anumerical‘ for zahllos (‗unnumbered‘). (x. xRb. e. Because no proposition can answer such a question. had in mind here: certainly in a universe containing a finite set of objects and a finite set of their combinations. (This has been overlooked by Frege and Russell: because of this the way they want to express general propositions like the one above is false. etc.: ―Are there unanalysable subject-predicate propositions?‖) 4. [Black (p.) We can determine the general term of a formal series by giving its first term and the general form of the operation that produces the next term from the proposition that goes before it. yRb.1274 The question of the existence of a formal concept is nonsensical [unsinnig]. It is not clear what W. (Thus one cannot ask. 87 .

23 A name occurs in a proposition only in the context of an elementary proposition. 208): ―The questions [i. the elementary proposition. I write an elementary proposition as a function of names. It is a concatenation. so that each fact consists of infinitely many states of affairs and each state of affairs is composed of infinitely many objects. 4.2211 Even if the world is infinitely complex. q. 4.‖ ―z‖). in the form: ―fx. a linking.22 An elementary proposition consists of names.‖] 4. [Cf. ‗How can names combine to form a sentence?‘ and ‗How can objects combine to form a state of affairs?‘] are nowhere answered and it is hard to see how any answers. Here perhaps we have instances of irredeemable nonsense. r. even then there must be objects and states of affairs.‘s view.‖ ― (x. Or else I indicate it by the letters p.03.‖ etc. which consist of names in immediate combination.y).211 It is a sign of an elementary proposition that no elementary proposition can stand in contradiction to it. 88 .e.24 Names are simple symbols. in W. of names.] 4. could be expected.4. [Black (p. 2. Here the question arises of how the combination of propositions comes to be. 4.21 The simplest proposition.‖ ―y. asserts the existence of a state of affairs.221 It is obvious that by the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions. I indicate them by single letters (―x. 4.

in which I stipulate that it should replace an already known sign ―a‖. Wittgenstein says that names are signs.241 If I use two signs with one and the same meaning [Bedeutung] then I express this by putting between them the sign ―=. they say nothing about the meaning [Bedeutung] of the signs ―a‖ and ―b.‖ Thus ―a = b‖ means that the sign ―a‖ is replaceable by the sign ―b.‖ or those derived from such expressions.‘] 4. then I write the equation – the definition – (like Russell) in the form: ―a = b Def. There. it is impossible that I cannot translate them by each other.] 4.‖. The definition is a rule for signs. in which two names occur.‘ Pears and McGuinness have ‗rule dealing with signs.‖ (If I introduce a new sign ―b‖ by an equation.202 and 3.‖ [Wittgenstein later (see PI §370) seems to have repudiated this distinction. without knowing if they mean the same or something different? If I am acquainted with the meaning of an English word and of a synonymous [gleichbedeutenden] German word.] 4.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition [Black (p.‘ and Black (p.) [Ogden has ‗symbolic rule. Expressions like ―a = a. then it is impossible that I do not know that they are both synonymous.243 Can we understand two names without knowing whether they signify the same thing or two different things? -Can we understand a proposition. 209) notes that this seems to conflict with 3.242 Expressions of the form ―a = b‖ are thus only aids for presentation. are neither elementary propositions nor otherwise 89 .26. 211) suggests ‗rule about signs.

there will be 2n factual or nonfactual possibilities to which 2n truth/falsehood possibilities will correspond in the case of elementary propositions. two propositions have four truth-possibilities. that is. 211) presumes that what is to be shown later is so shown at 5.] 90 . pp. three have eight possibilities. [J. Wittgenstein‘s formula here amounts to 2 n. 85–94. etc. there are possibilities.28–4. if an elementary proposition is false. The world is completely described by the statement of all elementary propositions plus a statement as to which of them are true and which are false. one elementary proposition has two truth-possibilities. four. 4. (This will be shown later.signs with sense [sinnvolle Zeichen]. as Schroeder notes (p.533.27 tells us that if we are considering N SACHVERHALTE [states of affairs] each of which is capable of being or not being the case.25 If an elementary proposition is true then the [relevant] state of affairs exists. (4. All combinations of states of affairs can exist and the others not exist.‖ In other words.) [Black (see p. 63. note 18).531-5. 2008. 88-89: ―4.31).26 The statement of all true elementary propositions describes the world completely. sixteen. N.27 As to the existence and nonexistence of n states of affairs.] 4. then the state of affairs does not exist. Findlay ―Wittgenstein and His Tractatus‖ in The Philosophical Forum 39 (1) . 4.

3 The truth-possibilities of elementary propositions mean [bedeuten] the possibilities of the existence and nonexistence of states of affairs.28 To these combinations there correspond just as many possibilities of truth – and falsehood – for n elementary propositions.] 91 .31 We can present the truth-possibilities by schemata in the following way (―T‖ means ―true.‖ The rows of ―T‖s and ―F‖s under the row of elementary propositions indicate [bedeuten] their truth-possibilities in a readily comprehensible symbolism): p | q | r T | T|T F | T|T T | F|T F | F|T T | T|F F | T|F T | F|F F | F|F p| q T|T F|T T|F F| F p T F [Schroeder notes (p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 4.‖ ―F‖ means ―false. n. 4. 65. 4. 20) that lines 4 and 5 of the first table are wrongly printed in each other‘s place in other editions of the Tractatus.

2007.4.41 The truth-possibilities of elementary propositions are the conditions of the truth and falsehood of the propositions. [‗Plausible‘ is suggested by Black (p. Ogden ends up with ―It seems probable even at first sight. 100). 220). Indeed the understanding of all propositions depends palpably on the understanding of the elementary propositions. 142: ―Based on nmany propositions there will be p-many (namely.‖ while Pears and McGuinness have ―It immediately strikes one as probable. Wittgenstein himself computes this at TLP 4.411 It is plausible from the beginning that the introduction of elementary propositions is foundational for the understanding of all other kinds of propositions. [Gregory Landini Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell Cambridge University Press. there are possibilities.43 We can express agreement with truth-possibilities by coordinating the sign ―T‖ (for true) with them in the schema. The Notes on Logic say ‗obviously‘ at the corresponding point (p.] 4. 2n) rows of the truth-table and 2p many truth-functions. 92 . 4. The absence of this sign means disagreement.‖ The word I translate as palpably is fühlbar – ‗feel-ably‘ or sensibly.‖] 4.4 A proposition is the expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary propositions.42.42 As to the agreement and disagreement of a proposition with the truth-possibilities of n elementary propositions. Otherwise we have ―It is probable from the beginning…‖ which does not seem to make much sense. p. 4.

For each such proposition determines the True as the value of the same function for the same argument. then you do not specify a sense by specifying a truth-value. ‗~p’ would have the same sense as ‗~q‘.44 The sign that is produced by the coordination of each sign ―T‖ with the truth-possibilities is a propositional sign.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 4.‖] 4. (Frege quite rightly therefore put them first [vorausgeschickt] as an explanation of the signs of his concept-script.‘‖ Hacker (p.g. For obviously ‗~p‘ is taken to have the same sense as ‗~q‘ if and only if ‗p‘ has the same sense as ‗q‘. Only the explanation of the concept of truth that we get from Frege is false: if ―the True‖ and ―the False‖ were really objects and the arguments in ~p etc.431 The expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary propositions expresses the truth-conditions of a proposition.‖ 93 . But this is absurd by Frege‘s own lights.441 It is clear that no object (or complex of objects) corresponds to the complex of the signs ―F‖ and ―T. But if so then Frege‘s explanation of the negation sign does not determine its sense. A proposition is the expression of its truth-conditions. ‗The moon is hot‘). then Frege‘s determination of the sense of ―~p‖ would in no way determine it. 4. In such a case each compound proposition merely expresses the thought that the False falls under the concept of negation. The argument turns on the extensionality of functions. 41): ―if ‗~‘ were a name of a genuine function the argument of which is one of the two truth-values.‖ just as little as do horizontal and vertical lines or brackets.) [Anscombe (p. 107): ―As a criticism of Frege the point can be summarized by saying: ‗If truth-values are the references of propositions. then provided that ‗p‘ (e.g. ‗The sun is cold‘) has the same truthvalue as ‗q‘ (e. – There are no ―logical objects.‖ Of course the same goes for all signs that express the same as the schemata of ―T‖ and ―F.

p. 4.) If the order of the truth-possibilities in a schema is fixed once and for all by a rule of combination.] 4. Therefore ―|–‖ belongs as little to the proposition as does the number of a proposition. 29-57) treats this. then the last column by itself is already an expression of the truth-conditions.022. noting that these remarks are virtually identical to ones Wittgenstein wrote in 1913 in his Notes on Logic (see Proops. A proposition cannot possibly assert of itself that it is true. then the propositional sign will be: ―(TT-T) p. for Frege (and Russell) it shows only that these authors hold the propositions thus marked as true.42. 4. Proops (p. He argues that Wittgenstein misunderstands Frege‘s position.[Cf. 94 . in effect.. (The number of places inside the brackets on the left is determined by the number of terms in the brackets on the right. If we write this column as a row.g. is a propositional sign: ― p | q || T | T || T F | T || T T | F || F | F || T ‖ (Frege‘s ―assertion sign‖ ―|–‖ is logically quite meaningless [ganz bedeutungslos].442 This. along with 4. e. q)‖ Or more distinctly ―(TTFT) (p.442 is.e.) [cf. what Frege calls a ―Proposition of Begriffsschrift‖—i.064 and 4. 38): ―what Wittgenstein means by a ―proposition‖ at 4. q)‖.063 as containing the core of Wittgenstein‘s critique of Frege‘s assertion sign.0312 and 5. 31. note 86). Proops (see pp.

Philosophical Investigations § 22: ―Frege‘s idea that every assertion contains an assumption.45 For n elementary propositions there are Ln possible groups of truth-conditions. the words ―It is asserted‖ simply become superfluous.46 Of all the possible groups of truth-conditions there are two extreme cases. as the difference is already clear. 8) to distinguish complete propositions from subordinate propositions contained within them. In one case the proposition is true for all truthpossibilities of the elementary propositions. 226-227) says that the assertion sign is unnecessary in Russell‘s Principia because it is introduced explicitly (see vol. this is unnecessary. really rests on the possibility found in our language of writing every statement in the form: ―It is asserted that such-and-such is the case.‖ Black (pp. which is the thing that is asserted.‖. In the second case the proposition is false for all truthpossibilities: the truth-conditions are contradictory. And if I write. In the first case we call the proposition a tautology. The groups of truth-conditions that belong to a number of truth-possibilities can be ordered in a series. But. according to Black. and so the effect is that the sign indicates simply that the authors are putting the proposition forward as true. but ―It is asserted: such-and-such is the case‖.‖—But ―that such-and-such is the case‖ is not a sentence in our language—so far it is not a move in the language-game.‖] 4. where ‗S‘ is replaceable by a sentence of English. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological. Wittgenstein understands such signs … as translatable into English by expressions of the form ‗S is true‘ and ‗S is false‘. So ‗is true‘ and ‗is false‘ can also be said to be ―verbs‖ in a derivative sense. 4. 95 . p. I. not ―It is asserted that….Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition a sentence of Begriffsschrift immediately preceded by the judgement stroke. in the second case a contradiction.

tautologies and contradictions ―show something about the nature of logical structure. ~p‘ is that the disintegration is revealed by means of it not to be arbitrary. namely the rules we must follow if we are to make sense. for instance.) but nevertheless are not gibberish.‖ One might ask: What does it show? Mounce tries to answer this question: ―In ‗p . They are not gibberish because there are rules for constructing truth tables that yield tautologies and contradictions. ~p‘ unless we already grasped the rules of logic of which it supposedly makes us aware? And don‘t the rules of logic. but it shows something about logic that this cannot be said. To construct gibberish one need only violate these rules. is revealed a disintegration of sense. about the weather if I know that it is raining or not raining. 43) says that Wittgenstein means that tautologies and contradictions say nothing (about the weather. One is aware.g.g. Also. by which we construct truth tables. and a contradiction is true under no condition.. [Mounce (p. e. also mean that anything else is gibberish? So there are rules for constructing gibberish.4.) 4.461 A sentence shows what it says. in a way similar to that in which ―0‖ belongs to the symbolism of arithmetic. that these signs when put together say nothing. e. by means of it. of rules which reflect logical form and that enable one to construct out of the symbols which constitute it propositions that do say something.) (I know nothing. but not for gibberish. (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)] 96 . Tautology and contradiction are senseless [sinnlos].‖ (One might still ask: Is such a thing thereby revealed? Was it not already apparent? Could we understand ‗p . or rather. a tautology and a contradiction [show] that they say nothing. they belong to the symbolism. ~p‘. Thus ‗p . A tautology has no truth-conditions because it is unconditionally true. one might say. ~p‘ says nothing. but the value of ‗p .4611 But tautology and contradiction are not meaningless [unsinnig].

Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition

4.462 Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of reality. They present no possible states of things. Because one lets every possible state of things be, and the other none. In tautology the conditions of agreement with the world – the presenting relations – cancel each other out, so that it stands in no presenting relation to reality. 4.463 Truth-conditions define the room to move [Spielraum – literally ―play space‖] left to the facts by a proposition. (A proposition, a picture, a model, are in a negative sense like a solid body that restricts the free movement of others; in a positive sense [they are] like a space limited by solid substance wherein there is room for a body.) Tautology leaves to reality the whole – endless – logical space; contradiction fills the whole of logical space and leaves reality not a point. Neither of them, therefore, can determine reality in any way. [Cf. Notebooks November 14th 1914.] 4.464 The truth of tautology is certain, of propositions possible, of contradiction impossible. (Certain, possible, impossible: here we have an indication of the gradation we need in the theory of probability.) [No article before ―tautology‖ or ―contradiction‖ here, or in 4.463, as per Wittgenstein‘s wishes in Letters to Ogden, p. 30. No plural because ―there are in fact no contradictions but there is only contradiction, for they all mean the same, i.e. nothing. And the same applies to tautology.‖] 4.465 The logical product of a tautology and a proposition says the same as the proposition [on its own]. Thus that product is identical with the proposition. Because one cannot change the essence of the symbol without changing its sense.

4.466 To a definite logical combination of symbols corresponds a definite logical combination of their meanings [Bedeutungen]; every arbitrary combination corresponds only to unconnected symbols. That is to say, propositions that are true for every state of things cannot after all be combinations of symbols, because otherwise only definite combinations of objects could correspond to them. (And there is no logical combination to which no combination of objects corresponds.) Tautology and contradiction are the limiting cases of the combination of symbols, namely their dissolution. [I have changed ―signs‖ to ―symbols‖ here in line with p. 60 of Letters to Ogden.] 4.4661 To be sure, even in tautologies and contradictions signs are still combined with one another, i.e. they stand in relations to one another, but these relations are meaningless [bedeutungslos], inessential to the symbol. 4.5 Now it seems possible for the most general propositional form to be given: that is to say, to give a description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoever, so that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol that fits the description, and that every symbol that fits the description can express a sense, if the meanings [Bedeutungen] of the names are suitably chosen. It is clear that in the description of the most general propositional form only what is essential to it may be described, -otherwise it would precisely [nämlich] not be the most general form. That there is a general propositional form is indicated [bewiesen] by the fact that there may be no proposition whose form one could not have foreseen (i.e. constructed). The general form of the proposition is: Things are thus and so.


Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition

[White (p. 82): ―…in any natural translation, the final sentence of 4.5 looks astonishingly banal, even silly, as a statement of the goal Wittgenstein is struggling to arrive at. Perhaps we should take the overtones of sich verhälten that are lost in the English and render it as: ‗This is how things are arranged‘, with the idea, that if we have the general form of proposition, then it will show for any proposition how things must be arranged in the world for it to be true.‖ Ostrow (p. 114): ―in the transparent vacuity of this culminating statement we are meant to see the vacuity of the Frege/Russell logic, of any attempt to specify a priori the limits of thought and language.‖ See also PI § 136.] 4.51 Suppose that all elementary sentences were given to me: then it can be asked simply: which sentences can I build from them? And those are all sentences and thus are they limited. 4.52 Sentences are everything that follows from the totality of all elementary sentences (and of course from the fact that this is the totality). (Thus one could in a certain sense say that all sentences are generalizations of elementary sentences.) 4.53 The general propositional form is a variable. 5 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.) [Frascolla (p. 118): ―The principle which is enunciated at 5 is universally known as the Thesis of Extensionality.‖ Janik (p. 61): ―If one simply reads the seven propositions that constitute the main ideas of the Tractatus consecutively one quickly comes to the realization that the book‘s center is in fact propositions 5 and 6. Proposition 5 tells us that all meaningful sentences are truth functions; whereas 6 tell us that double negation is the general form of all truth functions. The

the Caesar of the genus Julius.) The confusion of argument and affix. Black argues that Wittgenstein gets Frege wrong here (see p. (In the name Julius Caesar ―Julius‖ is an affix. in ―~p‖ however.02 It is natural to confuse the argument of functions with the affixes of names. p. [Russell uses ―+c‖ in Principia vol. to whose name we attach it. E. and their arguments the affixes of these names. 73.‖] 5. For Frege the propositions of logic were names. ―p‖ is not an affix.. 5. 5. But this signifying depends on arbitrary agreement and one could choose a simple sign instead of ―+ c‖. An affix is always a part of a description of an object.101 The truth-functions of every number of elementary propositions can be written out in a schema in the following way: 100 . but an argument: the sense of ―~p‖ cannot be understood without the sense of ―p‖ having first been understood. This is because I recognize just as well from the argument as from the affix the meaning of the sign containing it.] 5.g. II.01 The elementary propositions are the truth-arguments of the proposition. 239). In Russell‘s ―+c‖.g. That is the foundation of the theory of probability. is at the bottom of Frege‘s theory of the meaning [Bedeutung] of propositions and functions. if I am not mistaken.force of this assertion is that all of the propositions of logic are of equal logical significance.1 Truth-functions can be ordered in series. e. ―c‖ is an affix that indicates [hinweist] that the whole sign is the addition sign for cardinal numbers.

(~p. ~q) (FTFF) (p. q) in words: Not q. q) in words: Neither p nor q. (p (TTTF) (p. then q. ~p) (TFFF) (p. q) in words: q (FFFT) (p. ~q) or (p | q) (FFTF) (p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition (TTTT) (p. q) in words: p. ~p . or q. ~q: v: q. then q. q) Contradiction (p and not p. then q. (p ≡ q) (TFTF) (p. q) in words: If p.) (p p . (q. (p v q) (FFTT) (p. q) in words: If p. q) in words: p or q. q) Tautology (If p. q. and if q. p) (FFFF) (p. I will call its truth-grounds. q) in words: q and not p. q) in words: q and p. q) in words: p and not q. (p. then p. (~(p . q) in words: Not p. 61-62): ―The philosophical significance of the truth table method of representing propositions (as opposed to 101 p) q) . (p. ~q) Those truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that verify a proposition. and q and not q). (q. [Janik (pp. q) in words: p (TTFF) (p. (~q) (FTFT) (p. and if q. ~p) (TFFT) (p. (p. (~p) (FTTF) (p. q) in words: Not both p and q. (q (TTFT) (p. then p. q)) (TFTT) (p. q) in words: If q. then p. but not both. q q) (FTTT) (p.

then we say that the truth of this proposition follows from the truth of those propositions.122 If p follows from q. And similarly he could create no world in which the proposition ―p‖ is true without creating all its objects. Two propositions are opposed to one another if asserting them both makes no meaningful proposition [wenn es keinen sinnvollen Satz gibt]. If this is true. Every proposition that contradicts another denies it.11 If the truth-grounds that are common to a number of propositions are the same for a particular proposition. 5. 5. q‖ is one of the propositions that ―p‖ asserts and also one of the propositions that ―q‖ asserts.12 In particular. the Fregean notion in the Begriffschrift that logic is based upon privileged propositions designated as axioms turns out to be equally nonsensical. the truth of a proposition ―p‖ follows from the truth of another ―q‖ if all truth-grounds of the second are truth-conditions of the first. a contradiction or an empirical proposition (T.121 The truth-grounds of the one are contained in those of the other. p follows from q. 102 .123 If a god creates a world wherein certain propositions are true then he thereby also creates a world in which all the propositions that follow from them are already true. 5. 5. then the sense of ―p‖ is contained in the sense of ―q‖.‖] 5.124 A proposition affirms every proposition that follows from it.1241 ―p. 5. 5.its significance as a logical decision procedure) is literally to show that nothing that is a proposition can be anything other than a tautology.101). not only is the Kantian notion that the propositions of philosophy are synthetic a-priori truths shown to be logically nonsensical. 5.

111) suggests that Wittgenstein‘s concern here and elsewhere in the TLP is primarily ―to shift our pers103 . But if instead of ―p v q‖. then the internal connection becomes clear.. so that (it so happens) you cannot have both.) 5. fx‖ itself. but rather these relations are internal and exist as soon as. these propositions exist. fx shows that generality is present in the symbol ―(x) .Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition [Presumably the point of the last sentence has to do with sentences referring to or dealing with each other. deduce p from q.13 We see from the structure of the propositions that the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of another.|. They actually rule each other out. this is expressed in the relations in which the forms of these propositions stand to one another. Incompatible sentences are not merely incompatible.132 If p follows from q then I can infer from q to p. [Ostrow (p. 5. are senseless [sinnlos].g. and we certainly do not need to put them in these relations first by combining them with one another in a proposition. Only they themselves can justify the inference. 5. we write ―p | q . The nature of the inference is to be gathered only from the two propositions. and by the fact that.] 5. A red light and a green light just as such do not deny each other.131 If the truth of a proposition follows from the truth of another. as it were. (The fact that one can infer fa from (x). and would be superfluous. The reason why you cannot have both is internal to the sentences. p | q‖ and instead of ―~p‖ ―p | p‖ (p | q = neither p nor q). ―Laws of inference‖ that – as in Frege and Russell – are supposed to justify inferences. then the way of symbolizing here veils the relation of the propositional forms of ―p v q‖ and ―~p‖. but when used as traffic signals they do.1311 When we infer q from p v q and ~p. e.

the inference referred to ought to be the one mentioned in 5.13. the appeal to logical laws in the explanation of valid inference would in any case be superfluous.135.136 There is no causal nexus that justifies such an inference.pective so that we no longer feel any urge to account for why. See 4. even if.‖ 104 . not just the rules for inference in a particular axiom system. the laws of logic are to be viewed as expressing no facts of any kind.‖ Proops points out (pp. 515.] 5. 319. including axioms. for example.134 No other proposition can be inferred from an elementary proposition. [By Wittgenstein‘s numbering system. not the one described as impossible in 5.27. p. that is to say. including those of derivability in a sound system. Secondly. and Russell‘s (1905) ―Necessity and Possibility‖ in his Collected Papers Volume IV.] 5. 60): ―By ‗causal nexus‘ he obviously means the aprioristic certainty of causal connections.133 All inferences are made a priori. Proops takes Wittgenstein to think that (p. [Because they are independent. 80-86) that Frege and Russell seem to use ―laws of inference‖ to mean laws of logic. even if Russell‘s conception of logic were correct.‖ The concept of entailment cannot be explained in other terms. ―q‖ follows from ―p‖ and ―p q‖ in the first place. 5. 90): ―far from expressing truths which lie at the bottom of all valid inferences. the laws of logic were not sinnlos. 5.135 By no means can an inference be made from the existence of one state of things to the existence of another quite different state of things. Stenius (p. As evidence he cites Frege‘s ―Foundations of Geometry: First Series‖ in his Collected Papers p.

‖ (p. but by which it then takes place as having been necessarily brought about. 56. 219 Everyman. law. 31).‖ Compare Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil ―On the Prejudices of Philosophers‖ §21 (p. [This last sentence would be more literally rendered as ―Belief in the causal nexus is superstition. 130) Schopenhauer refers to the causal nexus in The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This necessity is the causal nexus. and the events of another type. Consequently. 1992. whereas he has told us unambiguously what the sentence means: ―I didn‘t mean to say that the belief in the causal nexus was one amongst superstitions but rather that superstition is nothing else than the belief in the causal nexus‖ (Letters to Ogden. 99-100): ―Wittgenstein‘s remarks on causality should not be interpreted as claiming there is no such thing as a causal relationship in the first place. identified as causes. it must not be introduced when these are not mentioned. p. identified as effects of those causes. What is denied is that causality is an internal relation between situations. Wittgenstein is denying ―that there is any necessity in the so-called causal nexus between the events of one type. constraint. Stokhof (pp. which is determined according to a rule. sequence. Thus the law of causality is the regulator of the changes undergone in time by objects of external experience.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Frascolla (pp. but all these are material. 55-56 he writes: ―it is most important for us clearly to recognize first and foremost that the law of causality relates solely and exclusively to changes of material states. Superstition is belief in the causal nexus.37.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present. number. Kaufmann): ―It is we alone who have devised cause. Every change can take place only through another having preceded it. 130-131) connects this remark and the next with 6.)] 5.‖ (Italics in the original translation. relativity. 105 . motive. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. p.‖ but despite Wittgenstein‘s italics this remains ambiguous. On pp. for-each-other. edited by W. freedom. and to nothing else whatever. and purpose.

like that of logical inference. III. For instance. i. 86): ―for Schopenhauer we can only understand what we perceive in terms of causes. the whole of experience as such cannot be represented. This is precisely what Russell had done in The Problems of Philosophy with respect to explaining sense data.32]. For this reason the law of causality cannot be extended to the whole of experience.e. i. its form can only be shown.e. Janik. – The connection between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.e.) 106 . Schopenhauer‘s idea that ―motivation is causality seen from the inside‖ and that the relation causeeffect can be assimilated to the relation premise-consequence. however.‖ we act once more as we have always acted—mythologically. Thus Wittgenstein would assert. (―A knows that p is the case‖ is senseless [sinnlos] if p is a tautology. In an argument that Russell himself admitted was weak. 116). sees Wittgenstein as making a basically Schopenhauerian point against Russell.e. 133 Frascolla interprets Wittgenstein‘s remarks here about causality as a rejection of some of Schopenhauer‘s views. Schopenhauer] points out in the chapter explicitly dedicated to the misuse of the law of causality in his dissertation on the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason (Werke. we understand perception on the basis of causal connection.and when we project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed ―in itself.. We could only know them if causality were an inner necessity. which physicists designate as laws.1362 Freedom of the will consists in the fact that it impossible now to know future actions. following Schopenhauer.‖] 5. This is precisely what Wittgenstein wants to deny.‖ On p. that the law of causality (i. Janik (p. he asserted that the simplest assumption that coheres with our experience is that physical objects cause them. Thus the law of causality cannot be extended to explain experience as such as he [i. the basis of pre-Kantian metaphysics) is not a law but the form of a law [see 6.

‖ (p.14 If a proposition follows from another. 219)] 5. And the problem with any appeal to a notion of self-evidence as a justification for acknowledging a proposition as true is that the truth of a proposition does not follow from its seeming to us to be self-evident‖ (pp.1363 If it does not follow that it is true from a proposition‘s being obvious to us. [See McGinn pp. 5.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition [McGinn (pp. all propositions. 64-68 on the importance of selfevidence for Frege and Russell. and no further. 5. ―Wittgenstein believes that the problem with any account of logic that treats the propositions of logic as substantial truths. then they are one and the same proposition. 107 . in the way that Frege and Russell do.142 Tautologies follow from all propositions: they say nothing. Contradiction vanishes. what no proposition has in common with another. then obviousness is also no justification for our belief in its truth. so to speak. in the context McGinn reads it instead as follows: ―The point of the final sentence of the first paragraph is that our knowledge extends only so far as what is logically entailed by what we know. 66-67). 218-9) says that Black and Anscombe read the last sentence of the first paragraph here as noting the logical connection between ―A knows that p‖ and ―p‖. outside.141 If p follows from q and q from p. then this latter one says more than the former. Tautology is the common property of all propositions that have nothing in common with one another. the former less than the latter. 5.143 Contradiction is the common property of propositions. However. tautology inside. is that it is forced to rely on a notion of selfevidence to explain our a priori knowledge of their truth.] 5.

5.153 A proposition is in itself neither probable nor improbable. any two elementary propositions) give one another the probability ½. If I now say: It is as probable that I will draw a white ball as a black.152 We call propositions that have no truth-arguments in common with one another independent of one another. let T r be the number of Ts in proposition ―r‖. The proposition ―r‖ then gives the proposition ―s‖ the probability Trs: Tr. then that means: All circumstances known to me 108 . tautology their substanceless center. T rs the number of those Ts in proposition ―s‖ that stand in the same column as Ts of the proposition ―r‖.g. 5. The certainty of a logical conclusion is a limiting case of probability. Then by this experiment I can determine that the number of black balls drawn and the number of white balls drawn get nearer to one another as the drawing goes on. then we call the ratio Trs: Tr the measure of the probability that the proposition ―r‖ gives to the proposition ―s‖. 5. 5. Propositions independent of one another (e. An event occurs.1511 There is no special object peculiar to propositions of probability.151 In a schema like the one above in no. I draw one ball after another and lay them back again in the urn. 5. That is therefore not a mathematical fact. and Trs the number of those truth-grounds of the proposition ―s‖ that are simultaneously truth-grounds of ―r‖.101. or it does not occur: there is no middle ground. (Application to tautology and contradiction. If p follows from q.) 5. 5. then the proposition ―q‖ gives the proposition ―p‖ the probability 1.15 If Tr is the number of truth-grounds of the proposition ―r‖.154 In an urn there are equal numbers of white and black balls (and no others).Contradiction is the outer limit of propositions.

13 and 5. (A proposition can indeed be an incomplete picture of a certain state of things.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition (including laws of nature assumed as hypotheses) give to the occurrence of the one event no more probability than to the occurrence of the other. What I confirm by the experiment is that the occurrence of both events is independent of the circumstances with which I am no closer acquainted. Black notes (p. as it were. It involves a general description of a propositional form.131 on internal relations and deductive connections.2 The structures of propositions stand in internal relations to one another. 109 . they give – as can be easily gathered from the explanations above – to each the probability ½.156 Hence probability is a generalization.29 We can bring out these internal relations in our means of expression by presenting a proposition as the result of an operation that produces one proposition out of others (the bases of the operation). 259).] 4. an extract from other propositions. [Cf. – If we are indeed not completely acquainted with a fact but do know something about its form. 5.30 An operation is the expression of a relation between the structures of its result and its bases. 5. 5.) A proposition of probability is. 5. a complete picture of something. or a complete picture in some sense]. Only in the absence of certainty do we need probability. That is. 4.155 The unit of the proposition of probability is: The circumstances – with which I am otherwise no further acquainted – give to the occurrence of a particular event such and such a degree of probability. but it is always a complete picture [i.e.

259): ―W.31 An operation is that which must happen to a proposition in order to make another out of it.) 5. yet the difference between the two seems at first nothing more substantial than a difference in point of view (and consequently in terminology). [Black points out (p. 260): ―The important point is that W. 259) says that ―relation‖ here means internal relation.231 And that of course will depend on their formal properties. truth-operations. wishes to make a distinction between an operation and a function (5.‖ Black (p. 260) that 4. on the internal similarity of their forms. [Black (p.233 An operation cannot occur until the point where a proposition is generated from another in a logically meaningful [bedeutungsvolle] way.2341 The sense of a truth-function of p is a function of the sense of p.‖] 5.[Black (p.] 4.234 The truth-functions of elementary propositions are results of operations that have the elementary propositions as bases. 5. 110 . Thus at the point where the logical construction of the proposition begins. restricts ‗operation‘ to the case where the ‗bases‘ and the ‗result‘ (5. Mathematicians commonly use the terms ‗function‘ and ‗operation‘ interchangeably.] 5.1252 tells how a formal series arises. (I call these operations.251). 5.232 An internal relation that orders a series is equivalent to an operation by which one term is generated from another.22) of the operation are internally related.

are variables that give general expression to certain formal relations. 3. logical addition. and this depends on the bases of the operation.) 5.‖ ―q.242 The same operation that makes ―q‖ from ―p.) [See Black p. are operations.] 111 .24 An operation shows itself in a variable: it shows how from one form of proposition one can arrive at another.‖ makes ―r‖ from ―q‖ and so on.) 5.) 5. (Operation and function must not be confused with one another. but the result of an operation can be a basis for that operation. 5.251 A function cannot be its own argument. (Negation reverses the sense of a proposition.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Negation.252 Only thus is the advance from term to term possible in a formal series (from type to type in the hierarchy of Russell and Whitehead). [Cf.241 An operation characterizes no form but only the difference between forms. only its result does. (Russell and Whitehead did not admit the possibility of this advancing. It gives expression to the difference between the forms.25 The occurrence of an operation does not characterize the sense of a proposition. An operation indeed asserts nothing.333. 260 and Anscombe p. etc. 130 for more criticism of Russell along these lines. etc. (And what is common to the bases and the result of an operation is just the bases. 5.‖ ―r. logical multiplication. This can only be expressed by the fact that ―p.] 5.‖ etc.. but they made use of it again and again.

The first term of the bracketed expression is the beginning of the formal series. the negation in ―~~p‖: ~~p = p).‖ This bracketed expression is a variable. and the third the form of the term of the series that follows immediately after x. O‘ O‘ a. 5.‖ 5.3 All propositions are results of truth-operations on elementary propositions. the second the form of an arbitrary term x of the series. In a similar sense I speak of the successive application of multiple operations to a number of propositions. In accordance with the essence of truth-operations. O‘ a.2522 The general term of a formal series a. x. 112 . Operations can neutralize one another. Truth-operations are the way that truth-functions are produced from elementary propositions. 5.2521 I call the repeated application of an operation to its own result its successive application (―O‘ O‘ O‘ a‖ is the result of three successive applications of ―O‘ ξ‖ to ―a‖). 5. Every proposition is the result of truth-operations on elementary propositions.2523 The concept of successive application of an operation is equivalent to the concept ―and so on.g.254 An operation can vanish (e. 5. a new one arises from truth-functions in the same way that their truth-functions arise from elementary propositions. … I write thus: ―[a.5. a proposition.253 One operation can cancel the work of another. O‘ x]. The result of every truth-operation on the results of truth-operations on elementary propositions is again the result of a single truth-operation on elementary propositions. Every truth-operation begets from truth-functions of elementary propositions another truth-function of elementary propositions.

In Theory of Knowledge. ‗not‘ as the name of the concept of negation (a unary function). 35) identifies Wittgenstein‘s target here: ―Frege argued that truth and falsehood were special logical objects named by sentences.31 also then have a meaning [Bedeutung].‖ ―q. Russell argues that it is a kind of experience or immediate knowledge that allows us to understand such words as ‗particulars. viz. expresses a single truth-function of elementary propositions. Russell too ―enmeshed himself in confusions‖ according to Hacker (ibid. Russell conceives of these constants as entities with which the mind can be directly acquainted. 5.‖ ―r. non-technical sense"). In his The Principles of Mathematics (p.‘ ‗relations. On p. the binary connectives as names of relations.32 All truth-functions are results of the successive application of a finite number of truth-operations to elementary propositions.4 Here it becomes apparent that there are no ―logical objects‖ or ―logical constants‖ (in Frege‘s and Russell‘s sense).42. [Fahrnkopf (p. 99 Russell adds that acquaintance with certain logical ob113 . he treated the logical connectives as names of literal functions. [Hacker (p. 4. 4. 97).‘ and ‗predicates‘ (see Theory of Knowledge p. p.‖ etc..31 The schemata in no.] 5.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 5. if ―p. are not elementary propositions.).‖ Frege also tried to prove that numbers were logical objects. v). Finally. And it is easy to see that the propositional sign in no.‘ ‗universals. even if ―p‖ and ―q‖ are truth-functions of elementary propositions. 41) says that this is the only place in the Tractatus where 'Bedeutung' is used not in connection with objects (but rather in "a wide. vii) Russell gives the name ―logical constants‖ to indefinable logical concepts the discussion of which ―forms the chief part of philosophical logic‖ (ibid. and the quantifiers as names of second-level functions.

.‘ ‗all.42 It is obvious that v. ~~~~p. namely ~~p. are not relations in the sense that right and left etc.. and that this ―v‖ is the same as the first.‘ and ‗some. 31.jects must be involved in our understanding words such as ‗or.‖ All propositions of logic say the same thing however. [Wittgenstein suggests leaving out any translation of ―von vornherein‖ (―from the very beginning‖) in the first sentence here.. And it is obvious that the ― ‖ that we define by means of ―~‖ and ―v‖ is identical with that by which we define ―v‖ with the help of ―~‖.g.44 Truth-functions are not material functions. And it is no less remarkable that the infinite number of propositions of logic (of mathematics) follow from half a dozen ―primitive propositions.] 5.] 5.‘ By this stage. p. If one can produce. or both? 114 . or affirm p. but he still thinks of them as objects of some kind.41 Because all results of truth-operations on truthfunctions are identical when they are one and the same truthfunction of elementary propositions. and much less still signs for relations. is then negation – in any sense – contained in the affirmation? Does ―~~p‖ negate ~p. Russell denies that these things are entities (see p. e. etc. an affirmation by double negation. 97). and so on. etc. The possibility of the crosswise definition of the logical ―primitive signs‖ of Frege and Russell shows already that these are not primitive signs.43 It is scarcely credible that from a fact p infinitely more others should follow. probably thanks to Wittgenstein. Namely. 5. nothing. are.‘ ‗not. 5. See Letters to Ogden.

44) is merely a paraphrase of the point that logical connectives do not represent things in the world.‖ or ―( x).‖] 5. if negation is introduced then we must now understand it in propositions of the form ―~p‖ in just the same way as in propositions like ―~(p v q).g. E.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition The proposition ―~~p‖ does not deal with negation as with an object. The construction of logic out of its primitive signs must be made clear.45 If there are primitive signs of logic then a correct logic must make clear their position with regard to one another and justify their being. fx.441 This vanishing of the apparent logical constants also occurs if ―~( x) . 115 . 5. We may not introduce it first for one class of cases and then for another.. And were there an object called ―~‖ then ―~~p‖ would have to say something other than ―p. fx. 5. and there would be no available ground for using the same way of combining signs in both cases. ~fx‖ et al. One cannot therefore introduce it for one combination first and then another time for another. If a primitive concept is introduced then it must be introduced in every combination in which it ever occurs.442 If we are given a proposition then with it we are already given the results of all truth-operations that have it as their basis.‖ ―( x). because it would then remain undecided whether its meaning [Bedeutung] in each case was the same. but the possibility of negation is already presupposed in affirmation. the other not. X=a‖ the same as ―fa.451 If logic has primitive concepts then they must be independent of each other. Fx. 72): ―The remark that ‗truth-functions are not material functions‘ (TLP 5.‖ 5.‖ Since the one proposition would then deal with ~. X=a‖ says the same as ―(x). [Schroeder (p.

so to speak.) If. the introduction of a new device has proved necessary in one place.(Briefly.453 All numbers in logic must be able to be justified. 5. Why suddenly words here? This would need a justification. Then they define what these combinations of signs mean. there can be no classification. When they later introduce quantifiers they have to explain how these work together with the negation sign. a wholly innocent face – in brackets or in a footnote. Russell and Whitehead first introduce signs for ‗or‘ and ‗it is not the case that‘. what Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik) has said about the introduction of signs through definitions goes. for the introduction of primitive signs. 5. then one must ask oneself straightaway: Where must this device now always be used? Its place in logic must now be made clear. however. (Thus in the Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead there appear definitions and basic laws in words. using ‗~‘ only where there are no quantifiers used. [Cf.) [In Principia Mathematica. 89) says that Wittgenstein is objecting to this piecemeal approach. mutatis mutandis. 6. since the procedure is actually forbidden.127. White (see p.452 The introduction of a new device in the symbolism of logic must always be an important event. In logic there cannot be a more general or a more specific.] 116 .454 In logic there is no coexistence. Or rather: it must be evident that there are no numbers in logic. No new device may be introduced into logic – with.] 5. There are no pre-eminent numbers. This is missing and must be missing.

It is not clear that Wittgenstein thinks there is no delusion here. there it is Ahnung. A field in which the proposition holds: simplex sigillum veri. but a little grandiloquent. Proops (p. 5. thus not only ―p v q‖ but already also ―~ (p v ~q)‖ etc. note 80. 27. People have always suspected that there must be a field of questions to which the answers – a priori – are symmetrical and form a closed. 268) points out that this was a motto of Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738) of Leyden.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple because they set the standard of simplicity. regular structure. but the most general form of their combinations.3211.461 The apparently unimportant fact that logical pseudo-relations like v and need brackets – in contrast to real relations – is of great importance [bedeutungsvoll]. The use of brackets with these seemingly primitive signs indicates [deutet] already indeed that these are not real primitive signs. And surely nobody is going to believe that brackets have an independent meaning.] 5. fx.‖ is superior to Ogden‘s. 117 .Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 5. incorrectly referred to as note 79 in the text on p. the noun (suspicion). Pears‘ and McGuinness‘s translation: ―mankind has always had a presentiment.‖ But this reminds me of 6.46 If one introduced logical signs correctly then one would also thereby have already introduced the sense of all their combinations. 26) suggests ‗had an inkling‘ where I have ‗suspected‘ as Ogden‘s ‗thought‘ ―risks making it sound as though Wittgenstein regarded the idea as some kind of delusion.‖ ―( x). etc. a form of the verb ahnen (to suspect).‖ Black (p. [The Latin means ―simplicity is the hallmark of truth.‖ etc. And thereby it would have become clear that the proper general primitive signs are not ―p v q. which uses the same root (here it is geahnt.. One would thereby also already have introduced the effect of all possible combinations of brackets.

One could say: the one logical constant is that which all propositions by their nature have in common with one another. x=a. 5. [Proops (p. 15): ―Wittgenstein‘s point is that the logical connectives share with punctuation marks the feature of lacking sense and reference while nonetheless having a meaning in their own right.4611 Logical operation signs are punctuation marks. Because ―fa‖ says the same as ―( x).5. thus the essence of the world. The propo118 .‖] 5. fx.4711 Giving the essence of the proposition means giving the essence of all description. Everything that is possible in logic is also allowed. are already all logical constants. Indeed all logical operations are already contained in an elementary proposition.473 Logic must take care of itself. 5. That though is the general propositional form.‖ Where there is complexity [compoundness] there is argument and function. 5. The point of the comparison with punctuation is to bring out that the logical connectives make a purely structural contribution to the meanings of the sentences in which they figure.472 The description of the most general propositional form is the description of the one and only general primitive sign of logic. 5. (―Socrates is identical‖ therefore denominates nothing [heisst darum nichts] because there is no property that ―identical‖ denominates. and where these are.47 It is clear that everything that can be said generally in advance about the form of all propositions must be able to be said all at once. A possible sign must be able to signify.471 The general propositional form is the essence of the proposition.

119 . 5. Cf. (Even if we believe that we have done so. and I say: Every possible proposition is legitimately constructed.] 5. can only become superfluous in logic by language itself preventing each logical mistake. and if it has no sense. or one justified by its practical success: it says that unnecessary symbolic units mean nothing [nichts bedeuten]. by accident. 5. but not because the symbol in and of itself would be forbidden. 490 and p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition sition is nonsensical [unsinnig] because there is some arbitrary definition that we have not made. the two symbols have only the sign [das Zeichen] in common with one another. 5. Signs that fulfill a single purpose are logically equivalent. 492 as good sources for his views on selfevidence. – That logic is a priori consists in the fact that nothing illogical can be thought. signs that fulfill no purpose are logically meaningless [bedeutungslos].4732 We cannot give a sign the wrong sense. then that can only be because we have given some of its parts no meaning. go wrong in logic.4731 Self-evidence.) So ―Socrates is identical‖ therefore says nothing because we have given no meaning to the word ―identical‖ as an adjective.47321 Occam‘s razor is of course not an arbitrary rule. [Black (p. 274) cites Russell‘s ―Philosophical Importance‖ p. which Russell spoke so much about. in a certain sense.) We cannot. Since if it occurs as the sign of equality then it signifies [symbolisiert] in a wholly different way – the signifying [bezeichnende] relation is different – thus the symbol too in each case is wholly different.1363.4733 Frege says: Every legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense. 5.

§92 of Frege‘s book. that must be signified. what it is saying about nonsensical ones draws directly on a way of spotting meaninglessness which we had all along.475 All that matters is to build a symbol system of a definite number of dimensions – of a definite mathematical multiplicity.‖ Black also cites vol. 2.] 5. but about the expression of a rule. That is. and thereby of the priority of the concept of the sense of a proposition over that of what the constituents of a proposition signify.‖ pp. 120 . She adds (same page) that ―Wittgenstein‘s disagreement with Frege amounts to a reassertion of the context principle. it looks as if. the Tractatus does not have anything new to tell us about the distinction between sense and nonsense. [Black (p. Diamond. 275) points to 4.[McGinn (p. a theory of nonsense.04 for more on multiplicity. for instance. presumably Wittgenstein did not think that you need the Tractatus to tell you that if there is some sign with no meaning in some combination of signs that looks as if it were meant to be a sentence. 162-163: Now. It does not offer. 242) says that the reference here is to §32 of Frege‘s The Basic Laws of Arithmetic.] 5. then the whole combination is not a senseful sentence. 5.474 The number of necessary fundamental operations depends only on our notation. in ―Peter Winch on the Tractatus and the unity of Wittgenstein‘s Philosophy. To spot a meaningless sentence by spotting a meaningless word in it is not to apply some general principle discovered for us in the Tractatus for spotting meaninglessness.476 It is clear that this is not about a number of primitive [or fundamental] concepts. In other words. whatever the Tractatus may be telling us about what our senseful propositions are.

‖ N( ) is the negation of all the values of the propositional variable ξ. which sounds too arbitrary.502 Therefore I write ―N( )‖ instead of ―(-----T) (ξ. (Thus if ξ has the three values P. according to which those propositions are constructed. 276) suggests ‗prescribed‘ and ‗prescription. How the description of the terms of the expression in brackets is done is not essential. …. 121 .‘ I follow Ogden. Giving a formal law. Black (p. whose values for all values of x are the propositions to be described. R. Q. ―ξ‖ is a variable whose values are the terms of the expression in brackets. In this case the terms of the expression in brackets are all the terms of a formal series.5 Every truth-function is the result of the successive application of the operation ―(-----T) (ξ.). This operation negates all the propositions in the righthand brackets and I call it the negation of these propositions. R). then ( ) = (P. …. We can distinguish three kinds of description: 1. 77) argues that Ogden‘s ‗determination‘ is preferable to Pears and McGuinness‘s ‗stipulation‘. The determination is the description of the propositions which the variable represents.] 5. Giving a function fx..)‖ to elementary propositions.501 An expression in brackets whose terms are propositions I indicate – if the order of terms in the brackets is indifferent – by a sign of the form ―( )‖.. Q. [Friedlander (p.) The values of the variables are to be determined. 3.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 5. Direct enumeration. In this case we can put in place of the variable simply its constant values. 5. and the line over the variables indicates that it represents all its values in the brackets. 2.

vol.503 It is clear that it is easily expressed how propositions can be constructed with this operation and how propositions are not to be constructed with it. 93. where Schopenhauer writes of ―the knowing part of consciousness‖ becoming ―the clear mirror of the world. 206 of vol. p. 61 of Letters to Ogden. 287-288): ―Man … is the most complete phenomenon of the will. 380. Friedlander (p. world-mirroring logic use such special hooks and manipulations? Only by all these being connected into [i.‖] 5. ~q (neither p nor q). that is.e.…).511 How can the all-embracing. so this must also be capable of exact expression.51 If ξ has only one value then N( ) = ~p (not p). This is the apprehension of the Ideas. 2. This is borne out by p. The intellect is the mirror of the world. N( ) is a multi-grade operator. 1.‖ Friedlander takes the ideas to be mirrors. it corresponds to the operation expressed by the sign (----T) ( ξ. pp. 5. if it has two values then N( ) = ~p. [My parenthetical comment follows p. in order to exist. this phenomenon had to be illuminated by so high a degree of knowledge that even a perfectly adequate repetition of the inner nature of the world under the form of representation became possible in it. the pure mirror of the world. note 4) notes Schopenhauer‘s reference to a mirror of the world (WWR. which is a two-place operator. as was shown in the second book. but it seems more natural to read this passage as calling man‘s apprehension of the Ideas the mirror of the world. 122 . so as to form] one infinitely fine network. and. 232): ―The operation expressed by N( ) is not strictly equivalent to Sheffer‘s stroke. for Schopenhauer.[McGinn (p.‖ Cf. the great mirror. 5. 216 and p. which jointly negates all the propositions that are the values of the variable ξ.

151): ―What is properly called thinking in the narrower sense is the occupation of the intellect with concepts. It is also expressed by the word reflection which. See also Schopenhauer‘s Fourfold Root (p. that ―p v ~p‖ says nothing. at the same time states the derived and secondary character of this kind of knowledge. He notes that Anscombe identifies the great mirror with language on p. 5. without the one or the other it has no support.‖ This ability. is the proposition ―p v q‖. How can the stroke ―~‖ now bring it to agreement with reality [or: the truth]? What negates in ―~p‖ is however not the ―~‖ but that which is common to all signs of this notation that negate p. and: Every proposition has only one negative.513 One could say: What is common to all symbols that assert p as well as q. And thus one can say: Two propositions are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common with one another. etc. q‖. Thus the common rule according to which ―~p‖.] 5. is the proposition ―p.121.‖ Black (p. 4. What is common to all symbols that assert either p or q. ~p‖. and hence all inner activity of the mind generally requires either words or pictures of the imagination. There are 42 entries under ―mirror‖ in the index to Schopenhauer‘s The World as Will and Representation. (ad infinitum) are constructed. Thus in the true proposition ―~p‖. 164 of her Introduction. etc.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Black (p. ―~p. 27) calls this image of a mirror the dominant image of the whole book. It is evident also in Russell‘s notation that ―q: p v ~p‖ says the same as ―q‖. 277) says cf. ―p‖ is a false proposition. ―~~~p‖. the presence in our consciousness of that class of representations here considered. because there is only one proposition that lies completely outside of it. is what places us above the animals. ―~p v ~p‖. 123 . And this commonality mirrors negation.512 ―~p‖ is true if ―p‖ is false. P. 153: ―All thinking in the wider sense. Schopenhauer says. as a metaphor from optics.

5.514 If a notation has been set down, then there is in it a rule according to which all propositions negating p are to be constructed, a rule according to which all propositions affirming p are to be constructed, a rule according to which all propositions affirming p or q are to be constructed, and so on. These rules are equivalent to the symbols and in them their sense is mirrored. 5. 515 It must be apparent in our symbols that what is connected with one another by ―v‖, ―.‖, etc. must be propositions. And this is indeed the case, because the symbol ―p‖ and ―q‖ itself presupposes ―v‖, ―~‖, etc. If the sign ―p‖ in ―p v q‖ does not stand for a complex sign, then it cannot have sense on its own; but then also the signs ―p v p‖, ―p. p‖, etc., which have the same sense as ―p‖, could have no sense. If however ―p v p‖ has no sense, then also ―p v q‖ can have no sense. [Black (p. 279) writes: ―The German text is puzzling and may have been printed incorrectly. I suggest (as an alternative to Pears and McGuinness) that the remark might read: ‗And this is so, for the symbol p in p v q itself presupposes ―v‖, ―~‖, etc.‖] 5.5151 Must the sign of a negative proposition be constructed with the sign of a positive proposition? Why should one not be able to express a negative proposition by means of a negative fact. (For instance: If ―a‖ does not stand in a specific relation to ―b‖, this could express the fact that aRb is not the case.) But even here the negative proposition is given indirectly by the positive proposition. The positive proposition must presuppose the existence of the negative proposition and vice versa. [Cf. 5.44.]


Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition

5.52 If the values of ξ are all the values of a function fx for all values of x, then N( ) = ~(x). fx. 5.521 I separate the concept all from the truth-function. Frege and Russell introduced generality in connection with the logical product or the logical sum. So it would be hard to understand the propositions ―(x). fx‖ and ―(x). fx‖, in which both ideas are contained. [See Anscombe pp. 141-143 on this. She says that Frege and Russell did not at all explicitly do what Wittgenstein says here. The relevant Frege paper is ―Function and Concept,‖ and Russell offers similar explanations of generality in his work. Frege explains his sign for generality in terms of what it means, and specifically in terms of when it means what he calls ―the true.‖ Wittgenstein believes that the truth of a general proposition is the truth of a logical product. Hence his claim here about what he takes to be implicit in Frege and Russell. Universal propositions (―For all x, …‖), he thinks, each say that some logical product is true, and particular propositions (―For some x, …‖) each say that some logical sum is true. White (p. 94) says that Wittgenstein‘s target here seems mainly to be what Russell says in Principia Mathematica.] 5.522 What is peculiar to the symbolism of generality is first, that it points to a logical prototype, and secondly, that it emphasizes constants. [I follow Black (p. 284) on the translation of hinweist as ‗points to.‘ What logical prototype? See 3.315.] 5.523 The symbol of generality occurs as an argument. [See Letters to Ogden p. 49: ―Here I want to use symbol and not symbolism because I refer to the variable x or y etc. in (x, y)… and not to the whole complex of symbols as before. I

own this is very dark but please leave ―symbol‖ here and don’t make it uniform with 3.24.‖] 5.524 If the objects are given, then all objects are thereby also already given to us. If the elementary propositions are given, then all elementary propositions are thereby also given. 5.525 It is incorrect to render the proposition ―(x). fx‖ in words – as Russell does – as ―fx is possible‖. Certainly, possibility or impossibility of a state of things will not be expressed through a proposition, but by the fact that an expression is a tautology, a meaningful [sinnvoller] proposition, or a contradiction. That precedent, to which one would always like to appeal, must already lie in the symbol itself. [Russell implies (e.g. in lecture V of Logical Atomism) that if something is possible then it is sometimes true. The ground for saying it is true would then be just the kind of fact that one wanted to say was possible. Anscombe (see p. 80) sees this view of possibility as a consequence of the picture theory, an undesirable one.] 5.526 One can describe the world completely with completely generalized propositions, which means therefore without initially coordinating any name with a particular object. In order then to get to the usual means of expression one must simply say ―And this x is a‖ after an expression ―There is one and only one x, such that…..‖ [Fahrnkopf (p. 49): "The second paragraph, which shows the replacement of an apparent variable by a name only for the case of 'a', a letter customarily used to represent an argument (i.e., a particular), is slightly misleading, because the point of talking about completely generalized propositions--as is made clear by 5.5621 as well as by the comparable discussion of

What this proposition says." "The point. and not with the aid of an identity sign.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition completely generalized propositions in the Notebooks--is that in such propositions even the function is generalized.5262 The truth or falsehood of every proposition changes something in the general structure of the world. φx‖ we must mention ―φ‖ and ―x‖ separately. "of the statement in 5.) 5. and not that only such things satisfy the function f as have a certain relation to a.5261 A completely generalized proposition is composed like every other proposition.. can be represented by apparent variables rather than by constants.562 that the description of the world can take place 'without first correlating any name with a particular object' is surely to stress that even those objects which are universals. x = a‖. then in any case there is thereby one more true elementary proposition. φ). as in an ungeneralized proposition. then.53 I express identity of the object by identity of the sign.g.) A characteristic of a composite symbol: It has something in common with other symbols. but in order to express this we would need the identity sign itself. One could of course say that in fact only a has this relation to a. Both stand independently in signifying relations to the world. 5. (This is shown by the fact that in ―( x. And the range that the totality of elementary propositions would allow its structure is exactly the same as that which completely general propositions delimit. 127 .5301 Identity is patently not a relation between objects. e. [I express] difference of objects by difference of signs. is simply that only a satisfies the function f. This becomes very clear if one considers." he continues. (If an elementary proposition is true. the proposition: ―(x) : fx. 5. . and thus represented by function-signs."] 5.

a = b‖ but rather ―f(a. y) . it still has sense. b) . fa: ~ ( x.01 for Russell‘s definition of identity which. y) .5. ( x) . [Anscombe points out (p. b)‖. but rather ―f(a. and not ―( x. (Even if this proposition is never correct. But in that case.f(x. definition 13. 149) that he is here allowing a way of saying that only one thing has f. This looks like a problem. fx: ~( x. y) . b)‖). ―it is difficult to see how he could avoid a way of admitting formulae which say ‗There are only n things and m functions‘ without using either ‗thing‘ or ‗function‘ as a function.fy‖.f(x.) 5. vol.] 5. y)‖: ―( x.f(x. e.] 128 .5303 Incidentally: To say of two things that they are identical is a nonsense [Unsinn].‖ Yet at 5. because according to it one cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common. a)‖ (or ―f(b. f(x.532 And analogously: Not ―( x. x = y‖.v. And the proposition ―only one x satisfies f( )‖ reads: ―( x) . b) .g. y) . y) . y) . not by some statement of how many objects there are. 5.fy‖.~x = y‖. y) .5302 Russell‘s definition of ―=‖ is inadequate. as Black notes on p. x). but rather ―( x) .f(x.f(x. ~a = b‖. (Therefore instead of the Russellian ―( x. 292.5321 Instead of ―(x): fx x = a‖ we therefore write.535 the number of objects is supposed to be shown by the number of names with different references. ―( x) . 5.) [See Principia. And what can be shown supposedly cannot be said. is based on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.f(x. And not ―f(a.531 Therefore I write not ―f(a.fx . y) .fx. 1. and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all [gar nichts].. x)‖. as Anscombe notes. x)‖. . y) .fx . but rather ―( x. y) .

And indeed this happens when one would like to speak of the prototype: Proposition.] 5. ―a = b . 5.535 Thereby also all problems that were connected with such pseudo-propositions take care of themselves. All the problems that arise from Russell‘s ―Axiom of Infinity‖ are ready to be solved here. but my translation is more literal. 5.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 5. where he says that if this axiom is not the case then ―it must be theoretically possible for analysis to reach ultimate subjects. ―( x) . cannot be written at all in a correct concept script. while Pears and McGuinness have ‗This also disposes of‘. It should be read as meaning ‗are dealt with by themselves‘ or even ‗dispatched by themselves. etc. What the Axiom of Infinity is supposed to say would be expressed in language by there being infinitely many names with different meanings. 142.x = a‖. ―(x) . [Ogden has ‗disappear‘ for erledigen sich. So maybe he doesn‘t want to ban them after all.‘ ‗Connected‘ could mean in one‘s mind as well as in reality. but that he says in 6. Thus Russell in the ―Principles of Mathematics‖ has rendered the nonsense [Unsinn] ―p is a proposition‖ in symbols with ―p p‖ and presented it as a hypothesis in front of certain propositions 129 . and it is these that give the meaning of ―particulars‖ or ―individuals.5351 There are certain cases where one is led into the temptation to use expressions of the form ―a = a‖ or ―p p‖ and such.x = x‖.‖‖ Black (p. etc. 296) notes that it sounds as though Wittgenstein wants to ban certain formulas as pseudo-propositions. b = c . a = c‖.534 And now we see that pseudo-propositions like ―a = a‖.2 that mathematics consists entirely of pseudopropositions. Thing.533 The identity sign is thus not an essential part of the concept script. See also Russell‘s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p.

But even if this were a proposition. because the hypothesis for a nonproposition as argument becomes not false but nonsensical [unsinnig]. (It is therefore already nonsense to put the hypothesis p p in front of a proposition in order to ensure that its arguments are of the right form. — would it not also be true.5352 Equally. as the senseless [sinnlose] hypothesis hung on it for this purpose. ‗P entails Q‘.54 gives us a direct method of criticizing ‗P entails Q‘.) Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance. ‗P‘ and ‗Q‘ are intended to be markers of the occurrence of propositions. immediately after §5. 72-73: ―At first it may seem as if Tractatus §5.] 5.54 suggests that ‗P‘ and ‗Q‘. [James Conant and Cora Diamond ―On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely. 46-99 in Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss (eds. if indeed ―There were things‖. So it looks as if §5. For. are not being used as propositional signs. or as badly. that a proposition may merely appear to be one in which propositions occur non-truth-functionally. therefore it saves itself from incorrect arguments just as well.541. but these were not identical with themselves? 5. the whole. but ‗entails‘ is plainly not a truth-functional connective. Routledge. pp. and because the proposition itself becomes nonsensical [unsinnig] with the incorrect kind of argument. in §5.whose argument places thereby could only be occupied by propositions. 2004. Since no other use has been assigned to them. That argument is inadequate.54. Wittgenstein tells us.54 In the general propositional form propositions occur in [other] propositions only as bases of truth-operations. x = x‖.‖ pp. 297) suggests that ‗antecedent‘ might be a better translation of Hypothese here. is nonsensical. as they occur in ―P entails Q‘. people have wanted to express ―There are no things‖ by ―~ ( x) . as the Tractatus indicates. What needs to be done in such a case is that the appearance of 130 .) [Black (p.

Contrast Frege‘s view that in the proposition ‗Copernicus thought that the planetary orbits are circular‘ ―the man and the thought occupy. Especially in certain propositional forms of psychology. etc.‖ etc.541 At first glance it seems as though there is another way in which a proposition can occur in another. the same stage‖ (Frege Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence ed.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition non-truth-functional occurrence has to be investigated. at least not in Logical Atomism. since then you could only ever have true beliefs. Hans Kaal. Moore. (And in the modern theory of knowledge (Russell. like ―A believes that p is the case. Russell does not know how to solve this problem. These are the problems that Wittgenstein appears to have pointed out to Russell.‖] 5. nor a non-existent Finland in which Hamlet lives. since people judge falsely sometimes. But then the relation becomes just another object. since propositions do not really exist. So how can we have false beliefs? How can we really believe something that is not the case? For instance. even though Hamlet does not live in Finland and there is no non-existent Hamlet who does so. p cannot stand for a fact. and how are they to be related to it? We cannot simply assume that the objects are related correctly in the judgment. in Theory of Knowledge. when you have a sentence like ‗A believes p‘.) those propositions have been understood in just this way. These objects include relations. so to speak. What you believe cannot be a logical fiction. We need to attempt to clarify the proposition which appears to be one in which propositions occur non-truth-functionally. Nor can p be a proposition. he treated propositions as functions of judgments. and that Russell wrestles with in Logical Atomism. Earlier. trans. but must be something real.‖ or ―A thinks p.) [According to Russell. Here it seems superficially as though the proposition p stands in a kind of relation to an object A. in ‗A believes Hamlet lives in Finland‘ ‗lives in‘ must be treated as a verb. so how is it to be related to the other objects. University of Chicago Press. Brian McGuinness. 131 . consisting of objects that the person making the judgment is acquainted with.

] 5. [Anscombe (p. it is not contingent that they mean p. 88) says: It is perhaps not quite right to say that ‗A judges p‘ is of the form ‗―p‖ says that p‘. but given their meaning. Of course. because what is believed must make sense.542 It is.‖ ―A says p‖ are of the form ―‗p‘ says p‖: And here it is not a question of a coordination of a fact and an object.‖ ―A thinks p. we do not have to be told what these say.] 132 . 86): ―The point is simply that B can convey to us what A says (or thinks) simply by telling us what sounds he utters. we can tell that for ourselves. How is this possible? Well. 164). though.1980. Mounce (pp. but he was certain that a thought must have constituents corresponding to the words of language. or nothing. was of the form ‗―p‖ says that p‘: ‗A believes p‘ or ‗conceives p‘ or ‗says p‘ must mean ‗There occurs in A or is produced by A something which is (capable of being) a picture of p‘. since we ourselves have a grasp of logical form. because these words possess logical form. what he should have said was that the business part of ‗A judges that p‘. first. the part that relates to something‘s having as its content a potential representation of the fact that p. We should here remember the letter to Russell in which he said he did not know what the constituents of thoughts were. and second because. 85-86) says that Anscombe makes a mistake here. clear that ―A believes that p. p. and the non-empirical fact that p means p.‖ Mounce also points out that what is believed is not an object in the ordinary sense. a man (Copernicus) and a thought (that the planetary orbits are circular). but rather of the coordination of facts by way of the coordination of their objects. She fails to distinguish between the contingent fact that a person A happens to have uttered p. According to Mounce (p. understand a language. the sounds or marks that make up p might have meant something else. Frege takes this sentence to relate two objects.

5421 This shows also that the soul – the subject.11.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its parts are combined in such and such a way. and vice versa. see 3. 113): ―Only an internal connection between the act of thinking or judging and the constitution of the judgment is capable of explaining why a subject cannot judge what is not sense. Because we quite truly [eben wirklich] see two different facts. then a appears in front. etc. PI §358. 5. A composite soul would by definition [nämlich] be no longer a soul. and so an act of meaning is not what gives sense to (otherwise meaningless) strings of words. Perhaps this also explains the fact that one can see the figure as a cube in two ways.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition ―A judges that p‖ must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense [einen Unsinn].) [Friedlander (p. what is nonsense. (Russell‘s theory does not satisfy this condition. (If I look first at the corners a and only cursorily at b.‖ Cf.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 5. is a nothing [Unding]. – as it is conceived in the contemporary superficial psychology. and all similar phenomena. One cannot mean a senseless string of words. On that idea.) 133 .] 5.

2. and PI 89. 3. [Black (p. not before the What.552 The ―experience‖ that we use to understand logic is not that such and such a thing is the case. See 5. but rather that something is: but that is no experience at all [eben keine Erfahrung].] 5.024 (identifying the What with Substance).5. Presumably Wittgenstein has Russell in mind here. 303) points to 6. then how could there be a logic.) [Black notes (p. 28-35 of PO. then this shows that we are on a fundamentally wrong track. 5. even if there were no world. Logic is before every experience – that something is thus. This was in 1929. since there is a world? 134 . Since we cannot give the number of names with different meanings [Bedeutung]. (And if we get into a state of things where we need to answer such a problem by looking at the world. ―This must be regarded as a temporary aberration. It is before the How. though.551 Our fundamental principle is that every question that can be decided at all with logic must be decidable without anything else.0271 (identifying the How with the contingent or changing).5521 And if this were not so.] 5.55 We must now answer a priori the question about all possible forms of elementary propositions. we cannot give the composition of the elementary proposition either. An elementary proposition consists of names. which he later repudiated.4.44. ―Some Remarks on Logical Form‖ is on pp.221.‖ according to Black. 2.1222. 6. 303) that Wittgenstein got onto precisely this ―wrong track‖ in his remarks on logical form. how could we apply logic? One could say: If there would be a logic.

‖] 135 . but gives no specific reference and suggests that Wittgenstein is only alleging that Russell supposes this. But between which numbers? And how should this be decided? – By experience? (There is no pre-eminent number. 304): ―The answers to all three questions are clearly intended to be in the negative.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 5.‖] 5.] 5. 304) says that Wittgenstein ―no doubt‖ has Russell in mind here again..553 Russell said that there were simple relations between different numbers of things (individuals). Letters to Ogden pp. e. that the correct answer to the initial question ―would be. but there is no a priori reason against it. 304) gives the reference here as p. where Russell writes: ―I see no particular reason to suppose that the simplest relations that occur in the world are (say) of order n. 5.g.5542 But may we then ask such a question at all? Can we erect a symbolic form and not know whether something could correspond to it? Does the question make sense: What must be in order that something can thereby be the case? [Wittgenstein says. 206 of Russell‘s Logic and Knowledge.554 The giving of any special form would be completely arbitrary.) [Black (p.5541 It is supposed to be possible to determine a priori whether I can get in the position. 33-34. that we may NOT!‖ Black (p. [Black (p. But it is ironical to notice that the third question expresses one of the main preoccupations of the Tractatus. of having to symbolize with the sign for a 27-termed relation.

but rather the full truth itself. 50).) [See PI §97.5. 136 . which refers to this.5561 Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit shows up again in the totality of elementary propositions. and must be. and not the individual symbols. that we should give here.‖ so he might be alluding to a Platonic illusion of pure simplicity. logically completely in order. On the same page. Hierarchies are. independent of reality. rather I must have to deal with what makes it possible for me to invent them. Only what we construct ourselves can we foresee. but possibly the most concrete that there are. (Our problems are not abstract. Propositions are just as OK in ordinary language as they are in any concept-script.556 There cannot be a hierarchy of forms of elementary propositions.5562 If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions. is not a likeness of the truth. 5. Wittgenstein says that ―That simplest of things‖ should be an expression parallel to ―the highest good‖ or ―the good and the beautiful. p. 5. where one can construct symbols according to a system. just as they are. However. then it must be known by everyone who understands the propositions in their unanalyzed form.5563 All propositions of our ordinary language are in fact. 5.555 It is clear that we have a concept of the elementary proposition irrespective of its special logical form. ―Only it is easier for us to gather their logical form when they are expressed in an appropriate symbolism‖ (Letters to Ogden. – That simplest of things. 5. And how would it even be possible that I should have to deal with forms in logic that I can invent. there this symbol is what is important logically.

96): ―note that (both in 5. 25) says that what Wittgenstein writes here and in the following remark show that to discover what objects are would require an empirical investigation.6 The limits of my language mean [bedeuten] the limits of my world.‘] 5.557 The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are. logic cannot anticipate. they do not produce it (cf. [Schroeder (p. then it must lead to obvious nonsense [offenbarem Unsinn] to try to give them.5571 If I cannot give the elementary propositions a priori. Anyway. This is clear: Logic must not collide with its application. [Black points out (p. 91) that this contradicts Russell‘s claim in his Introduction to the TLP that language only has meaning ―in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language which we postulate.511 and 6. 306) that wollen could be rendered as ‗to want‘ as well as ‗to try‘ here.13. Therefore logic and its application may not overlap each other. 306) suggests ‗touch‘ where I have ‗be contiguous with‘ and Pears and McGuinness have ‗be in contact with. Black (p. Logic and language reflect the form of the world.‖] 5. where logic is said to mirror the world).Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Anscombe points out (p. What lies in the application. TLP 5.62c) the limits of language are not said to be the limits of my world. but to mean or indicate them (bedeuten). [White (p.] 5.6 and 5. Wittgenstein nowhere entertains the idea that logic 137 . But logic must be contiguous with its application.

we therefore also cannot say what we cannot think. Ogden.‖ Wittgenstein might have discussed solipsism because of Russell‘s problems with knowing of other minds and with 138 . which in the foreword Wittgenstein said was the aim of the book.‖] 5. 255) points out that there is a sense of climax here.62 This remark provides the key to the resolution of the question. [Black (p. the limits of the world are also its limits. 167 footnote: ―Dr.‘ or. only it cannot be said. not that. perhaps.61 Logic fills the world. we cannot think. 309) says that meint should not be translated as ‗means‘ (as Pears and McGuinness. That would precisely [nämlich] seem to presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities and this cannot be the case. Lewy has found a copy of the first edition of the Tractatus with a correction by Wittgenstein giving ‗the only language that I understand‘.] 5. We therefore cannot say in logic: In the world there is this and this. to what extent solipsism is a truth.‘ ‗believes. and I have it) but as ‗intends‘ or ‗wants to say. [McGinn (p. but rather shows itself. C. see Anscombe p. since otherwise logic would have to be beyond the limits of the world.‘ It means something like ‗thinks. What we cannot think. when it could consider precisely [nämlich] these limits from the other side too. That the world is my world shows itself by the limits of language (the only language that I understand) meaning the limits of my world. of the limits of thought having been drawn. ‗has in mind.might be subjective in a transcendental sense: imposed upon the world by us. What solipsism itself [nämlich] means [meint] is completely right.‘ On the translation of the parenthetical remark.

the very issue Russell seems concerned with here: ―I say that the solution to the riddle of the world must come from an understanding of the world itself. there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true. 56. of these two very heterogeneous sources of knowledge‖ (WWR. See TLP 6. we can yet have knowledge by description of things which we have never experienced‖ (ibid. 337). volume II. On understanding language. 1988. (1947). 59). 444).51 on the idea that solipsism cannot be refuted (as Russell and Schopenhauer believed). In spite of the fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms which we have experienced in acquaintance. or Weininger (see Rudolf Haller Questions on Wittgenstein. carried out at the right point. therefore. since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge. Routledge. On solipsism and Wittgenstein generally. quoted in Magee p. 428). p. (p. If what solipsism means cannot be said. p. 1959.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition words‘ being able to mean anything other than immediate. 446-449.. see Russell: ―The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. that the solution to the riddle of the world is possible only through the proper connexion of outer with inner experience. p. private experience (see Glock p. Schopenhauer (see above). Cf. thus effected. and hence that the task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists. Schopenhauer linked the riddle of existence to the connection between inner and outer. In The Problems of Philosophy Oxford University Press. either in the Tractatus or at any other time‖ (Mind. Rush Rhees: ―Wittgenstein has never held to solipsism. and by the combination. 10) Russell writes that while solipsism ―is not logically impossible. I say. but to understand it thoroughly. can it be thought? And if not. can there be a meaning here to be correct? See 139 . 388. pp.‖ which is similar to Schopenhauer‘s dismissal of it. where he argues strongly that Wittgenstein was a solipsist of some kind. and the relation between this and the self. 95-96).5 on ―the riddle‖ and 6. see Glock pp.

) But then how could I say what the world is if the realm of ideas has no neighbour? What I do comes to defining the word ‗world. 269: ―We suppose for a moment that we have caught what the solipsist means without thinking of something that cannot be said as if it could be said.‘ ‗I neglect that which goes without saying.Morris and Dodd. And consciousness not physiologically understood.621 The world and life are one. but consciousness as the very essence of experience. p. Schopenhauer largely took his form of idealism for granted.631 There is no thinking. or understood from the outside.] 5. (The microcosm.‘ […] Back to ‗neglecting‘! It seems that I neglect life. 95) takes this as an expression of idealism that is not argued for but simply taken for granted. but a little reflection shows us that the very idea of what is meant is also the idea of what can be said. representing subject. Couldn‘t I say: If I had to add the world to my language it would have to be one sign for the whole of language.63 I am my world.‖ (PO. which sign could therefore be left out. as. in his ―Notes for Lectures on ―Private Experience‖ and ―Sense Data. 140 .‖ In the mid-1930s Wittgenstein wrote. 255): solipsism teaches us a lesson: It is that thought which is on the way to destroy this error. But not life physiologically understood but life as consciousness. [Schroeder (p. the world. the appearance of the world. p.) 5. (Solipsism stops short of saying this and says that it is my idea. For if the world is idea it isn‘t any person‘s idea. he says.] 5.

. 60) says that ―The ‗you‘ he addresses in 5. or rather to show that in an important sense there is no subject: Of it alone precisely could there not be talk in this book.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You say here it is just as with the eye and the field of vision. 101) notes that the ―representing subject‖ referred to here (―das vorstellende Subjekt‖) is a Schopenhauerian term. PI on the visual room §§398-400. while the metaphor of the limit hits the nail on the head.‖ On p. And nothing in the field of vision allows the conclusion that it is seen by an eye.] 5. But you do not really see the eye. the 141 . Wittgenstein‘s point is that the eye metaphor is misleading. 97) says that Wittgenstein‘s view is that there must be a subject if there is experience.632 The subject does not belong to the world.] 5. David Weiner (p.53. etc. Strictly speaking nothing can be said about the subject. – [Also bear in mind 6. Schroeder (p. rather it is a limit to the world. As such the subject does not belong to the world (of experience). At issue are Schopenhauer‘s two basic metaphors for the metaphysical subject. [and] this is precisely [nämlich] a means to isolate the subject. but can be thought of as a kind of boundary of the world or else identified with the world.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition If I wrote a book The World as I Found It then I would also have to report on my body in it and say which parts are subject to my will and which not. the eye suggests an empirical necessity that does not exist. the eye and the limit. but that the subject is not an object of experience. [Schroeder (p. [Cf.633 is Schopenhauer. with its experiences. 64 Weiner explains that ―According to Wittgenstein.

Everything that we can describe at all could also be otherwise. on the other hand captures a logical necessity that does exist. coincides with pure Realism. Everything that we see could also be otherwise. we really see everything as a hollow sphere in whose centre is our eye.‖] 5. 96: ―Thus since our power of vision reaches equally in all directions.64 Here one sees that solipsism. p. There is no a priori order of things. Now he suddenly is arguing with an unnamed interlocutor. pp.)‖] 5.‖ In a footnote referring to the p. 79-80. Weiner adds: ―By introducing the ―You‖ at 5. (See Notebooks 1914-16.‖ Compare Schopenhauer. The reason for this change of voice is that the passage derives from a segment of Wittgenstein‘s notebooks in which he is arguing against Schopenhauer.6331 The field of vision has precisely [nämlich] not a form such as this: [Friedlander (p. The I of solipsism 142 . The Fourfold Root. 60 passage just quoted (note 80 on pp.limit. 123-4).634 That no part of our experience is also a priori hangs together with this. 116): ―From the point of view of representation there is no limit whatsoever. Wittgenstein suddenly shifts from monologue to dialogue. This is the point of Wittgenstein‘s analogy between the visual field and the field of experience as such.633. Up to this point. 5. rigorously followed through. His voice has been like an oracle that casts out definitive truths to the world at large. he has simply been making assertions.

but it is impossible even to conceive such an object clearly‖ (WWR. namely that the intellect and matter are correlatives. 153) but this is only a possibility. both stand and fall together. This is the general form of propositions. pp. Wittgenstein‘s claim is in effect that ―all logical incompatibility is a matter of contradiction. They are in fact really one and the same thing. p.] 5. the one is only the other‘s reflex. II. 78) quotes a long passage from Schopenhauer WWR Vol. and this one thing—here I am anticipating—is the phenomenon of the will or of the thing-in-itself‖ (WWR. ―The fundamental mistake of all systems is the failure to recognize this truth. 6. a general form of the world (see 2. the one exists only for the other. not the human body. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the ―world is my world.‖ The philosophical I is not the human being. p.04). The general form of truth-functions is: [ . [McManus (p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition shrinks to an extensionless point. not something that Wittgenstein has proved must be the case.‖ (p. or the human soul that psychology deals with. but rather the metaphysical subject. II. For in143 . he suggests on p. N( )]. considered from two opposite points of view. . the limit – not a part of the world.‖ He sees it as problematic because no argument is really given in its favor and because it seems to bring metaphysical commitments with it. 141. II. 15-16). in other words. [Schopenhauer on realism: ―The aim of realism is just the object without subject.641 There is therefore really a sense in which there can be non-psychological talk in philosophy of the I. Weiner (p. 140) renders the idea here as that: ―Every proposition is an elementary proposition or a (possibly very complex) complex proposition. 193 in which Schopenhauer writes that in a sense an identity of the ideal and the real might be affirmed. and the reality coordinated with it remains. 12). If there is a general form of propositions then there is.

6. ―the formula at proposition 6 is radically incoherent‖ (p. I define 144 . Wittgenstein‘s notation gives us a rule for moving from a propositional variable to a proposition. according to White.] 6. N ( )]'( ) (= [ . 152) White says that Russell silently corrects the text of 6 in his introduction to the Tractatus. 6. another one can be produced. White says. e.02 And so we come to numbers.stance.. White (p. PG 269 and RPP I 38.002 If the general form is given of how a proposition is constructed.‖ Yet Wittgenstein has made a mistake. giving ―a satisfactory informal exposition of what Wittgenstein should have said. He later abandoned this assumption. N( )]). This is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another.‖ As written. then thereby already is given also the general form of how from one proposition. if a spot is red it cannot also be blue. 103). but what it is supposed to do is give us a rule for moving from one proposition to the next proposition in the series. In note 43 (p.g. 103-4). by means of an operation. or as good as does (see pp. (See. 6. 6.) At the time it probably seemed bland and inoffensive.001 fixes the problem. according to White. He later saw that it brought unwanted problems and commitments. . But is ―This spot is red‖ a contradiction of ―This spot is blue‖? Or could it be a kind of empirical knowledge that a spot cannot be both red and blue? Wittgenstein assumes that the meanings of the logical constants that connect elementary propositions into complex propositions are topic-neutral.001 This says nothing else than that every proposition is the result of successive applications of the operation N‘ ( ) to the elementary propositions.01 The general form of the operation ' ( ) is therefore: [ . 35) refers to 6 as ―the central claim to which the book builds up. the same in all contexts.

ξ + 1].02 is given the task of putting the abstract notion of the application of an operation at the bottom of the construction of arithmetic. x. And I define: 0 + 1 = 1 Def.031 The theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics. x]‖ instead of ―[x. Ω‘ Ω‘ x. …. x. the general form of the number.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition x = Ω0. Therefore I write ―[Ω0.022 The number concept is nothing other than the commonality of all numbers. x = Ων+1. but as the number of applications of a symbolic procedure. x. 187): ―The inductive definition at the outset of 6.03 The general form of integers is: [0. Ω0+1.‖] 6.021 A number is the exponent of an operation. Ω‘ x. x. And the concept of numerical equality is the general form of all particular numerical equalities. 0 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 Def. ξ. x. x. Ω‘ Ω‘ Ω‘ x. Ω0+1+1+1. x Def. Ων. 145 . 6. number is not construed as the number of elements of a class (of the extension of a concept proper). 0 + 1 + 1 = 2 Def. …. Ω‘ ξ]‖.. Ω0+1+1. thus: Ω0. Ων+1. whose iteration gives rise to a potentially endless formal series of propositions. ξ. (and so on) [Frascolla (p. In sharp opposition to the logicist programme [of Frege and Russell]. and Ω‘ Ων. 6. x Def. 6. The number concept is the variable number.. According to these symbolic rules [or: rules about signs] we therefore write the series x.

i.g. p. But then the number 2 depends on the existence of a class of couples. according to Burton Dreben and Juliet Floyd ―Tautology: How not to use a word. One could e. and suggests that it probably does not mean ―true by definition‖ or ―true in virtue of the meanings of its component words‖ here. 319-320) notes that this is the only occurrence of the word analytischen in the Tractatus.. And that was the point of using that word. And so on.‖ and it is not logically necessary that even one thing exists.] 6. Kantian sense. infinity (ibid. let alone 1000.e.) [Black (pp. nor is it used here in its original. And the number 1000 depends on the existence of 1000 things. according to our definition.11 The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. 18). p. this definition secures definiteness and indubitableness‖ (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. on the existence of couples. but rather is simply a synonym for ―propositions that say nothing. without study of the actual world. ―the class of all couples will be the number 2.. uses the word ‗tautology‘. that they are empty or insignificant. (They are analytical propositions. At the expense of a little oddity.‖] 6. But Russell admits that ―Logical propositions are such as can be known a priori.111 Theories that allow a proposition of logic to seem to have content are always false. pp. and then it would seem a remarkable fact that 146 . 204). at least as Russell. e.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies. 23-49. [Russell says. [This implies.] 6. believe that the words ―true‖ and ―false‖ signify two properties among other properties.That the generality that we need in mathematics is not the accidental [contingent] kind hangs together with this. or. he says.‖ Synthese 87 (1991).g. even worse.

Indeed.125 Wittgenstein puts ‗true‘ in scare quotes.112.113 It is the peculiar characteristic of logical propositions that one can perceive from the symbol alone that they are true. 108. And thus it is also one of the most important facts. and in his Notes to G. note 38). The fact that its parts connecting together just so gives a tautology characterizes the logic of its parts. and 6. Wittgenstein rejects a view called the universalist conception of logic. 6. given 4. [How can a tautology be true. 1) notes that here and in 6. at 6. 4. even if it were true. according to which ―logic is a theory of the most general features of reality.112 The right explanation of a logical proposition must give it a unique position among all propositions.] 6. every proposition now takes on completely the character of a natural scientific proposition and this is a sure sign that it has been falsely understood. that the truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions cannot be perceived from the proposition alone. just as little self-evident as the proposition ―All roses are either yellow or red‖ would sound. For propositions. That 147 .] 6. After all.13. This now seems to be anything but self-evident. 6. quoted in Proops). and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic.12 That the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal – logical – properties of language. 109 and p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition every proposition possesses one of these properties. they must have specific structural properties. to make a tautology.‖ which he found in Frege and Russell. connected in a specific way. E.06? Proops argues that he means ‗true‘ ―only in an honorary sense‖ (p.1231. Moore he says that ―logical propositions are neither true nor false‖ and refers to ―what is called the truth of a logical proposition‖ (Notebooks p. [Proops (p. of the world.

: and the coordination of the truth or falsity of the whole proposition and the truth-combinations of the truth-arguments with lines in the following way: 148 . 6. etc. 321) suggests ‗determinate. ―q‖. (p) : : (q)‖ give a tautology. 6. etc. in cases in which no sign of generality occurs in the tautology.g.1201 That. e. the propositions ―p‖ and ―~p‖ in the combination ―~(p. fx : : fa‖ is a tautology. instead of ―p‖.1202 It is clear that one could use contradictions instead of tautologies to the same end. That the propositions ―p q‖. shows that fa follows from (x) . ―r‖. e. ―p‖ and ―q‖ combined with one another in the form ―(p q) .. fx. ―TrF‖. etc.they make a tautology when so connected shows therefore that they have these structural properties.] 6. one can. etc. shows that q follows from p and p q. ―TqF‖. [I translate bestimmte as ‗specific. I express the truthcombinations with brackets. shows that they contradict one another.‘ ‗Definite‘ might be good too.1203 In order to perceive a tautology as such.‘ where Pears and McGuinness have ‗certain‘ and Black (p.g. ~p)‖ give a tautology. That ―(x) . avail oneself of the following method: I write ―TpF‖.

The form ―~ ‖ gets written in our notation as. ~q) goes thus: If we put here ―p‖ instead of ―q‖ and investigate the combination of the outermost T and F with the innermost.g. 149 .g.121 The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions. its falsity with none of the truth-combinations. the form ― . ~p) (the Law of Contradiction) is a tautology. e.. ‖ thus: So the proposition ~(p.. then we get the result that the truth of the whole proposition is coordinated with all the truth-combinations of its arguments. 6.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition This sign. the proposition ~(p. by combining them into propositions that say nothing [nichtssagenden Sätzen]. would therefore present the proposition p q. e. Now I will investigate on the strength of that whether.

since we can perceive in an appropriate notation the formal properties of propositions with a simple look at these propositions.122 From which it follows that we can go on without logical propositions.] 6.‖] 150 . every notation is suitable.‖ According to White (p. So that even if we continue to say that a tautology shows that it is such. If we then have propositions involving multiple quantifiers ranging over infinite domains. The strength of the current is measured not directly but by looking at what is necessary to bring about a state of equilibrium.One could also call this method a null method. 105): ―Wittgenstein goes badly astray in his development of this train of thought [i. ‗showing‘ cannot be treated as a straightforward epistemological concept. then even the most perspicuous notation may not be able to display the information that a given proposition is a tautology in a form that is surveyable by us. 1936] have shown that what he says at 6. [A null method is a method for measuring a current (or other force) by creating a balance so that the measuring apparatus indicates zero.e.122 is demonstrably false. he has to allow the possibility of quantification over infinite domains. it may not do so in a form that is recognizable by us: we may simply lack any method for extracting the fact that it is a tautology. [Black (p. that found in the 6. and subsequent developments in logic [Alonzo Church. 107): ―What Wittgenstein overlooks is that once he allows the possibility of there being infinitely many elementary propositions.‘ He adds that ―In a sense. 324) suggests ‗corresponding‘ for entsprechend where Pears and McGuinness have ‗suitable‘ and I have ‗appropriate. In a logical proposition.‖ White (p. This means that in this use of the concept of ‗showing‘ at least. propositions are brought into equilibrium with one another and the state of equilibrium then shows how these propositions must be logically constituted.1s].

we see from these two propositions themselves. ―All propositions are either true or false‖. p: : q‖ and now showing that this is a tautology. 127: ―Negation and disjunction and their derivatives must have a different meaning when applied to elementary propositions from that which they have when applied to such propositions as (x). 6.φx. Not only must a proposition of logic be capable of confutation by no possible experience. has become 151 . p. rather one is enough. two propositions ―p‖ and ―q‖ in the combination ―p q‖ give a tautology. 6. a unique law of contradiction for each ―type‖. 326) quotes Russell‘s Principia vol.1224 It becomes clear now also why logic has been called the theory of forms and of inference. but we can also see it by combining them into ―p q . p‖. since it is not to be applied to itself. 6. any more than they can be confuted by experience. That.g.‖ Also Logic and Knowledge (p.g. 6. e. then it is clear that q follows from p.1222 This throws light on the question why logical propositions cannot be confirmed by experience. for example.1221 If.) [Black (p. as Russell thought. 1. ―q‖ follows from ―p q ..1223 Now it becomes clear why it has often been felt as if ―logical truths‖ were ―postulated‖ by us: We can indeed [nämlich] postulate them in so far as we can postulate an adequate notation.123 It is clear: The logical laws must not themselves be subject to further logical laws.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 6.φx or (Ex). e.. (There is not. 63): ―The first difficulty that confronts us [after adopting the ―vicious circle principle‖] is as to the fundamental principles of logic known under the quaint name of ―laws of thought‖. but it must also not be confirmable by any such thing.

But it is clear that logic has nothing to do with the question whether our world really is thus or not. if true. for instance of the proposition ―All men are mortal. 152 .1233 A world can be conceived in which the axiom of reducibility does not hold. [Cf. 299 of the Cambridge Companion to Russell. Ramsey and Wittgenstein showed that the axiom was not necessary. An ungeneralized proposition can indeed be just as tautologous as a generalized one. This kind of thing belongs to logic. not just mathematical. and would come under its own scope. [Russell‘s Axiom of Reducibility says that any higherorder property or proposition can be reduced to an equivalent first-order one. If it were significant.‖ Propositions like Russell‘s ―axiom of reducibility‖ are not logical propositions.) Every propositional function is thus logically equivalent to a predicative function. it would be a proposition. To be general indeed means only: to happen to be valid for all things. The axiom is introduced because without it the ramified theory of types makes certain mathematical proofs impossible. about the class of classes not members of themselves as well as paradoxes about infinity. because it is necessary in order to overcome logical. in contrast to accidental general validity.1231 The mark of a logical proposition is not its general validity. and this explains our feeling that. in Russell‘s view. they could be true only by a propitious accident. paradoxes.‖] 6.g.] 6. It means that the same class is determined by two propositional functions that are equivalent. e.1232 One could call logical general validity essential.031 on kinds of generality.] 6. 6. (See p.meaningless.

must show. We said that much in the symbols that we use is arbitrary. 6. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense: And this is their connection with the world. (In fact from a tautology only tautologies follow.023. then all the propositions of logic are already given.126 One can figure out whether a proposition belongs to logic by figuring out the logical properties of symbols. in fact also according to the old conception of logic. 153 .1251 Hence there can also never be surprises in logic.) Of course this way of showing that its propositions are tautologies is thoroughly inessential to logic. The proof of a logical proposition consists in our being able to establish it from other logical propositions with successive applications of certain operations. but rather in logic the nature of the essentially necessary signs exhausts itself: If we are acquainted with the logical syntax of some sign language. They ―deal‖ with nothing.] 6. from which the proof starts out. It is clear that it must show [anzeigen] something about the world that certain combinations of symbols – which essentially have a specific character – are tautologies.42 and 4. And this is what we do when we ―prove‖ a logical proposition. Herein lies the decisive thing. Because the propositions. much not. Because without concerning ourselves with a sense [Sinn] and a meaning [Bedeutung] we construct the logical proposition from others according to mere rules for signs. [Black (p. 331) points out that the image of scaffolding (Gerüst) occurs also at 3. that they are tautologies. 6.125 It is possible.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 6. In logic only this latter expresses anything: That means however that in logic we do not express what we want with the aid of signs.124 Logical propositions describe the frame of the world. to give in advance a description of all ―true‖ logical propositions. or rather they present it. which produce ever more tautologies from the first one. indeed without proof.

‖] 6. then in the light of Church‘s Theorem of Undecidability of the first-order predicative calculus. (Hence no surprises. in logic every proposition is the form of a proof.1263 It would indeed be all too remarkable if one could prove a meaningful [sinnvollen] proposition logically from another. since no mechanical procedure can exist which enables us to decide.) 6. Why is all logic just this in different forms? Why 154 .‖] 6. 6. and a logical proposition too. the confused product of word-play. Begriffsschrift] shown simply in that ‗they‘ are shown up for what they are: namely. and if we call ‗mechanical‘ any procedure of calculation.1264 A meaningful proposition states something.e. therefore q. 85: ―ontological distinctions are now [with the right mechanical means. and its proof shows that it is so.[Frascolla (p. i. understood as a set of effective instructions for manipulating symbols. (And one cannot express the modus ponens with a proposition. p. 141): ―If we take the expression ‗logical proof‘ in its more general meaning. Wittgenstein‘s thesis is simply false.) [Modus ponens is argument of the form: If p then q. given any arbitrary formula of the first-order predicative calculus (which is included in the calculus of Principia Mathematica). Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens presented in signs.1262 Proof in logic is only a mechanical means to make perception of a tautology easier in cases where it is complicated.1261 In logic progress and result are equivalent. [McManus p. whether it is a tautology or not. It is clear in advance that the logical proof of a meaningful proposition and proof in logic must be two completely different things.

155 .] 6.13 Logic is not a theory [doctrine. [Black (p. What is p.127 All propositions of logic have equal rights [i. forming the logical product of Frege‘s basic laws [Grundgesetzen]. but rather a mirror-image of the world.] 6. hence pseudo-propositions. by simply. but a variable? Replace it with something specific and the general form goes away. there are among them no essential basic laws or derived propositions. after all.. The propositions of mathematics are equations. 6. 6. p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition can‘t this be expressed in a proposition? Perhaps because it is the general form that matters.1271 It is clear that the number of ―logical basic laws‖ is arbitrary. we don‘t have a proposition with real meaning. (Frege would perhaps say that this basic law is now no longer immediately selfevident. 341) quotes Ramsey‘s criticism: ―this is obviously a ridiculously narrow view of mathematics. But it is remarkable that so exact a thinker as Frege appealed to the degree of self-evidence as the criterion of a logical proposition.2 Mathematics is a logical method. Every tautology shows by itself that it is a tautology.g. since one could indeed derive logic from a single basic law. (legal) status]. But without such replacement. science].e.21 A proposition of mathematics expresses no thoughts. and confines it to simple arithmetic‖ (Foundations. e.1265 One can always conceive of logic in such a way that every proposition is its own proof.) 6. 6. Logic is transcendental. 17).

22 The logic of the world. But the essence of an equation is that it is not necessary in order to show that the two expressions that the equals sign combines have the same meaning [Bedeutung]. [White (pp.‖] 6. since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. which the propositions of logic show in tautologies.231 It is a property of assertion that one can understand it as double negation.211 In life it is indeed never the mathematical proposition that we need. (In philosophy the question ―To what end do we really use this word. we need to refer back to 4. But whether this is the case must be evident in the two expressions themselves.6. There they are described as only ‗representational devices‘ and that is what we need to understand if we are to interpret the claim that they are ‗pseudo-propositions‘.23 If two expressions are combined with the identity sign. this means that they are substitutable for one another.241-4.242. mathematics shows in equations. but rather we use mathematical propositions only in order to infer from propositions that do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics.) 6. that proposition‖ leads time and again to valuable insights.232 Frege says the two expressions have the same meaning [Bedeutung] but different senses [Sinn]. It is a characteristic of the logical form of two expressions that they are substitutable for one another. 109-110): ―To understand what Wittgenstein means by ‗equations‘. 156 . 6. It is a property of ―1+1+1+1‖ that one can understand it as ―(1+1) = (1+1)‖. 6.

233 The question whether one needs intuition to solve mathematical problems must be answered by the fact that language itself here supplies the necessary intuition. Calculation is not an experiment. Because in order to be able to assert something about their meaning. On this method depends precisely the fact that every proposition of mathematics must go without saying. to get to its equations.2341 The essence of the mathematical method is to work with equations. 342) thinks that ―identity‖ would be better than ―equation‖ here. 6.2321 And.2] 6.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 6. 6. 6. means indeed nothing other than that their correctness can be seen without it being necessary to compare what they express with the objects in order to determine its correctness. 6.24 The method of mathematics.2322 The identity of the meaning [Bedeutung] of two expressions cannot be asserted. [Cf. I know whether the meaning is the same or different.2331 The process of calculation brings about precisely this intuition. namely the standpoint of their equality of meaning. 157 .] 6. [Black (p. 6. that the propositions of mathematics can be proved. is the method of substitution.2323 An equation marks only the standpoint from which I regard the two expressions.234 Mathematics is a method of logic. 6. I must be acquainted with their meaning: and in being acquainted with their meaning.

e.Since equations express the substitutability of two expressions and we proceed from a number of equations to new equations by substituting other expressions in accordance with the equations. since it is clearly a meaningful [sinnvoller] proposition. 343) calls Wittgenstein‘s supposed proof here eccentric and incomplete. the idea that everything has a cause.. i. This.241 So the proof of the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 runs thus: ( 2×2 v µ ) 'x = v×µ 2 'x Def.] 6.] 6. – And therefore it also cannot be an a priori law. as he reads Wittgenstein. 345) points out that there is more than one ―law of induction‖ that Wittgenstein might have had in mind here.3 The exploration of logic means the exploration of all regularity [lawfulness]. And outside logic everything is accidental. Black (see p.32 The law of causality is not a law.2321. [Black (see p. So far as two events can be distinguished. 'x = 1+1' 1+1'x = 'x = 4'x. is not a law because it tells us nothing about the world. they must have some difference. [Mounce (see pp. and this difference can always be regarded as causally relevant. Saying 158 . 75-76) says that the law of causality is the law of sufficient reason. 'x = ( 2)2'x = ( 2)1+1'x = ( ' )'( ' )'x = ' ' ' 'x = ' 2 1+1+1+1 [See 6.31 The so-called law of induction cannot in any event be a logical law. but rather the form of a law. 6. 6.

345). the law of least action) ―into something new and really serviceable. 159 . properly speaking. If he is talking about the possibility of a certain kind of empirical generalization then.321-6. 346) points out that ―if form is itself a possibility. [Black (p.033 and 2.) 6. like the principle of sufficient reason. before it was known precisely how it went. of least expenditure in nature. 345) points out that at 2.‖] 6. p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition ―everything has a cause‖ then is not really reporting on a contingent generality but insisting a priori that every event will be interpreted as caused. as ever.] 6. the a priori certain proves to be something purely logical. laws of the causality form. 460): ―Maupertuis really had no principle. Black (p.321 ―Law of causality‖ – that is a generic name. but only a vague formula.151 Wittgenstein links form with possibility. Black (p.33 We do not believe a priori in a law of conservation. of continuity in nature.e. [On the law of least action. the phrase [i.36 ―the ‗law of causality‘ has been emptied of any determinate meaning‖ (p. He adds that by 6. but rather we know a priori the possibility of a logical form.3211 There was indeed also a presentiment that there must be a ―law of least action‖. Black thinks. but not with 6. which was forced to do duty as the expression of different familiar phenomena not really brought under one conception. 551 Mach adds that Euler changed the principle (i. And as we say there are minimum laws in mechanics.‖ On p. – such as that of the least action – so there are in physics laws of causality.34 All these propositions.34.e.‖] 6.36. this fits with 6. (Here. ―the possibility of a logical form‖] shows redundancy. 346) quotes Mach (Mechanics.

. e..342 And now we see the relative position of logic and mechanics. that it can be described by a net of a given form.) It says nothing about a picture. Mechanics defines a form of world description by saying: All propositions of the description of the world must be obtained from a number of given propositions – the axioms of mechanics – in a given way. (One could also have a net consisting of different kinds of shapes. Let us think of a white surface with irregular black spots on it. etc. Now we say: Whatever kind of picture these spots produce. as one can [write down] any arbitrary number with the number system. 160 .341 Newtonian mechanics.) 6. This form is arbitrary. I can always describe it as closely as you like by covering the spots with a suitably fine square netting and now say of every square that it is white or black. such as triangles and hexagons. you must somehow put together with these and only these building stones. In this way it supplies the building stones for the construction of the scientific edifice and says: Whatever edifice you want to build. Different systems of world description correspond to different nets. I will have brought the description of the spots to a unified form. one must be able to write down any arbitrary proposition of physics. and so on. (With the system of mechanics. It is possible that the description would have been simpler with the help of a triangular net. such as the one mentioned above. (Since this goes for every picture of this kind.] 6. since I could have used with the same success a net with triangular or hexagonal holes.etc. brings the description of the world to a unified form.) However it does characterize the picture that it can be completely described with a specific net of a specific fineness.g. all these are a priori insights concerning the possible fashioning of propositions of science. [Black (p. 346) says that in a letter to Russell (129. meaning that we could have described the spots more closely with a bigger triangular net than with a finer square one (or vice versa). In this way. 2) Wittgenstein treats ―principle of sufficient reason‖ and ―law of causation‖ as synonymous.

Laws. 6. But the net is purely geometrical. 361) says that this should be read in connection with 6.35 Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures. throughout the physical laws still speak of the objects of the world. like the principle of sufficient reason. as opposed to applied. 35) says the word ―through‖ at the beginning of this sentence means the same as in ―I speak through a tube.‖ Black (p. In it there is never.g. geometry.35. 361) says that ―purely geometrical‖ is a reference to pure.] 161 . deal with the net. [Black (p.‖] 6. e.3432 We must not forget that the description of the world with mechanics is always completely general.. but [it does say something] that it can be described in that particular way in which indeed it is described.343 Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to one plan all true propositions that we need for a description of the world.3431 Through the whole logical apparatus.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Thus too it says nothing about the world that it can be described with Newtonian mechanics. but rather always only about any such points. geometry can still obviously say absolutely nothing about their actual form and position.] 6. [Pears and McGuinness have ―point-masses‖ for ―material points. etc. 6. It also says something about the world that it can be described more simply with one mechanics than with another.. [Wittgenstein (Letters to Ogden p. not with what the net describes. talk of particular material points. all its properties can be given a priori.

Unfortunately. it is at least possible that the idea that the world is all that is 162 . 362) says.6. lawful] combinations [connections] are thinkable. Where one.361 In Hertz‘s way of speaking. then we can understand this as the reason for the occurrence of the one and the non-occurrence of the other.3611 We cannot compare any process with the ―passage of time‖ – there is no such thing – but rather only with another process (perhaps with the working of the chronometer).] 6. one could say: Only regular [law-like. Hence the description of a temporal process is only possible if we rely on another process. Exactly the same kind of thing goes for space. [Pears and McGuinness have ―subject to law‖ instead of ―regular. He suggests (pp.136. 362-3) that Wittgenstein might have had in mind something like this passage from Hertz‘s Principles § 109: ―There exists a connexion between a series of material points when from a knowledge of some of the components of the displacements of these points we are able to state something as to the remaining components.‖ But of course one cannot say that: it shows itself. And if there is such an asymmetry. there it is really a matter of one not being at all able to describe one of the two events without some asymmetry existing. because no reason exists why the one rather than the other should occur.54. then it could read: ―There are laws of nature. 128-133. e. says that neither of two events (that are mutually exclusive) can occur. [Cf. given 6.g. 35).‖] 6.. the allusion to ―Hertz‘s terminology‖ is obscure.36 If there were a law of causality. as Black (p. [Nordmann criticizes Wittgenstein for being ―caught in the present‖ in the Tractatus on pp.‖ Ogden has ―uniform‖ even though Wittgenstein said this was wrong and told him to look up the English translation of Hertz (Letters to Ogden p. But. 5.

194).e. 194. That is. where the two congruent figures a and b also cannot be made to cover each other without moving them outside this space: ---o——x--x——o--a b Right and left hand are actually completely congruent. Schopenhauer refers to it twice in the Fourfold Root. 40 and on p. not explained from concepts alone. In Letters to Ogden pp. that one cannot make cover each other. His claim is that the difference between a left glove and a right glove can only be seen. A right-hand glove could be put on the left hand if one could turn it around in four-dimensional space. Wittgenstein writes: The figure s<c>hould be thus -----o——x-----x——o a b I. It is. on p. Nordmann regards the book as being written in the subjunctive mood. 61-62. The idea is that space is thereby shown to be an a priori form of intuition. [This problem is discussed by Kant in the Prolegomena. it cannot ―be made intelligible except by means of intuition‖ (p.] 6. indeed in one-dimensional space. the little cross and the circle should be just at the end of each line and not at a distance from it and they should be quite 163 . exists already in a plane. he thinks.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition (present tense) the case is meant to be overcome and discarded. a kind of reductio.36111 The Kantian problem of the right and left hand. Indeed. And the fact that one cannot make one cover the other has nothing to do with it. since such differences in space must be intuited.

e. 102-105. Kant had realized it was based ‗upon a false view of the understanding‘ (op. pp. Black (pp.36111. according to Kemp Smith. p.)] 6. W. It was omitted from the second edition of the Critique—because. the possibility of non-identical counterparts does not square with 6.3611 (3)—unless we take W. This is different from the configuration given in 6.362 What can be described can also take place. 363) says that according to Kant things such as left and right hands or gloves can be ―exactly alike in all spatial respects‖ and yet do not fit the same space. says that the impossibility of making counterparts fill the same space (at least without entry into a higher dimension) leaves their congruence unchallenged. they are different. but the understanding cannot (according to Kant) grasp it. and Mach in turn credited Möbius as the source of the idea. But Kant would readily have agreed: W. does nothing to explain how the congruent counterparts can be numerically distinct. i. Black (p. On the face of it. which was Kant‘s puzzle. In intuition we get the difference. Henk Visser in ―Wittgenstein‘s Debt to Mach‘s Popular Scientific Lectures‖ Mind (1982) Vol. 164 . 165).small. VCI. cit. but presumably that is not Wittgenstein‘s intention. and what is supposed to be excluded by the law of causality cannot even be described. 3634): Kant used the argument several times—and to prove opposite conclusions. says that what Wittgenstein says about Kant is conspicuously similar to what Mach says on the same issue. for they should just mark that the two ends of each line are different. to be suggesting that the counterparts must have different causal antecedents by which alone they can be distinguished? (And this is now close to Kant‘s conclusion.

6. [Black (p.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 6. but is not consistent with it. whereas in the new system it is supposed to seem as if everything were explained.3631 This process though has no logical.371 At the root of the whole modern worldview [Weltanschauung] lies the mistaken view [or: illusion] that the socalled laws of nature are the explanation of natural phenomena. 165 .36311 That the sun will rise tomorrow is an hypothesis.363 The process of induction consists in our assuming the simplest law that can be brought into unison with our experiences. The ancients are certainly clearer in so far as they recognize a clear conclusion.373 The world is independent of my will. 365) says that this resumes the argument of 6.37 There is no force such as to necessitate one thing‘s happening on the strength of another thing‘s having happened. It is clear that there exists no ground for believing that the simplest case will also be the actual one that comes to be. 6. as the ancients stopped at God or fate.31. and seems to think that it has nothing else to be said for it. 6. [Anscombe (see p. And indeed they are both right. There is only a logical necessity. but only a psychological grounding.372 Thus they stop at laws of nature as at something sacrosanct. and that means: we do not know whether it will rise. 80) says that this view about necessity is a direct consequence of the picture theory.] 6.] 6. and wrong. 6.

space. I. but only the will is noumenon or thing-in-itself. The will does not cause actions. ―The will as thing-in-itself is quite different from its phenomenon. The relation between acts of will and bodily acts is one of identity. Anscombe sees the independence of the will and the world here and in 6. Plurality cannot apply to it. TLP 5. then we must borrow its name and concept from an object …‖ (WWR. since this concept belongs to the phenomenal. if I am not to remain uncomprehended or misunderstood‖ (WWR. 80-81. See Anscombe pp.. so to speak. be a gift of fate. Magee says that Schopenhauer was aware of a difficulty here. and is entirely free from all the forms of the phenomenon . I. p. p. But I see quite well that the reader‘s own observation must help me a great deal.631. 112). if this thing-in-itself (we will retain the Kantian expression as a standing formula)—which as such is never object. is phenomenon. The will is not a phenomenon. so acts of the body are acts of the will. and causality.[Will is a very tricky notion for Schopenhauer. such as force or energy.. I. In a sense the will (noumenon) is the body (phenomenon). then this would still only. 140-144. since all object is its mere appearance or phenomenon. 145). ―Now. All idea. and not it itself—is to be thought of objectively.] 6. p. all object. Cf. Hence it is independent of time. not cause and effect.374 as undesirable consequences of the picture theory and the theses about modality that it implies. and decides only ―with some misgiving‖ to give it a name: will.) ―I wish it had been possible for me by clearness of explanation to dispel the obscurity that clings to the subject-matter of these thoughts. and it is not even an object in the first place. Magee thinks the problem would be solved if only Schopenhauer gave the noumenon a less misleading name. 110). since there is no 166 . to the realm of time and space.374 Even if all that we wished happened. See Magee pp. (But surely unity cannot apply to it either.‖ (WWR. so it can never be a cause. discusses it at length.

375 As there is only a logical necessity. since this is excluded by the logical structure of color. meaning that it cannot be in two places at the same time. state nothing. and logical necessity is a matter of tautologousness. ―The Tractatus eschewed both psychologism and Platonism. 6. e. Let us consider how this contradiction presents itself in physics. [Hacker (p. two colors to be at the same point in the field of vision. All necessity is logical necessity (TLP. The expression that a point in the field of vision has two different colors at the same time is a contradiction. The nature of necessity had bewildered and bedazzled philosophers for twenty-five centuries.‖ Hacker identifies two main types of theory: Platonism. For tautologies describe nothing. 6. that is. 50): ―Wittgenstein‘s explanation of the nature of logical necessity is.. and the assumed physical connection itself we could surely not in turn will. Approximately thus: That a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time.g. Tautologies are neither about mental objects nor about abstract Platonic objects.4 All propositions are of equal value.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition logical connection between will and world that would guarantee this.‖] 6. in a sense. which understands necessary truths to be ―descriptions of the properties and relations of special kinds of entities. meaning that particles in different places at one time cannot be identical. which treat them as being about human ideas or ways of thinking.3751 It is impossible. 167 .) 6. According to Hacker. the high point of the Tractatus. are about nothing.375). Nor do they state what are the most general features of the universe. so there is also only a logical impossibility. (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can be neither a tautology nor a contradiction.‖ and psychologism. logically impossible. They do not describe the laws of human thinking or the putative super-physical laws of abstract entities. for.

If there is a value. there is no value in it – and if there were. then it must lie outside all happening and being-so.41. 6.421 It is clear. the entire construction is based on a certain kind of experience. since. since otherwise this would again be accidental. then it [i. Ethics is transcendental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it happens. which is of value. 367). mere moralizing. by 6.] 6.e. cannot have any effect. since the principle of individuation applies only to the phenomenal. [Stokhof (p. because it does not motivate. Propositions can express nothing higher. (Ethics and aesthetics are one. that is.[Black (p. 168 . and yet in truth there is only one will.‖ Schopenhauer: ―Morality without argumentation and reasoning. 370) says that the value in every case is zero. Now what springs from this has no moral worth‖ (WWR I p.) [According to Schopenhauer every living being is essentially egoistic.41 The sense of the world must lie outside of it. ‗Wrong‘ is what we call one will‘s encroaching on another. Since all happening and being-so is accidental.] 6. It must lie outside the world. that ethics cannot be articulated. this value] would be of no value. no significant proposition expresses anything of value. (Analogously. there is no argument for the absolute status of logic either.) In other words.42 Hence there can also be no propositions of ethics. But a morality that does motivate can do so only by acting on self-love. 239): ―Neither the Tractatus nor the Notebooks contains any argument or reasoning to establish the existence of values or their absolute character.

chapters 47-49). 2. 412). that the reward must be something agreeable. but it is the nature of the will always to desire more.‖ Wittgenstein avoids all these problems by distinguishing.423 Of the will as the bearer of the ethical. And the will as a phenomenon is interesting only to psychology. but these must lie in the action itself. if I don‘t do it? It is clear. the blind force. So ‗good‘ and ‗evil‘ are relative terms and ―absolute good‖ is a contradiction in terms. and TLP 6. There must certainly be a kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment. (And this too is clear. 24.] 6. 3) the cosmic will. Since something must be right in the putting of this question. between good and bad willing (see Notebooks 21.43). ‗evil‘. ―is so quintessentially undesirable. the thing in itself. and 29/7/16. the punishment something disagreeable.‖ is: And what then. rarely. What is on the side of our will we call ‗good‘. Glock notes three problems with Schopenhauer‘s ethics (see pp. never to be satisfied. 2) the denial of the will is itself an act of will. So there can be no such thing: the concept is self-contradictory.) 6. (See WWR I §65). that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. ‗Right‘ is a negative term. however. 442-43): 1) they seem to require both denial of the will and altruistic willing in the form of compassion (see WWR vol. ―will turning against itself‖ (WWR vol. p. it is difficult to see how the mystical experience of feeling at one with this will should provide a kind of moral salvation.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition seen at its extreme in cannibalism. 169 . meaning only the opposite of this.422 The first thought at the setting up of an ethical law of the form ―thou shalt…. nothing can be said. and what is opposed to it we call ‗bad‘ or. I. The highest or ultimate good would be something that so satisfies the will that it never wanted again. Therefore this question as to the consequences of an act must be irrelevant. Glock says. – At least these consequences should not be events.

See WWR I: 373-4. 232. I think. 35).‖ (But. Wittgenstein seems to have lived like a Cynic. as far as that can be done. 229-231. 96): ―Wittgenstein does not mean that the ethical attitude is itself a matter of temperament. only the second half of this equation holds. What Wittgenstein really means by the ‗good exercise of the will‘ is a version of asceticism. On the contrary. Schopenhauer contrasts altruism with egoism in a way that comes readily to mind when reading TLP 6. See Young p. 170 . Egoism concentrates. though. 230).43 If good or evil willing alters the world. we need not only detachment from desire (Stoicism) but the abandonment of desire (Cynicism). not that which can be expressed through language. while altruism expands. 3. July 2004. In short. who cites Schopenhauer WWR II: 155-6. According to Schopenhauer. then it can only alter the limits of the world. 79. choosing poverty and asceticism. not the facts. ―That Wittgenstein‘s waxing/waning metaphor so strongly recalls Schopenhauer‘s expansion/contraction metaphor makes it look as though Wittgenstein‘s person of ‗good will‘ is the Schopenhauerian altruist and the person of ‗bad will‘ is the Schopenhauerian egoist. [Pears and McGuinness have ―happy man‖ even though Wittgenstein explicitly asked Ogden to remove the word ―man‖ from the translation (see Letters to Ogden p. Friedlander asks. See David Wiggins ―Wittgenstein on Ethics and the Riddle of Life. the world must then thereby become an altogether different one. In fact. p. So it is not about altruistic willing.‖ Philosophy Vol. and Young.] 6. It must.[This sounds very Schopenhauerian. but rather giving up willing altogether. No. pp. of Schopenhauer‘s ‗denial of the will‘‖ (Young. 363-391. on this passage. wane or wax as a whole.43. Mounce (p. The world of the happy is a different one than that of the unhappy. one‘s temperament is just another of the facts towards which one has to adopt an ethical attitude. pp. so to speak.

E.‖ Cf. Will. 171 . but rather stops. But what happens if another person – an unhappy one – does not have the same experience as I do? Moore answers firmly. they include such experiences as the pleasures of personal experience and the contemplation of beautiful objects. See PI §644.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition ―what is an attitude toward the world. Wittgenstein sees the world as good and independent of my will. Wittgenstein was manning the searchlight at night on a boat in Russian territory and. ―and in that sense is like Schopenhauer‘s good will.‖ The idea that the will cannot change the facts has a biographical underpinning according to Schroeder (see pp. 6. Anscombe calls the will that alters the limits of the world but effects nothing in it ―chimerical‖ (p. Wittgenstein‘s good will is not concerned with how things are. A happy person is the one who enjoys the most valuable ―unmixed goods.] 6. 172). consequently. resides in what we do. Moore. and regards both as bad. a target for the enemy. she says that Schopenhauer identifies the world with my will. that such a person literally perceives a different object. we must conclude literally that the unhappy philistine has different objects in his world than my objects of experience. like intention. she suggests. One does not live through death. true to his realist doctrine of the objects of experience. If we simply add to these Moorean conclusions the Wittgensteinian idea that the objects that constitute the substance of my world are the object of my experience. 73 and Tractatus 5. and in what sense is it not part of psychology?‖ (pp.‖ According to Moore. 102103).4311 Death is not an event in life. however it is. it accepts the world as it is. Notebooks p. Similarly. Mounce insists.5423.431 As too at death the world does not change.43: ―Where does this mysticalsounding view come from? The right answer is: G. 15) asks of 6. Hintikka (p. In a footnote on p. Clearly he was not in control of his fate at this time. 172. Schopenhauer‘s idea of a good will is one that denies itself. 197-198)) The stuff about the world of the happy is only an analogy.

432 How the world is. 36. meaning therefore its eternal survival even after death. I think it is. Our life is just as endless as our field of vision is limitless. 36. but in the first place this assumption does not at all do what people have always wanted to achieve with it.If one understands eternity not as an endless period of time but as timelessness. 6. Wittgenstein says the word should be appropriate for. p. not to the correct response to it.] 172 . [―Correct response‖ instead of ―solution‖ because in Letters to Ogden.4312 The temporal immortality of the soul of man. [Wittgenstein suggested ―without limit‖ instead of ―limitless. says: ―I don‘t w<h>ish that there should be anything ridiculous or profane or frivolous in the word when used in the connection ―riddle of life‖ etc. so I have left it in.g. Wittgenstein. then not just as mysterious as the present one? The solving of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside of space and time.4321 The facts all belong only to the assignment. It is a more literal translation of the German grenzenlos. then he who lives in the present lives eternally.‖ but only on the grounds that ―limitless‖ is not normal English. p. reveal] himself in the world.) [―Mystery‖ might perhaps be better than ―riddle‖ here. the digging of a hole when someone tells someone to dig a hole. because I survive eternally? Is eternal life.] 6. on this account. God does not disclose [or: manifest. is not only in no way guaranteed. is completely indifferent for what is higher. Is a riddle thereby solved. (It is indeed not problems of natural science that are to be solved. in Letters to Ogden.‖] 6. e.

then one also cannot articulate the question. 2001.4312. If a question can be put at all. 2004) suggests that the reference here and in 6. Cambridge University Press.] 6. Edwin Mellen Press.‖ see Letters to Ogden.45 The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a – limited – whole. The riddle does not exist. On Last Things. while the riddle of life is the riddle of time. On pp. 1904-1907.44 The mystical is not how the world is. and claims that. 36-37.‖ although he prefers simply ―the mystical. In Letters to Ogden. pp. p. The riddle of the world is said to be the riddle of dualism. 128129 Schulte quotes Weininger to the effect that ―the deepest problem in the universe‖ is constituted by the riddle of life together with the riddle of the world. but rather that it is. Weininger links the fact that life is not reversible with the meaning of life. ―The unidirectionality of time is … identical with the fact that the human being is at bottom a being that wills‖ (Otto Weininger and Steven Burns A Translation of Weininger's Über Die Letzten Dinge. [The second sentence refers back to 6. then it can also be answered. Stern and Béla Szabados (eds.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 6. and considers the translation ―the mystical feeling. 37) that his reference here to ―the riddle‖ ―means as much as ―the riddle ‗par excellence‘‖.) Wittgenstein Reads Weininger. As Schulte notes. Wittgenstein says (p.5 If it requires an answer that one cannot articulate. 89).4312 might be allusions to Weininger. there is a lot of irony and pa173 . 6. 132 of his essay in David G. [Wittgenstein says ――das mystiche‖ is an adjective belonging to ―Gefühl‖ here. The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical.‖ Joachim Schulte (p.

if it would doubt where nothing can be asked. Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason: ―To know what questions may reasonably be asked is already a great and necessary proof of sagacity and insight. the problems of our life would still not have been touched at all. it not only brings shame on the propounder of the question.521 The solution of the problem of life is perceived in the vanishing of this problem. the ludicrous spectacle of one man milking a he-goat and the other holding a sieve underneath‖ (A 58/B 82-83). 6.] 6. and this only where something can be said.51 Skepticism is not irrefutable. After all. (Is not this the reason why people to whom the meaning [Sinn] of life has become clear after long doubt could not then say in what this meaning consists?) [Anscombe says (p. Wittgenstein discusses the unidirectionality of time in Notebooks 12th October 1916. Since doubt can only exist where a question exists. but may betray an incautious listener into absurd answers. and just this is the answer. but rather manifestly nonsensical [offenbar unsinnig]. For if a question is absurd in itself and calls for an answer where none is required. thus presenting. [Cf. as the ancients said.radox in Weininger. a question only where an answer exists.52 We feel that even if all possible questions of natural science were to be answered.] 6. 170) that this shows that Wittgenstein does not think all thoughts of the meaning of life are nonsense. which makes interpreting such remarks difficult. how could it become clear unless it could at least be shown?] 174 . Of course there would then be no more questions remaining.

‘ It is not the same as ‗unsayable‘. This method would be unsatisfying for the other person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – but it would be the only strictly correct one. Anscombe (p. 50-51) argues that unaussprechlich should be translated ‗inexpressible in speech.41 (see Nordmann p.44 but not the same as 6. 198-199 he writes: ―That the words ―there is indeed the inexpressible in speech‖ are nonsensical and have no sense makes the point that there is. 194).‖ Nordmann (pp. This shows itself.522 There is to be sure the inexpressible.542‘s ―‗p‘ says p‖). and is therefore ungrammatical. but must contemplate without words. Wittgenstein says that das Mystiche here is the same as in the case of 6. Frege never defines ―course-of-values. 37. but refers rather to the ability (or inability) of a human subject to get something out in language. the inexpressible in speech.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition 6. Nordmann contrasts the expressible in speech with what is expressible in music.53 The right method for philosophy would properly be this: To say nothing other than what can be said. to point out to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. He says it cannot be 175 . if another wanted to say something metaphysical.‖ for instance. On pp. and then always. thus propositions of natural science – thus something that has nothing to do with philosophy –. 4. See Basic Laws vol. it is the mystical. gesture. indeed. 19): ―There is indeed much that is inexpressible—which we must not try to state. He sees this remark as following from the denial of what needs to be denied in order to avoid the contradiction in 6.‖] 6. since a proposition can say (as in 5. or conduct. [In Letters to Ogden. So perhaps it is not a feeling. [Consider the method advocated here in possible application to Frege. p.115 is the only place in the Tractatus where Wittgenstein mentions the sayable and the unsayable. 2 §146.45. Yet he also sees this remark itself as nonsensical because it fails to establish a subjectpredicate relation.

257) that there is an implicit claim here about all attempts to say something philosophical. Routledge 2004. each criticism would be ad hoc. pp. that the method pursued in the Tractatus is not the ‗correct‘ one. Wittgenstein speaks of a reader who has been helped by the book in the way he intends as one who understands him. could never be of any very simple general form. But in such cases.) He must overcome these propositions. putting forward a verificationist criterion of meaning. 377): ―It will be noticed. Black (p. 32-45). is to give hints as to the meanings of such terms. then he sees the world rightly. even though he uses the concept a lot and introduces it as early as §3.54: ―First. [Peter Sullivan ―What is the Tractatus About?‖ (in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance edited by Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss. so to speak. In this way he carefully avoids offering any ground for an accusation of double-think. It is perfectly intelligible that the utterance of nonsense may serve in some context to con176 .] 6. according to the principles of the Tractatus.defined. not one who understands his propositions. a claim that seems to stand in need of some argument. All that he can do. 39-40 notes two aspects of 6. As such it would seem to be itself a philosophical claim.‖ Morris and Dodd point out (see p. (He must. pp. he has climbed out. for instance. and hope that the reader gets the idea. it is possible that the author himself has failed to give a meaning to his term.54 My propositions elucidate by whoever understands me perceiving them in the end as nonsensical. when through them – upon them – over them. throw away the ladder after he has climbed out upon it. he says. Weiner points out (see pp. and fall within the subjectmatter with which the sentence professed to deal. 151): ―The criticism of sentences as expressing no real thought. Anscombe (p. 159160 of Reck).‖ Wittgenstein is not. of course.

199. I. Black (p. Wittgenstein describes here the way an understanding reader will be helped. London: Jonathan Cape.54: ―the idea is that the Tractatus‘s incoherence—the fact that it is nonsense. Franz Mautner and Henry Hatfield. e. 53. 2.‖ From Georg Christoph Lichtenberg Aphorisms and Letters ed. we suggest.‖ Morris and Dodd (on p. 377) also quotes Sextus Empiricus comparing a skeptic who proves the non-existence of proof to a man who kicks over a ladder after he has used it to climb to a high place. if true—reveals.‖ Nordmann (p. 7: ―Anything that I might reach by climbing a ladder does not interest me. vol. is the pers177 . 115-117) sets out various ways in which Wittgenstein has ‗said‘ things that. but by his propositions – plural. he says. p. Anscombe (p. 4243 for more on this. not his utterance. including these in 6. but that the doctrines of the Tractatus and.‖ White (pp. 258) insist that Wittgenstein must be referring to all his propositions as being nonsensical. 78) says that ―Wittgenstein used to say that the Tractatus was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock. 1901-3). are self-undermining. According to Nordmann (p. 2. with these. p. 1969. Second. and this other perspective. not that we should take up some other philosophical position on the nature of representation. philosophy itself.‖ The ladder image occurs in Fritz Mauthner‘s Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache (Stuttgart: Cotta. and in Schopenhauer WWR vol.54 (―my sentences are nonsensical‖) is nonsense par excellence and therefore self-exemplifying. p. but like a clock that did not tell you the right time. 80. not by his system. note 86): ―TLP 6. and in such a case to appreciate the point will be to understand the utterer. 23) quotes Lichtenberg: ―we always teach true philosophy with the language of the false one. See Weiner pp.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition vey a point which the utterance itself does not express. Cf. The text is designed to bring us to adopt another perspective on life altogether.g. CV p. cannot be said. in his remarks on formal concepts and the logical form of propositions that is shared with reality.

can be said in three words. Whereof one cannot speak. But it still seems important to him not to be one of these chatterboxes.‖ The implication is that the noise of empty talk.‖ As long as we do not actually 178 . the opposite of silence is not necessarily speaking with sense but. We must not. It does not follow that he would have no objection to a philosopher publishing works for a general (i. 156) says that ―one remains silent when speaking nonsense knowingly. He gave his word to a friend of his (Maurice Drury) that he would not refuse to talk to him about God or religion. thereof one must be silent.g. he seems to have thought. 261) This perspective. which places the act of expression against a background of noise: ―…and whatever a man knows. with its limits visible. The ending of the Tractatus should therefore be read in conjunction with the epigraph of the book.‖ Friedlander (pp.] 7. (Yet see what Wittgenstein says about talking nonsense in the Lecture on Ethics—it is nonsense. 149-150) goes on to show how Wittgenstein‘s views on silence were not simple. in the next paragraph: ―Moreover.) Friedlander (p. Nordmann (p. conceals something.pective of mysticism. ―What is at stake here is. Wittgenstein talks about speaking (sprechen) not saying (sagen). an actual intervention with speech rather than the abstract opposition of the sayable and the unsayable.‖ (p. at least later in his life. be silent about important matters (e. God) just because chatterboxes talk a lot of nonsense about such things. [Ostrow (p. since failure to remain silent would indicate a refusal to accept reality or the course of one‘s own experience. but he respects the tendency to produce it. whether it be nonsense or mere mindlessness. they argue. 133) sees an ethical obligation here. whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard. Silence is what we need in order to be attentive to what there is. consists in seeing the world as a limited whole. wide.e. To be silent means primarily not to fall prey to the rumbling and roaring of rumor. rather. 148) is more Heideggerian. impersonal) audience on such subjects. Speaking without sense is one way of being noisy.‖ He continues. to the showing of truth. making noise. then.

‖ Schopenhauer Fourfold Root p. 154: ―Indeed. ―this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies. nothing is a relative concept. what remains after the abolition of the will is nothing. so long as we know what we are doing and do not lay any ―claim on what is inexpressible in speech. Black (p. Here Schopenhauer implies that his work. Paulist Press. for instance. Nonsense of this sort can be used in teaching logic. Cf. be still. if you be wholly quiet. als du begehrst. This applies even to a logical contradiction. whereas. For the willful.43?). Like good and evil. schweig: kannst du nur gänzlich schweigen. 409).54 and 7. but he simultaneously admits that this deliverance can well appear ―as a transition into empty nothingness‖ (p. can lead to the ―denial and surrender of all willing. Allerliebster. New York. xi. Schopenhauer says. which is not a thought but is still a combination of words. Mahwah NJ. 1986. Maria Shrady. Beloved. p. 408-409— could this be the world of the unhappy. there are some [ideas] which never find words./ So wird dir Gott mehr Gut‘s.‖ §71 of WWR I also seems relevant to 6. though. and so has a use and is not absolutely nothing.‖ This is translated thus: ―Silence./God will show you more good than you know how to desire‖ in Angelus Silesius The Cherubinic Wanderer trans. 378) quotes Silesius: ―Schweig. Nothing is only the negation of some positive thing. referred to in TLP 6. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil §§55-56 on the nothing as a replacement for God in Schopenhauer. erzeigen.] 179 . of course). 412). and alas these are the best.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition say anything. for those who have denied the will. we can speak as much as we like (which perhaps will not be very much. There is no absolute nothing. and thus a deliverance from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering‖ (pp. if he succeeds in imparting his main idea. is—nothing‖ (p.

F. Anscombe An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Harvard University Press.) The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. New York. University of Pennsylvania Press. Albany. Trans. UK. Santérus Academic Press Sweden. Wadsworth. M. 1964 Cambridge Companion to Russell = Nicholas Griffin (ed. Bearn Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Existential Investigations (SUNY Press. 1997) Black = Max Black Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Cornell University Press. 1997 Hintikka = Jaakko Hintikka On Wittgenstein. Hacker Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein Thoemmes Press. pp. 1971 Beaney = Michael Beaney (ed. 2003 CV = Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. 1988 Frascolla = Pasquale Frascolla Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Routledge 2007) Friedlander = Eli Friedlander Signs of Sense: Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus.‖ in Christopher Janaway (ed. E.Key to Abbreviated References Anscombe = G. Peter Winch.) The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. H. 1980. 1997 Bearn = Gordon C. Cambridge University Press. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman. S. Fahrnkopf = Robert Fahrnkopf Wittgenstein on Universals Peter Lang. 2000 Janik = Allan Janik Assembling Reminders: Studies in the Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Concept of Philosophy.) The Frege Reader Blackwell Publishers. 422458 Hacker = P. G. Bristol. 2006 180 . M. 1999. 2001 Glock = Hans-Johann Glock ―Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein: Language as Representation and Will. Ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Notes on Logic = Appendix I of Notebooks 1914-1916. Ed. Ed. F. Block (Cambridge: MIT Press.) Essays on Frege University of Illinois Press. H. 181 . G. 247-276. 2nd ed. Anscombe. 2006 Monk = Ray Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius Jonathan Cape. von Wright. Vol. Klemke (ed. 2005 Notebooks = Ludwig Wittgenstein Notebooks 1914-1916. 1981) pp. London: George Allen and Unwin. Mounce = H.‖ in Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein edited by I. von Wright and Anscombe. 1968 Letters = Letters to Russell. von Wright and Anscombe. 1981 Nordmann = Alfred Nordmann Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: An Introduction Cambridge University Press. 1979.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Kant CPR = Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason trans. E. New York. Ed. 1997 McGinn = Marie McGinn Elucidating the Tractatus. D. M. Norman Kemp Smith. H. E. Ed. M. G. 1969 Klemke = E. von Wright. Oxford: Blackwell. 2nd ed. McGuinness ―The So-Called Realism of the Tractatus. G. London. Keynes and Moore. Oxford: Blackwell. O. pp. 1979.H. Trans. 1986 Magee = Bryan Magee The Philosophy of Schopenhauer Oxford University Press. K. 1974 Letters to Ogden = Letters to C. 2007. 60–73 McManus = Denis McManus The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Oxford University Press. G. Mounce Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction Basil Blackwell. 2006 McGuinness = B. Bedford Books. 1990 Morris and Dodd = Michael Morris and Julian Dodd ―Mysticism in the Tractatus. Oxford: Blackwell. G. G. 1973 Logical Atomism = Bertrand Russell The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Ogden. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Urbana. Anscombe.H. Trans. 1914-19. 8: The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays. Oxford: Blackwell.‖ in European Journal of Philosophy 17:2.

C. Indianapolis: Hackett. Anscombe. Ed. K. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Clarendon Press. M. PG = Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Grammar. Ed. F. New York and London. F. Trans. Ostrow = Matthew B. Anscombe and Rush Rhees. M.Ogden = Ludwig Wittgenstein Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus trans. Oxford: Blackwell. Ill. Volume I. 2002 Pears = David Pears The False Prison: a Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. von Wright. New York. Barnes & Noble Books. Proops = Ian Proops Logic and Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Schopenhauer‘s Fourfold Root = Arthur Schopenhauer The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (translated by E. 2002 RPP I = Ludwig Wittgenstein Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. UK.. G. Trans. H. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy Oxford University Press. 1987 Pears and McGuinness = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Rush Rhees. p. Trans. 2000. Oxford: Blackwell. Anthony Kenny.. Trans. Anscombe and G. ed. 2006 182 . La Salle. J. Ostrow Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Dialectical Interpretation Cambridge University Press. Ed.. G. Inc. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann. E. D. 2003. 1961. Volume One. Payne. xix. 1993. PI = Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations. Reck. 1974. 1953. Open Court. E. Ogden. Oxford: Blackwell. 1980. Oxford. Pears and B. Anscombe. Ed. PO = Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions 19121951. Polity Press. F. Cambridge. Garland Publishing. McGuinness. Reck = Erich H. 1974 Schroeder = Severin Schroeder Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle.

1992 White = Roger M. F. Lee. Ed. 1969. ed. B. White Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus. 7: Theory of Knowledge. Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. the 1913 Manuscript. 1958. Sullivan ―The Totality of Facts‖ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2000. New York. Oxford: Blackwell. 2005 Other Works of Wittgenstein cited in the text: The Blue and Brown Books. 1980. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1960 Stokhof = Martin Stokhof World and Life as One: Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought Stanford University Press. pp. From the notes of J. 175-192 Theory of Knowledge = Bertrand Russell The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. 1979. Oxford: Blackwell.Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus: A Student‘s Edition Stenius = Erik Stenius Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines on Thought Basil Blackwell. F. 183 . Payne. Continuum. London. 1984 David Weiner = David Avraham Weiner Genius and Talent: Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy. King and Desmond Lee. McGuinness. 2006 Winch = Peter Winch Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Blackwell. WWR = Arthur Schopenhauer The World as Will and Representation trans. Associated University Presses. J. E. London: George Allen and Unwin. Young = Julian Young Schopenhauer Routledge. Cambridge 1930-1932. Notes recorded by Friedrich Waismann. 2002 Sullivan ―The Totality of Facts‖ = Peter M. Vol. Dover publications. New York. 1987) WLC = Ludwig Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures.

Oxford: Blackwell. and von Wright. Proto-Tractatus. White. H. King and Desmond Lee. 1980. Trans. 1975. Nyberg. 1971. von Wright. D. Ed. Lee. 184 . Wittgenstein’s Lectures. T. From the notes of J. Rush Rhees. Oxford: Blackwell. F. Ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. McGuinness. Trans. R. Pears and B. McGuinness. F. Ed. Cambridge 1930-1932.Philosophical Remarks. Hargreaves and R. with an introduction by G.