G.R. No. 2832, Barlin v.

Ramirez and Municipality of Lagonoy

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC November 24, 1906 G.R. No. 2832 REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal representative of the general interests of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva Caceres, plaintiff-appellee, vs. P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial Church of Lagonoy, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF LAGONOY, defendants-appellants. Manly & Gallup for appellants. Leoncio Imperial and Chicote, Miranda & Sierra for appellee. WILLARD, J.: There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that this was done by the order of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in the pueblo was required to work for the government, without compensation, for forty days every year. The time spent in the reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the forty days. The material necessary was brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from the funds of the church and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the completion of the church it was always administered, until November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic Communion and all the people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to that church. The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church on the 5th of July, 1901. he administered it as such under the orders of his superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery. That document is as follows: At 7 o’clock last night I received through Father Agripino Pisino your respected order of the 12th instant, wherein I am advised of the appointment of Father Pisino as acting parish priest of this town, and directed to turn over to him this parish and to report to you at the vicarage. In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you that the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction with the parish priest thereof, has seen fit to sever connection with the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and join the Filipino Church, the head of which is at Manila. This resolution of the people was reduced to writing and triplicate copies made, of which I beg to inclose a copy herewith.

For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable to obey your said order by delivering to Father Agripino Pisino the parish property of Lagonoy which, as I understand, is now outside of the control of the Pope and his representatives in these Islands. May God guard you many years. Lagonoy, November 14, 1902. (Signed) VICENTE RAMIREZ. RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT. The document, a copy of which is referred to in this letter, is as follows: LAGONOY, November, 9, 1902. The municipality of this town and some of its most prominent citizens having learned through the papers from the capital of these Islands of the constitution of the Filipino National Church, separate from the control of the Pope at Rome by reason of the fact that the latter has refused to either recognize or grant the rights to the Filipino clergy which have many times been urged, and it appearing to us that the reasons advanced why such offices should be given to the Filipino clergy are evidently well-founded, we have deemed it advisable to consult with the parish priest of this town as to whether it would be advantageous to join the said Filipino Church and to separate from the control of the Pope as long as he continues to ignore the rights of the said Filipino clergy, under the conditions that there will be no change in the articles of faith, and that the sacraments and other dogmas will be recognized and particularly that of the immaculate conception of the mother of our Lord. But the moment the Pope at Rome recognizes and grants the rights heretofore denied to the Filipino clergy we will return to his control. In view of this, and subject to this condition, the reverend parish priest, together with the people of the town, unanimously join in declaring that from this date they separate themselves from the obedience and control of the Pope and join the Filipino National Church. This assembly and the reverend parish priest have accordingly adopted this resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to send a copy thereof to the civil government of this province for its information, and do sign the same below. Vicente Ramirez, Francisco Israel, Ambrosio Bocon, Florentino Relloso, Macario P. Ledesma, Cecilio Obias, Balbino Imperial, Juan Preseñada, Fernando Deudor, Mauricio Torres, Adriano Sabater. At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this document was adopted, there were present about 100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that the population of the pueblo was at that time 9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants were satisfied with the action there taken. Although it is of no importance in the case, we are inclined to think that the testimony to this effect merely means that about 100 of the principal men of the town were in favor of the resolution and about 20 of such principal men were opposed to it. After the 14th of November, the defendant, Ramirez, continued in the possession of the church and other property and administered the same under the directions of his superior, the Obispo Maximo of the Independent Filipino Church. The rites and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the same after the 14th day of November as they were before, but the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the defendant had been entirely severed. In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief. The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial of the allegation of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property. After this answer had been presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant

That possession has been taken away from it and it has the right now to recover the possession from the persons who have so deprived it of such possession. would constitute no defense. But waiving this point and assuming that the possession of Ramirez. Their testimony in regard to the delivery always refers to the action taken on the 14th of November. 1906. or answer in intervention. Ramirez. . said that the municipality as a corporation had nothing whatever to do with the matter. It does not appear that the municipality. Plaintiff answered this complaint. as such. to say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and is not entitled to have it delivered back to him. and who can not produce any written evidence of title. was in possession of the property described in the complaint under the authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the owner thereof. ever took any action in reference to this matter until they presented their petition for intervention in this case. when the return of such possession is demanded by him the plaintiff. and which has been quoted above. Under such circumstances he will not be allowed. It is apparent that the action taken consisted simply in separating themselves from the Roman Catholic Church. There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be affirmed. is plainly established by the evidence. The principle of law that a tenant can not deny his landlord’s title. say that they are owned by the people of the pueblo. That the resolution adopted on the 14th of November. had been in the lawful possession thereof for more than thirty years and during all that time its possession had never been questioned or disturbed. paragraph 2. was the right which was given to him by the plaintiff.therein. The only right which he had to the possession at the time he took it. which is found in section 333. Ramirez. a record of which appears that in the document above quoted. That decision holds that as against one who has been in possession for the length of the plaintiff has been in possession. is applicable to a case of this kind. and nothing is said therein in reference to the material property then in possession of the defendant. There is no claim made by him that since the delivery of the possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has acquired the title thereto by other means. the mere fact that the defendant is in possession does not entitle the defendant to retain that possession. Ramirez. the question still arises. the witnesses for the defense. in its answer. unless the latter can show that they have a better right thereto. That the person in the actual possession of the church and other property described in the complaint is the defendant. but there is no evidence in the case of any such delivery. No. gives the municipality the rights of a possessor. in which he alleged that he himself was the owner of the property at the time he received it from the plaintiff. the municipality of the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged that the defendant. Ramirez. as a corporate body. he must show a better right thereto. As we have said before. (2) The municipality of Lagonoy. Ramirez. The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of the church by the people of the pueblo to the defendant. This was the preposition which 1 was discussed and settled in the case of Bishop of Cebu vs. nor does he is own behalf make any claim whatever either to the property or to the possession thereof. Who has the better right to the present possession of the property? The plaintiff. the evidence shows that it never was in the physical possession of the property. or in which he alleged that the pueblo was the owner of the property at that time. decided June 1. in 1902. and the case was tried and final judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. claims as such. the president. In fact. of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendants then brought the case here by a bill of exceptions. This petition been granted. is apparent from an inspection thereof. and also in the Spanish law. it appears that he took possession of the property as the servant or agent of the plaintiff. and one witness. In order that he may continue in possession. Ramirez. An answer of the defendant. 1748. Mangaron. and who had been deprived of his possession. was not the action of the municipality. when they speak of the ownership of the buildings. and he took possession under the agreement to return that possession whenever it should be demanded of him. which he alleges in his answer is the possession of the municipality. to be the owner of the property. (1) As to the defendant.

That law is as follows: The parish churches which was erected in Spanish towns shall be of durable and decent construction. and parish houses of the Spaniards and natives of our Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost and expense of our royal treasury. and that by the circular of that Government. Law 2. It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parish churches in the Philippine Islands were built by the Spanish Government. the ownership and the right to the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. and applied for their service and maintenance the part of the tithes belonging to us by apostolic concession according to the division we have made. of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies is. even though the Indians are few. that by section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1. contribute. title 2. we command that for our part there be contributed the same amount as the residents and encomenderos. and by their warrants. The one of February 10. Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial churches such as the one in question. and the residents who have no Indians shall also contribute for this purpose in accordance with their stations and wealth. Law 4. As to the municipality of Lagonoy. there is no evidence whatever to support the last proposition. . for the purposes of the argument. situated in the Philippine Islands. such property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands. title 3. book 6. namely that the Government of the Philippine Islands has transferred the ownership of this church to the municipality of Lagonoy. another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the place where such churches are constructed. cathedrals. We have found no circular of the date above referred to. 1902. dated November 11. nor right of possession. that by the treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the Government of the United States. Its claim of ownership is rested in its brief in this court upon the following propositions: That the property in question belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the Spanish Government. it is very clear that it has neither title. But this assumption is not true. any right of whatever in the property in question. there shall be erected a church where mass can be decently held. therefore. in part. contains nothing that indicates any such transfer. respectively. Law 11 of the same title is as follows: We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the fund for the erection of churches shall be given to their superintendents to be expended for those things necessary for these churches with the advice of the prelates and officials. notwithstanding the fact that it be the subject to or separate from a parish. but to guard these structures. Their costs shall be divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal treasury. And we request and charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in the collection and disbursement thereof. and it shall have a donor with a key. the Spanish Government at the time the treaty of peace was signed. and not otherwise. and that which is so given shall be deducted from the share of the Indians should pay. 1903. as follows: Having erected all the churches. or place there should be any Indians incorporated to our royal crown. nor of any other property like it. is as follows: In all settlements. As a matter of law. which is probably the one intended. as such. book 1. 1902.The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality has. and the other part by the Indians who abide there. we should admit that the other propositions are true. and if within the limits of a city. ownership. village. It has produced no evidence of ownership. If. was not the owner of this property. (3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership ever admitting that the Spanish Government was the owner of the property and it has passed by the treaty of Paris to the American Government.

hold them thus as guardians or servants. instituted. both relating to the construction and repair of churches. yet they are not the owners thereof. parish churches. churches. title 6. void. or holy thing. or other pious or religious establishment without our express permission as is provided in Law 1. and by the royal order of the 13th of August. This provision is contained in Law 2. there being authority for saying that the latter order was in force in the Philippines. in Law 12. title 3. having been erected by the Spanish Government. which in this respect we revoke and make null. They. religious. title 2. and the buying of chalices. the next question to be considered is. clothing. and others things which they might be in need of. or votive churches. and to aid to this effect with out royal treasury whenever possible. but it was made unlawful to erect a church without the license of the King. 1856. this order shall be observed where the contrary has not already been directed by us in connection with the erection of churches. and maintain all cathedrals. speaks. found. after discussing what can be called public property and what can be called private property. 1876. was to be devoted to pious purposes. such as the feeding and clothing of the poor. and under its direction. No sacred. and we shall be informed of God. That law is as follows: Law XII. institute. book 1. and Law 1. of those things which are sacred. the support of orphans. monastery. our Lord. of this book. hospital. religious. . That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the Indies was continued to the present time is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January. which is as follows: Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us by the apostolic concessions of the supreme pontiffs. title 16. and religious and pious establishments where they are necessary for the teaching. and of no effect. the balance. nor can it be considered as included in his property holdings. founded. Hence they were allowed to take from the revenues of the church and lands what was reasonably necessary for their support. By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown of Spain. or maintained any cathedral. and preaching of the doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith. belonging to God. parish church. all tithes in the Indies were given by the former to the latter and the disposition made the King of the fund thus created is indicated by Law 1. and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines. – HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON. or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or without them. and other similar charitable purposes. To whom did these churches belong? Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of things and. notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by our viceroy or other ministers. book 1. the marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women because of their poverty. we command the officials of our royal treasury of those provinces to collect and cause to be collected all tithes due and to become due from the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in which it has been the custom to pay the same. or holy. and to receive information of such places where they should be founded and are necessary. can be the subject of ownership by any man. which is as follows: Whereas it is our intention to erect. and from these tithes the churches shall be provided with competent persons of good character to serve them and with all ornaments and things which may be necessary for divine worship. This church. devoted to the service of God. to the end that these churches may be well served and equipped. and for the redemption of captives and the repairing of the churches. Although the priests may have such things in their possession. votive hospitals.Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by the King and under his direction. monasteries. and the ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies belonging to us: We command that there shall not be erected. books. propagation.

called divine. etc. is as follows: Property of public ownership is 1. third partida. their nature and species should be ascertained either to identify them and exclude them from such relations or because they furnish a complete explanation of the foregoing tabulated statement. Corporeal or ecclesiastical things (sacred. prayers. religion. books. p. we say. Sanchez Roman.. and mines. which defines public property. called human. the altars therein. Diccionario de la Administracion Española. p. Article 339. and banks. That belonging exclusively to the state without being for public use and which is destined to some public service. and other works for the defense of the territory. although once recovered by the Christians. roadsteads. torrents. A. canals. – Corporeal or ecclesiastical things are so divided. crosses. fasts. holy. 480. That destined to the public use.) The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and what belonged to private persons. (a) Sacred things are those devoted to God. These things can not be alienated except for some pious purpose and in such cases as are provided for in the laws. and the title to these things can not be alienated except in certain specific cases as we have already shown in the first partida of this book by the laws dealing with this subject. vestments. ports. Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. indulgences. shores. etc. reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it and shall have all the right and privileges formerly belonging to it. whose work on the Civil Law contains the following statement: First Group. and bridges constructed by the State. chalices. which are those means more or less direct for the proper religious salvation of man. it will again become sacred. Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly established by God for his service and sanctification of men and which are governed by divine or canonical laws.And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in to which this law has divided these things. which are those which have a direct influence on the religious redemption of man such as the sacrament. That the principles of the partida in reference to churches still exist is indicated by Sanchez Roman. or to the development of the national wealth. (2 Derecho Civil Español. and all other things which are in tended for the service of the church. the ground upon which it formerly stood shall always be consecrated ground. religious. But if any consecrated church should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it shall there and then cease to be sacred as long as the enemy has it under control. and that of similar character. and corporeal or ecclesiastical. article 344 declares as follows: . This makes it necessary to divide them into spiritual things. and worship in general. 2. such as churches. it defines in Law 13. such as roads. and those governed by human law. – From early times distinction has been made by authors and by law between things governed by divine law. such as temples. 7. fortresses. to the believers and the clergy. 3 Alcubilla. are those which are consecrated by the bishops. In the first group churches are not named. and although the former can not be the subject of civil juridical relations. 486. and in defining what property is of public use. and in so far as their use is concerned. consecrated things. until their concession has been granted. censers. 636. title 28. The code also defines the property of provinces and of pueblos. or finally because the laws of the partida deal with them. Spiritual. p. rivers. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical. according to which their control pertains to the ecclesiastical authorities. 8 Manresa. First Group. Divine things. The present Civil Code declares in article 338 that property is of public or private ownership. ornaments. B. We say further that even where a consecrated church is razed. altars. such as walls. That law is as follows: Sacred things. and temporal belonging to the church).

such as the shores of the sea. streets. existing in the King of Spain with reference to the churches in the Philippines. it proves the contrary. and the roads of all kinds. churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. and public waters. provided they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants. It was. It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any mention made of churches. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. rivers and their borders. for the purposes of its creation. The truth is that. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith. intrusted to that body. under the Spanish law. ports. the only body which could under any circumstances have possession of. All other property possessed by either is patrimonial. existed. nor could they be subjects of private property in the sense that any private person could the owner thereof. wagon roads. islands. It was for the purposes of that religion and for the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches in the Philippines were erected. and roadsteads. It is not necessary or important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. Second.Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads. did not give him any right to interfere with the material possession of these buildings. if they had belonged to the State. It is sufficient to say that this right to the exclusive possession and control of the same. unless otherwise prescribe in special laws. They were not public property. the squares. with the exception of railroads. A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the State and to the eminent domain thereof. and the question occurs. by virtue of the laws of Spain. it did not mention churches. streets. By virtue of those laws this possession and right of control were necessarily exclusive. or any control over. therefore. The possession of the churches. their care and custody. public promenades. was intrusted that possession and administration? For the purposes of the Spanish law there was only one religion. from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the United States. and commons of towns. or which belonged to the State. always reserving the servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers. To whom. for. and shall be governed by the provisions of this code. and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces. and any other analogous property during the time they are in common and general use. while it mentioned a great many other things. The right of patronage. fountains. . and the maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily. parks. being material things was necessary that some one should have the care and custody of them and the administration thereof. But. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State. any church dedicated to the worship of God. It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law indicates that churches belong to the State and are public property. They constituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which was that it was devoted to the worship of God. When the Civil Code undertook to define those things in a pueblo which were for the common use of the inhabitants of the pueblo. walls of cities and parks. they would have been included in the first paragraph instead of being placed in a paragraph by themselves. That was the religion professed by the Roman Catholic Church. the promenades. That article is as follows: There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of the law: First. and which is for the use of all.

we hold for the purpose of this case that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery that he has to the church. It is not necessary. There is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the Indies because he had constructed them. in article 8. and prior to the treaty of Paris. Any interference that has resulted has been caused by private individuals. It may be that by virtue of that power of eminent domain which is necessarily resides in every government. as the case may be. to which the preceding paragraph refers. without discussing the question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are all respects applicable to cemeteries. That treaty. municipalities. or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded. follows that in 1898. prevents. it might have appropriated this church and other churches. But nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the Philippines. acting without any authority from the Government. among other things. Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private persons. That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. as follows: And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession. Law 49 of the title commences as follows: Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops. or whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made between the church and the convent. (4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. it is not intended to say that the Government and had no power over it. That law is as follows: We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such houses as may be deemed sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios may live comfortably adjoining the parish church of the place where that may be built for the benefit of the priests in charge of such churches and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian parishioners. as to it. The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. These laws relate to the right of presentation to ecclesiastical charges and offices. ecclesiastical or civic bodies. or provinces. provides. the provisions of Law 19. It was then in the full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. to invoke the provisions of that treaty. When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain. however. can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds. nor the Government of these Islands.Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies treats Del Patronazgo Real de las Indias. dignitaries. and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any other purpose. It is always mentioned in connection with the church and convent and no point is made by the possession of the church and convent. has ever attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. no other person can obtain or possess the same without our presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of this title. the Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. It. therefore. title 2. For example. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the church and. This suggestion. Neither the Government of the United States. and private property of individuals. public or private establishments. and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and ecclesiastical offices whatsoever belong to us. but there is nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the private patron is the owner of the church. book 1. of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies would apply. or of private individuals. So. curates. he is not also entitled to recover possession of the cemetery. made with reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any other . bishops.

concurring: I am in entire accord with the majority of the court as to the disposition of this case. he says: Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence up to the time of Galieno. and because. because he can not be heard to set up title thereto in himself or a third person. with the finding that the defendant municipality failed to establish a better right to the possession than the plaintiff in this action. reserves his vote.. After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in accordance herewith. preservation. I agree. that the defendant.J. and distrustful as I ought to be of my own. because. 3 Alcubilla. J. J. Since the latter half of the third century. 1890. furthermore. I accept the argument and authority of the opinion of the court in so far as it finds: That the Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity in the Philippine Islands.. See also the royal order of the 4th of December.personality in Europe. speaking of the Roman Catholic Church. and ten days thereafter the record be remanded to the court below for execution. it failed to establish the existence of such grant. can not and should not be permitted in this action to deny the plaintiff’s right to the possession of the property in question. Arellano.) The judgment of the court below is affirmed. it was shown that the plaintiff or his predecessors had been in possession and control of the property in question for a long period of years prior to the treaty of Paris by unlawful authority of the King of Spain. and that the possession of the defendant Ramirez. p. Separate Opinions CARSON. and which existed “when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch. JJ. Alcubilla. claiming to be the owner by virtue of a grant from the Philippine Government. the transcendant importance of the issues involved seems to impose upon me the duty of writing a separate opinion and stating therein as clearly as may be the precise grounds upon which I base my assent and the reasons which forbid my acceptance of the majority opinion in its entirety.. Torres. the latter gradually entered upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition. and when idols were still worshiped in the temple of Mecca. and transmission of property the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. by the edict of Milan. who was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it among the juridicial entities protected by the laws of the Empire. nor accept without reserve all of the propositions laid down in the majority opinion. but I can not adopt the reasoning by which some of the conclusions appear to have been obtained. Mapa and Tracey.” does not require serious consideration.. that the municipality of Lagonoy has failed to show by evidence of record that it is or ever was in physical possession of the property in question. and more particularly since the year 313. presented by Montero Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of October 1871. inaugurated an era of protection for the church. 211. at least until he has first formally surrendered it to the plaintiff who intrusted it to his care. and that since the sovereignty of these Islands has been transferred to the United States the new sovereign has never at any time divested or attempted to divest the plaintiff of this possession and control. (3 Dictionary of Spanish Administration. can not be relied upon as the possession of the municipality because the same reason which estops Ramirez from denying the right of possession in the plaintiff estops any other person claiming possession through him from denying that right. . Johnson. Ramirez. So ordered. it existed until then by the mercy and will of the faithful and depended for such existence upon pious gifts and offerings. C. Profoundly as I respect the judgment of my associates. In the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical obligations. furthermore. with the costs of this instance against the appellant. when Constantine. concur. 189.

I am convinced. I am not prepared. in the unlimited and unrestricted sense in which it is stated in the majority opinion. however. to review the legislation of Spain for the three centuries of her Philippine occupation for the purpose of deciding the much-vexed question of the respective property rights of the Spanish sovereign and the Roman Catholic Church in State-constructed and State-aided churches in these Islands. as it appears in the majority opinion. because it is not necessary in the decision of this case. therefore. that the Government of the United States is not. It is evident that if any of these propositions is successfully controverted. final. such property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands. that by the treaty of Paris the ownership of thereof passed to the Government of the United States. supported as they are by the law and the evidence in this case. it is inaccurate and misleading. and in making its finding it completely. 1902. and finally disposes of defendants’ claim of ownership. and it may not be improper. But the mere fact that a finding that the King of Spain had no right of ownership in this property which could pass to the United States under the provisions of the treaty of Paris is not necessary in my opinion for the disposition of the case at bar. to indicate briefly my reasons for doubting it. the claim of ownership of the defendant municipality It is rested upon the following propositions: That the property in question belonged. such transfer. would not impose upon me the duty of writing a separate opinion if it were in fact and a law a correct holding. All the acts of the Government of the United States and of the present Government of the Philippine Islands which can have any relation to the property in question are before us. it is a very different undertaking. the ownership and the right to the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. and second. if not wholly erroneous. then I think that this court should refrain from making so momentous a finding in a case wherein the United States is not a party and has never had an opportunity to be heard. and these propositions. and complete determination of the case at bar. however.Thus far I am able to accept the reasoning of the majority opinion. perhaps. That it is not necessary for the proper disposition of this case will be apparent if we consider the purpose for which it is introduced in the argument and the proposition which it is intended to controvert. however. because I am of opinion that. . As stated in the majority opinion. “the owner of this property or any other property like it is situated in the Philippine Islands” is not necessary for the full. and so short a period of years has elapsed since the transfer of the sovereignty of these Islands to the United States that it is possible to demonstrate with the utmost certainty that by no act of the United States or of the Government of the Philippine Islands has the ownership and possession of this property been conferred upon the defendant municipality. 1902. the mere right of eminent domain. completely dispose of the question before us and establish the right of the plaintiff to a judgment for possession. and if I am correct in my contention that a holding that the King of Spain was not. inferentially. conclusively.” and inferentially that the United States is not now the owner thereof and has no property rights therein other than. or attempted to make. The majority opinion finds (and I am entire accord as to this finding) that neither the Government of the United States nor the Philippine Government had ever made. that by article 12 of the act of Congress of July 1. prior to the treaty of Paris. I decline to affirm this proposition. and that by a circular of that Government dated November 11. it is inaccurate and misleading. to give my assent to the proposition that prior to the Treaty of Paris “The King of Spain was not the owner of the property in question nor of any other property like it situated in the Philippine Islands. the defendants’ claim of ownership must fall to the ground.” and. that when stated without limitations or restrictions. first. to the Spanish Government.

books. in contemplation of Spanish law. to deny to that church and to all others the right of ownership in the property thus dedicated. to place those sacred edifices under the guardian care and custody of the church of the State. and. clothing. and other things which they might be in seed of. yet they are not the owners thereof. it would seem that a grant to Him by the King or the Government of Spain could not suffice to convey to Him the legal title of the property set out in the grant. indeed. the balance. title 28. absolutely and conclusively. belonging to God. third. the legal title. first. in any usual or ordinary sense to take or hold. But this transfer of sovereignty. and it is evident that for this purpose we must look to the substance rather than the form and examine the intention of the grantor and the object he sought to attain. It is not necessary to go beyond the citations of the majority opinion to see that the objects which the grantor sought to attain were. and that all these sacred edifices were to be regarded as beyond the commerce of men. or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or with them. “it does not admit of doubt that the parish churches in the Philippines were built by the Spanish Government. and for the redemption of captivers and the repairing of the churches. and chiefly. and the absolute severance of church and state which resulted therefrom. render it necessary to ascertain as definitely as may be the true meaning and intent of this conventional treatment of the parish churches in the Philippines as the property of God. second. nor it can be considered as included in his property holdings. possession. and control of the parish churches in the Philippines. such as the feeding and clothing of the poor. to advance the cause of religion among the people of the Philippine Islands and to provide for their religious instruction and edification by furnishing them with parish churches suitable for the worship and glorification of God. devoted to the service of God. but limited by and subject to the royal patronage ( patronato real) which included the right to intervene in the appointment of the representatives of the church into whose hands the possession and control of the sacred editors were to be intrusted. No sacred. its very indefiniteness seems to have aided in the accomplishment of the end for which it was adopted. and still more difficult to state. The anomalous status thus created might well have given rise to doubts and uncertainties as to the legal title and beneficial ownership of this property had not the grantor and the lawgiver of Spain expressly and specifically provided that neither the Roman Catholic Church nor any other person was or could become the owner thereof. the purpose and object of which was crystallize the status of all such property in the peculiar and unusual mold in which it was cast at the time of its dedication. this convention served its purpose well. the beneficial ownership. the support of orphans. So long as church and state remained united and so long as the Roman Catholic Church continued to be the church of the State. as I think. or holy thing. They hold them thus as guardians or servants. to enforce or to defend the legal title to this property. was said to have been in God. and the truth would seem to be that the treatment of this property in contemplation of Spanish law as the property of God was a mere arbitrary convention. and other similar charitable purposes. the precise meaning and legal effect of this disposition of the ownership. partida 3. I am satisfied that the status created by the above-cited law 12 of the partidas continued without substantial modification to the date of the transfer of sovereignty from the King of Spain to the United States. But it must be admitted that after this property was dedicated. but since it was not possible for God.” and it would seem therefore that prior to their dedication. and there can be no doubt that the physical possession and control of these churches for the purposes for which they were dedicated was given to the Roman Catholic Church – not. can be the subject of ownership by any man.As stated in the majority opinion. (Law 12. Although the priests may have such things in their possession. the declaration of the . the ownership. and the buying of chalices.) It is difficult to determine. and on a review of all the pertinent citations of Spanish law which have been brought to my attention. was to be devoted to pious purposes. rather than the words and conventional terms whereby that intent was symbolically expressed. the possession and control of all this property must be taken to have been vested in that Government. the marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women because of their poverty. and since God could neither take nor hold the legal title to this property. Hence they were allowed to take from the Revenues of the church and lands what was reasonably necessary for their support. religious.

Villa. including the disposition of any funds arising therefrom. and because. it passed. For the purposes of this opinion it is not necessary. This declaration that these churches are the property of God and the provisions which accompanied it. subject to the trusts under which it was held prior thereto. Silvestre and Garcia . Footnotes [[1]] 6 Phil. In other words. nor would it be profitable. and as long as the property continues to be used for the purposes for which it was dedicated.R. Vales v. and to exercise no right of property in them inconsistent therewith. the people of the Philippine Islands became the beneficial owners of all such property. for the religious edification and enjoyment of the people of the Philippine Islands – and that he would give to the Roman Catholic Church the physical possession and control thereof. 10028. If this interpretation of the meaning and intent of the convention of Spanish law which treated God as the owner of the parish churches of the Philippine Islands be correct. Rep. No. if I am correct in my contention that the legal title to the State-constructed churches in the Philippines passed to the United States the virtue of the treaty of Paris. appear to me to be precisely equivalent to a declaration of trust by the grantor that he would hold the property as trustee for the use for which it was dedicated – that is. was in effect no more than a solemn obligation imposed upon himself to hold them for the purposes for which they were dedicated. and it is to withhold my assent from this proposition that I have been compelled to write this separate opinion. 286. that when dedicated these churches became in some peculiar and especial manner the property of God. the prayer of the complaint is for the possession of this property of which it is alleged that church has been unlawfully deprived. under certain stipulated conditions and for the purposes expressly provided by law. the Government of the United States has no lawful right to deprive the Roman Catholic Church of the possession and control thereof under the terms and conditions upon which that possession and control were originally granted. and the United States can not at will repudiate the conditions of that trust and retain its place in the circle of civilized nations.King of Spain as set out in the above-cited law.. and while the complaint in this action alleges that the Roman Catholic Church is the owner of the property in question. nevertheless. G. furthermore. nor to discuss at length the question of ownership of this property. and the grantor continued to hold the legal title. because whether it be held to be in abeyance or in God or in the Roman Catholic Church or in the United States it has been shown without deciding this question of ownership that the right to the possession for the purpose for which it was dedicated is in the Roman Catholic Church. in trust nevertheless to hold the property for the purposes for which it was dedicated and on the further trust to give the custody and control thereof to the Roman Catholic Church. to do more than indicate the line of reasoning which has led me to my conclusions. a holding that the King of Spain had no right to ownership in this property which could pass to the United States by virtue of the treaty of Paris can not be maintained.

SILVESTRE.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION December 16. upon the payment of the sum required of him.41 and retain the property sold to him by the plaintiff. plaintiff-appellee. as stated.: This is an action to set aside certain transfers of real estate from the plaintiff to one of the defendants and to require that defendant to recover by good and sufficient conveyance the title to such properties. and on P752 thereof at 6 per cent per annum from the 4th day of April. Cohn and Fisher and Orense and Gonzalez Diez for appellee. and MARIA GUIA GARCIA. vs. 1913. with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from October 17.089. Ross and Block and Manuel Torres for appellants. No. upon the failure of either of said defendants to elect. and retain the property. And against the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for the sum of P3. whether she will pay the plaintiff the sum of P7. Lawrence. to elect within 15 days from date thereof whether he will pay the plaintiff the sum of P8. Villa. and for P25. FELIPE S. 1911. in case of retention of the property. 1911. This appeal was taken from that judgment.500 thereof at 6 per cent per annum from September 5. or to pay the amounts required by them to be paid. for the costs of the action. Haussermann.600. compelling the defendants to execution the deeds as indicated. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: Requiring the defendant Maria Guia Garcia to elect within fifteenth days from date hereof. defendants-appellants.R. MORELAND. And requiring the defendant. and in favor of the plaintiff. 1913.500. 1913. 10028 JOSE VALES. issues and profits of certain real estate during a certain period. and of deeding to plaintiff without compensation the parcel of land deeded by plaintiff to her on the 4th day of April. 1916 G. with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 5th day of September. who may immediately enforce his election by execution. J. 1913. Simeon A.59. or deed the property described as follows (description of property) and the property sold to her on the 4th day of April. or deed the property to the plaintiff upon the payment by the plaintiff to him of the sum of P8. VILLA. SIMEON A. and described as follows (description of property) together with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October.000 damages. together with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 24th day of October. the right of election as to performance shall be in the plaintiff. 1911.274 with interest on P6. and. to the plaintiff upon plaintiff’s paying her the sum of P7. And.910. 1911. to refund to the plaintiff a certain sum paid by plaintiff for the recovery of certain other real estate. and for an accounting by the defendants of the rents. .

the defendant Maria Guia Garcia appearing in both conveyance as the vendor of the properties. wife of the defendant Simeon A. Shortly after the conveyance of March 22. the conveyance containing a clause giving to the vendor the right to repurchase the premises within one year from the date of the conveyance by a payment to the vendee of the consideration stated in the conveyance. 1909. Maria Guia Garcia being the vendor in that conveyance. the purchase price named in the conveyance of 1904. The defendants. The consideration for the transfer was the debt of P20.580 certain property.800. she being an elderly woman and Maria Guia Garcia being considered by her the heir to all her property. on parcel of the property described in that conveyance was sold to Judge Jocson. known and designated as No.It appears that the defendant Felipa Silvestre is a widow. for the consideration of P6.000. 1913. remaining unsold. and P5. together with the lot whereon the same is erected. the consideration for the conveyance. 47b.000. but the plaintiff contends that there was a parol agreement between him and the defendants entered into at the time the conveyance was executed and delivered. giving him the right to repurchase the premises so conveyed at any time on paying the vendee the P25. respectively. (c) one house of strong materials. At that time he was in debt to the defendant Felipa Silvestre in the sum of P20. On the 4th day of April. located on Calle Salsipuedes. he claiming that he had paid long before the full sum of P25. and 11. district of Ermita. This action was commenced on the 25th of October. and is the aunt of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. The defendants deny the existence of such a parol agreement and the controversy thus raised is the origin of all the difference between the parties to this action.000 named as the consideration for the transfer. and in March 22. but not a part of the property described in the conveyance of the 22d of March. Plaintiff did not repurchase. plaintiff also conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia a house and lot located on Padre Faura Street for P8. the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for P7. (b) one house of strong materials. so far as appears. (d) two houses of strong materials situated upon the private street known and designated as Callejon Maria Paz. and in 1913 a parcel of land adjoining the Salsipuedes property for P752. together with the lots whereon said buildings are erected. in spite of the conveyance of the 22d of March. conveys the property in fee simple. the additional debt which had been created during the time intervening between the two conveyances. a year. 1909. having become indebted to Felipa Silvestre in an additional sum of P5. the defendant Maria Guia Garcia conveyed to plaintiff the properties described in the conveyance of March 22. district of Ermita. It is claimed by the plaintiff that. together with the lots wherein the same are erected. known and designated as Nos. on that day. Villa. 1909. In 1911. collecting them and using them for his own personal purposes. known and designated as No. to wit: (a) Two houses of strong materials. 45 (now 221-225) Calle Mercado. 37 to 47 (now 105-113) Calle Nebraska. 49 (now 303-311) Calle Mercado. after the conveyance of the 22d of . district of Ermita. he continued in possession of the properties described therein as virtual owner thereof. he. consisting of 11 doors or posesiones. deny that the plaintiff. In 1911. 1909. plaintiff thereby receiving on payment that which he claims he was entitled to receive for nothing under the alleged verbal agreement. together with the lots wherein the same is erected. 15 and 17. 1915. Still later another parcel of the property described in said conveyance was sold to one Garchitorena. 70 years of age. 1909.000.000. 13.000 which entitled him to the reconveyance without further consideration. at the request of Felipa Silvestre. on the other hand. The deed was absolute on its face and. also the subject of this action.000. at the rate of 9 per cent per annum.644 Philippine currency.250. In that year he executed to her a conveyance of the properties above described in consideration of the debt. and still later a second parcel.000. or P2. He also claims that he rented those portions of the properties described in the conveyance which he himself did not personally occupy and that he had the benefits of such rents. In 1904 plaintiff was the owner of the following properties. conveyed the premises to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. and numbered 47a. and that all he paid for such possession was the interest on the P25. said houses and lots having an assessed valuation of P23.

deny that he acted in such negotiations as owner.000. as stated. It is admitted that.000 and P15. constituting the full amount due to defendant under the verbal agreement to reconvey attached to the conveyance of the 22d of March. of course. it was grossly inadequate. in the sale to Judge Jocson and to Garchitorena. 1909. 1909. and was paid in pursuance of the alleged verbal agreement to reconvey the premises on the payment of the P25. upon the payment of that sum. that difference consists largely in the reasons which underlie the facts thus stated and the forces and motives which moved the plaintiff to the performance of the acts referred to and from the effects of which he asks to be relieved. 1909.000 or any sum whatever. but assert that he occupied them as tenant of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia and that he paid rent to her continuously while in the occupancy thereof. The history of the transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant as given by counsel for the parties is not essentially different.000 which formed the consideration for the conveyance of the 22d of March. that is.000 in full. counsel say: . a wide difference in the claims of the parties to the action. asserting that he received the whole of that purchase price as the owner of the property and that he paid therefrom to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia the sum of P15. while it is admitted that the plaintiff rented portions of the properties to other tenants. said sum. that the defendant Maria Guia Garcia received the full purchase price in each case. The defendants deny. were induced either by the fraud of the defendants or by the force and undue influence which they were able to and did exercise over him by virtue of the advantages they possessed by reason of the fact that the conveyance of March 22d. Counsel for the plaintiff claim that the conveyance subsequent to that of the 22d of March. Plaintiff also claims that the consideration received for the conveyance to Judge Jocson was received by him as the real owner of the property and that P10. which is the origin of all the controversies between the parties. and that the only sum that plaintiff received was that paid him by the defendant for his services as agent in selling the property. he was entitled to receive a reconveyance from the defendant Maria Guia Garcia of the properties described in the conveyance of the 22d of March. however. occupied the premises as owner. 1909 was absolute in form. With respect to the conveyance of March 22. Defendants. While there is. that they would repudiate the verbal agreement which plaintiff alleges was attached to that conveyance. and this plaintiff admits.000 thereof was paid to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia as a part payment of the P25. Plaintiff’s position with regard to the various transfers and the other acts of plaintiff is best shown by statements of counsel in their brief in this court. remaining unsold. the amount of the rent being reduced as portions of the property were sold. together with the sum of P10. the plaintiff personally conducted the negotiations.000 paid from the Jocson sale. Counsel further assert that one of the elements of the alleged fraud and undue influence was that there was no consideration for the transfers to defendants or if there was a consideration. that such verbal agreement existed and also specifically deny that such threat or any threat was made or that the conveyances of the property referred to were obtained by virtue thereof. but allege that he acted as their agent. if he did not do so. as we have seen. on the contrary. he acted in so doing as a tenant of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia and under a permission to sublet. and his appearance as a witness for the defendants in the various proceedings in the Court of Land Registration concerning certain of the parcels of land in litigation and all other acts against his own interests. he was induced to accept such considerations and to make the conveyances by reason of the threat aforesaid. 1911. 1909. and he asserts that. Defendants also say that. defendants canceled plaintiff’s lease and thereafter collected the rents themselves from all occupants. He asserts that the consideration paid by the defendant for these properties was grossly inadequate and that. With regard to the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties the plaintiff claims that they were obtained from him and that he was induced to execute conveyances therefor in favor of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia under the threat that. the defendants would not reconvey to him the properties described in the conveyance of the 22d of March 1909. 1909. and that in December.March. 1909. He makes the same claim with regard to the purchase price of the property sold to Garchitorena. They assert. They also deny that he received the purchase price of said properties and that he paid them P10. including the plaintiff.

there would be trouble in the event of the death of said Guia Garcia. the land with the improvements thereon had been conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia under pacto de retro for P20. He accordingly engaged the service of brokers to find a buyer for the house and lots at Nos.000 were received from . The result of this activity was the sale to Garchitorena of these properties for the sum of P20.000. all of which had been employed in the construction of improvements on the land. Of this sum P2. in the form of an absolute deed (Exhibit 1) in favor of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. The judge identified the surveying sheets of the rough draft of the document so prepared by him (deposition. The sale to Judge Jocson was the occasion of the first intimation to plaintiff that he had committed a folly in executing a deed to property worth P78. and until he was later ousted from the remainder as hereinafter stated. and wife of Dr.000 for the premises at No. Vales.000.000 was paid by plaintiff on account of his indebtedness and the remainder of P2. Exhibit B.000 was retained by plaintiff for his own uses. and that in view of said explanation Vales requested the judge to prepare a suitable document which would show the real equity of Vales in the property. until he sold a part of the property. for the purpose of signing the formal deed..000 the plaintiff was required to increase his interest payments from 9 per cent to 10 per cent.000 and to place the property beyond the reach of an impecunious brother-in-law. This additional P5. The testimony of this witness also corroborates absolutely that of the plaintiff to the effect that when the P20. that since that time the plaintiff had received form time to time an additional P5. who states that he was informed by Vales that although he was the owner of the property he had allowed the title to stand in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia as security for an obligation. and the monthly payments of P187. 49 Calle Mercado. were carried on with the plaintiff exclusively. The revenue from the property amounting to the sum of P600 per month was wholly received by the plaintiff. upon one pretext or another they failed to execute the same. under guise of covering the additional P5. 1909.000. Guia Garcia.50 were thereafter continued at the rate of P125. who appraises the said properties at over P36. niece of Felipa Silvestre. who were present. as shown by the testimony of Goyena. 1909. This attitude of theirs aroused the suspicion of plaintiff and he forthwith determined to sacrifice a part of his property in order to obtain the money with which to discharge the remaining balance of his indebtedness.00.000 to P15. The broker who made the sale testifies positively that the defendant Felipa Silvestre informed him that the property in question belonged to Vales. In thus reducing his debt from P25. 1904. free from any control on the part of the defendants. the price for the sale was fixed by the plaintiff after the latter had abandoned his efforts to secure a higher price. counsel say: In October. of course. 9) and administered the same for his own use and benefit. After the execution of this deed to Maria Guia Garcia.000.500 to secure a debt of only P25. P10. 77-8). was the so-called consideration upon which the conveyance under pacto de retro was converted into an apparently absolute conveyance. the plaintiff was induced to execute a writing. When this document was presented to defendant Villa and his wife. none of which was retained by the plaintiff.000 and was to have a reconveyance of his property upon the repayment of said indebtedness. The judge testifies that he explained to Vales that although he. 105-113 Calle Nebraska. This is shown not only by the testimony of plaintiff but also by that of Judge Jocson. Simeon A. extending over several months. and that from him he received his commission for his services in effecting the sale. included in the deed to Guia Garcia. the plaintiff.000. All of the negotiations with Judge Jocson. the plaintiff found a purchaser for one of his houses in the person of Judge Jocson. Vales. p. that he received all his instructions regarding the sale from the latter. although this was far below their real value.On March 22. With regard to the transaction with Judge Jocson. Villa. and the money was paid to plaintiff by Judge Jocson in the presence of the defendants. a competent and disinterested witness.000 without expressing therein its real object. continued in the absolute possession of the properties (test. The deed expressly recites that by an escritura dated September 23. This deed was made upon the express understanding (not contained in the instrument) that the plaintiff was to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum upon his indebtedness of P25.000 was employed in building a stable and fences. might have absolute confidence in the good faith of the defendants. who paid P14. p. the plaintiff.

said that that would be done after Holy Week (sten. Its actual cost of building (some P14. In addition to informing him that they would indefinitely retain his Ermita properties.000 is surprising.800 above stated the plaintiff was unable to comply for the some time. and piling Pelion on Ossa. page 14). The temerity of plaintiff in even mentioning his rights was deemed worthy of chastisement. after a two days’ delay. He then again preferred his request for the restoration of his Ermita properties. they ousted him form the administration thereof. Fearing that he would be deprived of his property. to reconvey to him the rest of the mortgaged property and that the defendant Villa. the defendants having discovered that plaintiff was the owner of a strip of land adjoining the house and lot already wrested from him and having made unsuccessful demands upon him for the transfer of that strip to them. 1911. This house was completed about August 1. This property had apparently excited the avarice and cupidity of defendants. and so. finished and completed to the taste and requirements of Dr. Villa. he succeeded in borrowing this sum from one Rafael Alonso.500. in April 1913. the value of which. plaintiff requested defendants to reconvey to him the rest of his property. Villa for the meager sum of P8. Finally in December. which had stood as security for the debt.000. was P24. With the demand of P6. and yielding to the threat of the defendants. but that if he did not do so. Villa and frightened into retracting his statements and consenting to the issue of title unto Maria Guia Garcia. that they would then reconvey to him the rest of his property.000. collected the rentals thereof and even compelled the plaintiff to pay them rental for that part occupied by himself and family. Succumbing to this pressure. The situation. advised them that they were at the end of their rope. they demanded of plaintiff the Padre Faura house.800 or the excess of cost over the purchase price of P8. stenographic notes of plaintiff’s testimony. he succeeded in securing the refund of the balance of his Ermita possessions (worth about P24. was over P15. availing themselves of the fact that the record title was in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. after April 11.800) was advanced by Dr. The mere fact that the plaintiff had meekly been haled before Judge Ostrand by Dr. page 39). but left the plaintiff with an equity of about P18. the plaintiff made conveyance of this additional tribute.800. 1911. in the presence of the other defendants. 1911. and on September 5. Counsel have this to say with regard to the transaction involving the house on Calle Salsipuedes: On April 14. and under the guise of punishing him for his ingratitude in telling the true history of his woes to Judge Ostrand of the Land Court and thus delaying the title to the Salsipuedes house. but was informed that this would not be done until he had sold them for P7. 1911. was deeded by plaintiff to defendant Maria Guia Garcia. and had planned and commenced a building thereon to cost about P17.Garchitorena for the sale of the property in question P5.000 of it was turned over to Vales. as fixed by the witness Goyena.500). notes. notes. but the titles to the remaining properties. especially such as would redound to the profit and gain of defendants. the plaintiff completed the house and conveyed it to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for P7. and with this sum (P6. as established by the undisputed testimony of the witness Goyena.437. all of whom were there present. This occurred on the night of April 11. Doubtless the delay in procuring for their demands the ultimate P6. . they would keep it. Finally. The details of the discussion which this outrageous demand provoked are found on page 17. The plaintiff had purchased a building lot on Calle Padre Faura. He also testifies that at the time Vales requested the defendants. was that the plaintiff had returned to the defendants the whole amount of his indebtedness to them. put the screws upon his thumbs a little tighter. still stood in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia.800) as a nominal consideration.000.500. therefore. 1911. seemed to make no difference. or the threatened fulfillment of the adage that even a worm will turn. The value of these properties. The final upshot was that the defendants told plaintiff that if he would finish the house as they wanted it and sell it to them for P7. And so the Padre Faura property went the way of the house on Calle Salsipuedes and settled into the maw of the defendants. when finished the poor plaintiff was owing to defendants the sum of P6. Why the defendants did not complete their undertaking.000.500 a house and lot of his on Calle Salsipuedes. but the rapacity of the defendants was not satisfied. The details of what transpired on this occasion were also given by the plaintiff in his testimony (sten.

” “Ratification. the brief of counsel for plaintiff is divided into four parts.” “Duress. Moreover. . conspiring together. and that they are bound to make restitution to him of every dollar which they have extorted from him by their threats and intimidation. was for security and not an absolute conveyance. Counsel for appellants say in their brief in this case: This is an action to annul a series of real estate transactions between plaintiff and defendants on the ground of duress. however. played upon the fears of plaintiff and extorted from him the money and property described in the complaint. however. Still later counsel say with respect to the sale of the properties in question for P5. Counsel then continue: From this premise he (speaking of counsel for appellant) argues that as there was no legal obligation to reconvey. that instead of performing this duty. the defendants. Our law would be indeed a travesty on justice if.” There is no division of the brief which is devoted to fraud or deceit and no direct discussion of either element. manifestly their refusal to do so could not have coerced plaintiff’s volition. and taking advantage of the fact that the conveyance by way of mortgage was in the form of an absolute deed. It is our contention that the consent thus wrung from the plaintiff was vitiated by the duress to which he was subjected by the defendants.” counsel for plaintiff have this to say respecting the real issue in the action: With no dispute or denial of the shameful charges laid at the door of Villa and his wife by this plaintiff. They say: The action has been erroneously described in appellant’s brief as one to annul a series of real estate transactions on the ground of duress. upon the facts disclosed by this record. and constituting the very first sentence of that portion marked “Argument. Under the heading “Argument” there is a discussion of the claim that the conveyance of March 22. There appears to be some confusion as to the precise nature of this action.It is thus clear that the real difference between the parties in their relation of the facts in the main lies in the coloring given them by the disclosure by the plaintiff of what he alleges to have been the motives and forces which drove him to the transactions which he now wishes to have annulled. 1909. etc.515: It is repugnant to common sense to think for one moment that any sane man would be willing to sell property of this value for less than a third of its actual worth. and must elect to make up the deficiencies. Under the heading “Res judicata” we find this: But the plaintiff does contend that the defendants must undo their fraud. counsel for appellant seeks strenuously to avoid the issue of duress. each part headed by a word or phrase in bold face type descriptive of its contents.000 when the undisputed evidence shows they were worth P78. Later in their brief. “Res judicata. This is followed by the part marked “Duress” where counsel say: The evidence also shows. More correctly this is an action to compel the defendants to account unto the plaintiff for the proceeds of a series of frauds practiced upon said plaintiff. no relief could be afforded to the plaintiff. They are “Argument. This statement is sharply challenged by counsel for appellee in their brief.

taken in conjunction with the allegations of the complaint. the defendants. As we have said. using that word in its popular and not in its legal sense. and it was a complete termination of the relations existing between the parties arising out of the properties which he claimed were sold with a right to repurchase. that we find no fraud in this case. inasmuch as fraud and deceit are so prominently mentioned. That fact however must be alleged and proved and relied upon before it can be utilized by the person asserting its existence. The validity of that conveyance is admitted. is to declare that if. and plaintiff went into each one of them knowing all of the facts as well as the defendants. therefore. the other party was deprived of property. The ultimate purpose of the action is the recovery of the properties described in the deed of March 22. It was not alleged or proved in this case and plaintiff does not rely upon it in his brief in this court.It would seem from the foregoing. After having obtained the very thing he desired and having done so in a manner which he deemed best and most suitable under the circumstances. the sales were all made by the plaintiff with full knowledge of the facts and there appears nothing in the record which warrants a rescission of them from the standpoint of fraud. Under his own statement and according to his own theory the defendants did no more than break their verbal contract with him with respect to all subsequent transactions as they had with respect to the first. . Certainly the repurchase of the properties which he so much desired was not procured by fraud or deceit. that plaintiff. the plaintiff has already recovered those properties. he would not have made. and then repudiate not only the transaction in which he was defrauded of that property but also the very transaction by which he recovered it. His consent was not obtained by deceit in any of the transactions. The claim is simply that there was a verbal agreement to reconvey on the repayment of the consideration named in the instrument and that defendants made use of the fact that the agreement was verbal and. and can he nor repudiate not only the transaction by which he recovered them but also every other transaction which he claims related thereto? It is incomprehensible. plaintiff had obtained the very thing which he had been seeking to recover all through thus dealings with defendants and to obtain which he claims he had suffered so much. According to plaintiff’s contention. again and again accepted the verbal promises of the defendants to reconvey. That was not fraud. however. it should be noted of March 22. Dealing with the case from the standpoint of intimidation. It is well recognized however. for P6. Most if not all of the elements of fraud are absent. and. Before this action was begun. In none of the transactions was there a misrepresentation of an existing or past fact. was obtained in that form by force or thereat. unless the mere failure to fulfill the various verbal contracts can be said to constitute fraud or deceit. then. there is fraud and deceit. having been deprived of property by fraud and deceit. that the theory of the action is duress. difficult to prove. There was no deception. and that. 1909. Having secured before this action was begun precisely what defendants had promised him and the very thing he sought. as clever by which they forced him to convey to them additional properties before they would comply with the verbal agreement. remaining unsold. and not all have gone that far. 1909. therefore. There did not exist in any one of the transactions complained of a condition where “by words and insidious machinations on the part of one of the contracting parties the other is (was) induced to execute a contract which. from a legal point of view. although it was done again and again. there remains nothing further to be said or done in that connection. knowing them. after getting all he can out of the other party.” Reduced to the lowest terms this action constitutes an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to extricate himself from a series of foolish transactions. as appears from the evidence. one of the parties has present in his mind the purpose and intent to break it.800. the authorities holding that the state of mind of the party is a fact entering into the consideration of the contract without which it would not have been made. But. may recover that property through a voluntary agreement between him and those who deceived and defrauded him. having purchased them from the defendants on April l4. did he not thereby terminate all relations between himself and defendants with respect to. and that purpose and intent enter into a the contract as the main element or consideration thereof on his part. without them. by virtue of that state of mind. The furthest the authorities have gone along this line. as is also the fact that the verbal agreement to reconvey was omitted from the conveyance knowingly. or growing out of those properties. This is a necessary deduction not only form the fact that there was no misrepresentation but also from the fact that plaintiff knew precisely what he was doing – was fully acquainted with the facts. each one of the conveyances between him and defendants subsequent to the original conveyance was an extortion. if we may accept his allegations respecting them. at the time a contract is made. 1913. that a mere failure to live up to a contract is not fraudulent or deceitful. We might say.

and that he executed and delivered the subsequent conveyances for the purpose of extricating himself from the unfortunate situation so produced. to reconvey to him the properties remaining. . There must be. the great and the small. placed himself in a disadvantageous position. it is not illegal’ and of itself is not ground for relief. and when the two meet on a fair field the inferior cannot murmur if the battle goes against him. The same may be said with greater force of a case where a person’s own voluntary act. intelligence. and the demand that he pay to secure his extrication is not illegal. sense. the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong. sometimes with gain and advantage to all. but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. and lose money by them – indeed. may place a person in a disadvantageous position with respect to another. they must take care of themselves. He pays for his lack of foresight. He may be required to lose more property to his enemy or go to the courts for redress. any more than it protects the strong because he is strong. make ridiculous contracts.800 to recover the remaining properties. acument. It is the voluntary act of a sane and mature man performed upon reflection. by not incorporating the verbal agreement to reconvey in the instrument itself. told him to pay the additional sum rather than to suffer the inconvenience and expense of an action in court. use miserable judgment. One man cannot complain because another is more able. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another. the person injured may renounce his right to take the matter to the courts and may compromise with the wrongdoer. At each conveyance the defendants agreed. in addition. When of age and sane. His judgment. In their relation with others in the business of life. all they have in the world. operating upon this condition. Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains. In such case the payment of an additional sum as a means of escape is not necessarily a payment voidable for duress. always verbally. In these contests men must depend upon themselves – upon their own abilities. training. after each such conveyance. training. ability and judgment meet and clash and contest. sense. Men may do foolish things. but each time refused to do so and proceeded. uninfluenced by another. While the demand may be reprehensible morally. even if an actionable wrong be committed in such manner as to authorize the courts to intervene. relieve him from one-sided contracts. A payment made under such conditions is not voidable. as a consideration therefor. threatening him with a refusal to comply with the verbal agreement to reconvey and the consequent loss of his properties. The foolish may lose all they have to the wise. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. to a fresh extortion.. or go to the courts to be relieved. has put him in a disadvantageous position – a position which another may unjustly make use of to his injury. or has better sense of judgment than he has. was the last penalty which he paid for his mistake in not incorporating the verbal agreement in the conveyance itself. sometimes to a few only. judgment. the strong and the weak. with loss and injury to others. The ultimate extortion. or to exclude from the operation of its terms things verbally agreed to be excluded. and a payment made pursuant to such demand is not necessarily voidable. The fact that one may be worsted by another. talents. he may be offered by his adversary one or more avenues of escape. of itself. having been placed in a very disadvantageous position by the wrong committed against him. a violation of law. It is contended that plaintiff. Not only this. protect him from unwise investments.in order to intimidate him and thereby obtain the conveyance. The law furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior. or to record an instrument. Furthermore. This much was plain to him: he had either to let the matter stand as it was with the loss already sustained. but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. furnishes no cause of complaint. The act was preceeded by an exercise of judgment. it is a compromise of the original wrong and a ratification of the relation which the wrongful act was intended to establish between the parties. wits. or to have witnesses present when a verbal agreement is made. Or. before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. It makes no distinction between the wise and the foolish. All men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to be moved by substantially the same motives. but that does not mean that the law will give it back to them again. the payment of P6. The failure to reduce a contract to writing. The law furnishes protection to both alike – to one or more or less than to the other. etc. or better trained. or annul the effects of foolish acts.

he found himself in precisely the situation he was before. He may do this expressly or impliedly. the will which moves it is another’s. While his hand signs. He may expressly accept the agreement as it stands. First. a new element enters. . only one party to it.” Article 1268 declares the effect of violence and intimidation on the contract. While a contract is made. but is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a mere automation and acts mechanically only. instead. Not only this. Or. Or. it is. was still verbal. it is unenforceable for lack of a second party. he may compromise by paying something to be relieved from its effects or to have its terms changed. as where he executes a contract or performs an act against his will under a pressure which he cannot resist. irresistible force is used. applying the principles already enunciated: Was there intimidation in this case under the facts as related by plaintiff himself. or in a modified from. from his point of view.” Article 1267 provides that “violence exists when. a disappearance of the personality of the actor. he not only made another verbal agreement but also paid them. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. and there are others not now necessary to mention. even if it should have been employed by a third person who did not take part in the contract. without a scrap of paper to show for it or specify its object. Intimidation resulting from the fear of losing his property. if it falls in the second. under violence. There is no question of error or violence in this case.” and the “intimidation exists when one of the contracting parties is inspired with a reasonable and well-grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property. in order to exact consent. Plaintiff had his choice. in reality and in law. then. From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged intimidation must be examined to determine within which class it falls. the sum of P10. But into whichever class it falls the party coerced may. waive his right to annul the contract and to recover damages. and in his place is substituted another – the one exercising the force or making use of intimidation. His judgment operated upon the situation thus presented and he concluded that. which he claims he had twice paid for. in reality. . he required no writing to protect himself from the very trap into which he had once fallen. judgment. and his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested. the one using the force or the intimidation. is the element relied on. gives no consent at all. his interests would be best subserved by paying the additional consideration. and where he. and he was no better off than before. or deceit shall be void. In any one of which cases. The verbal agreement to reconvey. he renounces and waives his defense of intimidation and thereby eliminates that element as one having any influence on the case thereafter. there being only one party. it is clear that all that defendants did was to refuse to live up to their verbal agreement with the plaintiff unless he gave them an additional consideration therefor. and live up to it as thus accepted. or he could pay the price asked. but he did the same thing a second time. Between the two acts there is no difference in law. namely. as we have seen.000 on that agreement. then. with the very persons who had refused to live up to their original agreement because it was verbal. by intimidation. .There must. But when his sense. Article 1265 of the Civil Code tells us when duress exists: “Consent given by error. and. be a distinction to be made between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment. he may accept benefits under the contract. The defendants having refused to fulfill the second verbal agreement and having refused to give him credit for the . it has. If it is within the first class it is not duress in law. It provides: Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation. and go into court for relief. if he did not comply with defendants’ demands. leaving out of account the conclusions drawn and stated in the brief of counsel? Summing up the whole case under these facts. and we have already disposed of that of deceit. He took no receipt showing the purpose of the payment. He ceases to exist as an independent entity with faculties and judgment. But having paid it. He could refuse to pay again for the right which he had paid for once. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. but.

and we do for the purposes of the present discussion. there was a refusal to fulfill and the plaintiff.800 for the recovery of the properties described in the original conveyance remaining unsold. duty to comply with their promise — to reconvey the premises on the payment of the debt he owed them. if one he ever had. It is an offer to make a new contract. with having ratified and confirmed all that was done. of itself. stand absolutely uncontroverted and undisputed. He is still free to act as he pleases. astounding as they are. There was a simply refusal to comply with the terms of a contract unless plaintiff did certain things. and with having wailed and renounced his right of action based on intimidation. payments. But. This time he succeeded. There is nothing in this which can produce intimidation. Instead. Before entering upon this branch of the case it is necessary to correct certain errors into which counsel for the plaintiff appears to have fallen in their brief. A threat to refuse to comply with the terms of a contract without an additional consideration is not. . we see that there was no intimidation in law. Still there was no receipt. to obtain the very thing which had been the subject-matter of these prior verbal contracts. He was free to resort to the courts at the first refusal of defendants. and settlements and readjustments between the parties after a breach of contract whereby the person injured by the breach pays an additional consideration to the person breaking it in order to obtain a fulfillment. Again. There is nothing which can engender a wellgrounded fear of imminent and serious injury to person or property – which destroys volition and chains the will. he has still a refuge from the evil threatened’ he still remains free to secure the same redress which every other person can obtain who is injured by a breach of contract.000. still we believe that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover on the record. it stands corroborated and undenied in spite of unusual opportunities afforded to the defendants of correcting it in any particular in which it may have been distorted. If we accept these as facts. If a threat to refuse to live up to a contract is equivalent to a threat of imminent and serious injury to the person or property of the other contracting party.000 paid. The recital of woeful abuse which constituted the plaintiff’s complaint might stagger the credence were it the mere version of a litigant. By his delay and his subsequent dealings with the defendants he has not only given them the opportunity to charge that his conduct casts grave doubts on the truthfulness of his allegations. There was no relation of trust of confidence. He can still exercise judgment and will. words have lost their meaning and language its significance. but there was no threat of imminent and serious injury to his person or property. were obtained and procured by means of intimidation. together with all the other acts of the plaintiff which militate against his interest. and his chances for obtaining the relief sought would have been far better than they are now. overdrawn or misrepresented by the plaintiff. to establish new relations. disputed or contradicted by his opponents. intimidation. however. nothing but the naked word that had twice before been repudiated. and acts referred to and to have renounce the right o interpose the defense which intimidation originally offered him. nor does it mean that he was not dealing at arm’s length with the defendants. he entered into a third agreement under which he paid them P15. with a statement from the one making the offer that he will no longer abide by the old contract. no writing. Breaches of contract are the commonest cause of litigation. even though it should be found that the execution of the conveyance of the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties and the payment of the consideration of P6. There was a lack of sense and judgment. It may be admitted that plaintiff was in an unfavorable position. On the payment of the fourth consideration he secured in black and white the title to the property which had so eluded him. but he also laid himself to open accusation of having compromised with his enemies. But still the agreement was verbal.800. are also common. paid a fourth consideration of P6. They owed him nothing but the naked legal.P10. Under the heading “Statement of facts” counsel say: The facts upon which this action is based. Every person who makes a contract assumes the risk of a refusal to comply. His acts in general not only contradicted the most material portions of his testimony. that the efforts he made to extricate himself therefrom entailed no consequences. We never have understood that such arrangements were voidable for intimidation. That does not mean. as he ultimately did. but there was no imminent and serious injury threatened to his person or property. for the tried time. Such an act does not put the other party in the power or under the control of the one making the threat. but he must be held to have ratified the conveyances. or by a single witness or document offered in their behalf.

Villa. they point to the fact that the only receipt introduced in evidence by plaintiff to substantiate his claim that he was paying interest and not rent shows upon its face that it was a receipt of rent. to his acts in assisting defendants to procure the registration of their titles not only to the lands described in the original conveyance but also to those which plaintiff claims they obtained from him by threats and intimidation. the three defendants. As further corroboration. They testify that the conveyance of the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff and for a consideration regarded at the time as adequate in each cae. however. They deny that he sold the properties to Judge Jocson and to Garchitorena as owner. after all of the alleged wrongful acts of the defendants. deny the material allegations and testimony of the plaintiff. and in doing so our attention is drawn to the admission of counsel for the plaintiff in their brief where they say: “The recital of woeful abuse which constitutes the plaintiff’s complaint might stagger the credence were it the mere version of a litigant. they refused plaintiff’s request to reconvey to him and denied that there was any agreement to reconvey.Under the head of “Argument” counsel again say: With no dispute or denial of the shameful charges laid at the door of Villa and his wife by this plaintiff. to the fact that the plaintiff assisted them in obtaining Torrens title to those properties and that he did so after the defendants had repudiated his contention of the existence of a verbal agreement to reconvey. to his acquiescence for a period of six months after such repurchase before the present action was commenced.800 therefor. to his failure to act when he was ejected from the premises as a tenant. or that they influenced him one way or the other in any of the transactions of which he complains. admitted by the plaintiff. the plaintiff repurchased the remaining properties. They call attention to the inherent improbability of plaintiff’s story.800 therefor. Not only this. There are several other statement in the brief of similar character. or by a single witness or document offered in their behalf. We find in the record. to the fact that they obtained Torrent title thereto with the assistance of the plaintiff who testified to the absolute character of their title. disputed or contradicted by his opponent. again and again. They deny that they threatened plaintiff in any way. They deny the existence of the verbal agreement upon which plaintiff bases this case. the testimony of Felipa Silvestre. was an absolute sale and was intended as such by the parties thereto. evidence the fact. Not only do they in their oral declarations contradict the plaintiff’s testimony but there is a grave question whether or not the plaintiff is not bound by their testimony. or some of them. that they finally ousted him from the possession of the property and collected the rents themselves. paying them a monthly rental therefor. to the conveyances of the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties for considerations expressed. and some of them testified to facts demonstrating. to his acts which contradict his words. to support this denial. the unreliability of the testimony of the plaintiff. They assert that plaintiff occupied the premises after such sale as a tenant. called by him by virtue of section 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They declare that the sale of the 22d of March. if true. They deny that he paid interest and assert that he paid rent. and while their testimony was not introduced by the plaintiff. it was offered by the defendants and accepted as evidence by the court with the consent and agreement of counsel for the plainful. They were his witness. counsel for appellant seeks strenuously to avoid the issues of duress. but refer to it simply to call attention to the possibility that section 355 may have its penalties as well as its rewards. paying a consideration of P6. but allege that he acted as their agent in doing so. “and we necessarily recur to the fact that the defendants did contradict plaintiff not only in their oral testimony but by the documents and documentary evidence introduced by them. We do not find it necessary to decide this question at this time. They point to the record showing that. 1909. but declare that the purchase price was paid to them with the exception of certain sums paid to the plaintiff on their behalf. . or that they intimidated him. and in this connection they again invite consideration of the fact that. by word or by letter. Counsel for defendants on this appeal challenge the truthfulness of plaintiff’s testimony when confronted by the denial of the defendants and a history of his own acts. but defendants point to the absolute nature of the conveyance of the 22d of March 1909. and. to his repurchase of the properties described in the original conveyance remaining unsold and his payment of the consideration of P6. Maria Guia Garcia. to his acquiescence for a long period of time. They deny that plaintiff received any of the purchase price of the properties sold to Judge Jocson and Garchitorena. These witnesses. and Simeon A.

or at least one of them. C. that “the action of nullity is extinguished from the moment the contract may have been validly confirmed. for plaintiff.800 for a conveyance of the properties described in the conveyance of March 22.” The first rejection of plaintiff’s claims of the existence of the parol agreement in connection with the conveyance of March 22. By his repurchase of the remaining properties in April. however. took no part. and this time in writing. Not only this. the plaintiff assisted the defendants in obtaining Torrens title to the very properties which he claimed to own and which he now claims he had been deprived of by intimidation practiced by the defendants. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed. plaintiff continued his dealings with the defendants.. 1913.. Taking the case as a whole. being aware of the cause of the nullity and such cause having ceased to exist. but also the very transaction by which he recovered it. That claim was again rejected in the same year when the Salsipuedes property was conveyed. selling them the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties. he accepted everything as it stood at that time and elected to take from the defendants a conveyance of the remaining properties as a final termination of all their relations in connection therewith. 1909. . Carson.. after having been deprived of property by intimidation. to recover that property through a voluntary agreement between him and those who intimidated him. if there was. Johnson and Trent.” while article 1313 provides that “confirmation purges the contract of all defects which it may have contained from the moment of its execution. J. the plaintiff has placed himself in a position where he was not entitled to urge it as a defense. concurs. and by paying them P6. 1909. but after such rejections. dissents. and then repudiate not only the transactions in which he was deprived of that property. article 1309. In spite of these rejections. occurred in June or the last part of July of 1909 when the defendants refused to sign an instrument presented to them by the plaintiff putting in written form the alleged verbal agreement. J. Arellano. concur in the result. Torres and Araullo.Returning to the question of ratification and renunciation. without costs in this instance. It shall be understood that there is an implied confirmation when. the person who may have a right to invoke it should execute an act which necessarily implies his wish to renounce such a right.” and article 1311 declares that “the confirmation can be made either expressly or in an implied manner. as we view the law.. JJ. remaining unsold. the Civil Code provides. So ordered. apparently assenting to their right to eject him as tenant from the Ermita properties. we are therefore of the opinion that there was no intimidation and that. JJ. It is impossible.

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