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Summary of Updates in Political Law Prof REX M.

ALOBBA

Legislative Powers; Creation of Pet; Judicial Review 1. MACALIN TAL VS. PET (G.R. No. 191618; November 23, 2010; MR denied on June 7, 2011) Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation. Petitioner here claimed that the creation of the Presidenti al Electoral Tribun al (PET) is uncons titution al as it viol ates Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualific ations of the President or Vice-President, and may promulg ate its rules for the purpose.” He contends that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. The Court said that, while the above provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, the same. The Court further said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving the President or Vice-President, and its rule- making authority in connection therewith (granted by the provision of Section 4 that the Court “may promulg ate its rules for the purpose ”), are not restric ted but include all necess ary powers implicit in the exercise of such mandate and authority. These powers are plen ary and the authority of the Court to decide presidential and vicepresiden tial election contests through the PET are derived from the une quivocal grant of jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET implements Section 4 and faithfully complies with the constitutional directive. The discussions of the Constitution al Comm ission clearly support the foregoing conclusion. Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function. The Court here rejected petitioner’s claim that the Presidenti al Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-judicial func tions contr ary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states that “The Members of the Supre me Court and of other courts established by law shall not be design ated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administr ative functions.” The tradition al grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” Consistent with the pres idential system of government, the function of “dealing with the settle ment of dispu tes, controversies or conflicts invol ving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforce able” is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies invol ving rights which are legally dem andable and enforce able, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or ins trumentality of the Government.” Judicial power was thus expanded, but it remained absolute. The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution characteri zes the resolu tion of electoral contests as essenti ally an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET, resolves a presiden tial or vice-presidenti al election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The present Constitution has alloc ated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding president ial and vice-presidenti al election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a deri vative of the plen ary judicial power alloc ated to courts of law, expressly pro vided in the Constitution. Power of Judicial Review; Executive Power 2. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO versus THE PHIL IPPINE TRUTH COMMISS ION OF 2010 (G.R. No. 192935; December 7, 2010) REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R. No. 193036; December 7, 2010) Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limi tations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sus tained, or will sus tain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restr ain the unl awful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied. Collins: "In matter of mere public right. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sust aining any person al injury attribut able to the creation of the PTC. Thus: Locus standi is defined as "a right of appe arance in a court of justice on a given question. Not claiming to be the subject of the comm ission’s investig ations." Succinctly put. In other wo rds. however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right. the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. any personal and direct injury attribu table to the implement ation of Execu tive Order No." With respect to taxpayer’s suits. only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue. Silk. Thus. the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds. he is but the mere instru ment of the public concern. the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. Here. their petition primarily invokes usurp ation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceed ings. The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legisl ators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Arroyo explained the deep-se ated rules on locus standi. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxp ayer" standing in public actions. he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindic ation of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. Thus. Nowhere in his peti tion is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidenti al issu ances in defense of the Constitution. Enriquez. Legal St anding of the Pet itioner s The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legisl ators to file their peti tion for failure to demonstr ate their personal stake in the outcome of the case." Accordingly. while in the latter. to their mind." or in the category of a "citizen. and that a public griev ance be remedied. of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished. legisl ators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerog ative. Evidently. In the former. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. The case of David v. 1. where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. This cert ainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurp ation of their power and rights as members of the legisl ature before the Court. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. if not the duty. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a deriv ative but nonetheless subst antial injury. It emphasi zes that the funds to be used for the creation and oper ation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropri ated by Congress. since his office confers a right to partici pate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. does so as a represent ative of the general public. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Biraogo has not shown that he sustained. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired. With regard to Biraogo. as a taxpayer. powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviol ate." In priv ate suits." . he has to adequ ately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. the OSG argues that. the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congression al action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s power over contingent funds. or is in danger of sus taining. any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts." or ‘taxpayer. which can be questioned by a member of Congress. standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interes t" rule as cont ained in Section 2. Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. so is the power of each member thereof. infringes on their prerog atives as legislators. as amended. Terr v. In such a case." In either case.Among all these limi tations. It provides that "every action must be pros ecuted or defend ed in the name of the real party in interest. the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefi ted or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its oper ations. As held in Philippine Constitution Associ ation v. they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which. As correctly pointed out by the OSG. Indeed. He could be suing as a "stranger.

" Insofar as it vests in the President the plen ary power to reorg anize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office. 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal org ans of the Office of the President Proper. ERC and Meralco are non-existent in this case. a statute or an authoriz ation ves ted in him by law." "merge. Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the afores aid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorg anize. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. or of paramount public interest. such power cannot be presumed since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. petitioners-legisl ators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. Inc. They maint ain that the deleg ated authority of the President to reorg anize under Section 31 of the Revised Administr ative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office. 1. [Emphases included. in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution. the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure. the President overstepped the limits of this deleg ated authority. No." "consolid ate. 2) is limited to the reorg anization of the administr ative structure of the Office of the President. but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overre aching significance to society. The Court takes cogniz ance of the petition not due to overwhelming politic al undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public. ordin ary citizens and taxp ayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and gener al interest shared in common with the public. Similarly. xxx . he must show that he has sust ained a dir ect injury as a result of that action. in Coconut Oil Refiners Associ ation. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness. Torres. De la Fuente. Ullman." and "abolish. and by issuing Executive Order No. taxpayers. of overreaching signific ance to society. Citations omitted] Notwithst anding. to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he dis agreed with. such as. Felix. much less a truth commission. the Court held that in cases of paramount import ance where serious constitution al questions are involved. The OSG claims that the determin ants of transcendent al impor tance laid down in CREBA v. Where the issues are of transcendent al and paramount import ance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar. or will sust ain dir ect injury as a result. 192935. economy and efficiency. No. He adds that Section 31 of the Administr ative Code of 1987. v. In the first Emergency Powers Cases. and legisl ators when the public interest so requires. Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. the standing re quire ments may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. tr ansfer of functions and transfer of agencies. Thus. The Court. Such continuing authority of the President to reorg anize his office is limited. The same Court ruled that for a pri vate individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legisl ative action. finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcenden tal import ance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. In People v. and 4) only to achieve simplicity. it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and subst antial int erest in the case such that he has sustain ed.R. can be relaxed for nontr aditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens. the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt. According to petitioner. later reaffirmed in Tileston v.However. Power of the President to Create the Truth Comm iss ion In his memor andum in G. Vera. Undoub tedly." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases. novelty and weight as precedents. Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separ ation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repe aled upon the effectivity thereof. granting the President the continuing authority to reorg anize his office. This Court adopted the "dir ect injury" test in our jurisdiction. hence.R. President of the Senate. 193036. and thus hinders the activities of government al agencies engaged in public service." Thus. Pascual v. and it is not suffici ent that he has a general int erest common to all memb ers of the pub lic." "transfer. Custodio v. such as when the matter is of transcendental import ance. they should be resolved for the guid ance of all. however. in G.

Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)]. 47 Clearly. No. The ques tion is this. No. Control is essenti ally the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the perform ance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. 1416. it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorg anize. the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorg anize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. P. services and activities. the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. shall have the continuing authority to reorg anize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. therefore. embodied in its last "Whereas" clause: WHEREAS. transfer appropri ations." For this purpose. while the latter finds basis from either a valid deleg ation from Congress. even the Solicitor Gener al agrees with this view. Executive Secretary. to transfer functions. much less envisioned in said provision. the power to create a truth commission pursu ant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P. The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorg anize the national government. the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. consolid ation of offices. and to standardize salaries and materi als. including the power to group. empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG. This decree. 1772. declines to recogni ze P. even in the plainest meaning attribut able to the term "restructure"– an "alteration of an existing structure. is there a valid deleg ation of power from Congress.D. No. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. In fact. The former is inherent in the Executive. as expressly provided in Section 6. subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity.D. Accordingly. No. Clearly. the answer to the question is in the negative. became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress. as it was only for the purpose of providing manage ability and resiliency during the interim.D. the transition tow ards the parliamen tary form of government will necessi tate flexibility in the org anization of the national government. the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. These point to situ ations where a body or an office is already existent but a modific ation or alter ation thereof has to be effected. consolid ating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another. Hence.D. P. But of course. x x x . 1416. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. consolidate bureaus and agencies.D. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Dep artment of Finance." Evidently. It falls under the Office of the President. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. 1416 was a deleg ation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorgani ze the administr ative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropri ations pursu ant to one of the purposes of the decree. Hon. we ruled that reorg anization "involves the reduction of personnel. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a mispl aced supposition. 1772. Title I. authority and responsibility between them. economy and efficiency.The question. including the lines of control. or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. consolid ation of offices. before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorg anize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administr ative Code? Section 31 contempl ates "reorg anization" as limited by the follo wing functional and structur al lines: (1) restructuring the intern al organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing. as amended by P. anachronis tic and inoperable." It takes place when there is an alter ation of the existing structure of government offices or units therein.D. "the President. to abolish offices. No. (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. in relation to Section 20. to create and classify functions. In Canoni zado v. Executive Secretary. however. 1. Book III of E. 292 (otherwise known as the Administr ative Code of 1987). Under Section 31. Clearly. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned. [Emph asis Supp lied] In the same vein. or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redund ancy of functions.O. the provision refers to reduction of personnel. or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redund ancy of functions. Book III of Executive Order No. Said decree is already stale. he may transfer the functions of other Dep artments or Agencies to the Office of the President. as amended by P. The Court. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which consti tutes an express grant of power. or his inheren t duty to faithfully execute the laws.

the alloc ation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. bure aus. the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. and offices. No. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. it maintains intact what is tradition ally considered as within the scope of "executive power. x x x. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. 1772.D. (Emphasis supp lied). fund amental laws on public accoun tability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. Manglapus: x x x. PARGO. there is no usurp ation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropri ate funds. It would not be accur ate. Thus. The President’s power to conduct investig ations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case. As correctly pointed out by the respondents. PCAPE. Further. the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumer ated in the Constitution. And if history is to be revisited. the authority of the President to issue Ad ministr ative Order No. The 1987 Constitution.While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P. It has been adv anced that whatever power inherent in the government judicial has to be executive. the Executive is given much leew ay in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. With AO 298 as mandate. to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws. The President shall have control of all the executive dep artments.g. e. Section 17 reads: Section 17. the legality of the investigation is sustained. the President has the oblig ation to ensure that all execu tive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. however. the Melo Com mission and the Zenarosa Commission. No. executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. In said case. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropri ate funds for the oper ation of a public office. On these premises. Furthermore. There being no changes in the government structure. [Emphasis supp lied] It should be stressed that the purpose of allo wing ad hoc investig ating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the perfor mance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. One of the recogni zed powers of the President granted pursu ant to this constitution ally. 298. That the authority of the President to conduct investig ations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investig ating team and the PCAGC had the same composition. in the words of the Solicitor Gener al. On the charge that Executive Order No. in Department of Health v. it was ruled: The Chief Executive’s pow er to create the Ad hoc Inv estigating Committ ee cannot be doubted. executi ve and judicial powers by their actual distri bution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of sp ecific powers of the President. however. As stated above. this was also the objective of the investig ative bodies created in the past like the PCAC. brought back the presidenti al system of government and restored the sep aration of legislative. the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. the Court is not inclined to declare such executi ve power as non-existent just because the direct ion of the political winds have changed. suffice it to say that there will be no appropri ation but only an allotment or alloc ations of existing funds alre ady appropri ated. that is neither legisl ative nor Indeed.mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. the Feliciano Commission. imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. his power over the country's foreign relations. for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pert ain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. In other words.D. or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. to which respondents belong. . Accordingly. 1416 as amended by P. the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17. there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the oper ation of the commission because.. Article VII of the Constitution. Camposano. creating an investig ative committee to look into the administr ative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld." Corollarily. Having been constitution ally granted full control of the Executive Dep artment.

for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters. study. much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them. the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. deter mine. Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power. a legal inquiry. The diction ary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge. "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. Nowhere included or intim ated is the notion of settling. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. highlights this fact and gives credence to a contr ary interpret ation from that of the petitioners. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department. explore. to find out. research on. The func tion of receiving evidence and ascert aining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regul ations. the PTC will not suppl ant the Ombudsm an or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department." commonly understood. To determine finally." "investig ation" being in turn described as "(a)n administr ative function. is to discover. Invoking this authority. Contr ary to petitioners’ apprehension. deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by applic ation of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. x x an inquiry. the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accomp anied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the con troversy may be decided or resolved authori tatively. Pow er of the Truth Com mission to Investi gate The President’s power to conduct investig ations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recogni zed. such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legisl ature in the case of administr ative agencies. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII. arbitrate. or to sentence or condemn." [Italics included. settle. To be considered as such. to find out by careful inquisition. means to adjudge. Implies a judicial determin ation of a fact." "to inquire. decide. finally and definitively." and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine ques tions of fact to which the legisl ative policy is to apply and to decide in accord ance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. obtain information. As the Chief Executive. subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. settle or decree." The purpose of investig ation." The actual prosecution of suspected offenders. 257. to make an investig ation." Moreover. The distinction between the power to investig ate and the power to adjudicate was deline ated by the Court in Cariño v. Section 17 thereof. to decide. of course. means to examine." commonly or popul arly understood. the recommend ation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investig ation. to search into. the President constituted the PTC to prim arily inves tigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropri ate action. Commission on Hum an Rights. Citations Omitted] Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice. in quire or delve or probe into. judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power. rule on. If at all." under Section 2(g). resolve. As previously stated. Thus: "Investigate. judicial or otherwise. to learn. . the investig ative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The legal me aning of "investig ate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observ ation. As poin ted out by the Solicitor General." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense. the taking of evidence. to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy. examination. no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. To trace or track. or even a quasi-judicial agency or office." In simpler terms. there is no impropriety in the funding. x x."whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The function of determining prob able cause for the filing of the appropri ate com plaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. The diction ary definition of "inves tigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." In the legal sense. judge. The phr ase. "when in the course of its investigation." "Adjudicate. is cert ainly not a function given to the commission. and the entry of a judgment.

the Ombudsman’s power to investig ate under R. at any stage.A. the Davide Commission. which states: to investig ate criminal (1) Investig ate and prosecute on its own or on com plaint by any person. Also. 6975 (1990) or the “Dep artment of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” pro vides that the “Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regul ations shall apply to all personnel of the Department. 3. can be shared with a body like wise tasked to investig ate the commission of crimes. the Feliciano Comm ission and the Zenarosa Commission. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other simil arly authorized government agencies. Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclus ive and. The power to conduct preliminary investig ation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Dep artment of Justice. EUGENIO S. No. No. unjust.” to which herein petitioner belongs. instrument alities. Its author ity under Section 3 (2). it was written: This power of investig ation granted to the Ombudsm an by the 1987 Constitu tion and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other simil arly authori zed government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municip al trial courts and munici pal circuit trial courts. office or agency. nowhere in Executive Order No. be recommend atory in nature. to strengthen the merit and rewards system. from any investigatory agency of government. the Ombudsm an and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommend ation. at best. [Emph asis supp lied]. and agencies of the government.R. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G. Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No.A. improper or inefficient. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. in the case of Ombudsm an v. any act or omission of any public officer or employee. Such a determination is a purely politic al question. The civil service embraces all branches. is mandated to establish a career service. Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regul ations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cogni zance over any irregul arities or . Novem ber 19. (G. Galicia. Section 28. Title III. 2009) • The Civil Service Com mission (CSC) Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investig ation of a possible administr ative case of dishonesty against PO1 Cap ablanca for alleged CSP examin ation irregularity. it may take over. Executive Order No. In addi tion. the Ombudsma n retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sangguni ans to investigate compl aints against local elective officials. In this reg ard. Thus.At any rate. 2011) Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts constituting the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the alleg ations in the compl aints. The CSC. MERCEDITAS N. efficiency and integrity in the civil service. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. No. its findings would. as the central personnel agency of the Government. including government-owned or controlled corpor ations with original charters. the inves tigation of such cases. 179370. Specifically. Much like its predecessors. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Finally. 6770. Febru ary 15. It has pri mary jurisdiction over cases cogniz able by the Sandiganbayan and. 1 cannot contr avene the power of the Ombudsman cases under Section 15 (1) of R. which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature.R. 193459. GUTIERREZ V. are not deprived of their mandated duties but will inste ad be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. And being so. This is categoric ally out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991. Its power to inves tigate is limited to obt aining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the perform ance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. and to adopt me asures to promote mor ale. therefore. when such act or omission appears to be illegal. MA. thus. [Emph ases supp lied] The act of investig ation by the Ombuds man as enunci ated above contempl ates the conduct of a preli minary investig ation or the deter mination of the existence of prob able cause. Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. the PTC commits no act of usurp ation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties. 292 or the “Administr ative Code of 1987. Jurisdiction and Authority of the Civil Service Comm iss ion 4. The SC denied this as that would require the Court to make a determin ation of what constitutes an impe achable offense.” enumer ates the powers and functions of the CSC. ET AL. subdivisions. Chapter 1. in the exercise of its prim ary jurisdiction. CAPABLANCA vs. These offices. No.

Based on the foregoing. prevent and disallow irregular. we have previously ruled that its exercise of its gener al aud it power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. 158562. Hence. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this consti tution al mandate given to COA. Powers of COA 6. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. Title I. 2011) In our view. SPOUSES DAVID ELISEA RAMOS (G. WINSTON F. extravag ant or unconscion able expenditures of govern ment f unds. Chapter 4. No. 174137. the CA there by correctly appreci ated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely government al or sovereign function. We uphold the CA’s afore quoted holding. Section 11. RAMON R. it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initi ated the conduct of a preli minary investigation on the alleged civil service examin ation irregul arity committed by the petitioner. GSIS employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circul ars. Civil Service Commission that the appell ate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administr ative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office./WINSTON F. MARIO I. 159402. ET AL. MARIO I. empowering its Regional Offices to take cogniz ance of cases involving CSC examin ation anomalies. April 23. 2010) The civil service enco mpasses all branches and agencies of the Government. Thus. YAP VS. In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority. rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on disci pline. (G. and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from che ating in the civil service examinations. we rule that. COMMISSI ON ON AUDIT (G. ET AL. the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallo wed disbursement and not simp ly restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. in resolving cases brought before it on appeal. or those created by special law.R.R. 2010) The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardi an of public funds. 157383/G. 16 Thus. 5. GARCIA VS. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees. No. ves ting it with broad powers over all accounts pert aining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authori ty to define the scope of its audit and examination. • It has alre ady been settled in Cruz v. MOLINA. Subtitle B. unnecess ary. To carry out this mand ate. Furthermore. respondent COA is not merely legally permitted. Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise. like the Government Service Insur ance System (GSIS). an activity that was not the exclusive prerog ative of the State in its sovereign capacity. State Immun ity 7. excessive. and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regul ations.R. MOLINA. No. attend ance and general terms and conditions of employment. 991936. but was instead involved in the management and mainten ance of the Loakan Airport. AIR TRANSPO RTATION OFFICE vs. Febru ary 23. No. respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a govern ment agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. GARCIA VS. in De los Santos v. In conson ance with its gener al audit power. . including government-owned or controlled corpor ations with original charters. the CSC issued Resolution No. or the Uniform Rules on Administr ative Cases in the Civil Service. August 18. We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compens ation and without the proper expropri ation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. establish the techniques and methods for such review. we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough l atitude to determine.anomalies connected with the examinations.R.

even in that area. In the present case. testing. in any case. and revenues. INC. and the issu ance of certific ations is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardiz ation. From the perspective of this func tion. 9497 abolished the ATO. which thereby assumed all of the ATO’s powers. the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own charter. It would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondent’s right to be duly compens ated for actual work performed and services rendered. or jus gestionis. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered. VIGILAR. PROFESSIONAL VIDEO. The rule. R. and the public end angered.. controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administr ation of the government. In exercising the right of eminent dom ain. Lastly. 9497. The proscri bed suit that the state immunity princi ple covers takes on various forms. AQUINO (G. nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of government al functions. the Court explained. June 26. Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contr act with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued.A.R. consequently. the State exercised its jus imperii. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetr ating any injustice on a citizen. cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.70 meters long occupying a total area of 1. the oblig ations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP. No.. 9.20 meters wide and 128. vs. but where the ulti mate liability will fall on the government.e. real and person al properties. TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and. 155504. where priv ate property had been taken in expropri ation without just compens ation being paid. namely: a suit against the Republic by name. . 9497.69 meters long occupying an area of 2. R. a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s performance of government al functions. et al. yet. where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor. thus. GREGORIO R. and a suit that on its face is against a government officer. if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and. 17 the trial court’s dismiss al based on the doctr ine of non-su ability of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of property where a road 9 meter s wide and 128.Intermedi ate Appell ate Court. 2011) The doctrine of government al immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. 8. other wise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. No. the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. January 18. the public policy reason that the perform ance of government al function cannot be hindered or del ayed by suits. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP). assets. funds. No. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH). versus ARNULFO D. Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an est ablished princ iple that anted ates the Constitution. 180388. and on the practic al ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. No. and certific ation in the country. the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners.165 square meters and an artificial creek 23.R. as dis tinguished from its propriet ary rights. viz: x x x With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursu ant to R. x x x Under its Transitory Provisions.A. the core reason for the existence of state imm unity applies – i. No. duties and rights. a suit against an unincorpor ated government agency..906 square meters had been constructed by the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contr actor without the owners’ knowledge and consent was reversed and the cases rem anded for trial on the merits. is not absolu te for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. It is a universally recogni zed princi ple of intern ational law that exempts a state and its org ans from the jurisdiction of another state. 2009) The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3. The TESDA performs government al functions.A. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (G.

in his capacity as Executive Secret ary. and the people. treaties and international agree ments actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encomp assing and absolute nature of sovereignty. under our nation al crimin al justice system. 9522 March 10. However. 2011) International Agreements. abdic ation being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing intern ation al crimes in the country. as long as the negoti ating func tionar ies have remained within their powers. treaties and executive agreements. it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Nation al crimin al jurisdiction being prim ary. is hereby ame nded to read as follows: . 5446. by entering into the Agreement. in this case. nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. because its consti tutional efficacy is beyo nd doubt. entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines". International Agreements. or it ma y opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons” committing high crimes in the country and defer to the second ary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. as the parties in either intern ation al agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle. BAYAN MUNA versus ALBERTO ROMULO. OPLE. the Senate. the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumer ated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agree ment. into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. the Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US. it is always the responsibility and within the prerog ative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equ ally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. such as comm ercial/consular relations.R.Inte rn ationa l Law 10. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an execu tive agreement. that the categoriz ation of subject matters that may be covered by intern ational agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. postal and navig ation arrangements and settlement of claims. and BLAS F. 2009 AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. a ratified treaty. trademark and copyright protection. No. As it were. The RP. as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. By their volunt ary act. however. The prim ary consider ation in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an intern ational agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. According to petitioner. patent rights. most-f avored nation rights. the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirm ation of the Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. 3046. The Supreme Court held. Petitioner relies on the case. a treaty having behind it the authority of the President. a treaty has gre ater “dignity” than an executive agreement. Thus. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering. 5446. does thereby abdic ate its sovereignty. Eastern Sea Trading. AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. By their nature. Under intern ational law. argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity. The usual underlying consider ation in this partial surrender may be the gre ater benefits derived from a pact or a reciproc al undert aking of one contr acting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. Commissioner of Customs v. unlike an executive agree ment. on a given subject. hence. while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well est ablished nation al policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executi ve agreements. takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. in his capacity as Secret ary of Foreign Affairs (G. as the term is understood in the Agreement. there is no difference between treaties and executi ve agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned. In the same breath. part aking as it does of the nature of a treaty. Petitioner. February 1. in which the Court stated: intern ational agreements involving politic al issues or changes of national policy and those involving intern ation al arrangements of a per manent character usu ally take the form of treaties. 3046. the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to “persons” of the RP committing high crimes within US territori al jurisdiction. limitations on sovereignty. Republic Act No. 159618. Section 1 of Repub lic Act No. TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPP INES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it ena cted by the Senate and Hou se of Representatives of the Philippines in Congre ss assembled:: Section 1.

Horodaba Rk.51 " 12º21’41.64 " 12º17’27.12 " 125 º30’19.08 99.80 4. 21º6’57. Digollorin Pt. San co Pt.95 " 12º11’48.16 " 12º11’20.53 " 7º42’45.19 " 18º18’35.54 0.25 " 126 º34’29.78 " 122 º26’4.33 " 14º29’54. Atalaya Pt.31 " Distance to next basepoint 70.79 " 17º5’51.42 " 12º27’37.69 " 122 º57’51.94 " 125 º58’8.68 5.73 " 19º57’38.62 " 12º31. Bigan Pt.41 " 12º32.93 " 7º28’30.81 " 126 º28’53. Dinoban Pt.21 1.29. Finch Rk.23 " 125 º23’7. Arangasa Is.84 " 122 º31’42.08 " 126 º35’59.30 " 17º7’16.44 40.37 " 125 º17’12.61 " 122 º26’50.19 " 125 º12’59.57.91 " 14º6.66 " 122 º31’3.00 " 10º45’16. Cube Rk.24 " 126 º35’59.30 " 17º6’14.04 6.97 " 7º27’29.12 .40 " 12º41’6. Spires Is.42 " Longitude (E) 121 º57’27. Divimisa Pt.58 " 8º53’16.32 " 125 º18’5.28 57.54 5.29 0.83 1.11 " 16º47’38.71 " 125 º8’50. Suluan Is.41 " 125 º27’0.30 " 126 º35’51.26 80.86 " 16º18’44.79 5.05 0.17 " 12º13’21. Matulin Rk.70 " 125 º13’32.30 7.47 " 125 º31’30.76 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows: Basepoint Number Station Name Location World Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS 84) Coordinates Latitude (N) 1 PAB-01 2 PAB-02 3 PAB-04 4 PAB-05A 5 PAB-05B 6 PAB-05 7 PAB-06 8 PAB-06B 9 PAB-06C 10 PAB-07 11 PAB-08 12 PAB-10A 13 PAB-11 14 PAB-12 15 PAB-13 16 PAB-13A 17 PAB-14 18 PAB-14A 19 PAB-14D 20 PAB-15 21 PAB-16A 22 PAB-16B 23 PAB-16C 24 PAB-16D 25 PAB-17 26 PAB-18A 27 PAB-19C 28 PAB-19D 29 PAB-20A 30 PAB-21B 31 PAB-22 32 PAB-22C 33 PAB-23 34 PAB-23B 35 PAB-23C Amianan Is.50 " 126 º35’57. Balintang Is. SE Tobabao Is.28 " 122 º27’56. Ditolong Pt. Ditolong Pt.02 " 7º29’49. Bago so Is Languyan Languyan Languyan N Baculin Pt. SE Manjud Pt.43 " 14º6.71 83.33.71 " 122 º9’46.34 " 122 º31’43.40 " 122 º14’06.94 56.47 " 7º29’16.15 " 124 º16’59.29 " 125 º34’11.94 0. Tinaga Is.90 1.69 30.52 0. N Tua son Pt.74 3.51 2. E Bunga Pt. NW Manjud Pt.39 3.80 12.39 " 126 º20’48.70 " 9º49’59.10.94 116.17 71. Ditolong Pt.32 " 122 º20’19.78 " 126 º10’6.29 9.54 96.07 " 122 º31’28.2 10.09 5.45 " 12º28’36.40 30. Digollorin Rk.67 " 12º6’7.Section 1.37 " 12º36’18.31 " 17º2’36.95 0. S Sorz Cay Panablihon Alugon N Bunga Pt. Bacan Is.88 " 125 º31’48.03 " 16º49’56.28 " 125 º3’53.91 " 16º59’18.62 " 8º13’11.21 " 124 º17’26.

45 " 5º2’23.08 " 6º11’4.19 " 119 º5’12.53 41.88 8.87 1.81 " 122 º13.86 " 7º54’36.15 " 119 º3’22.35 " 8º2’0.28 1. Balabac Great Ree f Balabac Great Ree f Balabac Great Ree f Ada Ree f Secam Is.24 " 4º24’53.65 0. Marampog Pt.46 3.97 5.73 " 6º16’8. Pola Pt.14 63.28 67.19 " 116 º53’28. W Calia Pt.94 55.44 3.64 " 116 º54’10.36 PAB-24 37 PAB-24A 38 PAB-25B 39 PAB-25 40 PAB-26 41 PAB-27 42 PAB-28 43 PAB-29 44 PAB-30 45 PAB-31 46 PAB-32 47 PAB-33A 48 PAB-34A 49 PAB-35 50 PAB-35A 51 PAB-38A 52 PAB-39 53 PAB-40 54 PAB-40A 55 PAB-41A 56 PAB-42A 57 PAB-43 58 PAB-44 59 PAB-45 60 PAB-46 61 PAB-47 62 PAB-48 63 PAB-48A 64 PAB-49 65 PAB-50 66 PAB-51 67 PAB-52 68 PAB-53 69 PAB-54 70 PAB-54A 71 PAB-54B 72 PAB-55 73 PAB-60 74 PAB.08 " 119 º14’50.36 " 126 º36’18.85 30.11 " 125 º28’19.17 " 7º52’19.83 " 4º36"9.48 " 5º22’2.88 12 .20 75.61 15.66 " 5º21’58.44 " 6º26’47.05 " 7º48’30.43 " 6º17’14.49 " 117 º18’33.31 0. Tapundo Pt.54 13.75 " 116 º59’39.84 " 4º25’3.04 " 119 º3’15.79 78.43 3. Sibaung Is.14 " 119 º39’51.42 10.38 1.60 75.26 " 8º11’18.88 " 5º12.42 122.26 " 126 º35’57.73 " 5º46’35.73 " 116 º53’16. Kantuan Is Tonggu il Is.44 2.22 " 6º2’33. South Mangsee Is.65 " 6º13’39.75 " 119 º1’44.88 29. Manamil Is. Pea rl Bank Bagnan Is. Kirapusan Is Manuk Manka Is.72 85.91 " 5º23’20.25 " 4º47’5.44 " 118 º23’40.01 " 4º42’52.53 " 7º30’26.50 " 121 º56’36.20 " 121 º54’41.15 " 118 º3’52.24 43.18 " 6º9’8.77 " 6º1’8. 7º17’19.77 " 118 º26’57.35 " 5º23’34.28 18.45 " 121 º63’11.51 " 6º0’17.80 " 7º16’14.73 " 125 º19’44. Libiman Is.21 " 125 º21’52.44 0.60 23.06 " 125 º28’42.15 " 6º5’58.80 " 6º21’55.69 " 7º51’27.40 2.94 " 119 º22’1.17 8.37 44. Balabac Is.70 " 4º47’39. Alice Ree f Alice Ree f Omap oy Rk.59 " 126 º25’11.27 5.14 " 119 º51’58.29 " 124 º15’42.20 " 126 º12’14.07 " 4º45’55.20 " 5º23’21. Fran ces Ree f Fran ces Ree f Bajapa Ree f Paguan Is.40 " 126 º11’35. Pangil Bato Pt.09 " 118 º0’5.30 " 118 º18’33.04 " 116 º59’51. Bukut Lapis Pt.87 " 1. S Pusan Pt.41 " 6º4’14.06 26.17 " 120 º41’38.08 1.18 " 116 º54’17.36 " 4º55’10.99 " 6º52’14.30 119 º44’18.00 6.03 " 125 º20’59.34.48 6. Cape San Agustin Cape San Agustin SE Sarangani Is.71 119 º14’15. Muligi Is.33 " 118 º6’54.61 Pusan Pt.18 2.8. Tongqu il Is Tongqu il Is.90 " 6º17’43. Taganak Is Great Bakkungaa n Is.

45 " 15º48’43. Piedra Pt. Rocky Ledge Piedra Pt.69 " 119º47’20.94 " 119º47’7.63 0.08 0. Rena Pt.04 " 117º15’51.38 " 17º34’24.80 " 121º56’43.61 " 119º15’17.12 82. Piedra Pt.85 " 121º56’48.76 74.76 " 119º45’11. Dile Pt.49 " 16º19’28.20 " 9º2. Rena Pt. Baboc Is.65 1. 8º87’56.09 " 119º44’55.79 " 121º57’3. Amianan Is Amianan Is.74 " 119º50’56.86 " 119º46’56. Amianan Is.56 " 120º33’42.62 " 119º46’44.15.42 " 18º30’52. Section 3. Pinget Is.50 " 119º46’28. Repub lic Act No.78 " 20º43’15.74 " 21º7’17.30 12.82 " 12º19’35.32 " 119º45. Tambobo Pt. sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including.04 0. .69 9.40 " 8º53’32. 7160.37 " 117º28’15. SW Tatub Pt.20 81.40 1. Section 5.42 " 16º16’34.37 " 8º44’17.57.47 " 21º7’18.75 PAB-62 76 PAB-63 77 PAB-63A 78 PAB-64 79 PAB.65 93.77 58.25 0.46 " 16º37’12.36 " 120º21’2.48 " 120º20’33.22 " 13º53’24.70 " 16º18’29.88 " 118º36’53. W Sicud Pt.00 120º1’5. withou t limitation.41 " 21º7’12.44 Section 2.78 " 117º37’38. Piedra Pt. Itbayat Is.64B 80 PAB-65C 81 PAB-67 82 PAB-68 83 PAB-71 84 PAB-72 85 PAB-72B 86 PAB-73 87 PAB-74 88 PAB-74A 89 PAB-75 90 PAB-75C 91 PAB-75D 92 PAB-76 93 PAB-77 94 PAB-78 95 PAB-79 96 PAB-79B 97 PAB-80 98 PAB-82 99 PAB-83 100 PAB-84 101 PAB-85 Latua Pt.67 " 16º9’57. and b) Bajo de Masinloc.90 " 16º10’12. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produ ce and pub lish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clea rly representing the delinea tion of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.43 0. This Act. shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.35 " 121º12’52.30 1. Pinnacle Rk.41 " 120º34’55.15 35.95 " 119º46’19.20 " 120º24’40. Cabra Is Hermana Mayor Is.25 6. This Act affirms that the Repub lic of the Philippines has dominion.23 " 117º20’39.65 " 7. Dry Is.07 25. also known as Scarborough Shoal.86 14.06 0. Cape Bojea dor Bobon Calagangan Pt. Tarumpitao Pt.47 " 9º59’22.56 " 17º55’4.94 " 17º41’17.88 115.23 98.60 6. as amended.54 " 11º13’19. Section 4.89 13.91 11. Sinangcolan Pt.20 " 16º20’4.61 " 15º57’61.13 " 18º29’32. otherwise known as the Local Gover nment Code of 1991.64 " 121º46’57.63 80. 1596. The baseline in the following area s over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaa n Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No.88 " 19º10’14. together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines.

and all other laws. The provisions of Repub lic Act No.Section 6.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES Secretary of Senate . (Sgd. BARUA-YAP Secretary General Hou se of Represenatives Approved: MAR 10. 2699 and Hou se Bill No. Section 9.) MARILYN B. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supp lemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its ena ctment into law. 3216 was finally pa ssed by the Senate and the Hou se of Representative on February 17. This Act shall take effect fiftee n (15) days following its pub lication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation. Section 8. 2009. rules and iss uances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly. Section 7. as amended by Repub lic Act No. executive order s. 3046. 2009 (Sgd. NOGRALES Spea ker of the Hou se of Representatives (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE President of the Senate This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. decree s. Approved (Sgd. 5446.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President of the Philippines (Sgd.) PROSPE RO C. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.