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Mysticism and Ethics: An Examination of Radhakrishnan's Reply to Schweitzer's Critique of Indian Thought Author(s): William F.

Goodwin Reviewed work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Oct., 1956), pp. 25-41 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: . Accessed: 07/05/2012 07:53
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IT IS an obviousfact that the ideals

and "ways of life" of Indian Asia have not been found congenialto the modern Western temper. A civilization in appearanceat once both inordinately religiousand ignorantlypoverty-stricken seems to the materiallyand scientifically successful Westernernot merely incomprehensibly anachronistic in the twentieth century;the situation bespeakssins perversely multiplied rather than purposefully purged. Yet it will not do to say that the sweeping criticisms of Eastern civilizations voiced by Westerners reflect merely the smug snapjudgments of the successful; they have been uttered, on occasion, by some of the most eminent and learnedof Western scholars. And have been rejected with unanimity by their Hindu counterparts as distortions and misrepresentations.' The invidious comparison between the East and the West, at least as understood in Indian intellectual circles, has usually been formulated in a religious context. Dr. SarvepalliRadhakrishnan, now VicePresident of India, the most highly regarded and authoritative living spokesman for Indian thought and culture, brilliantlysummarizesthese more reflective criticisms.
Unfortunately, a tendency has grown up of late to distinguish Eastern mysticism from that of the West, or, to be more precise, Hindu mysticism from the Christian, by contrasting the immense ethical seriousness of the latter with the ethical indifference of the former. Christian thought, it is said, is dynamic and creative. It affirms the reality of the world and the

meaningfulness of life. Hindu thought, on the other hand, is said to deny the reality of the world, despair of human life, poison the very springs of thought and activity, and exalt death and immobility. It does not create power and purpose directed to high ends.2

Yet, as Dr. Radhakrishnan recognizes, the issues as he sketches them are not merely a matter of opposed religious commitments, but are basically philosophical. And in the essay from which the above quotation was drawn, Dr. Radhakrishnanundertakesto state and refute what he justly regards as the most thoroughgoing and penetrating evaluation and rejection of Indian' thought, particularly Indian ethical thought, put forward by a considerable Westernthinker in our century: namely, the criticisms voiced by Dr. Albert Schweitzerin his study Indian Thought and Its Development.4 In this essay I propose to state both Schweitzer's criticisms of Indian metaphysics and ethics, and Dr. Radhakrishnan's understanding and refutation of those criticisms; and to seek to clarify for further discussion and consideration certain basic ambiguities, vaguenesses, and misunderstandings which becloud proper appreciationof philosophicaldifferencesboth profoundand sharp. I Although Schweitzer is himself an avowed mystic, and recognizes in the Indian philosophers men of kindred spirit, that apparent unanimity does not deter him from indulgingin the severest




kind of criticism of the Indian philosophies. They are held to be idolatrous of words,and both ethicallyperverseand inconsistent on vital issues. The Indian philosophies, being types of "abstract" mysticism,make the fatal errorof taking such abstract terms as "the Absolute" to stand for something real; they are ethically perversein that they are worldand life-denying; and they are inconsistent in that they nevertheless undertake to establish a system of natural values and duties. Thus Indian moral philosophy is held by Schweitzer to be an adventitious accretion to Hindu conceptionsof reality and value, ratherthan an integral aspect of the latter. These criticisms are set forth primarily in but and Indian Thought Its Development; are supplementedin important ways in and ThePhilosophyof Civilization' Christianity and the Religions of the World,6 for in these latter works Schweitzer's own form of mysticism is propounded and workedout in relationshipto Hindu thought with a profundity not found in and Indian Thought Its Development. In the following discussionI shall not adopt Radhakrishnan's procedure of breaking down Schweitzer's criticisms into a set of eight separate contentions but shall concentratethe discussionupon the issues delineated above, which himselfsingles out as the Radhakrishnan crucial points in Schweitzer's critique.' II In the Preface to Indian Thoughtand Its DevelopmentSchweitzer notes that from the outset of his studies he was convincedthat the great problemof philosophy was the formulation of an acceptable mysticism.8 The Indians interested him because they had early busiedthemselveswith this problem,and becausein its scope Hindu ethical theory

takes in all living beings. In his earlier major work, The Philosophyof Civilization, the great and tragically pressing philosophy is held task of contemporary to be the renewal of civilization. The task is twofold: the establishmentof an ethical basis for civilization and of the essential connectionbetween civilization But these two formulaand world-view.9 tions of the task of the philosopherare not independentor inconsistent; rather, the latter formulation is the former as it presents itself in the context of contemporaryworld history. For, according to Schweitzer,the only adequate worldview is mysticism, and the core of the mystical experienceis ethical. Schweitzer thinks the modern world deluded in its conviction that civilization is a matter of "creative, artistic, intellectual, and on materialattainments"I1O the contrary, it is constituted by ethical attitude: by a proper valuation of the worthof life, and by a "rule of life"" consonantwith that valuation. And ethical attitude is for Schweitzer it necessarily"world-and life-affirming"; must hold that life is of worth and that it can be lived successfully. True, he does state unequivocally that ethics, as "the activity of man directed to secure the inner perfection of his own personality," is "quite independent of whether the theory of the universe is pessimisticor optimistic."But in a metaphysic of the former type, ethics is so contracted in conception that in the "ethics has case of the ancient BrAhmins nothing whatever to do with the objective world."2 And elsewhere Schweitzer denies flatly that a pessimistic theory of the universe is capable of engendering an ethic;'3on the contrary, "world-and life-negation,if consistently thought out and developed does not produce ethics "'I4 but reducesethics to impotence. Its logical outcome is suicide."



II It was noted above that self-perfection of the individual is projected by Schweitzer as both the ethical goal of man and the essentialtask of civilization. "For a quite general definition,"he tells us, "we may say that civilization is progress,materialand spiritualprogress, on the part of individualsas of the mass." Such progress means "to live out one's life in the directionof its course,to raise it to higherpower, and to ennoble it ... to live itself to the full."'6It is the whole man who is to be cultivated and raised to a higher power, not just a "spiritual piece" of him.'7 Yet the emphasis is certainly upon spiritual self-perfection, For self-perfection, Schweitzer holds, cannot be merely egocentric in man. As Schweitzersurveys the universe, will-tolive manifests itself
which, so far in a process of individualizing
as I can see from the outside, is bent merely on living itself out to the full, and in no way on union with any other will-to-live. The world is a ghastly drama of will-to-live divided against itself. One existence makes its way at the cost of another; one destroys the other. One willto-live merely exerts its will against the other, and has no knowledge of it. But in me [man?] the will-to-live has come to know about other wills-to-live. There is in it a yearning to arrive at unity with itself, to become universal.'8

to, and a sense of union with, all life (all that exists). "The basic principleof ethics, that principlewhich is a necessity of thought, which has a definite content, which is engagedin constant, living, and practical dispute with reality, is: Devotion to life resulting from reverencefor We life."20 are acquainted only with individual lives; and active devotion to, and union with, them constitutesthe one true mysticism.

We are now prepared to formulate Schweitzer'scritique of Hindu thought. The indictment is, quite simply, that Indian philosophy in all its various schools and subschools2'has leaned toward that which Schweitzer denominates "abstract" mysticism. In consequence, Schweitzersometimes speaks of these philosophiesas incomplete,if deep; at others, as dead and meaningless.Or, perhaps, their seeming depth turns out to be pseudo and meaningless;it is likely that the latter is his consideredview. "Abstract" mysticisms are philosophies which distinguishbetween the universe and the Spirit of the Universe, or reality and the Essence of Reality, or the space-time order and the Absolute, or nature and Brahman;they take such abstract terms-"Spirit of the Universe," "the Absolute," etc.-to denote somethingreal, and in consequenceurge men to seek union with this reality. The result, holds Schweitzer, is systematic derogation of life, both metaphysically and axiologically. Metaphysically, the error of these philosophers lies in their failureto realizethat such abstractterms "denote nothing actual, but something
... absolutely unimaginable." Reality

Schweitzeris in effect arguinghere that the most immediate facts of consciousness are my awarenessof, and consequent commitmentto, my ownwill-to-live;subsequently, there comes the recognition that a like will-to-live, and like commitment,manifestthemselvesin all other things. But further, I cannot logically stop with reverencefor my own will-tolive alone;reflectionforcesme to see that I must show a like reverencefor all life.'9 Thus ethics are "responsibilitywithout limit towardsall that lives." Such a sense of reverence for life is a "concrete" mysticism in that it is an active devotion

"knows of no Being except that which manifests itself in the existence of individual beings ... it knows of no relations except these of one individualbeing



to another." In consequence,mysticism significance granted to nature in these ''must in all seriousnessgo through the philosophies is that of an encumbrance: process of conversion to the mysticism an obstacle which, in being surmounted, of reality.... There is no Essence of disciplines the self toward realization. Being, but only infinite Being in infinite Since the ultimate value or significance of life is held to lie in a state of the soul manifestations." such philosophiesare in coincidentwith or subsequent to moksa Axiologically, errorin that ethics, as the drive to self- or release, Indian philosophers, if conperfection,is turned away from develop- sistent, must look upon life in the world ment of the personalityto an experience as without value in itself. In brief, for which is supra-ethical;they make "ab- such a philosophy the motive for ethical sorption into the Absolute become an action lies not in the spiritual and maaim in itself." Since there is no Absolute, terial expansion of individual wills-tothese philosophies,which aim "solely at live; but in a systematic quenching of securing the self-perfection of the in- the will-to-live as not a part of the soul dividual as this comes to pass in inner that is to achieve release, but rather as freedom and disconnection from the the Ignorance that binds the soul to world and the spirit of the world,"invite the round of rebirths.As understoodby man to "enter into a spiritual relation Schweitzer, and I think correctly, the with an unreal creation of thought."22 Indian philosophies maintain that it is Thus that which the Indian traditions will-to-live which blinds the soul to its take to be the most profoundof experi- true nature and destiny. The tasks of religion and philosophy are to remove ences is mere self-delusion. These criticismsmay be brought to a this blindness by (gradually)withdrawfocus by turningto Schweitzer'sremarks ing the soul from its false identification upon the philosophy of the Bhagavad- with will-to-live, which is an aspect of he GOt&. Git&, notes, "grants recog- nature (prakrtior mdyd).Only when the The nition to activity, but only after activity soul has so withdrawndoes it come to has renounced natural motives and its a full understandingof its true nature.24 Such philosophies are inevitable lifenatural meaning." "But," he continues, "actionwhich has ceasedto be purposive denying in import, since they conceive in a naturalway has lost its significance. of life in nature as something to be The only activity whichis truly of higher overcome rather than as something to quality is that which sets natural aims be fulfilled.From such a mysticism there before it and realizes these in self- comes "only a dead spirituality. It is a purely intellectual act. No motives to devotion to a supremeend."23 This criticismis to be generalized.The activity are given in it. Even the ethics philosophiesof the major Indian tradi- of resignationcan only eke out a misertions are on the right track in conceiving able existence on the soil of such an ideal"as "spiritualunity intellectualism." In contrast, in the of the "supreme with infinite Being"; but all make the "mysticism of reality . .. the ethics of tragic-philosophicalmistake of conceiv- self-perfectingand the ethics of altruism ing of infinite Being "in its purity" as can interpenetrate each other. . . they unrelatedto nature. In consequence,its cannot but meet each other in a thought realization (moksa) is a state without . .. of living devotion to Being which natural significance; the only spiritual lives."25



The trend of Indian thought over the centuries, Schweitzer is glad to admit, has been steadily away from life-denial Yet toward a healthy life-affirmation.26 the generalindictment stands. V atBefore turningto Radhakrishnan's tempted refutation of Schweitzer's critique, it would be well to point out that Indian scholarsthemselves are in accord of with the general characterization Indian philosophyset forth by Schweitzer.Thus the most eminent contemporaryhistorian of Indian philosophy, the late S. Dasgupta, in noting "some fundamental points of agreement"among the Indian systems at the outset of his great fivevolume work, declaresthe conceptionof the soul as essentially separate from involvement in nature to be characteristic of the Indian philosophies:
When the Indians, wearied by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldy events, sought for and believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless time that we connect it with these. The realization of this transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless cycle of birth and rebirths though karma.27

The summumbonumof life is attained when all impuritiesare removedand the pure nature of the self is thoroughlyand permanently apprehendedand all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated." Dasgupta also emphasizes the pessimistic outlook of these philosophies toward the world. "All our experiences are essentially sorrowfuland ultimately Sorrowis the ultimate sorrow-begetting.
truth of this process of the world.
. .

. It

is ourignorancethat the self is intimately connectedwith the experiencesof life or its pleasures,that leads us to action and arousespassion in us for the enjoyment of pleasuresand other emotions and activities." And then the optimistic note characteristic of "abstract" mysticisms: "Throughthe highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion towards world-experiencesand retire in body, mind, and speech from all worldly concerns.... [The self] becomes at this stage ultimately dissociated from citta [mind-stuff]which containswithin it the root of all emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipatedthe self for ever conquers all sorrow." In these passages Dasgupta clearly sets forth the metaphysical and value dualisms of Indian thought, which, according to Schweitzer, give rise to abstract mysticism and to an axiology of world- and life-negation with its consequent rejection of ethics.28 VI Schweitzer's critique is systematically challenged by Dr. Radhakrishnanin his Sir GeorgeBirdwoodMemorialLecture, "Mysticism and Ethics in Hindu Thought." But beforeturningto a statement and evaluationof Radhakrishnan's attempt to rebut Schweitzer'scriticisms,

He finds that all the major Indian philosophies except Buddhism (and Radhakrishnanwould not admit of this exclusion) are in agreement that the soul, "variously called atman, purusa or jiva," is "pureand unsulliedin its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not form a real part of it.



it is desirable to specify further what to -appear be certain large general agreements in outlook which characterizethe respectivephilosophiesof these two men. Both hold that mysticism is the perfected form of world-view, and that an adequateethics presupposesan adequate world-view.Likewise,both maintainthat self-perfectionis the supreme (spiritual) goal of life; and that humanism must become"universal":ethics must involve veneration, not merely for human life, but for all life.29 sense of these underRadhakrishnan's lying agreementscomes out in his comment that "the contrast to my mind is not so much between Hinduism and Christianity as between religion and a self-sufficienthumanism."He then goes on to affirm his belief in an organic relationbetween religionand humanism. "While the chief value of religion lies in its power to raise and enlarge the internal man, its soundness is not complete until it has shaped properly his external existence. For the latter we require a sound political, economic, and social life, a power and an efficiency whichwill make a peoplenot only survive but grow towardsa collective perfection.
. . . A spiritual view is sustained not only

by insight but by a rational philosophy and sound social institutions." Contrariwise, "apart from eternity there is nothing that can, strictly speaking, be called human .... Mere moralitywithout spiritual conviction or jifcnac is incapableof giving us satisfaction.... Even the social conscience that urges us to extend the benefits of a material civilization cannot be accounted for by the principles of With these senscientific naturalism."30 timents, one can feel assured, Schweitzer would be in general agreement. Yet their statement is indicative of which Radhakrishnan the considerations

is concernedto bring to bear in exhibiting the inadequaciesof Schweitzer'scritique of Indianthought. That critique,as hinges upRadhakrishnanrecognizes,3" on Schweitzer'scontentions that "there are two great fundamental problems commonto all thought: (1) the problem of world and life affirmationand world and life negation, and (2) the problem of ethics and the relationsbetween ethics and these two forms of man's spiritual attitude to Being"; and that in Indian thought "world and life negation occupies a predominantposition," and "in itself is void of ethics...."32 His rebuttal, in turn, rests not merely upon a denial of the incompatibility of these two attitudes toward the world and life; but also upon the conviction that both are necessary phases of an adequatephilosophy,i.e., of philosophies which, like some forms of the Vedanta, are both mystical and humanistic. "The many reservations which Schweitzer is obliged to make in applying his scheme of world affirmationand world negation as opposite categories of which one or the other must be denied show that it is not adequate to the facts." Further, if we "make ethics or world affirmation independentof religionor worldnegation, our life and thought becomecondescending, though this condescensionmay take the form of social service or philanthropy.... If goodwill, pure love, and are disinterestedness our ideals, then our ethics must be rooted in other-worldliness."33 VII In assessingthe adequacyof this reply to Schweitzer,we must first observethat the latter does take world- and lifeaffirmationand world- and life-negation to be incompatibleattitudes of the will toward Being: "what is decisive is his



[a man's] inner attitude towards Being, his affirmation or negation of life."34 Then we must come to grips with the question: Is the object of religiousdevotion, or, better, is the content of the mystical experience as envisioned by Radhakrishnanso related to the world that life in the latter is conceived to be of worth per se? Or, to put our question in alternative form, is world- and lifeaffirmationimplicated in the conception of the divine advocated by Radhakrishnan? There is no question but that for Radhakrishnan the answer is in the affirmative; indeed, to argue this affirmationis the burden of his essay. Yet I am completely confidentthat Schweitzer would hold that Radhakrishnanhas failed to make his case;" and I could not but agree. In introducingthe topic of discussion in the second essay of EasternReligions and Western Thought ("The Supreme Spiritual Ideal: The Hindu View"), Radhakrishnanremarksthat "when we enter the world of ideals the differences among religions become negligible and the agreements striking. There is only one ideal for man, to make himself profoundly human, perfectly human." And a few pages later he affirms that "life is a supreme good and offers the possibility of happiness to every one." And undoubtedly, one of the chief concerns of Dr. Radhakrishmanis to reestablish and spell out in essential detail the link between spirituality and humanism which he takes to be integral to "the Hindu view of life." Although granting that religionis more distinctive of the East, and humanismof the West, Radhakrishnandoes not accept the conclusion that "India has failed because she has followed after things spiritual." On the contrary, "she has failed because she has not followed after them suffi-

ciently. She has not learnedhow to make spirit entirely the master of life, but has created in recent times a gulf between spirit and life and has rested in a comTo promise."3" fill that gulf, not merelyto bridge it, is the pressing task of modern India. The materials of synthesis lie ready to hand in India's own traditions:
The distinctive feature of the Hindu view is that it does not look upon the development of mind, life, and body as the primary ends of life. Health and vigour of the body are essential for vital energy and mental satisfaction. As the expressionof the spiritual, the perfection of the physical is an integral part of man's complete living. While it is desired to some extent for its own sake, it is desired more for its capacity to further human activity which has for its aim the discovery and expression of the divine . in man (dharmasddhanam) .. morality, individual and social, is not a mere rational ordering of man's relations with his fellows but is a means for his growing into the nature of spirit. ... The power of the spiritual truth casts its light on the natural life of man and leads it to flower into its own profound spiritual significance. Such a view does not take away from the value of ordinary life, which becomes supremely important when it is felt to be instinct with the life of the spirit and a support for its expression.... Similarly, we are not called upon to crush the natural impulses of human life [as Schweitzer contends the Indian philosophies require] or ignore the intellectual, emotional, and aesthetic sides of man's being, for they are a part of man's finer nature, and their development not only satisfies the individual but helps to express the spirit in him. The aim of ascetic discipline is the sanctification of the entire personality.... To develop out of a materialized being into a spiritualized one is the crown of human evolution. It is to live in the immortality of spirit though attached to a mortal body. It consists in a self-finding, a self-becoming. We have to outgrow much and exceed many of our limitations in order to attain this, but the transfigurationto which we aspire is the very law of our nature. Ignorance and imperfectionof self-knowledge conceal this fact from us.37

It seems clear that in these passages Radhakrishnanis endeavoring to work



out a conception of value that will link human life and spiritual life, if we may conveniently so designate these two aspects of total experience,in one evolutionary processof progressiverealization of value. Thus human life and spiritual life are not to be sundered into ends and means, instrumental and terminal values, but are to be thought of as phases of one liberative process. VIII Yet the languageused by Radhakrishnan in characterizingthese states, not sugonly in these essays but elsewhere,38 gests that that which he is here so earnestly endeavoringto present as successive phases of one continuousprocess breaks apart into the discontinuous in ways which give substance to Schweitzer'scriticisms.Thus, if one doctrine both distinctive and central to Indian thought were to be singled out, Radhakrishnanholds that it would be
the belief that there is an interiordepth to the human soul, which, in its essence,is uncreatedand deathlessand absolutelyreal. The spirit in man is differentfrom the individual the ego; it is that whichanimatesand exercises of the individual, vast background his beingin which all individualslie. It is the core of all being, the inner thread by being strung on whichthe worldexists.39

"In the soul of man," he continues, "are conflicting tendencies: the attraction of the infinite,which abidesfor ever, changeless, unqualified, untouched by the. world; and the fascination of the finite, that which like the wind-beaten surface of the waters is never for a moment the same.... The heart of religion is that man truly belongs to anotherorder,and the meaningof man's life is to be found not in this world but in more than historical reality.... God and not the world of history is the true environmentof our souls.... Hindu religion. . . pictures the world as a mere

for vestibuleand training-ground another in which alone life is real, rich, and abiding." The cruxof the problem,as Schweitzer sees it, arises precisely at this juncture. Does the Indian philosopherconceive of these two orders in such fashion that we can talk significantly of them and of their relations? And, if we can, of a continuity of value embracing both? Radhakrishnancertainly takes the view that we can, for "the dualism between body and spirit is not radical." And a few sentences earlier he remarks that "spirit without mind or spirit without body is not the aim of human perfection." Yet Radhakrishnanalso tells us that "the perfecting of self is to pass from the narrow,constricted,individual life to the free, creative,spirituallife.... Wisdomis not cheaplywon.... It is the perfectionof human living, the ceaseless straining of the human soul to pierce through the crushingbody, the distracting intellect, the selfish will, and to apprehend the unsheathed spirit. It is intent living, the most fruitful act of man by which he tries to reach reality behind the restless stream of nature and his own feelingsand desires.The destiny of the human soul is to realizeits oneness with the supreme." These are statements which Schweitzer would characterizeas abstract mysticism, since they "describe" the experience which constitutes the ultimate import of life for the Hindu in terms which unequivocally suggest its nonnatural status. This "unsheathedspirit" is declared by Radhakrishnanin a pasunsage quotedabove, to be "changeless, qualified,untouched by the world"; and in an earlier passage setting forth the nature of spirit according to Sadakara, it is declaredto be "pureexistence, selfaware,timeless, spaceless,unconditioned ... not dependent for its delight on



the gross or subtle touches of outward Sucha "mysticismof identity," things."40 according to Schweitzer, "whether Indian or European, is not ethical either in originor in nature and cannot become so."''4 It cannot, for reasons which we have already cited: such terms as "the Essenceof Being, the Absolute,the Spirit of the Universe, and all similar expressions [here "the unsheathed spirit"] denote nothing actual, but something conceived in abstractions which for that reason is also absolutely unimaginable. The only reality is the Being which manifests itself in phenomena." Thus, according to Schweitzer, the mystics of India, whose philosophical outlook Radhakrishnanis concernedto explicate and to defend, are prating about nothing at all. For infinite Being is known to us only as individual beings and their relations. Reality, he urges, "knows nothing about the individual being able to enter into connectionwith
the totality of Being.... If mysticism,

then, intends to be honest, there is nothing for it to do but to cast from it the usual abstractions,and to admit that it can do nothing rational with this imaginary essence of Being.... Abanand doningall stage decorations declamation, let us try to get its experiencein living nature" (italics mine). The logic is apparentlyinexorable:Since "there is no Essence of Being, but only infinite Being in infinite manifestations," and since "it is only through the manifestations of Being, and only through those with which I enter into relations, that my being has any intercourse with infinite Being," then "the devotion of my being to infinite Being means devotion Ix of my being to all the manifestationsof To all this Radhakrishnan rightly Being which need my devotion, and to which I am able to devote myself ... by repliesthat such knowledge"is not meredevoting myself to that which comes ly intellectual any more than ignorance within my sphere of influenceand needs is error." Yet even if we grant, as I

me, I make spiritual, inward devotion to infinite Being a reality and thereby give my own poor existencemeaningand richness. The river has found its sea."42 Such a Weltanschauung Schweitzer calls the "mysticism of reality" in contrast to the "abstract mysticism" which he is concernedto refute. Of the latter he remarks,as we have noted, that "from self-devotionto the Absolutethere comes only a dead spirituality. It is a purely intellectual act. No motives to activity are given in it." Whereas, since in the mysticism of reality, which involves devotion to all that lives-"reverence for life"-there is a real object of devotionthe entire universein all its individuality and concreteness-"there is therefore dominantin it a spiritualitywhichcarries in itself in elemental form the impulse In to action."43 these passagesSchweitzer apparentlyis urging that since Being, or reality, is exhaustedin its manifestations, our only moral recourse is to devote ourselves to Being as its manifestations; and that those mysticisms which have been concerned to talk about devotion to the "source"or "spiritualessence" of that which exists, have beguiled themselves through that which Bacon called "Idols of the Market-Place" into the fromlife in tragicmistakeof withdrawing favor of somethingnot even imaginable. Since abstract mysticism is a purely intellectual act focused upon nothing, it is sheer self-deception to think that such an "experience"can give rise to moralpreceptsor to a positive evaluation of the world. There is no value in such an experience,let alone a value-continuity between it and the world.



think we must, that the Indian mystic experiencessomethingand that this experience, this something, becomes of transcendent importance to him," Schweitzer's contentions are not fully met. They are not met for the reason that, as Radhakrishnanhimself points out, the conceptof the infinite, of spirit, of Brahman, is held to be without empirical content. The conceptof Brahman is the experience the mystic philosophof ically interpreted. And we can rightly raise the question, what is the relationship of Brahman, so conceived, to the world as we understandthe latter? And to this question there is, as Radhakrishnan admits, no answer.45 But if there is no answerto this query, it becomesimpossibleto offeran account of the natureand continuityof the valueelement which links the world as we understand it with the self (Brahman) so conceived. As I have pointed out in another context (cf. Note 1), orthodox Indian opinion on this matter, when worked out logically, leads to the conclusion that from the standpoint of Brahman, the world is disvalue. Radhakrishnanendeavorsmightily to fill the axiologicalgulf between "the finite and the infinite"; but to no avail. The ontological difference is too great. No theory as to the origin of the universe in Brahman, he says, "can be logically satisfactory since the question itself is not logically framed. It involves a confusion of standpoints.We are using temporal terms with reference to an order

is in insuperable difficulties. How is it possible, logically, to construct a theory of value specifyingsuch continuity when the terms used have application only within the world? True, he affirmsthat "the eternal is not out of all relation to the world of history," that "becoming is an imperfectrepresentationof being," that "God has in His own being eternal values which human history tries to realizeon the plane of space-time-cause," and that "the world is created by God out of the abundance of His joy." But what do such statements mean?We are left lame for an answer. tells us that "jnana,or Radhakrishnan seeing through the veil of mdy&,is the spiritual destiny of man." What is this spiritual destiny, fulfilled?Accordingto Saihkara, whom I take Radhakrishnan to be following, it is not individual, nor temporal, nor causally conditioned, nor dependentupon the world for its value. Nor is there self-concern,or concern for others, or for self-enjoymentof God. The sage is "at the heart of the universe"; and for him the distinctionbetweengood and evil is meaningless,for individuality no longer exists. "Good and evil," Radhakrishnantell us, "presupposethe basis of egoism. Good acts are those which aim at the well-being of oneself and others, and evil ones are those which interfere with the well-being of oneself and others."But all such individualwellbeing is ultimately to be transcended. What, then, is the continuity between the well-beingof the individual and this which is essentially non-temporal.... As transcendent experience?In its "inmost to how the primal reality in which the being," we are told, "reality is neither divine light shines everlastingly can yet good nor evil, neithermoralnor immoral. be the source and fount of all empirical . . . " These value and moral distinctions being, we can only say that it is a are a symbolism,but a symbolismwhich mystery, maya." Thus the predicates "is not artificial, accidental, or false. and relationsdescriptiveof the world are It tells us about the ultimate reality, inapplicable to the primal reality. In but darkly, reflected as it were in the consequence, Radhakrishnan'saxiology mirror of the world. As good and evil



belong to this world, and as the real is beyond good and evil, the problem for man is to pass fromsymbolsto reality."46 The continuity implicitly indicated in the statement that this symbolism "tells us about the ultimate reality, but darkly," would seem to call for explication. The darkness is indeed immense; one would think impenetrable. It is Schweitzer'scontention that the discontinuitiesbetween the Hindu's conceptions of the "supreme reality" and its value, and their conceptions of the world and its values, are so great that the logical thing to do is to turn away from the latter to the former. The unrationalized conclusion is suicide. And it may be claimedwith some justification that to urge universal self-destructionis not to propounda moral code. Certainly in Schweitzer's sense of the moral it is not. But as I have shown elsewhere, granted the Hindu point of view, it assuredly is. In Radhakrishnan'sforceful language, "an ideal which requiresus to integrate ourselves, to maintain a constant fight with the passions which impede the growth of the soul, to wage war on lust, anger, and worry, cannot but be deeply ethical. The power to perceive reality, to absorb it and be absorbedby it, is the rewardof a severe and sustained process of self-purification."47Yet such an ethic has not been shown to be world- and life-affirming; Radhakrishnan has still to resolve the darkness.

of reality."49 Unlike abstract mysticism, which, as we have seen, is charged by Schweitzerwith having hypostatized abstract substantive terms into realities, the mysticism of reality recognizes as meaningfulonly those substantive terms which designate individual things.50 The mystic cannot become one with the "spiritualessence" of reality or with the "Spirit of the Universe," for there is no spiritual essence of reality, no spirit of the universe; there is "no Being except that which manifests itself in the existence of individual beings ... no rela-

Two issues remain before us to be noted, if not resolved. Schweitzerholds that philosophical mysticism as he formulates it48 is world- and life-affirming in

that the metaphysical and axiological continuitieswhich he finds lacking in the "abstract"mysticismsof India are established in his own Christian "mysticism

tions except these of one individualbeing to another." These statements might lead the student of Schweitzer'sphilosophy to conclude that the terms "Being"or "infinite Being" are names for the class of "individual beings," since the intent of the above passage is, apparently, to assert that the individual human being comes in contact only with other individual human beings, and with things-with "living nature." This interpretationwas put forwardwith some hesitance by the late Oskar Kraus, who concludes in his important study of Schweitzer5" for that the latter the term "World-Spirit" (Weltgeist) is a "fiction." Kraus then continueswith the query, "Is 'God' then too, for him, a mere 'thought entity'? 'The only actuality,' he says, 'is Being apparent in phenonema.' Any one who can speak thus producesthe impression that he can concede reality only to 'phenomena'and does not acknowledge the existence of a transcendentalBeing. But perhaps we misunderstand him. . . . " It is Kraus'stentative opinionthat "perhaps,indeed probably, he is a pantheist. It seems quite possible." Yet Kraus also points out another passage which suggests that Schweitzer is a theist. "On the other hand, however, he says that the knowledge of God that



counts is 'that which I experience in myself as ethical will,' that will in which the 'mysterious divine personality' reveals itself to me." In a passage of like theistic vein, yet one which would seem to involve both these emphases, Schweitzer affirms that divine I live my life in God, in the mysterious personalitywhich I do not know as such in the world, but only experienceas mysterious Will withinmyself. whichis freefromassumpRationalthinking tions ends thereforein mysticism. To relate for oneselfin the spirit of reverence life to the multiform manifestationsof the will-to-live which togetherconstitutethe worldis ethical mysticism. All profoundworld-viewis mysticism,the essenceof whichis just this: that out and naive existencein of my unsophisticated the world there comes,as a result of thought about self and the world,spiritualself-devotion infiniteWillwhichis continuto the mysterious ously manifestedin the universe.52

In this passage Schweitzer seems to be saying both that ethical mysticism is constituted by reverence for the multitude of individual embodiments (wills-to-live) of the Will-to-live which together make up the universe; and that the essence of mysticism as a world-view is "spiritual self-devotion to the mysterious infinite Will" of which individual things are embodiments. The words which I have italiEthical mysticism humbly leaves unanswered cized in this passage present strong evithe question in what manner the World-Spirit dence for that which Kraus calls the exists within the poor human spirit and in it "theistic" interpretation: that there is a attains to consciousness of itself. It holds only Will which make itself empirically evi- to the fact that the poor human spirit, by dent, i.e., evident to the external scrutiny leaving behind its existence for itself alone, in of science, as the universe of particular the devotion of service to other life experiences union with the World-Spirit and thereby bethings. comes enriched and finds peace.55 It is Kraus's view that Schweitzer vacThese words constitute a profoundly illates between theism and pantheism, a view which Schweitzer confirmed upon moving and original interpretation of inquiry. In a letter to Kraus Schweitzer Christianity. And the philosophy which confessed that " 'I do not seem able to they express is richly deserving of the and get ... beyond the conflict between pan- respect shown it by Radhakrishnan Yet we must push home the theism and theism. And I mean it in the Kraus. of philosophical as well as in the traditional question, as the formerdoes not,56 the for Schweitzerof such terms as religious sense.'" Methodologically, he meaning

writes in the same letter, " 'it has been my principlenever to express in my philosophy more than I have experiencedas a result of absolutely logical reflection. That is why I never speak in philosophy of "God" but only of the "universal will-to-live," which I realise in my consciousness in a twofold way: firstly, as a creativewill outsidemyself and secondly, as an ethical will within me.... I prefer to content myself with a description of the experienceof reflection,leaving pantheism and theism as an unresolved conflict in my soul. For that is the actuality to which I am always being forced to return.'"I Yet I venture to suggest that in Schweitzer'swritings, if not in his meditations, the issue has been largely resolved; and in favor of theism. The weight of logic, as one reflects upon Schweitzer'sphilosophy, particularly as it is set forth in Christianity and the Religions of the World,54leaves little doubt. At the time he wrote his book Kraus had read the above work, but not the later Indian Thought and Its Development,in which Schweitzer distinguishes between the World-Spiritand the human spirit with a sharpnesswhich does not leave room for argument:



"World-Spirit," "infinite Being," and "universalwill-to-live." How, as terms, do they differin meaningfrom the meaning-or, better, the alleged lack of itof such terms as used in the derided abstract mysticism? If the World-Spirit is not the "spiritualessence" of the universe, what is it? If the only relations with which we are acquainted are those obtaining between individual wills-tolive, how, in devoting ourselves to the latter, do we come to union with infinite Being? Schweitzer,I am confident, would attempt to meet such queries by urging that they miss the point: mysticism-of-the-will has access to experiences of whichscience (and logic?)knows nothing. Schweitzer'sphilosophy is a voluntarism: theistic, dualistic (in a double sense), optimistic, and mystical. The Being which manifests itself in phenomena is Will, and this manifestation is twofold: as impersonal non-ethical creative energy in nature and human nature, and as ethical personality in the humanconsciousness."The eternalspirit meets us in nature as mysteriouscreative power. In our will-to-live we experience it within us as volition which is both world- and life-affirming and ethical." Monism and pantheism are to be rejected, "however profound and spiritual," for they do not "lead into the ultimate problemof religion.That problem is, that in ourselves we experience God as different from the God we find in Nature: in Nature we recognizeHim only as impersonal creative Power, in ourselves we recognize Him as ethical Personality." Faced with the fact of epistemological dualism-philosophical (scientific) knowledge of nature as the manifestation of an impersonalcreative power, and mystical awareness of God as divine Personality-Schweitzer does not hesitate in naming the profounder

insight. "Now, which is the more vital knowledge of God? The knowledge derived from my experience of Him as ethical Will." Or in the philosophical terminology of The Philosophy of Civilization: "The volition which is given in our will-to-live reaches beyond our knowledgeof the world. What is decisive for our life-view is not our knowledgeof the world but the certainty of the volition whichis given in our will-to-live.... Our relation to the world as it is given in the positive certainty of our will-tolive, when this seeks to comprehenditself in thought: that is our world-view. World-viewis a product of life-view, not vice versa." The dualism, as we noted above, is twofold: God and His creation;and that creation as it presents itself in nature, and in the human consciousness.In nature and in other human beings we observe will-to-live from without; in ourselves, from within. Thus Schweitzer's epistemological dualism is a doubleaspect theory.57In man will-to-live has come to consciousnessof itself.
The creative force which produces and sustains all that is, reveals itself in me in a way in which I do not get to know it elsewhere, namely, as ethical Will, as something which desires to be creative within me. This mystery, which I have experienced, is the decisive factor in my thinking, my willing and my understanding. All the mysteries of the world and of my existence in the world may ultimately be left on one side unsolved and insoluble. My life is completely and unmistakably determined by the mysterious [mystical] experience of God revealing Himself within me as ethical Will and desiring to take hold of my life.58

We are now in a better position to understandwhy Schweitzercalls Indian mysticism "abstract." It denies, in the Vedanta, which Schweitzerrightly takes to be its culminating form, both the ultimate reality and the intrinsic value of the world; whereas Schweitzer is ac-



quainted only with the latter and with his "inner experience."Neither of these aspects of the universal will-to-live corresponds in meaning to the Indians' Brahman;hence the latter is an empty term. Moreover,Indian mysticismis morally dead, since it does not enjoin "work in the world," but withdrawal from the world. Although the issue as thus stated is axiological,its ultimate importis metaphysical. The Upanisadsand the various schoolsof the Vedanta, Schweitzermaintains, conceive of reality as Idea, i.e., as an eternal and unchanging object of perfect quiescent knowledge, whereas Schweitzerthinks of reality as volitional in character,as an ethical Will to which man must endeavorto conformhis will.59 Hence the mystical experienceof which the Hindu philosophersspeak seems literally unimaginableto Schweitzer.Since the ultimate metaphysical reality is ethical Will, mystical identificationwith
it is volitional rather than cognitive.0 How

the primal ethical Will (which the religious consciousnessinterprets as Ethical Personality or God) comes to manifest itself initially as impersonalamoral nature, and only later to mirroritself in man as consciousethical Will, is the ultimate mystery of Being. Schweitzer accepts both the mystery and the absolute moral commitment he finds within it. We need only reflect upon this fact in order to understand Schweitzer'srejection of all mysticisms which rest upon cognitive identification with the "Essence of the Universe." How identify one's own will, i.e., oneself, with the universal Will except by participatingin its (moral) creativeness?"

from the world means withdrawalfrom nature, either complete, as in moksa or Nirvana, or withdrawal-in-lifefor those philosophieswhich admit jivanmukti.In any case, the experiencedoes not recognize the claims of natural values, or even, perhaps, the existence of such claims. In a word, for these philosophies freedom from the world means freedom from desire, freedom from the demands of the will-to-live: the Indian thinker relegates to nature (Prakrti or Maya) that which Schweitzer makes constitutive of reality. It is the function of the Hindu dharmato shape all living things away from their natural selves toward this supra-natural ideal. With liberation, Dr. Radhakrishnantells us, "the soul is raised to a sense of its universality. It leaves behind its existence for itself alone and becomesunited with the spirit of the universe. No longer has it any private wishes of its own.... The abandonment of the ego is the identification with a fuller life and consciousness." Rooted in the eternal, "the liberated individual works for the welfare of the world." But such work is not to be construed as concern for the welfare of individual wills-to-live; the seer has transcendedthe delusions of egocentricity. "He is conscious of the wider destiny of the universe."He is a knower of Brahman.The concernof the sage, then, is a concernfor each of us qua Brahman. His task is to help each to achieve

The conception of freedom from the world functions very differently in the philosophy of Schweitzer, though there is a like emphasis upon the importance of the attitude or state. According to Schweitzer, freedom from the world is Xi constituted by freedom from the comWith this query we come to the last pulsions of the unthinking egoistic willtopic of discussion: freedom from the to-live of nature and the natural man, world. In the Indian traditions freedom and submission to the demands of the



ethical will-to-live which manifests itself within us. This demand, philosophically formulated, becomes the ethic of universal reverence for life; theistically, submission to the ethical Will of the divine Personality. But it is always an individual freedom: "True ethics presume the absolute difference of one's own ego and those of others and accentuate it." The ethic of universal reverence for life is cognitivelygroundless in that its claims go begging for a basis in a nature which is amorally "red in tooth and claw"; they rest entirely upon reflection on the will-to-livewithin us. Thus "ethics are non-rational"in the sense that "they are not justified by any corresponding knowledge of the nature of the world, but are the dispositionin which, through the inner compulsionof our will-to-live, we determine our relation to the

evolution of the world,we do not know." The claim is absolute; the possibility of failure, or failure itself, irrelevant. "Ethics are responsibilitywithout limit towardsall that lives," or, alternatively, "Devotion to life inspired by reverence for life." "A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrinksfrominjuringanything that lives.
... Life as such is sacred to him." Only

so doesman unite himselfcompletelywith the universalwill-to-live which has within him become ethically conscious of its strivings for perfection. "The river has found its sea."65

XII Is the river at last satisfied? Or, as the naturalist critic is tempted to ask, has Schweitzer satisfied us that the sea exists? It would seem both presumpworld."63 tuous and idle to elaborate answers to And comfortless,in that such reflection these queriesuntil the long-awaitedthird gives us neither a moral code nor as- part, "The World-View of Reverence surance that our devotion to life "will for Life," is before us. "What the activity make a difference."64 of this disposition of ours means in the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
NOTES end Wiederaufbauder Kultur; Kulturphilosophie II: Kultur und Ethik (MUnchen: C. H. Beck, 1923). Trans. into English by C. T. Campion and published in one volume as The Philosophy of Civilization. Part I: "The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization"; Part II: "Civilization and Ethics" (New York: Macmillan, 1950). All page references in this paper are to the above printing of the English edition (hereafter designated "POC"). 6. Albert Schweitzer, Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen (Bern: Paul Haupt, 1924). Trans. into English by Johanna Powers as Christianity and the Religions of the World (New York: Macmillan, 1951). All page references in this paper are to the above printing of the English edition (hereafter designated "CRW"). 7. Cf. ERWT, pp. 75, 65. 8. "From the very beginning [of his career] I was convinced that all thought is really concerned with the great problem of how man can attain to spiritual union with infinite Being" (ITD, pp. vi, 194). Cf. also CRW, p. 80.

1. Cf. citations in my paper, "Ethics and Value in Indian Philosophy," Philosophy East and West (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), Vol. IV, No. 4 (January, 1955). 2. S. Radhakrishnan, "Mysticism and Ethics in Hindu Thought," the Sir George Birdwood Memorial Lecture given at the Royal Society of Arts, London, on April 30, 1937, and printed as chap. iii of Eastern Religions and Western Thought (2d ed.; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1940), p. 64. (This volume hereafter designated "ERWT.") 3. The terms "Hindu" and "Indian" will be used synonymously in this paper. 4. Albert Schweitzer, Die Weltanschauung der Indischen Denker "Mystik und Ethik" (MUnchen: C. H. Beck, 1935). Trans. into English as Indian Thought and Its Development by Mrs. C. E. B. Russell (London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1951). All page references in this paper are to the above printing of the English edition (hereafter designated "ITD"). 5. Albert Schweitzer, Kulturphilosophie I: Verfall


29. Cf. ERWT, pp. 63, 80, 105 ff., 45 f.; cf. also POC, pp. xii f., 49, 71 ff., 57; ITD, pp. 10 f.; articlecited in n. 10 above, p. 234. and Schweitzer,
30. ERWT, pp. 75, 76, 81, 93, 80. 31. Ibid., p. 65. Radhakrishnan considers that the latter "brings together in a convenient form the chief criticisms urged against Hindu thought." 32. ITD, p. vii. Schweitzer defines these terms on pp. 1 f.: "World and life affirmation consists in this: that man regards existence as he experiences it in himself and as it has developed in the world as something of value per se and accordingly strives to let it reach perfection in himself, whilst within his own sphere of influence he endeavors to preserve and to further it. "World and life negation on the other hand consists in his regarding existence as he experiences it in himself and as it is developed in the world as something meaningless and sorrowful, and he resolves accordingly (a) to bring life to a standstill in himself by mortifying his will-to-live, and (b) to renounce all activity which aims at improvement of the conditions of life in this world." Cf. also pp. 3, viii. 33. ERWT, p. 74; also p. 83; italics mine. 34. ITD, p. 2. "World and life affirmation... corresponds with the instinctive will-to-live which is in us. World and life negation ... contradicts this instinctive and intuitive force within us" (p. 3). 35. N.B.: CRW, p. 68: "Hinduism is indeed incapable of becoming a definitely ethical religion, for that would mean a break with polytheism. Incapable for this further reason, that ultimately it is unable to replace the Brahmanic philosophy by any other. Wherever Hinduism ventures to think consistently, whether in its older or in its more modern representatives, it falls back into the Brahmanic way of thinking. There is little scope for moving away from it, and Hinduism tries in vain to hide the chain fastened to its foot." 36. ERWT, pp. 35, 46, 75, 56 f. 37. Ibid., pp. 99 f. 38. Cf. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (2d ed.; London: Allen & Unwin, 1948), hereafter designated "IP." I, 208, 213 f.; II, 614, 627. 39. ERWT, p. 83. 40. Ibid., pp. 75, 102 if., 98, 96, 105, 87. 41. ITD, p. 262. 42. POC, pp. 304, 305. The tone here is only superficially that of Gandhi, as Schweitzer is well aware. Cf. ITD, pp. 235 if. Yet see N. K. Bose, Selections from Gandhi (Ahmedabad: Navajivan

9. Cf. POC, Author's Preface to the first English edition. 10. Cf. POC, pp. xii, 56, 58, 303, 304; ITD, p. vi; CRW, p. 80; the article, "The Ethics of Reverence for Life," Christendom,I, No. 2 (Winter, 1936), 234 ff. 11. The phrase is Bishop Butler's. 12. POC, p. 57. Cf. CRW, pp. 47 ff.; P. T. Raju, "Activistic Tendency in Indian Thought," the Vedanta Kesari (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math), XLII, No. 6 (October, 1955), 256. 13. Cf. ITD, pp. viii, 111.

14. POC,p. 288.

15. Cf. ITD, p. 7. 16. POC, pp. 21 f., 282. According to Schweitzer, everything that is, is alive: "In the flowering tree, in the strange forms of the medusa, in the blade of grass, in the crystal; everywhere it [will-to-live] strives to reach the perfection with which it is endowed. In everything that exists there is at work an imaginative force, which is determined by ideals." 17. For a penetrating discussion of this tendency in supernaturalism against which Schweitzer is inveighing, see the chapter, "Realistic Idealism," in Max Otto, The Human Enterprise (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940). 18. POC, p. 312. 19. Schweitzer's argument for this position, his "proof," occurs in POC, p. 309: "As in my own will-to-live there is a longing for wider life and for the mysterious exaltation of the will-to-live which we call pleasure, with dread of annihilation and of the mysterious depreciation of the will-to-live which we call pain; so is it also in the will-to-live all around me, whether it can express itself before me, or remains dumb. "Ethics consist, therefore, in my experiencing the compulsion to show to all will-to-live the same reverence as I do my own. There we have given us that basic principle of the moral which is a necessity of thought. It is good to maintain and to encourage life; it is bad to destroy life or to obstruct it." 20. POC, p. 311; cf. pp. 306, 324. 21. Excepting the CdrvacE materialists. 22. Cf. POC, pp. 330, 305, 304, 302, 57. 23. ITD, p. 191; cf. CRW, pp. 68 if. 24. Cf. ERWT, pp. 75, 94 ff., 51, 105 if., 50, chap. ii passim. 25. POC, pp. 305 f. 26. Cf. ITD, pp. 9, 17, 238 if., 255 if. 27. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I (Cambridge: University Press, 1922), 74 f. 28. Ibid., pp. 75 f. For other accounts of like import see T. R. V. Murti, "Rise of the Philosophical Schools," in The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III: The Philosophies (2d ed.; Calcutta: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1953), p. 27; M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), pp. 24 f., 50 ff.

PublishingHouse, 1948),Sel. 83. 43. POC,p. 305; cf. CRW,pp. 51 f., 80. 44. ERWT, p. 95. It seems fantastic that shoulddeny this. Schweitzer 45. Cf. ERWT, pp. 90, 92. IP, II, 633; idem, The Hindu View of Life (London:Allen & Unwin,
1927), p. 67; The Bhagavadgitd (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), pp. 38, 40.

46. ERWT, pp. 90, 104, 100, 91, 92, 93, 94, 87, 101, 102 f., 103, 104 f. 47. Cf. ITD, p. 7. For Hindu philosopherssuicide is a mere viciouslyidle gesture;it is effacement the empirical of self whichis spirituallyessential.ERWT, p. 53. 48. Schweitzer answers ownquery,"Whatdo his we mean by mysticism?" saying:"Wearealways by in presence of mysticismwhen we find a human being looking upon the division between earthly and super-earthly,temporaland eternal, as transcended,and feeling himself, while still externally amid the earthly and temporal,to belong to the super-earthly eternal"(Die Mystikdes Apostels and Paulus [TUbingen: C. B. Mohr(Siebeck),19301). J. Trans. into English by William Montgomeryand F. C. Burkitt as TheMysticismof Paul theApostle (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1931), p. 1. The above definition would include, of course, the "abstract"mysticismof India. For a definition of Schweitzer's own mysticism-of-the-will POC, see p. 79; CRW, p. 80; ITD, p. 11. 49. POC, p. 305. N.B. CRW, p. 80: "A union with God, however,which is realized throughthe intellectual act of 'knowing,'as conceivedin the Easternreligions,must always remaina dead spirituality. It does not effect a re-birth,in God, into living spirituality.Living spirituality,real redemption from the world, cannot come but from that union with God which is ethically determined. The religionsof the East are logical mysticism, Christianity aloneis ethicalmysticism." 50. RecallSchweitzer's fervent"let it [mysticism] try to get its experiencein living nature" (POC, p. 305). 51. Oskar Kraus, AlbertSchweitzer, sein Werk und seine Weltanschauung (Berlin: Kurt Metzner, 1929). First publishedin the Jahrbuch Charakfitr terologie, Vols. II and III (1926), under the title "Albert Schweitzer:zur Charakterologie ethider schen Persdnlichkeit und der philosophischen Mystik." Second edition translated into English by E. G. McCalman Albert as Schweitzer: Workand His His Philosophy (London: & C. Black,Ltd., 1944), A. p. 41. All page references this paper are to the in above printing of the English edition (hereafter designated"AS"). 52. POC,p. 79. 53. Cf. AS, pp. 42, 43. Schweitzerfinds a like "unresolvedconflict" in Christianity. See CRW, pp. 74 f. 54. Although Schweitzerdistinguishesbetween a philosophical and a religiousworld-view,the distinctionis "quitesuperficial.... Christianity, the as most profoundreligion,is to me at the same time the most profoundphilosophy"(POC, p. 112). Cf.


CRW, p. 83. Yet as the readerwill note, the tone of Schweitzer's letter to Kraus evidencessome uneasinessin the identification. 55. Cf. also last paragraphof article cited in note 10. 56. Radhakrishnannotes the passage quoted above and suggeststhat the difficultiesSchweitzer findsin Indianphilosophies integralto his own. are See ERWT, p. 90, n. 2. 57. CRW, pp. 61, 77, 78, 76 f., 282. Also POC, pp. 78, 282. 58. CRW,pp. 77 f. 59. N.B.: Radhakrishnan: "The end of morality is to lift oneself up above one's individualityand becomeone with the impersonalspirit of the universe.But, so long as thereis a traceof individuality clinging to the moral subject, this lifting up can only be partial"(IP, II, 626). Cf. ERWT, p. 94; IP, II, 614; also POC, pp. 305 if.; CRW, pp. 46 ff. 60. Or affective,as with the bhaktischools. Cf. IP, Vol. I, chap. ix, sec. 10. 61. N.B.: "To the question,how a man can be in the world and in God at one and the sametime, we find this answer in the Gospel of Jesus: 'By living and workingin this world as one who is not of the world'.... Whenevermy life devotes itself in any way to life, my finite will-to-liveexperiences union with the infinitewill in which all life is one, and I enjoy a feelingof refreshment whichprevents me from pining away in the desert of life" (CRW, pp. 73 f.). Cf. POC, p. 313. 62. N.B.: Radhakrishnan: "Negatively, release is freedomfrom hamperingegoism... " (ERWT, p. 97). Cf. CRW, pp. 39 if.; cf. also ERWT, p. 100, and "The sage is not egocentricin the sense of caringfor his own soul, or altruisticin the sense of caringfor others... ." (on p. 101). 63. POC,pp. 80, 283; also see ITD, p. 131. 64. Cf. "The Problemof Ethics for TwentiethCentury Man," Saturday Review,June 13, 1953, p. 47. "But where does this leave ethics?"queries
Schweitzer. His answer: ". . . completely in the

realmof the arbitrary." articlecited in note 10. Cf. 65. POC, pp. 80, 311 ff. Yet Christianitygives man "the assurancethat thereby [through"reverence for life"] God'spurposefor the world and for man is being fulfilled... that thereby the will of God is fulfilled"(CRW,p. 76). But this is not the cognitive assurance that Dr. Radhakrishnandemands; see ERWT, pp. 82 f. Yet at times Dr. Radhakrishnan seems to agree with the Western critics. Thus in the context of a discussion of Saxhkara'sAdvaita Vedanta we find him saying that "the morallife is relatedto the spiritualmoksa; how, we cannotsay" (IP, II, 633 f.). See also POC, pp. 310, 311; cf. ITD, pp. 259 if., 305.