This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
INTRODUCTION CASE TITLE DIZON V CA DIGEST FACTS: Overland entered into a contract if lease with option to buy with Dizon. Dizon wanted to cancel the contract for nonpayment but Overland insists it has a lready made a partial payment for the option to buy with Alice Dizon. HELD: Ther e was no valid payment because Alice Dizon was not authorized by the seller to a ccept any payment. DOCTRINE: Sale us a consensual contract and he who alleges it must show its existence by competent proof. The elements of a contract of sale are consent, object and price in money or its equivalent. The absence of any of these essential elements negates the existence of a perfected contract. FACTS: T here was a barter between Fule(owner of land) and Dr. Cruz(owner of emerald-cut diamond earrings). Fule was given time to inspect the jewelry, being a jeweller himself. When asked if the jewelry was okay, he said yes. He later complained th at the earrings were fake and wants his land back. HELD: there can be no return of properties because the contract had already been perfected. DOCTRINE: A contr act of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing to which is the object of the contract and upon the price. FACTS: Celestin o, maker of sash, doors and windows, claim that it should only be assessed 3% co ntractor’s tax because its work is based on special order, not the 7% tax for on s ale of manufactured articles. HELD: Celestino cannot avail of the 3% tax because it does not only serve special customers only since any builder may order from them. DOCTRINE: A factory which habitually makes sash, windows and doors, and se lls the goods to the public is a MANUFACTURER. The fact that the windows and doo rs are made by it only when customers place their orders and according to such f orm or combination as suit the fancy of the purchaser does not alter the nature of the establishment. FACTS: Eng’g is engaged in the design installation of centra l air conditioning system, pumping plants and steel fabrications. HELD: Eng’g is n ot a manufacturer but a contractor so it should not be assessed tax for manufact ured goods. DOCTRINE:The distinction between a contract of sale and a contract f or furnishing services, labor and materials is tested by the inquiry whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which would never have existed bu t for the order of the party desiring to acquire it, or a thing which would have existed and has been the subject of sale to some other persons even if the orde r had not been given. S FACTS: There was a contract between Quiroga and Parsons so Parsons can sell Quiroga beds in Visayas. Quiroga claims that Parsons had vio lated certain obligations implied in agency. HELD: the contract was of purchase and sale and not a contract of agency. Parsons’ obligation was to pay the price fo r the beds whether are sold or not. DOCTRINE: In a contract of agency, the agent receives the thing to sell it and does not pay for the prince but delivers to t he principal the price he obtains from the sale of a thing to a third person. If he does not succeed, then he returns the thing to the principal. FACTS: Puyat w as the agent in Manila of Star Piano. Arco contracted with Puyat to purchase sou nd reproducing equipment. FULE V V CA CELESTINO V COLLECTOR COMMISSIONER V ENGINEERING QUIROGA V PARSONS PUYAT V ARCO
Arco later learned that Puyat has a 25% discount with Star Piano and wants Puyat to return the equivalent amount of the discount to them. HELD: Arco is not enti tled to the discount that Puyat enjoyed because Puyat was not an agent of Arco. DOCTRINE: It is well-known that local dealers acting as agents of foreign manufa cturers, aside from obtaining discount from principal, also adds to the price fo r local purchasers. If a purchaser later discovers that it is at the short end, he alone must bear the blame and contract cannot be rescinded. FACTS: Laigo obta ined loan of 11M from Dao Heng Bank, Inc and pledged 3 mortgages as security. La igo failed to settle the obligation and verbally offered to cede to Dao Heng one of the two mortgaged lots by way of dacion en pago. Dao Heng demanded payment a nd filed an application to foreclose all 3 mortgages. HELD: There was no dacion en pago because Dao Heng had not consented. DOCTRINE: Dacion en pago as a mode o f extinguishing an existing obligation partakes of the nature of sale whereby pr operty is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money. It is an objective novation of the obligation, hence, common consent of the parties is r equired in order to extinguish the obligation. FACTS:Myers and Maritime entered into a contract of Conditional Sale (Contract to Sell). Myers reserved the right to cancel contract in case of Maritime’s failure to pay installments. Maritime fa iled to pay, hence, Myers cancelled the contract. HELD: (as previously proven) c ontract to sell, not of sale. When payment was not made, contract of sale was no t perfected. DOCTRINE: The distinction between contracts of sale and contract to sell with reserved title has been recognized by this Court in repeated decision s upholding the power of promisors under contracts to sell in case of failure of the other party to complete payment, to extrajudicially terminate the operation of the contract, refuse conveyance and retain the sums or installments already received, where such rights are expressly provided for, as in this case. FACTS: Dignos sold their land to Jabil payable in 2 instalment, w/ assumption of indebt edness. Jabil paid and it was acknowledge by the spouses in a deed. Later, Digno s spouses also sold the same land to Cabigas, a deed of absolute sale was execut ed. HELD: The property belongs to Jabil since when Dignos sold the land to Cabig as, the could not validly do so since they no longer were the owners. DOCTRINE: Difference between contract to sell and contract of sale: sell – reserves ownershi p subject to fulfilment of condition i.e. full payment, and ownership does not p ass to the buyer despite delivery of the thing until said condition is fulfilled ; sale – does not reserve ownership over the thing sold and ownership is transferr ed immediately upon actual or constructive delivery of the thing. FACTS:Fernando Canullas and Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas were married and begot 5 children. Fern ando abandoned his family and lived with his concubine. Fernando sold the land a s well as the house where his wife and children resided to Daguines for P2,000. Daguines initiated a complaint for quieting of title against Mercedes. DOCTRINE: The sale was contrary to law morals and public policy, and thus is null and voi d. The sale was subversive to the stability of the family, a basic social instit ution which public policy cherishes and protects. The prohibition of donations a nd sale DAO HENG BANK V LAIGO LUZON BROKERAGE V MARITIME DIGNOS V CA II. PARTIES TO A CONTRACT OF SALE CALIMLIMCANULLAS V FORTUN
CRUZ V CA between spouses apply to common-law relationships, otherwise, “the condition of th ose who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those is legal union”. FAC TS:Gloria Cruz and Romeo Suzara lived together as husband and wife without the b enefit of marriage. Out of love and affection, Cruz executed a deed of absolute sale over her lot in favour of Suzara without any monetary consideration. Suzara subsequently mortgaged it and was it was foreclosed because he however failed t o pay. Cruz paid the bank partially to restructure the loan in order to extend r edemption period. Suzara redeemed the property and sold it to a 3 rd person DOCT RINE: While Art. 1490, which prohibits the husband and wife from selling propert y to each other, was extended to common-law relationships, Cruz can no longer se ek reconveyance of the property when it has already been acquired by 3 rd person in good faith and for value. The real purpose of the Torrens system of registra tion is to quiet title to land and to put to a stop to any question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. A purchaser i s not required to explore further what the Torrens title on its face indicates i n quest for hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his rig ht thereto. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO V ROLDAN FACTS: When father died, Mariano, inherited 17 parcels of land from him. His ste pmom Roldan, was appointed his guardian through guardianship proceedings. Roldan sold the land to her brother-in-law Ramos allegedly to invest the money in a ho use in Manila. The next day, Ramos executed in favor of Roldan a deed of conveya nce covering the same 17 parcels. DOCTRINE:Roldan purchased her ward’s property th rough her brother-in-law. She planned to get them for herself, evident from the amount of time that lapsed between the two sales (8d). Only ONE DAY had passed f rom the time the guardianship court judicially confirmed the sale. From both leg al and equitable standpoints, the sales cannot be sustained. The sales from Mari ano, by Roldan, to Ramos, and then from Ramos to Mariano, are void for violation of 1459. FACTS: Francisco Militante claimed ownership over land to which he fil ed an application for registration of title. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands. Pending litigation, Militante sold the land to Domingo Rubias , his son-in-law and a lawyer by profession. Rubias declared the land for taxati on purposes under various tax declarations and land taxes. DOCTRINE:Aside from a cquiring nothing from Francisco Militante, since his application for registratio n was denied by the land registration court – as affirmed with finality by the CA. Assuming in arguendo that Militante had anything to sell, the deed of sale exec uted in 1956 by him in favor of plaintiff at a time when plaintiff was concededl y his counsel of record in the land registration case involving the very land in dispute was void. The purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from h is client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Civi l Code RUBIAS V BATILLER MACARIOLA V ASUNCION FACTS:Judge Asuncion purchased a property from Dr. Galapon, who acquired the sai d property from the parties in a partition case previously handled by Judge Asun cion.
at the time of the perfection of the contract. The report submitt ed stated that Parcel No. could be determined by simply re ferring to the Arellano plan. and that its designation as lot No.III. the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. The case handled by Judge Asuncion had long been final. including lots 1214-C and 1214-D. nor even to clarify matters or explain their intentions. The instrument of sale d id not mention lot 1214-B.808 square-meter) and Atilano II retained 535-A but is now occupying 535-E (2. avenues and parks according to the Arellano plan. MELLIZA V CITY OF ILOILO . and not by the mere lot nu mber assigned to it in the certificate of title. Simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torren s system does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the propert y described therein.” T he Arellano plan had long been in existence before the execution of the deed. Atilano II bought 535E but is now occupying 535-A (1. Atilano II of course wants to get the other bigger parcel. without the parties needing to draw-up a new contr act. Heirs of E. where he reconstructed his house where his heirs continued to reside. as intended and understood by the parties. FACTS:Eulogio Atil ano II brought parcel of land from his brother Eulogio Atilano I. 535-A which was the one presently occupied by heirs of Atilano I. 2 was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the spouses. it was discovered that th e land sold to them designated as Lot No. He di dn’t buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs either. his acts invited su spicion of impropriety & distrust thus he was reminded to be discreet in his pri vate/business affairs.a p iece of land. FACTS:Melliza sold under a deed several tracts of land to the then Mu nicipality of Iloilo. Therefo re. but the real intention of the parties to that sale. was being contested by the municipality as a river and thus form part of public domain. the exact area of the land ne eded. 535-A.” which had long been in existence and it specifically provided for the land areas needed for the city hall site. ownership of w/c changed hands u ntil it landed to spouses Martinez. FACTS: A parcel of land. lot No. but stipulated that the area being sold shall include the area “needed for the constr uction of the city hall site. At ilano II claim that upon resurvey of the subject land. was that specific portion whe re the vendee was then already residing. The requirement was deemed fulfilled und er the contract of sale because it specifically referred to such other portions of the lots required by the “Arellano plan. The real issue here is not adve rse possession. DO CTRINE:The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is fulfilled as long as. Said parcel is a branch of the main river that has been covered with wa ter since time immemorial and thus part of the public domain. at the time the contract is entered into. It is incapable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription. The object o f sale. : namely. although it was contiguous to the other two lots. 535-E was in fact Lot No. SO. for example . The spouses’ title does not include the river. DOCTRINE:Parcel No. The municipal officials of Lubao refused to recognize the Subcom mittee’s decision. The incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens c ertificate of title does not operate when the land covered is not capable of reg istration.one sells or buys the property as he sees it. The dispute was referred to the Comm ittee of Rivers and Streams which conducted an investigation. 2 is a river of the public domain as eviden ced by its technical description which states that it is bounded on all sides by rivers. DOCTRINE:When one sells or buys real property . in its actual setting and by its physical metes and bounds. However. 535-E in the deed of sale was a simple mistake in the drafting of th e document. which was the subject matter of the sale. SUBJECT MATTER MARTINEZ V CA DOCTRINE:The prohibition in the NCC on acquisition of properties by judges cover s only acquisitions taking place during the pendency of the litigation involving those properties.612 square meters).
ATILANO V ATILANO .
1968 up to January 1. Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana then sold his i nterest to Alejandro. Yu Tek paid Gonzalez P3000 but the latter was not able to deliver the sugar because of the almost total failure of his crop. and in connivance with Vicente. FACTS:Ranft was given quedans as document of his title to bales of hemp he had purchased. a contract of lease of the land itself. DOCTRINE:Vicente is estopped from asserting his title as against either Montel ibano or Uy-Cana. selling 4/1 8 of his interest in his mother’s estate. Where the true owner of property. DOCTRINE:The document in question expresses a valid contract of sale. Notwithstanding that fact. they will be protected. allows another to appear as the owner of or as having full power of disposition over the property. for all legal intents and purposes. 1976. There is a perfected sale with regard to the “thing” being sol d when it had already been physically segregated from all other articles. He died without paying Siy for the hemp. with knowledge of his own right. a promise of sale and not a sale. Siy wanted to get the queda ns from HSBC as these were not yet paid for.200. Alonzo sold to Pichel through a “deed of sale” all the fruits of the coconut trees which may be harvested in the land for the p eriod 15 September 1968 to 1 January 1976. 1096 and 1182 are not a pplicable. Vicente sold his interest to his uncle Rosendo . It has the essential elements of a contract of sale a s defined under Article 1485 of the New Civil Code. the contract between Gonzalez and Yu Tek was merely an executory agreement. of cou rse w/ prohibition from encumbrance. things having a potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale. he offered the quedans as security for his preexisting deb ts to HSBC.PICHEL V ALONZO FACTS:Alonzo was awarded a parcel of land by the Government as homestead. which subject matter is a determinate thing. an encumbrance prohibited under RA 477. Vicente. even though he had actually purchased all of his father’s intere st. OBLIGATION OF SELLER TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP HERNAEZ V HERNAEZ SIY CONG BIENG V HSBC . The subject matter of the co ntract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land durin g the years from September 15. Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code. the loss of the thing must be borne by the buyer. Thus. to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana. DOCTRINE:Siy is estopped from denyi ng that the bank had a valid title to the quedans for the reason that Siy itself had voluntarily clothed Ranft with all the attributes of ownership. He sold his interests to the undi vided estate of both parents to his son.Alonzo fil ed an action for the annulment of a “Deed of Sale” because the contract actually is. he executed a document of sale all his interest to his father’s estate and 1/18of his mother’s to Alejandro Montelibano. There was no “appropri ation” of any particular lot of sugar. The contract of sale being valid. After that. In the case at bar. on the same day. for however short a time. However. in consideration of P4. it is clear that articles 1452. FACTS:Domingo Hernaez’s parents died. and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner. w ithout knowing of the arrangement between the IV. As ther e was no perfected sale. YU TEK V GONZALES FACTS:A written contract was executed between Basilio Gonzalez and Yu Tek & Co f or Gonzalez to provide Yu Tek with 600 piculs of sugar of the first and the seco nd grade according to the result of the polarization within three months for a c onsideration of P3000. He also execut ed a document of sale. without pay ing for the hemp yet. or. the same being in the latter’s actual possession. holds out anothe r. The bank. Pending crops w hich have potential existence may be the subject matter of the sale. what was designated was the generic name “sugar”. DOCTRINE :A contract of sale is not perfected until the parties have agreed upon the pric e and the thing sold.
JALBUENA V LIZARRAGA parties. Co Kang Chiu paid P985 in cash. even as against the original owner. an owner of a restaurant. the same being in the latter s actual possession. the latter must be protected. While s he was talking to Garcia. The ref was delivered to Co Kang Ch iu. Lopez sold the ref to Velasco. Ruling this way w ould facilitate commercials on movable & give stability to business transactions . allows another to appear. the contract remained binding. as a result of some intervening ca uses. for buyers can’t be reasonably expected to look behind the title of every artic le when he buys at a store. Garcia refused to return the ring. and innocent thi rd parties are thus led into dealing with some [such] apparent owner. DOCTRINE:Accdg to A559 CC. FACTS:A diamond ring was stolen from Guevara’s house. This rule is necessary in a country such as ours where free enterprise prevail s. DOCTRINE: Jalbuena is estopped. DOCTRINE:This is a case of an imper fect or void title ripening into a valid one. As the car was again sold to another. and if it is mentioned it is more of an XPN that the GR SUN BROS. She brought an action to recover the car. Sun Bros filed a complaint for replevin. one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereo f. may nevertheless recover it from the person in possession of it. as judgment creditor. The policy of the law from w/c we do not feel justified to deviate. or. DOCTRINE:The possessio n of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. V VELASCO MASICLAT V CENTENO TAGATAC V JIMENEZ FACTS: DOCTRINE: FACTS:Tagatac was induced by fraud(pretending he had lots of mo ney) to sell and deliver his car to Feist for which she was given a post-dated c heck. Neverthel ess. relied upon the apparent ownership in good faith FACTS:Salvador Lizarra ga. for howe ver short a time. as the owner of or as having full power of disposition over the property. Velasco sold the ref to Co Kang Chiu. the tit le acquired by the subsequent purchaser was an indefeasible one. The doctrine of caveat emptor is now rarely applied. has al ways been that where the rights & interests of a vendor comes into clash w/ that of an innocent buyer for value. There was a valid transmission of ownership from Tagatac to Feist by virtue of the sale and delivery of the car to the swindler. after displaying the ref a t his store. they will be protected. Garcia averred that she bo ught it from her comadre. she recognized the ring on t he latter’s finger and asked how she acquired the same. FACTS: Sun Bros delivered to Francisco Lopez an Admiral refrigerat or. As long as no action was taken for annulme nt. At the time of the levy Doronila stated to the sheriff that the mill belonged to him. although possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. The following day. The fraud and deceit practiced on her earma rked the sale as a voidable contract. the judgment debtor and husband of Jalbuena. Lopez paid only the down payment of P500. It was ascertained the ring was indeed Guevarra’s but de spite written demands. holds out another. If the DE GARCIA V CA . The check was dishonored and the car was subsequently sold from one person to another until it was displayed in a car exchange where it was discovered by the plaintiff. with knowledge of his own right. one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may re cover it from the person in possession of the same. caused the sheriff to levy upon an old sugar-mill as t he property of Ildefonso Doronila. Where the true owner of property.
If it is only w/ a false consideration. the brother of the owner of the land. Maximo sold the whole lot to the Narcisos. Irineo handed the documents to Marella. except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale. EDCA delivers the books. The dee d of sale is governed by the Old Civil Code.EDCA PUBLISHING V SANTOS possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived. has acquired it in good faith at a public sale. He inquired from a woman he saw for L. The check to EDCA bounces. it is voidable. It establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability. De Dios and he was told that no such name lived or was even known there. he has a right to recover it. EDCA discovers the fraud of the impostor. Impostor sells books to Santos who buys in good fa ith. Marella also requested the registration papers and copy of deed from Irineo. the posses sor cannot retain the thing as against the owner. V. on the pretext that he would show it to his lawyer . releasing. DOCTRINE:Article 559 of the Civil Code applies in this case. FACTS: Ong ex ecuted a quitclaim deed in favour of Maruzo(minor) transferring. thus she has tit le to them as owner. the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. Marella said they had to go to his sister’s h ouse to borrow money. De La Pena acquired ownership over the books which he could t hen validly transfer to the Leonor Santos. assi gning and forever quitclaimed ½ of parcel of land for a consideration of “1 peso and other valuable consideration”. Santos’ son. when the owner (1) has lost th e thing. In this case. but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basi s of acquisitive prescription. it is i nexistent. who may recover it without pay ing any indemnity. but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder. FACTS :Illiterate spouses were tricked into signing a deed of donation of the eastern portion of the land to Maximo. thief or robber. to wit. FACTS:An impostor(alias Jose Cruz ) buys books from EDCA through telephone. or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. Once inside the house. They alighted while an unidentified co mpanion of De Dios stayed behind in the car.There was a perfected contract of sale. PRICE MAPALO V MAPALO ONG V ONG .The title of the possessor is not th at of ownership. De Dios did not come out of the room. The documen t signed by the spouses was actually a deed of sale conveying the WHOLE property to Maximo. the consideration of P500 was totally absent. In these cases. DOCTRINE:Ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the t hing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. AZNAR V YAPDIANGCO FACTS:To get purchase price for car. DOCTRINE:A contract of pu rchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where the sam e is without cause or consideration in that the purchase price which appears the reon as paid has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. not only from t he finder. If it is w/o consideration. Irineo was a sked to wait in the sala while De Dios went inside a room. The inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and cannot be the subject of prescription. The car was also not there outside anymore. the rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing. First sentence of Art 559 CC “the posse ssion of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title”. is paid through personal check . Santos acquired possession of the movables (the books) in good faith. thief or robber. or if he h as been unlawfully deprived of it. HELD: The quitclaim was valid because the consider ation was no one person alone but also other valuable considerations. and se eks to recover ownership of the books from Santos. and issues a sales invoice. for un der it.
but rather the consummation stage where the price agreed upon can be paid under the mutual arrangements agreed upon by the parties to the contract o f sale. the consideration may have been much more. in representation of the Bur eau of Prisons. FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines. and to be rendered for my benefit.00 (in each deed) plus unspecified and unquantified services VALUE: At least P10. the first owner’s duplicate copy was not lost or was either foun d by Montinola. then the preside nt of PDRC. 1989 because he. is for the court t o pass upon and decide after hearing all the parties in the case. He also intimated that if he does not arrive in his hometown with a new c ar.00. Apostol. DOCTRINE:Where the contract of sale states that the co nsideration is P1. DOCTRINE:S ale of land is VOID AB INITIO for having false and fictitious consideration (P1 in the deed compared to P10. the term “equivalent” of price can cover other than money or othe r media of exchange. Apparently. FACTS: Luna wanted to buy Toyota Lite Ace.00 although the actual consideration may have much more. DOCTRINE: PRDC has legal interest in the case b ecause A1458 provides that the purchaser may pay “a price certain in money or its equivalent. was used by him to sell the lot again to Morales Development. Mo rales claims to have a better right over the property because of the suspicious price paid for the sales. The complaint says that sometime prior to Apostol’s transactions th e corporation had some goods deposited in a warehouse. but without the knowledge or consent of the stockholders thereof. instituted against Macario Apostol a civil complaint. Reyes. being rendered.00. as it defines a contract of sale. disproportion between: STIPULATED PRICE: P1.500. met w/ a sales rep ad emphasized that he needed the Lite Ac e not later than June 17. It is not unusual in deeds of conveyance adhering to the Anglo-Saxon practice of stating that the co nsideration given is the sum of P1.0 0 (based on assessments for tax purposes) FACTS:Montinola sold his lot to Reyes using a second owner’s duplicate of the TCT for only P1. as is the case herein. since no othe r true and lawful cause was shown. in turn. sold t he lot to the Abellas again for P1. 1 set claims that the lands were sold to them as depicted in a deed for the consideration of P1. PDRC moved to intervene. Whether the go ods claimed by PRDC belong to it and delivered to the Bureau of Prisons by Apost ol in payment of his account is sufficient payment therefore. FACTS:Hilario Mateum died without ascendants or descenda nts. his family and a balikbayan guest wou ld use it on June 18 to go to his home province where he would celebrate his bir thday.00. he would become a laughing MORALES V CA REPUBLIC V PHIL RESOURCES TOYOTA SHAW V CA . even by dation in payment.” which means payment of the price need not be in money.00 and “services rendered.500 as valued in the tax declaration). not to say enormous. and survived only by 2 sets of collateral relatives. Upon the consideration alone that the apparen t gross. ***VILLANUEVA NOTES This case is not at all authority to say that under A1458. di sposed of said goods by delivering the same to the Bureau of Prisons in an attem pt to settle his personal debts. The Abellas subsequently sold it to the D eseo. since this case covers not the perfection stage of a contra ct of sale. as the assignor’s liberality may be a sufficient cause for a valid contract.BAGNAS V CA DOCTRINE: Apparent inadequacy in price is of no moment since it is the usual pra ctice in deeds of conveyance to place a nominal amount although there is a more valuable consideration.
FACTS: SMPPI was selling several lots in Pasig for P52M.000 was part of the purchase price.000 shall be paid by the plain tiff to the defendant in 10 years from November 29. Bernardo told them that the car could not be delivered si nce “nasulot ang unit ng ibang malakas”. 1962.stock. They presented the VELASCO V CA LIMSON V CA SAN MIGUEL V HUANG . while option money is the money given as a distinct consideration for an option contract. DOCTRINE: A definite agreement on the manner of payment of th e purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enfor ceable contract of sale.000 was to be completed was not specif ied by the parties”. while when the would-be buyer gives option money. when Limson gave the "earnest money" the Re ceipt did not reveal that she was bound to pay the balance of the purchase price . enclosing P1M representing “earnest-deposit money” subject to the cond itions. FACTS: Agreee ment between Limson and seller de Vera to buy parcel of land. A disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. They met several times to negotiate the payment terms but could not come to an agreement. bu t may even forfeit it depending on the terms of the option. It was not shown that there was a perfected sale between the parties whe re earnest money was given. She agreed to pay the balan ce of purchase price so mortgage may be released. Limson gave the su m of P20. They were not able to do so be c of failure of de Vera to appear on meeting places. DOCTRINE: No obligation on Toyota’s part to t ransfer ownership of a determinate thing to Sosa and no correlative obligation o n Sosa’s part to pay a price certain appears therein. DOCTRINE: Huang d id not give the P1M as "earnest money" as provided by Art. o Ear nest money is part of the purchase price. he is not required to buy. No definite agreement on the manner of payment so no perfected contra ct since the terms of payment – still had to be mutually covenanted. while option money applies to a sale not yet perfe cted. Huang deman ded that SMPPI execute a deed of sale covering the properties. and. St ipulation in the contract says: “the balance of P70. 1482 of the Civil Cod e.000 to de Vera as "earnest money." and de Vera signed a receipt giving her a 10-day option period to purchase the property. o Earnest money given only w here there is already a sale. DOCTRINE: Earnest money and option money Earnest money" and "option money" are not the same but distinguished thus. A defini te agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in th e formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. Not Earnest Money!! Nothing in the Receipt which indicates that the P20. Sales rep informed them that the vehicle was being readied for delivery b ut after about 1 hour. Nothing was mentioned about the full purchase price and the manner the instalments were to be paid. SMPPI returned the P1M given as "earnest-deposit". o When earnest money is given. FACTS: Vela sco and Magdalena Estate entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land. Xxx That the time with in which the full down payment of the P30. Velascos admit that they and Magdalena still had to mee t and agree on how and when the down payment and the installment payments were t o be paid. the buyer is bound to pay the balance. Huang offered to buy the property. Limson later found out that " de Vera sold to Sunvar the property. Finally.
De la Cavada accepted t he offer. seller Bormaheco made certain chan ges – 1. Ana. and that he would pay the price after the title has been app roved. there being no incompatibil ity before and after the changes were made. Crossed out the word NASSCO and 2. By introd ucing amendments.a. their contract had not yet been perfected . DOCTRINE: An acceptance with contains changes in the offer but does not ESS ENTIALLY change the terms of the offer does not constitute a counter-offer. Zayco later learned that Ser ra had already sold the property to Whitaker and Concepcion. on condition that the property shall be surveyed and registered under the Torrens system. The essence of consent is the confo rmity of the parties on the terms of the contract that is. FACTS: Cuison Lumber obtained loans w/ Traders Bank and offered a payment arrangement. tendering the sum of P 100. The bank replied through a le tter of its resolution to grant to grant repurchase to the foreclosed property. FACTS: Antonio Diaz granted an option to Antonio Enriquez de la Cav ada to purchase his hacienda at Pitogo. but sale was subject to confo rmity. On the same day. The ascertainment whether there is a meetin g of minds depends on the circumstances surrounding the case. Citibank gave pro-forma contract and XYST proposed amendments. Cuison Lumber did not make an express acceptance. DMC decided to sell the unit to XYST Corp but consent of Citibank must be obtained. When Zayco accepted the offer. it must be plain and unconditional. FACTS: Za yco and Serra executed a contract for an option to buy Palma Central for 1M but no stipulation was made as to how much the first payment would be and when it sh ould be paid. Zayco wrote to Serra accepting the contract tendering P100. Serra’s offer did not state th e amount of first payment. Acceptance must be absolute otherwise the same constitutes a counter-offer and has the effect of rejecting the offer. and not any other. DOCTRINE: In order for an acceptance to have the effect of converting an offer to sell into a perfe ct contract. should be the amount of the fi rst payment. Inserted the words “per annum” instead of p. In the counter-offer of buyer Villonco. In this case . that this precisely.000 as his first payment before the option period expired. the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other.000 as first payment. Changes made were so trivial. It will not be so if it involve s any new proposition for in that case. not contained in t he offer. In this case. At the time when SMPPI accepted. DOCTRINE: A contract is perfec ted from the moment there is a meeting of the offer and acceptance upon the thin g and the cause that constitute the contract. FORMATION OF CONTRACT OF SALE VILLONCO V BORMAHECO amount merely as a deposit of what would eventually become the earnest money or down-payment should a contract of sale be made by them. FACTS: DMC was sold 18th floo r by Citibank because it built the Citibank Tower. There was a series of negotiations between the par ties. it will not be the acceptant’s conformity with the offer w/c is what gives rise to the birth of the contract. the contract was perfected as evince by subsequent acts of the parties: Cuison Lumbe r paid continuously and even asked for extensions. The counter-offer was accepted by Diaz.VI. FACTS: Sale of property was made subject to condition that Bormaheco will acqu ire the property in Sta. DOCTRI NE: A contract is perfected by mere consent. there was no concurrence of offer and acceptance. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute and unqualified. TRADERS ROYAL BANK V CUISON LUMBER XYST CORP V DMC URBAN PROPERTIES ZAYCO V SERRA . So l ong as it is clear that the meaning of acceptance is positively and unequivocall y to accept the offer. XYST introduced counter-offer w/c DMC did not agree. The amount was thus give n not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of the cont ract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents would not back out of the sale. his acceptance involved a proposal.
DE LA CAVADA V DIAZ .
Demandability may be exercised at any time after the execution of the deed. in the same document. but they were rejected by Mrs. which upon acceptance by the mortgagees gave rise to a perfected contr act of purchase and sale. which gives him the right to buy. 900. DOCTRINE: The option offered by Reyes had be en accepted by the Villamor.00. is null and void". Rigos’ defense was that the contract between the parties "is a unil ateral promise to sell. alleging that he needs ample time to raise sufficient fu nds in order to exercise the option. if he choose s. Reyes offered to repurchase the lot in but it was refused by Vill amor. SIHI notified Carcellar. from another person. for example. The letter of Carceller to SIHI is fair notice of the intent to exercise the option. Later however. DOCTRINE: An option may be exercised validly even though in a way not in accord with that stated in the contract. the offeree. non-withdrawable during a period of t wo years. Rigos. despite the request for the extension of the lease contract. FACTS: Bautista mortgage land to Soriano with an option for Soriano to purchase the land within the 2-year period of the mortgage. by force of the New Civil Code. ipso facto assumes obligations of a vende e. Soriano info rmed Bautista of intent to purchase the land. cert ain merchandise of certain specified property. FACTS: Reyes sold half of her land to Villamor. should the option be exercised. She also exe cuted a “Deed of Option” in favor of Villamor for the remaining portion of the lot. who instead expressed their desire to purchase the remaining portion of th e lot but the Reyeses ignored them. Within 2 years." if "Sanchez shall fail to e xercise his right to buy the property" within the stipulated period. at any time within the agreed period. Several ten ders of payment were made by Sanchez within said period. and the same being unsupported by any valuable considera tion. F ACTS: Rigos gave Sanchez an option to purchase her property within 2 years and s aid option shall be deemed "terminated and elapsed. 3 weeks before expiration of leas e contract. A consideration for an optional co ntract is just as important as the consideration for any other kind of contract. Carcellar requested for six-month extension of the lease contract. DOCTRINE: Mortgagor s(Bautista’s) promise to sell is supported by the same consid eration as that of the mortgage itself. SIHI replied that thes request was disappro ved. Bautista refused to sell the land. The mortgagors promis e was in the nature of a continuing offer. an additional amount having been agreed upon to make up the en tire price of P3. the promises. FACTS: Carceller and SIHI entered into a lease contrac t with option to purchase two parcels of land. The contract of optio n is a separate and distinct contract from the contract which the parties may en ter into upon the consummation of the option. which is distinct from that which would support the sale. The acceptance of an offer to sell for a price certain created a bilateral contract to sell and buy and upon acceptance.SORIANO V BAUTISTA DOCTRINE: An OPTIONAL CONTRACT is a privilege existing in one person. if it would be consistent with t he primary intent of the parties. CARCELLAR V CA VILLAMOR V CA SANCHEZ V RIGOS . for which he had paid a consideration. at a fixed price. Carceller notified SIHI of his decision to exercise the option to purchase the property.
Par8 of the lease contract p rovided that the Mayfair will be given 30 days exclusive option to purchase the property should Carmelo desire to sell it. Vitug. his promise partakes of the nature of an off er to sell which. Paranaque offered to buy the p roperty for 5M. An accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price 2 When the offerer has allowed the offer ee a certain period to accept. It lacks the force of law sufficient to compel compliance per se or to establish a creditor-debtor or obligee-obligor relation between the pa rties. if accepted. dissenting: a right of first refusal as a simple j uridical relation. but. The Ang Yu decision may apply if the contract is limited to th e buying and selling of the real property. withdraw it. pending not ice of the withdrawal of his offer. Sales Lady says: There was bad f aith in Raymundo’s part. LESSEE shall have the first option or priority to buy the properties subject of the lease”. nor be given the same legal effect as. 1479. calling the price ridiculous. accordingly. Santos sold the lots to Raymundo for 5M. as something paid or promised 1 . the promisor is not bound by his promise and may. and with much greater reason. except when the option is founded upon consideration. the offer may be withdrawn at any time before acc eptance by communicating such withdrawal. If a right of first refusal cannot even be properly classed as an offer o r as an option.DOCTRINE: SC harmonized articles 14791 and 13242 of the Civil Code to rule that if a promise to sell or is unsupported by a distinct consideration. Mayfair’s negotiations w/ Carmelo didn’t ripen into a sale. The consideration is built into the reciprocal obligation s of the parties. It should be enf orced according to the law on contracts instead of the panoramic and indefinite rule on human relations. it cannot be the equiva lent of. Carmelo sold the properties to Equatorial. the obligation of Carmelo to first offer the property to Mayfair is embodied in a contract. The sale of the subject real property by Carmelo to Equ atorial must be rescinded since Mayfair was prejudiced by the sale to Equatorial w/o Carmelo conferring to Mayfair every opportunity to negotiate within the 30day stipulated period. certainly. The right of first refusal is an integral part of t he contracts of lease. No re scission! FACTS: Santos and Paranaque Kings entered into a lease contract. 8 i s not an option clause or option contract but a contract of a right of first ref usal by virtue of Art. a duly perfected contract. It was also offered to Paranaque for P15M and given ten days to make good the offer which it rejected. DOCTRINE: Par. EQUITORI AL REALTY V MAYFAIR FACTS: Carmelo leased its property to Mayfair whereby Mayfai r constructed thereon the Maxim & Miramar Theatres. Contr act says “ in case of sale. The right of first refusal has alread y ripen into a contract FACTS: Tenants of residential and commercial spaces owne d by Cu Unjieng were granted priority to acquire the properties they PARANAQUE KINGS V CA ANG YU ASUNCION A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocall y demandable. However. DOCTRINE: The basis of the right of refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase of any prospective buyer and on ly when the optionee fails to exercise his right can the same be sold to third p ersons under the same terms as offered the optionee. Paranaque has right of firs t refusal to the same price offered to Raymundo. results in a perfected contract of sale. The remedy is specific performance because all the elemen ts of a valid contract of sale between Paranaque and Santos are already present – the price was already determined to be 5K.
A right of first refusal need not be writt en to be enforceable and may be proven by oral evidence. They wanted the contract of sale to be annulled in order for them to ex ercise their right of first refusal. o NOT option under the second paragraph of Article 1479 o NOT an offer under Article 1319 In RoFR. among other laws o f general application. including the price.g. is resci ssible. its breach cannot justify correspondingly a n issuance of a writ of execution. would be dependent not only on the grantor’s event ual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also o n terms. However. it must be shown that the v endees acted in bad faith as they were aware or should have been aware of the ri ght of first refusal granted to another person by the vendors therein. However. in t his case. the object might be made determinate. During the negotiations. They asked the Cu Unjiengs to p ut their offer in writing. they found out that the property had already been sold by the owner to R osencor. FACTS: The lessees were given a right of first refusal by the owner.V CA were renting. Later. DOCTRINE: A contract of sale entered into i n violation of a right of first refusal of another person. it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of prep aratory juridical relations governed not by contracts but by. DOCTRINE: Even if a party is aggrieved by the failure to honor the right of first refusal. the right was given orally. that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. but it was made orally and not in writing. The latter failed to specify the terms and conditions of the offer and the tenants also received information that Cu Unjieng was abou t to sell the properties. A19). Right of First Refusal an innovative juridical relation WHAT IT IS NOT: o NOT perfected contract of sale u nder Article 1458. Prio r thereto. the exercise of the right. They counter-offered 1M. however. (HINDI TALAGA DAPAT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE!!!) The remedy is an action for damages for abuse of rights. Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while tenants made a counter offer of P5million. the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on h uman conduct (e. while valid. The representative of t he owner sent them an offer to buy the property for 2M. in order for the doctrine to apply. nor would it sanction an action for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable element of consensuality in the perfection of contracts. Yet. ROSENCOR V INQUING .
(2) The cession. DOCTRINE: While a sale of a piece o f land appearing in a private deed is binding between the parties. modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property. There must be cl ear and convincing proof that Rosencor was made aware of the said right of first refusal before they can be guilty of bad faith. FACTS: A private document of absolute sale was executed between Sabesaje and Dalion. Instead. No. It was agreed that only upon Espino’s arrival at Puerto Princesa will th e price be paid and the deed of sale executed. the evidence of which is letters only without any written contract. 000sqm of the 1/3 portion to the Secuyas in a private document. not for validity or enforceability. how ever. embodying the essentials of the contract and signed by party charged. repudiat ion or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains. 1403. it cannot be considered binding on third persons.FORMALITIES OF THE CONTRACT DALION V CA it makes it difficult to prove that the buyer was aware of such right. the Agreement of Partition is actually an expre ss trust. HELD: There was no property to partition. (2) is clear that a written note or memorandum. FACTS: The original owner of a 10. was never actually transferred. No particular form is required for it s validity. 2 and 1405. chattels or things in action are governed by articles. it was repudiated when the land was sold to another. the Secuyas cannot prove their claim over it. even a private one. ∞ Remedy of the lessees for the v iolation of RoFR: action for damages for the unjustified disregard of their righ t. (3) The power to administer property. if it is not embodied in a public instrumen t and recorded in the Registry of Property. All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing. DOCTRINE: Article 13583 provision on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience. A contract of sale is a consensual contract. Article 1403. including the portion bought by the Secuyas. The private document through whi ch they acquired the 3. HELD: The SC ruled that the contract between the two d oes not fall under the Statute of Frauds by virtue of the existence of the lette rs. Construct ive notice cannot apply since even the lease contract was oral. However. Paredes sou ght specific performance. transmission. Sabesaje denied the fact of the sale contending that the document sued u pon is fictitious since his signature there was forged. (4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding f rom an act appearing in a public document. and 1405. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contr act of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. or sh ould prejudice a third person. parts of the original 10. DE SELMA PAREDES V ESPINO 3 The following must appear in a public document: (1) Acts and contracts which hav e for their object the creation.750 lot. DOCTRINE: Statute of Frauds does not require the contract itself to b e in writing. or any other power which has fo r its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document. (as a re sult. The 1/3 lot. (1280a) . par. or his ag ent.750sqm lot bound herself to transf er 1/3 of it to Sabellona thru an Agreement of Partition. suffices to make the SECUYA V VDA. embodying the essential terms of the contract. Thus. But Espino refused to execute the deed upon his arrival despite Paredes’ demand and willingness to pay. But sales of goods. which constitute sufficient memorandum. 2. Sabellona then sold 3. No. Sabellona could not validly sell the property). was sold to Selma. sales of real property or of an interest t herein are governed by articles 1403.000 sqm lot was lost. FACTS: Espino and Paredes agreed abo ut the sale of a lot. Even if the trust subsists .
City-Lite conveyed its interest to buy in a letter to Metro Drug af ter and all correspondence to Metro Drug. it is still within the context of the Stature of Frauds. Myers reserved the right to cancel contract in case of Maritime’s failure to pay installments. INIGO V ESTATE OF MALOTO CITY LITE V CA VII. Partial performance mu st be coupled with intent to perform. not executory). By Manila Railroad’s objection to the in troduction of parol evidence to prove the oral contract of sale. DOCTRINE: Under Art. 1403(2)(e). Holding s because the broker had no authority to sell the property because authorization was only to find buyers. Barretto brings specific performance suit. U pon death of seller.P. taking it out of the operation of the statute. Maritime failed to pay. HELD: (as previously proven) contract to sell. but when he delivered and presented it to the company. DOCTRINE: If a contract is not partially performed.BARETTO V MANILA verbal agreement enforceable. F.P Ho ldings refused to execute the corresponding deed of sale in favor of City-Lite. the sale shall be void. DOCTRINE: Article 1874 of the CC provides: “When the sal e of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent. City-Lite and Roy reached an agreement. a practicing lawyer and register ed real estate broker who in turn passed on these documents to City-Lite Realty Corporation. the latter refused to buy. Holdings(owner) offered for sa le to the general public its land thru its broker Meldin Roy of Metro Drug. Barretto made a deed of sale. T he contract & the receipt of the purchase price were not reduced into writing.” For lack of written authority to sell. a verbal contract for the s ale of real property is unenforceable. Roy sent a sales brochure to Atty. FAC TS: Barretto allegedly had an oral contract w/ Manila Railroad whereby the compa ny would buy his house.P. However. HELD: The contract of sale is unenforceable because delivery of a deed of sale w/o intent to part w/ the title until paid is not constructive delivery or performance. FACTS: Inigo (Buyer) & Maloto(seller) had a verbal contract of sale of a property for w/c buyer paid the purchase price. her heirs inherited the property. said contract c annot be proven or enforced. Gelacio Mamaril. Oral evidence of the alleged consummated sal e is not forbidden by the Statute of Frauds. hence. For some reason or another and despite demand. otherwise. HELD: The Statute of Frauds doesn’t bar the sale of real pro perty in the case at bar because it has been partially performed (executed alrea dy. When they met in person. sale should be as it is declared null and void. the authority of the latter shall be in writing. contract of sale was not perfected. this only applies to executory contracts & not to those eit her totally or partially performed. Buyer demands the executi on of a deed of sale. HELD: There was NO perfected contract of sale between City-Lite and F. The contract is not partially performed to take it out of the context of the Statute of Frauds. TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP KUENZLE V MACKE LUZON BROKERAGE V MARITIME . F. not of sale . unless ratified as it offends the Statute of Frauds. FACT S: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS:Myers and Maritime entered into a contract of Condition al Sale (Contract to Sell). When payment was not made. Myers ca ncelled the contract.
When const ruction finished. which is not the case. and the assumption of the same by the vendee. payment is only a positive suspensive condition. and the other acquires the right to and the possession of t he same. DOCTRINE: Delivery has been described as a comp osite act. Actual manual delivery of an article sold is not essential to the passing of the title thereto (art 1450. In the Law on Sales. despite repeated attempts to load the logs. HELD: Case had already complied with his obligation to deliv er the logs since he had already delivered the logs alongside the vessel. He demanded a refund of the total value corresponding to the lacking floor area. FACTS: Where the goods were ready for delivery at the time and place agreed upon. Ong n oticed that in the Deeds. No written document was executed for the sale. by reason of the improper equipment of the v essel. but both form sof delivery contem plate ‘the absolute giving up of the control and custody of the property on the pa rt of the vendor. t he failure of which is not a breach. where such rights are expressly provided f or. There is power of promisors under contracts t o sell in case of failure of the other party to complete payment. Civil Code) unless made so by the terms of the contract or b y an understanding of the parties.BEAN V CADWALLADER DOCTRINE: A contract to sell. He conducted a verification survey and it was found that the tota l area of the units was actually much smaller. but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding f orce. CAdwallader wants the contract rescinded. a thing in which both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. Case bound himself to deliver said pieces of wood to the BW Cadwallader alongside the latter s ship at Basilan. delivery may be either actual or constructive. The parties to the contract may agree when an d on what conditions the property in the subject of the contract was passed to t he prospective owner. FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: Ong Siao Hua bought a condo unit from Cebu Winland. However. It is an act by which one party parts with the title to and the possess ion of the property. HELD: Ong Siao has already acqui red ownership of the condo unit. FACTS: HELD: DOC TRINE: OCEJO V INTERNATIONAL BANK CEBU WINLAND V ONG SIAO HUA AVILES V ARCEGA . casual or serious. it means transfer of possession. Winland turned possession of the properties over to Ong. refuse conveyance and retain the s ums or installments already received. where nonpayment is a resolutory condition. George Case and BW Cadwallader had a con tract for the sale of certain types of logs. To argue that there was only a casual breach is to proceed from the assump tion that the contract is one of absolute sale. the mere fact that the buyer. to extrajudici ally terminate the operation of the contract. was unable to take the goods aboard the vessel. the stated floor area of his units were smaller than w hat he bought. Cas e was able to deliver the logs on time in the port of Basilan. they were not loaded. cannot relieve the latter for responsibility under the contract. In its natural sense. delivery means something in addition to the deliv ery of property or title.
Foz refused to receive and repudiated the contract.PHIL SUBURBAN V AUDITOR GENERAL SARMIENTO V LESACA FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: Foz executed a contract. When Florendo tendered payment for remaining balance. FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: APT had certain premises (where machinery & equipment were stored) leased to Creative Lines. F ACTS: Abuan acquired homestead which passed on to his legal heirs upon his death . DOCTRINE: As a general rule. pay ment to be made monthly. selling his property to Florendo. HEL D: There was no constructive delivery upon the execution of the deed or issuance of the gate pass because it was not APT that had actual possession of the prope rty. 1955). execution of a de ed of sale is equivalent to the delivery of the object if from the deed the cont rary doesn’t appear or can’t clearly be inferred. The thing must be place in control of the object in order for execution of a dee d to effect tradition (but it’s only a presumption) except when the delivery isn’t e ffected because of a legal impediment. BAVIERA CITATION In a contract for the sa lvage of surplus property. the Court held that it was a case of t radition longa manu and ownership passed as soon as the property was salvaged. Creative Lines’ refusal to haul the machinery isn’t a fortuitous event. the remaining balance was agreed to be paid when they see each othe r in Vugan during thye next month. AP T sold some of the machinery & equipment therein to TJ Enterprises. Garcia paid P500 on that day and promised to pay P1500 mo re (on or before April 30. 1955. HELD: Foz can be co mpelled to deliver the property to Florendo. 1953 . the employer assigned all its rights and title to all surplus property salvaged by the contractor at a price of P90 per long ton. on the basis of recovery reports of sunken surplus prop erty salvaged during the preceding month. re tified by notary. not to its legal situation. Florendo already made a part ial payment. TJ wasn’t able to haul the machinery & equipment from the premises because of APT’s refusal. August 7. the execution of it shall b equivalent to delivery of the thing – formal delivery de jure. DOCTRINE: When a sale is made by me ans of a public document. FLORENDO V FOZ MASALLO V CESAR ASSET PRIVATIZATION V TJ ENTERPRISES BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V FLORO ABUAN V GARCIA . For movables.Legal heirs sold land to Garcia by a Deed of Absolute Sale (p ublic instrument). The phrase as-is where-is basis pertains solely to the physical condition o f the thing sold. Legal heirs filed action to recover land due to fraud and con tract being executed without consideration – which was eventually settled amicably on February 28. delivery may consist in delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or kept.
if it should be movable property. Seller told him that he already gave the lot to Buyer 2. Other issues involve BPS. Buyer 2 presented a memorandum wherein the Seller obligated himself to sell the lot to him. Intenti on to give possession and ownership was gleaned from the fact that in the 2nd de ed (which was a private deed NOT construed as constructive delivery): There is n o stipulation reserving ownership The fact that the agreement was entered into i n consideration of plaintiff’s/ legal heir’s desistence. Buyer 2 had the sale registe red 4 days after the 1st sale was registered. Although the memorandum between Buyer 1 & Seller wasn’t in the form required by the Statute of Frauds. f rom prosecuting their reivindicatory action. DOCTRINE: Court reiter ated Art.” 4 . The 1 st sale was properly perfected & consummated. and. to the person who presents the oldest title. Should there be no inscription. DOCTRINE: There was DELIV ERY BREVI MANU or TRADITIO BREVI MANU permissible under A1499 and A1501. LEAVING PROPERTY IN THE HANDS OF GA RCIA. it was still proof of a partially perfor med sale. Should it be immovable property.HELD: The period to repurchase has already prescribed. FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: HEL D: DOCTRINE: FACTS: 2 buyers offered to buy the seller’s land w/ assumption of mor tgage The price proposal of Buyer 1 was accepted and memorandum was made allowin g the seller to occupy the land for 1 year and to lease it thereafter. the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in goo d faith. When Buye r 1 went to the Seller w/ the deed. in the absence thereof. 1544 on Double Sales4. provided t here is good faith. The circumstances show that Buyer 2 was in bad faith. HELD: Buyer 1 was in good faith – at the time of their negotiations & the perfection of the sale. the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first record ed it in the Registry of Property. as well as a deed of sale. as owner thereof. there was no 2nd s ale yet to speak of. as in fact they desisted. Seller retained possession of her house as a lessee. The assumption of the mortgage & the lease of the house formed part of the consideration of the sale. the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession. Good faith of the buyer of the realty is essent ial in registering his deed BAUTISTA V SIOSON BEHN MEYER V YANGCO GENERAL FOOD V NACOCO DOUBLE SALES CARBONELL V CA “If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees.
" "th e honest lawful intent. FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: Compania exec uted two mortgages on the same building. per 2nd par. but in ascertaining the intenti on by which one is actuated on a given occasion. 1st buyer was in possession first in good faith DOCTRINE: GOOD FAITH: Test: Good faith. with safety. what is decisive is prior possession in good faith. is not a visible. 2 nd buyer/ mortgagee had the sale to hi m (by a public auction) registered despite his knowledge of the 1st sale and the 1st buyer’s possession. Court said first buyer should be declared the owner becau se the 2 nd buyer made the inscription in bad faith. and under 1473 of the Civil Code. but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs. the Court is necessarily contro lled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inwar d motive may. Ong Che has a bette r title than the first purchaser. et al." which constitutes good faith implies a "freedom from kn owledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. It is: "the honesty of intention. Ong Che bought the property from Lichauco brothers and immediately took possession. was a LEUNG YEE V FL MACHINERY RIVERA V ONG CHE 5 DBP vs. but failed to take possession of the property. FACTS: Lichauco Brothers offered for sale certain old machinery and boilers which were deposited in a yard. 1544. anterior registration) to merit the protection in Art. et al. 11 SCRA 405. et al. and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vend or.k. He was a purchaser in food faith who immediately took possession of t he property." "Good faith. Rivera sue d Ong Che in order to recover the articles. Soriano. or the want of it. or the lack of it. Mangawang. who has never had possession at all.. is in its last analysis a question of intention. Ong Che. of the said article. Under article 1473(now 1544) of the Civil Code. Magale. Rivera allegedly purchased some of the materials through an agent..CHENG V GONZALES of sale (a. 8 SC RA 489 . tangible fact that can be seen or touched. 1 st buyer bought the lot through a deed of sale (public instrument but not registered) and was I possession of the building ever since. the second purchaser having acquired possession first must be declared the true owner. vs. DOCTRINE: Two different agents of the same owner successively negotiated sales to two dif ferent purchasers. be determined.a. HELD: Ong Che has a better right of ownership.5 If there’s no inscription (registration). Both were foreclosed." (Wilder v Gilman) BAD FAITH: One who purchases real e state with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim tha t he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the l and or of an interest therein.
who has never had possession at all. The vessel sank in the Manila harbor during a storm – this was b efore Roman was able to produce the proper papers showing ownership of the vesse l. it was HELD: The first buyer is the owner. After this. On the issue of who ha s a better right to the land. The sheriff levied upon the land and was sold in a public sale. the certificate of title was issued ov er the land. under article 1473 of the Civil Code. DOCTRINE: In case of convey ance of registered real estate. FACTS: A parcel of unregistered land was sold to Macam. Grimalt agreed to buy it at 3 equal installments provided the title papers were in proper form. The rul es on registered and unregistered land cannot be applied because the situation o btaining here does not fall strictly within the ambit of any of the two rules. He did not register the sale. the registration of the deed of sale is the oper ative act that gives validity to the transfer. to th e effect that upon the execution and delivery of the final certificate of sale i n favor of the purchaser of land sold in an execution sale. FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: HELD: DOCTRINE: FACTS: Roman (owner) and Grimalt (buyer) verbally agreed upon the sale of the schooner Santa Marina. Sec 35. He. RISK OF LOSS ROMAN V GRIMALT . Grimalt refused to pay upon Roman’s demand. The buyer was able to consolidate ownership and register the sale. a better title than the first purchaser. Pilapil asserts his title to the property through a duly notarized deed of sale execute d in his favour. the title o f the vessel was not in Roman’s name. th e buyer in the public sale had nothing to step into. Roman promised to perfect his title to the v essel but failed. Rule 39 of the ROC. in addition to his deed of sale.CARUMBA V CA purchaser of these articles in good faith. HELD: PILAPIL wns the land. we apply ROC – the buyer in a public sale steps into the shoes of the judg ment debtor. DOCTRINE: Better right is much more than the mere prior deed of sale in favor of the 1 st vendee. He acquired possession by virtue of h is purchase. title. FACTS: HEL D: DOCTRINE: FACTS: Hanopol claims ownership of the land through a seies of purc hases in a private document and a CFI decision in a reivindicatory case. HANOPOL V PILAPIL DAGUPAN V MACAM QUIMSON V ROSETE SANCHEZ V RAMOS VIII. However. such purchaser “shall be substituted to and acquire all the right. undoubtedly has. It is the prescri ptive right that had supervened or other facts and circumstances exist which. interest and claim of the ju dgment debtor to the property as of the time of the levy”. Then. Since the judgment debtor had previously sold the land to Macam. the 1 st vendee can be said to have better right than the 2nd purchaser. I nstead. the original owner was made a judgment creditor in a separate case.
The motorcycle was registered in the Land Transportation Commission in the name of Alberto Nepales. Aircon was delivered to Perez. This is in accordance with the well-known doctrine of res perit domino. HELD: Ownership was not transferred to Nepales since there was no delivery. FACTS: Sun Bros and Perez entered into a conditional sale agreement involving a n Admiral Air Conditioner.Norkis delivered the bike to Julian Nepales(3 rd person) with out authority from buyer Napales.HELD: Roman should bear the risk of loss because there was no sale yet. Norkis issued a Sales Invoice showing that the contract of sale had been perfected signed by Nepales. the purchase of which had not been concluded. from the moment of perfection of the contract to the time of delivery. and Arts 10967 and 11828 re obligation to deliver a speci fic thing & extinction of such obligation due to loss or destruction do not appl y if no contract was perfected in the first place. DOCTRINE: Ownership is not considered transmitted until th e property is actually delivered and the purchaser has taken possession of the v alue and paid the price agreed upon. The bike was completely destroyed in an accide nt.” Norkis was still the owner and possessor of the motorcycle when it was wrecked. shall be governed by (Arts 1163 to 1165 and 1262) 6 Now Arts. Art 1452 6 of the old Civil Code re injury or benefit of the thing sold aft er a perfect contract. notwithstanding nonpayment of price. and before he has incurred in delay (par. 1165 When what is to be delivered is a determinate thing. HELD: Article 1496 provides “in the absence of an express assumption of risk by the buyer. in which case the sale is considered perfec ted. after the contract h as been perfected. The invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature. he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery. the creditor . If the thing is indeterminate or generic. The conversations bet the p arties did not establish a contract sufficient in itself to create reciprocal ri ghts bet the parties. 1480 Any injury to or benefit from the thing sold. Grimalt was not obliged to pay the price of the v essel. Sun Bros can recover payment. but Norkis retained possession. If no co ntract of sale was executed by the parties. he may ask that th e obligation be complied with at the expense of the debtor. the t hings sold remain at seller’s risk until the ownership thereof is transferred to t he buyer. 7 Now Art 1262 An obligation w/c consists in the delivery of a determinate thing s hall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed w/o the fault of the debt or. or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do not h ave the same interest. The agreement specifically states that Perez assumes responsibility for any loss. the loss must be borne by its owner & not by a party who only intended to purchase it and who was unable to do so du e to the failure by the owner to show proper title to it and thus enable them to draw up the contract of sale. in addition to the right granted him by Article 1170. PEREZ Now Art. quantity an d cost of the thing sold not necessarily coupled with the intention of the deliv ery of the thing. FACTS: Nepales bought from No rkis a Yamaha Wonderbike. and was totally destroyed by fire. Registration was only to facilitate the execution of a chattel mortgage in favor of DBP for the release of the motorcycle loan. If the obligor delay s. HELD: Perez bears the risk of loss. 1) 8 . may compel the debtor to make the delivery. NORKIS V CA SUN BROS.
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT SMITH BELL V MATTI . well knowing that it had not yet b een insured: and that Song Fo & Co. FACTS: Smith Bell and Sotelo en tered into contracts whereby Smith. who had exclusive control of the operation of the v essel. and Sot elo to purchase: 2 steel tanks for Php. DOCUMENTS OF TITLE SIY CONG BIEN V HSBC Supra of Quedans(warehouse receipts DOCTRINE: The quedans were issued in the nam e of Siy Cong Bien duly endorsed in blank. SONG FO V ORIA IX.LAWYER’S COOP V TABORA DOCTRINE: An agreement making the buyer responsible for any loss whatsoever. and 2 electric m otors Php. even if the title to the property remains in the vendor. HELD: altho ugh Lawyers’ agreed that the ownership of the books shall remain with it until the purchase price shall have been fully paid. i s neither contrary to law. or to keep her in port pending their application for insurance. had no power to interfere. obligated itself to sell. a big fire broke at the law office and library of Tabora The books were burned. If the owner of the goods permits another to have the p ossession or custody of negotiable warehouse receipts running to the order of th e latter. 25. Bell & Co. to be shipped from New York and delivered at Manila within 4 months. DOCTRINE: Party who has exclusive control of property bears the risk of loss. 2 expellers at Php. HELD: Oria. but was shipwrecked and became a total loss while en route to Oria s place of business in Samar. FACTS: Atty. All the equipment arrived later than the date specified. and thus negotiable in form. nor to morals or public policy. it is a representation of title upon which bona fide pu rchasers for value are entitled to rely. In the very contract it was expressly a greed that the "loss or damage to the books after delivery to the buyer shall be borne by the buyer. 2. This is not guaranteed”. subject to contingencies – the rigid measures imposed af ter World War 1. Stipulaiton as to delivery is as follows--”Approximate deli very within 90 days. or to /bearer.000 each. In the midnight of that same day." DOCTRINE: Any such stipulation that any damage shall be bo rne by buyer after delivery is sanctioned by Article 1504 of the Civil Code. No part of the purchase price has ever been paid. The books were duly delivered and received. HELD: the obligation was complied with in time since the ob ligation was conditional. Tabora made a partial payment of the purchase price. ISSUES/ HELD: XI. sent the launcgh from Manila to Samar. 1918 or asap.000. The launch was delivered to Oria in Manila. but such stipulation cannot make it liable in case of loss not only because such was agreed merely to secure the per formance by the buyer of his obligation. whi ch in part provides: (1) Where delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer or to a bailee for the buyer. to be ship ped from San Francisco in the month of September. the goods are at the buyer s risk fro m the time of such delivery. FACTS:Song Fo sold a launch to Oria. It is a representat ion that the one to whom the possession of the receipt has been so intrusted has the title to the goods. in pursuance of the contract and the ownership in the goods has been retained by the seller merely to secure performance by the bu yer of his obligations under the contract.000 each. It follo ws that on the delivery of the quedans to HSBC they were no longer the property of the endorser unless he liquidated his debt with the bank. despite breaches of trust or violations of agreement on the part of the apparent owner. Tabora b ought from the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company one complete set of Americ an Jurisprudence. for tuitous or otherwise. 21.
REPUBLIC V LITTON FACTS: RP Gov’t enters into contracts of sale w/ Litton for padlocks and other goo ds to be used for the April 23. 1946. for the lump sum of P47. which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate. 98 hectares. The shipment was delayed so Chelsey wanted the contract rescinded. Anderson and Co. Only a small part of the goods arrived before or on schedule. Goods were to be shipped from US to RP.Should the vendor be paid? .Was the obligation complied with in time? YES DOCTR INE: when the time of delivery is not fixed in the contract. HELD: Facts show that contract was not conditione d on any RP Gov’t obligation to procure export license and shipping priority from US Gov’t. DOC TRINE: Interpretation of Art 1471: “In case of the sale of real estate for a lump sum and not at the rate of a specified price for each unit of measure. Azarraga refused to grant the request. the vendor shall be obli ged to deliver all that is included with such boundaries. 67 ares. Soler sold to Chel sey all his rights without any condition and even guaranteed that the equipment was “on its way”. The same rule shall apply when two or more estates are sold for a single price. and 32 centares. HELD: Soler was in delay since time was an essential element of the contract. The res t were either delivered after. H. SOLER V CHESKY FACTS: Soler entered into a contract of sale with Wm. the delivery must be made within a reasonable time. more or less.000 to be paid as provided in the contra ct. C helsey gave his consent to the contract because he expected the machinery to arr ive within a short time. partly in cash and partly in installments. for th e purchase of certain oil machinery subject to contingencies. alleging that the 2 nd parcel with an area of 98 hec tares according to the deed of sale. But the seller m ust nevertheless act with all reasonable diligence or without unreasonable delay . In such cases. Gay ref used to pay the full price. FACTS: Azarraga sold two parcels of land to Gay for the lump sum of P47. the a rea of the estate should be designated in the contract.000 payable. Although there was no specific time specified for the arrival of the machin ery. the first containing 102 hec tares. HELD: price canno t be reduced bec all land contained within boundaries were delivered to Gay. DOCTRINE: He who contracts and assumes an obligation is presumed to know the circumstances under which said obligation can be complied w ith. and brought suit against the Buyer to recover the whole price agreed upon. had only 70 hectares. DOCTRINE: If a party assumes liability in all eventualit y. Reasonable time does not mean immediately or that the seller must stop all his other work and devote himself to that particular order. It is preposterous to suppose that delivery after the elections woul d ever be contemplated. as it was also made clear that the goods were to be used for the April 23 elections. The agreements stipulated that d elivery was to be made on or before March 1. and therefore asked f or a reduction of the price. time is regarded as unessential. even should it exceed the area specified AZARRAGA V GAY . They agreed upon the sale of 2 parcels of land.the time reasonably necessary for such machinery to rea ch Manila from America. and the second. there sha ll be no increase or decrease of the price even if the area be found to be more or less than that stated in the contract. but. if in addition to a statement of the boundaries. 1946 elections. The question as to what is a reasonable time for the delivery of the goods by t he seller is to be determined by the circumstances attending the particular tran saction. It was expressly made clear that delivery was to be made on or before Ma rch 1. it cannot invoke force majeure as a defense. Said 2 parcels are defined by means of the boundaries given in the contract. the guaranty was tantamount to saying that under normal condition they woul d arrive in a short period of time (like 3 mos in the case of the expellers).
But it may be said that although he has n’t received the object accdg to the stipulated terms." applies to contracts. should he not be able to do so. the buyer shall have the right eit her to reduce the price proportionately to what is lacking of the area or number . It is deter minate because it is dealt w/ as a single realty so long as they are sold for a single price constituting a lump sum and not for X price per unit.When construction finished. If the buyer would not have bought the property ha d he known of its smaller or inferior quality however. consequently. When the construction was finished. in the instant case. for "the action to claim rescission. No written document was executed for the sal e. HELD: Refund because the sale not lump sum but made at the rate of a certain price for a square area . unless the contract be annulled by reason of the vendee s refusal to accept anything other than tha t which was stipulated. thus the power to nullify it. not for X price per unit of measure or number." but the action therefor — in the language of Art. “ 1st par of 1471: deals w/ the situation (a) wherein ever ything included w/in the boundaries has been delivered. or to rescind the contract at his option. cau sing considerable damage and the flow of the system was so sluggish. La Fuerza’s a ction was filed after 10 months. with damages in either case. 1389 of sa id Code. 1571. or 2+ for a single pr ice also a lump sum. some bottles jumped off the conveyor belt and were broken. DOCTRINE: In Article 1539. Action for rescission based in hi dden faults or defects must be filed within 6 months after delivery. Why? Because the consideration in the contract i s the determinate object & not the number of units that it contains. HELD: La Fuerza’s action for rescission has already prescribed. provided in Art. t he conveyor system did not met its expectation because: several bottles collided with each other. and. which refers to sales in particular. the determinate object w/c was the consideration is not delivered. to La Fuerza’s dismay. although it may exceed the area or number expressed i n the contract. to said Art. it is in his power to carry the contract into effect w/ the just decrease in price. La Fuerza r efused to pay the balance of the conveyor system’s purchase price. 2nd par of 14 71: WON the object of the sale be 1 realty for a lump sum. FACTS: Ong Siao Hua bou ght a condo unit from Cebu Winland. he shall suffer a reductio n of the price in proportion to what is lacking of the area. FACTS: Associated constructed a conveyor system for La Fuerza’s wine factory. or 2+ for a single price also a lump sum.in the contract. and must yields. there shall be no i ncrease or decrease in the price even if the area be found to be more or less th an that stated in the contract. and. He conducted a verification survey and it was found t hat the total area of the units was actually much smaller." The period of four (4) years. and. If everything w/in the stipulated bo undaries isn’t delivered. Rule: WON the object of sale be 1 realty for a lump sum. CEBU WINLAND V ONG SIAO HUA LA FUERZA V CA . DOCTRINE: Pursuant to A1566 and A 1567. the seller shall be bound to deliver everything that is included wit hin the boundaries stated. if the area actually delivered is less than the sti pulated. the buyer can either choose to oblige the seller to deliver the remaini ng area or demand for the proportionate reduction of the purchase price if deliv ery is not possible. in general. Ong noticed that in the Deeds. 1571 — "shall be barred after six months. In case he cannot deliver it. He (and he alone) may also rescind the contract if the infe rior value exceeds one-tenth. consequently not at X price per each unit of measuring or number. from the delive ry of the thing sold. Winland turned possession of the properties over t o Ong. the stated floor area of his units were sm aller that what he bought. if the thing sold has hidden faults or defects the vendor shall be responsible and the vendee “may elect between withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportion al reduction of the price. he may rescind (regardles s of the one-tenth rule). He demanded a refund of the total value corresponding to the lacking floor area.
to extrajudicially terminate the operation of the contract. Otherwise. FACTS: Bareng purchased from Alegria cinematographic equipment installe d at the Pioneer Theater. even though it may have been stipulated that in default of the price wi thin the time agreed upon. DOCTRINE: Failure to comply with a co ndition imposed upon the perfection of the contract results in the failure of a contract. the failure of which is not a breach. In the sale of real p roperty. contract of sale was not perfected. casual or serious. To argue that there was only a casual breach is to proceed from the assumption that the contract is one of absolute sale. which is not the case. Subsequent non-payment will not void it. HELD. de la Cruz w as not able to pay the purchase price of P450. After suc h demand has been made the judge cannot grant him further time. There is power of pro misors under contracts to sell in case of failure of the other party to complete payment. at any time b efore demand has been made upon him either by suit or by notarial act. From the time Alegria and Ruiz reached this settlement. In addition. FACTS:Myers and Mariti me entered into a contract of Conditional Sale (Contract to Sell). the buyer who suspended payment shoul d immediately resume payment. When payment was not made. but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. not of sale. where no npayment is a resolutory condition. HELD: contract was valid because th ere was consideration –P450. HELD: (as previousl y proven) contract to sell. Failure to comply with a condition imposed on the performance of the o bligation only gives the other party the option either to refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition.DELA CRUZ V LEGASPI FACTS: de la Cruz purchased from Legaspi a parcel of land. DOCTRINE: Subsequ ent non-payment of the price at the time agreed upon did not convert the contrac t into one without cause or consideration: a nudum pactum. DOCTRINE: A contract to sell. neither party incurs delays both are not ready to comply. Ruiz informed Bareng that he was a co-owner of the equ ipment and told him to suspend payments because he was not agreeable to the sale . Maritime failed to pay. payment is only a positive suspensive condition. Alegria and Ruiz subsequently reached a compromise in the case. Myers cancelled the contract. Alegria then s ued Bareng for the unpaid balance. refuse con veyance and retain the sums or installments already received. DOCTRINE: When the disturbance feared of had already ceased. where such rights are expressly provided for. (Art. In reciprocal obligations. BARENG V CA LAFORTEZA V MACHUCA LUZON BROKERAGE V MARITIME . hence. the suspension of payment was justified only at the time before the compromise between Alegria and Ruiz. Non-payment does not void contract. Machuca informed the Lafortezas that he already has the balan ce but Laforteza refused to accept it. However. Machuca asked for an extension but was de nied by Laforteza. The contract had already been perfected . the heirs were not ready with the reconstituted title within the specified period. there was no longer any danger of thre at to Bareng s ownership and full enjoyment of the equipment.). HELD: failure to pay the balance within t he period allowed does not void the MOA. the buyer would incur delay and would b ecome liable for interest. Th e Memorandum of Agreement stated that Machuca would pay the price within 30 days from the reconstruction of the title. the resolution of the contract shall take place ipso facto. Legaspi claims that the contract was null and void for lack of consideration. 1504 Civil Code. FACTS: Laforteza sold to Machuca a parcel of land. Myers reserve d the right to cancel contract in case of Maritime’s failure to pay installments. the vendee may pay even after the expiration of the period.
and not to contracts t o sell or conditional sales where title passes to the vendee only upon full paym ent of the purchase price. The Maceda law seeks to redress the acute house problem in the country that has prompted th ousands of middle and lower class buyers of houses. ACTIVE REALTY V DAROYA DOCTRINE: twin requirements for a valid and effective cancellation under the law – a notarized notice of cancellation and cash surrender value refund. Arellano had 3 months from Dec 31. Songco estimated to him that the field would produce 3. S ellner could judge with his own eyes as to the character of the cane. XII. Daroya for 3 months amortizations prompting the Corp to sent a notice of cancellation of their contract to take effect 30 days from receipt of the letter. and it is shown that he measured the fields and ascertained that they contained 96 1/2 hec tares. the vendors have the burden of provin g a contractual breach on the part of the vendee. WARRANTIES SONGCO V SELLNER FACTS: Sellner bought Songco’s sugar cane as so he can use the right of way. DOCTRINE: Article 1592 applies only to contracts of sale. in order to enforce the automatic forfei ture clause in a deed of conditional sale. Furthermore. The law allows considerable latitude to seller s statements.017 picul s. lots and condominium units t o enter into all sorts of contracts with private housing developers involving in stallment schemes. (In this case . HELD: Songco’s representation can only be considered matter of opinion as the c ane was still standing in the field. Arellano wasn’t able to pay for 2 months so she tendered payment of the 2 months together w/ the payment for the 3rd mon th. Sellner requested Songco to guara ntee the quantity but Songco did not. Valarao m ay automatically rescind the contract if Seller pays to pay 3 successive monthly installments or 1 year lump sum payment. agreed to buy from Active Realty a lot in its subdivision. DOCTRINE: A misinterpretation upon a mere matter of opinion is not an act ionable deceit. and the quantity of the sugar it would prod uce could not be known with certainty until it should be harvested and milled. A man who rel ies upon such an affirmation made . a Bu yer has a 1month grace period for every year of installments paid.000 piculs of the sugar. between Valarao and Arellano. HELD:The contract cannot be rescinded. Relevant In any case. The refusal of the seller to warrant his estimate should have admonished the purchaser that that estimate was put forth as a mere opinion. a contract worker in the Middle East. nor is it a sufficient ground for avoiding a contract as fraudul ent. and experience teaches that it is exceedingly risky to accept it at its face value. Daroya filed a complaint for specific performances and damages. Daroya. Valarao was not justified in refusing Arellano’s tender of payment. Buyer filed a consignation case but Seller made a “rescission letter”. Active cancelled the contract and forfeited all previous payments. or dealer s ta lk. 1990) FACTS: In a contract to sell. The crop turned out to be only 2.VALARAO V CA FACTS: Under a deed of conditional sale. Valarao refused to accept the payment per order of the Sellers. HELD: There was no valid rescission because there was no compliance to the Maceda Law of notariz ed notice of cancellation and refund of cash surrender value. rescissi on and forfeiture of payments can’t be effected because under the Maceda Law.
Soledad gave an implied warranty of title. DOCTRINE: If seller does not appear to have violated the truth when he stated a belief. and must take the consequences of his own imprudence. PMC was able to examine the oild’s quality. Gervacio made an init ial payment and executed a promissory note for the balance of P2. The contract had an express warranty. CA reversed. following Art. sold the Mitsubishi GSR to Bugash and before it was re gistered under his name a writ of replevin was issued on the Mitsubishi GSR. It doesn’t appear that Dean deliberately violated the truth in stating his belief that there were such a number of coconut trees on said lands. not only regarding 5% ffa but al so against impurities. at which Levy Hermanos was the highest bidder for P800. Ang paid the mortgagee the balance amount and sought to recover from Soledad but fa iled. and Levy Hermanos foreclosed the mortgage. Action prescribed.400 and mortgag e the car to secure the payment of the note. Dean declared that the Masbate land had more than 6K coconut trees growing on it but it turned out the trees were less than 6k. BREACH OF CONTYRACT LEVY HERMANOS V GERVACIO 9 Caveat Emptor – buyer beware . DOCTRINE: An intention to deceive o r mislead the purchaser of merchandise to his prejudice is an essential element of fraud. if he is given a c hance to inspect the property. Ang. then there is no false representation.a.600. FACTS: Soledad and Ang entered a “car-swapping scheme”." Soledad gave a warranty against ev iction. being engaged in buy and sell of cars. Thus. In pledging that he "will defend the same from all c laims or any claim whatsoever [and] will save the vendee from any suit by the go vernment of the Republic of the Philippines. the oil had impurities. HELD: action has already prescribed. When Portsmouth received it. FACTS: Levy He rmanos. Inc. DOCTRINE: Article 1454-A applies only to contracts of sale of p ersonal property in installment where there is failure to pay 2 or PMC V GOJUCO ANG V CA XIII. MTCC dismissed the case on prescription. Levy Hermanos filed a complaint for th e HELD: Gervacio should still pay because Recto law does not apply there being o nly one payment. Also. It was shown that Gochangco viewed the lands and himself estimated that there were more than 6.GOCHANGCO V DEAN by a person whose interest might so readily prompt him to exaggerate the value o f his property does so at his peril 9. DOCTRINE : In declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle. There was also no implied warranty s ince PMC was able to fully examine the oils. there was still a remaining balance of P1. FACTS: Go Jocco sold 500 tons of coconut oil PMMC . Goch angco exchanging his Pasay Estate land w/ Dean exchanging his Masbate land. FACTS: Gochangco and Dean agreed to exchange their properties. sold to Lazaro Blas Gervacio. RTC affirmed but granted Ang reco very based on equity. Go Jocco guaranteed jthat the oil was 5& f.. HELD: The allegation of false & frau dulent representations as to the existence of the 6K coconut trees wasn’t proven. The prescriptive period to file a breach thereof is s ix months after the delivery of the vehicle. Held : Go Jocco is not liable to PMC because their contract did not contain an expres s warranty against impurities aside from the stipulation that not more than 5 pe r cent of free fatty acid would be allowed. The car was sold at pub lic auction. then there is no fraud.f. They then sold the oil to Po rtsmouth. 1571. a Packard car. Gervacio failed to pay the note at its maturity.000 coconut trees thereon.
There is no such temptation where the price is to be paid in cash. A chattel mortg age was also executed over the bus to secure the indebtedness. This failure prompted Manila Trading to proceed with the foreclosu re of its chattel mortgage. . expenses of collection. The automobile was sold for P200 at a public auction and Reyes still had an unpaid balance. Cruz defaulted on his paymen ts.BORBON V SERVICEWIDE more installments. . for it is in these cases t hat partial payments consist in relatively small amounts. If sale is not one on installments. Filipinas required. or partly in cash and pa rtly in one term since partial payments are not so small as to place purchasers off their guard and delude them to a miscalculation of their ability to pay. The phrase "any unpaid balance" can only mean the deficiency judgment t o which the mortgagee may be entitled to when the proceeds from the auction sale are insufficient to cover the "full amount of the secured obligations which . DOCTRINE: The remedies u nder A1484 are not cumulative but alternative and exclusive. in which the balance. include interest on the principal. and Cruz agreed to give. as it has done by the enactment of Act No. Manila Trading instituted an action for the recovery of it and questions constitutionality of Art 4122(Recto Law). Pangasinan Auto Mart assigned the note & chattel mortgage to Filinvest C redit Corporation. Reyes executed a chattel mortgage on an automobile as security for the payment of P400 in favor of Manila Trading. the proc eeds of the sale were not enough so they wanted to foreclose on the second secur ity. 1454-A does not apply. Filipinas then foreclosed the chattel mortgage on the bus. a nd the costs. FACTS: E. which the TC granted along with liquidated damages and attor ney’s fees. HELD: Recto law is constitutional. without sanctioning class legislation. after payment of the initial sum. HELD: The award of liquidated damages is not proper bec “all unpaid bala nce” pertains to ALL other claims on the promissory note. should be paid in its total ity at the time specified in the promissory note. HELD: Filipinas cannot foreclose the 2nd security because it is barred by 1 484. However. an additiona l security – a Second Mortgage over a parcel of land. then to Servicewide. Reyes failed to pay some of the instalments. Rationa le for 1454-A: possible miscalculation of ability to pay Aim of the law are sale s where the price is payable in several installments. including costs and attorney s fees . DOCTRINE: The controlling purpose of Act No. and without a denial of the equal protection of the laws. FACTS: Cruz bought 1 unit Isuzu Diesel Bus from Filipinas and executed a promissory note.M. MANILA TRADING V REYES CRUZ V FILIPINAS . but on straight term. Since no down pay ment was made by Cruz. FAC TS: Borbons bought an Isuzu Crew Cab from Pangasinan Auto Mart under a promissor y note. constituting thus a gr eat temptation for improvident purchasers to buy beyond their means. The Borbons failed to comply with their obligation to pay the installment . 4122. An action for replevin was instituted to for eclose the vehicle. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the f oreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. The argument is apt ly made." The legislative intent is not to merely limit the proscription of any further action to the "unpaid balance of the principal" but to all other cl aims that may be likewise be called in for in the accompanying promissory note a gainst the buyer-mortgagor or his guarantor. attorney s fees. The Leg islature may change judicial methods and remedies for the enforcement of contrac ts. without unduly interfering with the obligation of the contracts.
IFC demanded payment of the balance of the price of the car. In choo sing to sue on the note. These remedies have been recognized as alternative. the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any of these three remedies-either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obl igation. promising to pay in installme nt. pursuant to an earlier court decision for co llection for the unpaid notes. DOCTRINE: Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the payment of two or more of the agreed installments. if one was constituted.00. or to cancel the sale. HELD: Art 1484 CC is applicable in this case (s ale of goods on instalment). Buyers ex ecuted a promissory note and failed to pay at least 2 monthly installments. (3) foreclosure of chattel mortgage if any. despite the earlier foreclosure of the chattel mortga ge against him. the exercise of one would bar the exercise of the others. Tajanlangits seek to annul the writ saying its obligation was already satisfied by the first execution. secured by promissory note and chattel mortgage over said car in favour o f vendor. Ultimately.350. the car was reposses sed by vendor’s assignee (IFC). it will be the debtor-vendee who will be made to bear the payment of the balance of the price. South ern Motors can still levy Tajanlangits’ other properties. or to cancel the sale. They defaulted. it was not thereby limited to the proceeds of the sale. on execution. The proceeds were insufficient to cover the purch ase price so another writ of execution was obtained. if one was constituted. The vendor can still collect because the o ption chosen was not to foreclosure. The protection given by Art 1484 would be indirectly subverted. that the exercise of one w ould bar the exercise of the others. (1) performance. Delt a Motors prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin. FACTS: Spouses Nonato bought a car on insta lment. Delta is claiming for the remainin g balance. which the Court granted after Delta Motors posted the requisite bond. To sustain Far East’s ar gument about proceeding against a third person is to overlook the fact that if t he guarantor should be compelled to pay the balance of the purchase price. It has also been established that the forec losure and actual sale of a mortgaged chattel bars further recovery by the vendo r of any balance on the purchaser’s outstanding obligation. which were subjected to a chattel mortgage.DOCTRINE: Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the p ayment of two or more of the agreed installments. These remedies are alternative. Sheriff levied. For their failure to pay two or more instalments. YOU CANNOT HA VE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO! FACTS: Niu Kim Duan and Chan Fue Eng purchased from Delta Motor 3 units of ‘DAIKIN’ air-conditioner all valued at P19. not cumulative. and not under a foreclosure under the chatter mortgage. the exercise of one would bar the exercise of the others. or to foreclose the mor tgage on the purchased personal property. not cumulative. the vendor or seller has the o ption to avail of any one of these three remedies – either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obligation. They paid thru promissory notes. of the mortgaged good. fro m Souther Motors. Despite repossession. are alternative. DOCTRINE: The vendor had a right to select among the three remedies established in Article 1484. (2) cancellati on. not cum ulative. It sought judicial declaration that it had validly rescin ded the Deed of Conditional Sale and thus chose the 2nd remedy of Article 1484 i n seeking enforcement of its TAJANLANGIT V SOUTHERN MOTORS NONATO V IAC DELTA MOTOR V NUI KIM . HELD: Delta is not entitled to the balance of the aircons that it suc cessfully repossessed. HEL D: The first execution was for the collection of the unpaid obligation under the promissory notes. the g uarantor will in turn be entitled to recover what she has paid from the debtor. FACTS: Tajanlangit bought goods. or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased pe rsonal property. The remedies there.
the claim of a bank against the lot and r equested a refund of all installment payments made on account of the contract. less damages su ffered by the obligee. The Sevilla spouses failed to pay th e amortizations on time. DOCTRINE: P. Saldaña wrote Hermanos saying he can’t build on the lot because of Hermanos’ failure to intr oduce improvements such as roads. namely. Interest payments forfeited in favor of Hermanos. " and in the interest of justice and equity.” FACTS: Sapinoso bought from Northern Motors an Op el Kadett car and to secure payment thereof. After t he commencement of the action but before filing his answer.D." NORTHERN MOTORS V SAPINOSO LEGARDA V SALDANA CASA FILIPINA V OP . H ELD: Sevillas are entitled to a refund pursuant to Sec 23 of PD 957 becase notic e was already given notice regarding. another to be retained by Hermanos. upon the Buyer’s failure t o pay 2+ instalments. HELD: Northern need not give back the 2 payments of Sapisano..contract with Buyers DOCTRINE: The seller in a sale of personal property payable in installments may exercise one of 3 remedies. Section 23 does not require that a not ice be given first before a demand for refund can be made. The notice and the de mand can be made in the same letter or communication. They then wrote a letter to CFRC regarding the absence of any improvement in the subdivision. He failed to pay some instalments but several payments were made. DOCTRINE: A1234 of CC: If th e obligation has been substantially performed in good faith. then Northern has not yet chosen a relief. However. (1) exact fulfillment o f obligation if Buyer fails to pay. the obligor may rec over as though there had been a strict and complete fulfillment. It is true t hat replevin is the first step towards foreclosure. he executed a chattel mortgage over the same car. (2) cancel sale upon Buyer’s failure to pay 2+ instalments 3) foreclose the chattel mortgage. and demanded for refund. Aft er 8 years (95 out of 120 monthly installments) of faithful compliance on due pa yments. HELD : Since the payment was already more than the price of one lot. the nondevelopment of the subdivision. Saldaña stopped payments leaving a balance from the purchase price. Northern filed a case against Sapisono. since Saldaña failed to pay remaining installments. “It canno t have its cake and eat it too. if any. 957 was iss ued in the wake of numerous reports that many real estate subdivision developers and/or sellers "have reneged on their representations and obligations to provid e and maintain properly subdivisions" for the health and safety of home and lot buyer s. claiming it was availing of its option of extrajudicial foreclosure and prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin. Sapisono made 2 paym ents. The 3 remedies are alternative and NOT cumulative. FACTS: Denni s and Rebecca Sevilla agreed to purchase from Casa Filipina Realty Corporation ( CFRC) a parcel of land in CFRC’s subdivision. such as fa ilure to deliver titles to buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. upon its filing of the bond. Hermanos cancelled the contract. arguing that it is a contract to sell. DOCTRINE: There is n o reason why a mortgagee should be barred from receiving payments before the act ual foreclosure. which is the first step toward foreclosure. It was designed to stem the tide of "fraudulent manipulations perpetrat ed by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators. among other things. since there was no foreclosure yet. FACTS: Saldaña bought 2 lots from Hermanos and Legarda’s subdivision. tendered voluntarily by the debtor-mortgagor who admits his ind ebtedness. deliver that lot of Saldañaand Hermanos retain the other lot.
McLaughlin would hold that even after the expiration of the gr ace period provided by the Law. so Mclaughlin filed a complaint for the rescis sion of the deed of conditional sale. 2. DOCTRINE: (from Villanueva) McLaughlin provides two basic doctrines applicable said law: 1. FACTS: Mc laughlin and Flores entered into a contract of conditional sale of real property with the stipulated purchase price payable on installments. Since the tender of payment of the b alance of the purchase price was made within the 30 day period. which is a min of 60 days 2. Flores defaulted in the payment of the installments.MCLAUGHLIN V CA Should the notice requirement provided for in Sec. this prevented t he cancellation of the contract. However. Flores still failed to pay on the dates provided in the compromise agreement. with Flores agreeing on a scheduled payment of the balance of the purchase p rice. the buyer still can prevent rescission or cancel lation of the contract w/in the 30-day pd when rescission or cancellation is to take effect. HELD: McLaughlin cannot rescind the contract and forfeit all the installments since Mclaughlin could cancel the contract onl y 30 days after the notice of cancellation. the intent of the law to protect subdivision lot buyers will tend to be defeated. The law seems to require rescission and cancellation to be both by notarial act. all payments previously made shall be fo rfeited in favor of the Mclaughlin as liquidated damages. McLaughlin thus provides for two grace periods: 1. the suit was eventually compromis ed. The period before the re scission or cancellation actually takes effect. McLaughlin would hold notarial act as merely applicable to rescission. . Such compromise agreement also provided that in case of failure of the buy er to comply with the terms of payment. 23 be construed as required t o be given before a buyer desists from further paying amortizations. so Mclaughlin refused to accept further payment and eventually filed a motion for the writ of execution for the rescission of the contract. The one provided for expressly by the Law. whereas “notice of cancellation” need not be by notarial act.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.