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Abstract Will the Arab Spring lead to long-lasting democratic change? To explore this question I examine the determinants of the Arab world’ democratic de…cit s in 2010. I …nd that the percent of a country’ landmass that was conquered s by Arab armies following the death of the prophet Muhammad statistically accounts for this de…cit. Using history as a guide, I hypothesize that this pattern re‡ ects the long-run in‡ uence of control structures developed under Islamic empires in the pre-modern era and …nd that the available evidence is consistent with this interpretation. I also investigate the determinants of the recent uprisings. When taken in unison, the results cast doubt on claims that the Arab-Israeli con‡ or Arab/Muslim culture are systematic obstacles to ict democratic change in the region and point instead to the legacy of the region’ s historical institutional framework.
Department of Economics, Harvard University. This paper was prepared for the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, March 22-23, 2012. I thank George Akerlof, Pol Antràs, Lisa Blaydes, Edward Glaeser, David Romer, Andrei Shleifer and Justin Wolfers for helpful discussions and comments. I also thank Gallup for sharing their data. Any remaining errors are mine.
Will the Arab Spring lead to long-lasting democratic change? As Islamists perform well in elections across the Arab world, many have begun to predict that the recent uprisings will usher in a wave of Islamist-dominated autocracies instead of the democratic institutions many protestors initially demanded. These observers often point to the political trajectories of non-Arab states such as Iran and implicitly claim that Islamist-dominated states cannot be democratic. Others note that the emergence of democratic regimes in Indonesia and Turkey demonstrates that Islamists can play a constructive role in democratic institutions.1 One challenge that those interested in forecasting the evolution of institutions in the Arab world currently face is that there is little consensus regarding the factors that led to the region’ democratic de…cit before the recent uprisings. Some studies s stress the e¤ects of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian con‡ (El Badawi and Makdisi ict 2007), while others highlight factors as diverse as the subservient status of women (Fish 2002), fossil fuels (Ross 2001), Muslim culture/religious beliefs (Huntington 1996) or Arab-speci…c cultural and/or institutional characteristics (Sharabi 1988, Noland 2008). Many of these studies reach con‡ icting conclusions. Perhaps more importantly, they fail to explain why the “Arab democratic de…cit”seems to extend to neighboring non-Arab, Muslim-majority countries but not to other Muslim-majority regions. The geographic clustering of less democratic regimes in and around the Arab world in 2010 is presented in …gure 1. In this …gure, more democratic states are shaded grey, while the region outlined in black denotes areas conquered by Arab armies in the centuries following the death of the prophet Muhammad.2 The concentration of non-democracies within the outlined boundaries is striking and suggests
For an example of this debate see the article on Islamists, elections and the Arab spring in the
December 10th issue of The Economist. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21541404. 2 Students of Islamic history will note that the boundaries in …gure 1 do not exactly correspond to the regions conquered by Arab armies. Throughout the paper I use the short-hand “conquered by Arab armies” to denote the early (and persistent) incorporation into the Islamic world throughout the paper for expositional simplicity. When I refer to countries conquered by Arab armies I mean the group of countries that had at least half of their present-day landmass persistently controlled by Islamic dynasties since at least 1100 CE. See section 1 below for a more detailed discussion.
a possible explanation for why countries such as Azerbaijan, Chad, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share the Arab League’ democratic de…cit today s whereas Muslim-majority countries such as Albania, Bangladesh, Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia or Sierra Leone do not. I hypothesize that the former countries were more exposed to the control structures that developed following the Arab conquests than the latter. These historical arrangements, in turn, have had enduring e¤ects that help explain the geographic clustering of non-democracies detailed in …gure 1. To investigate the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, I calculate the percentage of a country’ landmass that was conquered by Arab armies in the centuries s following the death of the prophet Muhammad. I then show that from a statistical standpoint this variable accounts for the Arab League’ democratic de…cit today. s This empirical pattern is interesting, in part, because it provides an opportunity to distinguish between a number of competing theories regarding the determinants of the Arab world’ democratic de…cit on the eve of the recent uprisings. For example, s the fact that the Arab world’ democratic de…cit is shared by 10 non-Arab countries s that were conquered by Arab armies casts doubt on the importance of the role of Arab culture in perpetuating the democratic de…cit. Hypotheses stressing the role of Muslim theology also do not receive empirical support. Once one accounts for the 28 countries conquered by Arab armies, the evolution of democracy in the remaining 15 Muslim-majority countries since 1960 largely mirrors that of the rest of the developing world. Alternative views attribute the region’ democratic de…cit to the e¤ects of oil s or to the Israeli-Palestinian con‡ ict. But if one omits oil exporters and countries that are in close geographic proximity to Israel the results are almost identical to those obtained when these countries are included. Consequently, my reading of the evidence provides little support for these hypotheses. A …nal group of hypotheses, which I believe provides the best explanation for the empirical patterns I document, is the “institutional persistence” hypothesis (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Nunn 2008, 2009; Dell 2010). Many scholars maintain that the roots of the Arab world’ democratic de…cit are to be found in the region’ history s s of “unrelieved autocracy”(Lewis 1993b) which “date[s] back to the early ninth cen3
One empirical prediction that arises from this literature is that the government’ share of GDP s should be higher in areas conquered by Arab armies.tury”(Khashan 1998). Kuran 2011. they cast doubt 4 . Chaney 2012) to suggest that this pattern re‡ ects the long-run in‡ uence of control structures developed under Islamic empires in the pre-modern era. One would also expect regimes in these areas to prevent the emergence of independent centers of political power and to undermine the in‡ uence of trade unions. The most robust …nding that emerges is that countries that experienced uprisings witnessed signi…cantly lower levels of self-reported well being in the year before the uprisings. If the Arab League’ democratic de…cit today can be traced to the long-term efs fects of the region’ institutions. my strategy in this section is simply to investigate the characteristics of countries that experienced uprisings in 2011. On the one hand. This result suggests that the Arab Spring shares characteristics with other popular movements that have led to stable democratic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). the results provide reasons to be cautiously optimistic that the Arab Spring will lead to sustained democratic change. This view builds on a distinguished line of scholarship going back at least to Montesquieu (1989 ) suggesting that historical developments in the Islamic Middle East have made the region particularly prone to autocratic rule. I …nd that the available data is consistent with these predictions. For example. what institutional developments following the Arab s conquests had such enduring an enduring impact? Although data limitations preclude an investigation of the precise channel(s) of causality generating this empirical relationship. This literature suggests that these historic control structures have left a legacy of weak civil societies where political power is concentrated today in the hands of military and religious leaders that work to perpetuate the status quo. making Arab states fertile ground for sustained democratic change? Since data limitations again preclude a systematic investigation of the channels through which the region’ autocratic institutions have s persisted. I use history and recent scholarship as a guide (Blaydes and Chaney 2011. Have the numerous structural changes over the past century (Rauch and Kostyshak 2009) helped lessen the weight of history.
on claims that Muslim theology. Since recent history suggests that Islamists are just as likely to establish autocratic rule as other groups in the absence of checks on their power. the Israeli-Palestinian con‡ or Arab culture are ict systematic obstacles to democracy.g. popular support for Islamists may undermine democratic e¤orts if such groups are not checked by other contenders for power.g. 5 . they provide sobering evidence that the region’ democratic de…cit has deep historical roots. Jamal and Tessler 2008). it is also possible that they remain in place today. Egypt or Yemen). This provides both an impetus for future research and reasons to be cautious about the evidence we have regarding democratic change in the Arab world. On the other. Tunisia) Islamist groups may play an important role in sustaining democratic institutions by constraining (and being constrained by) rival political groups. While such impedis ments to democratic change may have been weakened by structural changes over the past decades. our understanding s of the determinants of democracy in the region remains incomplete. Finally. Inasmuch as the region’ institutional history is useful for forecasting the future. Stepan and Robertson 2003. In this sense. Where popular support for secular and religious leaders is more balanced (e. it s suggests that democracy is less likely to emerge where political power remains largely divided between religious leaders and the military (e. it is important to stress that while this paper provides new empirical evidence for the reasons behind the Arab world’ democratic de…cit. ethnic or religious characteristics (e. the interpretation that I believe best explains the empirical patterns I observe echoes recent studies suggesting that the region’ democratic de…cit is more a product of its s unique political equilibrium than its cultural. at least as a guide for future policy decisions.g.
interacted with dummy equal to one if at least half of the country’ landmass was controlled by Muslim dynasties s in both 1500 and 1900 CE. 4 In addition. M uslimic is an indicator variable equal to one if at least half of a country’ population is Muslim. Since the majority of the lands under the control of Muslim dynasties in 1100 CE were conquered by Arab armies.6 3 For expositional ease I leave the description of the majority of the data used in the paper to the appendix.4 This interaction term removes countries such as Spain that lost the relevant institutional framework centuries ago. 165) as “consist[ing] of all 6 .1] with higher values denoting more democratic institutions).1 Arab Conquest and Democracy: the Empirical Evidence This section presents the main results. 5 The results presented in the paper are robust to a variety of alternative measures of early incorporation into the Islamic world.3 To measure the extent to which countries were persistently exposed to the institutional framework developed in the early Islamic world I de…ne the variable ArabConquest as the proportion of a country that was ruled by Muslim dynasties in the year 1100 CE. p.5 In table 2 I investigate the extent to which ArabConquest can statistically account for the democratic de…cit in the Muslim world in general and the Arab League speci…cally. I set the variable ArabConquest equal to zero for Israel. 6 The Arab League is de…ned in Rauch and Kostyshak (2009. ArabConquestic is as de…ned above and X is a vector of covariates including continent dummies and an indicator equal to one if Rauch and Kostyshak (2009) de…ne a country as fuel-endowed. To do this I estimate a regression of the form: Democracyic = 1 M uslimic + 2 ArabLeagueic + 3 ArabConquestic + 0 X + "ic (1) where Democracyic is the normalized polity score of country i on continent c in 2010 (where the normalized polity score lies on the interval [0. for expositional simplicity I use Arab conquest to refer to early incorporation into the Islamic world throughout the paper. ArabLeagueic is an indicator equal s to one if a country is a member of the Arab League.
31 normalized polity points (over one standard deviation) less democratic than the rest of the world. Western Africa. Northern Africa. These results are consistent with previous studies that have found both Arab and Muslim democratic de…cits. Central Asia. In column (3). I add the variable ArabConquest. In column (4) I add continent dummies and a dummy variable equal to one if the country is fuel-endowed.htm 7 .7 In column (2) I add an indicator variable equal to one if the country was a member of the Arab League in 2010. Middle Africa. Caribbean. In columns (5)-(8) I limit the sample to Muslim majority countries. In column (8) I show that the result continues to hold when one increases the cuto¤ to only include countries whose Muslim shares exceed 0. The coe¢ cient on ArabLeague is also negative and statistically signi…cant. in subsequent tables I only report the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.un. The results do not qualitatively change and show that from a statistical standpoint ArabConquest explains both the Arab and Muslim democratic de…cits found in previous studies.8. Northern Europe. Throughout table 2 heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses whereas standard errors clustered by UN regions are given in brackets to address potential concerns of spatial correlations in the error terms. Australia/ New Zealand and Melanesia.In column (1) of table 1 I provide an estimate of 1 omitting all other covari- ates. The UN regions are: Eastern Africa. the Arab League’ s democratic de…cit is shared by countries that were conquered by Arab armies.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin. The point estimate shows that Muslim majority countries are 0. South-Eastern Asia. South America. Eastern Asia. The countries in each of these regions are detailed at: http://unstats. Southern Asia. When this variable is added. the coe¢ cient on M uslim decreases in absolute value although it remains negative and statistically signi…cant. 7 Since the clustered standard errors and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are almost identical throughout the paper. These results show that within the Muslim-majority world. In columns (5)-(7) I use all countries who have Muslim population shares greater than or equal to 0. Southern Africa. North America. the point estimates on the variables M uslim and ArabLeague drop sharply in absolute value and become statistically insigni…cant. Western Asia. Southern Europe.5. Western Europe. Central America. countries in which (a dialect of) Arabic is the spoken language of the majority. When this indicator is added. Eastern Europe.” See table 1 for a list of the member states of the Arab League in 2010.
small sample sizes limit the analysis).2. The second group contains Muslim majority countries that were not conquered by Arab armies.1.1 The Emergence of the Democratic De…cit The evidence presented so far documents that countries conquered by Arab armies experienced a democratic de…cit in 2010. 8 I de…ne developing countries as those that were not members of the OECD before 1980. The third group contains developing countries that neither possess Muslim majorities nor were conquered by Muslim armies. the average normalized polity score remains approximately constant prior to 1960 in the two Arab-conquest countries where these scores go back to 1800. Although systematic statistical analyses are not possible before this date. After 1990 the non-Muslim developing world experienced a wave of democratization that was followed by the nonArab-conquest Muslim countries with a lag of roughly ten years. the democratic de…cit of countries that were conquered by Arab armies dates back at least to 1960. …gure 2 plots the average polity score by countries in three groups since 1960 (before this date.4. the levels of democracy in this region in 2010 remained well below that of the rest of the developing world. The qualitative implications of the analysis are robust to alternative de…nitions.8 In the year 1960 -when the majority of the developing world had been decolonizedboth Muslim-majority non-Arab conquest and non-Muslim developing countries had (normalized) polity scores of roughly 0. The …rst group contains countries conquered by Arab armies. In sum. Until around 1990 this gap of around 0. 8 .2 points remained roughly constant. Although countries conquered by Arab armies have seen a slow trend towards increasing political openness since 1990. 9 These countries are Iran and Turkey. The scores in countries that were conquered by Arab armies were signi…cantly lower at around 0.9 This result is consistent with the claim that the region’ democratic de…cit has deep s historical roots. When did this de…cit emerge? To examine this question.
In column (2) I run the same regression omitting the member states of the Arab League.1 The Culture Hypothesis The culture hypothesis claims that the Arab League’ democratic de…cit is a prods uct of the region’ culture. Lako¤ 2004). Noland 2008). there is no evidence that member states of the Arab League have systematically lower polity scores. s In column (3) I omit all countries that were conquered by Arab armies. Another version of the culture hypothesis suggests that Muslim religious beliefs are responsible for the region’ democratic de…cit (Huntington 1996. In other words. the results show that the coe¢ cient on Muslim majority is small and not 9 .2 Hypotheses and Explanations for the Arab World’ s Democratic De…cit In this section I examine the extent to which existing hypotheses for the Arab world’ s democratic de…cit on the eve of the Arab Spring are consistent with the empirical evidence presented above. 2. Results in table 3 demonstrate this point in a more formal manner (that complements the inclusion of the Arab dummy in the previous section). the e¤ect of Arab conquest on democratic outcomes today seems to be independent of Arab culture. Of the 28 countries that were conquered by Arab armies in the sample. The results show that the omission of the Arab League states has almost no e¤ect on the point estimate on the variable Arab conquest. When this is done. 18 are members of the Arab League today whereas 10 are not. In column (1) I present regression output from a regression similar to equation (1) using the entire sample. The empirical evidence presented so far is not consistent with this hypothesis. this result casts doubt on the importance of Arab culture in perpetuating the observed democratic de…cit. One version of this hypothesis is that Arab culture is s inimical to the emergence of democratic institutions (Sharabi 1988. Within countries conquered by Arab armies. Since membership in the Arab League is generally used as a proxy for Arab culture.
This result is not consistent with claims that Muslim theology or gender norms in the Islamic world are responsible for the region’ democratic s de…cit (Fish 2002). El Badawi and Makdisi 2007. In addition. Diamond 2010).11 2. explicitly claim that any negative e¤ects on democratic outcomes should be limited to the Arab world. If stronger religious beliefs are driving the result. Thus. However.2 The Con‡ ict/Resource Curse Hypotheses Another group of studies stresses the importance of the Arab-Israeli con‡ (Stepan ict and Robertson 2003.e. however. 10 . when taken in unison these results cast doubt on the importance of the Arab-Israeli con‡ ict as a systematic obstacle to democratic change across the region. Together with the …ndings presented in column 3. one would expect these countries to drive the ict con‡ results if they existed. Jordan. Results in column (4) show that this is not the case. in column (5) of table 3 I present results omitting Israel and the neighboring Arab counties (i. one would expect the inclusion of per-capita alcohol consumption to signi…cantly a¤ect the point estimate on Arab conquest when limiting the sample to Muslim countries since Islam prohibits the consumption of alcohol. However.10 Have Islamic religious beliefs put down stronger roots in the areas that were conquered by Arab armies? To investigate this hypothesis.statistically signi…cant. Such studies. And thus echo the conclusions of recent analyses such as Stepan and Robertson (2003) or Jamal and Tessler (2008). Since these countries have experienced the con‡ most directly. as I have shown above. the results in column (5) show that the ict point estimates are almost identical when these countries are removed. the region’ democratic s de…cit extends to a sizeable number of countries outside of the Arab League. Egypt. these results cast doubt on Islam as the primary obstacle to democracy. 10 11 In the appendix I provide additional evidence supporting this claim. In the appendix I provide additional evidence showing that religious beliefs do not seem to be abnormally strong in regions conquered by Arab armies. Lebanon and Syria). I gather data on alcohol consumption across the world.
Consequently. the data do not support the hypothesis that oil wealth drives the Arab League’ democratic de…cit. The view that the region has a propensity toward autocratic institutions that is rooted in historical events goes back at least to Montesquieu (1989 ) and was echoed by prominent Arab thinkers in the 19th century (Hourani 1962).Another in‡ uential literature argues that large amounts of oil wealth are inimical to the development of democratic institutions (Ross 2001). many saw the failure of the parliamentary-democratic form of government as the legacy of the region’ historical s institutional framework (Issawi 1956. Are the results driven by oil rich countries? To investigate this possibility. More recently. I have included a dummy variable denoting fuel-endowed countries as de…ned in Rauch and Kostyshak (2009) in the regressions above and shown that the inclusion of this variable does not qualitatively a¤ect the results. In the ninth century. however. rulers 12 I do …nd evidence later in the paper.3 The Institutional Persistence Hypothesis The institutional persistence hypothesis attributes the Arab League’ democratic s de…cit today to the long-term in‡ uence of the control structures developed in the centuries following the Arab conquests. in column (6) of table 3 I present the results of regression (1) omitting all fuel-endowed countries. Again. Following decolonization. Historical evidence supports the notion that an abnormally autocratic political equilibrium developed in the Arab-conquest regions. In other words. Rather.12 s 2. consistent with the claim that popular pressures for democratization are more muted in oil-rich counties. 11 . 27). the results in the paper are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that oil wealth discourages the emergence of democratic institutions. the omission of these countries does not a¤ect the point estimate on ArabConquest in a signi…cant way. scholars such as Bernard Lewis (1993b) and Kedourie (1994) have emphasized that a unique set of institutions developed in the areas conquered by Arab armies and that these historical institutions have had enduring political impacts. As a further robustness check. p. they suggest that oil wealth cannot account for the entire region’ democratic s de…cit.
These institutional divisions within the Islamic world have proven remarkably resilient. 247-248). In this autocratic environment. although Egypt was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 12 . p. pp. both religious and military elites worked together to develop and perpetuate a “classical” institutional equilibrium. Instead. an institutional divide arose within the Muslim world between areas that had been incorporated into the Muslim world by Arab conquest and those that were incorporated in later periods. For example. religious leaders emerged as the only check on the power of the sovereign (Chaney 2011). Areas incorporated into the Islamic world after the era of Arab conquests had ended did not adopt this classical framework in its entirety (Lapidus 1988.g. 103-104). For example.to sta¤ their armies.e. Although religious leaders devised “equilibrium institutions” to protect the interests of the general population to a degree. local elites remained in power and perpetuated previous institutional arrangements (Lapidus 1988. p. 252). Concentration of political power in the hands of a few groups and weak civil societies are thought to be the long-term legacy of this historical institutional framework (e. Consequently. Indonesia. This institutional framework -which is often referred to as Islamic law.across this region began to use slave armies -as opposed to native populations. Malaysia or sub-Saharan Africa) institutions were shaped “by a local elite which preserved its political and cultural continuity” (Lapidus 1988. Chaney 2012). Kuran 2011. pp. Where Islam spread by conversion (e.g. in regions conquered by non-Arab Muslim armies such as India and the Balkans. Blaydes and Chaney (2011) argue that the widespread use of these slave armies allowed rulers to achieve independence from local military and civilian groups and helped remove constraints on the sovereign in pre-modern Islamic societies. the sovereign backed by his army of slaves) and religious leaders did not produce democratic institutions. both the military and religious elites worked to resist the emergence of rival centers of political power such as merchant guilds that could have facilitated institutional change (Lapidus 1984.seems to have been designed with the interest of both military and religious leaders in mind (Kuran 2011. 249). p. 301). The historic division of power between the military (i.
p.1 Institutions or Geographic Endowments? Is the Arab League’ democratic de…cit today a product of institutional persistence? s An alternative explanation for the empirical patterns I observe is that countries dominated by desert terrain selected into Arab conquest and that the results are picking up the long-run e¤ects of “desert institutions”(Haber and Menaldo 2010) or even a direct e¤ect of desert terrain on democracy today.” Contemporary observers have also noted that the present day political equilibrium bears more than a passing resemblance to the historical equilibrium.” This autocratic environment has led religious leaders to again emerge in their historical role as the primary check on the power of the state (al-Sayyid Marsot 1984. xxvi) notes that “that the military [in Egypt. For example.. This point is stressed by Bernard Lewis (1993b) who notes that “[m]odernization in the nineteenth century. some Arab critics have “called their rulers Mamelukes. it is entirely driven by countries conquered by Arab armies (which are denoted with grey boxes). Chaney 2011). far from reducing this [historic] autocracy.3. p. in the upper graph of …gure 3 I detail the relationship between desert terrain and democracy in the entire sample. 13 . Despite the many changes that Arab-conquered regions have undergone over the subsequent 200 years.1517 CE. and still more in the twentieth. Once these countries are removed from the sample.] practice[s] prerogatives similar to those enjoyed by the [slave soldiers]. alluding to the slave-soldiers who exercised unrestrained and arbitrary power in those countries”(Kedourie 1994. To investigate this possibility. substantially increased it. 2. both colonizers and native rulers following independence seem to have worked to perpetuate the historic concentration of political power in the hands of the ruler. 92) and Sonbol (2000. remnants of the local elite eventually reestablished themselves and continued to rely on slave armies to support their positions until the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt in 1798 CE. Although the negative relationship between desert terrain and democratic outcomes in 2010 is striking. the relationship between desert terrain and democracy is no longer statistically signi…cant and is given in the lower graph..
371) notes that bedouin armies were particularly able in the “barren and inhospitable” milieus that constituted much of the territory conquered by Arab armies. in turn. overidenti…cation tests provide an additional test of the hypothesis that desert terrain only in‡ uences democratic outcomes today through Arab conquest. Second.13 If the only way desert terrain impacts democratic outcomes today is through institutional developments that followed Arab conquest. while Hill 13 In the appendix I provide further evidence in support of this claim. p. Thus. Kennedy (2007. Bernard Lewis sums up this point by noting that “[t]he strategy employed by the Arabs in the great campaigns of conquest was determined by the use of desert-power [. the available evidence provides little support for the hypothesis that desert terrain has e¤ects on democratic outcomes today that are independent of Arab conquest. the point estimates on the variable Arab conquest do not substantially change when measures of desert terrain are added to the regression and these estimates remain statistically signi…cant. p. I present results instrumenting for Arab conquest with desert terrain. In these speci…cations I add controls for desert terrain to regression (1). First.. In columns (8) and (9) I use the logarithm of a country’ average rainfall s in both a linear and cubic speci…cation as suggested by Haber and Menaldo (2010). In table 4. In column (7) I use the percent of a country’ current landmass that is occupied by desert s terrain.] [t]he desert was familiar and accessible to the Arabs and not to their enemies (1993a.. 14 . I do this for two reasons. 54). Similarly. Although the roughly 50% increase in the standard errors is a product of the fact that Arab conquest and desert terrain are highly correlated.In columns (7)-(9) of table 3 I demonstrate this point in a more formal manner. are small in absolute value and statistically insigni…cant. if Arab conquest is a noisy measure of treatment with the relevant historical institutions then IV results can help address biases caused by this measurement error. The coe¢ cients on desert terrain. then desert terrain should be a valid instrument for Arab conquest in equation (1). Why do I expect desert terrain and Arab conquest to be statistically related? It is well known that Arab armies had signi…cant military advantages in areas that were dominated by desert terrain.
I instrument for Arab conquest using desert terrain. In columns (2) and (5). Again. its centroid) from Mecca. (2010) for a related discussion of how desert terrain and unequal agri- cultural endowments may have a¤ected the selection of countries into the “classical” institutional framework. I cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal at conventional levels of statistical signi…cance.14 In table 4 I present the relevant results in four panels. I instrument for Arab conquest with the distance of the geographical center of a country (i. areas with desert terrain should have been more likely to select into conquest by Arab armies. the data support the exclusion restriction implied by my approach.(1975) suggests that the Arab use of the camel greatly facilitated conquest on or near desert terrain. the evidence is consistent with the claim that desert terrain a¤ects democratic outcomes today through institutions developed following 14 See Michalopoulus et al. In both speci…cations the point estimates and standard errors on Arab conquest roughly double. 15 . In panel B I present the …rst-stage for Arab conquest. The …rst three columns use the entire sample and the …nal three columns limit the sample to countries with Muslim majorities. In columns (3) and (6). The overidenti…cation tests are useful since they are a direct test of the exclusion restriction that desert terrain only a¤ects democratic outcomes today through Arab conquest. I instrument for Arab conquest using the logarithm of a country’ average rainfall. In panel C I provide the OLS results and in panel D I provide the p-value from the overidenti…cation tests when relevant.e. In panel A I present the IV (2SLS) estimates. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the IV s coe¢ cients obtained using Mecca and rainfall as instruments are equal. In columns (1) and (4). In panel D I present the p-value testing that the IV coe¢ cients obtained using Mecca and Desert as instruments are equal. Although it should be noted that such tests may not lead to a rejection if all instruments are invalid but still highly correlated with each other (and thus should be treated with some caution). Thus. Panel B shows that there is a strong …rst stage relationship between distance from Mecca and Arab conquest. Consequently. The …rst-stage results show that there is also a strong relationship between desert terrain and Arab conquest.
government today should be directly involved in an abnormally large share of economic production in Arab conquered regions (Kuran 2011. I view this analysis as preliminary and exploratory. governments worked to impede the emergence of autonomous social groups in Arab-conquered regions. the state stymied the emergence of politically powerful merchant groups (Pamuk 2004. Nunn and Puga 2012).15 2. Access to Credit. In table 5 I present results investigating the empirical relevance of this prediction.2 Government Share of GDP. 15 In this sense.Arab conquest and not through channels that are unrelated to Arab conquest. as data limitations make it di¢ cult to pin down the precise channels underlying the observed empirical patterns with any reasonable degree of certainty. 301). Malik and Awadallah 2011). The main prediction of the institutional persistence hypothesis as developed above is that political power should be abnormally concentrated in areas conquered by Arab armies and that civil societies in the region should be unusually weak. Since I do not have direct measures of either. I instead use as proxies government share of GDP. the results complement recent studies that …nd that geography in‡ uences present- day outcomes through historical events (e. 16 . Instead.g. After the end of the s colonial era. In columns (1)-(3) I present results from a regression similar to equation (1) using government’ share of GDP in 2010 as the dependent variable. Results in column (1) s show that countries conquered by Arab armies have government GDP shares that are 7 percentage points higher than in areas that were not conquered by Arab armies. p. The logic behind the use of the government’ share of GDP metric is rooted in s the region’ economic development over the past 60 years. As a consequence. the extent to which existing institutions facilitate access to credit and the number of trade unions normalized by GDP. I examine the extent to which the available data are consistent with the historical evidence.3. For example. Trade Unions and Arab Conquest I now turn to the channels through which Arab conquest may continue to a¤ect institutional outcomes today.
In column (2) I show that this result is not driven by the region’ democratic de…cit. I use the number of trade unions a¢ liated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) per country. In columns (4)-(6) I examine the extent to which governments in Arab-conquered areas continue to resist the development of autonomous social groups today. They are. I use the World Bank’ “Strength of Legal Rights Index” as the dependent s variable. in this subsection I have presented evidence that is largely consistent with this prediction. 17 . consistent with the prediction that civil societies are abnormally weak in Arab-conquest areas. These results do not seem to be driven either by the region’ democratic s de…cit or by membership in the Arab League. To measure the number of trade unions. s In column (3) I show that although there is not much evidence that Arab League countries are di¤erent from non-Arab League countries. I expect the legal system in countries conquered by Arab armies to be inimical to the expansion of credit since the region’ historical institutions have both endowed ruling elites with s unusual levels of political power and have left civil society groups such as merchants abnormally weak. in columns (7)-(9) I present the number of trade unions normalized by GDP (measured in billions of dollars). In sum. although it is di¢ cult to measure the extent to which political power is abnormally concentrated and civil societies are weak in areas conquered by Arab armies.35 fewer trade unions per billion dollars of GDP (or just over one standard deviation). the results on Arab conquest lose statistical signi…cance when one introduces an Arab League dummy. Finally. I normalize this index to range from 0 to 1. Namely.21 and 0. however.29 points (or roughly one standard deviation) less hospitable to the expansion of credit than legal systems in other regions. the legal systems in countries that were conquered by Arab armies are between 0.28 and 0. The results are consistent with this prediction. The point estimates on Arab conquest in columns (7)-(9) shows that areas conquered by Arab armies have between 0. with higher scores indicating that the legal system is better designed to expand access to credit. To do this.
data limitations have prevented a systematic investigation of the channels through which history continues to a¤ect democratic outcomes today. it is hard to know the extent to which structural changes have helped 16 See Acemoglu et al.1 Advances in Education While space considerations limit the extent to which I am able to investigate the evolution of the many available indicators in the Arab League over the past decades. this result does not imply that the Arab Spring will not lead to sustained democratic change. However.16 In …gure 4 I present the evolution of the average years of education since 1950 for three groups of countries: i. 17 In a recent working paper Campante and Chor (2011) argue that such structural changes have made political protests more likely and pressures for democratization more acute. 18 . in this section I detail the evolution of average education in the region over the past 60 years. Consequently. countries that were conquered by Arab armies. rendering many Arab states fertile ground for sustained democratic change today. developing countries. I concentrate on this indicator because a large literature views high levels of educational attainment as a prerequisite for democracy. (2007) for one causal mechanism through which higher levels of education may lead to more democratic outcomes. Muslim.17 What do such structural changes imply for the future of democracy in the Arab world? Unfortunately. the numerous structural changes over the past 50 years (Rauch and Kostyshak 2009) may have helped to lessen the weight of history. educational attainment in countries conquered by Arab armies has largely converged to the non-Arab-conquest Muslim average. non-Arab conquest countries and iii. (2005) for an overview of this literature and Glaeser et al. 3. Indeed. The results show the tremendous increases in average education in the countries conquered by Arab armies over the past 60 years.3 The Arab Spring: Past as Prologue? The …ndings presented in this paper suggest that the democratic de…cit in the Arab League on the eve of the Arab Spring had deep historical roots. ii. They also show that while di¤erences in education do not seem to explain the democratic de…cit from a statistical standpoint in these countries (see the appendix for these results). Non-Muslim.
the large increases in education in the Arab conquest countries over the last 60 years suggest that the prospects for democracy in the region are brighter today than at any time in its history. Thus. 19 . these groups seem on the whole less moderate and to wield more political power in Egypt than in Tunisia. the widespread protests that swept across the region in 2011 have no precedent in the region’ history. if the literature stressing the importance of education for democratization is correct. the political equilibrium in many states in the Arab League resembles the equilibrium that has accompanied autocratic institutions for centuries. To the extent that religious leaders derive political power from popular support. Namely. s However. This is consistent with the results from surveys presented in table 6 showing that a larger share of the populace support Sharia implementation in Egypt than in Tunisia. I do observe popular support for Sharia implementation. However. I use popular support for the Sharia as a measure of the extent to which political power remains concentrated in the hands of religious leaders across the Arab world today.18 Average support for Sharia implementation over the years 2005-2010 in the mem18 The use of this metric is supported by recent election results in Tunisia and Egypt. For example. The region’ institutional history suggests that democratic change is less likely s where political power remains concentrated in such a manner. political power appears to be concentrated in the hands of military and religious leaders in many areas. Although Islamist parties won majorities in both countries.2 A Democratic Dawn? At some level it is obvious that the structural changes the region has undergone over the past 60 years have made the Arab world more fertile ground for sustained democratic change today than at any time in the past. support for Sharia implementation may be a good proxy for the relative power of religious leaders across countries. Although I do not observe the extent to which political power is concentrated in the hands of military and religious leaders. 3.to remove the historical impediments to democratic change.
This result suggests that the level of subjective well-being in 2011 may help predict the propensity for further unrest across the Arab League. Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates seem unlikely to experience widespread unrest in the near future.ber states of the Arab League is presented in column (1) of table 6. oil-rich gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia. see Brückner and Ciccone (2011). in columns (2)-(4) of table 6. however. However. To the extent that this is the case. In table 6.19 To both investigate and quantify the extent to which popular discontent helped drive the Arab spring. The level of self-reported well-being in 2010 is the only variable I have found that robustly predicts unrest in 2011 from a statistical standpoint. It should be noted. I provide the mean number of respondents who were self-reportedly “thriving”by countries. that the sharp drop in well-being in Bahrain between 2009 and 2011 from a relatively high base suggests that even countries with high levels of self-reported well-being may be more susceptible to unrest than the results in table 6 suggest. 20 . 2010 and 2011 using Gallup’ World Poll data. I detail the evolution of self-reported well-being in the Arab world in 2009. History suggests that the emergence of stable democratic institutions is less likely in areas where religious leaders face fewer political rivals.3 Measuring the Propensity for Unrest One prominent model of democratic change links economic downturns and popular discontent with democratizations (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In each s column. While the region’ history reminds us that democratizations might prove ‡ s eeting 19 For a recent empirical investigation of this hypothesis. with the exception of Lebanon nowhere in the Arab League does popular support for Sharia implementation approach the low levels of Turkey which is widely seen as a democratic model for the region. The results show that in countries such as Egypt and Yemen popular support for Sharia implementation is high. countries that experienced unrest in 2011 are marked in bold. These results suggest that religious leaders will wield greater political power in countries such as Yemen and Egypt than in others such as Tunisia. 3. In countries such as Syria and Tunisia it is much lower.
are the implications of the preceding analysis for the current policy environment? Although the results suggest that the Arab League’ democratic de…cit s 21 . Will the Arab Spring end the region’ long history of autocratic rule and usher in s long-lasting democratic change? Unfortunately. Consequently. Instead. Despite these limitations.in the absence of competing interest groups. Indeed.g. at some level the structural changes the region has undergone over the past 60 years have made the Arab world more fertile ground for sustained democratic change today than at any time in the past. the widespread protests that swept across the region in 2011 have no precedent in the region’ history. What. Arab culture. In this sense. the available evidence suggests that the region’ democratic de…cit is a product of the long-run in‡ s uence of control structures developed under Islamic empires in the pre-modern era. then. s Egypt or Yemen) the present-day political equilibrium seems more similar to the historical equilibrium that has accompanied autocratic institutions than in others (e. I am unable to measure the extent to which these channels continue to a¤ect political developments. the results also show that popular discontent with the status quo helped drive the protests. That having been said. 4 Conclusion In this paper I have provided evidence suggesting that the Arab League’ democratic s de…cit on the eve of the Arab Spring has deep historical roots. Tunisia). the Arab-Israeli con‡ or oil ict wealth are systematic obstacles to democratic change. data limitations prohibit a detailed investigation of the channels through which the region’ historical institutional equis librium continues to a¤ect outcomes today. history suggests that democracy is less likely to emerge in the former group of countries than in the latter. This result suggests both that the Arab Spring seems to share important characteristics with other successful democratizations and that such discontent seems to have helped to unify protestors in pursuit of change.g. These results cast doubt on claims that Muslim theology. in some countries of the Arab world (e.
D. and J. 46(5): 813-831. D. there are many reasons to be cautious about using the evidence we have regarding democratic change in the Arab world as a guide for future policy decisions.check their power. “From Education to Democracy?. J. 2006. the recent past shows that Islamists are just as likely to establish autocratic rule as other groups in the absence of checks on their power. Robinson.. unless other interest groups -such as labor unions or commercial interests. 95(2): 44-49. 22 . D. S. Acemoglu. and S.. S.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. El Badawi. 91 (5): 1369-1401. if there has been a regime shift (statistically speaking) predictions based on this framework will be poor.”The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. Robinson and P. Robinson. Johnson. 117(4): 1231-1294. Indeed.”American Economic Review. A. 2001. “Explaining the democracy de…cit in the Arab World. it should be stressed that these conclusions are largely based on an implicit model of the region’ institutional history. In closing. Johnson. Acemoglu.. Thus. A. S. A. Robinson.”American Economic Review. New York: Cambridge University Press. and J. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. Islamists may replace secular rulers and usher in a new wave of autocracy in some Arab countries. and J. Yared. While this conceptual framework s might be consistent with the available data and may help explain the past. However. Acemoglu. I. Johnson. 2002. Thus. this de…cit does not appear to be rooted in religious beliefs. References Acemoglu. the region’ institutional history shows s that overwhelming popular support for Islamists may undermine democratic e¤orts by concentrating political power in the hands of these groups. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.on the eve of the Arab Spring has deep historical roots. A. Makdisi 2007. 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. D.
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e. Arab conquest) are outlined in black.Figure 1: Arab Conquest and Democracy in 2010 More democratic countries are shaded grey and the persistent boundaries of the Islamic world in 1100 CE (i. . Democracy data for 2010 are missing for cross-hatched countries.
2 Standardized Polity Score .2010 1990 Non−Muslim Muslim. Non−Arab Conquest Arab Conquest Figure 2: Arab Conquest.6 .8 1970 1980 2000 . Developing nonMuslim Countries and Democracy since 1960 1960 0 .4 . Muslim Countries.
4 .2 . se=0. b=−0.8 SDN KAZ CHN ERI JPN CPV DNK SWE FINTWN NOR CRI TTO MUS CAN USA LTU SVN SVK NLD IRL GBR URY HUN POL DEU PRT ITA GRC AUT CHE NZL CYP ESP IND NIC JAM PAN COM EST ROM BGR MON HRV MKD ALB FRA PER LSO KOR GHA SLV GTM DOM SLB IDN PHL LVA MDA SRB CZE BEL PRY BRA ZMB BEN SEN SLE HND COL BOL MWI BDI LBR GNB GEO MYS GUY UKR MOZ ARM ZAR BGD GINECU LKA THA NGA RUS PNG BTN GAB KHM ZWE MDG CIV BFA HTI CAF TZA UGA AGO TGO SGP VEN RWA CMR COG FJI GMB GNQ MMR LAO VNM CUB BLR SWZ PRK Figure 3: Democracy.4 .17] .8 1 0 0 [N=132. Arab Conquest and Desert Countries conquered by Arab armies are denoted with grey boxes.6 .8 JPN CPV DNK SWE FINTWN NOR CRI TTO MUS CAN USA LTU SVN SVK NLD IRL GBR URY HUN POL DEU PRT ITA GRC AUT CHE NZL CYP ESP IND NIC JAM PAN COM EST ROM BGR MON HRV MKD ALB FRA PER LSO GHA KOR SLV GTM DOM LVA MDA SRB CZE PRY BEL BRA SLB IDN PHL ZMB BEN TUR SEN SLE HND COL BOL MWI LBR GNB BDI GEO MYS GUY UKR MOZ ARM GINECU ZAR BGD NGA LKA THA RUS PNG BTN GAB KHM ZWE MDG CIV BFA HTI CAF TZA UGA AGO TGO SGP VEN CMR COG RWA FJI GMB GNQ MMR AZE LAO VNM CUB BLR YEM KWT LBY OMN ARE BHR QAT SAU SWZ PRK 0 0 Percent Desert . The top graph includes the entire sample whereas the bottom graph omits countries conquered by Arab armies. se=0.6 .2 Normalized Polity Score .2 Normalized Polity Score .06] 1 AUS CHL ZAF BWA MEX ARG KEN KGZ NPL MNG ISR NAM DJI ETH .4 .2 . .4 Percent Desert .51.6 .14. b=−0.8 1 [N=160.1 AUS CHL ZAF BWA MEX ARG KEN LBN KGZ NPL MLI PAK NAM MNG ISR NER ETH SOM SDN TJK TUN KAZ CHN UZB ERI MAR IRN SYR TKM TCD IRQ DZA DJI MRT JOR EGY .6 .
1940 0 2 4 6 8 1960 1980 2000 . Non−Arab Conquest Arab Conquest Figure 4: The Evolution of Years of Education since 1950 Average years of education in Arab Conquest. Muslim and developing non-Muslim countries since 1950.2020 Non−Muslim Muslim.
Underlined countries are non Arab League members that had at least half of their landmass conquered by Arab armies.Table 1: Country Codes. while those with Muslim majorities are denoted by ∗ . See text for details. Countries that have Muslim majorities but were not conquered by Arab armies and are not members of the Arab League in 2010 are in italics. the Arab League. United Republic of Uganda Ukraine Uruguay United States Uzbekistan∗ ∗ Venezuela Vietnam Yemen∗ ∗ South Africa Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe Country Code Country Code Country Code Country AGO ALB ∗ ARE∗ ∗ ARG ARM AUS AUT AZE∗ ∗ BDI BEL BEN BFA∗ BGD ∗ BGR BHR∗ ∗ BLR BOL BRA BTN BWA CAF CAN CHE CHL CHN CIV CMR COG COL COM∗ CPV CRI CUB CYP CZE DEU DJI∗ DNK DOM DZA∗ ∗ Angola Albania ∗ United Arab Emirates∗ ∗ Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan∗ ∗ Burundi Belgium Benin Burkina Faso ∗ Bangladesh ∗ Bulgaria Bahrain∗ ∗ Byelarus Bolivia Brazil Bhutan Botswana Central African Republic Canada Switzerland Chile China Ivory Coast Cameroon Congo Colombia Comoros∗ Cape Verde Costa Rica Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Germany Djibouti∗ Denmark Dominican Republic Algeria∗ ∗ Notes: Countries marked in bold were members of the Arab League in 2010. . Arab Conquest and Muslim Majority Code LAO LBN∗ ∗ LBR LBY ∗ ∗ LKA LSO LTU LVA MAR∗ ∗ MDA MDG MEX MKD MLI∗ ∗ MMR MNG MON MOZ MRT∗ ∗ MUS MWI MYS ∗ NAM NER∗ ∗ NGA∗ NIC NLD NOR NPL NZL OMN∗ ∗ PAK∗ ∗ PAN PER PHL PNG POL PRK PRT PRY ROM RUS RWA SAU∗ ∗ SDN∗ SEN ∗ SGP SLB SLE ∗ SLV SOM∗ ∗ SRB SVK SVN SWE SWZ SYR∗ ∗ TCD∗ ∗ TGO THA TJK∗ ∗ TKM∗ ∗ TTO TUN∗ ∗ TUR∗ TWN TZA UGA UKR URY USA UZB∗ ∗ VEN VNM YEM∗ ∗ ZAF ZAR ZMB ZWE ECU EGY ∗ ∗ ERI ESP EST ETH FIN FJI FRA GAB GBR GEO GHA GIN ∗ GMB ∗ GNB GNQ GRC GTM GUY HND HRV HTI HUN IDN ∗ IND IRL IRN∗ ∗ IRQ∗ ∗ ISR ITA JAM JOR∗ ∗ JPN KAZ ∗ KEN KGZ ∗ KHM KOR KWT∗ ∗ Ecuador Egypt∗ ∗ Eritrea Spain Estonia Ethiopia Finland Fiji France Gabon United Kingdom Georgia Ghana Guinea ∗ Gambia. Countries marked with the symbol ∗ had at least half of their landmass conquered by Arab armies. The ∗ Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Greece Guatemala Guyana Honduras Croatia Haiti Hungary Indonesia ∗ India Ireland Iran∗ ∗ Iraq∗ ∗ Israel Italy Jamaica Jordan∗ ∗ Japan Kazakhstan ∗ Kenya Kyrgyzstan ∗ Cambodia South Korea Kuwait∗ ∗ Laos Lebanon∗ ∗ Liberia Libya∗ ∗ Sri Lanka Lesotho Lithuania Latvia Morocco∗ ∗ Moldova Madagascar Mexico Macedonia Mali∗ ∗ Myanmar (Burma) Mongolia Montenegro Mozambique Mauritania∗ ∗ Mauritius Malawi Malaysia ∗ Namibia Niger∗ ∗ Nigeria ∗ Nicaragua Netherlands Norway Nepal New Zealand Oman∗ ∗ Pakistan∗ ∗ Panama Peru Philippines Papua New Guinea Poland North Korea Portugal Paraguay QAT∗ ∗ Qatar∗ ∗ Romania Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia∗ ∗ Sudan∗ Senegal ∗ Singapore Solomon Islands Sierra Leone ∗ El Salvador Somalia∗ ∗ Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Swaziland Syria∗ ∗ Chad∗ ∗ Togo Thailand Tajikistan∗ ∗ Turkmenistan∗ ∗ Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia∗ ∗ Turkey∗ ∗ Taiwan Tanzania.
08] Arab Conquest (0.10] -0.11] [0.10] [0.12) [0.10) (0. Arab Conquest is the percentage of a country’s landmass that was persistently controlled by Islamic Empires since at least 1100 CE.11] [0.10] (0. The sample labeled 80% limits the sample to countries whose Muslim population shares are greater than 80%.11) [0.05 -0.11] (0.10] [0.31 -0.11] -0.Muslim (0. Controls include continent dummies and a dummy variable equal to one if the country was a fuel-endowed economy as deﬁned in Rauch and Kostyshak (2009).10] [0.1] (higher values indicate more democratic institutions). .10) (0.20 -0.38 -0.32 -0.11] [0. Islam and Arab Conquest Dependent Variable: Normalized Polity Score in 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) -0.12] -0.40 (0.06 0.10) (0.09) (0.04 -0.10] [0.05 (0.10) [0.07] (0.05) [0. See text for details.21 -0.02 -0.07] [0.07) (0.18] N Controls? Sample 160 No World 160 No World 160 No World 160 Yes World 43 No Muslim 43 No Muslim 43 Yes Muslim 32 Yes 80% Notes: The dependent variable is the polity score in 2010 normalized to lie on the interval [0.13) [0.01 -0.07) Table 2: Democracy.10) [0.09) [0. Arab League is an indicator variable equal to one if the country was a member of the Arab League in 2010.23 -0.12) (0.05 Arab League (0.11) [0.28 (0. Muslim is an indicator variable equal to one if at least half of the country’s population is Muslim.07) (0.39 -0. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses whereas standard errors clustered by region are given in brackets.
30 0.15) (0.05 (0.02) 0.05 0. Jordan.09) (0.14) (0.05 ln(Alcohol Consumption) -0.07 (0.10) (0. %Desert is the percentage of a country’s landmass that is covered by desert terrain. Muslim is an indicator variable equal to one if at least half of the country’s population is Muslim.07) 0. the “Non-Conﬂict” sample omits Egypt.09) (0.02) N Controls? Sample 158 Yes World 158 Yes World Notes: Arab Conquest is the percentage of a country’s landmass that was persistently controlled by Islamic Empires since at least 1100 CE.33 -0.14) Table 3: Possible Explanations: Culture. ln(Alcohol Consumption) is the logarithm of average per-capita alcohol consumption.31 -0. Israel.Arab Conquest (0.03 0.02 (1.05 0. Oil and Desert Normalized Polity Score in 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) -0. .04) [ln(Rain)]2 -0.05 -0.11) (0.34) [ln(Rain)]3 160 Yes World 139 Yes NonArab 132 Yes NonConquest 43 Yes Muslim 155 Yes NonConﬂict 147 Yes NonOil 160 Yes World 0. ln(Rain) is the logarithm of a country’s average rainfall.31 (0.29 -0.15) %Desert ln(Rain) 2.09 0.01 (0. the “Muslim” sample restricts the analysis to countries with at least 50% Muslim population shares. Conﬂict.10) (0.07) (0.05 (0.07) (0.32 -0.07) (0. Controls include continent dummies and a dummy variable equal to one if the country was a fuel-endowed economy as deﬁned in Rauch and Kostyshak (2009).05 0.07) Muslim (0. The “Non-Arab” sample omits members of the Arab League.97) 0.35 -0.29 (9) -0.34 -0.07) (0. Lebanon and Syria and the “Non-Oil” sample omits the countries deﬁned as fuel-endowed in Rauch and Kostyshak (2009).15) (0.10) (0. the “Non-Conquest” sample omits Arab-conquest countries.02 (0.
10) -0.51 -0.67 (0.46 -1.85 (0.07) 0.10) Muslim 0.29 (0.50] [0.32 -0.35 -0. Arab League is an indicator variable equal to one if the country was a member of the Arab League in 2010.09) 0. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.29 (0.15) -0. Mecca is the distance of the country’s centroid to Mecca measured in tens of thousands of kilometers.59 (0.07)) -0.17 (0.16) (0.07) ((0.47 -0.07) Panel D: Overidentiﬁcation Tests [p-value] [0.29 (0.07) 0. Muslim is an indicator variable equal to one if at least half of the country’s population is Muslim.Table 4: IV Regressions: The Impact of Arab Conquest on Democratic Outcomes in 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares Arab Conquest -0.29 (0.28) %Desert ln(Rainfall) 0.63] N 160 160 158 Sample World World World 43 Muslim [0. %Desert is the percent of a country’s landmass that is covered by desert terrain.15) 0. .16 (0.05 (0.32 -0.12) (0.32 (0.05 (0.56 -0.13 (0.07 (0.05 (0.1] (higher values indicate more democratic institutions).10) -0.10) Muslim 0.12) (0.03) Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares Arab Conquest -0.14) (0.02) -0.30) (0.14) (0.07 (0.65] 43 Muslim Notes: The dependent variable in panels A and C is the polity score in 2010 normalized to lie on the interval [0. ln(Rainfall) is the logarithm of average annual rainfall in the country.09) (0.11) 0. The dependent variable in panel B is Arab Conquest: the percentage of a country’s landmass that was persistently controlled by Islamic Empires since at least 1100 CE.36 -0.82] 43 Muslim [0.09) Panel B: First-Stage for Arab Conquest Mecca -0. Controls include country dummies and an indicator equal to one if the country was a fuel-endowed economy as deﬁned in Rauch and Kostyshak (2009).
47) -0.08) 0.09) (0. Democracy is the country’s polity score normalized to lie on the interval [0.46 (2.12) (0.56) 0.28 -0.1] (higher values indicate legal systems that greater facilitate access to credit).08) -0.35 (2.42 (3.28 (0.21 -0.12 (0.24) 0.10) 7. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.07 (0.08) 0. In columns (7)-(9) the dependent variable is the number of trade unions normalized by GDP measured in billions of dollars.68) (0.58) -5.55) -5.53 -0.01 (0.09 (0.93) 6.37 9.08) 0. Arab Conquest is the percentage of a country’s landmass that was persistently controlled by Islamic Empires since at least 1100 CE. Share of GDP Access to Credit Trade Unions Arab Conquest 7.10) (0.04 (0.08) -0.10) (0. In columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is the World Bank’s strength of legal rights index normalized to lie on the interval [0.16 (3.00 (0.07) 0.07) 0.21 (0.73) (3.20 (0.07) 0.83 (5.00 (0.03 (0.24 -0.13) (0.11) 0. Trade Unions and Arab Conquest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Govt. . All regressions include continent dummies.16) 158 158 158 152 152 152 160 160 160 Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is 100 times the government’s share of GDP in 2011.11) 0.04) 0.02 (0.05) -0.48 (3.21 (0. Fuel-Endowed is an indicator variable equal to one if the country is a fuel-endowed economy as deﬁned in Rauch and Kostyshak (2009).50) -0.1].29 -0.02 (0.05) 5.50) 8.02 (0. Muslim is an indicator variable equal to one if at least half of the country’s population is Muslim.29 -0.07) 5.18) Muslim Fuel-Endowed Democracy Arab League N -5.89 (2.Table 5: Government’s Share of GDP.20 (2.28 (3. Access to Credit.26 4.29) (3.03 (0. Arab League is an indicator variable equal to one if the country was a member of the Arab League in 2010.
15) 4.55) 13.99 (0.80 (0. Well-Being and the Arab Spring Somalia Saudi Arabia Egypt Qatar Yemen Jordan U AE P alestine Djibouti Kuwait Comoros Libya Algeria M auritania Iraq M orocco Syria Tunisia Sudan Lebanon Bahrain Oman T urkey 10.80) 55.54) 29.56 (1.99 (0.69 (1.27 (0.05) 38.17 (1.00 (1.15 (1.79) 13.70 (0. doing well) in the years 2009.90) 34.48) 14.93 (1.70 (1.67) 9.35 (0.80) 22.60) 32.93) 56.19 (1.46 (0.27 (1.33) 8.51 (1.51 (1.63) 9.31) 47. .71) 24.10 (0.62) 21.94 (0.63 (1.70 (1.82) 11.36) 13.73) 13.10) 36.43 (1.07 (1.73) 51.64 (0.64) 4.15) 13.77) 13.27 (0.87 (1.98 (0.51 (0.29 (1.01) 21.50 (1.11) 52.99 (0.14) 25.22 (1.e.11 (1.57 (1.17) 3.32 (0.51) 66.68) Notes: Column (1) provide the average proportion of individuals between 2005 and 2011 answering that “Sharia must be the only source of legislation” in response to the question “Sharia is an Arabic word which means Islam’s religious principles.05 (0.23) 2.12) 64.64) 45.99 (1.19) 50.59 (0.26 (1.46 (0.63) 51. which of these statements comes closest to your own point of view?” In columns (2)-(4) I present the proportion of individuals who were self-reportedly “thriving” (i.73 (1.81) 51.11) 56.50) 60.64 (1.57 (1.80 (0.97 (1.05 (0.75) 6.62 (1.27 (1.18) 20.02) 16. In general.56) 17.19) 11.12 (1.35 (1.25) 20.68) 10.76 (1.39 (1.30 (1.80 (0.38) 71.18) 13.87 (1.14) (3) Well-Being(2010) 12.12) 34.80) 11.13) 16.58) (2) Well-Being(2009) 18.53 (1.41) 24.13 (0.81 (0.63) 41.17 (1.28) 14.74) 46.23 (0.25) 37.25 (0.00 (1.37 (1.96) 6.84) 11.02) 28.25 (0.18) 16.56 (1.15 (0.81) 30.12 (1.76) 44.73) 22.79 (1.31) 18.03 (1.25) 17.98 (1.61) 14.11 (1.97) 52.64) 16.67) (1) Sharia 75.94 (1.32 (0.90 (0.74) 47. Countries marked in bold witnessed uprisings in 2011. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.49 (1.97 (0.04 (0.13 (1.06) (4) Well-Being(2011) 6.87) 10.64) 42.89) 37.09) 27.58 (1.52 (1.26) 14.19 (0.47 (0.88) 18.21) 16.Table 6: Support for the Sharia.67 (1.24) 10.41) 71.80) 48.77) 69.37 (1.19 (0.94) 13.01) 18. 2010 and 2011 respectively.
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