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Study on the Risk-Based Methodology for Ship Structural

Design

Choung-Ho Choung
1
, Jun-Kyu Kim
1
, Jae-Hong Park
1
and Tae-Bum Ha
1





ABSTRACT

These days, risk-based approach is considered as an effective methodology for promoting the safety of ship,
and the relevant researches and works are actively going on. The SLA (Safety Level Approach) based GBS
(Goal-Based new ship construction Standards) in IMO is able to be mentioned as a representative instance.
In this research, a specific risk-based method using the SRA (Structural Reliability Analysis) for ship
structural safety assessment was investigated, with the aim of calculating the quantitative level of structural
safety. Especially concentrating on the structural safety of longitudinal stiffeners attached on the outer
shell of ship, a limit state equation for the yield strength from bending behavior of the structural member
due to both lateral pressure and hull girder longitudinal stress acting on was developed, and related
uncertainties were also formulated and assumed. Then, considering an example design case, the design
safety level of a bottom longitudinal stiffener that is based on the concept of probability of failure was
calculated and evaluated. Finally the feasibility of applying the risk-based method to the structural design
and safety assessment of ship was reviewed.


KEY WORDS

Risk-based approach; SLA-based GBS; Structural reliability analysis; Probability of failure; Reliability index; Target safety
level; Design safety level


INTRODUCTION

For the sake of further enhanced safety of ship, there have been lots of activities of introducing risk-based approach into ship
design and approval process in the maritime industry. The most prominent issue at present is the SLA (Safety Level
Approach) based GBS (Goal-Based new ship construction Standards), which initiated in 2002 and still has been being
discussed in IMO (International Maritime Organization).

The application of risk-based approach to ship design and construction is expected to broadly affect the conventional design
and approval process of ship. However, there are not many proactive movements of applying risk-based approach to the
structural design and safety assessment of ship, because a specific risk-based method or procedure has not been fully
established yet and furthermore, relevant instances are not sufficient. This study, therefore, was carried out in order to
develop a feasible method and relevant procedure, on the basis of risk-based approach, applicable to the ship structural design
and safety assessment.

When developing a risk-based procedure for the structural safety assessment of ship, the essential point is the computation of
quantitative safety level considering both failure modes (or functional requirements) of concerned structure and various
uncertainties associated with strength and loads. In this regard, the SRA (Structural Reliability Analysis) was chosen as the
most appropriate technique for the study. The SRA is able to deal with uncertainties related to various aspects of structural
strength and acting load on the structure in a probabilistic manner, and produce the probability of failure or the reliability
index as a quantitative safety level of structure.


1
Korean Register of Shipping (KR), Republic of Korea



In this study, firstly hull scantling assessment procedure based on risk-based approach was deliberated. And then, among the
several failure modes of ship structure, a limit state equation for the yield strength related to the bending behavior of local
supporting member due to lateral pressure and hull girder longitudinal stress was newly developed through recomposing the
existing formulas proposed in IACS (International Association of Classification Societies) CSR (Common Structural Rule)
for double hull oil tankers. In order to verify the procedure and the limit state equation developed, one example case was
selected in consideration of typical structural design data from a vessel that was constructed and delivered already. Regarding
the example case, design safety level using the concept of failure probability was calculated with the help of the SRA. And
consequently, comparing with a specific target safety level proposed by an IMO document (MSC 79/6/15) for ship structure,
structural safety of the case was evaluated.


RISK-BASED PROCEDURE FOR HULL SCANTLING ASSESSMENT

The outline of risk-based procedure for hull scantling assessment is illustrated in Figure 1. Actually smooth cooperation
between approver(s) and designer(s) is very important for performing successive work in this procedure. In other words, a
person or team in charge of approval should propose formulas, criteria and guidelines for structural design to designer(s), and
frequently monitor and verify the works done by designer(s). And a person or team in charge of structural design should
make design in consideration of proposals and feedbacks from approver(s), and properly document his works.


Figure 1: Risk-based procedure for hull scantling assessment

The procedure is described in detail as followings;

- Step 1 Design scope: Specific structural member to be designed and/or evaluated and related information should be
decided by designer(s). The information should cover both failure mode concerned and the members initial
scantling basically including location, configuration, arrangement, material properties and corrosion margin of the
member.

- Step 2 Target safety level: It is the quantitative safety goal of structural member and means the smallest allowable
value for securing structural safety of the member. In order to deal with the safety level in a quantitative and
practical way, it is reasonable to adopt the concept of failure probability since it is simple and easy to understand.
Considering structural member type, failure mode and consequence of structural failure, target safety level should be
defined obviously by approver(s) and proposed to designer(s).


- Step 3-1 Limit state equation: Design criteria (Z) for determining whether structure is safe or failed should be
formulated with both load factor (L) that is acting on the structure and resistance (or strength) factor (R) that is
resisting against the load. The most basic formula of the design criteria (Z) is like the equation [1] below.


L R Z = [ 1]

Where, R > L means the structure is safe and R < L does it is failed. Therefore, Z = 0 becomes the boundary
between the safe and the failed. For this reason, the design criteria (Z) is generally called as limit state equation (or
limit state function, failure equation etc.). Specific formulation of limit state equation depends on the type of
failure mode of concerned structure. The probability of failure is equivalent to the likelihood that R < L or Z < 0
occurs.

- Step 3-2 Design variables: For reasonable estimation of failure probability of structure, various design variables,
which are associated with either load factor or resistance factor, should be considered in a probabilistic way. That is,
design variables used in the limit state equation defined should be modeled as probabilistic variables having specific
distribution type and parameters. This probabilistic modeling would make it possible to handle uncertainties or
randomness of design variables appropriately.

- Step 4 Structural reliability analysis (SRA): When it comes to calculating the failure probability of structure, the
SRA is regarded as one of the most effective analytical tools. By using the limit state equation and design variables
defined above, the SRA can produce probability of failure or reliability index (both are identical actually). At
present, various methods for the SRA have been established well, such as Monte-Carlo simulation, FOSM (First-
Order Second-Moment method), SOSM (Second-Order Second-Moment method) and so forth.

- Step 5 Design safety level: It is the quantitative state of structural safety of the concerned member and means the
actual safety level ensured by the current design of the member. After carrying out the SRA, design safety level on
the basis of probability of failure is able to be estimated specifically.

- Step 6 Safety evaluation: With the documentation submitted by designer(s), all the works done should be verified to
be reasonable and in line with the guidelines proposed by approver(s) in the risk-based procedure. And then, if there
is no problem in the works, the design safety level calculated should be compared to the target safety level. When
the design safety level is not less than the target safety level, the current structural design can be assessed as safe
enough, and then it is possible to approve it. Otherwise, the current design should be amended in order to increase its
structural safety level higher.


LIMIT STATE EQUATION

Regarding failure of hull structure, there are several failure modes, for example yielding, buckling, impact, fatigue and so
forth. In this study, the yield strength due to bending was selected as the target failure mode. And among the various
structural members of ship, local supporting member such as longitudinal stiffener attached on outer shell plating, on which
lateral pressure and hull girder longitudinal stress are acting together, was considered.

A limit state equation for the failure mode and the structural member was newly developed through recomposing the relevant
scantling formulas proposed in Table 8.2.5 of CSR (Common Structural Rules) for double hull oil tankers, which was issued
by IACS (International Association of Classification Societies) and has been being applied to the structural design and
construction of ship since 2006. The limit state equation developed is like the equation [2] and [3]. The basic concept of the
limit state equation is that the capability of structure against load should be not less than the actual working load. In the limit
state equation, both the capability and the working load are represented by nominal stress term, and then beam theory is
mainly utilized to derive the working stress formula.


Working LMT
L R Z o o = = [ 2]


( ) ( )
vert HG
vert
Dyn WK Scale Stat WK
stiff bend
Dyn WK Stat WK Working
I
d
M C M
z f
s
P P


+ + + =
001 . 0
2

o
[3]

Design variables in the limit state equation above are briefly described in Table 1.


Table 1: Description of design variables

Design
Variables
Unit Description
LMT
o N/mm
2

Resistance factor, i.e. capacity of structure to resist the loads acting. In this study, it means the
nominal yield stress of structural material.
Working
o
N/mm
2

Load factor. In this study, it means actual working axial stress in the local supporting member
concerned.
Stat WK
P


kN/m
2
Static local pressure laterally working on the local supporting member concerned.
Dyn WK
P


kN/m
2
Dynamic local pressure laterally working on the local supporting member concerned.
Stat WK
M


kN-m Still water bending moment working at the longitudinal position considered.
Dyn WK
M


kN-m Vertical wave bending moment working at the longitudinal position considered.
, s
mm, m Spacing and effective bending span of the local supporting member concerned.
bend
f
- Bending moment factor, depending on the boundary condition of the beam concerned.
stiff
z
cm
3

Net section modulus of the local supporting member concerned (100% of corrosion addition
deducted).
Scale
C
-
Correction factor to modify the vertical wave bending moment directly calculated, not based on
IACS UR S11, to be in line with IACS UR S11, only when the moment at the probability level of
10
-8
is larger than IACS UR S11.
vert
d
m
Vertical distance from to the neutral axis of hull girder section considered to the local supporting
member concerned.
vert HG
I


m
4

Net vertical hull girder moment of inertia of the hull girder section considered (50% of corrosion
addition deducted).


OUTLINE OF EXAMPLE CASE

In order to verify the proposed procedure and the developed limit state equation above, a specific structural element and its
configuration was selected from the structural design data of a vessel that was constructed a few years ago, as an example
case (refer to Figure 2). Describing in more detail, the subject vessel is one of conventional oil tankers (AFRAMAX class)
and the structural element considered is a longitudinal stiffener attached on the bottom plating and located amidship. This
structural element is considered as the most basic local supporting member of hull structure. Detailed information of the
example case is summarized in Figure 2.


Figure 2: Information of Ship and structural element considered in the example case

For analyzing structural safety of the stiffener, several design conditions were assumed like the followings and they are
basically in line with the design basis defined in IACS CSR for double hull oil tankers.

- Design life: As a nominal design life of the sample ship, it is assumed that the ship is exposed to both operating
condition and non-operating condition for 25 years in total.


- External environment: It is assumed that the ship is operating in the North Atlantic wave environment for its entire
design life, even though the ship was designed for worldwide trading operations. The effects of wind, current, ice
and very low temperature of air and sea water are considered to be negligible.

- Internal environment: The conditions, such as specific gravity, corrosion addition, coatings, manufacturing, renewal
etc., are identical to them defined in IACS CSR for double hull oil tankers.

- Loading condition: It is assumed that the ship is in operating condition for only 85% of its design life (i.e., non-
operating condition, due to inspection, maintenance, repair etc., for 15% of 25 years). As for operating condition,
seagoing condition associated with full loading or normal ballasting is mainly considered in the example case. Full
loading condition and normal ballast condition are assumed to be for 45% and 40% of the ships life respectively.

- Wave spectrum: The wave spectrum represents the total energy of irregular seaway. The two parameter Pierson-
Moskowitz spectrum is utilized in the example case.


DESIGN VARIABLES DEFINITION

Based on the information of the example case and considering results of other similar researches, all the design variables in
the limit state equation above was modeled in a probabilistic way. That is, distribution type and parameters were defined for
each design variables adequately. The details of design variable modeling for the example case are summarized in Table 2.

Actually, reviewing the relevant literatures and selecting specific instances that were regarded as the most appropriate,
distribution types and parameters of the design variables were determined in the example study without precisely verifying
them. Considering that reasonable probabilistic modeling of design variables is critical to the accuracy of safety level
calculation for structure, further study such as a detailed and thorough investigation on design variables associated with ship
structure and loads should be carried out in future.

Table 2: Probabilistic modeling of design variables

Design
Variables
Unit
Distribution
Type
Distribution Parameters Reference
LMT
o N/mm
2
Lognormal Mean=348/CoV=0.06 (for HT32) MSC 81/INF.6
Stat WK
P


kN/m
2
Constant
150.829 (when full loading condition)
69.884 (when normal ballasting condition)
IACS CSR for double hull oil tankers
Dyn WK
P


kN/m
2
Weibull Refer to Table 3 & 4 Direct load analysis
Stat WK
M


kN-m Normal Mean=1,950,228/CoV=0.2857
MSC 81/INF.6 (70% of Permissible
moment considered for the example)
Dyn WK
M


kN-m Weibull Refer to Table 5 & 6 Direct load analysis
, s
mm, m Normal Mean=830, 4.03/CoV=0.04 SSS-93
bend
f
- Constant 12 (for both ends fixed) IACS CSR for double hull oil tankers
stiff
z
cm
3
Normal Mean=1762.9/CoV=0.04 SSS-93
Scale
C
- Constant Refer to Table 5& 6
Direct load analysis &
IACS UR S11
vert
d
m Normal Mean=8.845/CoV=0.04 SSS-93
vert HG
I


m
4
Normal Mean=354.492/CoV=0.04 SSS-93

Among the results of design variable modeling above, direct load analysis was conducted in order to derive the probabilistic
features of the variables associated with dynamic loads due to wave, such as P
WK-Dyn
, and M
WK-Dyn
. Carrying out conventional
ship motion analysis by using 3-D linear potential code and long-term prediction by statistical analysis, it was found that the
pressure and the moment, both would occur once the ship encounters one wave at seagoing, could have the distribution type
and parameters like the summary in Table 3 to 6. Considering wave induced pressure and moment are not independent each
other, the two variables were modeled individually by each heading angle (every 30 degree).



Table 3: Probabilistic modeling of dynamic lateral pressure (P
WK-Dyn
) for full loading condition

Design Variables Unit
Heading Angle
(degree)
Probability of
Occurrence
Shape
Parameter
Scale
Parameter
Dyn WK
P



Weibull Distribution
h
q
x
e x F
|
|
.
|

\
|

=1 ) (

- Lower bound = 0
- h : shape parameter
- q : scale parameter

kN/m
2

0 0.0833 1.03737 1.68135
30 0.0833 1.03464 1.98516
60 0.0833 1.03056 2.38922
90 0.0833 1.02734 2.70590
120 0.0833 1.02567 2.48912
150 0.0833 1.02644 1.88106
180 0.0833 1.04162 1.43410
210 0.0833 1.02964 2.77332
240 0.0833 1.02707 3.67518
270 0.0833 1.02720 4.26562
300 0.0833 1.03519 3.63436
330 0.0833 1.03740 2.72686


Table 4: Probabilistic modeling of dynamic lateral pressure (P
WK-Dyn
) for normal ballasting condition

Design Variables Unit
Heading Angle
(degree)
Probability of
Occurrence
Shape
Parameter
Scale
Parameter
Dyn WK
P



Weibull Distribution
h
q
x
e x F
|
|
.
|

\
|

=1 ) (

- Lower bound = 0
- h : shape parameter
- q : scale parameter

kN/m
2

0 0.0833 1.04434 1.73038
30 0.0833 1.04854 1.70500
60 0.0833 1.05558 1.59753
90 0.0833 1.05422 1.47172
120 0.0833 1.05489 1.49974
150 0.0833 1.05284 1.63043
180 0.0833 1.05308 1.67741
210 0.0833 1.05512 2.52563
240 0.0833 1.05519 2.85417
270 0.0833 1.05403 3.16280
300 0.0833 1.05661 2.69334
330 0.0833 1.05540 2.33878


Table 5: Probabilistic modeling of vertical wave bending moment (M
WK-Dyn
) for full loading condition

Design Variables Unit
Heading Angle
(degree)
Probability of
Occurrence
Shape
Parameter
Scale
Parameter
C
Scale

Dyn WK
M



Weibull Distribution
h
q
x
e x F
|
|
.
|

\
|

=1 ) (

- Lower bound = 0
- h : shape parameter
- q : scale parameter

kN-m
0 0.0833 1.02534 270034.20 0.826
30 0.0833 1.03145 254465.86 0.891
60 0.0833 1.05452 231936.60 1.000
90 0.0833 1.05484 203519.79 1.000
120 0.0833 1.04259 223626.57 1.000
150 0.0833 1.02804 265590.65 0.846
180 0.0833 1.02294 282137.93 0.785
210 0.0833 1.03145 254465.86 0.891
240 0.0833 1.05452 231936.60 1.000
270 0.0833 1.05484 203519.79 1.000
300 0.0833 1.04259 223626.57 1.000
330 0.0833 1.02804 265590.65 0.846








Table 6: Probabilistic modeling of vertical wave bending moment (M
WK-Dyn
) for normal ballasting condition

Design Variables Unit
Heading Angle
(degree)
Probability of
Occurrence
Shape
Parameter
Scale
Parameter
C
Scale

Dyn WK
M



Weibull Distribution
h
q
x
e x F
|
|
.
|

\
|

=1 ) (

- Lower bound = 0
- h : shape parameter
- q : scale parameter

kN-m
0 0.0833 1.03677 229781.15 1.000
30 0.0833 1.04077 212142.28 1.000
60 0.0833 1.05602 173345.75 1.000
90 0.0833 1.05810 153381.78 1.000
120 0.0833 1.05848 195326.95 1.000
150 0.0833 1.05055 239661.76 0.993
180 0.0833 1.04797 256419.26 0.923
210 0.0833 1.04077 212142.28 1.000
240 0.0833 1.05602 173345.75 1.000
270 0.0833 1.05810 153381.78 1.000
300 0.0833 1.05848 195326.95 1.000
330 0.0833 1.05055 239661.76 0.993

The hydro-models used for direct load analysis are shown in Figure 3.


[Full loading condition] [Normal ballasting condition]
Figure 3: Hydro-models for direct load analysis


TARGET SAFETY LEVEL

For the sake of structural safety assessment and decision-making when structural design, it is required not only to calculate
the design safety level (current safety level), but also to define the target safety level for comparison. (of course, both are to
be quantitative.) In this study, taking into account there is not rigorous target safety level internationally agreed for ship
structure yet, one sample was selected and used among several instances already presented in public, like Table 7.

Table 7: Example of target safety level (refer to MSC79/6/15)

Target annual failure probabilities and corresponding reliability indices
Failure Development
Failure Consequences
Not Serious Serious Very Serious
Ductile Failure with
Reserve Strength Capacity
P
f
= 10
-3
, = 3.09 P
f
= 10
-4
, = 3.71 P
f
= 10
-5
, = 4.26
Ductile Failure with
No Reserve Capacity
P
f
= 10
-4
, = 3.71 P
f
= 10
-5
, = 4.26 P
f
= 10
-6
, = 4.75
Brittle Behavior in terms
of Fracture of Instability
P
f
= 10
-5
, = 4.26 P
f
= 10
-6
, = 4.75 P
f
= 10
-7
, = 5.20
1
( )
f
P |

= u , where u is the standard normal distribution


The immediate sinking of ship due to the structural failure of local supporting member would be unlikely to happen in most
cases, and therefore failure consequence of the example case could be considered not critical to vessel. Accordingly, both
Ductile Failure with No Reserve Capacity and Not Serious, which are defined in Table 7, were selected for the example
case. Thus, target probability of failure, P
Failure-Target
becomes 2.5x10
-3
(=10
-4
x 25 years), and then target safety level, P
Safe-Target

is set to as 0.9975 (=1- P
Failure-Target
).


DESIGN SAFETY LEVEL

Design safety level, P
Safe-Design
that the concerned structural member actually ensures could be estimated from the results of
failure probability calculated by using the SRA, provided that the limit state equation has been defined and the design
variables have been modeled. In this study, for carrying out the SRA, the First-Order Second-Moment method (FOSM),
which is one of the most useful methods, was applied with the help of a commercial reliability program (STRUREL).

At first, the probability of failure when the ship encounters an individual wave, P
f-one wave
is necessary. For this, failure
probabilities for each heading angle and each loading condition should be calculated and then combined appropriately, like
the equation [4] and [5]. In the example case, the ratio of full loading condition, r
full
is 0.45 and the ratio of normal ballasting
condition, r
ballast
is 0.40, and the ratio of each wave heading angle, r
angle
is set to as 1/12.


ballast f ballast full f full wave one f
P r P r P

+ = [4]



=
angle
angle full f angle full f
P r P
,
,

=
angle
angle ballast f angle ballast f
P r P
,
[ 5]

For stochastic modeling of random occurrences of a specific event in the course of a given time interval, it is possible to use
the Homogeneous Poisson Process. With the assumption that the structural failure of ship due to an individual wave is a
specific event and the event could happen independently at any time during the design life of 25 years, the Poisson
distribution could be applied to estimating the design safety level of the example case, like the following equation;


, 2 , 1 , 0
!
) (
) ( = =

=
n for e
n
T
n P
T
n
waves of number total T

[6]

The equation [6] means that, in the time interval of T, the event having the intensity of , which is sometimes called the
expected number of events or the frequency of events, could occur n-times with the probability of P(n).

When calculating the design safety level of the example case, T was defined as 10
8
that means the total wave number for
ships life time, based on the assumption that one wave approaches the ship every 10 second. And was considered to be
identical to P
f-one wave
. The occurrence time of event, n was set to as zero because structural safety means no event of structural
failure occurs. Therefore, design safety level, P
Safe-Design
is given by the equation [7].


8 8
8
10 10
0 8
10
! 0
) 10 (
) 0 (
wave one f wave one f
P P wave one f
T
Design Safe
e e
P
P P


=

= = =
[7]

The calculation results of probability of failure for full loading condition and normal ballasting condition are summarized in
Table 8 and 9 respectively (also, refer to the equation [4] and [5]).

Table 8: Probability of failure calculated for full loading condition

Heading
Angle
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330
P
f-full, angle

8.79
x10
-12

9.26
x10
-12

6.25
x10
-12

1.22
x10
-12

5.65
x10
-12

9.07
x10
-12

8.42
x10
-12

1.03
x10
-11

7.69
x10
-12

1.77
x10
-12

6.79
x10
-12

1.01
x10
-11

r
angle
0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833
P
f-full
7.11x10
-12





Table 9: Probability of failure calculated for normal ballasting condition

Heading
Angle
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330
P
f-ballast, angle

2.82
x10
-16

2.85
x10
-17

6.04
x10
-20

2.93
x10
-21

9.58
x10
-19

2.46
x10
-16

2.59
x10
-16

3.15
x10
-17

7.56
x10
-20

4.26
x10
-21

1.14
x10
-18

2.66
x10
-16

r
angle
0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833
P
f-ballast
9.29x10
-17


Finally, according to the equation [7], the design safety level of the example case was decided as the following;


( ) ( )
12 17 12
10 199 . 3 10 29 . 9 40 . 0 10 11 . 7 45 . 0


= + = + =
ballast f ballast full f full wave one f
P r P r P [8]


9997 . 0 ) 0 (
8 12
8
10 ) 10 199 . 3 (
10
= = =

=


e P P
T
Design Safe
[ 9]


STRUCTURAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Structural safety would be evaluated by comparing the design safety level with the target safety level. Actually design
document verification process was not considered in the example case. As mentioned above, the target safety level, P
Safe-Target

was defined as 0.9975 and then the design safety level, P
Safe-Design
was calculated to be 0.9997. From these results, we can
conclude that, regarding the local supporting member considered in the example case, i.e. bottom longitudinal stiffener No.10,
the structural safety ensured by its design is adequate throughout the ships design life, because the safety level of current
design marks 0.9997 and it satisfies the proposed allowable safety level of 0.9975. Considering that the as-built net section
modulus of the stiffener, 1762.9 cm
3
, is larger than the minimum section modulus requirement to the stiffener from IACS
CSR for double hull oil tankers, 1317.98 cm
3
, the assessment result from the risk-based approach (or safety level approach) is
consistent with the deterministic approach that is a current structural design standard such as IACS CSR for double hull oil
tankers.

For reference, design modification of reducing the stiffener dimension for production cost savings following steel weight
decrease was examined in addition. Two cases of design change were considered by reducing the thickness of stiffener flange.
The first case (Revision 1) has the flange thickness of 20mm that is smaller than the original flange thickness by 2mm, and
the second case (Revision 2) has the flange thickness of 18mm. The design safety levels calculated by the same procedure
and method above, and assessment results from the viewpoint of risk-based approach and deterministic approach are
summarized in Table 10.

Table 10: Safety assessment results of design modification cases

Example
Case
Stiffener Dimension
Net Section
Modulus
of Stiffener
Design
Safety
Level
Assessment Result, Based on
Deterministic Approach
(IACS CSR)
Risk-based Approach
Original
Design
450x11+150x22 F.B(T)
HT32
1762.9 cm
3
0.9997 SAFE SAFE
Revision
1
450x11+150x20 F.B(T)
HT32
1675.5 cm
3
0.9990 SAFE SAFE
Revision
2
450x11+150x18 F.B(T)
HT32
1507.8 cm
3
0.9877 SAFE FAIL
The allowable minimum net section modulus requirement from IACS CSR for double hull oil tankers = 1317.98 cm
3

Target safety level proposed in this study = 0.9975

From the results, the design amendment of Revision 1 is allowable because it has adequate safety level in terms of
deterministic assessment as well as risk-based assessment. In case of Revision 2, however, the amendment is able to be
accepted only when it is assessed on the basis of deterministic approach. If we adopt risk-based approach such as the

procedure and method in this study, Revision 2 is not considered to be a safe scantling. Accordingly, it should be noted that
risk-based approach and deterministic approach may result in different assessment and decision-making result for ship
structural design.


CONCLUSIONS

In this research, a risk-based procedure for hull scantling assessment using probabilistic concept was proposed and then, a
limit state equation for the yield strength related to the bending behavior of local supporting member due to lateral pressure
and hull girder longitudinal stress was developed by taking advantage of the scantling formulas in IACS CSR for double hull
oil tankers. In order to check the validity of the procedure and the limit state equation developed, one example case was taken
from structural design of typical oil tanker, and its actual design safety level was calculated with the help of the SRA.
Consequently, structural safety of the example case was evaluated by comparing the design safety level calculated with a
specific target safety level quoted from an IMO document. And for more information, design modification cases were
examined additionally.

Through the results of this study, the feasibility of risk-based procedure and method for safety assessment of ship structure
using probabilistic concept was able to be verified. Furthermore, it was found that we can numerically understand how much
one scantling is safer than another, even though both are greater than the minimum scantling requirement of deterministic
structural rule, since risk-based approach produces the structural safety level in a quantitative way.

Actually various research works on applying risk-based approach (or safety level approach) are expected to be carried out
more actively in future. In this regard, it is hoped that the findings from this study might be practical and valuable
information for the research activities associated with structural safety assessment of ship.




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by a grant from the LNG Plant R&D Center funded by the Ministry of Land, Transportation and
Maritime Affairs (MLTM) of the Korean government, and also by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) of the
Korean government through the project Development of the key technologies for Risk-Based Design for Ship Safety.




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