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SCOTT LEHMANN

STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC

term. , singular non-designating

even 'pV p' shouldlack a truthvalueif 'p' containsa ... for a strictFregean,

Brian ([15] Skyrms at479)

1. INTRODUCTION

In thecourse arguing thereferent a sentence its truthof that of is tookthesentence that who value,Fregeremarks "anyone seriously was to at whilesoundasleep'] be trueor ['Odysseus setashore Ithaca falsewould ascribe thename'Odysseus' reference...; it is of the to a for of reference thename thepredicate affirmed denied" at 62). that is or ([7] if onebelieves 'Odysseus' not refer,oneshould that does Accordingly, alsotakethesentence be neither norfalse.Thisposition be to true may rationalized twoFregean of is by principles: thetruth-value a sentence (i) a function (i.e.,is thevalueof a function the referents its of of at) constituent and are and there names, (ii)functions operations, where is no inputto an operation, there be no output can either. terms of non-referring as an "imperfection" natural Fregeregards A he "should the languages. "logically perfect" language, writes, satisfy thatevery wellconstructed a as conditions, expression grammatically nameout of signsalready introduced in factdesignate shall an proper as name object,andthatno newsignshallbe introduced a proper without a that beingsecured reference" at 70).He suggests failure ([7] to keepsuchconditions mindcanleadus intoerror, it is in and indeed casesin whichreasoning accord in with easyto construct terms accepted logicallawsgoesawrybecause maynot refer (e.g., that mustbetruebecause follows existential it concluding 'Godexists' by from mustbe trueby thelawof generalization 'Godis God',which self-identity).

Journal Philosophical of Logic23: 307-336, 1994.

C 1994 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

308

SCOTTLEHMANN

In artificial may be achievedby languages, logicalperfection for E.g., classicalsemantics formalfirst-order languages stipulation. V securesFrege'sconditionsby requiring universes be non-empty, that in that namesreferto individuals V, and that k-placefunctionnames +7. However,sincesuch arrangements functionsq -do k-ary designate of natural makeit difficult not clearawaythe imperfections they language, to regarda formalsentenceas givingthe logicalform of an ordinary terms.This is largelybecauseFrege'sfuncsentence with non-referring - principle above- is centralto the modern tionalview of language (i) have a sentences notion of logicalform.We imaginethat ordinary and that fixes theirlogicalproperties relations,i.e.: semanticstructure 1. The semanticvalue of a sentenceis a functionof the semantic sentence values of its non-logicalconstituents(e.g., a subject-predicate of is trueif the referent the subjectbelongsto the extensionof the and predicate); in and relationsare to be characterized terms 2. Logicalproperties of some totalityof possiblesemanticvaluesfor these constituents (e.g., logical truthis truthfor all possiblevalues,some accountbeing given of this totality). are Typically,such structures represented a readingof formal (via by constructions) sentencesof a formallanguageso constructedthat is and syntacticstructure both transparent mirrorssemanticstructure; of semanticvaluesare represented interpretations this by possible termif language.Now we cannotreada formalnameas a non-referring at must assignto eachformalnamea referent, least if we interpretations assume: 3. The actualsemanticvalues of the non-logicalconstituentsof a sentence(i.e., the valueswe imagineare inducedby some actualuse of the sentence)are among theirpossiblevalues. Or, to put it anotherway, (3) is not consistentwith 4. Thereare non-referring singularterms and 5. The possiblevalues of a singulartermare its possiblereferents. Since standardconditionson classicalfirst-order interpretations assure(5) for formalterms,it is hard to see how formalfirstthe ordersentences,so construed,can represent logical forms of terms. sentenceswith non-referring ordinary

that we should not invoke hiddencomplexityunlessthereis good reasonto do so.not a merenothing"([4]at 62).g. via purelysyntacticderivation rulesfor manipulating such notations.in TheOdyssey) and that personis self-identical.. . that.e.But wheretermsdo not refer.. If we jettison semantics.g. Classicalfirst-order semanticsis more usuallydefendedby questioning (4) in one of two ways. we should not adopt (a) until we have investigated the form (e.this is not assured. so that familiarconreferring nectionshold wheretermsrefer. or neithertruenor false. logical truthdoes not imply truth.g.'Or (b) we may follow Descartesand that "non-referring" termsin fact refer.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 309 whichshouldwe (1) Assumptions through(5) are incompatible. We could abandonthe semanticnotion of logical form given give up? by (1) and (2) for a purelysyntacticone: the logicalform of a sentence is nothingmore than a notationwhich. e. What appearsto underwrite (b)'s appealto non-existing objectsis the idea that a conceptof X presupposes But this seems X.for the actualvalues on which truthdepends need not be among them. If 'Odysseus' does not refer. a sentencefollows from othersif its formis derivable from theirs).albeit Meinongin maintaining to objectsthatdo not exist.We certainlydo not want a sentenceto be logicallytrue but actuallyfalse. taking option of identifyinglogicalwith grammatical 'Odysseusis Odysseus'to be a simpleidentity)and found it to be unworkable. That is.determines logical properties its and relations(e.false.if logical truthis truth for all possiblevalues. and the basis for decidingwhich ought to be part of our accountof logical form.. (5) will insurethat the actualreferents of termsare among theirpossiblevalues.as by Kaplan[10]and others. form masks a complex (a) requiresholdingthat a simplegrammatical logicalform. (a) We may follow Russelland regard "terms"as disguiseddescriptions.so thatby 'Odysseus' meannot an existing we individualbut nonetheless"a something.I assumethat we do not wish to take this way out. and it may be objected. 'Odysseus so non-referring is Odysseus'is not an identitybut says somethinglike:one and only one personhas the properties ascribedto Odysseus(say.to what may we appealin settlingon a correctand completebody of derivationrules? The priceof dropping(3) is a weakerconnectionbetweenlogic and truth..'Odysseusis Odysseus'is true.yet this possibilitycannot be excludedwithout(3).g.

and the notions of reference non-referring honor NINO.310 SCOTT LEHMANN wrong:an individualconcept . Termsand formulaeare all taken as notationsfor allow for the value of a functionat an argument. developedin s2. It is more usual to proposethat logical form is such with that lack of inputdoes not precludeoutput.However.. i. interpretations and truthunder terms.the move from insteadof sayingthingslike "Thereare conceptto objecthereis suspect. and 'Odysseus' refersto non-existent objects. We must then say what semanticstructure deliversin this case. Moreover." we oughtto say only "Thereareindividual conceptsthat fit nothing.Its semantic basis.. an argument .3 though noncommittal about lots of features.a conceptof X .Odysseus it. (b) is not a viable option.2 Meinongapparently of courseindividualconceptswill generallybe non-existents.Part of the case for (i) will be made by developinga Fregeanfree logic for formal and first-order languageswith function-names identity.while (ii) the currently popularalternative supervaluationalsemantics. we must extendour understandingof (1) to the case wheresome of the functionalinputs are for lacking. is among them.so that some sentences and termshave a truth-value some sentencescontaining non-referring namesare logicallytrue.if it fits anythingat all. We expectthat a sentencewill lack truthvalue if a constituentterm lacks a referent.and 'Odysseus' does not refer.is merelyone we imaginefitsjust one individual." If so. the conceptof Odysseusis amongthem.promisesmore than it can deliver.The simplestprescription doing so is Frege's:no input. Since interpretation may be valid sentencesgenerallyneedn'tbe true or false. Such considerations give us reasonto exploremodifying(5) by the possiblevaluationsof a terma representation includingamong of situationsin whichit does not referat all. is very close to that proposedby Smiley[16] thirtyyearsago. 'Plato is Plato' as well as 'Odysseusis Odysseus')can be logicallytrue.g.Accordingly.largelybecauseit seemsto lead to an impoverished and counter-intuitive logic.so no sentencecontaining a name (e.X .NINO has not been popular. My view is that (i) the Fregeanapproachis not as unpromising as it may appear.no output(whichI shall abbreviate'NINO'). it is hardto grasphow any objectcan be suchthat it neitherhas nor lacks somewell-defined as believedtrueof some feature.e. Logicalnotions are treatedin s3.

Names are 0-placefunction sentences 0-placepredicates. generating names. 'n'.. P is a k-placepredicate.F.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 311 in a strongor a weaksense. Many of the formsof inferencewe regardas logicallaws are weaklyvalid. in partby suggesting the that have essentially"cooked"theiraccountof logical supervaluationists form to turn out desiredresults. since the treatment quantifiers s2 assuresthat existentials true of in are or false. with or without sub. whereF and F' are formulaeand v is a variable). '-'. terms .identities r = st]. variables.(t) is the result of replacing each free occurrence v in F by t.negationsr-nF1.).Sentences formulaewithout free variables. wheres and t are terms. and '3' and assumeformationrules terms(variables. In s5 I argument to with others comparethisapproach logic freeof existenceassumptions in the literature. NINO SEMANTICS Let L be a formalfirst-order languagewith identity. Both sensesof validitymay be definedin termsof a notion of characterizable a variantof Jeffrey's tree satisfiability syntactically by method[9]. 'P' and 'R'. shall take the logical are I names.e. formulae. subject-predicate wherek > 0. tk 1.and super-scripts..and k-placepredicates. An elementary formulais a subject-predicate identityformulaor the or are negationthereof.even the strongsensegives us morethan we mightexpect. I use 'e'.sentences. and 'X' (resp.terms. e will sometimesbe designated indicatesa fe(t)1.names.and the ti are terms.primitive symbolsof L to be '='.and sets of sentences(resp.F. variable-free) term.). ThereI shallarguefor (ii).predicates. and the ti are terms)and formulaerPtl . 't' and 's'.functionnames.(t) is a sentence. and Fe(s)1 designatethe resultof of will particular . if r3vF1is a of sentenceand t a constant(i.If t occursin e.in such contexts. F(t)1 occurrence t in e.accordingto whetherits conclusionis true or merelynotfalse undereveryinterpretation that makesthe premises true. 'F'. formulae(primitive sentences. tkl. variablesranging over as expressions. 'v'. 'f'. 'S'...whosenon-logical variablesof variouskinds.k-place symbolsmay include(individual) functionnames.The completeness is sketchedin s4.and descriptive wherek > 0. 2. Let e be a constanttermor elementary sentence. 'V'. and existentialsFrvF1. fis a k-placefunctionname. disjunctions VFF'1 . as usual.

. has a value.. a function/ whose domainis a (possiblyempty) set of k-tuples. To each k-placefunctionnamef: a k-aryfunction/..rklI remarks shouldsuffice. where4 indicatesa k-aryfunctionval(q). of An assignment values to variablesis a functionA assigningto E if each variablev a 0-aryfunctionvA such that vA (() X (SO . in the lattercase.. for the logicaloperations val(q). . i. e may be designatedFe(t.we look to the syntaxof t or F for the form and (dependingupon 4) to I. t')1. constantterm t or sentenceS may be regarded a notation for the value of a 0-aryfunctionat (). or a Fregeanaccountof r0l .e. or (ii) they are separated.~.e.Xi is not definedat ()).klq).by regarding as havingform FTal rkl.I indicatethe is empty.kk)). and VAL: valt(qFc . Wherepossible.vA 1.I assumethat thereis exactlyone 0-tuple ()..312 SCOTT LEHMANN of by replacingt at that occurrence s.with the help of an each term and formula assignmentof values to variables..K..i. For presentpurposes. so that the domainsof 0-ary functionsmay be {() } or 0. FtI. e = e(t(t')) or e = e(t'(t)).I suppressmentionof I and indicatevalues assigned by script. k1indicatesa k-tuple val(ral. have no symbolin common.. A. Occurrences terms t and t' in e are such that (i) one is containedin the other.. i.e..A few clarifying . I value to each An interpretationof L assignsan appropriate non-logicalsymbol: To the variablesof kind K: a (possiblyempty)range Vf of values. is the kind of v and . functionY. ..e.... To each k-placepredicateP: a k-arytruth-valued a functionwhose domainis a (possiblyempty)set of k-tuplesand whose rangeis {T.. (k l) = valt(o)(val(Fral.F}. The domainof a functionis the set of individualsat whichit is defined.we may identifyfunctions with theirgraphs. with whichits value val(t) or val(S) may be identified.. of A is an assignment In applyingVAL.val is defined.. i. Under as a interpretation. Wherenecessary. its range.e.. A v-variant A of dependence val on a particularassignment by rvalA that differsfrom A at most at v. i.

val(tk))is not in the domainoff. identitiesin whichat least one termdoes not refer..0 = '3' and FTl kl = l = rvF1. If S(t) is an elementary sentenceand t and t' areco-referring. Val(S(t)) .. tion I from truth-valued functionsto {T.albeitin some cases one whose domainis empty.... f'(vA'(())) = valA'(F). alwaysdescribes truth-valued function.namesn whose domainis empty. so we may speakof the referent of a constanttermand the truth-value a sentenceunderL Constant of termsare co-referring (underI) if each refersand to the sameindividual. val('V')is the 2-ary function : {T.. Thus the .. . definedat F} and for vof is variantsA' of A. rko1 (b) valis definedat or W l..and termsrftl . F} suchthat "'))= F iffI = V' = F In 3vF1. val('3')is the 1-aryfunc. the domainof F is 0. is the 2-arytruth-valued functionwhose value at any pair of val('=') individuals(a.. 0kl a but val(ol. F} such that '(F) = T iff a and val( vF1) is the truth-valued function such 9(a) = T for some 9that(i) if f = 0. So valis not definedat in if (a) valis not definedat [fTr. [ .k 1) = ().(()): A' is a v-variant A and valA.... F} --+{T. tk] suchthat some ti does not referor (val(tl). F} such that A(*) = T iff ' = F.. -k) is not in the domainof val(q). disjunctions whichat and in negationsof formulae least one disjunctlackstruth-value....STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 313 If k = 0. e) is T iff a is e.. val('--')is the 1-aryfunctionXV: {T. thenthe domainof f is {vA. . The followingfactsaboutextensionality be usedin the completeness will of s4. val(tk))is not FPtl in the domainof 9. (ii) if X'..... If s(t) is a referring then s(t) and s(t') are co-referring.As usual. VALis to be interpreted accordwithNINO. And the formulaethat get no truth-value (underI and A) are primitive sentencesP whose domainis empty.1I termsthat do not refer(underI and A) are variableswhose rangeis empty. argument constanttermand t and t' areco-referring El. existentialsf3vF1alwayshavea But since1vF1 a truth-value.. the value (if any) of a constant termor sentencedoes not varywithA. that lacktruth-value. F} -I {T. then = Val(S(t')).Tk is the empty expression and val( Fri. For notationalconvenience mayconstruct we from vala total function Valon formulaeby letting Val(F) = val(F) if valis definedat F and setting Val(F)= N otherwise.subject-predicate formulae . tkI such that some ti does not referor (val(tl).. E2. 0.

S is weaklylogicallytrue(i... it. Interpretations of L* must satisfythe additionalconditionthat the predicatesrKv1 are functionsX.e.logical falsehood. of variable. strongand weak sensesof logical truth. (b) for each kind K. conclusionof a stronglyvalid argument with premisesis also true. alwayshave the same S nor {S'. then ValA(F)= ValA(F.e. A branchof such a tree is closedwhen it containsan for explicitcontradiction: classicalsemantics.e. S is stronglylogicallytrue(i.and logical may be definedin termsof satisfiability*: equivalence a.e. and S' iffneither {S. If Y is a set of sentencesand *-sentences. Similarly. is nevertrue)iff {[S*1} is not satisfiable*.r . makeseach satisfiable* some interpretation *-sentence Y true and none of the othersfalse. neither{Fs*1.the conclusionof a weaklyvalid argument true premisesneed not be true.r -S1 } is satisfiable*. 3.r S'*1} can A syntacticmethodfor determining satisfiability* be obtained relative method [9] for determining satisfiability by modifyingJeffrey's to classicalsemantics..e.S'1} neverhave differenttruth-values) iff are weaklylogicallyequivalent (i.e. is alwaysfalse) iff {S} is not S is weaklylogically satisfiable*.S*1} is satisfiable*. nor {IS'*l. is is {a: of K.and (c) a marker'*'... c. so that the rangeof variablesof kind assignedtruth-valued = T}. b. S) iff X* U r-s]} is not satisfiable*. If t is a constanttermand valA(t)= vA(()).. false (i. The with true satisfiable*. it will be convenientto expandL to L* by adding(a) an unlimitedlist of new names.. S is stronglylogically false (i. S) is weaklyvalid(X k. If S is a sentenceof L*.Y is X* 1 iff satisfies*Y.(a) = { *l: S E X}.e.either F--= ttl or both S . i. is neverfalse)iff {[-IS*1} is not satisfiable*. SATISFIABILITY* To deal with logicalnotions. S and S' are stronglylogicallyequivalent (i.1.314 SCOTT LEHMANN E3. though it cannot be false. S) iff X* U {IS*l} is not (X. FS*1 a *-sentence L*.r truth-value) -. is alwaystrue) iff { -Sl } is not and satisfiable*. S) is stronglyvalid(X s. a new 1-placepredicaterK.(t)). of An argument(X. Testinga finite set X of sentencesfor satisfiability this methodinvolvesverticallylistingthem and then applying by reductiverulesto constructa downwardbranchingarrayof sentences (a treefor X).

a treefor someinitialsegmentof (Si) in whichall branches close.n*1 rF. i.The completeness the method (and its extensionto enumerable derivesfroma mechanicalprocedure X) which.a tree for (Si) in which some possiblyinfinitebranchis finished.s1 S Si Si ..S S-n$21 I r-.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 315 and F-S1.1 FI..X is satisfiablesince Hintikkasets are satisfiable(the rulesare "upward of correct").. If all branchesof the tree are closed. involvesmodifyingthe Adaptingthis methodto satisfiability* reductiverules.the rulesfor closing branches. produces (a) aftera finitenumberof steps. by the bottom..and the notion of a Hintikkaset. .-..e. S 1 rs*1 I rK1.1 S1 . since the reductiverulespreservesatisfiability (they are "downward An open(i. The modifiedreductive rulesare given by the following if diagrams: the sentenceor sentencesat the top of each diagramappear in a branch then / may be extendeddownward addingthe arrayat P.when to an enumeration a finishedtreefor (Si): either applied (Si).sl S2 . If an open finishedbranchis obtained. X is not satisfiable.or (b) aftera possiblyinfinitenumberof steps..Sl S21 rvS1 -.(n).*1 S(s) r=st' r=st*1 s(s)* 1 S(t) rS(t)* where S is elementary s 0 t and S rS*1 I whereS is (a) an existentialor negatedexistential (b) or an identityor negatedidentityeach term of which is a *-sentence *-term of 0. occursin some elementary of ' . VSIS2 SrI 1 r-S* f3vF*1 ! S* I S1* 3F* 1 r-. constitutea Hintikkaset. not closed)branchis finishedwhenits sentences correct").(t)l E1 x'l n where doesnot occur in above K.e.

then for some n. or [S*l and rFS-.g.(n)*lE/3 and [K. = tt*1. F.if F--. S E/3and or then[S* E /. 1e I/3 and -S21 E P/3. # is finishedwhen it satisfiesconditions hl-h7: hi. theneitherS1 E 3or S2 /3. and r-nS1 3.316 SCOTT LEHMANN The non-standard form of the *-disjunction is requiredfor rule the form of the negated upwardcorrectness. or rFS.if rv SIS1 E/. nor E and r-. 1 An finishedbranchthat is open satisfiesin addition: h8. h2 If r V S1S21] . 4.S*1E 3.then fS(t)*l E p. h7.then S*1 E /3.S*l E /3. then S E /3.1 h3.r. E/3 r--S. the conclusion for If disjunction this of the negatedexistentialrule were a *-sentence. If [3vF*l E 3. then for each t suchthat rKvt*lE /3. very non-standard ruleis required downwardcorrectness. NeitherrS*] P and r--S1E . then h6. Stage i + 1: a. and r-nTSE p.n*1E 3.= tt*1 P. If S E /3and S is either(a) an existentialor negatedexistentialor (b) an identityor negatedidentityeach term of whichis a *-termof /3. then E and rSzl E 3. wheret or s doesn't referor the referentof t is not in the domainoff.if . If r-3vF*l E . SupposeS(s) is elementary S(t) e p. or rS*l and r-S* 1 . rule would not be downwardcorrect. or S and -S*l. FF. s can A finishedtreefor an enumeration of sentencesand *-sentences (ei) be obtainedby the followingstagedprocedure: Stage 0: Writedown eo.e. if fS(s)*l /3.VSIS2*1 then E or E E /3.1 and -lS21 E/3. let F = r= sfv]. /3is closedwhen it contains r-. rS* E #3 a Conditionsh l-h9 characterize Hintikka*-set.then [-S. S2E 3 r-nS213..v S1S21E P/. If r--S1 E 3. If . Add ei+1 to the top of the tree. .(t)1 E 3. or [-Sl E 3 and E [Si1 E/3 rs[1E/. COMPLETENESS h9. h4. and [ = st*l E /3. nor r-S*1 3 and S E .If S(s) e 3. h5.

tk]]= [Ffs .) of L-termsti is a 3-sequence lengthn + 1)from to to tniff (to.and (c) either (b) t =t orr t'ti*l E p. The rangeof v is {[t]:for some s E [t]. t. then (ei) is satisfiable* because(a) 3 is a Hintikka*-setand (b) any Hintikka*-setis satisfiable*.let [s]= {t: (s. For s E TERM.L in applications the of existentialrule. tk E TERM. not all the termsin this sequenceneed be in a 6-sequence TERM.then[t]= [s]. then I satisfies* If T is a finishedtreefor (ei) in whichsome open branch# is finished. Apply the negatedexistentialruleas far as possibleto pairs r. then (ei) is not satisfiable*. .let (s. Skl]. A Hintikka*-set0 determines interpretation that satisfies* Its an P. . Ift E TERM.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 317 b. ti+l = ti(ti"). Apply the identityrulesas far as possibleto pairsS(s) and [ = st*l or fS(s)*] and r = st*1 availableat the completionof (c). . 4I is definedas follows: ial.A finite sequence of3 inducedby an equivalence . . If T is a finishedtree for a finite initialsegmentof (es)in whichall branches since the reductiverules close..and (b). c. d. And from the symmetry and transitivity ~: of F2. 1 rfsl [ti]= [si].. The preservesatisfiability* rulepreserves since if KrV SIS2] negateddisjunction satisfiability* is not false underI becauseSi has no truthvalue..skl E TERM. we By pastingtogether 3-sequences.using namesfrom L* . t E TERMand t E [s]. t) E }.It is easy to see that R is an equivalence relationon TERM. fKs*l E /3}. skip the proof of (a).andfor each i. and closed branchesare not satisfiable*. Ip is construction basedon a partitionof the set TERMof constantterms relationR on TERM. If [ft ... If s. Applyreductive rulesotherthantheidentityand negatedexistential rulesas far as possible. whichis straightI devote the remainder this sectionto establishing of forward.t E [t]..3vF*1and rKt* availableat the completionof (b). have: F3. If s. t) E 9 iff there is E3 from= to s t. (of either(1) n = 0 or (2) n > 0 and for each i: 0 < i < n thereare distinct termst' and t!' such that (a) ti = ti(t%)..then[Fftl. By the reflexivityof A: Fl.. t E TERM.

/ has no value at ([tl]... tn)with n > 0 be a shortest [t] = [s] by F2. i04. By connecting s to t: assume F4(b) for s'. otherwise. ip5. Proof. . otherwise. let connectings to t.. q(([tl].. (c). (d). (tL.. Otherwise.by h8. Suppose t E TERMand t refers. 9 has no value at ().. So val(t) [t]. [tk])) = F if there are si E [ti] I e . induction. and by F2. (a).I... If 6(s... If t is a *-term of/3. (i) the ti are *-terms and val(t1) = [ti] by IA and = = (ii)/(([tl].. to by (b). If 6(s. By inductionon the numberof functionnamesin t. t. [tk]). then val(t) = [t] by ip2.. sk] if there are si E [ti] such that Ffs. [tk])) = T if there are s E [ti] E such that rPsl . t) = 1.. t) and val(tj) = [t] by IA.. t). [tk] 0-place.Ski is a *-term of P. In proofs /.. If t E TERMand t refers...s1 E . t) < 6(s. Iffis 0-place.If t is a nameand refers. By F3. to and t~ are *-terms.. If s is connected a P-sequence the *-termt. (t .si1 As required../ has no value at (). If P is k-place and k > 0. Since tl = to(tg') and s = to = to(t').then t is a *-term ip2.. Since t is a *-term.... t') < 6(s. and val(s) = [t] = [s] by F4 (a). it is well-defined 0-place at predicates.. Il is at at well-defined functionnames... to')is a 0-sequence.. [tk])) [t]by ip3. t). By inductionon the numberof functionnamesin t. Y(()) = T if IS*l E PandY(()) = F if --S*1 otherwise. t E [s]. E 0. val(to) = [t'] and val(tK')= [t']. t' with 6(s'. .thenthereis a *-termin [t]. the length of a shortestf-sequence (b). t) > 1.. the range I# gives to v is {[t] : f'.. . inductionon 6(s..([t]) = T}.To establishthat it is well-defined other predicatesand that it satisfies* we need to verifysome additionalfacts. Y has no value at such that --Psl ([tl]. tk . so 6(tl. Iffis k-place and k > 0. [tk])) = [rfsl.. otherwise. then/'(()) = [f] iffis a *-term of f. and Y(([tl]. Thus to and tg are co-referring..thenval(t) = [t]. s and ti are co-referring by El... then s = t. If t E TERMand t refers. then val(s) = [t] = [s]./(([tl].IA is the inductionassumption.. by . If t is a name. If P is).. So val(s) = [t] = [s].318 SCOTTLEHMANN ip2.. t = fftl .. [to]= [tg]. so by F4 (a). by (mathematical) F4 (a).. so to' e [to]..so P-sequence (to. i63. (c).) is a f-sequence connecting tI to t. then val(t) = [t].

. ii').so by F3. tn(t. Basis:i =1j+ 1. Si) is a f-sequence.. so (i) is a shorter (to. tj3+1). .Sk l] = [ft.so there'sa *-termin [t].Otherwise.(') andthereis a f-sequenceof lengthnfrom to to Proof.(t'.. and (ii) is impossible as well. Supposethat (to. So ti = tj+I(t1. establish that the ti).) is j+l(tj).t = ftl . Since t E TERM. ti+1 t"'). r = tj't*l] Ef and for each i:j < i < n.......so by IA. Thenifj is the e greatestsuchi: (a).ti E TERM. there'sa *-termt E [t]. = t'(tjl. supposeon the = or contrarythat (i) t'" tj'(t1j+1) (ii) tf = t!fI(t')... = ti(t". sm= tM.so tj+1= tj+1(t'. So ti is connectedby a f-sequence to a *-termt'. tm).e. t~). Therefore...).). tI (I(t.tj'. t E [t]. (b). Sk is a *-termof 0. = or (ii) supposeon the contrarythat (i) t3'= t'+1 tP+(t"'). Iff is definedat ([ti].. [tk]). 9S1 .. wheren > 0. (to.. tj+2 is tj+I(t. . tk1].. tn) is a shorterf-sequence from toto t.. If t E TERMand t refers.). By inductionon i. f-sequence from toto t.. tk]. tn). val(t) I Part (b) of the followingfact is crucialin the arguments subsequent for facts. In case (i). = and tj is impossible..In case (ii)... ty. ByF1. = t ). t-j't+l tj+2.. so tj+l(t'(tj'+1)) . tj. For each i: j < i < n. [Ifsl....t **.in ti+1are separated.'+.... [si]= [ti].(t')) so again(to. = t(.. If t refers. and tj is t By h6.(t))..thenthere'sa *-term E [t]by F4 (c) and = [t]by F4 (b).To of and occurrences t"' t. tkl]....theremust by i/3 be si E [ti]suchthat [fsl .s. By F2. so that for m: - and m-<i.) is a f-sequence. ti+1 = ti+l (tj'.Sinceti = ti(t' tm(tj.. = t.. t' ... . ti).. = tj+(tj. Sj+l.and if si = ti(t.Sj+1. s (d). is a shortestf-sequence from to to tnand thatfor some i: 0 <i < n.. Sk!E [ftl . F= t~l ] E . (to. )tj*1E . i. .then (to. ti = ti(t'.. I. Inductivestep:suppose(a) holds up throughi... sj+ sj+l) is a f-sequencein virtueof the fact that r = It+1 p. . val(tk))is in the domainof f..tj+1)..STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 319 by F1. F5.Byh6 = t+ ef. t'(t'+ l) < . t. 1) tj+i1(tj ...t+1). and val(ti)= [ti] by F4 (b).the ti referand (val(tl). tj.. r = tt'*tl E p.. Since tji+1 tj+ (tj.. To establishthat the occurrences tj' and tj+1 of in tj+1are separated. (a).SO there'sa *-termin [t]. t).. t..

l E 3. = tn(t!')."in t ti+ are separated..ti+1= ti+1(tj'(t!)) = ti(t'. . tj. t1'contains t+1..(tfit"+1*l f. t). of considerhow the relevantoccurrences t" and t!+1in ti+1 may be related.. .. tj+2.. = t . By h6. t!' cannot contain t+ 1.. and (3) is impossible. = ti. By h6. tI1 containst'. t.si) can be extendedto s. (b).). tn) is a shorter ti+i(tj'(t"" = tj (t'+1)t tj.t" 1) and sn-1 = tn-l(tj..e.(t tf') ti+2= +).sof tf' and t. are Then ti). t!+l 1 1(t!.. sj+l. and by h6. Since ti = ti(tjt. .. So (to._... = ti 1(t'..1. tI') and t. So = and ti = ti+2= ti+1(ti+1)and tj = ti+I(t +l(tI.. and case (i) is impossible. t!)). But si = ti(tj. t. ti)). [ = tt"(t1 )*1 E 3. = tn = tn-l(t'...tn. Ifj = n .. si.. In case (ii).. because si ti+ = of tf) and the occurrences tf' and tI'in ti+l are therefore ti ti(tj'. .. t).tf+l).. f separated..tn-1 = tn(t). then t.Otherwise.. . t') and the relevantoccurrenc.. si+1. tj. = t+ (t. ) is shorter3-sequencefrom to t. = t (tf'). . . t+1l. In eithercase. sj+. t. si I si+1. tj... tn-1 = I so tn-(t!'. so t = t(t+ I). sj+l. 3-sequence Therefore..considerhow the relevant of occurrences t" and t+1. so .. tj.+.. to and (2) is a ti+2. impossible. t)ti +1 (tj Si si So as in case (1). . tf+1). If ti = ti(t!'.) is / 2.t!+1.. tI1 = ti+ l(t+l (te'. .. t!+ (t')).. ti+l(tJ. t(tf'). = ti(t. in ti+l may be related: so 1.i. and (to.ti+I = ti+l(t'W. then I ti+2 jI ti-.. ti) t1+J tE)..By the argumentof (2). ti+I = t+l (tf'. t'). E ti+1(ti+1(t). then. tj..si+1) is a P-sequence. .+l-= ti+(t *l Ep. sn-1 = tn(tf)and (to.). Thenti = ti(t). (to.*..). in virtueof = t'i+t' *1e /3...+(t). so = ti+1(tq.t). a shorter sequencefrom to to t. ti+l = ti+l(t+l (tf'). . tn-1) is a (b) /-sequence of lengthn from toto tn(t!).s-1) is a /-sequence of length n from to to tn(t')... Theoccurrences separated.t)). tf') = = ti+l I ti+2 +2= lI(t)... ti+l(t+. (t!)) and therefore ti+l = ti+I(t'. the 3-sequence(to. so t!+1 I = ti(tf. .In case (i). ti+2.t'). .si. .. ti+2... 3. t'). . 3-sequence To show that case (ii) is also impossible. t"N_).. t+ = t(t and ti+2 = ti1(t/(t!+1)).. follows from (a): ) S Incase(i).. So (to. So (to.. and ti = ti+I(t' So si = ti(tj.and si+1 may be definedas To show that (to.t').. and So if t. so t.tI).320 SCOTT LEHMANN )) = ti(t j"(t"1). Sj+1.So si+I = ti+l(tJ. = ti+ (t7. t+ (t')).. so either(i) are tIf contains tI' or (ii) these occurrences separated. I . By h6. . from to to t.. . tn) is a shorter from to to in. and (1) is impossible.

rterm t of TERMis connectedby a Proof. sk = [kPsl. s and t(t%) co-referring... a referring to a *-term. so (s. (i) if . .I .PsI..= st*1 0 0/3 by inductionon A(s)+ A(t): assumeF7 for s'. ti). it may be for transformed an argument case (ii) by interchanging and 't'. not enterthe argument essentially. t). thenfPsl .s 1 /3. 6(si.. A(t) be the lengthof the shortestsuch let /-sequence termsof TERM. If ECi(si. t ) < Eib(si.. SupposerPt*l E so t is a *-term of Let (to. . If ti) ti) > k.ti E TERM. tkl 3 and rt ..ii)and (f. tj with]j i do LCi(si. then /or or r-Pt l e /3by h6. /3. By F4 (c). then for some i. and = [s]. . where6 is as in the proof of F4 (b): assume F6 for (s'. into for 's' and 'P' and '-. [t] I give the argument case (i). = k. i n) . t1) F7. letj be the greatestsuch i. t1 E 3. If Psl E Ps*l E .So by IA. since It = t(tg').iii)of the THEOREM.andsi and ti are co-referring. = [ti]by F4 (b). .Sk] P and FPs . then si E TERM. and(ii) if Sptl . h6. and the claimis just h8. = t(tq')and a of < (s.ti) > 1. Thenby F5 (b).. and F4 (b).so to cleanup notation. thensi = ti for each i.. then = stl] /3and r-= st*l 0 0.. Either(a) I = t't*1 E /3for some i or (b) r = titt'*lfor each i...s 1 ~ /. The [si] proof is by inductionon. U 6(s. ti e TERMand co-referring..Ptl1 E /3 violatesIA. with n > 0 be a shortest#-sequenceconnectings to t. Iffor each i : 1< i <k. since tl and s are co-referring F4 (a) and F4 (b)...Assumethat s and t are co-referring = is proof that f-n stl /3and r.and ti E TERM. ti). In case (a).)) to t(t).. TERM. t') with Ei6(s!.. In case (b).If si.The sequence. -pPsl /3 and FPs*l1 P.F6 assuresthatI0 is well-defined at k-placepredicates k > 0..i6(si.. .P'. Thus rPtl .. If s. t' with A(s') + A(t') < A(s)+ A(t). t E TERMandare co-referring. FpPt(t)*1 so t(tf) E are By E/3. and by < 6(s. tk = =Pt1. for F6. The termssj. then [--Ptl are then both referto Proof.This -. By F4 (a) /3-sequence lengthn connectss t t(t) so (.Psl .a /-sequence connectssi and ti. = tt'l Ep..s) and (t.let i = k = 1 and drop the subscript'i'.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 321 F6 and F7 are generalizations h8 and h9 whichfacilitateproofs of of cases(f. t). in virtueof the scope of h 6. Let P be a k-placepredicatewithk > 0. Since [si]= [ti]. tl 1 /3. /3.

. and thereare si E [ti]such that r-Psj . tn = tn(tj')and a /-sequence of lengthn connects t with t. = stl E 3 or F. If A(t)+ A(s) > 1. by Therefore. tk)) F. contradicting Accordingly. = t't"'*lE /3. so F6..= st* E 3. So val(tt)= [ti]by F4 (d). Proof. Proof.(t')... for definiteness. The proof is by inductionon A(t)+ A(s)... In case (a). t. If r = ts] e 3.so (a) is impossible. t is connectedto a *-termby a shortest 3-sequence (t = to.. F= tis] = = to(t")s1eP3 by h6..n considerthe case whereA(s) > 1 or A(t) > 1.. then t and s are *-terms. Sincesi is a *-term.... But since A(s)+ I I F9. Then ti E TERMand Y((val(ti). = tt"*l1 E /3. [si]= [ti]by F2. thus by h6. tk1) F. then Val(F=ts]) # F.So if r-n st1 E 3.) with n > 0. whereA is as in the proof of F7: assumeF9 for t'. If A(t) = A(s)= 1. we may suppose A(t) > 1.. then by F5 (b)..it occursin some elementary of *-sentence p.. then KA(t1)< A(s) + A(t).. Since A(ti) + A(s) < A(t)+ A(s). If P is a k-placepredicatewithk > 0 and rPtl .so F= ts*l E/3 by h7. So F.= st*l /3 is like that of F6. tkl) = F. val(tk)))= F..322 SCOTT LEHMANN = If A(s) = A(t) = 1. so that a shortest /3sequenceconnectingt to a *-termis (t = to. F8 and F9 facilitateproofs of cases (b) and (c) of the THEOREM. s' with A(t')+ A(s') < A(t)+ A(s)...In case (b).t and s are co-referring F4 (b). = stl E 3 or . tkl E but Val(rPt . Since = ts E/3.then Val(Pti ..Now K.. As in the proof of F7. using h9 in place of h8. Val(rPtl . Since tnis a *-term. .. Val(r= t1sl) $ F by IA. st and ti are co-referring. then s and t are *-terms. tn(t) is also a *-termand (to. Supposer = tsl e but Val(r= tsl) = F.val(si)= [si]by F4 (a). = stl E p by h6. The proof that F-. SupposerPtl . Then t and s refer. By .. If .. and Val(F=tsl) = T.. s*l E by i#5. t) is not the shortestsequenceconnectingt to a *-term. F8. this is impossibleby IA. it follows that = st] P/.. letj be the largestsuch i. tn)with n > 0. supposeA(t) > 1. tk1E /3. So either(a) F= t!'t*l1e / for some i or (b) F= t!t'*l E P for each i. = then K-n st*] E / by h7..= stl 0 P and = st*l 4P/.

If FS*I1 3.(n)* E 3 and fKn*1 E . Val(S') $ F if S' E 3 and Val(S) = T if logical a.By ip4.. both t and tl referto [t. Since FK. then t and s are *-termsand referby F4 (a). S' is rV S1S2 E 3. If SE 3...S'1.By ip4... and are so ti . or S2 E 3and rS2] E 3. so Val(S)= T. s.. If fS*1 E 3. iv. S' is fPtl. so Val(S') = F.So Val(S')A T. r -Ptl. S' is F= ts1. S' is a negation. b. and by h4.so Val(S) = T.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 323 So F4(b). tkl. S is I = tsl. tkl. then Val(S) $ F by F8. so Val(S') 3 N.(n)) byIA. and n is a *-term. .So VaA f. contrary to supposition. [tk])) c. v. By IA and VAL. co-referring F4 (b). so by F7 neitherS E 3 nor [S*1 3. then t and s are co-referring.n*l 13. (i) the ti are *-terms then and val(ti)= [ti]by F4 (a) and (ii) [tk]))= F by i. Val(K= tsl) I THEOREM... . IA. But then S = by by tk1 13 F6.By assumethat if S' has fewer symbolsin S. S is ptl .. or Val(SI)= N. d.Then FS*1 3by h7. contraryto supposition.I satisfies* p. v. K-S1l E 3 and E r--S21 3. If S* E 3. or . S is rv S1S21. val(tk)))= T. by E2. By F4 (d). If S E 1.So E Val(S') # T. or Si E p and r-s1 1 E . and VAL. then t E and s are *-terms whichare co-referring F4 (b).so by ia5. =T Val(F. . Y(([tt]. then Val(S) $ F by F9.so val(n)= [n]by F4 (a). S is [-.]and are thus co-referring.By h 1 and VAL.If Val(S') = T.. by e. mathematical inductionon the numberof logical Proof. If [S*l E 13. then and val(ti)= [ti]by F4 (a) and (ii) (i) the ti are *-terms = T by ip5. whereS E 3 or fS*1 e 13: symbolsthan S. iii. S' is a primitivesentence... (F)= T byE3. S is r3vF1. thereis a namen E such that both iF. By = Val(S)TbyVAL. then the ti referand ((val(t). h2. S is a primitivesentence. Val(S1)$ T and Val(S2)5 T. F.. sk E 3. there are si E [ti]such that [Ps . ii..([n])= I fS* e. If Val(S') = T.si is a *-term.. If S E 3. then by h3.5. and thus Val(S') = F. Thereare the followingsubcases: i. E T by ip5. val(ti)= [ti].soifvA) = [n].

Pn3vPv'won't be true if Y(n(())) = T we but n(()) t .Val(S') # T. 'V-. I vA(()) = [t] for some t such that [Kt*l E .logical laws may fail for reasonsthat have nothingto do with lack of reference or truth-value. Let this system be I SFFL (for 'strictFregeanfree logic'). But r-. so 5. The completeness predicates of s4 is unaffectedby these restrictions. so by IA and VAL. re-writing quantifierrules as: r3vF*l1 F= nn*l wheren does not occur in 0 above r = nn*l and il as: [ 3vF*1 rF.Val(S') = F.By E3. e.324 SCOTT LEHMANN 1 Val(S2)= N. If FS* e . Suppose Val(S') = T. Then by e VAL. noting similarities differences free logics.the rangeof v is not empty and ValA(F)= T for some A. Val(Fv(t))= ValA(Fv(t)) T. So contraryto supposition. By ipl. and Val(S) # F.(t)) # T.g. may restrictattentionto formallanguagesin whichthe variables are all of one kind and interpretations may be regardedas specifying and qV assigningk-placefunction-names and a (possiblyempty)universe partialk-aryfunctionson T.. therefore. (We may also argument the drop the rangepredicateK from L*. rS*l1 . if differentvariablesare permitteddifferentranges.(t)l E by h5. IA.However. S' is r3vF1. . then Val(S)= T by h3. Val(F.F.To focus on the problemof reference-failure. = valA(t)= val(t). DISCUSSION In this sectionI considerfeaturesof the formalsystemoutlinedin and betweenit and some other ss2-3. vi.(t)l = {[t]: some s E It] is a *-term of P}). Val(S') # T. and VAL. t is a *-term. I have allowedvariablesof differentsorts becausein some of cases theiruse simplifiesthe representation logical forms. So by VAL.= [t].Xv.(n)*l wheret is a *-term of / above [rF.By h7.

here a predicategets two as underinterpretation. A more standardsemanticsfor k-placepredicates with k > 0 P would specifythat the valueof 9 was F at any k-tuplefromV for whichit was not T.exceptthat provisionmust be made for these cases. A k-placepredicate need not be false of the k-tuplesof V of which it is not true. if the thirdvalue is interpreted N. thereis no pair. such as '2 is mortified' and "slowly'hibernates'.althoughthe individuals of q thereare supposedto be names and not actualor possible objects.nominalinterpretations beingjust convenientrepresentations of whichatomicformulaeare true.The of s4 will go throughwithoutmajorchange.their semanticinputsare orderedpairs.and whereone termfails to refer or one formulafails to get a truth-value.van Fraassen. whilegrammatical.questionwhethera Fregean view of semanticstructure need be so strict. henceno and henceno output. Semantics The semantics SFFL is Smiley's[16]. since '=' and 'v' designatebinaryoperations.here that provisionis NINO.except thatVamay be empty of and the existentialquantifier treatedsomewhatdifferently is (see below). fPtl is true(false)if the referent and "extensions" of t is in both (neither)of them and has the thirdvalue otherwise. In particular. Some logicians.4 Predicatesemanticsof this sort can be found in Ebbinghaus The 3-valuedsystemof Schock[14]is similar.val is as in classicalfirst-order semantics. completeness argument except that the proof of F8 in this case is more like that of F9. variablesmay rangeover 0 and functionnamesand predicates may designateoperationsthat are not everywheredefined. The tree methodgiven in s3 can be adaptedto this changeby replacing'identityor negatedidentity'in the statement of the last reductive rule and in h7 with 'elementary sentence'. and whichneither.at least by implication.and we may think of the k-tuplesof whichit is true togetherwith those of whichit is false as constitutingits domain of Sucha semanticscan accommodate view that sentences the application.who . input. are not false but meaningless. [5]. This treatment predicates of may also be discernedin the nominal of interpretations Meyerand Lambert[13].STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 325 a. Underinterpretation. whichfalse.

" ([18]at 489).F. not truth-valueless. of wherepossibleworldsin turn are identifiedwith interpretations L. when t refersbut s does not. is This argument weakly.not 'r = stl is false'.St = st Ka* = ta* -= sa = sa = sa* (closed) =aa* (open and finished) what Kleene([11]at 334) termsits weak SFFL gives disjunction sense. But all that follows from 't refers'.5 but not strongly. whatfollowsfromthe truthof r3x = txl and r-'3x = sxl is Alternatively. not the truthof [F-= stl.326 SCOTT LEHMANN claimsthat his supervaluational systemcan accommodateNINO for contingentsentences([17]at 223).Woodruff[19]claimsthat the strongsense (one truedisjunct is rendersa disjunction by true)is required Frege'sthesis that reference He arguesthat the weak reading. .and the principle 'if r = stl is true and t refers.The desiredconclusionwill follow if r = st1 must be true or false. also maintainsthat r = sti must be false.then b also exists.. but van Fraassendoes not arguefor this thesis.N}. entailssomethingridiculous. but its non-falsity. then 'it is not the case that a = b' is also true"([17]at 220) and "that SantaClaus does not exist is sufficientreasonto concludethat the Presidentof the United Statesis not SantaClaus. it follows that if 'a exists and b does not exist' is true.togetherwith a functionof sense. that there is at most one proposition. as may be seen from the treesbelow: 3x = tx* n3X = Sx* ~ St* 3x = tx* 3x = sx* = st* Ka* = ta* = sa -= . the sense-reference thesis. He writes that "sinceit is necessarythat if b is identicalwith an existent.viz.then s refers'is 'F= st1 is not true'.'s does not refer'..valid.Woodrufftakes the thesis to entailthat (i) the proposition[p]expressed a sentence of L may be identified by p with (the graphof) a functionfrom possibleworldsto {T.

then existentials could get no truth-value. then entails [r]only if [p]entails [r]and [q]entails [r].(ii) makeslogicalrelationsdetermine logical semantics.if we take the meet of the of thatp and the propositionthat q to be the propositionthat proposition p and q.{T. but it is presumably where[p]entails [q]iff q is true whenever is true.the inputto an existential and is alwaysa truth-valued function(thoughperhapsone whose quantifier domain is empty).4 weredefinedon 1-aryfunctions9: &/-.g.and this [rvpql] meansthat we cannotread 'v' weakly.for an interpretation under whichp or q is true (and r is not) need not be an interpretation under which I Vpql is true. p Woodruffassumesthat (iii) for some sentenceu of L.E.r3v= vt1may be readas ft existsl.e. However. F3vRvv'l would lack truth-value l wereempty and [3vPfvywould lack if . Woodruffdoes not identifythe lattice-relation<. would resistexplicating 'proposition'in a way that entails.Given(i)-(iii). the weak readingof disjunction (and conjunction) impliesthat [p]= [u]for any p. is falseifV is emptyor t does not refer. and theirjoin to be the propositionthatp or q" ([19]at 128).) a E 1. 15.since r-'3v-nPfvl be true as can without fPfvl being truefor each value of v.but thissentence whichof courseguarantees appearsto havea subject-predicate structure.ratherthan the otherway around.g. that logicallyequivalentsentencesexpressthe same proposition.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 327 Healsoassumes (ii)theset[L]of propositions that in expressibleL "has at least the structure a lattice. its truthundersomeinterpretation.assumptions (ii).as does (i). Woodruffsuggeststhat "we may think of u as a sentencesuchas 'theroundsquareis red'" ([11]at 124)..7takingVi to represent what thereis (according I).Finally. If. [u]is the constant N-function..Fregecertainly (i). 16]. F} so that 9(g) = T if = F for each W(. However. is required (i)'s identification possibleworlds by with interpretations.existentials in alwaysget a truth-value SFFL. as in [2.. and (iii) are dubious.The problem with (iii) is that it is hardto dreamup a sentencethat is logically as of truth-valueless.g.one may preferto treatthe universalquantifier a basic operator. E. Understoodas 1-B3v--1-formulae. if [L]must be a lattice underentailment.6 SinceF3v= vt1 is trueiff r3vRvt] t refers. to universals as alwayshave truth-values well.unlessof course [FVpql] = [p]= [q]. Sinceunderinterpretation assignment. entailment.) = T for some a E and (g9)= F if W(a.

328 SCOTT LEHMANN truth-value V?werenon-emptybut/ mappednothing into the if oft domainof Y.Ebbinghaus Bencivenga[2]. Logic As noted in s3. SFFL rpl.sometimestruth-valueless N N [16] N N [19] N/T/F' - [14] F N [5] N N [2] N [15] N N N N N F F N N N N N T N N - F F T N F N N N T F N N F T N F N N N N N F9 N F N N N F - N b.F always truth-valueless r3vFl:rangeof v not empty.Woodruff[19]. [14].and Skyrms[15]. valuespriorto supervaluational last two columnsrepresent '-' means:not possiblein this system. s does not refer rv FF21: F1 true.F nevertrue sometimes false.: t does not refer Ptl: t refersbutto somthingnot in domainof Y r = ttl: t does not refer r = tsl: t refers. F2 truth-valueless Sv F F21. F2 truth-valueless r3vFl:rangeof v empty rangeof v F3vFl: not empty.Fi false.to the extentpossible. Thisunderstanding does not permitreadingr3v= vtl as Ftexistsl. .Schock [5].entriesin the corrections. and differences semanticsimilarities The table below summarizes betweenSFFL and the systemsof Smiley[15]. both weak and strongsensesof logical notions may be and definedin termsof satisfiability* therefore.

capture feature.it is not sentencesbut theirassertionsthat have logicalpropertiesor standin logical relations. of Analogs '*'maybe foundin Smiley andWoodruff [19].'t-satisfiable' replaces 't' maybe applied sentential to of sentences However.tF1 [I Accordingto Woodruff. thetreemethod ([16]at 135)thatwasapparently canbe regarded "axiomatizing" a fragment his semantic as of s3 if etc. firstis givenby:X U { f-S*1} is not satisfiable*. SFFLcanbe regarded a 3-valued as logic.as he .2).Logicalnotions are then definedin termsof correctness.The on axiomatization Woodruffpresentsof his systemis defective. Fraassen remarks by "itwouldindeed interesting investigate properties those be to the of transformations preserve as [which non-falsehood]. wellas theproperties of thosetransformations maytakea statement is neither which that truenorfalseintoa falsehood at leastdo not takea truth a but into falsehood.while the hedgedassertionof S (indicatedby underlining is correcton interpretation S) I iff S is not I-false.N is taken be If to by: a truth-value.satisfiability* andsatisfiability* canprobably adapted othermulti-valued trees be to logics." at 483.g. [16] introduces sentenial a with 't' Smiley operator (read'it is truethat') = T if val(F)= T andval(rtF1) F otherwise.. is applied to wholesentences. Smiley's parts wouldbe rendered Smiley's as whereas (e. FS* system rtS1 '*-satisfiable'. replaces 1. we mightdefinea set of assertionsto be satisfiable e.n.Thesecondtypeof transformation is ([18] weakvalidity. To we this only '*' adda coupleof simplification for 't': rules might FttF1 !FtI tF1 [F-ttF1 r-.He distinguishes the assertionof S (indicated two typesof assertions: unconditional simply I by S) is correcton interpretation iff S is I-true.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 329 decided themodified van of that method trees. the Yet another of validity transformations carry that non-falsehoods type intotruths is given X U{ I-n } is notsatisfiable*.g.SFFL's13vF1 r3vtF1). if thereis some interpretation which they are all correct. = left Smiley val(rtFl) the axiomatic of technical development histheoryto a "more paper" of but never written..

Relativelyfew are logicallytruein the strongsense. among the exceptionsare r3v= vtl and r V 3vF3v-'F1. proof is simpler. that I V -Fv(t)3vF1.valid arguments. Supervaluations Many classicallogicaltruthsare weaklylogically true in SFFL. Skyrms'remark.though in virtueof the semantic treatmentof '3' thereare more than one might expect. that r = ttl..and therefore{r=fvvl } is satisfiable. is not logicallytrue)but morenumerousthan those delivered by the strongreading(e. If Xis a set of assertions.g. we obtain a tree-system first-order that identityand function-names has standardclosurerulesbut an substitutionof identicalsin one directiononly. the way of logicaltruths. then (relativeto the same sentencesemantics) is satisfiableiff X* is *-satisfiable. though weaklylogicallytrueby E3. S=fvvl F=wl is open and finished.the method of s3 can probablybe let adaptedto it.n.but analogsof F6 and in much the sameway. X SFFL's tree-system as for may be regarded a tree-system satisfiability relativeto classicalsemanticsthat has been modifiedto characterize relativeto NINO semantics. They will think that the logical laws are less numerousthan those deliveredby the weak reading(e.is that satisfiability more often be establishedby a finite open finishedbranch.g.25). The advantage and F7 must be established in of its restrictive identityrule over those permittingsubstitutions can eitherdirection. though not stronglylogically . identityrule permitting The argumentof s4 can be adaptedto establishthat it is complete the relativeto classicalsemantics. Many free logicianswill not be happywith what SFFL deliversin etc. quoted at the beginningof this paper.as in [9]. X* be the set that resultsfrom it by replacingS with S*l1and [S1with S..is not quite accurate: rV 3v = vtB3v= vtl is among instancesof the law of the excluded middlethat are stronglylogicallytrue. c.E.If thesemodificationsare satisfiability* for languageswith strippedaway..however.330 SCOTT LEHMANN notes ([19]at 142.g.

is logicallytrue).(t)3vF1 is logicallytrue.so they will believethat neitherreading of capturesthem..g.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 331 true. van Fraassen's[17].the I' are obtainedfrom I by a convention to assigningtruth-values atomicformulaewith referenceless terms.. or it wasn't'mustbe true.g. non-actualindividuals.supervaluational In systemsdo not a truth-functional accountof the connectives.we considerways I' in whichclassicalconditionsmay be restoredin I so as to give S a truth-value VAL. e. shouldthereforeinterestthose who believethat sentenceslike 'Odysseus Odysseus'and 'Odysseus' is heightwas more than 6 feet.e. this problemreducesto justifyingsome alternative NINO.In some supervaluational systems.to hold that when normalevaluationprocedures do not fix a truth-value are to proceedas above?Imagine(whatis in we fact the case )10that followingthis procedure tellsus that Fv -F. In first-order to supervaluationalsystems..Is theresome reason.g.as in SFFL. justificationof this to the alternative cannotbe that it yieldsthe desiredlogical laws. FV FIF21can be trueunderI whileneitherF1 nor F2 is.It is less clear that it providesa rationalbasis for such beliefs. Instead. in others. To avoid circularity. general.what is compellingabout the method? so If the latter. the possiblesemanticvaluesof I non-logicalsymbolsare given by interpretations in whichclassical existenceassumptionsare relaxed. semanticsmakesformalsentencessuch as [ = ttl Supervaluational and FV F-iF1logicallytruein the strongsenseof beingtrueunderevery It interpretation. Shouldwe acceptthis resultor "correct" procedure the as to avoid it? If the former.The challengehere is groundingthese attributions truth:just why. give e.but the value of a sentenceS under I is fixed by a two-stepprocess..S is then said to be by I-true(-false)if it is true (false)undereach such I' and to be neither true nor false underI otherwise.If I does not determine truth-value a for S by VAL.we do not yet concludethat S is neitherI-truenor I-false. is r = ttl logicallytrue?Given the notion logical of logicalform outlinedin s1.g. I shallconcludeby considering whethersupervaluational semantics embodiesa principled alternative NINO. e. I shall . Bencivenga's by expandingI's universeto include [2].independent of desiredresults.what is compellingabout the "correction"? I do not thinkthat what the supervaluationists themselvessay on its behalf gives anyone much reason to embrace this semantics.

e. is One difficultywith this argument that the answerto the rhetorical is 'Not quite'. may be arguedthat certain sentenceswith non-referring terms. by view.singulartermsrefer.not the other way around. But isn'tthisjust whatsupervaluational containing and I an the methodof supervaluations.(2) "if a sentenceA is logicallytrue. and (4).. This argumentis inadequate. to justify rejecting NINO: in some no-inputcases. there are indeed semanticoutputs.The other two are supposedto point towardthe which these cases are and methodfor determining supervaluational in what outputsare forthcoming them.unless. storiesor myths). have no referent.g.so (3) 'Pegasus is Pegasus'is logicallytrue. It ii. but the argument to help rationalizethis approach. of course.supervaluational from substitutionis supposed us (1). providedlogical truthis understoodweakly. Theargument from convention. give the argumentfor 'Pegasus to is Pegasus'.Then the value (if any) of a sentencefor those non-referring by represented I would possiblevaluesof its non-logicalconstituents simplybe its I-value(if any). then any sentence obtainedfrom A througha consistentsubstitutionof singularterms for singulartermsmustalso be logicallytrue"[18at 489]. interpretation specifiesreferents a classical"restoration" of I simplysuppliesa conventionfor the use I' of those termsthat. Classicalsemanticsunderwrites but not (2) .NINO semanticswill groundboth (1) and (2). semanticscan give but then (4) is false.If we wantedto formalizethe idea that sentences question termsmay be true or false by convention.332 SCOTT LEHMANN The first is supposed developand criticizethreeof theirarguments. nonethelesstrue (or false) by convention(given.(4) any logicallytrue sentenceis true.so (5) 'Pegasusis Pegasus'is true. I i. Theargument from substitution. maybe generalized othersentences.becauseit fails to groundthe substitution (1) principle(2).If logical semanticswere to incorporatethis say. accordingto I.we'd do it with non-referring a represent conventionfor the use of by makingan interpretation terms. Of course. A moreseriousdifficultyis the assumption in that possibleconventionsmust be complete the sense of fixingthe . 'Odysseusdevisedthe Trojanare horse stratagem'. 'Cicerois Cicero' it (1) is logicallytrue. a possiblevalue for a namewould be a referentor a convention to about its use given by assigningtruth-values atomic sentences does?In semantics it. (2).

containinga non-referring But actualconventionsare incomplete.And of of ([3] coursethis sortof ruleis just whatwe findin supervaluational semantics. let the truth-value the sentence be left undetermined" at 225). wheretermsrefer.the truth-value a first-order can be identifiedwith the resultof an ideal "practical experiment": determine whetherthe referents S's termshavethe properties of required S's logicalform) for the truthof S. proposedrule is certainly"reasonable" the sense of decidingno-inputcases in a in way consistentwithstandardsemantics. iii.let that truth-valuebe definitelyassignedto the sentence. If the possibleconventionsare to includethe actualones. But this is not much of a recommendation: standardsemantics saysnothingaboutno-inputcases.whereaswhen this is not the case."1 if conventionsfor the use of nonAnd cannot referringtermsmay be incomplete. But for some sentences. Bencivengaobserves of sentenceS that.such as 'Pegasusdoes or does not have a white hind leg'."it is at least reasonableto proposethe followingrule:when all the mental to experiments agreein assigninga certaintruth-value a certainsentence containinga non-denotingsingularterm. .So. Theargument from mentalexperiments. and it might be that it does not. Therefore.then (a) supervaluations formalizea truth-by-convention to sentenceswith nonapproach termsand (b) sentences whoselogicalformsare givenby I = ttl referring or rV F-IFl will sometimeslack truth-value thus cannotbe logically and true in the strongsense. Now "it is at least reasonableto propose"does not suggestthat a The compellingcase has been made for supervaluations. all such "mental experiments" yield the same result.such (by are experiments impossiblein principle. Bencivenga concludes. considervan Fraassen's remark that "althoughI can think of many artificialways to bestowa certain truth-value 'Pegasushas a white hind leg.' I cannot find a single on reasonto call it trueor to call it false"([18]at 481). leg. Wheretermsdo not refer.but we may still conduct "mentalexperiments" askingwhat might be the case were termsto by Were'Pegasus'to refer.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC 333 truthvalueof eachatomicconstruction term.it doesn't seem to yield truth-values that are clearlywrong. plausible the argument does not honor principle(3) of s1.it mightbe that Pegasushas a whitehind refer. we cannotrequirethat possible conventionsbe complete.And as long as we stay away from sentenceslike 'Pegasusexists'.

produce desired results. that it correctly of [12]who look to it to save logic from unwelcomeinterpretations should.this does not seem good advice.ncivenga totally by considering it is. certainfamiliarlogical laws in just the way that principles(1) and (2) of s1 require. The truth-value any) of a sentencewhose termsdon't (if referis to be decidedby imagining.It is silly to think that realmarketsmust allocateresourcesoptimally becauseideal markets. Supervaluational termscan. then to technicaldevice.The naturalassumptionis that takingreference failureseriouslyinvolvesacceptingNINO. In general. microphysics . and we have no reasonto think those like Lambert identifieslogicaltruths. however. what I Given the weaknessof these arguments.we certainlydo not becauseit wouldhave been so.B'. we are to decidethefact of the matterby makingassumptions contrarytofact. Bencivenga's non-referring suggestionis really ratherodd. At the time of his death.334 SCOTTLEHMANN and very little is cl:ar about the truth-values sentenceswith of terms. that they do refer. look elsewhere. That is. I think.or can be made to12 . this assumptionby showinghow non-referring this approachseemsto ground furthermore. The issue. doubt that supercan valuationalconstructions reallyenableus to validatecertain familiarlaws of logic while at the same time takingnon-referring termsseriously. If thereis somethingpeculiarabout to truththat makesit appropriate judge what'strue in some situation should tell us differentsituations. but this principlemakes termsyield the truth-value gaps that keep sentences non-referring such as [ = ttl and I v F-F1 from beinglogicallytrue in the standard semanticsseemsto confound (strong)sense.Accordingly.definedby completelyunrealisticassumptions. do so. the ambitiousguest of Hawthorne's tale [8] has achievednothing.is whetherit is more than a technicaldevice don't give anyone for doing so.and imaginingwhat might have been servesonly heightenthe irony of the situation. But alternative NINO.Furthermore. yield truth-values. and the arguments considered just semanticsis merelya if supervaluational reasonto think that it is.Now it is clearthat supervaluational semantics does . after all.contraryto fact. but judge that his life was satisfactory for the avalanchethat endedit.if it embodiesno principled it cannot groundthe laws of logic.

([1] 12In[2]. .. in "sentences fictional as about characters" gaps" at at Such viewcouldbeaccommodatedadding a clauses ([19] 139).e.. Zemach [20]. wherer(t) is the readingof t. refer at are andt doesnotrefer. then 6 Thefollowing inconsistent: if V is empty (1) = F a ValA(F) ValA(F." at 134).Butit maybeargued a Russellian analysis such to thesame of terms insists.Bencivenga what fix" develops looklikea "technical to keepthesupervaluational method making V-iPtivPvllogically from r true. ([16] van that scheme in questions Fraassen's by 5 Skryms analysis suggesting theargument doesnotexist. 7 Strictly. as Bencivenga logical properties andrelations "should independent be exists what notexist" at400). that mountain because is it is.myemphasis). analysis referring as well..1 doesn't so warrant and values when r giving = nt1 fpnldifferent n doesn't ([15] 478).(1)and(3)hold that under (2) in SFFL. whereas entails it hasnotruth-value A. has is ultimately beestablished theground some to on of convention" at 401.. that of need give riseto truth-value ([19] 138).fr(t) exists1. of simply ([6] like have in hibernate'.. sentences 'adverbs current English. (1)and(3)entail r3vRvt/1 if A-false 4 isempty. 4oa ([15] Mj 10Notethatthelogical truths delivered thesupervaluational (falsehoods) by procedure described above justthosesentences areweakly are that true logically (false)..oreven fact that of has hind the like thissentence a truth-value. explains "wecannot howhighthegolden 3 Findlay say indeterminate in respect height" at 57). I& SFFLdoesnotcompletely (2) embody Frege's functional of language. a formula withk freevariables (2) designatesk-ary truth-valued function 11whose on values given F's truth-values various are under by is if For that is A. view valuation do notfixthevalues subject-predicate rules of sentences s Woodrufifs withnon-referring Hesuggests "failure reference notalways terms.(t)).what ([1] whatbasis there forassigning can be and is is different 'Odysseus Odysseus' 'Plato Plato' forms? logical see 2 Fora contrary view.If.. clauses be require fPn be true. assignments(3)[3vRvnl false n doesnotrefer. by covering specific such could that subject-predicate sentences.STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 335 I thankthe anonymousreadersof earlierversionsof this paperfor and pointingout variousmisrepresentations directingmy attentionto some of the articlesdiscussedin s5. NOTES be for The suggestion is thatRussell's here cumbersome analysis adopted non-referring terms terms of should that us commit only..g. " Bencivenga's version theargument convention withtheobservation of from starts that"the truth-value a sentence 'Pegasus a white leg'. n isnot. rPn21 and be under interpretation an no false. since failswhen is empty. and does of. rPn31 neither to assigning referent anyof the names. 9 Provided holds every in a-variant My of when hasno a-variant at 480).simply notbeengiven meaning any 4 "..

Philosophical [19] PeterW. 1969). Frege(Oxford: Writings Gottlob of "Theambitious Tales. Translations the Philosophical Blackwell.8-26. [11] StephenCole Kleene.. "Logical [12] KarelLambert."Onsenseand reference".CA: Dickenson.1966).Vol.Logiku.1900). Beardsley.Math. and "Truth. [1] Ermanno of to Reidel.336 SCOTT LEHMANN REFERENCES "Freelogics". TheLogicalwayof ed. [10] eds. Phil. concepts".477-82. van Fraassen. of Department Philosophy.S. HoughtonMifflin. Pridikatenund Funktionen".in Lambert.Log. singular [3] Ermanno 9 Philosophia (1980). mit Ebbinghaus.219-34. ItalianStudiesin thePhilosophy Science47 (Dordrecht: of of Science. [5] Heinz-Dieter "Ubereine Pridikatenlogik partielldefinierten Arch.121-42. 20 Analysis (1960). ed.truth-value gaps.1986).CT 06269-2054. of Bas C. "Supervaluations: [15] BrianSkyrms. eds. J.Vol. Grundlagen Math. Zemach. in truthandmicrophysics". HI:Alternatives Classical 373-425. Bencivenga. 33 (1968). Logic(Dordrecht: Philosophical Logic. V on in Meditation of Meditations FirstPhilosophy.ed."Vagueobjects". Philosophy Reidel. Formal Hill. terms."Logicand truth-value in Problems Logic:SomeRecentDevelopments Reidel. 1991). Logic:Its ScopeandLimits(New York:McGraw [9] Richard in DavidKaplan. Symb.. correspondence. Jeffrey.. Philosophers Descartes Nietzsche from 1960).219-29.125-85. BostonStudiesin the in [2] E. "Freesemantics". N. II (Boston: guest".93-117. 481-95. U. Doing Things free "Universally logic and standard [13] RobertK. . gaps".J.39-53. GeachandBlack. f.. [4] Rene Descartes."Sensewithoutdenotation". Lambert.J.25-79. Woodruff. to TheEuropean (New York:ModernLibrary. (New Haven:Yale. individual identity. Findlay.1970). terms". ed.63 "Singular [18] Bas C.Introduction Metamathematics 1952). in from [7] GottlobFrege. Van to (Princeton: Nostrand. (Dordrecht: [20] EddyM.121-35.. non-denoting Bencivenga.Logique Analyse25-26 (1964). Storrs. theory"."On finitelymany-valued 43-58.trs. 12 (1966). math. Handbook Bencivenga.210-17.Zeitschr.in Twice-Told [8] NathanielHawthorne. DavidsonandHarman.and freelogic"...A. of University Connecticut."Thecompleteness freelogic". van Fraassen.in Gabbayand Guenthner. quantification et logics".1980). [16] TimothySmiley.Nous25 (1991). Dalla Chiara.Logik12 (1969). and existence."Whatis Russell's theoryof descriptions?". 1963). Meyerand KarelLambert.323-40.56-78. 65 (1968).1975). OxfordUniversity and (Oxford: Theory Objects Values of [6] J.Meinong's Press. TheLogicof Grammar (Encino.31-48. (1966). [14] Rolf Schock. Phil. [17] d.

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