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Problem Set 3

The due date for this homework is Sun 3 Feb 2013 11:59 PM PST.

Question 1

Iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies Normal 1\2 U D L M R

We say that a game is dominance solvable, if iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies yields a unique outcome. True or false: Is the previous game dominance solvable? Consider both pure strategies and mixed strategies. a) True; b) False.

Question 2

Iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies In order to illustrate the problem that arises when iteratively eliminating weakly dominated strategies, consider the following game: Normal 1\2 U D L M R

True or false: in the above game the order of elimination of weakly dominated strategies does not matter (that is, the final outcome is the same regardless of the order in which weakly dominated strategies are eliminated.). [Hint: start the process

https://class.coursera.org/gametheory-2012-002/quiz/attempt?quiz_id=137

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of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies by eliminating different strategies at the beginning of the process.] a) True; b) False.

Question 3

Minimax Consider the matching-pennies game: 1\ 2 Left Right Left 2,-2 -2,2 Right -2,2 2,-2 Which is a maxmin strategy for player 1: a) Play Left. b) Play Right. c) Play Left and Right with probability 1/2. d) It doesn't exist.

Question 4

Minimax Consider the matching-pennies game: 1\ 2 Left Right Left 2,-2 -2,2 Right -2,2 2,-2 Apply the Minimax theorem presented in lecture 3-4 to find the payoff that any player must receive in any Nash Equilibrium: a) 2; b) -2; c) 1;

https://class.coursera.org/gametheory-2012-002/quiz/attempt?quiz_id=137 2/3

1/21/13

d) 0.

Question 5

Correlated Equilibrium 1\ 2 B F B F 2,1 0,0 0,0 1,2

Consider the following assignment device (for example a fair coin): With probability 1/2 it tells players 1 and 2 to play B, and with probability 1/2 it tells them to play F. Both players know that the device will follow this rule. What is the expected payoff of each player when both players follow the recommendations made by the device? If one of players follows the recommendation, does the other player have an incentive to follow the recommendation as well?

2 = 1 =

a) Expected payoff b) Expected payoff recommendation. c) Expected payoff recommendation. d) Expected payoff recommendation.

; player has an incentive to follow the recommendation. ; player does not an incentive to follow the ; player has an incentive to follow the ; player does not have an incentive to follow the

In accordance with the Honor Code, I certify that my answers here are my own work. Submit Answers Save Answers

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