Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense Author(s): Nelson Pike Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol

. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1967), pp. 159-165 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009239 Accessed: 06/11/2010 04:11
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sort of question could be raised with of other comments in the Treatise. a self other secondary literature on Hume's Treatise of Human Nature contains two major criticisms of THE the bundle theory of the self. What is by perceptions that remembers perceptions? Surely it be the collection of perceptions itself.2 My insuperable: remarks will be divided into three sections. It is clear. We could still ask whether he presupposed the existence of a Transcendent when he claimed to look within and discover Ego suppose only a series of perceptions. Hume claims to "look within" and discover only a series of perceptions." for example. empirical {Logic and Knowledge.) 159 . 'these are two that makes of the same person. Though Hume officially denied 1 Cf. but which unites."1 The second major criticism of Hume's bundle theory of the self in? volves the claim that the theory is inconsistent with a certain line of thinking evident in almost every section of the Treatise. the Philosophy takes much the same attitude toward this problem. 1956]. Given that the mind is simply a collection of perceptions (as Hume said). to take another case. what exactly two experiences between us say. it is simply awaiting solution. Number 1967 VIII. perceptions I shall here attempt to defend Hume against the second criticism outlined above.' It does not matter experiences precisely what this relation the logical formula for the construction of the person is the same whatever the relation may is. because be. We should still want to inquire about the principle by which can be divided into individual bundles. And in the third I shall attempt to show how the defense given in the second section of the paper for example. What is it that looks within and makes this discovery ? Surely a collection of perceptions could not perform this task. I shall make about the purpose of Hume's bundle theory of the self. Suppose Hume had provided an adequate criterion by which to divide perceptions into individual bundles. It does not matter with. April 4. of a certain to a range Hume that not only constantly speaks of a mind observes and remembers perceptions. bundles. "You Russell writes: of Logical Atomism. G. the mere and because fact that you can know that two experiences to the same person proves that there is such an belong to be ascertained relation ed. It is sometimes thought to be the problem Hume tried to solve in the section of the Treatise (unsuccessfully) entitled "Of Personal Identity. feigns. Marsh Allen and Unwin. Basson. Russell can collect a whole set of experiences into one string as all belonging to you. C. confuses. to constitute that is supposed the mind. The first centers on the problem of specifying a criterion by which perceptions can be grouped together into individual bundles. by R.American Volume Philosophical Quarterly 2. perceptions in the past this mind could not This same respect sort have been followed of another sort. For purposes shall assume that this latter is not a problem?or. by what principle shall we the perceptions between distinguish up your mind and the perceptions making making an answer to this question is up mine? Providing often taken to be the crucial problem confronting any advocate of the bundle theory of the self. I shall not deal an adequate with the problem of providing to divide perceptions criterion by which into in? I dividual of discussion. In "Of Personal Identity. we agreed that looking within does not require a self other than a series of perceptions. Penguin 1958). Conversely. by analysis.. A. In the some preliminary observations first. the notion of just such a self seems to work importantly in his In addition to the bundle of perceptions thinking. HUME'S BUNDLE THEORY OF THE SELF: A LIMITED DEFENSE NELSON PIKE existence of a Transcendent Ego. 2 In I shall assume that this problem is not better. In the second I shall address myself to the specific version of the second criticism to be found in D.e. Hume says that the mind remembers that than a mere collection of perceptions. Macnabb's commentary on the Treatise. p. David Hume Books. that the criticisms just out? lined are distinct. i. H. I think. (Baltimore. and similarly can other people's experiences as all belonging be collected to them by relations are observable that actually the existence and without together assuming of a persistent in the least to what we are concerned is the given empirical relation ego. pp. and believes things about the perceptions." [London. Hume seems to have presupposed the existence of a self that deals with perceptions in a wide variety of ways. 128. G. In his discussion of causation. 276-277.

re-pass appearance. accord? is here stated in the material Hume's conclusion mode of speech. III. Treatise. III. Italics are mine.7 perceptions constitute to it. I-III. to A Treatise Press. we find it If there is meaning.6 inward. It is presented as a theory about the make-up of the mind. And. 1952). of theatre their Hume where concludes: percep. there is no idea and. several successively away. particular ingly. like Locke's. chs. and must and make mingle situations. what idea it is. paras. what quoted we perceive via "inward" perceptions is a series of emotions and that this need not involve of ideas. 33. Further. 18-20 of the Introduction is a peach. 5 Cf. for instance. figure. the Abstract . language Thus a given word (or sound) that does not stand for some specific idea can not be assigned a proper or use. 8 Abstract. p. color. "annexed" To analyze the meaning of a given word is to the com? numerically The tions glide postures theatre mind distinct is a kind perceptions. He offered the terms "spirit" and "will" as illustrations of this claim.e."3 This ties in with doctrine view that Locke's to communicate is used primarily ideas. pp. con? taste. feelings to which for Hume. to the Principles. even Berkeley held that a word may have meaning if it does not stand for an idea. it would also seem to signification follow. are them sensations. Selby-Bigge Press. 25. So our idea of any mind the notion of anything without perceptions. Bk. that of is only etc. no meaning. 4 Essay. 27 of the Principles. .. 66-67. ideas are According to words. and para. to imagine On either limits nor a distinct a determinate impressions. Bk. without though it has or all are a faint naturally of hold slender with often other employed we are to re? a apt it. . from if it be And to confirm our now to the topic of the self. eh. or sensations) from impression(s) (i. Thus. of infinite in an variety . can be applied other than to versions of the same sort of attack Macnabb's. if so. for the idea "annexed" analyze to analyze a given idea is to identify the Hume. term. 14 of the seventh para. from "inward" sensations in the passage just (to use the phrase introduced from the Enquiry).8 either the the impressions that generated simple by uncovering doctrines "annexed" idea. A. especially obscure: the mind has but they are apt to be when confounded we have and ideas. The of the comparison are the successive us. .. . If one is to discover whether "annexed" a given term has meaning and. If there the idea "annexed" are no impressions. that idea is derived. But the same conclusion is more Treatise.. but the following passage from the Enquiry of the word brings most of them together into compact form : It is offered as a meaning-analysis 3 Essay. enlighteningly Here Hume stated writes: in the Abstract to the As only our that idea sistence. also A Treatise (La Salle. what meaning it has. Open Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and and 74-75 . of a particular size. we call substance. 1958). of any body.l60 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY All and them: sembling abstract ones. of a given word is to identify analyze the meaning that impression (or those impressions) from which to the word is derived. The Clarendon 10-11. p. words are the ". of Human Nature (Cambridge. These methodological are set out in any number in the The point is that the bundle of passages theory of the self is offered by Hume as an analysis of the idea of mind. the Alcephron. 20. pp. L. the analysis of any given word will consist of an examination of the idea for which that word stands. I According to John Locke. are meaning. or compound. idea annexed that strong is all and sensible marks of ideas. 6An of Human Court. Berkeley also disagreed with Locke's view that the chief use of language is to communicate ideas. impossible or idea (as suspicion. regard with? term is employed that a philosophical suspicion meaning what we is frequent) need but is that supposed idea derived? impression serve to assign this will any. that not mislead only pass.e. Hume Turning assumes that our idea of mind is derived from intro? spective observation. and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification. pp. 48-49 (Oxford. They the mind. munication Hume makes use of a theory of meaning very much to Hume. the Enquiry. II (opening sentence). p. Nature. On Hume's account.4 Bishop Berkeley disagreed with this view.. i.5 In Book I of the Treatise. outward more between determined: exactly error or mistake to fall into any is it easy with we to them. When entertain any therefore. if so. University 1938). Cf. one must discover whether there is an idea to the word and. 253. He said that words are often used to arouse the contrary. ideas. the vivid: out inquire. 7 Treatise. dialogue of ed.

as a substance works which while "has" perceptions spoke of the self in his published Bishop Berkeley (e." he to be referring only to the mind. Ltd. if this were a correct interpretation of the text. . the self is a simple substance sophers. generally means not (as we might say) to the whole person.12 Of course. I. meaning 1929].g. is always consciousness intimately gives us that 'tis not person. is not the perceptions. . as a theory about of whole the empirical sentences in more the mind about fashion. In the first two paragraphs of "Personal Iden? Hume considers a view that he ascribes to tity. Macmillan. Dover 1946]. The sixth paragraph (Bk. the existence of an impression of the self is explicitly denied. Mind strangely away and you put the mind. while his at of the "indirect" theory passions propounded II is made to rest on the assumption in Book length an in fact that we do of the experience impression and that this impression is ever-present to us?13 self." with Regard Treatise. 12This on Personal is made "Hume The Philosophical Penelhum." also contains mention 11 Treatise. p. Hume often pretation of Hume of the idea of mind. This brings me to my second reason for rejecting of Hume the above interpretation the concerning existence of the idea of mind.g. G. Put the perceptions but the thing which Say you the mind .These are vague. idea of sure. I think it is plain 9 is usually as a theory about the bundle formulated the contemporary theory of "mind" Among explicitly empiricists. To mean or thoughts. Of course. perceives. meaning. im? into a real by degrees in a of perceptions being in their and differing only of force vivacity. existence What find you there besides several perceptions. of ourselves that that our of our own 'Tis that the idea. p." According says. our explicitly mention of the the idea of mind.. evident.. accordingly. Luce and T. of the single term "mind" (cf. I have two reasons for thinking that this inter? is mistaken. and a conception to imagine it. to which idea This pression. We perceptions perceive are in this matter is a congeries of perceptions. We have no impression of a self-substance that has perceptions. Hume It is not simply the collection that has perceptions. meaning sophisticated (cf.11 to be Hume does not passages. .g. "we have and. e. one might argue at this point that affirms the existence of an idea of while Hume in Book II of the Treatise. and Sons. pp. take away the mind.10 is agreed by most scholars of Hume's writings. II. Consult. p. I must diverge briefly to literature on Here and there in the secondary denied that the Treatise it is suggested that Hume we have an idea of mind. Jessop in his Notebook A he entertained the [London. . (more obviously "The very existence writes: the meaning of the word "mind. Lewis. of perceptions itself. i960). Berkeley ransack your understanding.) punctuation Berkeley's 10 of the section of the Treatise to the Senses. In this connection. And if we turn to Book II of the Treatise we can is quite clear on the find passages in which Hume topic. J. Nelson ed. 18The Philosophy of David Hume (London." to some philo? "some philosophers. vol. 575-586." of ideas constitutes about the soul. vol. p. A. 72. a conveys of any other lively idea these to present intimately to the of vivacity degree we are related. what I have just the point of Hume's bundle theory said concerning It would of the self would have to be withdrawn. I think it has been these remarks which have led Smith (and others) to suppose that Hume denied the explicitly existence of an idea of self in Book I.. 317. But if one looks closely at these paragraphs. e. a thing you do not What mean you by the word mind? is a contradiction. Smith asks the following question: Kemp Why is it that in Book I of the Treatise. Further. nicely by Terence point Review. Italics are mine. Mind Scribner. A.hume's bundle theory of the self: a limited defense 161 "mind. 123-124). Unfortunately for these philo? we have no idea of the Hume continues. 421) or. 1948]. he denies mind its in Book I. or rather present so lively possible the impression with us. He or own speaks only But. E. . Ayer. 354. I answer you are abused by the words empty words without 1. makes them hard to read. Works. no such idea" (italics are mine). 64 (1955). be absurd to suppose that Hume offered an analysis of an idea he thought not to exist.. sophers. Identity. On the opening page of his existence on Hume's Norman commentary philosophy."9 consider At an this point objection. as ourselves person. it is interesting to note that Press. of ideas seem to be all one. when Hume uses the term "self" or "person. can anything in this particular go beyond And The us again: idea and of ourselves is always sensible object. I have taken the liberty of re-punctuating these passages... First. abused Take the perceptions and you by the words. I) entitled "Scepticism of our "ideas of self and person." {Works. p." PP. vol. . Consciousness. pp. self "after the manner it is here explained" (italics are mine). and the World Order [New York. The passage makes mention just quoted from the Abstract is a case in point. Language Truth and Logic [New York. 232-234) of this theory formulation bundle than Hume's) casts it as a theory Berkeley's theory of the self. A.v. great measure degree In these changes two kinds the and same.

S reports that the visual perception of a chair is presently occur? in my mind. With this under? quiring philosophical is suggesting is that the "in55 standing. but he does not deny to be analyzed. rather. I can find no reason to think this phorical is true. this of the theory put is not an adequate description advanced his theory as forward by Hume. The visual perception of a chair is a present member of the collection of perceptions <f>. Of criterion. about what is going on inmy mind. Macnabb as follows: A difficulty hexametrical of conscious when has which been has states been be formulated of Hume. rejects philosophical analysis of our idea of mind. be It that must this hexameter. the idea of a bundle of perceptions. Given the bundle chair-perception analysis of "mind. "my mind55 must a certain collection of perceptions that designate is specifiable without mention of anything other than perceptions. "I am in that club55). reduces to "The visual of a chair is presently in the collection perception of perceptions </>"(where the criterion for identi? of nothing other than fying <f)requires mention their qualities and relations). occurring presently of "Scepticism with Regard messages is that "I see a chair5' is reducible to of a chair is One of the to the Senses55 the statement enlightening of my way mind55 to look at the matter as a pre-analytical is to think phrase re? "The visual then perception mind. Yet it say about the meaning is clear. pointed I am putting this problem aside for the present. is the same collection "Pike's mind55 when designated others are wrongly is required all self-conscious times. And which collection to is that? The collection of perceptions belonging some pure ego?me? Surely not. that one result of Hume's a specific analysis of "mind55 is that it provides It might analysis of the "in55 in "in my mind. to be the of it is some aware We of of are itself.I?2 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY that they contain we have no idea no such denial. This is not to say that my mind ring is seeing a chair. I "in think a hurry. G. Thus for Hume. their qualities or relations." He had nothing directly to of the pronoun T5. G. it is. / am seeing the chair. we But. of the members is said speaking. Had we an adequate criterion by which to divide perceptions into individual bundles." I shall Consider call this statement S. course.55 the phrase "my mind55 must that special collection be understood as designating of perceptions which is mine.g. says that viz. as do not out actually above. But if I am sense. "In55 is not always used to signify spatial uses that place... We can see. as when a nation conscious . It has plenty of non-metaphorical have "in nothing his name. have or some such a such. We do have an idea of mind?as the passages just quoted from Book II make clear.) designates sound produced by in a certain chair at a a certain collection I consider time. the of perceptions by phrase It </>. we could now go on to provide a unique description aware themselves is really as members the members Just itself as a nation. self-conscious certain series. perceptions. (e.g. a of make the no collection mention <f>?a description of a pure-ego that that would "has55 the has perceptions. Macnabb's discussion of Hume's writes theory of knowledge. is no inconsistency There of the sort alleged by a certain Hume Smith. "I see a chair55 reduced to "The visual of a chair is presently occurring in my perception mind55 and this. Under analysis we discover that this idea is not the idea of a mental-substance. in turn. I see that the difficulty It is not the series as a whole put. the visual perception in my mind. mind-substance which He does not say that we have no idea of mind.55 Let us now consider the following passage from the closing page of D. "My mind. constituting collection of perceptions whose members are to one another by the special relation R. aware of someone by can a "How itself as a series?" in a series But criticism considered this body certain as a meaningful (the body sitting etc. I think. The point is that for Hume.55 "in to do with "in the space mood55). I think. that there is an idea of mind II the statement: "I see a chair. We of to be are the not at series of of the the time.55 assume of a chair is presently with Hume's occurring us Let in my attention. the whose feature F. Hume of a certain kind of mind. It is sometimes supposed that the whole point of a theory of the self (such as is to identify the object referred to by Huem's) in sentences such as S. But what? the pronoun T ever may be true of some theories of the self. what Hume in question is the "in55 of membership (e. that sentences such as S say some? The collection perceptions <?." be thought that "in" is properly a special term occurring in the phrase "in my mind55 in a meta? tell us something They thing about my mind.. collection is <j> the collection of perceptions members share a common introspectable is <j> the related or. (in accordance that S reports the presence of a visual intentions) in my mind.55 a more seeing a chair. Hume an analysis of "mind.

A series as A a of series. 251-252. in etc.55 occurring of of a And. / am aware of a of a certain series member certain perception of perceptions. D. Ill this defense of Hume.hume's bundle theory of the self: a limited defense 163 or some nation. of perceptions can aware be can of series anything at all. But I can find no special problem here for Hume. of conscious Surely. 1951). This seems intelligible. I want now to generalize But before I do. who the nation. the implication is that as a member if anything is aware of a perception it must be something of a series of perceptions. includes a picture which is My picture-collection or another picture) of a picture (itself hanging next to some other pictures in the collection. I can find no problem here for Hume. it thing is aware of a series of conscious must be something other than the series itself. other than a perception. I can only can not agree with this observation. etc.14 the answer a series of conscious states problem. aware of series of perceptions. But a collection of pictures might contain a picture which is of itself pictured as a collection. aware of itself as is how a given perception a member of a certain "How can be aware of itself as a series?55 The implication is that if any? states. But a series of conscious states is not the kind ofthing that can be aware of something?itself or anything else. alterna? bundle-analysis awareness of myself occurring perceptions the c/> is presently within "A certain series of per? tively. members of A) B.e." as a series the a member would awareness is presently ment. Again. But a perception (like a series of per? is not the kind of thing that can be aware ceptions) of anything at all." certain series per? of we must statement Following Hume "An first it (as it were) into a mention of my mind.e. But Hume "mind. / can be aware of things. of conscious might A series of conscious as a series.e. of Knowledge (London. as members of perception relational not know are aware of themselves them. E. are The need aware real members as members we of perceptions call unity to this question. can be says Macnabb.55 analyzed not T5. Macnabb is yet to says that the real problem come. Hume need His not Theory say that the whole and Morality series of 14David Hume: is aware of a tion does it affirm that a perception or that it (itself or another perception) perception it is a member. what is it for a to be aware of that of itself as a member of mind? I do perceptions say that only of themselves is aware some of itself as a series." relation On to neither some other interpreta? series of perceptions contains term Of <f>. "An as being Trans? a he would now be forced to adopt the erroneous can be aware of view that a bundle of perceptions itself as a bundle. making explicit I think the pattern suggested above. This last statement might mean: "A certain series of perceptions includes a member A which <j> B standing is of another member in relation to some other members C. states series can of but it is intelligible. of is of a per? includes a member which <j> perceptions (itself or otherwise) ception standing in relation to some other perceptions. here.55 lating mention this statement of my of mind. standing C." Or." This itself last statement is awkward."I can see no difficulty perceptions (i. He of of the the series series. "translate55 translate of myself occurring Hume's "An this as in my a statement series as follows: of perceptions This last state? of "mind. Analogy: A collection of pictures cannot paint a picture which is of itself pictured as a collection. conscious states this cannot last states be aware of itself observation can not be is correct. E. my this last still "mind55) so must be applied again. this ception given Hume's last means: as being "An bundle-analysis awareness a certain of "mind.. it might mean: includes a member A which is of itself ceptions </> (i. A perception be aware of itself as a member of a series of per? ceptions aware be any of more itself than as a a series / series.. is aware of the series of which On it says only that the collection both readings. as being is a member of a certain in my mind. As above. The the bundle-analysis final analysis is then: "An awareness of the series of perceptions is <f> which <f> presented as a series (in of perceptions) is presently the occurring within series of perceptions not be aware states <f>. . as an Hume Had offered his bundle-analysis account of the meaning of T5 (in such statements as "I am aware of myself as a series of perceptions55) things. into one making we get: an explicit of a awareness certain perception series perceptions. Thus if we are to discover what Hume would of the statement: say about the meaning "I am aware of myself as a series of perceptions. I shall consider one more specific Hutchinson. an But aware? a contain ness which is of itself presented as a series. But still. D. would of given mean: mind.." "myself55 course (i. pp. Again.55 that series of perceptions </>is occurring within within <f>).

breaks down. like the belief in self-substance. pp. And / discover that this of a chair-perception is perception ("inward") in a certain bundle of perceptions occurring <?. into and make to be united several them different lose their by identity. believing. ." seems to have thought As a general remark. a series of similar perceptions. p.e. For there may be difficulties with Hume's example. of charge with J. that Hume's psychological positivism Hume distinct But. perception a certain certain I think. / believe this fact. instead. an i. collection a only of the per? are essential to distinction and difference which this belief them.e. continuous. the belief in self-substance is mistaken.. a believes. Neither a of these claims presuppose self other than a series of perceptions?one which confuses succession with identity and later dis? covers that it has made a mistake. etc. ceptions. 253. can now be generalized."16 common man entities?he according and of a (i. or has a propensity to believe. "I the object perceived is not a physical an introspectable mental is. Hume would say that the first affirms that a certain idea which is (i. are included in a certain series of perceptions <f>. to recognize that has been confused with succession . and then. which I have as Passmore writes follows The : fundamental identity) problem is what of discussion (in Hume's succes? it is which confuses personal sion with Let's look at these last two statements.164 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY version of the kind been dealing. . . it. a certain belief-perception and "lively") is occurring in especially "strong" my mind. a chair-perception" means "An observe uninterrupted experience. p. ascribe identity . belief is in error. 18 Treatise. 269.. perceptions.e. is ultimately (in this case "see") ception verb excludable. Both the very one Given Hume's of "mind. 19 Treatise. run the to continuous. There may be difficulties with this view. texts and has been generally recognized by most on Hume's commentators I think philosophy.e. distinct single. ever reveal series the discovery fiction and that it is a fiction original are possible if there is something which is at first only can discover misled by. Hume that statements about the activities of mind (such as observing. according (or to believe) that successive per? have a propensity ceptions are "moments in" a single. p. I think our findings to Hume. and a (a belief-perception "realization-of-error-perception" in the second) another. comes and equally. p. remembering. after consideration. . entities continuous. supposed clearly of the contents of mind will establish inspection to Hume. series of itself Nor identity. (It is) at this point." these bundle-analysis last mean that certain kinds of perceptions only in the first case. 15 Cambridge 16 Treatise. a statement of the form "I According see a chair" is a (where the object perceived is reducible to a statement of the physical object) form "A visual chair-perception is occurring with a certain bundle of perceptions When the <f>.. Hume thought it is to be distinguished from the false. Thus.15 . The common man to . 17 Treatise. These claims entail only that certain kinds of perceptions are included in a certain collection of perceptions.. . whether 82-83. are "moments uninterrupted that these in" or per? uninterrupted experience). its fictional character. 233. . ". Statements containing such verbs are train of perceptions i. If all that is that a series of identity? happened similar (or causally there is no succeed linked) perceptions in which this way possible could the fiction of personal generate once the fiction could this generated. (1952)."19 Of course.. 259. single.e. is clear in Hume's So much.. Though the belief held by "some philosophers" concerning does not ascribe existence of a self-substance (Hume to the common man). ". has a propensity these successive the whole suppose . . claim that a belief is simply an idea which is especially "strong" and "lively. there is no difficulty of the sort urged by Passmore. The second (I think Hume would say) affirms that a second perception (call it a "realiza tion-of-error-perception") also occurs in my mind.)."18 perceptions characters of translatable presence "substance") of into statements a certain within mentioning (i. . that careful Hume Further. what it is which identity. A. separate aspects ception to "." is a physical the per? object perceived object. them the "substances."17 to one." But so far as I can see. In Hume's Intentions.. intended the same to be true with regard Hume to such statements as "I observe a chair-percep? tion"?where object but state. that it was misled by. held perceptions that the (in "Of Personal Identity") the mind are separate and up making called to Hume.

we often find him saying that themind perceives. ig66 to statements it is composed..e. remembers. etc. believes. Mental perceptions making are not to be included in other words. about. includes things. remembered.. The key to the problem. things. it of which perceptions is equally hard to see how a mere of collection could be that which perceives. as conveniences?manners of etc. a mind which does things. is these cases.. Given his analysis of "mind" there is nothing the very for such an Ego to do. of perceptions could be that which perceives. When of such statements via the objects with We get to the real meaning a Humean men? In statements the mind respect to which analysis. When we turn to Hume texts. Of course. analysis. statements affirming only the presence of certain have charged that Hume has supposed the existence a certain substances (perceptions) within other than a mere of per? mental of a mind collection no Hume It is hard to see how a mere collection collection. Statements containing mental verbs the objects receiving the action of such (whether verbs be physical objects or mental states) are used F . (allegedly) does some? are replaced are perceptions the activities of mind mental critics tioning by states) thing (i. in the finished mental vocabulary. Such statements suggest that there is by Hume speech. remembers. believes etc. believes perceptions things about. remembers.) are ultimately re? the presence of affirming in the collection of specialized perceptions verbs.. physical objects too Hume's critics (so far as I know) have ?though not sensed the need for a Transcendent Ego in I think.. Transcendent presupposes ceptions.hume's bundle theory of the self: a limited defense 165 are activities to with these activities respect states (i. Ego.e. whether it physical objects or mental states which are being is physical objects or mental observed. the mind does not do anything?it that for Hume. things ducible certain Cornell University Received February 7. up the mind. etc.

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