CONSTITIONAL LAW I& II ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968 Facts: A question novel in character, the answer to which

has far-reaching implications, is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional function to tax. Held: The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion there of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and selfrestriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES PRINCIPLE AND STATE

MIAA v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006 FACTS: The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and buildings.

At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Parañaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC. It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Parañaque posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of Parañaque three hours after the sale. Issue: Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax? Held: The Petition is GRANTED. The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the

exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national government instrumentalities. MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real estate tax. However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a taxable person. EXECTUIVE PRIVILEGE Neri vs. Senate G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vs. Legislative Inquiry during Question Hour Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege

Exception to Executive Privilege FACTS: This is regarding the contract entered into by DOTC with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project. In connection with this NBN Project, Senate passed various Resolutions and pending bills, which it then used as basis for initiating an investigation. One of the cabinet officials invited to appear before the Senate during the investigation was Petitioner, who was Director General of NEDA at the time. During the 11-hour questioning, Petitioner invoked executive privilege and refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. In view of his refusal, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee issued a subpoena ad testificandum, to which Petitioner replied that he was willing to testify to other matters besides those three questions covered by “executive privilege” and that he wanted to be furnished beforehand matters to be taken up during the inquiry so that he may adequately prepare therefor. Executive Secretary Ermita also sent a letter to the Blue Ribbon, affirming that indeed those three questions mentioned were covered by “executive privilege” because such information if disclosed might impair diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. As such, the Office of the President has ordered Petitioner not to answer those questions. Nevertheless, the Blue Ribbon issued a show cause Letter and a contempt Order against Petitioner. Thus, this case. ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? RULING: IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Scope and Limitations -The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of

information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege. Is there recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of E.O. 464? At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE: 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational

Nixon) does not apply -In Nixon. Clearly. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence clarifies as confidential and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege.” Unlike in Nixon. Some of these laws are Sec. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information. but in a legislative inquiry. the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military. In this regard. on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Senate v. xxx The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but. being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. and Sec. Instead. diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. RPC. In the present case. RA 6713. RA 3019. as may be provided by law. the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information. they do so as public officials and members of Congress. the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. This is the reason why the US Court was quick to “limit the scope of its decision. 7. there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Article III) itself provides the limitations. there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. Rule 130. also. to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases. Be that as it may. there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner of inquiry is conducted. Sec. in appropriate cases. i. not in a criminal proceeding. like any other right. 3(k). NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER ABAKADA GURO V.proximity” test. Furthermore. in Nixon. Ermita ruled that “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. though. In this regard. petitioner can be considered a close advisor.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality xxx and congressional demands for information. ROC. the right to information must be balanced with and should give way. Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern: More than anything else. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind. is subject to limitation. Respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need: xxx presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations xxxx Here. Art. ERMITA . 229. Executive Privilege vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern The right to public information. 24(e). specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial” (US v. the information here is elicited. This is because when they discharge their power. Senate v. EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: “Demonstrated. the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article.” It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. The provision (Section 7. Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decisionmaking process and diplomatic secrets. And third.e.

the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. revenue or tariff bills. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. also reiterate that R. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented..A. al.A. DELEGATION OF POWERS SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department. AUG. and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.R. So long as there is a public end for which R. No. No. NO.G. insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.^) . 2005 FACTS: Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED. et al. 168056. 3. CHECK OUT THE INTRO!!!! ^..” Escudero. ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al. No. V.by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate. the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation. As the Court stated in its Decision. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. 9337’s stand. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. 158540. Petitioners Escudero. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege. also contend that Republic Act No.A. bills authorizing increase of the public debt. the assailed provisions of R.A.. but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. ISSUE: Whether or not the R. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products. In the same breath. 9337 was passed. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand. considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.. bills of local application. No. The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. and Senate Bill No. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS. Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation. No. et. More importantly. especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance. Article VI. petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because “a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. as well as policy making. July 5. and a VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. G. it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. 2005 (HOLY CRAP.R. with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. 1950 on the other. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? RULING: The Court is not persuaded.

” POWER OF PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE TARIFF RATES: Without Section 28(2). such as department secretaries. This case. the President has no power. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist. constitutional limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs and similar measures. even as alter ego of the President. in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. (2) there must be specified limits. not the President. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. TARIFF COMMISSION AND DTI SEC ARE AGENTS: Concurrently. rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed. Indeed. In that regard.[1] who now seek reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July 2004 (Decision). both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres. of course. the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Article VI may be exercised. which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative. in accordance with legislative sanction. Without legislative authorization through statute. subject to limitations and restrictions. the parties in this case have done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their respective positions. it is about elementary statutory construction. and (3) Congress may impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. and obedience to the law. and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress. by the alter egos of the President. for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI. It is Congress. to levy tariffs and imports. not executive. the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. Just as much was asserted in the Decision. Indeed. Under the SMA. throwing in everything including the proverbial kitchen sink. Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the . has shifted to public respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor). it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. as ordained in the SMA. even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. the DTI Secretary has no inherent power. the burden of passion. For respondents. POWER EXERCISED BY ALTER EGOS OF PRES: The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2). When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions. the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. in their capacities as alter egos of the President. At present. it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity. is ultimately not just about cement. Section 28(2). the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial consideration: (1) there must be a law. Still. and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures. Certainly. In short. which granted the petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross). QUALIFIERS: This being the case. For this Court. to impose such measures. the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch. if not proof.“Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. and the same holds true with this present Resolution. Article VI.

AL. • Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong.No. The Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality.Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence by the other instrumentalities of the state like charters or the legislature’s action. Bernas actually states. it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power. we quote Section 28(2). Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? .NO. “Since the Constitution has given the President the power of control. • Thus this petition. Hon. • The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as a private citizen and taxpayer) • Camid contends/argues the following: o Municipality of Andong evolved into a full blown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and sevices. May the any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to Camid’s prayer? . there is an enumeration of existing municipalties including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid insists the continuing of EO107 arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. FACTS: • This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur • This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considerd null and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers. ISSUE: May the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation? RULING: NO. and 17 baranggays with chairman) o He noted agencies and private grous recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong • In the Certification of DILG. and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose. Thus. . tariff rates. What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President. San Andres was created through an executive order. Article VI: “The Congress may. no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem. authorize the President to fix within specified limits. tonnage and wharfage dues. import and export quotas. Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions. for the following reasons: o There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The . with all its awesome implications. it has ist own high school. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. Bureau of Post. ET. the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated. POWER BELONGS TO CONGRESS: …the cited passage from Fr. through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries.” Clearly the power to impose tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the President. and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong. with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature.Tariff Commission their respective functions in the legislature’s scheme of things. by law.” Does the President have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first place which may be curtailed by the executive power of control? At the risk of redundancy. the court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. CAMID V. DECS office etc. and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. • Likewise.Mendez. There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI.

Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment. o Andong did not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442(d) regarding municipalities created by executive orders. It says:  Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. o The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality. o The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House of Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong. Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33 invalidated municipalities are now considered existing? - No there was none. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the 1987 Constitution validates them. The fact that there existing organic statutes passed by the legislation recreating these municipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong. SC DECISION: DISMISSED for lack of Merit. RELEVANCE: Note the following Sections with regards to juridical personality of corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a different treatment with Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. 8: Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special

laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. 45 of the New Civil Code, those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions and Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. These two are governed by the law creating them. Since Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not a recognized political subdivision, it is not also considered a juridical person. Note: What happened with the people from Andong? The constituent barrios of the voided town returns to its original municipalities (Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are recognized and still existing. The solution to have Andong recognized is through legislation and not judicial confirmation of void title. PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL G.R. No. L-23825: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces…The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez

argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez’ argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC. HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative. TWO TEST OF A VALID DELEGATION SANTIAGO v. COMELEC G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997 Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political Law FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative? HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is

initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. People's Initiative This is probable the best case there is on the question of the people's right to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative. SANTIAGO VS COMELEC Nature: Petition for prohibition; the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative. Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, Ma. Isabel Ongpin – petitioners Jesus Delfin, Alberto & Carmen Pedrosa (PIRMA), COMELEC – respondents Raul Roco, DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN – petitioners/intervenors FACTS: Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution by People’s initiative. His proposal is to lift the term limits of elective officials and thus amending Sections 4 and 7 of Art VI, Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In his petition, Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue an order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) cause the publication of such order in newspaper of general and local circulation; and (3) instructing municipal election registrars in all regions of the Philippines to assist him and his volunteers in establishing signing stations. The COMELEC then issued an order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition and set the case for hearing.

At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Thereafter, Senator Santiago, et al., filed a special civil action for prohibition before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: The issues in the instant petition are the following: (1) Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. (2) Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. (3) Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. (4) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution. (5) Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. RULING: The Supreme Court held that: (1) The instant petition is viable despite the pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin Petition. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by Delfin

by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Joaquin Bernas it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure. 1997 Constitutional provision on People's Initiative is not self-executory Principle of Non-delegation of Powers. The petition therefore is granted. and for failure to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution is declared void. therefore. In its amended petition in intervention DIK and MABINI contend that the Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is. Exceptions . Revision contemplates a re-examination of the entire document to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. the law is incomplete. (4) Santiago’s petition contend that the people's initiative is limited to amendments to the constitution. The Office of the Solicitor General opined that extension of term of elected officials constitute a mere amendment to the Constitution. not to revision thereof. R. for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution. while there are subtitles for national and local initiatives. A revision cannot be done by initiative which. the SC had jurisdiction over the Defensor-Santiago petition because the petition may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests. COMELEC G. and although the change might appear to be an isolated one. (3) It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. No. it can affect other provisions. outside the power of the people's initiative. A. but a revision of. 6735 is declared inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It does not have that power under R. The SC said that despite the pendency of the Delfin Petition in the COMELEC. in the words of Fr. No. It does not become effective until passed by voters and its availability does not remedy the denial of the right to referendum. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced. not a revision thereof. Word of the Day: Initiative is a form of direct legislation by the people consisting of two parts: petition and election. Those parts of Resolution No.A. given the Roco motion filed with the COMELEC seeking dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It is only an amendment. March 19. It was held that COMELEC is without jurisdiction to entertain the Delfin Petition because it did not contain the signatures of the required number of voters as required by the Constitution. 127325. the Constitution because. Delfin in his memoranda contend that the lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under the 1987 constitution is not a "revision" of the constitution. is limited to amendments. (5) COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.and that it becomes imperative to stop the COMELEC from proceeding any further. such as. and the Commission on Elections is ordered to dismiss the DELFIN petition. "Amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the constitution. (2) RA 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative to amend the constitution because while Sec 3 mentions initiative on the Constitution and Sec 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of registered voters needed for a proposal. 6735. SANTIAGO v. the law does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. thus. there is no subtitle for the initiative on the Constitution. and this inadequacy cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. No.R.

intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. in the case of initiative on the Constitution. approved or rejected. The said section reads: SECTION 2.. the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III). Statement and Policy. considering that in the order . recognized and guaranteed. or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed. opposed on the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. xxx Bluntly stated. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. ordinances. Stated otherwise. and that Sec. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. Sec. It does not include. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. laws. – The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose. Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of this right? There is. among other things. and resolutions. xxx We agree that RA 6735 was. specifically lifting the limit of terms of elective officials. it could have provided for a subtitle therefor. If Congress intended RA 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 5. enact. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative. the Constitution” through the system of initiative.. approve. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. as among the contents of the petition. Santiago et al. in whole or in part. XVII of the Constitution. They can only do so with respect to “laws. Contrary to the assertion of public respondents COMELEC. the people cannot exercise it if Congress. ordinances.FACTS: Petitioners in this case sought to amend certain provisions of the Constitution. the Constitution. But is RA 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to “provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?” A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. which provides for initiative on statues and local legislation but not initiative on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier. 2 of Art. paragraph (c) requires. does not provide for its implementation. 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. or reject. in whole or in part. as its history reveals. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 adequately provided for people’s initiative on Constitution RULING: Constitutional provision on people’s initiative is not self-executory Sec. ordinances. while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right. 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. of course. Sec. statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted. as the case may be. amended or repealed.” Second. approve or reject.is not self-executory. which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws. 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative. It is true that Sec. enact. for whatever reason. or resolutions. Third. through people’s initiative. First. There is no law passed yet and RA 6735. the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended. initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section.

cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 28(2). Empowering the COMELEC.” Principle of non-delegation of power The rule is that what has been delegated. RA 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Delegation to the people at large. or hierarchy of values. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy. intrudes. senate concurring in the ratification by the president of the agreement establishing the WTO o Dec 29 – present petition was filed  Petitioner argues for the unconstitutionality of the WTO: o WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries at par with each other o WTO limits.of things. etc o Dec 9 – PS 1083. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete. ANGARA (1997) FACTS:  Petition for certiorari: State action to enter into WTO  April 15 1994 – DTI Sec signed in Morocco the final act embodying the results of multilateral negotiations regarding the WTO o Aug 12 – Senate receives letter from President submitting the Uruguay Final Act o Aug 13 – president’ letter submitting the Agreement establishing the WTO. impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the SC o WTO violates the constitutional mandate: to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. 97. Delegation to local governments. in every case of permissible delegation. VI. the primacy of interest. domestic materials and locally produced goods  Petitioner specifically seeks: o For the nullification of the concurrence of the Senate with the President’s agreement to join the WTO o For the prohibition of the enforcement and implementation of the WTO ISSUE/s:  WON the petition presents a political question . 5 above. to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. INCORPORATION CLAUSE TAÑADA V. an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. or implemented by the delegate. immediate adoption of the Agreement Establishing the WTO o Dec 14 – Senate Resolution No. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself. 23(2). The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Sec. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. carried out. inadequate. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote preferential use of Filipino labor. Ministerial Declarations. Art. and Delegation to administrative bodies. VI. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Sec. marks its limits. setting forth therein the policy to be executed. or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. However. maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. Art.

Art 12 of the 1987 Consti  WON the provisions of the Agreement unduly limit. or the Agreement  WON the provisions of the Agreeement violate the provisions of Sec19. Art 2. there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution that allow the Senate to ratify the concurrence with the WTO agreement • Need fore business exchange on the bases of equality and reciprocity . restrict. and Secs 10 and 12. and impair the sovereignty of the Phil Legislature  WON provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power  WON Senate acted with a grave abuse of discretion in concurring only in the agreement establishing the WTO SC RULING:  ISSUE # 1: MATTER OF JURISDICTION: political or justiciable o JUSTICIABLE because it seeks the nullity of a senate resolution on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution o An act of legislature is alleged to have infringed the Constitution: judicial review not just a matter of right but a duty (within the court’s expanded jurisdiction) o Application of a constitutional provision o Judiciary as final arbiter on GADLEJ o Judicial review for GADLEJ. protection of Filipino enterprises from unfair trade practices and overbearing foreign competitions o AND FURTHER. a disregard of which cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts o Kilosbayan. ONLY to determine WON there has been GADLEJ  WTO AGREEMENT AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM o Economic nationalism: violated by the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO Agreement o Economic nationalism in Sec 19. Inc v. not upon the merits nor propriety of govt policies. the cited WTO provisions do not violate the Consti o WTO agreement contains sufficient safeguards for developing countries • Declaration of Principles NOT SELFEXECUTING o Article 2 is a mere declaration of principles and state policies – basic political creed of the nation o Not intended to be self-executing o Used as aids by the judiciary in adjudication. and administrative procedures with its annexed agreements and imposed obligations o Negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor. not review of the wisdom of a legislative or executive policy. Art 2. Art 12 of the Consti o WTO: places nationals and foreign products on the same footing as Filipino and domestic products in contravention of the FILIPINO FIRST POLICY  Render meaningless “effectively controlled by Filipinos”  WTO: ensures conformity of national economic laws. and trade policies that uphold equality and reciprocity. or legislature in lawmaking o Not self-executing provisions. Morato: Do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation o Basco v.Feliciano’s concurring) • ISSUE # 2: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM SHOULD NOT BE READ WITH OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES TO ATTAIN BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY o Sec 10 and 12 of Article 12 should be read with relation to Sec 1 and 13 of the same Article: ideals of economic nationalism does not espouse an isolationist economy but a self-reliant and competent economy. Sec 1 and 13. WON the members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the Senate Reso No. Pagcor: broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement them • WHY? Because of basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the unchartered ocean of social and economic policy making (READ OPOSA. domestic materials and locally produced goods  RESPONDENTS: o Constitutional provisions are not selfexecuting. Secs 10 and 12. o Read properly. 97 are estopped from impugning the validity of the same. able to compete in foreign markets. merely policies o Such nationalistic provisions must be read in relation to: Art 12. regulations.

praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing. concurrence of the Senate in the WTO agreement o Ministerial Declarations were deemed accepted without being ratified. 2002 Facts: This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petitionin-intervention. by virtue of Article 25: Sec 1 of GATT JUDGMENT: The validity of the assailed resolution is upheld. 151445. unlike in the Security Council where major states have permanent seats and veto powers o Poor countries can protect their economies through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries o Not mere practical alliances.• Protectionist policy only against unfair trade practices Does not encourage entry of foreign goods services. LIM V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. period within which the reduction is to be spread out (page 61) o Export subsidy for agricultural production (GATT) o Anti-dumping measures. and trade without discrimination – rules of equality and reciprocity applying to all members  CONSITUTION FAVORS CONSUMERS NOT INDUSTRIES OR ENTERPRISES o WON the WTO/GATT will favor consumers is a political question. national treatment. but does not prohibit them either  WTO RECOGNIZES NEED TO PROTECT WEAK ECONOMIES o WTO has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing countries o Each vote by a member is equal to one. APRIL 11. similar to RA 165. which are considered to be automatically part of the country’s laws o Authority limited by principles of international law and treaty stipulations  UN CHARTER AND OTHER TREATIES LIMIT SOVEREIGNTY  ISSUE # 4: WTO AND JUDICIAL POWER: o In question: WTO TRIPS – Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights intrudes on the power of the SC to promulgate rules concerning pleading. countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges  CONSTITUTION DOES NOT RULE OUT FOREIGN COMPETITION o Policy of self-reliance does not necessarily mean no foreign exchange allowed o Not economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community o Independence refers to freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy o WTO rules on most favored nation. equal to any other’s vote. practice and procedures o Burden of proof on proving the authenticity of a patent similar to something else by another country SC upholds said TRIPS. wisdom of legislative policy  CONSITUTION DESIGNED TO MEET FUTURE EVENTS AND CONTINGENCIES  ISSUE # 3: WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE POWER o Petitioners: because each member-country is required to conform to the laws and regulations of the WTO. that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition . the lawmaking body of Congress is limited to this conformity o Especially as WTO infringes on the taxation power of Congress: when WTO fixes tariff rates  SOVEREIGNTY LIMITED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATISES o All government authority is inherently limited by the fact that it is a member of a family of nations o Doctrine of incorporation: the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law. but real negotiations rooted in law  SPECIFIC PROVISOS TO PROTECT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES o Amount of tariff reduction. Patent Law  ISSUE#5: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND NOT IN OTHER DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT o Assailed Senate Resolution expressed concurrence in what the Final Act required. GR NO.

in “Balikatan 02-1. 2002. both party-Iist organizations. 2001. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. not because of any issue as to their truth. in conjunction with the Philippine military. but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence.’activities” arose from accident. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. on an impermanent basis. the “Balikatan” is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s objectives. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops.” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Beginning January of this year 2002. which is presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. or impartiality. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts: Beginning January of year 2002. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA. In theory. petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. in conjunction with the Philippine military. 2002. Lim and Paulino P. a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part.” They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. accuracy. attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. in that United States personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement. which it refers to as the context of the treaty.against the deployment of U. and in particular. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative. from any political activity. 2002. as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south. the petition and the petition-inintervention were dismissed. As a rule. It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word . who filed a petition-inintervention on February 11. petitioners Arthur D. It was . The VFA permits United States personnel to engage. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text. Wherefore. in "Balikatan 02-1. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao. petitioners Arthur D. LIM vs. Lim and Paulino P. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms. Issue: Whether “Balikatan 02-1” activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement? Ruling: To resolve this. it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. On February 1. personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part. as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. it does not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se. Held: The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On February 1.S. It cannot accept. Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. in “activities. in the absence of concrete proof. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international antiterrorism campaign declared by President George W. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts.

The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents. Under these auspices. there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. assisting and training exercise. disaster relief operations.terrorism advising. and against associations. from enforcing its provisions. ICHONG V HERNANDEZ. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business. As conceived. 115 Facts: Petitioner. 101 PHIL. partnerships.” a “mutual anti. It is only logical to assume that . Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources. Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. and the like. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. (2) an exception from the above . The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons. the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act. sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession. civic action projects such as the building of school houses. In this manner. under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. In this case. even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which. for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents. not citizens of the Philippines. He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. particularly city and municipal treasurers. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which. from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Hence. and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him. brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional. a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. 1180. violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5. HELD: Yes. visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. Republic Act No. it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike.” falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.’Balikatan 02-1. being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. according to him. LAO ICHONG VS JAIME HERNANDEZ Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. contending among others that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law. it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. medical and humanitarian missions. and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. and.” For the sake of argument. or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. if it applies alike to all persons within such class.

It does not demand absolute equality among residents. The conflict.embracing and have transcended human foresight. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself. Otherwise stated. economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade. commerce and industry. the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses. Properly related. shall it be said. under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die. their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities. the nature of the business. giving. as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It has been said that police power is so farreaching in scope. Is there public interest. what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. for that would mean license and anarchy. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. a public purpose. among other matters. if it applies alike to all persons within such class. liberty and . is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose. 1954. It is not intended to prohibit legislation. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege. The balancing is the essence or. There can be no absolute power. Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved. as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world. which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. who are allowed to continue to engage therein. just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all. and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. whoever exercise it. (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike. it is said to be coextensive with self-protection and survival. until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons. So the State can deprive persons of life. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State. so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty. and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons. unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law. and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes. the most essential. the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless. insistent and illimitable. is it not unreasonable. therefore.prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15. (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization. that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. for that would be tyranny. or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied. (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States.

Specifically. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. According to him. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. 2005 FACTS: In 1938. who are granted special rights by the Constitution. Political Law FACTS: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty. STATE IMMUNITY REPUBLIC vs. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty. ICHONG VS. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18. 31 MAY 1957] Sunday. Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. provided there is due process of law. the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law . RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. is reason. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries. that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature. LIM GR no. HELD: According to the Court. February 01. and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.property. and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected. 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare. except those of the United States. and persons may be classified into classes and groups. with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. ISSUE: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. June 29. are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. L-7995. the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. 161656. that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. as always. the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug. . that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control. nor the due process of law clause. And if distinction and classification has been made. The test or standard.

the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio. in Valdehueza. They appealed the CFI’s decision to the SC. the Denzons’ successors-in-interest. one of the heirs of the Denzons.7 Accordingly. However. on May 1940.The Republic deposited P9. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property.500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Without prompt payment. of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.10 as just compensation. as security for their loans. The Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11. Article III. In jurisdictions similar to ours..40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question. this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16.This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land. the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4.248. Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim. adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. herein respondent. they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. An entry of judgment was made on April 5. Lt. 1966. declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. on September 20. the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim. an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. In 1950. he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value". Valdehueza and Panerio. 1961.” Petitioner. The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-ininterest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14. through the OSG. in view of the annotation on their land titles. 1940. respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots." The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property. it sustained the RTC Decision saying: “. As early as May 19.062. On 2001. in 1964. HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law. filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932. compensation cannot be considered "just". While it is true that all private properties are . For their failure to pay Lim despite demand. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939. The lot title was issued in his name." On September 6. Section 9. it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time.. On 1992. On November 1961.10.062. Meanwhile. holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P4. Thereafter. 1948. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value. the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio. 1948.. 2003. Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land. and in expropriation cases. In its Decision dated September 18. but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. 1961. but it "denied knowledge of the matter." Unfortunately. On July 1962. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots. where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation..

By the evening of 27 July 2003. however from the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain. however. Pimentel et al. The President. In Cosculluela v. we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots. whenever it takes property from private persons against their will. In the interim. vs. Romulo et al. the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. et al. SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings. Thus. 1 on leave FACTS: They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives." Thus. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP. Suplico. did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on 1 August 2003. 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 2 join. After all. So. [GR 159185]. Without prompt payment. for more than 50 years? Clearly. SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. however.subject to the need of government. "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation. here. among other things. 1 dissents in separate opinion. also Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers/Member [GR 159103]. 2 file own separate opinions." CIVILIAN SUPREMACY SANLAKAS VS." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v. There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. ISSUE: Whether the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration. and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REYES [GR 159085. the resignation of the President. HELD: . the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. to facilitate the payment of just compensation. Salem Investment Corporation. how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation. the Oakwood occupation had ended. [GR 159196] En Banc. Tinga (J): 3 concur. 3 February 2004]. In the wake of the Oakwood occupation. there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of 27 July 2003. without full payment of just compensation. there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. 3 concur in result. the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). the President issued later in the day Proclamation 427 and General Order 4.. several petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the validity of Proclamation 427 and General Order 4. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. compensation cannot be considered "just. required by law. both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Macapagal-Arroyo. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. we ruled that. the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete. it is the duty of the government. through Proclamation 435. After hours-long negotiations. et al. the soldiers demanded. Court of Appeals. vs.

The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter. the President lifted the same. reverse. courts do not adjudicate moot cases. the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding RAMON GONZALES VS EXEC SEC RUFINO HECHANOVA G. but. stones and other deadly weapons’ assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation 435. Gonzales. but. On that occasion.R. In other words. the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail. when it runs counter to an act of Congress. revise. declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist. Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters asso. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements.000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review. To prevent similar questions from reemerging. No. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute. also. firearms. explicitly prohibits the importation of . or writ of error. not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law. courts will decide a question. modify. Hence. filed and averring that in making or attempting to make importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207. Once before. the President on 1 May 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38 and General Order 1. Five days after such declaration. certiorari. the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President’s calling out power. judicial power being limited to the determination of “actual controversies. as the law or the rules of court may provide. suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative.. is not applicable to the case at bar. GONZALES VS. or affirm on appeal. bladed weapons. law. Ramon A. without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.” Petitions were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the validity of the President’s declaration.” Nevertheless. HELD: Under the Constitution.” The present case is one such case. except in the exercise of his veto power. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction". final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty. insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. ordinance. by providing that the SC may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review. Perez and accompanying cases precluded the Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. L-21897 Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Nat’l Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. “‘an angry and violent mob armed with explosives. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws. our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty. Gonzales. As a rule. because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. HECHANOVA 9 SCRA 230 FACTS: Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67. has rendered the case moot. however. the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. also. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation.NO. Hechanova not only admits. or executive order or regulation is in question". by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. otherwise moot. clubs.

18.R. VII of the Constitution. HELD: The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in consonace to section 2 art. Issues: (1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility violates the constitutional provisions on supremacy over the military and the character of the PNP armed patrols civilian civilian Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. the alleged consummation of the contracts with vietnam and burma does not render this case academic. ZAMORA G. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines. A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our government to default in the performance of such obligations as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the phils. enjoins our government not from entering contracts for the purchase of rice. VII of the Constitution. the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation . VIII of the constitution. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. otherwise. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces. Under Sec. 18. and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. 2000 Sunday. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law.. both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms. ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. January 25. Art. the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned law. NO. AUGUST 15. invasion or rebellion. Art. but from entering rice. However. Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. except under conditions prescribed in said act. the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden. IBP VS.141284. RA 2207. until such time when the situation shall have improved. he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only.rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency. Political Law Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-inChief under Sec. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

(2) Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement. the petition is hereby DISMISSED.R. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government 4. In view of standing Apart from this declaration. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times. is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. G. 2000. the PNP. (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. II of the Constitution. and not with the military. Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols. Nevertheless. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2. the political question being a function of the separation of powers. which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier. SO ORDERED. the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. ZAMORA. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution. Indeed. Hence. Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Section 3 of the Constitution. absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover. however. premises considered. 141284 G. none of its members. Art. disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel. 3. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions. AUGUST 15. Moreover. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained. Issue: 1. 141284. that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols. Ratio: The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP. The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing. the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows . of a particular act or measure being assailed. would be conducted. Held: WHEREFORE. 3. the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. NO.R. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under the Constitution. the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. is his alone. and. 2." The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more. National President of the IBP who signed the petition.of Sec. not the legality. called Task Force Tulungan. NO. while undoubtedly true. there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. IBP VS. whom the IBP purportedly represents. has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.

whether it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence. 4 As has been pointed out. the exercise of the President's powers as commander-in-chief. the military will gain ascendancy. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls. In view of burden of proof on factual basis It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. invasion or rebellion. and other public places. invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion). public utilities. President as stated in Section 18. under the Constitution. Calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court. under Section 18. invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety. In view of abuse of discretion The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines. the majority opinion says that what is involved here is not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement." the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. there can be no "insidious incursion" of the . (2) public safety must require it. at one point. two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and. invasion or rebellion. Thus. Article VII of the Constitution. specifically. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. but requires . we are left to guess or even speculate on these questions. the President's power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence. especially in the light of present developments. "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. . The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. requires proof — not mere assertion. . invasion or rebellion. Under the LOI. a factual showing of perceptible harm. We need to have evidence on these questions because. . the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed. or to act at all in contemplation of law. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. In view of the Courts concurrence We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. Considering the above circumstances. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. As such. There is. Moreover. Indeed. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary." Because of the absence of such record evidence. likewise. the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. . Article VII of the Constitution. in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law.

For this reason. 170165. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup d’etat. ISSUE: Whether the act complained of was serviceconnected and therefore cognizable by court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts RULING: The military justice system is disciplinary in nature. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character. but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in times of war. aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. GONZALES et. After much negotiation. The administration of military justice has been universally practiced. 164007. with discretionary power to act. more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue. Aug. The Court held that the offense is serviceconnected. No. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Subsequently. They then declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. 3 The exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch of government was often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine. contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not service-connected and that their violation of Art. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. 2003 at around 1:00 a. Equally indicative of the “service-connected” nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service – imposable only by the military court.m.R. evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. .. GUDANI v. Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution. for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. the group finally laid down their arms. 2006 The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege. but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces." 2 They have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the government. the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces. it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. They question the jurisdiction of the court martial. SENGA G. al v. Since time immemorial. but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace. at the same time that they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. GEN. In short. an Information for coup d’etat was filed against them with the RTC. 2006 The nature of the military justice system Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War FACTS: On July 27. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. xxx It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.R. Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war. where they disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building. No. 15. 10. Aug. ABAYA G. Makati City.

Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate. the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions. the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. prompting Gen. and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Senga issued a Memorandum. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Balutan and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition. prohibiting Gen. the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege. Gudani. which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. Gen. ISSUE: Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry RULING: We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so. Remedy is judicial relief At the same time. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. Gudani and Col. the clash may soon loom or actualize. but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. 22. the Constitution prescribes that it is the President. Nevertheless. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief. In the meantime. we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP. we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Balutan testified before said Committee. Gudani. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which . the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege. as a general rule. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief. including Gen. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress is based on Commander-in-chief powers As earlier noted. However. Again. it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces. After all. President Arroyo issued EO 464. If the President is not so inclined. yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the “Hello Garci” tapes emerged. Sen. since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could. In doing so.FACTS: On Sept. the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Senga to order them subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer. and not the Senate. At the same time. Col. require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. 2005.

The remedy lies with the courts. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. This is to minimize prostitution. informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions.. due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. The due process contention is likewise untenable. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive.members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise.5k/yr). a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES . the presumption stays. such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. arbitrary and against due process. INC VS MAYOR OF MANILA G. coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause. In this case.R. hence. As in this case. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches. WHO EXERCISES THESE GOV’T POWER cases: ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOC. the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship. The fact that the executive branch is an equal. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity. there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. L-24693 Police Power – Due Process Clause On 13 June 1963. No. it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The judiciary. Further. the third coordinate branch of government. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation. the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga.

safety and general welfare of the people. the property of the plaintiffs." "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. its use has rarely been denied. it should not be disturbed by the courts. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. The plaintiffs allege otherwise.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. peace. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would. as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth. convenience and morals of the community. May Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of Police Power? In view of the requirements of due process. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by . a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. to be the right of the State. or property. 1915 ( 32 Phil 580) FACTS: The case arises from the fact that defendant. L-10572. ordain. violate any of the provisions of the organic law. to prescribe regulations for the good order. or property. or billboard. liberty. which. "The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make. G. signboard. and of the subjects of the same. primarily rest the exercise of the police power. would like to destroy or remove any sign. not repugnant to the constitution. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction. whimsical. without doubt. has not received a full and complete definition. CHURCHILL vs. morals." "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. good order.. for the sole reason that such sign. unjust or unreasonable. Collector of Internal Revenue. and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws. which do not . and ordinances." "The police power of the State.POLICE POWER On the legislative organs of the government. the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life. Substantive Due Process: Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. health. Two types of Due Process Procedural Due Process: Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life. RAFFERTY. however. so far.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life. liberty. whether national of local..R. NO. peace. either with penalties or without. or may be offensive to the sight. liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Was there valid exercise of police power in this case? HELD: Yes. however. is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. comfort. be held to be invalid. signboard. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health. These range from the regulation of dance halls. or state functionary. protection. equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties. December 21.45 gas stations46 and cockpits.44 movie theaters. safety. or billboard is."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. or comfort. It may be said. it cannot be too often emphasized. statutes.

is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession. 2000 Police Power as exercised by LGUs. morals. March 31. But can city mayor cancel business permits or impose special conditions? As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment. although it does have in its employ. likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity. No. to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit authorizes the person. or to prescribe limits to its exercise. peace. through the legislature. the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law. natural or otherwise. v. ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra vires RULING: Police Power exercised by LGUs Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. morals." ACEBEDO OPTICAL Co. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits. It is provided for by law. what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. subject to certain conditions like prohibition of putting up an optical clinic. order." "It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries. on the other hand. as agencies of the State. CA G. withdraw or cancel the same. has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units. MMDA VS BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION . granting of permit to practice profession FACTS: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. examining and/or prescribing reading and similar optical glasses. in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. comfort and convenience of the community. peace. safety. good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. Did the conditions or restrictions imposed amount to a confiscation of the business? Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession.R. However. The State. etc. with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code xxx The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health. Permit was therefor issued.usage. the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke. its business permit was cancelled. restrictions and qualifications Power of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke business permits Granting of business permits vs. education. And the power to revoke or cancel. In the case at bar. When it was found that petitioner violated these conditions. 100152. or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare. if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose. is within the ambit of this power. A professional license. Power of city mayor to grant business permits The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil.

It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make. the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street. a road inside Bel-Air Village. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive. Marikina. BelAir Village Association. Once delegated. national government agencies. Navotas. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units i. and for the subjects of the same. With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995.. San Juan and Taguig. 1996. Pasig. Mandaluyong. it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. a notice dated December 22. After due hearing. convenience and welfare of the general public. On appeal. public safety. a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. is a non-stock. 1996. 1995. and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws. respondent received from petitioner. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. a private subdivision in Makati City. The National Legislature. may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. the cities of Caloocan. Las Pinas. One of these is transport and traffic . nonprofit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day. and the municipalities of Malabon. For this purpose. Manila. and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. . Quezon. BAVA was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units. the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. On December 30. Paranaque and Valenzuela. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. accredited people’s organizations. non-governmental organizations. From the premise that it has police power. Makati. the trial court denied the issuance of preliminary injunction. Clearly. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. Muntinlupa. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. BAVA instituted against petitioner before the RTC a civil case for injunction. and the general welfare. Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2. On January 2.Date: March 27. The implementation of the MMDA’s plans. Pateros. ordain. through its Chairman. the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts. either with penalties or without. public morals. Pasay. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety.e. reaching and justifying measures for public health. Inc. namely. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street. . 2000 Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc FACTS: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila. as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth. IAC. statutes and ordinances. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. not repugnant to the Constitution. however. ISSUE: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public HELD: No Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities.

Under this service.) No. installation of a system and administration. there is no provision in R." The MMA’s governing body. . the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. let alone legislative power. coordination. setting of policies. traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. D. infrastructure requirements. O. the Metropolitan Manila Council. monitoring. A. No. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons. and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances.) No. can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power. non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies. a "development authority. the administration of all traffic enforcement operations. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities. the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system. the predecessor of the MMDA. Court of Appeals. as termed in the charter itself." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power. The MMA’s power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila. the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22. the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. much less police power. was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation. There is no syllable in R. It did not have legislative power.management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies. management. Intermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). an examination of Presidential Decree (P. 824. either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA. Jjlex In 1990. The MMDA is. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units. Firstly. that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. In the instant case. The MMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances. people’s organizations. 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA. preparation. the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs. It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation. while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. implementation. Misjuris Secondly. through its president. President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. the charter of the MMC. as an exercise of police power. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It ought to be stressed." In addition. however. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation. regulation. standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations." fix. the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. Under the 1987 Constitution. By no stretch of the imagination. Contrary to petitioner’s claim. as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. No. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA. A. however.

The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. 1 SCOPE OF PROTECTED LIFE. No. 1995. Article X of the Constitution. Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units. Everyday. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. A. the President merely exercises supervisory authority. 7924 took effect. 3 Sec. No. It is the local government units.. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. to resign from the company. In Jan. the MMC under P. Tecson's superiors . Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. D. Clearly then. 1998. to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest. traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. that possess legislative power and police power. hence. In the case at bar. 7924. Unlike the MMC. Glaxo's competition. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILS. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months." When R. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people’s productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country.A. 438 SCRA 343 FACTS: Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. acting through their respective legislative councils. but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street. Esmso We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA’s noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. No. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila. 24. Before getting married. that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO VS. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter. part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite." and to "advise the local governments accordingly. No. LIBERTY AND PROPERTY cases: DUNCAN ASSOC. an employee of Astra. ART. INC. A. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. among others. In fact. 1999. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy. whereas in local government units.Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. R.

whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law. an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible. or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. under special provisions of law. Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29. March 26. the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid. it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct. or diminution in pay. marketing strategies. 2000. and he may be safely held. Corollarily. 15. PALANCA G. the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Betsy. On Constructive Dismissal Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting. however. manufacturing formulas. After his request against transfer was denied. Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Unable to comply with condition. by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. but he never availed of any of them. he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. when there is demotion in rank. It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. and other confidential programs and information from competitors. L-11390. to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. in person or by agent. The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. under certain conditions.R..informed him of conflict of intrest. insensibility. The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner. The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem. HELD: The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and evenhanded manner. No. FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein. 1918 JURISDICTION. "WHEREFORE. HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process. Afterwards. with due regard for the lot of the employee. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid RULING: On Equal Protection Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets. discriminatory or wrongful. or when a clear discrimination." TWO KINDS OF DUE PROCESS cases: BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO v.. In the case at bar. unreasonable or unlikely. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a .

and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief. foreclosure. in its narrow application. or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person. whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law. after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action Whether or not due process of law was observed RULING: On Jurisdiction The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different. and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. On August 7. or other form of remedy. about seven years after the confirmation of this sale. China. are in a general way thus designated. or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. whether by attachment. where the property is seized at the beginning of the action. or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address. may never be taken into actual custody at all. which is in Amoy. or some subsequent stage of its progress. is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. How Jurisdiction is Acquired Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority. though at all times within the potential power of the court. Nevertheless. 1908. . this sale was confirmed by the court. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings. and held to abide the final event of the litigation. at the instance of some person claiming to be owner. without taking actual physical control over the property assumes. The expression "action in rem" is. a motion was made by Vicente Palanca. However. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment. though related. under special provisions of law. Here the court. or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant. used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based.non-resident. as administrator of the estate of the original defendant. the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. it was necessary to give notice by publication. In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem. In the latter case the property. to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

This. though much increased. is not such an irregularity. and hence in our opinion that irregularity. it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present. the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due process? The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice. would not avoid the judgment in this case. and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. and usually in addition thereto. (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard. we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner. namely. furthermore. on the other hand. if the defendant for whom publication is made appears. there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. Though commonly called constructive. It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity. and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction. It will be noted. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. prescribing the time within which appearance must be made. as amounts to a denial of due process of law. (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem. under certain conditions. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. The jurisdiction being once . (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. is everywhere recognized as essential. if his residence is known. On Due Process xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding. is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service.xxx It is true that in proceedings of this character. for the mailing of notice to the defendant. under the law. does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem. if proved. however. however. but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In the light of all these facts. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands. if in fact he did so fail in his duty. and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. or substituted service of process in any true sense. to be considered absolutely necessary. In the application of the idea of due process of law. and he may be safely held. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication. that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event. in person or by agent. to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner. it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not.

established. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. 3. Attempt to evade or defeat tax 3. HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U. the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. . We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law. or television 4. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The case against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one’s property or property right. Finally. Judge in the light of these conceptions. The U. we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. Fraud by wire. as well as conducting further proceedings. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. False statement or entries 5. through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. The Grand Jury Indictment. and as publication was duly made in the newspaper. is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights. 2. the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 —Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US 2. all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard. the warrant for his arrest. The US government. and prohibition. for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced.S. Respondent. radio. At that point in time. Charges include: 1. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers. certiorari.S. Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice (DOJ). LANTION 322 SCRA 160 (2000) Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC FACTS: On June 18. SEC OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE RALPH LANTION Due Process Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. which. but even more so in the case before us. involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. grounds: 1. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. No less is this true. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.

ISSUES: 1. having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty . WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion. it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a. 3. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges. but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. & to the deprivation of his liberty.S. In essence. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. can possibly lead to his arrest. the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent. In the case at bar. Thus. may claim the right to appear therein & present their side. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing Yes. thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. replacement of an appointee) c. the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2). the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. therefore. similar to a preliminary investigation. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. cancellation of passport). 2. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. or property. Twin rights have been offered. civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action. Clearly. as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. & upon notice. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country. there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. & the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer. the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal. The U. liberty. Because of such consequences. & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. b. padlocking filthy restaurants. The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal. the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding.

Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay. that private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner. forcibly taken from his house. If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282. No conflict. decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with. Request should impose veil at any stage. RULING: An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and efficiency. separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS: cases: SERRANO VS NLRC FACTS: Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head of Security Checker. Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security agency.RULING: No. the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. His rights of abode. Due to alleged shortage of leather. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. ISSUE: Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to replace its current security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter. he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our government’s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. A person ordered extradited is arrested. the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering dismissal illegal. For this reason. to privacy. In 1991. the in accordance with that article. he should not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without legal effect. it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. as a cost-cutting measure. that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would be terminated. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he . That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. as applied in most countries. If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law. NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner. Kapunan. To contend that even if the termination is for a just cause. but are not superior to national legislative acts. Doctrine of incorporation under international law. Puno. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA.

The passage of the act did not conform to the printed-form and the 3 day requirement. that of having something to support its decision. Whether or not the apportionment of members of the HOR is valid. HELD: The petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved provinces have the personality to sue. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. an act that apportions representative districts in the country. and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR. 3. must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy. Furthermore. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and allege to be constitutional 2. They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040. (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental. 4. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. petitioners have no personality to bring such action ISSUES: 1. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. and that there is no certificate of urgency from the President was received by the HO. 2. in all controversial questions. They are. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring such action.favors it over NLU. they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because: 1. therefore. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population 3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing. and the reasons for the decisions rendered. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges. Misamis Oriental and Bulacan. They alleged that their respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation. Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they 1. it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded. a place when directly attached. Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the 3 year requirement. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. namely. The requirement that the . (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage 2. MACIAS V. Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and 3 day requirement.

on the other hand. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power. The Court held that RA 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.apportionment must be done within 3 year following the last census is complied with. 7783 is constitutional HELD: NO There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights. Private respondent. within the meaning of the constitution. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. In other words. 409]. Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. The apportionment of members of the HOR is not valid because it is not based on the number of inhabitants a province has. it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits.AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT. The petitioners. it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations. HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio.” CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO LIM v. Some provinces were given more representation despite the inferior in number of inhabitants. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No. JUDGE LAGUIO & MTDC FACTS: The petitioners seek to reverse the ruling of the ruling of the RTC regarding the unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. and it may even impose increased license fees. argues that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" [Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code] and that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police powers [Article III. SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA. 7783 which is entitled. He also granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS cases: UNITED STATES VS. Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community. ENTERTAINMENT. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution. personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. the appeal by the petitioners. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. contends that the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels and that the Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected. But inspite of itsthe judiciary virtuous aims. LUIS TORIBIO Police Power Sometime in the 1900s. Hence. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use. the enactment of the . Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC). ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid. but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. fornication and other social ills.

in this case. bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. the City Council. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. as "the law which hears before it condemns. out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance. YNOT VS. Local legislative bodies. No. 1987 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: (1) notice. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. (2) hearing. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites. Exceptions to Notice and Hearing This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for. contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the ordinance void is AFFIRMED. IAC G. as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se.Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. ISSUE: Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property without due process of law RULING: Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and Hearing The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which. challenging the constitutionality of said EO. March 20. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing. would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword." which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case. (2) reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose FACTS: Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. for example." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who. the least limitable and the most demanding of the three .R. exceptions SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires government interference. By reason of its function. like a mad dog on the loose. He brought an action for replevin. The conclusive presumption. Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive. to compel his return to the country he has fled. faced by the awesome power of the State. cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guiseof due process and equal protection of laws of police power. to be sure. there are a number of admitted exceptions. In such instances. Hence this petition for review. We have consistently declared that every person. Pornographic materials. 74457. is entitled to "the law of the land. which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. generally speaking.

to be meted out by the executive authorities. has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. Perhaps so. not to be flippant dead meat. by the measure itself. providing that "no carabao regardless of age. EO 626-A is unconstitutional In the instant case. Its reach is virtually limitless. viz. again following the above-cited doctrine. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. that there be a lawful method.000. far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. sex. were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12. Executive Order No. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed. we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement. so to speak. and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared. the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander.00. as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter. Even so. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. no such trial is prescribed. is hemmed in by the police power.inherent powers of the State. it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as. We note that to strengthen the original measure. thus denying . The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard. In the Toribio Case. which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. as forfeited to the government. the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. which was carried out forthright. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported. usually the police only. it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. not Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order. as the poor man's tractor. which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. as a member of society. convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment. Obviously. significantly. the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment. Under the challenged measure. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit. Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited.. with no less difficulty in one province than in another. As for the carabeef. The individual. Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Reasonable Means Necessary for the Accomplishment of Purpose. so says executive order. The executive order defined the prohibition. its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. First Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Interests of the Public Generally Require Interference xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao. However. retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims. which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. considering that they can be killed anywhere. the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise.

In the exceptional cases accepted. they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit. there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. finally. To sum up then. Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. on top of all this. in the case of carabeef." (Emphasis supplied. if condition it is. the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. There is. . there is here a "roving commission. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse. also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and. the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice. and even corruption. IAC Police Power – Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature. is unduly oppressive. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. Angeles.him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. Their options are apparently boundless. In the case before us. To strengthen the law. On 13 Jan 1984. as we held in Pesigan v. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition." in short. to wit. There is none. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer. we hereby declare Executive Order No. Considering that. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines. and only after trial and conviction of the accused. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. or better still. and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit. 626-A unconstitutional. We also mark. with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. however. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. Definitely. which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit. worse. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. For these reasons." a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. YNOT v. and in their own exclusive discretion. the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. in the case of carabaos. the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

briefing. or any tip from any school. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. There is. CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan. is unduly oppressive.ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. the title and text of which are reproduced below ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON. also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. CA FACTS: PRC issued a resolution directing that no examinee for the CPA Board Exam shall attend any review class. as this will infringe n the examinees’ right to libery. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. ISSUE: Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of . such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. Furthermore. then they must be held to be invalid. instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the 3 days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. GROUP OF PERSONS. review material. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. finally. 1969. LUPANGO v. GAMES. and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the theaters and they attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. lecturer. college or university. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued. BALACUIT v. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and. or shall receive any handout. worse. ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. The enforcement of Resolution No. HELD: Such resolution is unreasonable. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Such resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. or any review center or the like or any reviewer. To be valid. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. CFI FACTS: At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. conference or the like conducted by.

Accordingly. there is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. from Philippine or other nationalities. (the School. however. 128845. cry discrimination.R. no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction. In fact. and home leave travel allowance. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. of course. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is. transportation. NO. ISSUE: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. not at all practicable. the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. 640 unconstitutional and. null and void. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. however. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare. the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty. This is. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure. and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. shipping costs.power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City? RULING: No. taxes. We agree. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE cases: INT'L. classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health. Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad. safety. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners WHEREFORE. namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. G. such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment. beside the point. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children. the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. These include housing. Private respondent International School. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. mostly Filipinos. Inc. for short). therefore. the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters and other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. Further. RULING: . the local-hires of private respondent School. a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents. However. morals and the general welfare. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. 1 JUN 2000] FACTS: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances Ordinance No. Furthermore.

NO.R. the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. 2000 FACTS: The accused-appellant. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. therefore.14 of RA 9006 (The fair election act) insofar as it expressly repeals Sec. This rule applies to the School. Impleaded as respondents are the Executive sec. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. effort and responsibility. In this case. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts. collective bargaining agreements included. The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10. The petition is hereby granted in part. ISSUE: 1. Speaker of the House etal. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. the court laid down the rule: “The clause.The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work. under similar conditions. WON the effectivity clause which states “This Act shall take effect upon its approval” (Sec. Romeo Jalosjos. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman." "to afford labor full protection. the petition is given due course. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. 1997. the law shall take effect fiftten days after its publication in the OG or newspaper of general circulation. Wherefore. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy. it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. 132875-76. but it does not render the entire law invalid. An effectivity clause which provides that the law “shall take immediately upon its approval” is defective.147387 December 10.. FEBRUARY 3. skill." The State. FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. In Tanada vs Tuvera. unless otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself”… Publication is indispensable in every case." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications. has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. 1996 and march 19. its "international character" notwithstanding. we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. should be paid similar salaries. JALOSJOS G. That would be adding insult to injury. courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. For the same reason. PEOPLE VS.2003 FACTS: Before the court is a petition to declare as unconstitutional Sec. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires.67 of BP 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) filed by Farinas et al. are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest.16) is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution RULING: 1. must yield to the common good. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. . minority members of the minority bloc in the HR. The employer has discriminated against that employee. salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of localhires. the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates.

50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever.” And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. Ormoc Sugar Company. As it is now. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Art. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage. inspite of its importance. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company. For production of sugar alone is not taxable. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY INC. VS ORMOC CITY ET AL “Equal Protection” FACTS: In 1964. in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Ormoc City passed a bill which read: “There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated. Inc. from the coverage of the tax. the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. shall be void. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class. Inc. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company. or out of the same. it is true. However. 11. Still. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law. the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. VI of the Constitution. and none other. Inc.087. Inc. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment. to be reasonable. It may not be extended by intendment. . The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central.” Though referred to as a “production tax”. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. it has constitutional foundations. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7. it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality. it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company. implication or equitable considerations. of the same class as plaintiff. use of bridges or otherwise. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives RULING: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. the classification.. even if later a similar company is set up. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. as the entity to be levied upon. should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.

. 179817. alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case. petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted. whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise.R. 2007. be bailable by sufficient sureties.TRILLANES IV VS. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate. there was already conviction. FACTS: Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.e. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties. he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30. Excessive bail shall not be required. both being punishable by reclusion perpetua. is beyond cavil. In the present case. Further. there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. before conviction. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos. June 27. (Underscoring supplied) The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense. petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. PIMENTEL G. shall. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. i. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong." Furthermore. two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. albeit his conviction was pending appeal. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the . or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons. ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. No. or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. however. regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” In the 2007 elections. shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases. it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion. 2008 Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela. without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints. circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as. at dawn of 9 July 1988. DE VILLA FACTS: On 20 January 1987. The account. 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention. in the interest of public security. committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisonersappellants like Jalosjos. 2 RIGHTS OF UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE cases: VALMONTE VS. Moreover. AFP. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against . maintaining peace and order. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when. Once it is established that it is so. dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident. indeed. for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Metro Manila." proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. Petitioners aver that. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that. economic and political development of the National Capital Region. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order. illegal. in the course of their routine checks. was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta. the military. with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters. Subsequent events reveal the contrary. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. or threatened to be infringed. what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. especially at night or at dawn. Valenzuela. a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela. because of the installation of said checkpoints. the cause for foreboding became real. ART. in fact. In cases involving non-bailable offenses. ISSUE: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures RULING: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se. Bulacan. 3 Sec. Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29. however. bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. Benjamin Parpon.

NO. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide 2. our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. PROBABLE CAUSE: (definition) cases: HUBERT J. the checkpoints during these abnormal times.a warrantless search w/c is. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them 3. at the cost of occasional inconvenience. 3. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. VS. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. Vinzons. there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. ISSUES: 1. Metro Manila on June 30. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information. NO. when conducted w/in reasonable limits. 1995 and May 22. 1995 sworn statements. the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb. REASONS: 1.R. In arrest cases. 4. ARGUMENTS: Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners.. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. But. P. the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the. No. August 23. the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for . Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and. her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde. 2. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. however. reasonably conducted. True. Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation 4. respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Forthwith. 3. St. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. Antonio J. and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. DE LEON G. HONORABLE RAUL E. Michael Gatchalian. NO. WEBB. later. a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. RULING: 1. NO. neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely. BF Homes Paranaque. the former should prevail. 2. 1991. Vizconde. 121234. 1995 FACTS: On June 19. 1994.

and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Bagalihog. In truth. Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate. Florencio Fernandez. The judge wrote. “In the instant cases. Susana Lim. -An investigation of the incident then followed.the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Sr. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R. Sr. the designated investigator. and for the purpose of preliminary investigation. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the existence of guilt. Jolly T.” . 4. of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis). Harry O. and his security escorts. Jaime Liwanag. Jolly Fernandez. Sr. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. the court issued an order dated July 31. Jr. Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused . 1990. LIM. -Thereafter. Fernandez. although. Sr. With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers. 9211. Florencio T. -On July 5. No. With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro. Nestor Lim. SR. survived the assassination plot.. . . namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes. at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function. Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel. Fernandez. Nonilon A. Ronnie Fernandez. 1991) FACTS: -On March 17. 1989 stating therein that: “. the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. namely. Vicente Lim. 1989. pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. Gaspar Amaro. Jr. Mayor Nestor C. Tantiado.. the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. among others.. Congressman Moises Espinosa. Antonio Kho. the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. TSg.In another manifestation.A. at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport. located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate.Petitioners Vicente Lim. for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa. -After conducting the preliminary investigation. . 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19.. Vicente Lim. . Nonilon Bagalihog. VS JUDGE FELIX GR NOS. concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint. the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. Sr. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. he himself suffered a gunshot wound. the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate. the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. Jimmy Cabarles.

which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. each information is complete in form and substance. AFP. Although. Felix of Branch 56. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. maintaining peace and order. was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta. the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. Usually. economic and political development of the National Capital Region. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints. at dawn of 9 July 1988. because of the installation of said checkpoints. the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should. As held in Soliven v. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause. after all. have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Indubitably. However. However. and there is no visible defect on its face. ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. In making the required personal determination. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when. RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. at the very least. especially at night or at dawn. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion. Bulacan. this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information…” -Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix (statement immediately preceding this paragraph. there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. the Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. Benjamin Parpon. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters. However. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. Valenzuela. the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. As mentioned in the facts (stated above). he issues a warrant of arrest.are probably guilty thereof. 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. to be sure. the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him. Petitioners aver that. a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order. Metro Manila. italicized). 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. this depends on the circumstances of each case. the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5. Makasiar. CONDUCT OF CHECK POINTS: cases: VALMONTE VS. All of these should be before the Judge. Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5. with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas. for ignoring and/or refusing to . the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela. DE VILLA FACTS: On 20 January 1987. without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

found that the accused was possessing what seemed to be crushed marijuana leaves. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. PEOPLE VS. After the issuance of the search warrant. indeed. 20 JUL 1994 FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs. particularly methamphetamine or shabu. PEOPLE VS.R. In herein case. 120515. True. or threatened to be infringed. committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. NO. MANALILI V. P/Lt. however. COURT OF APPEALS 280 SCRA 400 FACTS: Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a cemetery who seemed to be high on drugs. its paraphernalia’s and of a . when conducted w/in reasonable limits. But. 1988. The next day. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. when . HELD: A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street. illegal. 109633. the military. ARUTA 288 SCRA 626 G. NO. ISSUE: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu. in the course of their routine checks. It has been held as one of the exceptions to the general rule against searches without warrant. at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio. G. the former should prevail. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. and pat him for weapons. at the cost of occasional inconvenience. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that.R. interrogate him. Sec 2 art. 13. 13 APR 1998 FACTS: On Dec. He tried to resist the police officers and upon inquiry. HELD: No. in the interest of public security. reasonably conducted. which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s. DEL ROSARIO 234 SCRA 246. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized.submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. ISSUE: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures RULING: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed.22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition. the checkpoints during these abnormal times.

She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. In her testimony. and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. Seizure of evidence in "plain view. the latter handed it out to the police. (b) When an offense has just been committed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag. RULE 113. 4. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag. Search of a moving vehicle. arrest a person: (a) When. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime. RULING: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law: 1. Instead of presenting its evidence. Stop and Frisk. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent. 5. 6. no search warrant was presented.the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was. the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. Highly regulated by the government. Customs search. Arrest without warrant. In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above. Also. and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. 3. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. the person to be arrested has committed. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. Consented warrantless search. RULES OF COURT Section 5. in his presence. or is attempting to commit an offense. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence. — A peace officer or a private person may. ISSUE: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence 2. there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. without a warrant. RULE 126. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. . or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are." the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties. the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”. is actually committing. RULES OF COURT Section 2. when she was later on arrested by the police. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. The trial court convicted the accused violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 in 7. The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12. she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. when lawful.

At that instant. ART. However. Right to break door or window to effect search. As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident. And he fetched a locksmith. RULING: Article 32. 1988. Once inside. in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. she heard pounding sounds outside. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops. At dawn. Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made. over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant.b) For compelling reasons stated in the application. by their own claim. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right . On appeal. Section 12. and other actions of the judge. if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return. vs. Section 7. petitioners had. she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel. return and proceedings thereon. — The officer. the result. together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. if the criminal action has already been filed. the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known. The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. in the morning of January 11. and the latter did. as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office. a laundrywoman of the hotel. forcibly opening the door of the union office. and if none. 32. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: In the present case. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant. SOLUTA FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida). may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. who directly or indirectly obstructs. shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant. If the return has been made. men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant. Yet. ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. Panlilio and his companions began searching the office. RTC acquitted the accused. Any public officer or employee. or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. despite ample time for them to obtain one. In the morning. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door. the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. or any private individual. allows so. already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. defeats. INC.

through Justice Zaldivar. it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32.. in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides: Art. petitioner. Such being the case. Hence. (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21. On June 25. search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk. or stop and search and examine any vehicle. . 27. 2219. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. this Court. persons exercising police . Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases. an action for prohibition was filed with the Supreme Court. more or less. As the respondent Fiscal Pamaran was bent on proceeding with the charge against petitioner. that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house. Based on such discrepancy. model 1957. 26. PAMARAN G. the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. a letter to the effect that the Land Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a "hot car. HELD: In a recent decision of this Court.00. 1964 received from the Administrator. ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitutional provision which states that only a judge could issue a search warrant applies to warrants issued in lieu of violations of customs laws. not being a dwelling house and also to inspect. among others. together with Maniego and Villanueva.R.against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.500. in these cases. petitioner instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention and thus the subject automobile was taken. No. stated: "Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court. General Affairs Administration of the Department of National Defense. being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. 28. warehouse. pass through or search any land. Mago. as what is required in the Constitution. package. the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace . It was brought into this country without the payment of customs duty and taxes. a warrant issued by the Collector of Customs is conceded. Respondent requested for the withdrawal or dissolution of the warrant of seizure but petitioner denied it. petitioners. that the warrants be issued by a judge. For respondents. FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile. are jointly and severally liable for actual. Thereafter. box or envelope or any person on board." It is our considered view. store or building. 29. Petitioner Pacis.00 for customs duty and taxes. Papa v. 1974 Doctrine: It is a well-settled principle that for violations of customs laws. where the seizure of alleged smuggled goods was effected by a police officer without a search warrant. respondent paid P311. the ones who orchestrated the illegal search. on July 22. inclosure. through his subordinates. without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter." By virtue thereof. 1964. respondent Santos filed a criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial functions with the City Fiscal of Manila. 32. therefore. 34 and 35. 30. its original owner Donald James Hatch being tax-exempt. But in the search of a dwelling house. moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32. Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.. looked into the records of his office and ascertained that the amount collectible on said car should be P2. L-23996 March 15. It is not necessary. DECISION: Denied. PACIS VS. beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.

has been assigned. several other police officers mauled him. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866.” Yu’s companion. at about 6:30 p. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. entered a plea of not guilty. On 30 August 1990. The police officers then approached one group of men. police officer Rogelio Malibiran. near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. is perpetually restrained from acting thereon except to dismiss the same. the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a “stop and frisk. and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years. or any one in the City Fiscal's Office of the City of Manila to whom the complaint against petitioner for usurpation of judicial functions arising out of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men. apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a . It is not susceptible of any misinterpretation. Manila. These men were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very fast.” Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. COURT OF APPEALS GR 123595. Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District. allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier. who then fled in different directions. No costs. WHEREFORE. Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized. As the policemen gave chase. as minimum. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. At arraignment on 9 October 1990. with each group. 12 December 1997 FACTS: On 27 August 1990. petitioner. It speaks for itself. the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). assisted by counsel de officio. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial . comprised of three to four men.. posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. as maximum. It being undeniable then that the sole basis for an alleged criminal act performed by him was the performance of a duty according to law. there is not the slightest justification for respondent Assistant City Fiscal to continue with the preliminary investigation after his attention was duly called to the plain and explicit legal provision that did not suffer at all from any constitutional infirmity.m. Police Station No. 25 August 1990. 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal. So much is implicit from the very language of Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Manila. 3. likewise at Plaza Miranda. On 18 February 1994. However. now a criminal circuit court judge. However. In its decision of 24 January 1996.” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information”. and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest.authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Upon searching Malacat. STOP AND FRISK RULE: cases: MALACAT VS. Petitioner was once again searched. No such constitutional question then can possibly arise. Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police. The power of petitioner is thus manifest. was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard. Pamaran. Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter’s “front waist line. but nothing was found on him. hitting him with benches and guns.38 caliber revolver was recovered. Quiapo. Quiapo. subjectmatter of this litigation. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander." The plenitude of the competence vested in customs officials is thus undeniable. inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday. the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted and the successor of respondent Manuel R.

WARRANTLESS ARREST cases: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.m. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat’s rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. there was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving very fast” — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p. (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. On the other hand. while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk. Third. and (6) a “stop and frisk. ATTY. for as he admitted. thus presumably dusk. assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade. ESTOPPEL. Second. SANDIGANBAYAN (SUBJECT: DELEGATION OF QUASI JUDICIAL POWER. Turning to valid warrantless searches. there is grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk. which underlies the recognition that a police officer may. on the part of Malacat. the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.” A genuine reason must exist. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest. ISSUED A . or an overt physical act. approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause.. as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search.” HELD: The general rule as regards arrests. the alleged grenade was “discovered” “inside the front waistline” of Malacat. there was at all no ground. searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant. Here. RAMIREZ AND ATTY.” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest. searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. ABELLA. in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions. subject to certain exceptions. Finally. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. FACTS: ON 18 MARCH 1986. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner. was being committed or was going to be committed. probable or otherwise. None was visible to Yu. any telltale bulge. to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon.” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. indicating that a crime had just been committed. (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest. and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. the arresting officer. PCGG AGENTS. to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches.” The concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. Here. Plainly. these are found in Section 5. a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. ISSUE: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid.court. As regards valid warrantless arrests. (4) consent searches. could not have been visible to Yu. there are at least three (3) reasons why the “stop-and-frisk” was invalid: First. (2) search of moving vehicles. and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat.

nevertheless. Sandiganbayan (Dio Island Resort. THEIR ORDER WAS NOT SIGNED BY ANY PCGG COMMISSIONERS. the Republic’s supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the sequestered property.[4][13] the Court held that a prima facie factual foundation that the properties sequestered are “ill-gotten wealth” is required.SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST THE RESTHOUS THE SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IS WHETHER OR NOT THE MARCH 18. MARCOS SHOULD HAVE FIRST SOUGHT THE LIFTING OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER THROUGH A MOTION TO QUASH FILED WITH THE PCGG. Alerted by a challenge to his action. BEING VOID. the Court struck them down as void: It is indubitable that under no circumstances can a sequestration or freeze order be validly issued by one not a Commissioner of the PCGG. Taking the foregoing view. JUDGE PEÑA. the PCGG passed a resolution “to confirm. an order of sequestration may only issue upon a showing “of a prima facie case” that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under Executive Orders 1 and 2. the resolution of the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered – whether or not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten – should be necessary. FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE PCGG AMOUNT TO THE EXERCISE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. v.[2][11] When a court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without a prima facie case.). BUT A VOID ORDER PRODUCES NO EFFECT AND CANNOT BE VALIDATED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL. THE COURT CANNOT ACCEPT PETITIONER’S VIEW THAT MRS. what makes it “ill-gotten wealth.” and how former President Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Still. FOR THE SAME REASON. The Republic presented no evidence before the Sandiganbayan that shows differently. the sequestration order he issued is still void since PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives . The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. Ramirez and Abella issued “to remove any doubt as to the validity and enforceability” of their writs. AND THE EXERCISE OF SUCH FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE DELEGATED BY THE COMMISSION TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES OR SUBORDINATES OR TASK FORCES BECAUSE OF THE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. The facts are substantially identical to those in the case of Republic v. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the two PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant such a prima facie finding. Parenthetically. THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE POWER TO STRIKE IT DOWN ON SIGHT. ratify and adopt as its own all the Writs of Sequestration” that Attys. IN PCGG V. Inc. PCGG.[6][15] There.[3] [12] In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Ramirez issued a sequestration order on April 14. 1986 SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST PROPERTIES OF IMELDA IN LEYTE INCLUDING THE RESTHOUSE AT OLOT. RULING OF THE COURT: The Court’s Ruling Under Section 26. MARCOS SHOULD BE DEEMED ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE SEQUESTRATION OF HER OLOT RESTHOUSE BY HER ACTIONS IN REGARD TO THE SAME. Inc. ISSUE: IS THEIR ORDER VALID? RULING: NO. The issue in this case is not new. it is clear that the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. Ramirez did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said sequestration order. The power to determine the existence of a prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG as an incident to its investigatory powers. 1986 against Dio Island Resort.[5] [14] Here. JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. and all its assets and properties which were thought to be part of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. The two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact. x x x Even assuming arguendo that Atty. PETITIONER REPUBLIC ARGUES THAT MRS. Inc. the same Atty. [1][17] THE COURT HELD THAT THE POWERS. the Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG but simply applies the law. Article XVIII of the Constitution. Ramirez had been given prior authority by the PCGG to place Dio Island Resort under sequestration.

as the text of the above letters clearly show. x x x The power to sequester. Ramirez and Abella to search and sequester all properties. Being void ab initio. such consideration is immaterial following our above ruling. Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella. But a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel. the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the challenged resolutions of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan dated February 28. documents. Further. 3 of the PCGG Rules. the Republic can be protected by a notice of lis pendens.[8][17] the Court held that the powers. money and other assets of respondents. Besides. the PCGG clearly has to use its own judgment in determining the existence of a prima facie case. before the passage of Sec. the lifting of the sequestration order will not necessarily be fatal to the main case since it does not follow from such lifting that the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten wealth. they were acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not .[10][19] Indeed. Such lifting simply means that the government may not act as conservator or may not exercise administrative or housekeeping powers over the property. the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight. SO ORDERED. The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is. It is the Republic’s theory of course that Commissioner Daza’s letter. directing Attys. PCGG is the sole entity primarily charged with the responsibility of recovering ill-gotten wealth. Ramirez and Abella should be treated merely as an implementing order. nothing exists to support its contention that the Task Force had been given prior authority to place DIO under PCGG control. should be considered as the writ of sequestration while the order issued by Attys. Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18. Marcos’ Motion to Quash the March 18. the respondent Court noted: Contrary to plaintiff’s representation. unavoidably. Consequently. CA 129 S 558 (1990) Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion against the mayor and policemen. 1986. PADILLA V. x x x. After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced. Marcos should be deemed estopped from questioning the sequestration of her Olot Resthouse by her actions in regard to the same. For the same reason. the Court DIRECTS the Register of Deeds of Leyte to immediately annotate a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the Republic of the Philippines’ claim over the same in Civil Case 0002 of the Sandiganbayan. 1986 Sequestration Order covering the Olot Resthouse.and subordinates. Marcos should have first sought the lifting of the sequestration order through a motion to quash filed with the PCGG. The Court is maintaining its above ruling in this case. Thus. Under Executive Order Nos. therefore. there is no reason to depart from the Court’s ruling in the latter case where it said: The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. that letter is of the same kind issued to Attys. a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its properties void ab initio. Ramirez and Abella in Dio Island Resort. In PCGG v. and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective.’”[9][18] Petitioner Republic argues that Mrs. it is deemed nonexistent. Actually. Attys. No pronouncement as to costs. But the letter did not have the tenor of a sequestration order covering specific properties that the lawyers were ordered to seize and hold for the PCGG. On the contrary. which granted respondent Imelda R. carries with it the corollary duty to make a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for sequestering a property alleged to be ill-gotten. functions and duties of the PCGG amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. WHEREFORE. and the exercise of such functions cannot be delegated by the Commission to its representatives or subordinates or task forces because of the well established principle that judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be delegated. Judge Peña. Ramirez did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said sequestration order. as though it had never been issued. Being void. had acted on broad and non-specific powers: ‘By authority of the commission and the powers vested in it. 1 and 2. 2002 and August 28. the Court cannot accept petitioner’s view that Mrs. 2002 in Civil Case 0002.

or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured.R. In herein case.been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Also. TEE "rights of the accused to speedy trial" FACTS: The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. (3) there is full termina¬tion of the criminal case and a separate complaint would be more efficacious than a remand.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious. G. (2) there is more evidence to be adduced. Under the Rules of Court. Hence. . and the unsettling implications of permitting reinsti¬tuttion of a separate civil action. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. However. courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. a separate civil action is warranted when (1) addition¬al facts are to be established. and oppressive delays. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition. However. HELD: No. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. The acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasona¬ble doubt refers to the element of Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished. ISSUE: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case. particularly methamphetamine or shabu. CA did not err in awarding damages despite the acquittal. in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial. or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. PEOPLE VS. such acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of petition¬er's market stalls. capricious. Sec 2 art. the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu. VALIDITY OF A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE JUDGE cases: PEOPLE v. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s. its paraphernalia’s and of a . DEL ROSARIO 234 SCRA 246. RULING: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. NO. After the issuance of the search warrant. ISSUE: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. 109633. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a separate civil action. The civil liability can be recovered either in the same or a separate action. The purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing of another civil action where the same evidence is to be presented. the extinction of penal action carries with it the extinction of civil only if there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not exist. 20 JUL 1994 FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. Art.

(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials. 3019 provides an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. (2) In cases of impeachment. MARQUEZ VS. W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential. HELD: Yes.R. PANGANDAMAN V. (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay. The warrant as against unidentified subjects will be considered as null and void. GANCAYCO G.which allegedly provides an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. But he filed a case against all 50 ambushers. So the court issued a warrant of arrest against the 50 John Does. It is of the nature of a general warrant. and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. L-18343 September 30. EXAMINATION DEPOSITS cases: PNB VS. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive. there were around 50 persons who staged the ambush from both sides of the hill. as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice. the reason of such delay. 135882 June 27. who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. Based on his description. No. one of a call of writs long prescribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject. The offended party was ambushed in Lanao. DISIERTO G. However. The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. but he survived. CASAR FACTS: The case originated in Lanao. Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized. 1965 OF BANK ACCOUNTS/ FACTS: Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. On the other hand." it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor.It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. he could not recognize anyone of the 50. all “JOHN DOES”. 3019) in support of their claim of authority. the plaintiff bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration. ISSUE: Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No.R. In declining to reveal its records. 1405. the defendants cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. x x x. 2001 FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in . required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty. ISSUE: W/N the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court issue a warrant of arrest against an unknown accused? HELD: NO it is not valid. No.

The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo. there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection. No. for violation of R. particularly RA. et.A. Sec. 1405. al. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. 3019. No. the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. Further.A. HELD: No. No.1405). Julia Vargas Branch. where petitioner is the branch manager. and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case . the account must be clearly identified. Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed.

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